USSBS Report 74, The Reduction of Wake Island

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 74, The Reduction of Wake Island

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The ReductionofWake Island


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Reduction.o f

W al(e Island


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"This report was written primarily for the use a t the ,S, trategicBombing urvey inthe preparntion O t fur ther reports of Itmore om-prehensive natura. ~\_uy couclnsion 0" opinions e-pl-essed in thi sreport must be considered uslimited to the specific muterial covered nndus subject to furthel ' interp re tu ti cn i ll the l ight of fl l~ ther s tudiesconducted by t ile urvey."

'rbe United Stutes tro.l .egic Bombing urvayWItS e !l tILbl ish d by the Ilor etnr y of WI1" OIl 3November 1944, pursuan t to " Direc ive from thelut-e P resid 'nt Roosevelt, I mission wa to con-duct un Impurtial and expert study of the effectsof ow' nerinl attack on Germllny, to be used ineonnectlon , ,, it ll nil ' a ttacks on Japs. l and to estab-lish iL bas is fo r Ilvn luat il lg the importance andpotentialities of air power as an ins trument ofmilitary stl'fltegy, fo


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INTRODUCTIONAgflinst all of these enemy bn ,the aeeial of-fansive in its IiI"St pln ,was d igned to destroJthe enemy 's off nsivepower . Once the bases wer e

bypassed, tllut oiJensi"e,in itssecolld phnse,soughtto maintai n th ei r neut ralizatio n and to enforce1J,l1i , . isolution 1,y aeriul blockade, Itwa s hopedthat unremitting uttacks would gradllally under-mine Japanese rnornle and induce sur render with-out,the necessity of costly invasion.The over-ali purpose of the survey condueted bythe :'IInrsllalls-GilbBrts-New Britain Party was,therefore, tos tudy the pl-ogl' ie development ofthe Allied s t rategic plan a it affected til targets,More speci fi ca lly, the pal ty und rook to inves ti -gate the eHects of our a ir a tt acks wit lt r efe rence,

not only to phl' i ea l damage inf li cted but also tothe direct and ind irect con equen OIL militaryins ta ll at ions, r pai r and main tenance f ac il it ie s.and food st ocks. Not t he least part of its p urposewas to study the effect of .. ria 1 attacks UpODenemy morale und to chart the progressive sappingo:f t 1 1 ( 1 Bllemy 's will t o r e si s t.In assembli ng th e material fot the present re-port, the Mlirs]"JJ.1 -Gilberts-New BriHliu Party,

immediately after the Jtlpllnese surrender, visitedeach of the ta.rget "rea uud conducted a fieldexamination. 1'01' purl' of thi investigationthe pa,rty was organized into five fact-finding cl iv i -sions "S follows:r. Mili ta ry and . . "a ,' o/ tud ie ViI'; ion.-Thisdivis ion was couceruad peimn cily wi h the tacticsof he air attack proper. he operational factorsin vclved. and the over-all e.tfed of th e a tta ck U p OIlJapanese ope ra tion und the . Inpunese s tmteg icplun,IT. Physical Damage Dh'is ;oll .-This divis ionwas eonce ruad speei fi eu lly with the dumnge i ll -

t l icted upon ,J,.PIlTIllSe gl 'Ound iIlSt,Ll!fltiolls of IIdofensive churueter.III. Transportatio Diehm>. - This divisionstudied (Jill xt ent to which .Jap an es tmnsportand eonununicutious w re impui t J 1)"our aerialattacks and Ih burden imposed on the Japunel'edefenders in their at(empt (0maintain their- sys-

t m in work ing 0 1 - . ; 1 " , ' .IV'. .d rea Stud] Did.4cm.-Tlllil division pnidsplltiul ntteutiou to dnmuze 'infl icted upon such

As part of this over-all plan the J\fu hu Ils-Gilberts-New Britain ]'"rl:y of t he United late.St rn tegic Bombing nl'vey was organ ized ill ' p-tember H145, under the leadership o f Brig. Gen.Lewie G. l Ie l' l' it t, SMC, commanding rr eneml ofthe Thir d M"ri .l le Air WiJlg. 'Phi pnl~") '1'0 as-s igned the task of examining five speei fi e i sl andm'euS-'Wllke Jslnml, and ,Votje, Jnluit, 1IJJloe]aj),and Mille . .. I. tolJs in the lLll"Shall I slands , whereCGl-(."Ul nil' compcuenta of the Anuy, NH'Y, and?!llrine C O J' ps o f the United States only , had beenbrought to bear. In addi tion, it was giv en titere sponsibi li ty of surveying condi tions n t Rabau lon New Bri tain Island in Ilhe Bismarck Archipel-ago, I lgniI)st which the combined effor t of cer tainr u t ' units of the nited tares, Au tralia, 3]1(1 wZenland had operated,

Inthe early s tages of the war, Wilke, togethe rwith the above-mentioned Marshall I slunds, werecenters of considerable .To,pollliSestrength, Theirpossession nnd continued development by the JnP:auese presented a ve:ry defi nite thrent t o Al lledforces oper at i. ng in the South and Southwest Pa-cine Oeenn Arens, Itwus well within estimateden emy eapnbilities to utilize t he se < lt ol l a s stllgw


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muintenance facilities us machine shops , repa irshops, power p lant s. wuter d ist il la tion uni ts andfood s tock , and in nddit ion, t abulated casual ti esinf licted upon the defending forces.V. Tile ,I!tn'ole Did.;;oll.-"(Jnder the directionof 1\ medical oll ieer . rhis dir i ion inres tignted the

C)V r- ul l pol iri ca l and mora le e !f ect o f the a ir a t-tuck find attempted to assess the effect of thebombing upon eivil inn and military health.In nddi tion t o stu dying the physi cal videnceu llor ded by the tel 'm in . each of the working d ivi -ions utilized tile operations orders, netion Mlportsnnd wur d in t i es of the .A. rmy, Ynvy, nnd lIILrine

Corp of t he Uni t ed I.ates and Allied 11 nits, whichhud conducted ope ra tions ag~ inst t il e nssignedareas. Jupan"" " r ecords wer e. fo r the moo par t,not avu ilnb le , hav ing been dest royed before theurrender of the garrisons, A large pnrt of theinfo rmati on included i n t his report , however isthe r u lr o f intensive intercogataou of . Jupanesemilit ary and naval p rsonnel in the areas tudi ed .The present report reHects the f indings and out-l ines the conclusions , of the f iveworkingdivi ions.In the interest of clari ty, t he findings for eachtarget-are. have been presen ted i ll narra tivefashion and In asbrie. t s cope aspos sible, The up.porting evidence is appended in theannexas wh ichform he bulk of the report.Tile personnel of the Mm-shlllls.GUberl;s-New

Britain Party was us f0110\08:CHIEF OF PARTY

Brigadier General Lew is G. MERRITT, U MTAFF

Executi \'eOfficer-Colonel ~!n.rion r....AWON,U J\[CIntelligence Officer-lfajor C. L. 1'. GABLEllUSMCR 'MedicoJ. Officer--Colnmnndel' John W. KOErf(UO), UNAdj ll tant and a rv iee Office r- II II I' ran t Office rHarryO. HORT,I1, S ro n

HJM])Q ARTER' E '1 '1 01 1'Warmllt Oil ie s t Hnrry . HORT,IT, i\I RMaster Te hn.ic~l Sergenut R. R. :i\u\RTIN Jr., MOR, mot" NCOOlerk- tllllographerTechnical ergeant P. R. BRI KMAJ.'l" UOH-Clerl{-Typist ' ,Corporal R. L. FLU,L, ilICl t-Driver

Pr ivate Fi rst C lnss J. D. KEARNEY, USMOR-Clerk-Typist

EDITORIAL ECTIOCaptain R. H. GRIFFIN, USMORCaptain G. A. CRAIG USMCRTechnical Sergeant D. W.HARDIN, US:i\ICR--Clerk- tanographer

Privata First Closs D. D. SELLERS, MCR-Clerk-TypistINTELLIGENCE, RCTION

Major C. L. T. GA.BLER, lISMCRSecond l ..ieutenunt G . H . WILLIAMS, USl ' l ICRtalf SergelUlt F. R. COLBERT, ;\iCRergennt W. '. PAY ON, U xr o

PHOTOGRAPB10 EOTIONMll.jor C. L. 1'.GA BLEB, U ~rCRPhotographer- Mote 3d Class W. B. CILUIBER ,USlI'RPhotogr apha r Mate 3d Cl! l1 lSN. D. aOR:i\IA.N,1'RPhotographer Uote 3d Class B. J. C RTIS,US~"'R

.!.\.REA STUDIES DIVISIONMajor C. L .. T. GABLER, MCRLieutenunt N. E.1'F[ORT ..AK SON , Nll-In.terpretarFirst Lieutenant M. M. SUTHERLA.N"D,UlIrR

j.\ITLITARY AND NAVAL STUDIESDIVI,'3ION

Lieutenant Colonel L. B. ROBERTSru. wUSUO 'lIrajor 1V.B. FlA.GENAF[, U, ~fCRi\ f ll.!01' ItE. liTTON,U liteRMaJO)!W. H. POlYELL, U MCRC~ptnin E. A. T. WILLIA1IfS, U ~1CRLlfilll:en'mt (junior' gnde) P. S .GILMAN, U NR-Interpreterergeant C.H .D NIGAN . J I . , . ~o[CR---Clerk.tenograph",.Yeoman 2d Clnss R. G. CARNITJI.A US1\'R-lerk t..l1ogrnpller 'Yeoman3d lass N. J. RAI rs, SNR-Clerk-Typist

MORALE DIVISIONCommander J.W. KOETT (MCj, USN

2

Lisutenunf (junior grude) Henry GARDINER,SNR--Intel'pr tel"Private First Olsss J. D. SH.;.\.V\ S~


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPO{Ifl-Jnt rod ueti on - - - - - - - -- -- -- - - - -- - - -- - --- - - 1

I. Geographical Description --__ 5U. The Development of Jnpanese ~ treugth on Wake:A. The J,lp,me"e S t ,: n te g ic P l lU l _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ 5

B. The Development on the Base (10-12--43)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ IIill. The .\.mericnn o!r""~i"e:

A. The Pattern of 1 1 m CnmpniJ;,. 'T1 J.gnillst Wllke _1. ThQ Ph", _2 . The American Forces Ava ilab le A""inst 'Yoke3. TIle Development of the ALt:lck__- = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =4. Tn ti und Operational Limitations _

B. The Results o f the C"1111):Ji~'T1Ag>LinstW a k e = = =1 . The De t ruet iou of - Iapanese Air PO\l-"' _'1 - Bombim- EII'eets

.u, Cfl~ll,dties _ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = - - - - -. A.:nti~\_i,cl"ILftnd COils11l1 Defellses____ _ -----e...Auxcilinry Defense Facilities = _ = = = = = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -d. Bench Defense __ _ ------------------i ~~g:~~~-~:~:~~~=~~:~::~~~~~~~~~~:::i, Some-Notes (}J] OICllIIU1CL __ ==------------------------------------j- Overall ]~trec:tivetJess ------------------------------------3 . The - Iapunese P r o b l e m of S u p p 1 . y _ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --k -Iupunese llellHh lind Iorule ------------------

; r u f m ~ : f ~ : ; ~ : ~ ; ~ : ~ ! ~ , , : = ~ - - . : : - = : : _ - = = - _ ~ : : ~ - ~ : ~ : : : : : : ~ : : : : - = : : : : ~ : : ~ :IV. Conclusions ------------------------------------------------ -------------------- ---------- ~- ------- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ANNEXE S

A. J-tdministTatiOJl ------ -____________________ __ PallOB. Wake I land __ --------------------------- 25

S etion 1. . r ;;~~~:: ' l~i~~--------.---------------------------------__ __ __ __ 29~ t ~ ~ ~ ;~ ~ h ~ - = = = ~ ~ ~ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ~ = = = = = = ~ ~Dmw ings ----- ------- 66Tub]oo --_~~-~_--_------------ ---------------------------------- 111- - - - - - - - - - - 1 9 1- - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - -

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101011111213B1-l1415] 5151 51 61 6171718t!)1920212122

THE REDUCTION OF WAKE ISLANDMARSHALLSGILBERTSNEW BRlTAIN PARTY

I.GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTIONWake Island. located lit 19 degrees , 1 minu te snorth lat itude, l ind 166 degrl le s. 36 m in ut es e ll tlongitude, l ies 3()'!, miles ncr th -northwesf of Po-kaakku Ato ll , the northe rnmost , o f t1'6 Marshal l

I slands . Properly all atoll, Vi' n,ke cons.islisof threecorul islets with II. connecting 'reef Itnd occupies u.nI ll :elLabout 4 miles long by 2 .n miles wi de. ThethJ."el).slets, Wake, Peale, and.Wilkes, are arrangedin It rude V o s h a p e d po.ttern concI\!e toward thnorthwest.WIl .ke, huges t o f the th r oo i slet s, has maxim urnlengths o f approximately 15,700 feet i ll !l north-south d ir ect ion and 15,800 feet ill a north west -southeast d irect ion. It s g rentes t wid th , meusur din it northwes t d ir ec tion f rom Peacock Poin t tot he lagoon i s 6,300 f: eet . The d imen ion of thtwo smaller islands , Peale and,WiLl ,os are respec-t iv el y 7 ,8 00 feet by 3 .100 f ee t am i 7.6.50 feet by1,800 feat, T1,eis lets are generally level illsurfaceconfigurution and form 11 GQl'111 t ab le lnnd with nnave rage e leva tion of 12 foot. Mn,,-:imum nuturn)el ev at ions do not exceed 21 feet, Th e fl' ingingand connect ing reef i sgen", rnJly a te p-r o. here sconsist of discontinuous benches of coral sand sep-arated bv boul der beach s und ski ps o f bare coralrock . The cornI i sl et s. tog-ethe r wi th the reef onthe northwest side of the atoll, enclose u 1""0011having maximum dept hs of 1 01.5 Iutbom in itsnorthwestern portion. A nntuml channel deep-ened by dredging, axists between Wilkes and WIlkeIslets and is navignble by beats unr l by ships Ill'to lit least 95 tons.Highcl' porti ons of the islets are ccvered by atui"h' heavy gl"Owth of - umbre ll a t rees. s crubbrush , v ines , und grf ls se s, al thcugh the so il i s t) '111and poor. In spite of the filet thllt min fuII isreasonubly "bunrlnnt. amounting 0 some 34 inchespel"year, the siZI1S and configuration of the i1 a~d sand the porous nature of the eeral rock undei-lyingt he urface have not , p ermit ted the fermutio n offresh watm' S~I"e>tmS o r ponds. Prin . ipnl SOUl' e of:fresh water is rainfall, although wells , dur ingra iny seasons a re capab le of p l 'o d llC il l l; l" 11 limitedamount. Tho groulldw,ttel" table, IL L ,t deepestpoint on the h ighe r port ions of WIlke , i s ub IL depthof approxima te ly 12 f ee t. El sewhere it . is shul-

lower .nd prob ab ly uvernge ome i feet through-out the rnblelnnd "r ou_ of the i slet s.Approximate distances in I IU U t iC U J m i le s fromWa.ke 10 key Pucifie hn es nre ShO"'1 in the 1 '01 -lo,,-ing !.tlble:

i U & P . pl ?e nT 'l B . .rlmr~ 1,00:1i\fldwns _~ ~ . ~ 1,028Yok(lllnmn ~ ].720-8u[p nn ... ~ 1,200Guurn ~.:UOMfliCl]S 700'l'r"1< ~ 1,100Ponupe ._______________ 860KW.,j~ll In .__ W . . . oWoUe 63li~lal"e'.p _ 870JOlull ~ B O ORub"'" __ _ USOII. THE DEVEIOPME T OF JAPANESESTRENGTH ON WAREA. Tbe !apanese Slrlliegic PI""Wake Island WlIS cue of th e objectives of t heinitial Jnp nssnult of 7 December 1941, and, , .Rera heroic deferu e by Cnited tutes ilioliJles undcivilian workers, cupitnlated on 211December. Inthe fo llowing" yea r. the muin American e ffort inthe Pacific Wu devoted to reinforcing its remain-ing bases und I' pelling fu rther ' Jap'lll e e~_'pan.sionto the east. so uth. and sout heast. Japanese possession of \l lIk wa therefore virt ually unchul-l enged. The i sland ,,":IS hit in late Junuury 1942.when an Ameri can cu rd r fOI'Ce s truck at J"'p[U)eseoutposts in t he G il be rt u nd 71 1"1 "5h3. 11 5 but, for themost par t. the .Inpunese were lef t alone to developth",i,.new'l)' won base und muke plans for its futureuse,Tho original Jnpi l l le:>e p lnu fOI" '1""k. HI"" notyet wholly den,'.' They seem, however, to havebeen extensi y(] :llId to huve been inf luenced. f ir st ,by tJle islanci's favorable position and, second, byIComp'ttcl lcnowloogco or J:liI)lLn~C .t,rnl~i~ plll_l'IJ Wltil ['c=.~ lQ

'Wtk4!"w m be J)bDb~ oflb Whl lln thl! n.Cl)rd1 LnImpcr.al Hmdqu~1tCl\IIII.rr m . w : i - c IlvaUllbl tit Amtlrt~ft ret ;ear- cheQ A.ny rordJ ""1:I1c:hMqbll"~ been II, p 1 1 Wa_kie.ItRll \U~~ dt.- .iro,rt.od herOn! ~ JapILIICRIU r1 lLm The ddmnt~ of J f ) f r o. J@ il:lh:ntJonl P 1KO t .. d . II .0 0 ~ U.bid.ed on ph) :& ......df,:n~ txh tinil l In lhl ! ' rorfJtor nul .! l ind mmal"}lnnnllllUon!! eed (;Inlh~ : n mC OJ, o'r I!I i "" lt d mi ll ~ P atOf tr. le lre:rLUIoling on the- bliind. h L lb oo 1d ~ nOim. t.hrkL no:nJ! at the tiEfkll!-nIf .l u~ lI o.Ei~1 admiUm. h ." It l g ~I">" " Oil W...kl l !p: rlr~lr to De-el l! l llbr.r 1 'D.t .l ! ,.~nct tblbt no unt i ;on J l "nrolln~ Win!' ""IIU."hlol!! lor 11:I~rmit6t!Dn.

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the continued success of .Inpanese arms in lO,l,lllndmost of 19,1.2. 'Vhe" it passed into .Tllpllnesecon-trol, Wake had became the base nearest to Midwayand th Hawaiian Islands. In any .Iapnnese ad-vunee toward these holdings, it, would have animportant role.

s rt ainly the -I npanese were think ing in 1V,l .2ill t erms of 11 continued offensive, l ind their f ir stcon ideration, in planning for Wllke.WaS Ihe build-inu of ldormidnble nil ' establishment there. Exist-iu g ev idence indicates that the i sland wus to bedeveloped I\S n point o j orig;n, a stag ing bas . 0/'both, tm' b( )w'b;ng a!lt/cks aga/I!J!I ;l1idway,~ Mornover, 6 : J l 1 e '1 l";ve aeria l I'erlOmloms( w" s \\'ell pl'ovido;d ~.itb {,lcltOJIl~'" fa ' il il i . the,. ., ,se\ 'l ,d~~ce to Hullett te th" tsome, lit l en"l . o f these fll "h(les were 1I0t used,The six II "ble ~:;,uon g al lo n I !" H so li ll 1) tOl'nge~'LHI(" \l'e!'e coye,red with s.mel. (lnd it is appal'llnlLhn,j, t 'he .Tapnnese n t I Cl ls t contemplated (]leh' em' S ( l1 I ' b e lo -w . Ann~X B. ~Uoil 1. lnturolo.flitJon, Tokud l l. que - - .l I ti on :rI.J 4 0 S ! ' _ , 1 : J e I , f t w .Annv!lt B . S i ! '( ] U u n 1. JT.lLoi!r"I:I ~lItt{lln. T o k u d l 1 o . qU9tton ' 2 L t

ployment . The re i s no ind ioot ion, however, tha tthe 'pier fuel pumping un i ts ware ever u,sed todeliver bulk shipments of fuel to the Island,Rather, i I lppe.us that fuel deliver ies were inter -mitten and no t up to thei r expectations. thepeak of Japanese operatiennl s tren!! th on 'Wake in!larly 194.'1, the following mel stores were onhaud:ll To..

HOMotor ll"""llne -------- l2QO~~::oo~t~~~lne= = = = = = = = = = = = S - " 1 lTh e main Americnn power p luut was located onWiLke I sland nea r the < l oc k a t Wilkes Channel,

This p lant , o f f rame co n truction and corrugatedsteel roof, housed two boil ers. It was dumagadduring the Japanese 11 nult but W[lSllLt~r l'llp!lin:dand put to use by them. Power suppl ied by thisuni " ' ' ' S supplemented ear ly in 19B by new Jap-anese construction. Theil ' centra] power plant wasn lurge reinforced concrete structure, locn~ed in thenorth tst r n ect ion of " '[I ke T land, housing threel25 -ki]owo.tt g.nemtol 's. upplemental p oweruni ts wer e I oca ted outhe two other i sl ands , Three30-kilowatt g e l1 e rn to L ' S w e re di parsed on PealeI sland, and 1;"0 or three of tni same model gen-erntor were used on "lYiIl,es Ishmu,12All of the bnse facil it ies enumerated above werelinked b" n ;n~U-de\' el[)pecl road net, The v eryl le :u ,jyl~\ .1 topography of Wilke I sland and thezene ra!xce l le l loo of urfnee dra inage presen tedfew problems of road const ruct ion. The locat ionof roads was dictated primarily by considerationof service and defen IIneeds. Tile .Inpanese inher -ied from the Am,,';CIID "good coral-surfncedroad around the islands, and had. in addition, abri ,l!!C counection bet '" II Wake und PooleIsl !1l~ds. They "Lo uppl emented this ex ist ingroad sy" tem with ,U I extensi~e ,nelwor~ or secondtil'.\' !IIlel connecting ronds. A. I ts maxImum de'l' ,e l.opment, the .Tl lpnnese rand system on, '1"nke mcJuded 16 1 1 1iles 0 ' 1 ' p " i J m l ~ Y , 'o"ds , 6 mI le s of S e ~ ontirll ',r roads .lIlt! ('1'O ,col1necti0I1S-11 tol;1I of2 2 m i le s >' s,," 'itLl"usped to defensiw! in~l"lI[ltiol1s. the .Jup-"III'S(! were not SO fO I 't u nn t o" l imy had been lDhill) cuse of the "bo"c facil it ies, n[ld Lhy fell 111mto ,'er'{ little ..I.llIeric:llI equipment thai was opemlioll ll l: Only 'foul ' wOl 'klLhle gun were le.n on theisllll1d nt the tim of t,he.Juplllle5eO('CL\pntmn-twoUSCI: !be l( lW, Ar.mu D. ~

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5in"b coastnl defanse j:!'U1IS nt Peacock Point , andtwo 3inch guns nt Heel Point." The building ofa st roll/! defensive ystem, therefo re, became aprime necessity. and the - Inpnnese mild" e,'e,y ef-fo rt to nccomplisn this tusk in the 12months whichfollowed rh if ini tial 1.l Ilding. At th end of theperiod. and ut its point 1) maximum e f f eclh '(>ncss ,the coustul lind nnt i -ni re rnf r defenses of Ihe islandwere II follows:IS.. toasL defense 20 em, inch, loeuted an Wakeand Pen le Islunds,

4 'O..lit defense 15em,!! iuch.Jocatsd on WnkeIInd Pellie llihlnds,twin mount 12,7 em. fi inch Ai,. locnted OnW"ke Island.unt i-tank 1:! "01, ....5 inch, located On Wilkeand Wil~"" Islands.

.j. em. 3.2 inch .\ .1.. lees I dILL Peacock Point,1 d n ul purpose i


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w u.ys re se mble d P IIT Combat . .ur Pa tr ol , but doesnot seem to h O I . " ' '' been flown con tinuall y day o rlIigh!. The comiugof the f ighters perhaps ref lects,a lso, a growing reul izarion on the .part o f the Japunese that Wilke wm;, in the future, topiay a purelyd..fe;nsive role in Pncilic stmtegy.Replacement p lane , both bomber and fighter,inTi ved infr eq uen tly a fter the beginn ing of 19;1.3.

TIle maximum number of planes b as ed a t ! kn l" r im eon 1Yak" wus between 56 and 60 a irc raf t, with, IIbomber -f ighter ra tio of two to one .a> This peakwns reaehed ill April 11143,just before Americn:n.bombing go t under way. F ly ing per sonnel , a t itsm ax im um .. s ee ms to have rnried betwe!!n 20 0 and250 officers and men.There i s some evi dence fpc the bel ief that, the.J apenese contempla ted a combined Army and

Nay): ~rr ison of approximntely ;1:,400, exclusive of Rnation perrs01l1le J.~. Ifhis were so, these plansalso fell short o f r ea li za ti on . . At tb im e o f A d -:mirnJ Sakaibara's UITh 'u i on the ialand illDecem-ber 19!2, the re was un approxima te tota l o f 2 ,700Japanese personne l on the i5111 .11d-l ,000 Navytroops; 600 Army troops, 1,000 N"n"yPionasrs and100 f1ymg personnel, Thi.s number was augmented~m 6 " 1 1 " " hilt by the a,'riml of t h! l f ig ht et c o u t i ng en tm e.arl~ ~943"but the Island Commnnd@r's requestforadditionn.lground troops was not granted until-Innunry 1944, when 1,000 .A.rmy troops arrived.". The d isp os ition and use s of the a vi at io n f nc H i_ "ne s and 1 ! ! ' 0 , , ; n ~ troops on Wake were complicatedby B .'"latrvely lDel\icient command sat-up. -Vi1 lerl l -u~ bot h na~' nl nnd nirfpr~es and II. joint Arm.y-Na.vy .garr lRon were responsible for the defenseof the island, the Isl:md Command",," had authorityt~ command only the joint ground 10roes . 1>bvalmr forces. operoting- under an l\,jl Comm~uderWake. were compJet.",ly outside the Island C _mender' . . r .. om. . S junsc ienon, being responsible to the AirDlnSlon Com.D" lnnder nt Roi on J{wnjnJein. Thus, ,:1though-as the chart helow slwws-both .avi"'~twn Itn.d.gl"Oundforces op. raterl Unrlcr thI!O""I"-",llSU~el"V~!llOnf the FOilrth Fleet at Truk, on 1 ' \ '"kGhI.and I tself there was nodO'e MO ' t beth ~ ~. pera lOll tWeenose fprces. and the Ialund COlnmanh"5O.both . .u:I llYnnd ~n ..yland -bltsed bombe'"1; im. I USEed the is]n.nd. In thelleriod December 19,1,3-Uay 19,J,.~,n estilllate totalof f i n n oorties WeN' flowll aj!llinst the island. drop-

Air Col!lmnndr I(Wn~B)

jaland (lomm,!" d""(Wake)

:t " II I"ftDrdrc . I I I _U&! :: : b wiLL b@ . rt luml : l 1 5t cd i I n t . h _ ' tab.le f ir , \ nnr,X 0":S~tkl'n .(i. . T.WM nl, ~r: t IV.11

ArmyN8:l'"" Gur:rl:gon(Wilke)N'nval .Alr Forces(Wilke)

By the end pf 1943the J' "apanese had made con-siderable prog ress wi th the development of t hebose lit Wo.ke. The island, however, did no t b e . -come" poten t fnctor in the r ea li za tion of the opt i-mistic s tmtegicnl thinking which WaS apparent n tthe beginning' of ehe previous yen!:",for the follow"ing l"IlUHO!l8:First, it WnS woefu lly short in bombing planes,and" thus, handicapped in . se r-v ing as ' In ini tinlpoint f ur any forward thrust ,Second, it lacked p atro l plan es and o ther aircm it

su i table for scou ting . T it ; s r ed n ee d m l1 .t o: n: ially its' el fe c ti v a ne s s l lg a in s t .AmeriOOll sh i pping.. TMrd, it was never equipped with propur rad ioinstallatdons to giva so.tisractory S8l"ViCIIICSa 1isten-Ing post,~he defensive ability of the island mrs jeopardized-c-Z : i 1 1 I t , by a serious deficinnc:y of f ig ht er p la ne s

whi eh made !!I1Ieat;II resistunee impossible .Seaond, bya lack of suffi cien t g lms to form a wel lbnlan ced all-uround gl"siL le ~l\edhersioll of~.LIl}" consld.eJnble por tion of force a su inst n ,e!slm\d. " ,Yllh the in ibi"c ion nnel s,,~sfnl prog-

10


10/66

ente red its d il> e. The finG I aim ing glid e by Iud i-vidual planes begnn between 8,000 lind 4,000 'foolIIltitude.[ .Q 'n-I~v"l G Q 1 1 I M 1 1 g I \t tl lc ks w it h e oo rd in ll t. edst l' ll iing n ttacks mnde u high speed .UPPI:OIICl! tominimum al t i tude genernlly followmg l Inl11edi -!ltely ufter dive bombing attacks.All li"htel'S which were not paet of tlte escortf(I ')lIP c;"ducted st,l'ntillg nhend of aJJ , the!' t.I1)"of IIIrucks..J(I/I(lJje~~~ml/lter-lat)lh'1i2f1 employed in the dufeu"e of "Take land consisted of illtel'captionsand anti-nil'ul'lIft fire. Beeuuse of the luck of IUJ9~icient r ar lu r a ir w ar ni ng systllm, the inte rcept ionof oUI'heavy homher s tri kes was neve r very SIICcess ful, D nring the p eri 0 11 D ecem be r 1942 to 6October 1043, inte rcept ion \1'1\ attempted f om - tosi... times but, by tile tim e the .Jlip fighters wereairborne. nur bombers generally were overhesddropping the i r bomb loads . Consequently, ul l ow-ing for nil estimutad 5 to 10 minutes to ge t thefighte,'S ill the , L i J " they seldom were able to donnything' except chase the bombers 011 letil'emellt.Furthermore , because of the bombers ' s peed l indcoordinuted lire power , no fl ghter kills wereclaimed. Howeve r , if one heavy bomber was !ly.ing alone, the ,Japs found they could approachfuirly dose Jll'efel'flb ly u si J1 g 11 f rontal attack fromabout 11 o'eloek Or t o'clock. 01 1 the earlier intercaptions our bombers' armcr seemed to withstand.Iap attacks and for thllt reason the calibre of theirgu ns Il'~ s i1 creased,'L'11eighteJ' intercept,ion }lhase of,Jupanese de-

fanse was t e rminated 011 6 October 1043. a,l thiselate ,,11 ervicc..ble fighl'BI,s (bel~ween Hi and 20)took olY to iJltercll}li nn Americpn car rier s t, ,' l,e.Non e returnec1.3'F"om ihe standpoint of anf.;airQl",/t defense.the ,T.upanese considBl 'I ld American J1igh-nltiL~l.Ide

bombIng attacks I lIos t etTec~ive for two reasonS 'jint, b@tuusi l theai t 'craf t Ivcl'ecommonJy ut or )len"t I. ,e e J ! 'e c th ' c v O I ,t ic a l ' ~ l1 l ge o f J l 1p " ,n e s n l lel lvy ant i -IIU"CITI f~wcapons; and second, becftLIse the opcn V~Ol "m~t rOl l g,:mer" l1y a Sl imed by the pln)leS mndeIt (h t l lcul l for ( ; he , l u, p n n es e . to concen tr ate a l1etll'Y, 'oiume of lire all more than n 'fell ' btrget ail'crnft.. T he .J 'lp U ll C e l 'lXpeL"innCllc! d if f i .cul~y in combof 'LlIlg s [ , ,. i k es b y (,l1n'j"r based fI i'l.'Cl'aftbeenuse of LheS:i.io~l J t ~ l l J ' l ~lq,c. tlct . .nd lhtdr spprlll[lhJ:Jof ftur """0, II"'!!MII(I:r B~UQII I I I [) -: i! :B.n le r" ront lgn , Sn. lmibnm. QUt5Uon l 17~90 : Obh :;nMI" I . QU! .1: ! 1 ' lhh Cl'Jt'!ni!t!(on lie'" lhe IlaU!ment of AtlmlJti1Silkaiburo ,.tli l lil: - ~ t r u : : I " ~ . ~,nPI"IlIII..n.1Q r AnUlr lc( l1] t.netlelll : iTJIIIJ ' .r Il1llln_C""I1!:P~~lion I, J ll t~ rl r o 110OU! !" !. !WUi no wny or IilldlrlJ.!: ouL,/ AJ1on,,~ D.. . .

! )~ lfnn. SIknUjnrn. nu~t. IUJ 31,

12

ClLl'eflllutilizatiou oj' cloud coyer and 6UI1posi t ionby ihc America n pilots, f ind because of the eoordi-nation of s imultaueous ati-a 'ks on ,1iIl'er"nt tllrgeareas. The latter lind fl. tondency to disn: pt ant i -uircrn ft d fen s s ince the guns ould no be trav-e rsedl '11l ' i (Uy enough to c ov er a ll incoming air -craft,No difficulty "'[I encountered by lhe Jupanese in

n dj lls ti.n g " "I i- n i" cl'" ft fi 1" i I 1,0 di ve bombing IL ltucks. "It hough 110nircruf t was ever observed in IIdive of more than fHio. The Jupane e bel ieved ,however, tJmt plane such ns figbtel'S.llghler bomb-ers, lind rocket plnnes-c-in oven shallower dives-\VO[ll mo r e d i ll ic u lt toh it . Both henry and mediumant.i-aircmft uunners believed the steeper the divethe ballet the ~"rge t .OlThe i s land defenders experienced difficuIty ill

meet ing tr,,11llg a l il 1 .c k s a g a in s t their' gUll posi-t iolls. The exposed posit ion of the shell ml1.gazines011 the top of WI 2il mm gu n made these weaponsextremely ,'U lnern hie and, when 'IIit, the resulting0 . " 1 )10 i on geners lly killed most of the g un c re w,'V!'llEl1l,werhe weiding plune were nble to knockout the25 mmguns, asat Peaeock Point , the result-illg bomb domage in the immediate vicini ty wasgrlNl t ly jucren ed,Gel1el'ully spenkiug, Lha .Tn'lanese were handi-capped in lhair ant i -ui rcrnf t defenses by n l ack of

radar fire contro l, T nt ~ 'ldng or on t inuouslypoin ed fire was direc ed o n l y ugn ist seen turgets .Therefore, uirernff hidden by clouds und darknesswere not tal;: n uncler f il 'e ." On thl 'ee 01 foul' oeClI-s ions Wulm wns bombed tbrough !l soljd overcastw it h c on si d mbl resultant dalll llge.":i\lo thell) ,, ' gu"" were duu] pu rpOS e nncllmd tobe plllced ,l! '( )l ll1d the shoreline to repel possiblelandings, Dispe l ,S l t I , thel'efOl'B, wns of secondary

impol" tance . ~M"olline COllJl011 nnd l igh , Illllohilleguns ,,.el' I J ln c ed u r ol ln d the larger gllns so thatonl ' l t~1)e of wenpol'l could ru'e on one tlll'gtlt, wil l ie!lie o ~ l J er s w e r e e n g-H ir i ng [I s eC {l nc l. " 'h el l t tT lf el 'sl lnJ. bombel'S were I l t tolck;l1g sill1ltitnneou l:r, thetmtiaitcrnfi. gUlls wOll ld (he fit bh" bombe.s. whilethe ll1l1chine gllllS eng'nged th strA.fel'....IIA.rUIU: 0, S!!et ion 1 . J nt , . e . : r tOK tlUOn, Sl:llmibam. Q1;L


11/66

The rest a rrived sa falv. but the ir 9 rriva~ coincided with the b&ginning of the gdsy stTlke b!Task Force 14, With the spproaoh of the Amert CIUl fleet unit s, the J ap an es e A ir CommllJlderoroned nil his serviceable lighters, between 15and20. into the air. None returned. A few hourshllar . American ear ri r planes appeared over UII'i sl and. s tra fed the a ir st rip n t IlJl nltitude of 50.to1 0 fee t . and destr03'OO the total bomber eontm-gen t. W1len Task Fore 14r et ired. n fter hav inginflicted sentre dnmilge upon shore installntionsand th e facil it ies of the air field, there WIlS not asingle opemciona I plane lef t on the island,

Th e J~.pnn(le m nd s n ,I n t futile attempt to buildup thei r air streng th on Wake during Xovember1043. and some new planes were f lown in. In De -cember. h ow ev er , t he entire air complement, con-it ing solely of 10 BettyB f lew to Truk becauseth e s ituat io n 0 0 W IL ke w as be co ming extre melydi ffi cult and, i n addition beenu Q J"paneS(! airs treng th . in the en ti re Centml Pacific wa s hardpres sed and these p lanes were needed more ur-gently elsewhere." Aviation personnel remainingon Wa,k e " 'o s e va cu at ed in J nn ua ry H H4 .1 18A1tu December 1943, no n ir cmft were basedregularly On Wake. An oceasionnl plane would

visi t the il un d wi th Slip pl ie s or p ers on nel bat. .van thi s c ea se d n f te r .J u n e 1 94 4. In s h e r t, ~lIri.can air power had a.ccomplished its f irs t objectiveand. by dest roy ing J apanese aviat ion on WILkehad mude possible increasingly effec t ive Americar:a~acks on the island. In the future . Am rieanmr forces cou ld bomb the i sland with no f ea r ofair-~oir oppOSi t ion while surface fore couldnow mdulgem elo r an ge h o mb lL T dme nt w i th ,-il'-cual impunity.2. Bombi ll g E{j e( "t sDur ing the ~ months of. r a p a ne s e o c c uP a ti o n ofWake the gnrrrson on tha t i land w as s ubjec te d to

nto tnJ of 1.9 2 t ons of bombs, nnd SeV81'1l1 thou-Q ] ] r l l'OllDrlS of nav~l_gnllJtre by combined A meri-cnn forces. In ad~ hon to the complete destruc-tion of .Tnpnn"Se Illl- pOlTer descriood abo tJ.shor8 illstalintions. deJenses l\I1d personVll ,) 18~Cfered c on si de ra bl e d am a ge . nl' su-B ~orc diSCUssing fll speo if ic resH]t f thAmCrIc:.n llt tacks. .e,-tai ll general shlt~ment:

the presen t Tepor t to f or~u l lL t e prlnclp les oferel a pp li ca ti on e o nc ar m ng t!18 r el at iv e e ll 'e e ~:ness of various types of ueriu] attacks. On t~o ther hand, w ith reg ard to Wake Islll,l Id itsel tboth physical evidence and th e sta tements of J 'anesa milita.ry personnel lend weight to celi:r~conclusions; namely,(1) Tbllt mediulU or high-Iev~1 bOlnbing while

more difficult for Japanese antl-lj,iremft" p ll lCllda smaller percentnge of its tOl l Jlage in the ~alltarget areas presented on an IItol l like Wilke ~ h a nd id d ive O r glide bombing,(2 ) T lm t d ive bombing, w h il a m or e " "1 IJ Q ~ uh I6

t o J ap an es e d e fe ns iv e fire, w n s m o re a cc ul 'n .l e! hn nhigh-level bombing;(3 ) Tha t glide bombing, considered by the . T n ! ) .I1n_ t o b e t he J e as t v ul ne ra bl e form of a tt ac k, h ad

npproximately the sam degree of nccuracy I1S divebombing; and(4) That the effectiveness of both d ive and glide

bombing was enhnnced conside rably by th e ox-trerne accuracy of American S&rfLfin"., whicb-ac.cording to the Island Com mand el'_ :no t o nly in-Il ic ted ser ious damage on parked .aircraft, lightmaterie l lind personnel, bu t also drove gun crewsfrom t.heir s t lLt ions , during bombing ,~ttll.cks,

a, O a ; n l ( z l t ie ! 1 . - Total casualt ies iJlfl icted uponJapanese troops on Wlih by combined aer inlbombing. and Naval gunfi r amounted , by Jap-anese estunate, 0 700 01' 800 persons. The largestloss ?f l if e f rom a s ingle mid occurred dur ing thec a !' rl e r a s sa u lt of 6-7 October 19i3 when betw ena o o , and 4 ~O p er ons W!lI) ki l led. During t hi s r ai d"-,di"ed hit was scored U1)011 the concrete fOltnc!B-non of an unf in ished Pun-American bui ld ing onPe :t le Isl and, killi ng 0 Korean labor troops who[HId taken refuge in u11 excavated :111l/\ under-neath."Following this I"l l id of O ct ob er 1 1:)


12/66

the structures on the il aml . The one eseept ien tothi s r ule was the N,L \'YHeadquarter s and 00111-municarions Center 011 Wake Island. This is 11huge st ructur e consi st ing of It ground 1\001" sup-ported by henT)' timbers and steel I beams co\'eredwith a very thick layer of coral sand and ur-mounted by the admiral's observation po s t. , . Thes tructure was capnbla of sustaining h it s by veryluge bombs without material damnge, A 1,000-pound ganeral purpose b omb s tr iking on the nor thsid did only superficial damage and caused t heoccupan ts noconcern . One large bomb inthe pastput some S!oI ' ! lSS on the grolllld floor struetural mem-bers whi ch were then st rengthened wit h anglebraces.9 Tills structure WAS nenrJy invulnerableto nir attack. Had repeated hit be~" scored with1,600-polmd armor piercing bombs. there is nodoubt , t hat the eommund post would have beendem~li~e~: b?t. in order to attain this probabilityof Jut, It IS likely that an exorbit an t number ofsuch bombs would hnve had tobe dropped.' .Another example of Olass I s tructures WaS thefu.el s torage wurehousa near the air s t I'ip , of henv}'r -emforeed concre e const ruct ion covered with

cora l nnd w:i th access r oad and ent rance heavi lyreve.~d. 51 fnny bomb craters were observed i~t~e unmediute vicinity, but the re were no directhits and 110 dnml1ge to this installation. An exam-ple of thi type of bui ld ing which was comple te lydest ruyed by American bombing was the a ir r aidshelter near Nnvy Headquarters a hen vy timbers tructur e covered wihh S to 10f ee t o f cora l whichwas dlmlolislll l

A_ possible source of inter rupted operations forthe Japs would have been the loss of the woodenbridge connect ing Peale und Wnke Is lands, Thiswas only h it ~wice by rockets, probably Ii-inch, andwas easi ly repa ir ed . The cnuseway para ll el ingthis bridge received a direct hit f rom u lorNe aer ialbomb and was put out of commission." Tmfficbetween Wake nnd Peale wus never interd ic tedhy neri"1 bombing.Of a.n oriu'illul tot:.l of 6 motor vehicles on

Wnke. th Jltl)l1ll e lost 18 as " result of nil" a t-tnck.~e An ndditionnl 28 were rendered uselesshoollu e of a l l i n su J !i cue nt supply of sp,rl'e P~l't,s."Excellell t , ,~. . of: camouflnge lind " ,, , . . tments pro-longed "'" Lifetime of tlle remaining y"h.icles.G '

A1'otor. ., AvitiUon DImI J C i . I ! ; on1---

. . ..An nu; '8, S~t:"m I, Inh: rn=iltilt.1on. "fIllclllbllm. q"";J IRfI. I I ln d :tTntC!1.[lIln.nd cFJhlr.fiuTllentlolL tllto ! I InO in !t I . b tl t . .tlIi.'I rruli,n ~ ':IlW!!wu therrdl tl r i l i@ QIO~ll'IlIQ "r1lL!~. It:w-.!.gJtt!n, 1 ' 1 ' 1 F\;LrWH'i" l!!l4~"O IS t !e An nlU D . Sea tl t lr l 3 , PhoU! ! 7 :1 1.a S~e .I!\nhd D, Sj!(ltJOTl :S o "Photo 'i2'.uS414t Ann~ B. StoeL iui l 3, Photo73.US(leA.nnu B. SHidQ'" Il. photo 7ft.

Itappears that at no time did the Japanesesuffe r ma te rial ly fr om being unable to move sup-plies and equipment by trucking. Acti vity, train-ing and ope ra tions dec lined by virtue of shortageof food stocks and resultant malnutrition andtherefore the requirements for transportation andthe need for trucks diminished. at t he same timethat available motor trnnsportation declined.Of th.. seven garnges en W ake devoted to themaintenance of veh ic l none received . a d ir ect h it

during an aerial attack. One or b;o were slightlydnmaged by near-miss ,bnt were not put out ofcommission.eFor inter-island tran portation the Japll,nese

had thr ee launches (l IIOLs) and one SIlJUU motor-boat. These w reused primarily toservice WilkesIs land and toma in ta in l iai son with Wake Island,One bfOL was damaged in t hree separat e a ta e keand finally sunk shortl y before the Jopnn~ 511r-rendered.Aircraf t destroyed about 71 1 percent of all thebarges and sma ll boa ts a t Wa.ke . As improvisedmeans of getti ng supplies a hore from ships andsubmarines failed, the lossofsmnll boa adversely

a.f feated unloading operations. . nloading opera-tions were fur ther ' hampered III l at e 19~3 whenan F6F sunk a lar ge l igh ter in the channel , ca usingi ts use , e spec ia lly a t n ight , to bes low and hazard-ous . The wreckage was finl il ly removed in p iecesand unloading ope ra tion re tu rned tonorma l, Twolarge American barges, recovered by the Japanese,were destroyed by "erial attack All three Jap-anese torpedo boats and six or seven small routingvessels wer also destroyed by bombinn-.ssi. Some Notes OJ. O".dll(J.nce.-As noted above,the bombs genern. lly dropped on Wilke were of th~gen eral purpose type. There i s no evjdence t hatarmor-piercing bombs were ever used, 1I11d, in newof the .na ure of the targets on the island theiremployment would have been uneconomical.When discussing the reIntive ,.ffecti \"I'ness of theva, rious type of ordnance actua lly used aga inmWn.ke, it s llould b. .noted thnt all types were effect ive when u I 'd agn inst proper tn.rgets, with aCCu-racy. For example, before the defendllr5 of I Il lkewent underground, whinh was inlmediatruy dter

the destr llct ivo raids of October 19!3, our attnekswith incendiary bombs of the typ(la\ "~ ilnb le to us'It t ha t t im e -- - -- (M - 6~ ) -- - -- -


13/66

l ind supplies. A.f ter these stores nnd snpplies werep ll lced und rground, i ll ndilll 'i were no longer~!fedive.In like degn;e. bombs with instantaneous f ll~ing

'II, ground surgicul J"Oom5capnbl ..of handling minor'\I'"k" W . f iS . ' ; bYPJlssed urea sub iect only to 'nui- cases and relteclforthet.I"(!l1.tl.ne!1~ofm!liol'sul'giclllsu~ce rai ds" and to sporudie nnd isolat ed currier cases upon ~he Navy hospital on Wilke Island.st["(kesmounted fo r the purpose of tl'lliniuO". Hu d Hild the islund been abJeto receive ] lorm,Ll rap]e.n-W ,l ke b ee ll o f p ri me i ll 1p o rb ll ll ce i ll t he COl~I!1c~01 islunen& of supp l i es , medical facil it ies might h,.vethe war. it wouLdhal 'e been sub jec ted to ,UI nlto. rrullllilled !l.d~qllllte.,e peei."lly in "jew of the smullgethel" diflel'Gnt type of Itttaek. SIze of tl,e Ishmd 5 gurrJson. But at the sametime thlLt American att1lcks we.l'edcst.roying e~-ist-

ing supplios, tbe Amllr ic 'Ln blockade IIf Iectiv


14/66

and blankets, enttered about th e d",'k were thepersonal ~nr oL the pat ient s. such as ragged andtorn clothing, worn ant. shoe, broken down messgear,!IIld atbel' items, Ffias ware present in nbund-ance. The heads were approximutely 10 feeL tot.l lerear of the building. and other sanitary facili-t ie s


15/66

1, C""MtlJt.-CDtltlnuerl

Atl!al."fT.-Con f u I Ie, S1 -~ _ ... . W ,H h br:h lY ~fItett-~e

apinn pArkld almm(tf l J ,1 : ) . . .. . .hlea and o tbH I drf !l le ll hJs. l Iat ftbl y Inth"t.ids of O ~ L 1 9- 1" &.b. I \ : t u ; ; l c k i . 'd out twolilthl.-ntl . .. i~lIlrt JIOII14"om.eo W... hj:id~17 rrrft!~t.ift &I , II Ir j I gb ;L rNlitr-r:i~l.tld ~'-nnrl.t. HHJ ! .I \ iU. e, to th~ ;~:rfod bt-rol't"

. );o;U- INO ~ the J IIIJ ~n( !( 'Wt:nt un. .dr~und, W8 ~ I !~tl...-t- t o d Ht rQ yl nl l r O ldl in d h 11 l: 01 :I lI II C. ~ brI. nHndl ll iry and GPo o m m .

& D c ! c < 1 ' C ! a H d tl:!1II.Cln4MlC) ' Qf 811011 by drlvinl(C:rewI f ro m t hE -l r : !1 mdon. dUrfh~ bGmbl.ri.l;""",0,",

A. Hilllr.tI.Dtd th~ (a1.l ld1:1II;todlc lt.l :ry . lhi!.HlJ.:rN; !c l'lltl!l. t'I: (I: tht- 1I:~I~oI!Yf " m i l ! I]JIo.1'rl!ian.

b. lnf lh; l" InddC!oUl lb ut I mp or ta n t d ll .mAX1tdurlnlJ 'nU~5.nll:c"milh."It. Admnl~~ II se-l ' i C l U ! l blow ttl .rpJi.h~moralr: 00 the 1: tl lUJd.,by demo.n.tf1!~I"1i it!!1m!)O~ncl: to. rep~11Me;n tt8t! ntLII(!kJ.

I . NAYAL Ihrn_ a. ~y t od v it al i n.&4. E1 ~' T __ :~bllgdmts bJ . ' pinpoint

bom"ba.rdm{!ftl (t,e, dbjDt!clon aC tiDwc:r plant;hAu:~l9""Ii).b.. tIe.ruoy~ iaD end

&nJ..I~l!Ifn::r:aIl ~itfcuu-........ctf" 136 ;pc t l" e . ! : I" i . L n:f gunlino lon.i'!!f" e f ! o e :l l It J G :m t l I I I&!1=Jtomlbu HI",'j .~e, "Dr;.t;r .Qyo!d ,~J lustl - a n e - 0 1 ' "& l i d - O n ! ! BmlhO .ni.tlol!ll!l dump.

IV. CONCLUSIONSAt the time of its surrender to American forces

in ept ember 1945 ,Wake land origi nally con-

TOgI 'Il I1 lof expnns io ll towl l rd the e a s t, . h a( ~ b e co l I\ ~: lo ne ly o utp os t. s ev ere d o ~ II1 ] c o mmU l Il Cl lt JO n w i tht ho h om el an d, w it h negligible d e fe ns ~ .l I~ J d I td Yi llgison O C th e nil" buse , few f"Clhtles Illlld nognrr_ . fensi itip lanes remn ine d . The d e el~~l"" I)OSI 1011h ad b ee u =========================================neplj,erl of 2 () p erc en I of Its fi re pOlVer and , innny event. WIIS impotent w he n.m o.n ned by a gU"i.so n w hich w as c ap nble o f working o nly a fe w ho ursn dny nnd hnd long given up normal ope rnmons ,The ofl'8nsivelllld defensive capabilicies of Wilke

could IlO~ hnve b ee n m o re effectively r ed uc ed h adit b ee n t he o bj ec t, o f s us ta i na d A m er ic an campaign01" in vnsion, Yet, in effect, operations nga,jnst theisland we r e d e s ul to ['y in c h I l I ' I J . a O O I ' . Th e f i r s t Re r e eat tack s d uring the period o f the Gi lber ts andMtl l ' ll lm i l campaigns had c om ple te ly nul lifie d theoffensi ve value of th e base, The peri od thllt fol-lowed wns mninly one of attri ion and blockadew hich, reduced both the defens ive ahi l ity and thedefensive wil l of the i sland.The Jupane s e garrison on TIr:lke Is land was .not

. foresd t o s u r r ende r , However .American ai rpower,by assisting in blockade and by bombing and m aochina gunning, w as In l'gely re sponsib le for reduc-jng the islnnd's defenses to such a state of inef-fectivenass t ha t I I s uc ce ss fu l landing co uld hav ebeen mad" with 'L minimum eIf01t-a fn~t attestedto by the Isl and Commander, who stated hat byJllIle 1945his forces could no longer have repe l led"11 invasion,

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYMARSHALLSGlLBERTSNEW BRlTAIN PARTY

REPORTNo. I-WAKE ISLAND

ANNEXES

23


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.ANNEX A - ADM1NlS 'IRATION

Section 1.- Or~linn ofMarsbaU~Gi1but!iNew B.r itaioPar ty

u. S. stRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYMARSHALLS-GILBIiRTS.NEW BRlTAlN PARlY

I CHIEF OF PARTY IIEXECUTIVE! OFFICER I

BElADQUARTERS 1 - - - - + - - - - - 1 ElJITORIALSElCTION SECTION

PHOTOORAPHIC I IINTE.LLlGE."'CESECTION -- SECTION

OPE1U'l'IONALFACTORSBOMBINGEFFECTIVE.NESS


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1'19September i945 _1 SeptembeJ.194/i.-----------------21-26 September Wl5--------------26 September 19415- _28 September 1945 ~ ._28 September-S October 1945 _2 October 1945 _5 October 1945 ~ _:;October-s November 1945 _~ Novembel' 1945 _2 November 1945 _2-7 November 1945 _7 November 1945 _8 November 1945- _8 },Tovember-18 November 1945-_---18 November 19;1,5 _20 November 1945-----------------20 November-28 November 1945 _2 overnbar 1945 _30 ovember 1945 _

ANNEX A - ADMINISTRATION

Section 2. - Chronology of Investigarion

Mo,l'ShlllJs---Gilberts--1i!ew Britaiu Party departed Oahu, T. J{.Putty arrived .Kwujalein Mltrslmlllshll1d.s.Organization, outfitting, preliminnry research.Par ty depar ted Kwajnlein "board U .'. Re(tll()ILT.Party nrr ived Wa.ke s land .Field investigation Wake Island.Pa rty departed Wake Is land .Par ty arr ived :Majuro, Marshall I slands .Field investigations, Wotje, } ioJoehp :Hillc and Jalui.t .t\toUS.lP:wty depar ted Mt\juro.Par ty arr ived Momete.Los Negros Admirulty f lends.Preliminury research on Rabnnl.Party departed "1IJ;omot"aboard . .s. IT'(llltuak and U.S.S toakda1 . e .Par ty arr ived Simpson Hnrbour, Babanl Ne'" Britain.

Field investigation, Rabanl."Party departed Rabaul,Party arrived Oahu T. H.Preparation of f inal divis ional repor ts .Editorial and Photographic Sections departed Oahu T.Editorial and Photographic Sections arrived WI1Shi.ngton, D.for preparation of f inal repor ts .

IThl!l invnt.lgl\UOJl w~i1 U a i l ! bu:!l r,!;II"the-eeecnd report !;It tbe- "bLrBbtlllt~Gnbl!!rU-N~w Brita:in Pi i. t1: , ..'Thls Invatlp!L.!o:n ' W 1 J 1 I i t.tlc bRl!l i li i [or- the: third re:port. -of tho h1.nl5.bIlloU..oIlbi!rts.Nc!:!,,,"Brltlll:n Pllrt)".

27


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ANNEX B

Section 1. - Interrogations

Pall61. Interrogation of SAKAIBARA, higematsu, Rear Admiral, IJN ,_______________ 292. Inter rogation of CmC.A.BARI, Shigeharu, Colonel, I JA..________________________________ as3. Interrogation of TACHIBARA Soichi, Lt. Commander, IJN 424. Interrogation of CHIBA, Kenjiro, Lieutenant, IJN 43Ii. Interrogation of TOh.'UDA, Sutematsu, Lieutenant, IJN 456. Inter rogation of NA.KAZATO Hisao, Lieutenant, IJN 477, Tnterrogatdon of ASAII, Masaaki, Lieutenant, lJN 498 . In te rroga tion of SHIRATA Kimeo, S e a m a n 1 / c ,I J N _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ 509. .Interrcgation of h .-uRJHA YASH! Kuma abu ra, Seaman 2/0, 1m ~---------------------- 51.0. Statement of TAcmBARA, Soichi, Lt. Commander-, 1JN 52I. Interrogation of Sa!


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medium bombers . Some thut hnd been burned 111'0till here. FIe thinks they are 'Bettys."12. Q. mmt wn th largest number that wereevel' here Itt !LnY one time! - ",\. Less thun 20Iigh tel 'S . -13. Q. 'WIUlt was the maximum number ofbombers I-A. On t i le S \11111 lduy us the October194 he~n"se elle), couldnot swing their gUlls a"ollnd ill t enough. Quitn 1Ifow of the 2.')mDlll1llchine Cl\JlIlonwere hit on toprmd Ul e n.nununition e:


20/66

sectors of tire 01 ' \\ 'C\'~ they free to select hU'gets ofopportunity I - .\.. 'nl~ll ri le y o rig il ln l1 y u se dthe directional f inder COlli1 '01 .they hnd nil their! !U :J1 liIin....on O1\e L l rg t ' t : but R fter 'ilwn dlllnng.dthey assigned. secror iii'. 10 dilf..rent buUeries.They had 3S much us po ible p laced the machinegill' 1l1'011Illging one truj!e~the muehine !!'IHS could l ire ul unother, Theydidn' t have enough guns so t bey dispersed t hem [ISm il e h as p oss ib le . Th e g n,a Ie t need w ns fo r 2 ~ m illmachine cannons So 1hut the loss of on e was v erygreat. At Peacock Point. when they Wlll'e knockedout much damage was done.53. Q. In placing the guns did they try to fixtheir gullS a round the 11'101 important installu-tions! Or did they try (0use an all around de-fen ~-AThe ant i-a ir ern ft gun "ere dnnl pur-pose and were to be used to repel Ieuclings so lba they had 0 be placed around the shore line . Thmachine cannon wer e p laced a round the gun posi -t ions. The larger positio ns Were tlb'eucly con-

t ructed when t h e a dm ir a l arr ived, ThOSf!lit PI.',(,-cock and He~1 Poin t s wer e t il ready eoust ructedwhen he arrived.54 . Q. Does he know ".hnt S'apnlm menDS! -A. He halieves the f ire bombs we used were he.~ng-onal In shape pr--69) and that no Nnpu lm wereused.55. Q . At what I " lI lg e w e r e. t i le gunner in truct-

ed to op en henry anti-air rnft on our LI'ikes!-A. hey used to open l ire Y5 dive bombing a ttaCKSwer e mo ef-teetiv e, Low-flyi ng planes going very fa t werehard to f ire a because you hal' to trav erse you rguns so rapidly.77. Q. Which type of munitions were mas f-fective i n knocking out their airfield 'O'OID thestandpoint o f d is rupt ing act iv ity on the a irf ie ld !Short delay 01' long delay fuzes! - A. ~Then the

runway W(lS bombed they had no planes here.None of them caused much dumnge because as SOOllus ~ he field w as bornbe.a they were II. b1e to IU J t h ec ra te rs up agni.78. Q. Were lilly delayed time-bombs droppedi- A . . There weren't people ill the n rea a the timeso they just waited un til they exploded and. re-turned. They would have been effecti ve if there

w re any planes in the ar fl. They would huve bee"'Vorl' ffective if there WCI' ftny planes there.79. Q. During the raids betv een 12 July

through 17 August 19 5, was he advised of II.I1Ydif fe rence in the s ize of the rockets u. d? - 1\.Last yenr when t hQy were being attacked theycliclll l know just " ,Imt wewere using, nnd thi yea",they discovered we were using' rockets. He r n . -Ii eves thur t im ones weused tili yenl'",,'Ill'" lal'gel't han tho ones wp used lust ,I'en,.but he didn't noticethe (li jfllL'cl1Ce.O. Q. Docs lui I 'ecnll the l 'Rids of _\.u. .. .st nthlind Gil] o f this yen1'1- A . Yes.e1. Q.U ." he been udvisod of I"r lt l' s ize bombswhidl "PI' ,wed to h lW


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Fleet f - A. So.100. Q . Who isin commnnd oftheFourth Fleetnow! - A. Hedoesn't know.101. Q. A.f ter he nnil'e,i at Wake did be takeo rder s f rom the Bose Force . Kwajnl ein o r f romthe Fourth Fleet I-A. His orders ClUue,';3 theBase Force a t Kwaja le in .

1(}-2. Q, 'Wl,O wa s in command of the Bose Force ,Kwnjulein !- A. rice Adrnirol Akiynrna.HI3. Q. Did h e r e ce iv e his instrl1ctions for car-rying ont lim job 0r Island ommandar Irom theommnnde r o f t h Fou rth F l e e t a t Truk o r f romthe Commander of the Base Force a t Kwajl1. Ie in1

- A. Thev sent him OUl here to 'Yake witbouto rder s and' n ft ar h en rM" d hera safel \' t he" sen thim a mes sn~ from Tokyo making ilim Islnm;lomrnander , Be fo re 1 . 1 1 ' left ' I'ruk he receivedverbal instructions that he was tobe made IslandCommander. of \lake.10-!. Q. In thei I' p lans for " , " akB how manyn a v a l p e rs o nn e l e x cl us iv e o f a v in t io n d i d tlley p lan

to hnve !- A.. He doesn 't know the general p lano f how many p lanes they int ended top lnca here,but when he nrrived hesent word tha t there wasn' t~no.ug~ personnel to defend the iand and theysent him A . n n : ! ' . p e rs on ne l w h ic h I1 p t o t ha t time~B d been orgnnized asa bat ta lion but tIllIn organ-ized themselves as a regiment.10- ' . Q. How mnny pe rsennel we r he re when

he arrived i-...Over 1,000. When he arrivedhere there were 1000 men of he Na val .Pionegroup. er106. Q. In addition to them how many Nand how many Army pers onne l cam' . ~ vy. hi cal] 1 e ID responSe~ OO .IS - A. One b[J,ttlLlion,n little bit over107. Q . HO\~ many did he as k fori _thinks h e a sk ed for 2 ,000. . iI.. He10. Q. Was there lillY Armwhen he ar rived 1 _ A. Over s d l er sonnel herehere when he arrived. rmy ]]JenWere109. Q . There wns IL totuJ nf nh Qright~ - .A. A little bi .' out~,600_i [hutmore.110. Q . Was herR ony A' Fr iv ed ~_ A. Yes . II' oree wh6n he ar..I1L Q. ! f a ' " ~mllny and whl1t .. ' IEI ther the rwenty. econd U,I1I [g. - ' A.Ai r Uni t f rom Roi I sl nnd. ri he Twenty-Fourth., era WitS u med iumTIll:! Uld'tll !ram lite T"''4!!Ilit)'-&!"ere tlJt.b.~ an l t . . "l id -dId "II.~d I:IId T"t rl tt~FCIQ Ib

c la . rl f ,. ln l l G ' l: I .e s tl (l n 1 7 1 If D t I = . Y tm Ut tb e: i Jtlr ill/O f ~ ~ .. fJ~'1' Set

112 . Q. D id be o s~ for m ore a v-iution1_ Ait doesn ' t concern 111m . . )/0 ,113. Q. As the I sl and Commander w tJ. 1 fl' ' us Ie ,Imimlre5[lon ib e or t 18 IlJr defenses or' ~".ground d efense s 1 - A . The admi ra l hlld lust th enection with the nil' defenses, no con11 4 Q. W110WGS responsibla f01: hllll' 'I ', .11 lI1]gfhf ig ht er p ll l> ll es l - A . The senior office of th e A ,eForce. It115. Q. W us th e a il ' wnl'nin.g S"s t em 11 I. . ~ 11, er Ibdircdionof th eud miral] - A . Y es, t1u ,t 'I'd ethe adrnirnls command. as un e,116. Q. When he did pick up "Blips" h irrtdlU' ,would he trnnsmif the w!trn jJ]g to t1 01 l ". le i".\.ltForcel- A. Yes, he would transmit it to tne . I . i ,Force C ommander, .,117. Q. D id th e Air Force Commu.nder dew.m i ll e w h e th e r t o launch the p lane s? - A. Yes .(!he 0d mi ra l d re w . a d. i ag ram at th is p oin t o fth e 1ltt.e~r"gatlOl1howing ( 1 . 1 1 organiz(Ltion charLo!th e m ili ta ry fin d n a val fo rce s o n the Is land ofWake,. wi.til t he n e. x1;highes t echelon s. Thi s d in .g r am i n d ic a te s th!tt unde r th e 4 th F l ee t is 1 ! 1 1 Ai rF o rc e a nd B as e Force which a re c o- eq u nl , a nd the

ba e force , ! l.nd~rwhich the island command i s & 1 l f ,must request a,lI'(ll 'aft from the .A. ir Forces ~ndt l : e I s I :l nd Commander h as no a.uthol'ity ov:r Ul eIIlr crtlf t based on his isl and, This chart is ,totached after q u es ti on 1 7 8 below. ' I' h e u dm i ra l f u r-ther states that the Army is under the 4,thFleetbu t receives its orders from the a dm iral a nd t h a tthe AI'my WIISordered to be under his (lorl1lntmd.)1 18. Q . Is th e lu ck of cont ro l on the p",rt of th e

I sl an d C O Il 1l 1. 1t lu d er o ve r th e Air F o rc e b as ed o n lhe~sli1ndtypi('"l of Jap'.LIlese organization 1- A.1tlS ~,heSlUnG everywhere, He bel ie ves tha t t il ls is~S ituation that mus t be chnnged, He tllillks t J l ~ rJt was set I lik I' A 'F . rp u e t 1JS because the Ja,panes" ITth orce w as v er y 10'" Oil p lan . H th inks thai, ife y h ad iii' Id .' 511 cient phmes they would pot, t IIlIUun Or th e tlHl can 1'01 of th Island Commander. .f . Q.Wasth admiral r pons ib le in , lllY Ifll)or Il.ppl . .to d' Ylnghe Air FOI 'e8~ -A. Behadno!dilng 0 Withthe supp l i es .X. trateqy.120. Q WI! 't k sl~b e dev . S I contemplnted tJmt Wll ~w~

th o eloped as fl seaplane base? _ A He tlJlPIiSol'e Wus h .'12 1 SUe C01ltemplated.b e d6~e~' iYnsjt contempluted thnt (In al1dlOI"ll~k no w )~ p el d for su b , u D rilles ~ _ .A . :fIe doeSD

. IIISIl't hcal'd allyt.h ing l lb o ut i t.34

122. Q , W~s "ny dredging o f the l agoon unde r.taken! - A. He snys thnt the American plan was~;odeepen t ] , , , urea, b il l he heard tllItt the JapaneseI ll te l~d"d to mnJ~en l arger area for a fai rway forl anding nnd tnk ing o ff . H hasn' t h ea rd anythingabout dl'edgu1g the lagoon for submarines,. 123: Q. Was any p rovi si on mad Tor the ber th .mgf or tlt6 'lnchoring of s ubmarines outs ide thelagoon 1- A.Hedoesn 't know.124. Q. Wher e did til submarines surfaca anddischarge their cargo! - A. Between Wake andWilkes Is lands, The submarines would surf acesome distance off the island and proceed to (Lpoin

about 2:000 meter s .off the coast and then tl",ywould discharge the ir ca. rgo by blLrgeor Illndingcraft,125. Q . Fnr what s trnt eg ic u se was the I sl andof Wilke in ended ~ - . H " doesn't know whntthe s tr at eg ic use for t h i sl and was : a nd the peoplwho would conduct any opera tions from hem were

at Headquarters and such matters wer e kepsecret.126. Q . Inhis opinion was Wake to be used asthe jumping o fr p lac e for futur a ssau lt 011 Amer-iean held islands] - A.. They used to receive sic-na l s from Tokyo instr ucting him to defend t1Jsplace because it was a ver y valuable base which

could be u sed in NUl coming 0 ffen.sh'e.127. Q. 'Vas thll "coming of fens ive" prior to

the iunel. 'iCl1fl occupation of the Mar sllnlls andGilberts? - A. Tho.t answer is that signals hadCODe through niter the Americans had taken the1\farslllllls and Gilberts.12 . Q . Prior 1: 0 the American entr y into theMal'Silal.!s and Gilberts, whut in the admiral'sopinion , was the s tr lt tegy unde rlying in the occu -pation of Wal


22/66

loW. Q, . Of th e heam, m r cl .I ' 'J ,'1111 gun flmmLmition10\\ much was destroy (H - A Ab t thamount. . . ou e slimeH5. : Of the 25 au 140 ru:ilJimeled _ A. ,,0IU n .h of It wa destroyed h dOD~ I ' t k ft .~, mow or SIll '1!am CIIJl110t sri\TIl an ILnsw r : 30 P I' r IIfor th h !IVY kind ' cen WOIl ( apply

" US. Q. lncl=l?jng he h a,y calib r 1-.d. The~O In~'!lamrn,IlUhOllWIIS not dnmneed, 'there aret'it? _0 rnm guns on Pllnl e Island and two 011 HeelPoint, .. 147. Q. During wha t ra ids was the major 1lO1'-tion of tlie ammun.i tion destl' oyed? _ A. It WlISdestroyed so offen that he cnnnot eive tl particulartune,.1~ . Q. How much would he estimate that themilitary e8iciency of the n av al forces wu reduced

by r ~so~ of loss of food and ammunition, bybombIng ingenernl? -ASometimes to one-thirdand sometimes one-fifth. ometimes it took fivemen to do the work of one. They hud no trainedfor the 1 y ear due to t he shortage of food.149. Q. When would you say that the absolutelow point of efficiency of the narul fo rces wasr:elIchecl1 -A. June 1945 .

X II. illMee l! a n eoU ll .150: Q. Had II landi ng ferea b een attempted atthat time, do you think you would have b een able

to repel it.? - A. He thinks he could not have re-pelled an invasion at that time.151. Q. How did the condition of your mel) on

the da! of SUIT ndar of the island compare to thecondition on June 1945? - A. The men were infa r bet te . condi tion when American forces a .r l' i" edon the island due t o tI le f ae t tha t tl, submarine hndarrived wi th pro vi si ODS a t the en d of .J une 1945.152. Q. If you were to assess the ell uses of theloss of eff iciency as between aer i1l1bombinfi ' and

the loss of supplies hrough lack of shipping whntpercantag would you assign to each! - A. Ninetyper cen t would he ass igned to blockading and 10percent to aerial bombings. This is his opinion'so~~ wo~d say 0 and 20 percent. The udmirul'sOP~OD IS that Lhe origi nal figu res he gave con-ce rrunn per centage by at tack and aerial bombinssa[~ ~ITect , ~Ul in his opinjou the concenslJs ~OpInion of Jus personnel would probubly a sign70 J'lprrent Itnrl JlOper'cent.

b tw I " ' reus eXIsL"le ,. e ween ier lind l'okosuka, but he is of lhe ' . .Ion thnt. the 'ollditiollS around th isls 'I ' opm,ernlly the same. The air for s l_eptll~l: nr J gen.bl ockadad durinrr the dnyligh t Md'tl l be IS l~n cl sh] k d I b . e su ll1al'llleso a ec Itat night, Therefore he would .4~ . t t - f ' - nSSlb 'l la percen a IIII ' ore lUldlO perc nt 1,0 sub.marinas.15~. Q. -When did it b come appnl'llnt to the

admiral that the success ot luture opel'Iltl'n .tl P if . IlS mie aci C w us P lls t !IS fal' as the island of -Wilkewas concerned 1 : - . 1 .. He fi'were lhe, dredging the lagoon?- . \. They weren' t d l' ec ll !;LnJ! ;he lagoon. They

didn't use the dledg IIl'LU.Iii . Q,. Of U te 3n P reem of th e n rn mn nu i ondestroved \\'[ it a tt ribu table to one or two l", id l;

Or""~ it 0\' r np ,,.io(1of time! - ~\_.Arnnumitionwa destroyed ill all the mid .llln. Q.Wl,"t t~ 'pe of mdar d id Lhey 113\-. here 1-~\ , He doesn't know,110 . Q.WitS it n Cni ted , rntes 01' British ndnp-tion1- _\. He doesn't know. bill it WrLS one madein Japan: its ell icieney WaS 1l0~ very gooel..rII I. A ,zditi{>nfl 7 'f"~Rli/)n~ to ~l(lrily th e a ir sit-'rill ion in j,?!,].

171. Q. Wl191 uir r nfl were . t at ioned a t Wakeut the t ime of the admira l' s IU'l'i, . 1? - , , \ . ThereWeI' "bout 10 I'n bomber p lanes fr om the T5 2Kokuia}. Be identified them. from n recognitionhandbook, UF Betty).

ORG,INIZATION CH,IRT DRAWN BY ADMIRAL StlKAIBARA00 QLlesUOll117 nbQYC:)

4th Il'LEET

Am DIYIS[ON IUl:;EFOUCE

I INALiL (JU.utO !'.ll'aLGuAnO ~AYAL GUARD

1)1>1 T rxrr U;)(Tl:

x X WAKE[3[_I...\'D rsr#I..I'D IS1.,\l"D

I

.37

1'T2. Q. Does the admi ral know when those'planes enme to TI'", lk~!_ A.He be l ie ,-e s lhey came3. Q. R O il " m n. ny 0 ttn ck s ~ c\ll"l" ed d llrin t, , 'Iig hl'/ - A. S,X or seven raids occllrred dg hic n. d tl h Ur l l 1 .tl e dnv- E,'ery now an len t sy ,,"O lud. .' t io~ ~ol,t if ied by nrmor , and isconcerned only withposittons covered by concrete Or timber. WaS d one, He no iced e""raJ craters ubout two


23/66

to \1' :1k in 19+:1. ear ly in 19-12.113 . Q. Hud the re -been nlO11! than 10or 12be-

fore hegot her !_\.H. be l i ." [here h ad beennbout tha i r nauy planes u l1I he rime ,17+. Q. \Vere there uny f ighter planes on Woke

when the admiral arr ived! -.A.. No,liS. Q. n-hen did the fighter plane come to

Wakel -.il... Early i ll lh~ spring of 1"+3. TheyC am e f ro m e it he r ihe Twenty- econd Ai r Fleet orlhe Twentv-Four th . .. I. irF leet . The admiral doesn o t l "M I em " be r j us t w hieh One. T he h en d q Itnrte rsot these air f leets wer ll at Truk, nnd some of theirplanes were ;II Rue 0 (Roi) I lnnd, Abo\lt H,p lnnes came here earl r in 19+3from Roi . AfterItfew weeks lbey were'relie"lKl byplanes from tileo ther a il " fl eet . They oek turns. Thnr i both theTwenty- eond and the Twenty-Fourth A ir F le et shad lighter p la ne s h er e a l d if i" eL ' en t t i me s.176 . Q. Wha t k ind of 6ghte l"! ;wer e I ll ey? - A.

They were Zeros. He do not know the type.1,7. Q. Did t he s a f ig h t! !l "! ! e v er a t te m p t inter-ception of nited tates bombers I -A . . About

f~ur to six limes. nn interception was attempted.IDee the radaz- d id not gh' " much warning . the

bombers could never be intGrcepted borfore !hevhad bomb d. and the Jnp fighters would chns~them back toward ~[jd lOlly in an attempt ut inter -ception. ~UIC " the n d \" un t. ge ' '' "0 thu nil withthe bombers .. none wera ever shot down nnd nonewere ever claimed to beshot down.17 . Q. Did the! rlan to mnke ,1 enplane baseat W{lk,,?-AOrJglm"'y. it \1"[1 part of the lanto mnke a seaplane baSI '. bu t t 1 u pl PIdoned. . 'In was" )ILII-~1.'\ Q. Were th ere nnr enplnnes based litW.lke. - A. Two Or three t'mes In' k e ap an es c um a tou e and then went awav .;:min 'I'l .. it . leI we i 'l l on l y'-'St ors , They wer e nevel ' based herl):

2. Int errog .uioD o f Chicabari Sh' hIJA. ' 'ge a'lI, Colon.l,D~~t:Commande ....hmy Forces. WukeAIIIV~ Wake Isl.nd: 10 July In43 ..age: 01) ym l" !!. .

1. Q. Ho \\" mony times "' ''s II . Iby .Jljed r :i rc,"H ft '/ _ ,\ 'fJ Ie I. IIn d u l l ac ke d. . lero e w ere ixlnrg 11lidsfind oih.r smlll ler 0 b' Or se.cnt,;mem ber the dn tes. n


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" '~ll id net become c:L",~lil 's . and one pnr t of theuni t fired machine g U ll s ' It p lanes when they eamewithin rnn:!!'e.36. Q. funt wasthe total l l 1 1 1 n o o r of enemyplanes shot down!- A. He has heard of repor tso f 2 pl an es being knocked down altogether, butdoesn't know whether Army 01' Nll\'Y shot themdown. and s ince the A"IIlT hod 110 position "longthe north eoost, the X " \ ~ . IIIight h" ve "hoi downsome there, hUL the total did not . .xeeed 20.3T . Q. Ho w mUD." A"my l)'lles a nd m ulti-engin ed p lanes 1- ,L They were 011earr ie r-based

planes , They d id n't s ho ot dOW1\ [m .1 'A rm y p l an e sbecause they Oew LOO high. H e d oe sn 't k no w, bu tthinks tha t the" II w LO O hieh. He thinks tha t theXUV}'knocked' down two multi-engined bombers,That would make it 22 nl toce the r .. Q. Where wa s he immediately before COIll-ing to ,Yake! - A. He wa in )['ll Ichuri a.39. Q. How did he trn.v I [1"OmMunchu ria to',ilke! - He WOOl f rom }Iil1lchuria to Japan byra il road , then to her e by plnne yin n ipnn . T ruk,and li"ajnlein.40_ Q. Whel"!!did he receiva hi orders tellinghim to come to Wake1-.A. He recei ved them inlInnchurin,, . 1 . Q. What is his next highest ecrnnmndar]

- .A. The udmirnl i s h is Den hijlhest commundsrand be get" his orders from Teuk,42. Q. Is it the headquarrei of the FourtllF1 l! tl t? - .A. It i s the Thi t' t;y-F il 'S t Anny Heud.quarters fif Truk,43. Q. How long did he W- ) ' at Trnk? _ A.About '2 Or 3 days. He w, wai ting for a phne.41. Q. Did h reeei VI ' . in rruction from the

Army Headquarters at Trttk "5 to whnt his jobwould be a t Wake' -.A.. When he wen to TrukThi:r t: l' :.Firs t Army Headquarters wa n't thet~ tth.at nme, He 1"el:eive " s in-4P w neh ha d bl'Otl"ht the 1,000 I ;roOP.Jnnulll ' wnnt b k . 1 "dJ ~ It to . Jl tp un 1 "0 1'anotJlIlt 0 .. ' I66. Q. Do h know if more n(l.val personnawas expected! - A .. He doesn t know.f 671, Q. Di d he, after he !Hrive 1 bere, receil '_!t~ut ~ ~r shipments. of guns ;"ms and RIDIIIUIlI'y'lonl_\. ,""". Jul .The ot Jl er troops which came 11 1"nd .TUUl lar b . then lY l"oughl; t he se t hi ng s WltJl .

40

lOcH.G9. Q. Di d th ey bring nuY eousur l defen guns

or heavy anri-nircrnft 1-A. No, the ArlllY didn'thuv nny. .70. Q.Weee the tanks intended fo, ' u e 011 .VakeT l nn d t - .A_.Yes.71. Q. lInd ehamicnl warfare upplies beenbrought inl- A.. No.72 . Q. \Vere ther e IlllJsuppli of gas on tile

is land 1 - ..\._ .A U tJIi~y he d Io r d efe ll!ie Itgn instgil weI'll the ITIILSkl i .

73. Q. J)u,l:iug the . yeur of 1 .Jnnunry 19H 1 .01 .Tllnual'Y 1045 how many Army t roops wer e lostb y r ea onof den t" or d is ease 01 " s ic kn es s! - A _ Hedo e n't know how many were lost durinz thisper iod. but dur ing tha p~I'ioc1 of JlIDO 1041 t~ ep-tomb..r 1945 about 500 died.7!, Q. How m[llly were killed! - A. 00.75. Q. iVl lat wns the Army strength in JUlie194!? - . A . . About ,700.76. Q. How were t .hey c rgan ized-x in to bat tal -ions? - I . . . They Wereorganized into two battal-ions, They wer e broken down into companies , e tc .77. Q. Were the deaths f rom disease and sick-ness in tha AJ'my compnrable to those in the Navy!- A. Iu the beginning the Army lmd 1I10re casual-t i l ' S due to disease hilt toward the end t hey wereabout Bveu.7 . Q. On 1 January 1044 whn WIIS the daily

ration of food to the men? - A. The A 1 " 1 1 1 ) " undhe ~rRvy !!RI'll ou t 720 g rams o f rice p er man pe rday , Vco-etn hles meat fish. et c. were not fixed.He do e 1 1 ' 1 know how rnueh of this type of foodwas raised in the gard en s and the tot al number offi sh eau h t.70. Q. On 1Innuary had t hat bean cut fi nd, if0, what was the n.llownnce] -.A . He snys itwnschanged so of: WI he ClID't r emember. He thinksit was about 520 grams. In the middl e of AugustIn.. ;!, it wn 5 nbou t 300 grfoms, 'rhey received S IIp-plies hOW find than by submarine , nnd they d id notknow how long it wus to Just .o. Q. On 1 .]annal '. \' 1945 wha t WOe tho ration 1- A. It WH bel'ween 30 tl n nd ""G Ogl"lulls-closerto JOG.

L. Q. Did they receive shipment betweenA ug lls t H IH nnd .1nnulIJ")' ] fl 41 i1 - A. Y e , l it e. ,"rlid receiYe shipm(lnts.

2. Q . n,,


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desrroved ufter rhar but he doesn't know t : ? ~~~e.!H . 'Q . Doe s he r emembe r the dates on W 110 \ I.smnll arm a rn rm m if i ou wn destroyerll-.~, o o ~ esmall nrrus a mr nu ni ri on w a s destroyed dur ing ~ e6--7 October 19*3 raids: u nd s uh se qu eu tl y. d ur in gthe raid of the 24th of i\lay 1\l4- !i .he20th of J lme19,.5 and the Ist of AuW!t 1945,smnll a rm s O l 1 l1 n U -nition wa destroved.95. Q. How m~n)-T.5 guns did they ha " e! - A.The \' hnd 5 but on~ wasknocked out ina ra id .9 6 , Q. W i tS the condi t ion of the gun c r ews ofthe Hi guns dur iag J'une l!1-Liisucllh" t tbey couldhandle and land the guns? - A. They were 1I0tab le to move the gun a round, but upon occas ionthey were nbl e to lire th em, They migh t as wellhave not f ired them.

9T. Q. 1 '\ "' ho t w a s t he r ic e ration on the 10th ofJuly 19,.31 - A, 720 grams., They hod lots ofeunned meat n t tha t t ime nn d they didn't have 1 :0go fishing,9 , Wbnt period does he consider the Io w pointof his military efficiency f rom the standpoint ofsupphs of ammun ition and the condi t ion of his

IDeD 1 - A.. J un e 19 45, .also be tw een eptemberand October 19,14they hnd IL very bad period.a D . Q. How did ~heJrecover f rom thnt per iod1- A, The upplies Came in and they were able tof at ten up It bit,100. Q. Of th e 20 planes hot down ho w many

wer e d ive bomber s? - A.He doesn 't !mO\T,101, Q. Ho,," mnny were fighters! - A. Hedoesn ' t know because they u se d t o d it ch t he m WHyout a~sen.102. ~ " Wh er e w as t he army entrenched 1_ A .He ~ny It depends u~on the time, There w e re t woperiods, F rom the tune hea rr ived unt il January

1(144 , they were entrellchedfrom 'he westero dof Wilk es Island to Peueoek Point . With ' "I nl ' th '" h Jll usIlles e avy. od fOllr glll1 positions, D . 'hI I nrl,n g" 6secont p11lSl l fro~ .huun,!"y 1944 to now, the lineswere extended mtdw[(;j' along tbe northenst shoreof ' ir o.ke I sland as tllr, the nnvlli !!lin 'flocated there. " P051 Ions103, Q - Were bis me n employ c l ag infant 'IA. Yes. He hIlS t "n.h :lnd also inmntr ryd -employed them Ilccordingly. y nn helOt Q . Did his men Ih'e n t t hei r p 't'A Y th li d OS I ,10ns 1 -. e, ey ". at their own nUl'.., ,, ., POSI"ons,105, Q.. DId they e"ar live in barracks?Before October 19a, Ulay l ived in f ,- A.barr nck , Ou r or f ive

Amimy's f ood supply w a s d e st ro ye d in 11 dUIll erm . J di . PatH ee l P o in t, After tho,t t l ey Ispersed t he f o Cl {j0.11over in St111lJls l:on>gtl dumps, The h tr ge st I O! ilw n s n ea r the southern shore near the W~tel 'n e ndf runll 'lI" "A" and wa s between the Intel 'l lection fo J "O." TI h . I Qrunwnys "A " nnd , 11 1 e~vy e l l. i bm ' [ li nmu .

nition w u tacked along th e euthern sho!'e i l iond ~ "J\ . " gths w estern en or runway .107. Q, Whnt was the largest amotlnt of r i f l e

ammunition per man at any ona time ~ - A, 1 , 5 0 0rounds per l ight machine gun and 500 rounds pe rrifle,3. In terrogat ion of Tachibara, Soiehi , L t . C omma n de rI J N ,

Duty: Executive Off ice r to Is land Com.. mander.Arrived W ub Is land : Sep tembsf 19 :>3 .A g e: 2 9 y ea rs .

I, Q., Did th e [ L i r raids disrupt the local ~ele,phone syste m? - A., Yas the y dis rupted the t e le -phone c om mu nic ati on s ys te m quite often. Th ete le phone cab les w ere bu ried be tw een 3 and 40 Jhfeet u nderground, and when a bomb would landin t ile -v ic in ity o f th e c able s it w ould B ut the m,The cab les had between 1 10 an d. 5 0 w ir es inside,2 , Q,W.r e you able to repa ir these quick ly a fter

th e raid s ~ - A , It took abo ut 1 d ay to r ep a ir t he m -a , Q , What proport ion of the total damage h e r ere sul ted from naval gunf ire? _ A . About 3 0 p erc en t o f t he total domage wa s caused by naval bem-bardments.,l, Q , When was the power pl an t, located near

t be I sl an d C omma n de r' s headquarters, d e st ro y ed 1- A. Itwas hit by a. 14-inch naval shell on 6Allgus~1945 . This was the only large power planton he Is land.0, Q. When l were thl! wn.ter dis ti llat ion ph.ntsi-. A , 'l 'h cre was one ill the powerhouse nea r ~he

Islnnd Communder's headqu.ar te rs o .n ot he r a bo ut2 5 ()Qfeet eat of Wilkes Ohannel and a t.bird 00the IU1!oon side of 'Wake Island o~posite the northend of the :-r tJ6 ~,or 1- outh rU llway. . ree

_ ' _ Q . DId t he hrge power p lant hoUse , th .!t',kllowntl gllnel'!ltors~ _ A . Ye s , that IS cor7, Q .. Wllich I ' 'nl' distilI ' 've rn t 1e A.merlcao wo."" herles? _ \ , .. t eI .. Jc,-, fhe Japanese built the onl! on rt h,,~oon side of Wake Island opposite the no

c n n . of lb.e ~ orth-South I " U I 1 1 ; I l Y bot it , , , a 5 neverID lsbed or d ' ,. p lcan,Use , Th!! o ther two were A,tl1B42

building IIi Hoel Poi nt which Wit built by theAmericans , consisting of s teel D'f lm work coveredw i th board s , T he whole bonding wfiS fillad withrico and cnnncd goods, and duri nrr the Octob er1943 rui d i I was hj~ and the p rovisions were de'stl'OJed. A ide from this, there was "ory littlednmuge to prov isi ons from ubsequent raids, Heha s 110 "'ay of esti.mating lhe to t" I 11moun t of foodsupplie tha t wor e des troyed.

9, Q, 1Yhy hndn 't the food been dispe rs ed? -A, .A t thut ti me ~hal"wu s the only buileling ill thevicini ~y thnt was suitable fOl'15toring provisions.p until then, 01 h ough they had raids nO W andth en from }HdwflY. the dumnge was sli ght, andth ey didn 't th ink it nee :ory t o disperse ihe sup-plies, and up until t hu time, they had been ~ t tingadequate supplies,10, Q. , ';'~ben was the d ispe rs e I of sma1Ibu i ld -Ulf,'Ss tnrred 1 - . 6 \ . . Alter th e October 19Ja raids.11. Q, l 'i '" s t l1e October 6-7 I'"id the first bigmid here1-_\, 1lS, Up until October 1!l+3therewere quit 11 number of buildi ngs strafed fromPerl Is land e lenr down to Heel Po in t. bnt , lu ring

,he ra i d of Oct ober 1943 they were n11flattenedl ind instead of rebuilding th em , t he y srn r1;e

Dul),; PIMoon Leade.r-October IIl!3-De-ember 194.

ompnny ommamler - DecemberlO-khJllh" 104-5,Exec,,! iva 'Of lke. . to IsI II Il(I Com-m ,lm lel' - July 1 1 1 " . 5 - eptelnher19"'~.A 'I'iv.d Wilke Ts ln llC l : 7 October 1943,

1. Q. When did he come t.o Wtlke Island? - A,He n.nived 'I L Wllkll Islfllld on 7 October 19-13.

43

, ' l 'n en he e,tnlC2. Q. ~1tllwus his jobl - .


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I n D ec em be r 1 9- 1- !h e b e< "o nmc omp nn y C O ll ll un n " I I . ffiC~T under t HIIII JIt!Y be b ec am ~ th e ..xerutH'll 0admiral. . f Wike3. Q. !,bllt were the ,r"p'Lnc-e plans or -'.Island! _ A. He doesn 't know forsLlI 'C. but thlIlkst he y i ~ tl md ed 10 UE(!it for lin nir lind submlll'llIebase. .4.. Q. How muuv N!1r~' personne l did they in-t end to hur e her .. .(- . \_ .1 .500 01 1,000 personucl.,Then he '{fond there Were6 o personnel he'....5. Q. H ow m any A I"m y p ers on nel d id tlle y C OIl-templute having here! - A, He doesn't ~"11011 'much about that, u pt ai n N a ka ji mu , of th e

.Armv, would know, He believes 1.500maximmnund they intended to hove more.6. Q : ~t wa the contemplated personne ltrength of the 2\"'1'1- A. ItWIIS only tI gIH1l'(1

unit. The enurd u nit is compnrnble t o a b at ta l io n .i. Q. Ho w muny n i rc r n ft h a e i th e r con t emplutedhaving !- A. The. maximum number of planesthey hod here wus ~ o fight I'S IIl1d medium bomb-en.. Q. Row WIl'R these planes divided accordingto Army and X > L \ ' )' type p lanes? - A.They didn' t

have allY Army p lanes . The re as on f or this WIISthat ihey had to IIe longrnuge plnnas,9. Q. ,1'hut \\"11 the break-down in types of

planes? -.~.15 or 16 fighter planes and 40medimnbombers.10. Q .. For whar pnrpcse were the bombers to00 used 1 - A. The planes were to be used ill lIlebombing of Midway.lL Q.. How much hel and oil was there on

~;md? - A. He does not know. Anything rala-nve to plane he knows noth ing about. He hasnever had nnything to do with airplanes ,12. Q, How Wa s ~he island supplied with fuel?- A. InOctober 104->the plan wereto be! lowll

IUlre and the fuel the~'llnd stored here. om~ wa sbrought in b) submarine. On nccount of A.meri -crtIl pau :, ls , . nt fuce emft cou ld not get in, Thl ll 'eWere qmte n fe, ," bombs and shells ored hAf t er a n ti -o . ix c r- J .f t b ll l" m ge s , shells go t low ~ r e tone i:ime!l ubmnrine brought in .hells. nn ..13. Q. When dil l she ll s get low 1 - A \ebthe last o f Mny or June In-l4 12 em 'sbol1 "t Ial i tI 0 b b' ~ "go own eto er 19U".1I manne b"OIl" Jl t lry .. . d" . .. '" -ClTlmnmu.mtlon nn ,,5=mmu.nltion. In Ju.ly 1944 f dbecame low a lld the men 50 wefi .1. tbat th . 00not hnndle 12 em runmunition. ey could14. Q .. \\7ben WIIS t.he1llStshipment of Ii .m o n, . .nd by what. means~ - A 7 t bmmunl-. ep em 111'19-14,

_ A . H e h ad n et l ~ en rd l U 1y th JI I~ nb(lut.it bu t th'PI 'SOImel thought. It was It good idea. 'p J6. Q. flu e! th ey contemphtted bUiJtlin. .1 1 A H 1 . .. niln D ch oT 1l ga f or snrps : - . 1 3 (0 66 11 ~ ! nI OW fsure. but he think thnt they were go0g to dred;the lngoon because they had rouble I n U l ll O R (l in gships,17. Q. l\ hut were the plans fo r' the stlbmarines 1_ .A . He think that t h ey plann (I to use the la:goon u u submarine?H and IInehol ' l l ! !e . Til.In~Goll wus to bemude JAto lUI a.nchol'lIge for ship>u,; 'lorger than ubrnarines and DEs.1. Q. WfiS Wake intende I I lS II S fn gi ng a re afor nircrnft ? - A. Since thi s was .Jllp..n's enste rnoutpost this \ '11 no t contemplated.]9. Q. . Was Wake intended for purposes of

nrids o n 0 11 1'shipping] - A. He thinks t 1 1 e y wer~to useWake I1S u submarine base for miding n l l i e dshipp ing, He doesn t WII.nt to be quoted und in'tsure,2Q. Q . Wa s lVl lke intended for '.L jumping of f

p oint fo r II fu tu re a S5 11 ll 1t? - A. He s ays tb ut itwas tobe u sed a s H [ump ing o ff point for a n a t tn o kon Midway.21. Q. Had thy setup long nlllge reconnnis-

ssnce pat rols from WIll-e? - A. Long l " U , l l g e pp -trols Ii"", f rom l~oi to 'Val,e nn d buck, Sometimespatrols would go to Roi ..nd sometimes to Truk.They l iewasec to r pa tro l ar ound the i sland .22. Q .Were these i sland used as l ist en ing pos t~on 0111' radio tmnsmission 1 _ A. The)' used fa

lis ten to our submal' ines and take bea"in~.23. Q. Di d the}' use uny of tI, i information forattacks to be launched froin this i sh tnd' l - A .

'When they would fix allied ship 01' subm'Ll'ill eEL h " y would infol 'l1l the M n I' l 'alls n nd Truk.24 . Q. From whll~ isl!ll1cl would ~ h e o rt le r i.o

rrttuc1. come? _ A. Itwould come frol11 Trnk, IIw as th e It adrjll:Il'tel'S of thl) 4 b Flee.25 . Q. At wlmt time WitS h mnsirnllll1 ] 1 u l n b s r

of P'! l ' l rurtneIhere I_A. Th e end of 19d-1Ibe large S '; ~D1 01 1 nt o f a i r cm ft Ill]d p erso lln I w ere hO I:e .

. Q . How Inllny1_ A. He doesn't knoll.27 . Q. ~V ll ~ n d id ~ h e Al',ny f ir st c om e t o W ak al:- A.!n tim middl of 1042 t i , e ArlllY C l U n G {orrha"not L lllle. .. 211. Q . IVbal "' l iS the lnl'O'l!st n umber- of , A . r l1llpersonnel here? _ A. I was a.roLUld1,2{10or 1 ,5~ .

2 f t ! ] ' Q . W h a t twe l l s were raided by Wilke Brera. l-A Th . d It)'. 0 011]y long rlLoge w a s l I< Ii , " I ' 44

they could re tu rn to ( he i \fl l, .shnl ls and Gilbert ;s .31. Q. \\rhen were nvin ion personnel nnd nir -crpf~ evacuated, \ l' lly ? - A. Th In t planes and,til' personnel Ief t i11.r'U)Il Il .I ' :I ' liJ.J4; they were rnkento 'I'ruk, It WlS only one plane.32. Q . lVheo were most of the plan S evacu-

,tteu ? - A. InOct ob e r 1 94 :3 ; t he re w er 20 planes1 1 1 1 1 > 1 1ncluding f ighters und bom b e l 'S . , \ f e w planeswere taken 0 'I'ruk, plane car ne back f rom Tl"I Jkto get the remaining personnel.33. Q. WlII,t dnles were t ile most severe ail'm ic 1s ? - 1 0 \ . . There was quite u severe ail' mid inFebrUlLry 1942 and ther WIIS one during ept em-

b I' 1943. TIler were severe air raids On the 6tllund 7th of Oct ob e r lOll-S.24th of :lIfn)'-HIM. .Iune,July, und Augus t 19# these raid w e l' a q u it e ef-fective.34. Q, How IIlfl"y per sonnel were injur ed inthese l'llids1- A.He doesn't know nbout..A.J"mybut

ljW to 130 "'111'


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11. Q. To w h a t e xte nt w a the fuel supply dam m a m d e r w a s d es t1 'O y ed b y fires caused b" in '.. Al'l' ind Wa.ke Island : December 1942. H. Q.Wha naval off icer has been 011 the islandlI" ed by Amer iC lln ra id ! _ A. _\ppros ima tc ly 51i d ia ry bombs. !!en Age: 2S years. the 10ngestl- . Be does not know, but he him-ton were destroyed. h d till. Q. Row did bombings and nil' raids reduce self and officers of similar Rtegory have been here12, Q. How was the fllel tored 1 - A. Itwas 26. Q. What WIIS tea e t ey completed th . supphe 1 - A. Originally food was tored above the longest.widely dispersed underground indeposit ofabout underground strllctUJ"l'.s! - A. By February IDolr ground but a f t e r the October 1943 mid which 15. Q . W h a t officers wer h e r e when he came11 ron each. the m a j o r part of i t was c o m p l e t e d . Ifplans h -1 4 cau ed con sid erable damage foodstuffs were stored - A. Be coul d not trunk of any.13. Q. RoW" much aviation gas i on the island g on e a s li la y had expected, t h e o nstructio n w e ~ ~ ill trenches which WfI.!"ecovered over with ditt and 16. Q. Was .\dmir,,] nkaibara here when heoo,d _ A ..,\.bout!lOO tons, have gone o n indeJ~ni te ly , bUL,be.Cllllse of t h e c~t. were not s t l "Ol lg enough to withstnnd direct hits. came? - A. The ndmiral came wit~ him in De-l~. Q.Ho w milch foodwass to red onthe i sland / l ing 0([ of suppli es all bll lJdlTlg const rU~l ion 2. Q .. How was food trnnsported ~ - A. Food eember 1942._ A. A month fl!!O there WIISU )fj.duy food supply sto pped about : .'lInrch 19t. For many month! was monad by trucks, 17. Q. D i d he handle supplies for naval avia-

and this WI1$ratk.ne-d SOi l' 10estO


28/66

"162""l - A. He has forgotten: , e _ A He35. Q.How many bombe rs iu 15_ I .does not know, b I36 . Q. mlllt types of 6ghte and OOIll ers -. . - d Z Ii J ters Th e bomberA. Mitsnblsil. l tI} ls an ""1"0 g I ".was a land bomber. and had two el lglll5. 3-, Q. Did the strength go up 01' dO\~11dnrmgthe 61 'S t ye nr! - A . It di d go down stelld.l),.

_ Q.Did replacements co me in ince 1 9 4 2 .1 -A, He thinks t hey sen t both r ep il ic em en ts f OI "pIlotsnnd planes,39. Q. How many were t hey nbla to evncuate?- A- About 10planes.~ O . Q. HoW "muu~' planes were destroyed on th efield I-AHe does not know, but quite a few..n. Q. How mn.ny planes were destroyed oncombat miss ions ! - A.He thinks, even though hehad no relation with operation, that morethan 30planes were des tr oyed becnu e new planes kep tcoming ll!.42. Q. How did our bombing a ff ect repai r and

mnintannnea 01 ' planes 1 - A. When the planesWill'll here there was no bombing,4.3. Q. 'When did they m 01


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17. Q. Were. tbes set- desr,r7~yrn.id ill the Truk~. ~ A. Yes .. Itis CRSY to ge .t!t, m._:gQ~gh 1!l,Ui. 17. Q. Wllilt 'U' " YOI lI ' feelings ill regards toB th f these sets were dLlD1Uge .t T1'eel ~ -. ".. II. Q. 1~1)ich i"l"nl were " ( IL l 011 ' l l II,,, t ime of . I k I I \_ Id I ik t to o r - - . . 115 The set It n ""'IJk. Itis ve r y d i f fi c ul t to get replll.lll, h o \ \ , o \ . , " ' ~ . ' 0 ~olllg,,,c 10111".-.. WOII 1 -e 0 re urn 0:fall of 19-H, and 3 " " , 1 l 1 I n . ' The set al l Peal e u 1 ,r !ho firing! - ~\. 011 Penle Islund. .In pan ns S O O J l L l S possible,PO; '. lt " -" . ec om p l" t nl , ,d e ; ;t ro y e {h l . . .L lIl'l"'I)- uuwenlakeitwor{. '7 Q IT I'll~ O~ " = U~ .. " 'ow m uny m en w ere {J at ! dUI'illg I his 1 '. Q, What rUJI! 't ions

-.A..Th e IIllvy ha d fivennd th e fllr forceshacl m CI:Ibusef t h e l ! l. . ckof f ood I1nd supplies; 'e d e C O ' !_ . l I have c e ll ! le d , u l ld ,,,ill riot talk of ; l r lpal l 's los.ing.)The" hlld lea t he se t wo b eh in 1 ~ o. IlCtl f ~ 'f IW I ''" ..... A U Se 0 the n av nl g un fi re we rece l of t i l ! 16. Q. iV h II di d .\,011 "_"peeL t '" AlIlPI'IC,UlS toII : ili!A re the y sti ll in u ~ - A,Yes , W8 s t i l l ~ en Cl ln W ll l' sh ip s; an d thirdly, b ew;US I l d . I. recllpll11'O) 1V"k" 151 " 1 1 d I-A. I e xpec ted L he

abJect condition o f the t roops o n th e l.laPgeneral, the enti te group felt as I :felt.

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9~ Interrogarien of Kurihayashi, Kumas abura, Sea-m'o llc, IJ N

D lItJ: )10ehinisr.AI"'; v..d '" uke Isluud : September 1!l43.Ab' ll : 32 years,

1. Q. \Y ere ou ever told by anvone t.hat i n theevent of your C; lp tu re by th e ,,\,lll>lic:ms you wouldbe t o r tured and killed! - ~\_,~o. I wns never101,1.2. Q. "I"I'ere you In'el' inSITl l r ied by nnyone to

com'l l i t se l" f -des t I'ucliol\ n lth 'r 11 I .11 ubmlL to t 'l1P'IUI'" if I he sitnntion "PI>eal'e to subiitimLiate \,OUI' bll-Ii rii, if lilly 1 - ~\ . S uch subject ,lid noL~IlL'1myll1in


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wnr. All r , C I l heard is thu] t he t wo C Q nn tr ip s 1 I" "estopped fil!'hting, hut nOllI'ked only 4 J 10 [I I'S ILda j'" bu t IstlII'was not complete IY well, "nd other~ C,Il m ay Ita v~ worked m o! 'C , ('Th ism" n has ooenIn ill health .!!lee nrri,'"l, '"nd has repoJ'led 10 sickcnll regularly for l!'~"tment),

Reg" ,~i ing deuths of Americnn prisoners in miduf 6-7 Odob.1' (!J .f ,~ ,

(Excel'pl 'from WAR CRIJ\IESIN\'ES'l'IG ATION)(~~I the t,lmc or the Am""!cnn raid o r 6-7 a,eto-bel ' 1043. there were npproximnte ly 100 Amel' lcun

c iv ili un pr isoners on the i sl und , Dur ing t im [a id,they were uppal 'enrly placed ill 2 shelters , one ofw], icli , aeeordinl;' to the .J ' ' i 'nneSAl, suJfereil 11directhit, killing all within it . ' Pi le .Japanese descriptiono f tho fate o f (he o the rs fol lows i)On tile morn ing of !I October 191B, 1Vn.ke WIlS

s ubjected to an American mid. Arou. nd noon"report W I! S (,!len ived 'It the cernrna 11d post to theef lee l that one o f tho 'IiI' r ai d she lte rs in which theAm er ic an p ri so ne rs were lmd been destroyed by adi"act hit, 'I 'h at e, en i.ng duri ugn lul l in t .l le midworking parties were dispatched to the she,lter tocligout 11ny sunri VOJ 'S who might bep resen t. How-e ,' 6I ', 0 II were found to have been killed, Aboutthis l,jme" dispatch wu s received from Rot u whichiudicntsd throt un American landing could be ex-pected u, t ,m.\' moment, Since telephone l ines con.necting Hil Ildq '1I1rtel~ with Peale Island had beensevered, it \\ '01S cons idared necessary to lllwe a re-spans ibl a o ffi cer in cb'Hge for t he de fense o 't thati sland , Therefore, I wns sen t to Pel1i .e I sland andmy knowledge of whnt happened to the remaindero f t he Am.Br ;cnns i s pure hen rsay . 'Wllml I re-turned r WIS told that in the e"ening of 7 October1943" soldiel' shouted i n u loud voica in the vicinity0'[ the command post tba t the America]l prisonershn d run Im'ny. Captain Sn.k;niOIl.I'n. then is suedorders , d i " ea t ing the command plntoon to recapturetho pr,lsonnand l .! I ' TacMoa l '(J . 'a StaMment

dO~ 22D.ecember 1.9:15,Rear Admiral SakaibiJ,ra" h ll tl aa thut 1l1e " '- . .d . ,,,!'ego'ng s ta~emel1t was fll .l sa1 1 1 1 thut, on l'O cto [ . 1" I . 'for II ;., 1ar ,, 43.,1 e h" d 1ssuad all orderlC execu tIOn. of DO Amedon]l oiv ili l ln war

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mn,nd ll lg ~l1icel'of" ! , e ,~dqmLrtGI'S company as wel lns Illy UC~Ulg execu tIve olJiae": 'Osing men of Iehendqnnr tera (;Oll]pnllY "l)pl'Opriutllly nut! aL "p lr.ee whicl~ ~"iIInot u~te l 'J1a"e with 0111'posiLi.ons,osecuec by hnLlg squad ail p riso ne rs o f w nr.' I WIISconvineed tlmt Ih~Aone,-icnns hat! conl.U.otwith theouts ide wor ld . ' I' hey had been seen wnvino- hand-kerchiefs a~UnHed ~ales l ,june; ;


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ANNEX B

Section 2 . . ~ Maps

1. . Gf !t i ." "m lR e f e r. e -, n (( ,Ma p , 'a, Th e Pad U (A r ca .). \ 'Vak~Ld:l1indand Surrcundlng At~~4.M2 P of J apanese r

USSBS Report 74, The Reduction of Wake Island

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Transcript of USSBS Report 74, The Reduction of Wake Island