USSBS Report 22, Hitachi Aircraft Company

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 22, Hitachi Aircraft Company

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYA-

Hitachi Aircraft Company(Hitachi Kokoki KK)

CORPORATION REPORT NO. VII(Airframes and Engines)

Aircraft DivisioaFebruary 1947


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Hitachi Aircraft Company(Hitachi Kokuki KK)

CORPORATION REPORT NO. VII(Airframes and Engines)

Aircraft DivisionDate of Survey:November 1945

Date of Publication:February 1947

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APR ^'^'

This report was written primarily for the use of the JJnited States StrategicBombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensivenature. Any conchisions or opinions expressed in this report must be consid-ered as hmited to the specific material covered and as subject to further inter-pretation in the ligiit of further studies conducted by the Survey.

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FOREWORDThe United States Sti'iitcgic Bombing wasby the Secretary of War on 3 Novem-

1944, pursuant to a directive from tlie lateRoosevelt. Its mission was to con-

an impartial and expert study of the effectsour aerial attack on Germany, to ])e used in

with air attacks on Jjipan and to estab-sh a basis for evaluatmg the importance and poten-

of air power as an instrument of militaryfor planning the future development of

United States armed forces and for determm-future economic policies with respect to the

defense. A summary report and somesupporting reports containing the findings ofSurvey in Germany have been published.On 15 August 1945, President Truman requestedthe Survey conduct a similar study of theof all types of air attack in the war againstsubmitting reports in duplicate to theof War and to the Secretary of the N avy.

officers of the Sm-vey during its Japanesewere:Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.PaulH. Nitze,Hemy C. (Alexander, Vice Chairmen.Harry L. Bowman,J. Kenneth Galbraith,Rensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,Fred Searls, Jr.,Mom-oe E. Spaght,Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,Theodore P. Wright, Directors.Walter Wilds, Secretary.

The Survey's complement provided for 300

civilians, 350 officers, and 500 (uihsted men. 'i'iiemilitary segment of the organization was drawnfrom the Army to the extent of 00 perceni, andfrom the Navy to Ww extent of 40 percent. Boththe Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos-sil)l(^ assistance in furnishing men, sui)j)lies, trans-port, and information. The Suivey operatedfrom headquarters established in 'i'okyo early inSeptember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with niol)ileteams operating hi other parts of Japan, the islandsof the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartimeJapanese military planning and execution, engage-ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign,and to secure reasonably accurate statistics onJapan's econoiiiy and war production, plant l)yplant, and industry by industry. In addition,studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strate-gic plans and the background of her entry into thewar, the internal discussions and negotiations lead-ing to her acceptance of unconditional surrender,the course of health and morale among the civilianpopulation, the effectiveness of the Japanesecivilian defense organization, and the efl'ects of theatomic bombs. Separate reports will be issuedcovering each phase of the study.The Survey mterrogated more than 700 Japanese

military, government, and industrial officials. Italso recovered and translated many documentswhich not only have been useful to the Survey,but also will furnish data valuable for otherstudies. Arrangements have been made to tm-nover the Survey's files to the Central InteUigencegroup, through which they will be available forfurther examination and distribution.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

Hitachi Aircraft Co. (Corporation Report No. VII)The Corporation and Its Importance in the Aircraft In-dustry 1The Air Attacks 6

Production Statistics =, 6Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence 8Appendix A. Planned, Actual, and Capacity Production Facing p. 8

Hitachi Chiba (Plant Report No. VII-1) 9Hitachi Tachikawa (Plant Report No. 11-2) 47


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THE CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRYThe lli(!i(lii Aiicrafl ('o. (irilMclii Kokiiki K K),

of bolli cn^rincs iiiul iiirfViiiiics, oixTiilcdpliiiits. Fioin Jiiniiiiry 1041 iiiilil (lie end of (lie

till' coiiipniiy produced 1:5,571 aircrnfl ciifiincs14 (ypcs, rcpi-cscntiiif;- 1 l.(i pcrcculof all ('iii;iii("S

l)y Japanese manufacturers during- that,The airframes division produced 1,783of 4 types, or 2.(3 percent of Japaneseproducetl from January 1941 llirougli1945.

The cori)()ration prinei|)ally was concei'ucdthe i)roduction of small engines for training

and also the assembly of trainer aircraft.tlie end of the wai- attempts were made

bring Ilitaciii into the pi-oduction of combatand combat aircraft engines, but theending of the wai- found production of

in a relatively experimental status (Table 1).T.\BLE 1. List of products, Hitachi Aircraft Co.

AIRFRAMES


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Scliiiiicll cslalilisJicd olliccs at the ('liilm jjluiiLtho purpose of aiding plant engineers in estab-

mass ])r(i(liietion assenibly line (celiniciues.ideas advanced by Seliniidt wei-(^ \v(^ll re-

and sections of the Cliiba i)laiil werelo jji-oduction of this n(>\v airci'aft. Due

seai'city of building materials, tlu^ general con-created \>y dispersal, and the raj)id end of

war, the j)rojeete(l ])lans never materialized.the company ])roduce(l equijnuent for

the services, the Army and Navy each hadand supervisors working with the com-

Ciovernmeut insix'ctors ])erformed routineand acceptance duties but did not

financial duties at any time. Hitachi'sefforts to fulfill contracts removed all

for government operation, and noial interest was shown exec])! by the Army infor till' development of the Ha-51 engine antlXaval interest in develophig the Cliiba plant

assemble Frances.

Organization and operationThe nniin ollici' n{' tiic llilaclii Aircraft Co. was

located in Tokyo. Tii


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Within tlu- fompany, tlu' Tatlukawa plant wasthe largest engine pioducer and the Chiba plantthe largest producer of airframes. The Omoriplant, from late 1942, had berime a "feeder"plant for Chiba engine production, and productionat Omori was rechiced to tlie complete assembly ofonly one engine, the Temjiu 1 o.The Ilaneda plant had been engaged in the

production of trainers (tyi)es 'A. 14, and 9.'!) u]) tolate 1944. At that time il loo became a feeder])lant for Chiba and concentrated on the assend)lyof parts for the trainer A6M5K (Zeke) and for thefighter A6M5 (Zeke).To aid in the assembly of airframes at the Chiba

plant, the Haneda plant transferred many workersto tills new company plant in November 1944.Similarly, the Omoii jilant had sent many trainedworkers to Chiba to oi-ganize the engine assemblylines.

Tiie Kawasaki plant always remained purely acasting foundry supplying Tachikawa, Chiba, andOmori until it was destroyed by B-29s in an areaattack on 1.5 April 1945. The plant produced bothahuninum and magnesium alk\y cylinder heads,reduction gear housings, crankcases, and casingsfordistributors, oil and fuel pumps, and carburetors.

Tiie Hitachi Aircraft Co. reached peak employ-ment iu September 1944. In that month 34,277|)eo|)!e were employed, 13,896 at Tachikawa,1 i ,978 at Chii)a, 4,576 at Omori, 2, 852 at Hanetla,and 97.5 at the Kawasaki foundry (fig. 3). Fromthai time tnitil Feltruary 1945 employment atChiba conliiuied to rise, reaching 14,467. Tachi-kawa employment remained fairly constant l)uteni|)ioyment at the 3 small iilants di'opped sharply.From Fel)ruary 1945 until tiie end of the war,air raids and dispersal caused a continued declineat all ])lants.There ai)|)eare(l to l>e no set company policy

on the use of single v nniltiple shifts of employeesat the various plants. Policy eliangcd at eachlocation.The T.Mcliikawa ])lant used a single-shift basis

(11 hvjin-s) until .November 1943 and then changedto two 12-hour shifts when govei'mnent orders forI lie lia ]3Ko and na-26 engines increased heavilyat that time. In September 1944 the plant man-agement again r'hanged the system to thice shiftsof 8 hours each and continued on lli.-it basis untilthe end f)f (lie war.

Tiie Chiba plant used dilVeicnt systems for eachdivision. The airframe division worked on a sin-gle 9-hour shift basis until October 1944 llien

chat\gcd to two r2-hour shifts and worked untilMay 1945 on that basis. In May it revertedback to the single shift system The engine divi-sion always used the two-shift basis.The Omori engine plant used a single 8-hour

shift until Februaiy 1944. From February untilJuly 1944 two 10-hour shifts were used and fromJuly 1944 until May 1945 the addition of studentlaborers prompted the management to convert tothree 8-hour shifts. From May 1945 until theend of the wai' the plant reverted back to a singh8-hour shift. "Haneda and Kawasaki used the single-shift

basis at all times.The dispersal programThe Hitachi Aircraft Co. began plans for exten-

sive dispersal in Decend)er 1944. Initial govern-ment orders to disperse were received at that timeand the directors of the company assuuKMl theresponsiliility for achieving the dispi'rsal.

Individual plant managers actually chose thesites for dispersing their own activities. The tw(largest plants, Chil)a anel Tachikawa, chose mainljunde'iground and se^miunderground locations ancused school builelings to a great extent (USSBSAircraft Division, Reports VII-1 and VH-2).Haneda and Omori plamied to disperse to build

ings near the parent plants in the hope that thesismall shops, although adjacent to the alreadybombed plants, would not lie bombed again.The Kawasaki fotuidry at first planned to con-

tinue production in buildings near the' plant, huthe increasing tempo of air attacks on the Kawasaki see'tion forced the management te) abandorthis policy and to ])lan to utilize some of the sitefselee'ted by tiie Tachikawa engine plant.

Like other aircraft companies, the Hitachi Costressed inadequate transportation as the chieipioblein in completing its dispersal plan. Manjmachine' tools were' spre'ael throughout the' e'oimtry-lside, abande)neel by drayage e'om|)anie's that wereforced to use' true'ks and oxcarts for otlu-r purposesin the' summe'r of 1945. Particularly in the Oamise'e'tion (a Cliilia elispe'rsal site') countless machineswe're' te) be' see'ii e)n siele re)aels anel on railwaj;sielings, lielativcly sle)w progre-ss of the Oami,Ye)ke>ta, and Yasliima (uniU'l syste'Uis was attribu-ted to lack of labor aiul elynamite. '{^

Labor e'onditions at the elispersal plants wercSsaid to be' be'tter since the emi)loye'e's we're' workingunder less mental sli'iiin and lost less time fromllieir work (hie to !ilerls and attacks.


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Offii'iiils of the company found it ilifiicult toestimate tlio ('(foct of disporsal on company pro-ihiction, due to llic fact that air attacks and alerts,as well as dispersal, caused losses in the sameperiod. Coupled with the air attacks against othercompani(>s upon whom Hitachi was dependent forsupplies, an assessment of relative loss due todispersal was doubly hard to compute. A figureof 15 percent was expressed as "only an ajiproxi-mation."The Oami tuimel system, chief dispersal site of

the Chiha air-frame plant, was an extremely elabo-rate and well-planned unit. The entire excavatedsite contained an area of 483,720 square feet. Itwas approximately 40-percent completed, and thewell-l)uill tunnels and semiunderground shopspromised to become one of the blotter dispersalplants in the Empire.The Vasliima undergrouml factoi-y, one of the

plaimed dispersal sites of the Tachikawa plant,was to contain 248,500 square feet, which wouldhave made it one of the biggest und(>rground fac-tories in the aircraft industry. At the end of thewar the Yashima factory was ajiproximately 20-percent completed.

THE AIR ATTACKSAir attacks against the Hitachi Aircraft Co.

plants caused a jjioduction loss of a])proximately70 percent. Since all live plants were located intill' liiuhly iiiilnstrialized Tokyo-Chiba region,attacks against the area were the greatest factorin Hitachi's production loss.Damage to the Tachikawa plant was tiie most

serious blow to the production cajjacity of thecompany (USSBS Aircraft Division, Report Vll-2)since Tachikawa was its principal engine producer.The attacks against this plant on 17 February and24 April 1945 rendered the plant completely in-operative. Physical damage to the plant wasii|)pnixiruiil('ly 50 percent.The Cliiba i)lant was only superficially damageil

by tiie three attacks made against it. Physicaldamage to the plant was negligible, only one build-ing, a guardhouse, being damaged (USSBS Air-craft Division, Report No. VII-l).The Haneda |)lant was damaged only once, in

the Xavy strike against the Ilaneda airfield on17 February, and damage was negligible. Attacksagainst the area, however, were so intense thatmachines and assembly lines were removed to.small buildings within the plant eonipoiind. Thisform of dispersal was efreet


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PLANNED, ACTUAL, a CAPACITY PRODUCTIONMAY 1939 AUGUST 1945

HITACHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY/l/^^^^/iffJ iyy///OA/ ^r^^j9*3rv^.


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CHIBA PLANT REPORT No. VlI-1(Airframes and Engines)

TABLE OF CONTENTSPasjeThe Plant and Its Function in the Airckaft Indisthy 10

Attack Data 20Effects of Bombing 20Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence 35Vulnerability 35Appendix A. Map of Plant, with Bomb Plot Facing page 36Appendix B. Organization of Plant 37Appendix C. Flow Chart, Airframes Facing page 38Appendix D. Flow Chart, Engines 39Appendix E. Employment Statistics _. 40Appendix F. Orders vs. Receipts, Raw Materials 41Appendix G. Orders vs. Receipts, Components 41Appendix H. Suppliers of Raw Materials and Components 42Appendix 1. Planned, Cajjacity, and Actual Production Statistics. 42Appendix -T. Analysis of Air Attack Damage 43Appendix K-1 . Dispersal Program, Engines 43

K-2. Dispersal Program, Airframes 44K-3. Dispersal Map No. I 45K-4. DispersalMapNo.il 46


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THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRYIntroduaion

Cliiha, the newest and largest of the 4 plants ofthe Hitachi Aircraft Co. (Hitachi Kokuki K K),produced both engines and airframes. It beganproduction in April 1942. The plant contained41 buildings, with a floor area of approximately2,209,838 square feet (Appendix A). It was en-cased in the assembly of the A6M5K Zeketrainer, the Tempu 11, Tempii 21, and Tempu 31engines, and planned to assemble the bomberPlYl (Frances) and the fighter A6M5 (Zeke).The Chiba plant was located on reclaimed land

about 2 miles south of the city of Chiba, on TokyoBay. Construction of the plant began in February1941 and was completed in April 1942 (Photos 1, 2,3, and 4). The period from April 1942 to July1944 was devoted to organizing the plant, trainingemployees, setting up machine shops, installingproduction lines, and to manufacturing small partsfor the Oniori plant, another Hitachi plant locatedin the Tokyo suburbs. The first aircraft wasbuilt in July 1944, and the first engines, Tempu21*8, were completed in August 1944.The ])lant was divided roughly in half, the north-

ern part used for engine, and the southern part forairframe assembly, with a combined floor area of1,671,735 square feet. This figure excludes anoffice, dining hall, repair shop, and a projectedstore room, machine shop, and sheet-metal shopwhich were the initial 1)uildings of a new additionbeing constructed for the assembly of Frances.The entire area south of buildings 16 and 23 wasto be devoted to work on this aircraft, and newland was to be reclaimed at the southwest cornerof the plant on which to construct additionalbuildings. It iiad lieen planned to begin asseml)lyof Frances in February 1946, but this did not allowfor the effects of air attack and dispersal.The Hitachi Cori)oration received instructions

from the Naval Air Board in November 1938 toexpand their facilities, and began the search for anew site at that time. In Novemb(>r 1940, it wasdecided to reclaim tiie land south of Chiba, and acontract was made between the Hitachi corpora-tion and the Chiba citv office. Actual work in-10

volved in reclaiming the land was not started untilFebruary 1941, and in October Hitachi receivedpermission from the governor of Chiba prefectureto lay the foundations of the plant.

Erection of plant buildings began in November1941. In April 1942 the Naval Branch orderedHitachi to plan for expansion over original build-ings for the assembly of the Zeke fighter, and inOctober 1943 the company was ordered to con-struct the additional buildings for the assemblyof Frances. The physical construction of theplant was financed by the Hitachi Holding Co.

All products of the Chiba plant were producedfor the Navy. Production of the A6M0K Zeketrainer began in August 1944 (Photo 5), that ofthe A6M5 Zeke fighter was planned for August1945, and that of the PlYl bomber (Frances) forFebruaiT 1946. Production of the Tempu 21engine began in July 1944, of the Tempu 31 inNovember 1944, of the Tempu 11 in April 1945,and of the Tsu 11 in May 1945. In the case of theTsu 11, Chiba served as a modification centerwhere the Italian Campini type jet unit wasproduced and fitted to Hatsukaze 1 1 engines sentin by the Navy, the resulting engine being redesig-nated Tsu 11 (Photos 6, 7, and 8).Note.The Tsu 11 engine was intended for the Oka

22 (Baka) suicide plane, which differed from Oka 11 inthat it was jet-propelled instead of rocket-propelled.Plant organization and operationThe ciiief of the Chiba plant, Kajiio Ideta, was

also an executive director of the eor|joration.Immediate responsibility at the ])lant fell uponYusaku Fukada, head of the airframe factory, andHiroshi Moroi, cliicr of the engine factory (ap-jjendix B).Both divisions of the ])lant were organizetl for

mass production. The airframe division in partic-ular was modeled after the Nakajinui plant atKoiztmii. The front, center, and rear fuselageassemblies were ])laeed on a wooden-rail systemaliout 4 feet above the floor, and were staged alongthe rail until they rolled off completely assembledand ready to be transported by barge to the


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Photo 1CHIBA PLANT.General view of the buildings of the engine division photographed from theadministration building.

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Photo 2CHIBA PLANT.General view of the buildings of tfie airframe division photographed fromadministration building. Note the dismantled buildings that were being removed to dispersal sites.

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mm 11.jlS^

Photo 3CHIBA PLANT.Newly constructed engine test cells at the Chiba plant (four stands).

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Photo 4CHIBA PLANT.Interior view of the engine test cells.

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5CHIBA PLANT.Side view of the Zeke trainer manufactured by the Chiba plant showing the installation of anauxiliary fin necessary to reduce flutter in the tail section caused by the addition of after cockpit and the added"greenhouse" on that type trainer.

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Photo 6CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of additional impeller ring added to Ha-11 engine for conversion tothe Tsu 1 1 type, for installation in Oka 22 (Baka) suicide plane.

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7CHIBA PLANT.Front view of the Campini type turbine that was added to the Ha-11 engine in orderto construct the Tsu 1 1.

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Photo 8CHIBA PLANT.General view of the assembled Tsu 1 1 engine.

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PRODUCTION SCHEDULEZEKE TRAINER (AGM 5-K)

J S STRATEGIC 90WBIWG SUHVEYHrTACHI AIRCRAFT CO.

CHIBA PLANTnoURE 2

January 1945, when a rate of 126 units per monthwas attained.Rebuilding and repair of airplanes and/or enginesNo rebuildiuo; or repairing of airphines or

engines was done at Cliiha. The produetion ofM'su 1 1 engines, however, was in reality a modifica-tion. Ha-11 engines which had originally ))e


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TEMPU 31PLANNED a ACTUAL PRODUCTION

NOV. I4-JUNE 1949

M iCHANIOAL

a3.sTH*Ttaic aomiwa uffvt>HrrACHI AIRCRAFT CO.

OHIBA PLANTF19URE 4

As none of the direct attacks on tlio main plantwore very effective', the practical value of the pre-cautions cannot be accurately judged, but it seemsim])robable that miK'h could have been accom-j)iished in the event of an accurate and effectiveattack oji the main plant.Interruption to production due to alerts

Altiiough physical damage to the plant wasnegligible, interruptions, caused by air-raid warn-ings, were a serious obstacle to jjroduction.The Tokyo industrial area, which included C'hil)a,was a target foi' frequent attaclcs and the j)lantwas warned whenever Allied air and naval forceswere in the vicinity. As a result, time loss due toalerts in July 1945 exceeded time s])ent in ])i()(luc-tion (Fig. 7).Interruptions to production due to area attacks

'i'he principal effect of area attacks was theincrease in absenteeism. Whenever planes W(>rei'ej)orted in tiie area the factory was warned, andworkers left in large numbers and were slow inreturning. If the homes of workers were destroyedor damaged, they took time off to find places tolive or to repair damages.

TEMPU II a TSU IIPLANNED a ACTUAL PRODUCTION

APRIL SEPTEMBER 1945

Tl HPU II (a(VERNMENT I^LANNED PRODUCTION)T^MPU II (ACTUAL PROOMCTION)(GOVI HNMENT PLANNED PROtUCTlONlSTÛ II (ACTllAL PROOUCt'lON)

Jî

T\// \/\

PUNNED PROI UCTIONEX TREMELr P( ORGOVERNMENT PI ANNING*y kOVBt IPT aPARTS f I lOMSUlB-CONTRACT )RS

TOPRÎBUTEO

u.fTW*Te4H: OMiiw u>vmHfTACHI AIRCRAFT CO.

CHIBA PLANTFIGURE S

Secondary effects were the disruption of trans-portation facilities and shipping schedules. Thisresulted in accumulation of finished engines await-ing shipment to users (Photo 12).Interruptions to supplies

Air attacks had a serious effect on receipts o1materials and components. Engine receipts fronKisarazu were very low in April, ^lay, and Juiu1945 because of interruptions in supply fromNakajima. Propeller receipts from Sumitomowere also seriously reduced due to attacks on theSumitomo plant at Kanzaki.The supply of instruments of all types waf

seriously curtailed in July, while special steeltubmg, bars, and light alloy metals of all ty])es;were in extremely critical shortage because ofattacks against Sumitomo's Amagasaki plant,Mitsubishi's steel plant at Fukagawa, and the!general attacks against the metal industries of'Kobe. IAttempts to find new sources of su])i)ly were'lunsuccessful since small factories were affected by j:area raids and demands of other manufacturers'!were equally pressing. Ii

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INTERRUPTION IN PRODUCTIONDUE TO AIR ATTACKS

120

100

80

60

40

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTIONATTACK OF 8 MAY, RECUPERATIOf^

ATTACK OF TJULY'

APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST

120

100

80

60

40


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MONTHLYDUE

MAN-HOUR LOSSTO ALERTS

700000

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000


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9CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of bomb crater from 500-pound bomb dropped in the attack of 10 June 1945.

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Photo 10CHIBA PLANT.Damaged building destroyed during the air attack of 10 June 1945. Damage occurred froma direct hit by a 500-pound bomb. This was the only serious damage to the plant by the attack and did notinfluence production since the building was used as a guard station.

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11CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of earthed-over shelter used by the plant as the headquarters of the air-raiddefense force. All personnel shelters at the plant were of similar construction and appeared to be completelyinadequate.

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Photo 12CHIBA PLANT.View of interior of the main engine assembly shop showing the great number ofTempu 21 engines that were awaiting shipment.

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13CHIBA PLANT.- -Photograph of abandoned machinery resulting from the hurried dispersal programof the Chiba plant. Oami area of Chiba Peninsula.

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Photo 14CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of the entrances to tunnels Nos. 4 and 5 of the Oami tunnel system.

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15CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of machinery installations in tunnel No. 1 of the Oami tunnel system.

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Photo 16CHIBA PLANT.One of many semiiinderground shops located in the Oami area. Close inspection revealsthe ventilator on top of the earthed-over shop and the entrance to the shop may be seen to the left of the photo.

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17CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of a dispersal site in the heavily wooded area outside of the city of Chiba.This particular site, the Miyazaka factory, was one of several dispersal divisions that were located in forests.Natural coverage from the trees and the technique of building the shops without destroying any of the forestincreased the effectiveness of the location.

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Photo 18CHIBA PLANT.Photograph of machinery installations in the forest plant at Miyazaka.

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of plant operationsThe ('liil)a plant cniharkcd u])()ii a very


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CO

ozs)Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing C'omi)anyCorporation Report Xo. IX(Xippon Cakki Seizo KK)

(Propellers)Tachikawa .\ircraft CompanyCorporation Report Xo. X(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)

(.\irframes)Fuki Airplane ComjianyCorporation Report Xo. XI(Fuki Hikoki KK)

(Airframes)Showa Airplane CompanyCorporation Report Xo. XII(Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK)(Airframes)Ishikawajima .Vircraft Industries Company. Ltd.Corporation Report Xo. XIII(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki

Kaisha)(fJngines)Xippon Airplane CompanyCorporation Report Xo. XIV

(X'ippon Hikoki KK)(.Virframcs)Kyushu .\irplane Company

Corporation Report Xo. XV(Kyushu Hikoki KK)(Airframes)Shoda Engineering Company

Corporation Report Xo. XVI(Shoda Seisakujo)(Components)Mitaka Aircraft IndustriesCorporation Report Xo. X \' 1(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)(Components)

*33 Nissan Automobile CompanyCorporation Report A^o. AT///(Nissan Jidosha KK)(Engines)*34 .\rmy Air Arsenal & Navy Air DepotsCorporation Report Xo. XIX(Airframes & Engines)*35 Japan Aircraft Underground

Report Xo. XXBasic Materials Division

*36 Coal and Metals in .Tapau's War EconomyCapital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division

*37 The Japanese Construction Industry*38 Japanese Electrical Equipment*39 The Japanese Machine Building IndustryElectric Power Division

*40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan*41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re-ports)

Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division*42 The Japanese Wartime Standard uf Living and I'tili-

zation of ManpowerMilitary Supplies Division

*43 Japanese War Production Industries*44 .lapanese Naval Ordnance*45 Japanese Army Ordnance*4f) Japanese Naval Shipbuilfiing*47 Jajjanese Motor Vehicle Industry*48 Japanese Merchant Sbi])building

Oil and Chemical Division49 Chemicals in Japan's War50 Chemicals in Japan's War.Appendix51 Oil in Jajjan's War52 Oil ill Japan's WarAppendix

Over-all Economic Effects Division*53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's WarEconomy (Including Appendix A: IT. S. Economic

Intelligence on JapanAnalysis and Comijarison;.\]jpendix B; Gross Natimial Product on Japanand Its Components; .Appendix C: StatisticalSources).

Transportation Division*54 The War Against .lapanese Transportation, 1941-

1945Urban Areas Division

*55 Effects of Air Attack on .Iapane.se Ilrban Economy(Summary Report)''SG Effects of Air Attack on I'rban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama*57 Effects of Air .\ttack on tne City of Xagoya*58 Effects of Air Attack on (Jsaka-Kobe-Kyolo59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima


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MILITARY STUDIESMilitary Analysis Division

Air Forces Allied xvidi Ihc riiilcd Stales in I he WarAgainsl JapanJapanese Air I'liwerJapanese Air \\'eai)iins ami TacticsThe EU'ect uf Air Action on Jajianese (Jromul ArmyLofrislics

iMnploynienl of Forces Under Ibe Smil hvvcsl Pacific('(iininand

'I'lie Stratenie Air Operations of \'ery Heavy Bom-liardnienl in the War Against Jajian (TwentietliAir Force)

Air ()])crations in China, Bnrina, IndiaWorld WarIIThe Air Trans])ort Command in the War AgainstJapanThe Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against JajjanThe Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the WarAgainst JapanThe Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan

Naval Analysis DivisionThe Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols; I and

II)Camjiaigns of the Pacific W arThe Rednction of Wake IslandThe Allied Campaign Against RabanlThe American Campaign Against Wotj'e, Maloelap,Mille, and Jahiit (V'ols. I, II and III)The Rednction of TrnkThe Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against JapanReport of Ships Bombardment Survey PartyFore-word, Introduction, Conolu,sions, and GeneralSummary

Re|)ort of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure A), Kamaishi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure B), Hamamatsu Area

Report, of Shijjs Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure C), Hitachi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure D), Hakodate AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure E), 5luroran AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure F). Shimizu AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Areas

S7 Hcpurl of Ships I'.iiiiibanlnient Survey Party (En-closure 1), ComuK'nts and Data on lOlfeclivenessof Amniunil ion88 lieporl of Ships lioinbardmenl Survort on loiglil ( 'ities)The l')ffecls of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb onJal)anese Targets (a lieporl on Xine Incidents;

Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, JapanEffects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, JapanEffects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Jai)a-ncse Targ'Us (a Report on Five Incidents)Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and FiveHundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (aReport on Eight Incidents)A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary

Report)G-2 Division

Japanese Military and Naval IntelligenceEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

jiese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive ReportEvaluation of Photograi)hic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part II, AirfieldspA'aluation of Photograjihic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb PlottingEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area AnalysisEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part V, Camouflagepjvaluation of PhotograiJhic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part VI, ShippingEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part VII, ElectronicsFlvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part \'III, Beach IntelligenceEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part IX, ArtilleryEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part X, Roaits and RailroadsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

USSBS Report 22, Hitachi Aircraft Company

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Transcript of USSBS Report 22, Hitachi Aircraft Company