USSBS Report 45, Japanese Army Ordance

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 45, Japanese Army Ordance

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RESTRICTBDTHE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

JAPANESEARMY ORDNANCE


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RESTRJCTBDTHE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURV1!Y

J~ANESEARMY ORDNANCE

MILITARY SUPPLIES DIVISIONDates of Survey:October - November 1945

December 1946

RESTRICTED


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Thi r~(llll't"'OcswtitLen primarily fO T the usc of tho nited StntcsSt1 'II~~icBombing urvey in the prerJllrn~ion of furlber reports of n mor compreb?I lS1VOnature. Any c < m e 1 u s i o l L or oplnicus expressed in this report must be .C01LSlde red

l imiied t o t he pen if ic mater ia l covered and a s ubj ec t, t o further interpreta-t ion in the l igb t o f fur thnr s tudi es conduct ed by the Su rvey.

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'I'he United ~tcs Strliwgic Bombing SurvoyWIIS established by tbo cretnry of WAr on 3Movetnbcr Hld4, pursuant to II direc iVQfrom thelate President Roes vclt, It mission was toconduct nu impartial and export study of theelfe Ii!; ot Our ae ri al I It tac k 011 Germany, to beused i ll connec tion w it ll a ir n tt nckB on J lI ll an andto c t.nbli h " basis.Ior eVRlunting the importanceand potential it ies of a ir POW(l1" as au ins trument ofJ ll il ita ry s tr at egy for pl anning the Iutui develop -ment of LheUnited 81,8tes armed forces and fOI'd termining future ccouomicpol ic ies with respectto tho nat iona l defense . .A s ummery report andsome 200 suppo rt ing repor ts cont aining the f ind -ings of tho Survey in Germany have been pub-lished.011 15August 1045, President, 'TruIl1011 requestedthat tho urvey condu .1 similar study of theeffects of all t ypes of a ir 0 ttack ill ~h()war againstJapan, ubmitting reports in duplicate to theSec l'stary of 1\7 ar and to I,bo 5 eretary of theNavy, The officers of t,be nrv y during itsJapanese phase were:

Il'rankliJl D'Olier, O/w . i rmcm.Pllul H. Nitze ,H~llry . Alexauder, ViCil-Ohau,men.Harry L. Bowman,J. Kennoth Galbraith,Rensis Likert,'Ernnk A. M 'nmcc, Jr.,.FJ'ed Searls, JI" . ,Monroo E. pagllt,Dr. L wis R. Thompson,'I'heodorc P. WrigJlt, Dirtllwrs.Will ter Wilds, Secreta" lI .

FOREWO,RD'I'he urvey's eempl mcnt provided for 300

civi li nns , 350 o ff ice rs , l ind 500 enl is ted moo. Themilitary segment of ~ho o rgan iz at ion wa s drawnIrom th Army to the e....ent of 60 percent, andfrom the Navy to the extent of 40 percent, Boththe Army and the Navy gave the uNey all pos-sible assistance in furnishing men, suppl ies, t rans-port, and information. The urv4)Y operatedf rom headqua rt er s e st ab li sh ed in TO~70 ear ly inept ember 1945, w ith subheadquar ter s i n~ ogoya,Osnko, Hiroshima, and NIIgIISRki.,and with mobileteams operating in oUler]>ar of Japan, thei sl ands o f U,C Paclf ic , and the Asiat ic mainland.lL wa po ibla to reconstruct much of wartimeJapanese mil itary planning and execution, ongtlge-

mont by engagem nt, and. campaign, by campaign,lind to secure l'C as onably accur ate atatisties onJ apan' economy 'and war- production, plant, byplnnt, and industry by industry. III additicn,studies were conducted on Japan' s ove r- al lstra tegie plans and the background of her entryinto tho war the internal discussions and nego-t ia tions leading to her acceptance of uneondi-tionel surrender, the course of health nnd moraleamong the c iv il ian popul at iou, t he ef fcc ti venof the Japanese c ivil ian detense crgauiaee lon, l indtho eff eta of tho atomic bombs. parate re-ports will be issued 'covering each phase of thestudy.The urvey interrogated moee than 700 Jap-anese militery, government, and industr ial offi-

cials, It als o recovered and trnnslat.ed manydoeumen ts wh ich not only have been useful to U t I !urVGY, but also will Iurni b data valuable forothetstudic. Arrangements have been made toturn over tbe SllTVoy's files to the entral Intelli-gence GroUI), through which they will be availablefor fur th er examina ti on and d is tr ibut ion .

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TABLE Of CONTENTSUl.!>IAH.. .. . ....

STRI)'C'J't,'11E OF ARMY ORDNAXCIl , \ tr ,,>lUFACTum ..> I G , COMP.o.II1S01< OF AIIMT OnDX ...."CIl Sur 'PLIES AXI) REQU1REME""TS.l'nODUCTION", J 9;1.]-1945. _ . __ . _ . .....BO'I'TIL."ECKS IN PRODI)'CTIOX,. .... _ ., . . . . . .DIl!P&RSAr. .BOllll D"llA;c1udeballoon bombs fromtho pic la Jr a Ior s evera ] r easous . Ba lloon bombsdid not 1100 the SIUIl,C raw materials UI"! are COll1-m on to 0 t hl l.! 'o ni ll ill ic c p ro du ets, p n rli c u i n rl vsteel, which is closely tied in with tho product i"~s tory for tit e To.IIIaindc r of I II'mv o .d n 81\e". A \ 0 ' 0 .balloon bomb produetion, w l; ie lt rc nc ll cri s ig ni-fiean t pro porti (>lIS in tb e fallo! 194.4 and ~QIIS"clcOlllplntcly after Uaruh W-t5, did not utilize lhesame Lype o J plant , capnei ty tha t had previouslybeen used for ord ll~lwc product ion, mul to H epr-taln extent iL tapped " diffol'Cnt labor supply.Bnl loon bombs wore til;) oll ly lmportnn t i tem o faNInanee who to prod uetion "'118 s topped deliber -",tcll' 8 n ,L n o t tlirough loroo of cireumstanrvs,Mo.e important than the 0 " 0 . .. . 11 increase illordnanee outpu t up through HI4-1 a re the shift ~which look place ill i ll ! cempes lrlon . Th~ . r a p " -nese start ed Limwar, with no adequa te concep t oflho typu of wllrfnco that would develop, ' I'hey.intended to light aquiek WAr of conquest, to hol doIf tit Qi'f on ollliQS un til IIIcy g rew tirod 0 r tile 1:911-

nicLor W e N ) benton in )JI lNlpC, lind l lwn to makepeace. Couscque !It ly thoy planned 10 wage warwith a lairly lightly equipped and lightly supported'infantry (()rce. With this ill mind, production in1941 was primarily in the standard ordnance i t . .DI Sto be used by ground t roops such ns ammuaiuon,

JAPANESE ARMY ORDNANCE

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SUMMARYThis r-cp01' t cevers oil LYII(tS 01 Japanesa Army

01'111101100, iuc luding sma ll a rms , nrt il lcl j' , a rmn-mont for a iro ra lb , ammuni tion (f nr' g round usc .nircl'lliL lISC, and !Iuti'n.il'l:ro[t lise) ccmbut ,


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fie ld arlill" I'\', sm all arm s fo r g ro an d USIl, andtanks, On the basis of their 8Sllunlplions as tothe ty pn of w ar they w ere goiag 10 f igll~, ,Tup?nesop ro du ct io n w as concelItrl!lW in the "gh! Items8ml thei r stocks 0 r th eg . i t( )f fiS we IT ",!!ficiN' t.Their suceesscs in th ope nillg months 01 the 1I"8fis proof of 1 , 1 , ; , .The BR lue of : :u :i d, , ay a nd t he O u ad el ce na lcampaigu m ark ed th o b .-g in in g o f th~ ddeM i"op bl lS < ' 0 1 t he wll" lor tbc Japa n.,;e . an d U IC Y W ~(!marked the begining o f 1 ~" "S I" lllo air W "rIM e.This meant, in (erms 01 .\rmy ordnance pro-d ue tio n. m ore airo::mh arms and ammunition,m or n 8 11 tl ai n; ra ft we ll po os a nd a mm un it io n, a ndmore r&dio sud radar. The m c ~i fi en ny n im e d nt tlws~ Lurgets


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loss i n _ \ nn .' " o rd n an c e producti".' oapacity of be -11l"eI. c _w. X.".,..-thlSUO:l~.O'.IIO'IIJC'"000lcMh'D < > .no .

D J l II . U Ia . .. . a: 1U b 1 :. , . K i f A ko . .C'.hkuD,o.u~ut1!

Tat&II I .Ip). t int _ ~.y"lw I lb n, _ . . _ . . "'trbllllJldl.l.Pl!~.~~..Kusup la l! .t . . . . . AflfAl mm . 1. U IH k la a d

1crW~.J2(IoplJ.JChl 1 f t . .hol':u ..bhl.m.. ~\td&1~ JU 1J . tidIm anlWrcl"ati; ~hlM,UM

Do.~.mQ", Clilku$hl

1U1 Fulfuatll ;wfcdaAII_tobl.mu.... lt~()ltII,lft~

Tho rl1lativo import.(lllce o f the VllriOUS nrsenalCl>mplcxesis showll in table 4, bolow.TADI;T. 4.-Rt:loll'&te itl'lptirUmu. 0/ tM ,~ Army cr.enalt. "V

jlfe{l/ ~"'r,1941-1946I I. .. .. . " .. 1

.\~


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Th e (}mkB arsenal llool;lI~d 8om~\"hat i n . r e la t ;" 0imporlance with IbQ dimilli>!bl,l lt o. ge h el d in 1941 can be tracedin two "'8.)'s: flrst, through, Lhe failu re to i ner a sestocks of ordinary ground weapons 115 the numbero f t ro o ps increased j and saooud, through the Iailurto meet MIQ I) w demund , pr in eip al ly in tho f ie ldof air warfar e, which d "eloped C rom 1942 untilthe en d 01 tlul war,A summnry of stocks, prcductiou, an d con-su mp tio n o f o rd in ary gI"oUII(l w cap on s fro m 1941througll 1 9 4 .5 i s SbOll'1l in Table 6, below . The doto.Oil stock and on um p L ion were rurnisb.nd by themilil.-tlry affoirs Bcc~ioll of the JllP(lU~SC AYII1YM inist.ry . Prodution dnLIl were de!'i" d froll1Lhll SLln'~y's sludy of Lhe A rm y ordllllllce bureoua nd i ts l lr se ll oi ll .Stocks oi t ru ck s r em ll in nd constant from 1941through 1943, declining sharply tberealt-nf h O U Iin nbsoluLQ Dllmb r nod in DlLInb p in operotingcoodition. tocks of w eapons lncrooscd abou t 20p reont botwcom 1941 Ilnd 1943 OJlo.1 dropped bi\Okto the 1 94 11 0vo l by ~h B lllld 0 1 i li a 11'81'. "lockso f l Lmmu ll i ti o n remuincd about CO(!stllllt througll1943, dec lined 20 percent in 1944, lind another 10perCl lD tin U145, This re.cord of i \rmy eu ppli!l$ist ho cont ras t I l' it b nn inl)l'oase il l !JIB Army o( 50

pe rcent be~ 'v eBn. 1941 and 1943, a no ther 50 per-con by 1944., and enother 50 percent by 1945.10 other word , BU ppl iea of the standard, ground101'ceordnance items f ll il ed t o keep pace wilh theg ro wing A rm y and the increasing demnnds of thownr,TADL& 6.-Bloc1:4, fJTodudJon aild wruurnprlon 0 / am~u,u . .,;O~,1 I1 0u "d " "a p j> n ., ~ d " " ,, , -, , ""Md.. '''' 1 1 < 0 . . , 1 " " < 1 , , ,U'''', JlJil-1,6

A~IMU"(TION'

I 1M>(,I...IM I 1112. l!>Il 10" .".-AUlUll)r-:IHocII: at belhm!J'l1 of,f&t _~_

' 00 \lO S lU I 1.0:1 '"rodUllllloD~.. __ " , . . . ~coo .w .mpl .loo . . II " " . . 41 I.Stock It .md ot )tm _ . I C I i l " " 1m '" 7.

WBlJ ,po:ss,sl.ot!t Id. _ [ n n " " a( fHl" os ItO III ,'" 10>r~todlJ.d.lon.~.. I. 17 '" 22 IICOfiJUmpt!aD __ It III , .i S ~ ' " . , crul


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A htlg1! haN ", r l h 1 ' 11 1 1 11" d il li e s were biftl1t1from combat vohieles t o s i" ,n l fl "l id boa ( pro-duction. 'rhe priority 011 t rueks was lowNedfrom :B in 1942 to III 1943 lind 194~. In ,i~\'-of the s ho rl ng e o f local tl'lUlsportnlioll illlim homoi sl BU d il i ll 1945 and its " I f " . . , t on "II t Y ] I C ' S of pro-duction, this . .Hemp! at ('('Ullom),turned out 10be unw - . Itwill be noted that a ll the J8]101l($0am~mpl' to pick out categor ies of productionwbich COI I II I 0 0 rOOu""d Were bilS!>d on l Im I he or ythet the y cou ld avoid n IB I'g""-< oo.Iu eontin IIt.. 1Will'. III other words, Ihey inlended 10 corry out" m lB lh 'e ly I IO I lD l CC hB n iz ed c B Il lp u ig n i n hinaW Id did not eount on war witb Russ ia .Japlm s ,\. [JJlYordnance foiled to meel (he re-quirements {oreed OIl it in the period from UIOummer of 194~ up 1 0 t he l ime Japanese trnlcgis!sabandcued attempts to upply treops outside thehome i IBUds, in the spring of 1945. Tbe rnns t,

impo rU lD l single Iaeter in mising requirementbeyond the limits of production Were shipping10 . In p lann ing the supply of thei r out ly ingIIJeILS the Japanese figured that they would 10 0about 10 percent of their supplies in tmn it.Table i, below, ho\\ the tons shipped and ton10 t by _inking by area, The tonnage figurescover .u J Army upplies-food, clothing, fuel, andconstruction mater ial a weDas ordnance.In t he f in al pha of J apanese st ro tcgy-lhodefense of the home islands f rom invaslon=-thede . ion "'lIS mede to eease supply ing over seasTADL" i .-T


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nisinteresting to not~ l i lA I , nlthough the decision\\'35 made in 1939 to sbift t'Ol1lpletcly 10 '7.7 mill.weapor' f rom Ii.S mrn., the G.5 1111ll . rine woretil l being mad.. in 1944. At til ead f rhe warmost of the Japanese troops iu the sout h emPacific, part of th~ lroops in the Ph i l i J l piues, and10 percen t of the Kwnntung L\rm~' we", s ti llequipped with I l. S mm. rill ince Il.Dlllluniliollproducers did not 'hilt 10 7.i rom." rapidly ass ma ll a rm s manufacturers. mo-t of the I\:wnntltll(:l '.r lj ly 's nmmuui tio n " 'l IS 6 .5 m ill . c ali be r, " ,h ilQ00percent of their small arms wus i. mrn. III Iheend of the WIlT.ArtilleryO'Ilr 00 percent of all lin ill"I)' production wascarried 0111 either in Osakn Rrsen III planta orunder the .ndmioistrotion of the Osaka '}r .!cDllI,with he remainder handled by the N' "gorll nrse-aal . Originally. pl' llct ically all the artil lery " ,amanufactured in the Osnkasrsennl plants. but a ,demands for guns increased, more and morework WlI_ Jarmed Oil! to chili"o Iaetcries . untilat tbe en d of the war II private plants were

manufucturing artillery or artillery components.The weupcns were largely assembled, however, illthe arsenal, In 1944and 1945. with the realiza-tion of the vuinerabili ty of onceutruting ,1I1lilln)us mbly in a rsenal p lan ts . approxima te ly one -quarter of the .final 0 mhlv Wi handed over toprivare I ncLones. The pn; ,dpol civi li an p lnnt sdoing final 0 rnbly work on ar ti ll ery for thosaka arsenal are lis ted in table 10below.TA.U: lO.-Pri"clp\-1 A-I A-I

The top priority given to th 0 wenpons I rom1943 011 was re flected in the ir outpu t. Produc-tion, in value term, doubled every year fromt941 thro1lS '' ' t944 and ",!}S nt a s ligh tly h igherrate for April-July 1945 elton in 19401. _ lthoughoutput held lip well through ~hly .t94.5, by Julyit hnd dropped 27 percen below vhe averagemontf ly mUl in jbo f ' a < : , n . ] ycnr 10",-4. Productionof oiroraft, arms nppears to have met demandstbnlllghouL th WIl that is, th TO is no evidenceof Army fllrcrnft production boing held lip becauseof luck of guns.Annunl pr oduc tion of IIireruIt urrns, by type,is S.bO\\'D in tablo 13, below."" ; \O LII , .13.-/h~ lulIl proJ.ut.t io11 0 / ( Jr m! ! O ft U fJ /t madtinclP"n~,by I!lp


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Approriruall ' ly halC of the ammunition producedwas " ,, ,de in a escnal p lan t , wi lh l "~ rema inderscattered among II largo number of small e iv il ianrnc tor; .. s. The c ivil ian plant " ' .. .. ..u t il i . .. .d prin-cipally lor component (fuze. cartridge OIlSC, cte.)mann facture.ExplosivesAll Army ordnance explosives w .. re rnanufuc-lu red in the p lan ts o f t il ' ro "-y( ) second Arsena l .Wb. i l e chemical for explosives earne from civilianplants, only 2 percent of the actual work ofpreparing explesiv for Amly IISC wa done illcivil ia n fac tor ie s. The re were 11 s rsennl pl antworking under Toky() second nrsenal hendquertcrs.Thl'Sll 6J"() l is te d in TohI. . 15, b elow, wi th thei rl oca ti on s and their ou tput i n th fiscal yellr 1044.

TABU: 15.-,1/uIIIIanillJo . plcrle..w.l .< 51 . T "1'.l.n~.1' .:.:.rMmr.ol1.1~ hrUQ:D.U4J. w,:4 am.m:o-tlltl"llllo I.r.ld1'~T.: ! O l " r1I11Jo-upbtlnllbC.- u...U T I .

1 :: 1 .. ._ _ . . O'URrt~ . _.. :-=I=~nltnu('ondT="'T..TId..~~ r llirOlhImarnlturf.. i:d:::::-Son t- _ ~ . .. . K otWI L _ ~ __ ~ ~: ;~ ~ In 11M.l~:50-.r.oil.tlHllO'll"j!n~ILJlI1TNT.........__._. _ dq._........ .;,~~_.

1.U, TNT.f = . r . . . 1&Idd~.... Oltr.PR l t c tW 't ~ ~~~!~11J~

~l .I l fDlOalJ'ct.r la DGCJaInonl .l.rm. m.t .O Jm.m(l,;nllla~ AridT-ST.~. nu ll l t :fww. PC*'I~(f

Prior it iC li on explos iv es dur ing the wo ru. s f 01l0w1I; wereIPIIC

12

IhQpriori!~ was r l l i " 1 l < . 1 i l l HlH lind in 1945becsusoof the Mod for o .,plosivcs for elo lIghting nud(Qrlilicntion work.E.-qllo ives prodl lc lion , in vnlu terms, wasfni rl " cons ll lnt t hroughou t t he wa r. ' I' be tlllnuniIndex of product ion, by Ii clll year, is us follows:

IIl

10 0l i P ' . I90 IOU73

There was 11 sha rp de cl in e in ou tput i n Juno 1945,wh ich " ,n 42 percen t below tb average monthlyrote of production in 1944. July 19'~5 wns .37p er ce nt b elo w th e nvemge monthly rate in 1944.A summa ry or xplos iv e p roduct ion by Lype, byfiseul yen. during the wur is g i " ell il l Tn bl e 16,below.,'ADL IG.-Army o r d n a n c c erplOlrN p-Iodueao:rl, D U O '!lpr,

/., tho /i.wl U"i,,", JI)41-1945[lhilrict.oMJ

Bht.l: lX!'ffltl"~. * ~ ~ G . : 1.1 I 1 . 3 0 1 1 1.~IO " ' " "H r O l, 'l o Jl 'i lk i 5 c _ ~ _ . _ _ _ _ A n. '.110 m 1mXt~( t rl n , ft d' "( n . ..~__~.____ 11 " " %III 2S2 nsNIttad~rJD IQMOh t . .1 ____~ ! ) 1 .10" I~:,,02.4 4 . l SPidlt: Itkl.__.~_ , " . r . _ . . _ _ _ ,.~ II,IIS 1I,;Oj I . & n >1:'l\T ~___.... ____ (1) .. . "' , '.m 0.;11 1 . $ 1 1 5T. : < . . . . . . . . . to! 2.100 ~'Iii , , 0 0 ' l I.in ;.U~onn ____:~:~::.::~~::::: 1:0 , . . , 0 2~:2 a~ o. mml O n Ul lt l! a. Dd TN T. 0 0 2 , l47 1,,1'Q'1)1;;Ja dw-rc pQIId~_~ _* _: 1.192 I.It; L . > ' lG I.or o SiltD lD _l t ro - DOI I~ b I ' . . .. . .. _ . . .. . ~ 11 0 . . 36 "' . 'l!\7~'. IJl!o-DI . rn.L __ _._ n~ I . " ' 0 0 0 "ttt1I .............. ____...... ~~. ZI ~ 60 " "t lu . tn 1 te . . .. . .. . _ _ _ _. . . _ _ _. . . _ . ,~ S " -IS " "Yn:Jlm'ttt ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 2 ! < 0 J .M" . l : 1 . < 0 0 2.0'1 1.0Ir.'Tanks and Orner Combe r Vehicle,Tbe Japan" (I r._rs~Il~Lomptnd "to manu fneLuTl'com.boL "chi les in 1931. Prior to tho.l lime

fON'-lgll models ()f ta nk s l ind armored c ar s hnd b enpurchased, and enrly JOIJnncso designs worn ill-i1uCIlccd by those models. During Lho period19~1 througb 1937 manufa Lure \VASimit .cd to 0senes () f 3-7~ton)jghL tank mode!', IIfew experi-m~Htal medium tank, and n smnll number orprime n~o"c.rs Iln~ miscellancous tracked vcbicles.ProdUCtion of bghL tanks during tbis ])criodn~lJountl mJ2'1 1.8 II 12The yun rly Index o ( combat veh icl e p roduct ionwas as follows: . ..,

ll-lc. . . . .6~

Output in April nnd May 1[14-5\VIS 45 percentbelow bhe Iwarag mO llw !y rut (or 1944 . IIIJUliO and July 1945, however, produet iou c limbeduntil itwas only ubout 15 percent below averagem on th ly o utp ut in 1944 . July 194.51)rodllctio,ll.of combat vehicles bowed Ihe lea t decline from1044 ' level s o f any cn legal '. I' of Army ordnuueeproduction.Tab) Ii,below, gives the year ly produc tion o fthe principal tYll(lS of combut vehicles dur ing thewnr.T .IlI.>: 17.-I',.ducl;M 01 tI p,i"c"I'"1 IY{>


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includillg 75 percent of the medium tanks nnd 60peree nt of Lho lighl tanks. The total floor areaWlIS 905.000 quare rl)('~IUId I he plnnt oontain 0 (.)!lOblll.nUt locator. ._ . , . 0 (.)

Marioe Trnnsportnrion EquipmcmlJlal l boa ts nnd c ra rt ro r .Ann. \' use were COIl-structe Iby the .Anny tran port division untilOc tobe r 1913 . when i ts dut ie s were t ransfer red toLhoArmy ordnance bureau and boat construction

was pu t under \,1,&sIIpo.vision of the Osakn andSngami ursennls. Each of tho nrseuels supervisednpproxirnntely half of tho mar ine trausportntionCOlIstnleLi,m progrnm in 1944. III 1945 Osakall1ll1dled 60 porcl!ll~ and IlglUni 40 perc nt.Pract ical ly none of the work , however, was doni" tbo arsenal plants. Hull lind engines weremade in small private shipyards, mot or vehiclel ind murino engine p lnnt s, end u group of misce l-laneous heavy industry 1IIl1ls.Prinr it ies for . tbis equipment wore as follows:

II~ 1Ij.J ttl'Lnrg rnoter b o . t , , _ _ _ _ _ A-7 A-4 B-2Ttn"'po,t 8ub""'ri,,=_ A-5 C D

The index of annual produetion, in value terms,by fise!ll yenr, \VIIS us follows:1,-" lsa 'Pd 19U JQi&HlO 101 274 710 181

The marin trnDspol'ta.tion quipment programbecame impor tan t n tt er 1942 with the inc reaseddemand (or small oroft to run suppl ies and rein-Jorcement into a reas where the Jupanese bad lostS15

1 1f tr l: (i~ o il lo . b o! I. l~ .. . . ~ . _ _ 3 0 0 o . 5 o S 1.31' , . 4 S t J (G:IE:l!tn.l :1JKtd~OOll :l .Jl :_t~ . . . _,_. no " ) l a. ~ _. ~ !Sm l. U 1 mJ :Idbm l~ .~ ~ . ~ . _ _ II:{! 3 00 iX J ~ _ A ' fm O i" N ' bo rI ,l u. .. ~ . a . ~ ~ .~ Ullb-lJ)tll!d m ot Of 'b Gc lt ., .~ 11 Ii . ~.... _IAlfJI1~m ~t.~~ __ I .. . ' __ __J..ialJttr whb c .flIHl~ ,._._ _ _ '2W w .o . _ _ .LI" Jl lt l: l ~~ ' '.U"'._. 3 ' . . 0 4ro M) ._~.~ _8ubwmiM tnnsg.ort ...u . ,.IS U:Ulllh"'lliCfdifallfporl mIt .~_ ..~.. . Z\ ~... ~:~~I=~~~~~::::::-:~-:~::---~:~~:~--'-';';~....Bpetoblllllhlt~ bo : I' l .u . . .. . . . . ....0500 J,SS

B.lIooo Bombs.ProdUllt ion of bnlJooll bombs I(" ted on 1\ mall"cole in July 1 9 4 4 l ind r l'ucbed it peak ill Fehnmry


12/19

this, but plans Jor g"!le,~1 p l nn l , '~ p u ns iO l Il in thisanw st il l had to I nk" I he e lect ri ci ty shurtage intoaccount,1942In th is ~'~ar, es in 1 [ 1 . 1 I , l l< lr l l" "pcki ! l im ited thedesired industrial expansion. rnrher 1hall rNluel' R n d m ru nu ni ti on .Tnblc 21 , below, sivIlS the rclll.t.iollsbip betweenst.(l~1 del;"crjes llud production of both Army nn dNo lO Y aircrdt arms !lld IHllllHI niIiOIl during the, war R nd tlln percllnt Army production was or thetowl, by wlhlO.

N os t l1 t is ticul dll.tn. II. r e u .v n i l lL bl e 011 s to cks of t< lo l o n ]u lD d, b ut it is Ilppnnmt l l "Onl .T n btl'S 20n 11 d 2 l, IlD OV O, thn.t by 1945 produetion !l.t 011increD s ing rn t o, with sh n r ply dec r cu si Il g s te eld al ivcrics, . ho.d e:'1.hnustcd iu,,~m tor iCB. T ru s con-

elus ion is ecrroboreted by the testimony 0 1 the.J apanese, WII i l ~ th e re wer. e oeeasiona I sm II1 1s t-ocks 0 f st-eel 0 II h 8nd ILL l he end of I he Will',TM'Lt20.-lndi= qJ fJU",lqly .d

nU: ____~_~~__~ ~.~ ~ __ ~. ~ _~. __ . __ ~ __ ~ ~_3rr_. r _._ r ._ _.__ .~.&.._.ro J ~ . ' . ~ ~ . ~ . ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ ~ &

1 1 l - - & 2 :I..~.. * . _ _h ~~ .: 2 , ~ r~~~ __3 _ _ _ , ._ .. & & ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ _ -

11H3:~.r _ _ _ ._ _ .2....... , _." . , - -- ~ - . - ~ ~ ~ . + - - - . ~. .- -. -- ~ -- - ~ . ~ ~-t.. _ ._ ._ .r .r . .. _ .~ _ . . _r.--_~~ . r ~ &

I " O . .U:1 _..... ~~.... ~~..~.~.............__,. + ~ __ ~ . _ r. ~3 . .. _ .. _ . __ . _ ._ .... _~&4~~~~~nu~_~~ .._ 4 ~1 ~ . 5 I :1.T'.~ r~ _ T ~.~ .

T"B~E ZJ.-/ndi_ oj 9 1 1 1 J r U T 1 y ddi"",i." oj olt


13/19

rheso were due to lack of t ransporbuien IInlL ;neJ>Ladministration of tho d.dining stl'~1 tocks , Onth" whole, the inadequate Bu ' . .1d liveries in 194;;placed n r ei li D g o n e rd n an ee produ l io n w h ic h WII-appronml1tely ~Opereoru below the !-14level ofouLput. A nd th e d ow nw ard tre nd ills te el p ro d u e-lion at thi l imo (Basic : .\[aterials Roport) wouldu nd ou bl ed ly 1 11 1" " f 0 1 '< ;1 '( 11\ further redu ction inA rmy OrrlWlDC4' output had the wa r eontinu d.The general ~. tern or .Army ordnauce p ro l uc -

tion during l"~ WIll'-ellrrying out linal assemblvin arsenal plants with parts and subllssemlili';"m an ufac tu re d in II l ar ga n um b er n r o iv il in n f il c-torics=put n p rem ium on local lmnsport.af,ioll.A g rn du al re du ctio n in th e to tal number of trucksIIsharp drop in rh num ber of truck in opcrntin~condition. and th g r ol v in g s tr in g e nc y in til oilu p pl y c om bi n ed to create iL seriou transportation

p ro ble m b y 1945. Only :10,000 to 40000 trucksincluding military, w ere ill u se ab le ;o nd it io n i~JllpnJI . ..t tbe end of the War. This was eer npl l.cIIII fur ther by the ndditiOrtAI demands pu t onl~l t~porlation by tile dispersal program,which mvo!\'cd mo r tmnsporlatioll of materialsand eompcnen - UUlDwas necessary in eentralizedand integ rated plan . A ir nttnekB also often~ed u p l oc al t ra ns po rt at io n f ac il it ie s f or d R YS II~ alime. There is littlcovidctlec of II Sl!riOIIS failureof the milronds to meet the demnnds of ordnaneomllnuf?ctl!~rs . COI lSL, , - js hipping, howel'cr, wa sbC t'O mm g increa ingly d ifficult due to our navnland air attacks.By the Summer of 1945 t h e J a pa n es e 11IId come

to rely to n large extent on car ts m id e ve n humanhneks to h au dl e t he ir J oc nJ transportntion. ' \"bjlelim lnck of s h i. p pi n g n f fe c te d the del i, 'c ry of fuelanrl rawm~lel"llll , the principill e ff ec L o f the 10Cll lImnsportlllIoli shorUige \VIIS in s lo wi ng d O" '1 1 theOOIVof COD lp ? ll co ts { rom plant to p lll.nt. .LUCk. of skilled lal)()r, B riOU B problem during

lho perlO~ o f . 1 ! .~pWld ing ordnance product,ion, ";88not al VltoJ unportnnce during 194" . II k r .' ~!nCO t I.e~c 0 ra.""materLals o od l b . . l a ck o f t rn ns po rt a-[lon Wid, III~me e?",~, I)()mhdllmoge, had loweredmonufacLuMng. II In'lty O'''~r 40 parC;, s k il le d . a n d IIn.sk ill d' JI I I'd' ' . C , II}or( HIlIIOOP, nn I I noL, Ingenerlll b av e m u- " If 'I . .'... "" ee. on pro(llctJon. A study of Army ftud J. dn -( t . "vy or nne'6e or.()S HI 43 reprt~ e nt at iv c c iL i" 8 by 1I bIl.rf!ll8 division sbow ed that Lbn IC ur (Ino purcentagc of18

w ork er> ; ab so n], fro m Ih oir jo bs d ou ble d b sL we illJldy 19H and Jul 1945, standing o~ 40 percontill III hlttpr month. omparable figul '" fotp la n! . ou~id" u rb an o rc as o re p ro ba b ly c on sid er-a.b ly lo we r. H is irn pn rtan t to note ~ hllt the per-rQnt~1gtI of 11'0 rkers 11bs(mt from 1:lmi' j 0 bs , g h' enabove, i nc lu de s e nf or ce d . id le uo ss , or instm\ccswhore workers were allowed to sltty home becausethere WIIS no work for th III to do.The prjncipal C611.S C or absenteeism other (h,meoforced idleness was the air nuaeks, An i>ldi( ln~

tion of tll;S is th e fn ct, l,h llL ab se nte eism rate sr os e s Ju lr pl y a s l hn ,,'o ig il c o f r .i , a tt ac k i no re us ed .Tbe oil ' mitis burned workers homes disruptedtransportation between bomB and fato.y, and10'ared m or al e. J ). no Lb er factor tending 10 in-I'M (I nbsent.cci m was Ihe det r iornting f cd

situ atio n w hic h in cre ase d sickness nnd forco dworkers to leavo their jobs to forago for food 10su jl pi e D , Q n t th ej r rn t ions,DISPERSAL

Prior to 1945 dispers ion plans of Lhe Armv~l"S nals nnd. he civil ian plants \ V e T i l not 01signif-I ca nt l I1 ag m tu d e. Le than 4 percent of thet~tal ~pncity of nil p lant s was scheduled ford l. l! p~ rs lo n n nd o f this 0 0 p e rc e nt 1 1 18 $s u cc e ss fu l ly. e ~rrJ(!d out. T id" W!IS mostly concentrnted Ilt thoKekurn I1rsCDl1 w hich had Iloticipn l.cd nttnck bythe D-29' ~''''Ill the A iatle IIlllinlnnd and hadstarled. 0. dispers ..~ cbeme in April 1944 bybcgm l ll l lg ~ons t. . uot JO I l of fnoilities IIOIlT the villageof ltoguclllY llm n, H m iles southeast of Kokul"Of or . t ~o production of nircrn ft 1I1"0hi1 lO guns nn d811tlolrcmft ordnanea, III the nigh~ of 15 -16June 1944 , B-29's f ro m C h in n bnsesmnde t h ei r f i. r> ; tatt.ack O f ' . . ~he Japan e homo islands. Th e target\l'IIS t~IC .r ow n ~Il s te el p la n t. A bout 4 lIlil eilsL oftbe lIlIlIrng I)o ml la~ th o K ok u1 11 8 r> ;e llo J I In (l th e. fi rs t, 8 e~ n. d, li nd H urd fll tories grouped together10 on o .1I1111tar, c om po un d \ \' it h I~ bui ld ing a rea ofappro;nmo.roly 306,000 quaro meters All b t(h ,c o f th e att.ockin" planes bombed b' d IIf . ~ OO G p" y rn nr andOU I iJ " bom b truck u "ojog o r on of thoshO I) The ph ysical dnlllng e "'119 o eg lig ib le b ut{h e fOM of (uLure ottncks enu ed I' . ;...to be in tensif ied . ( I Sp o ns lo n o l lo r tsJ Lm:ge-scale d is po rs io ll II'I lS II0 t pI>1 11Ied 1Intilajll1ll sulTercd the hea vy ai~ att.ocks i t! .of 1945. At this t ime itWil pl~nn t ' Lo]~sprlugu b O l l t 2 percent of tho II{ ( lSP~I 'SIl

C i l po c it y " t il i~ d in Army or:~ ~ . m anU fa( tunngA hr IlkdoWIJ of d' I b ee manu 11L U T .lllperso. eew ean arsenlll and

T.a\.nl. . t~ 2Z.-P{annW .(JJld adliPi di.~r'lolJ 0/ GrlmaL andci"iliotl plant. pfoc/lierna Jap(lnuo J1r-my ordn(lll(le

1'0'11:,0 IItftDIJ) .N:CI.I ~mIJln:A~l1iBJ plan,-",ClVUWi:p:1ruI1aA I ' R f lN An l l clvJllu 1 ,I "n t B To 1 i: } ' O IU ' kI I 8 l No . 'lC'OmJ)l to~:' '' ''1IlIl plAlllf.. .Oh;ll~ plan1.. t ." ._~\fJ('ni . l IIIJ]d c l v ll J l .l l p . l ll n . .,

iJIllJi(j..f""~IJ.,lCC1mllltl:A : rt .I tf !_ l I, l J 1 0l A nl l ~ . C ' , , :IH .M p I I ll U" ~ rAr14!Rl.lanii cl~IUa:j IIltu11l

O".kl llnthill mmpko:r . :" "ru\Iplilntl .l\"U 1ID P illlt.I~ ..~ .A l ll OO cJ v ll Il t' H ft .r a . ..u nl lU ' R M J O O !m p l~ :AtnruII p"." .

Clh'lllflhl llIJ IL1i ..\ lH_n-i!!I,.IlIild , 1 : 1 , Ult n ~ ll Jj u_

Jto.ttllram:r;aHu.1C.'(lmfl'l~);-:Ar: lt J' iAl r~lMl .L l. .u ~ C lv lU :I Ln ~l rmb. .. .. . /I. rRl ' I41 tult,1 c lv lllin fll.1 'I t iL _

A 1 1 "t ~ tu d ( Omp lO%O : 'J ;A 11\ IIa pJfIIl lt . _ _ .C h n a . n p~aql.J .~\f1tD.allWdclwll11l1"I.lnt. _.

10iO.00 " " I~2ii01118 I." 1 ... , W1~ ~. . 3~m31 1JO O

:r.I1~llJO.,. 100so 00 '"0:I 1 by I iy pc o f product i s g iv en il ltable 23.Itwill b noted !lu.t the II> senals moved 90 II -ent of the equipment which I ,hey b o d p la nn ed todisperse, but eivil ian 1 1 1 , } J l t . s on the o M I U < I If [I I( .lI ,l Io n ng ; ed 1 0 move only 40 percen t o f I \'b a~ theyhad planned f o r d i sp e rs al . Tho ren on why 01'-senals were 11101' efli ieut ill t h ei r o p er at io n s 1\'11due almost entirely to tho fnet that tbey couldc om man de er trO ll porlalion and ouOying fncilities.G re at est d isp raion WM planned fo r the combo!., 'ohicle industry becausc this industry WIlS highlyconcentr ll ted. ]~our plnn!.s we re l '~ s ]) o ns i .b I Q (or7 0 percent of tho Lot , , . , I o ut pu t, Dnd so dispe!'S


14/19

,nduHrilll')\l''''' J lI~m INI to be d is pe rs ed u nd er -ground. or this 8!'1l~ only 0 :000 squa re tuotersh" d Jw.i.n dug 011 t und prod He uou w us DD t tIndcr-way at any point ,Details 0 1 1 . t he d is p e r s lo n by a re a a nd by prod.uets within thl$. ' areas nregiven in Tncble 23.

Tokyo F " " l r $ ' Ar~"nalTh e over-all dispN"ion plu ns of the T o ~ " 'Y ofirstdl&'naland .i t s e iv il i n n p la nt s i m' lJ l ve d 2 6 PCJ'C(lD to t 10 tulcapaei ty as in,Ii~B lI'd by tho periodo! pOllkp r od u t t io n . Hall of the ,1I.$p(.'l1>i n "'l IS 10 be

p la ce d i n u nd ~r gr ou Dl I J ac to ri es . By I he end 01the war , the above-ground dispersal points wereo n ly o p cr n tiD g Rl 30 p er ce nt o f t he ir planned out-put III ld DO underground fncililic;; w ere in o pera-t ion. Ground ammunidnn h> ! d a 15 percentplanned d i spc r> iOD I l l" ! optical 4 ' < J ui pmen t J 0 per-cent, . Dispersal of communications manulnct ur-ing facil it ies nmoltntcd lOB planued 40 percentwb ic ll e o l' cr in g all phases , , , ! \ ! e:;peeinlly centeredon vacaum lu hi! prod uction, This I"ill be rI is-cussed in det ail in t he R ep or t Oil th II Ja p n n e s eEIl'I1trical Ind U$tri"". However t bere IIad beenpractically 110 produetion by Ihe end of the war ,E ~aeL evnl u s D on of dispersion as a fa Glor ill.

terfering wi tt. prod IIc ti on i s d i !l ie u It to ou r culnto,Howe'nr . prior t o ; ",I ur cb I 0 4. 5 it is n ot fclt to besignific8n!. F or e xa mp le . t he p ro du ct iO II o fg :r ou ndfo r ce ammun it ion WIISlDain tained tiu'ough :l>lnrch1 9 4' ;; ; i n Arml. "fay. and June nil" a Lla~ks on IheT ok yo f ir st a IS C nu l w er e ~ oi nc id en .t w it h A p ri l de.cline of 1'0 percent nn d t h @ h in U ny and June 11;' ;0 percent dedine, Communicnliun eq!lipmell~fo llo we d th e S nm e g Clle ml p uU em ,,~tllH 'e dif-f e ro D C e Ih n t t i l e A p ri ! d ce l in e wns ;';0 pcrne.nL an din ).Iny snd Junoil descended to Il le"el 7 0 por-ee n l below t he p oin t of pen k prod uelion. Si nNI1h ec lT e el s o f a ir ' "Hack eAmICd such 1\ l o :r g e p r o.d uc ti on d ec li ne i . n .Ap . ri l , ;"Iny. ond ; JUIIC , disper-"jun hnd less e{foot on t he I ~" .c [ of 1(1101 p ro du ct i onlallI! it w quld hava Lild otherw ise, In tj . lCSC nir"Llucks machinery suffered r el at iv el y l it tl e ,melmachine cnpncilyexisted 1.0 ,Produce f ur i n Q x ce ... .o f w ll n! ne tun Ib' wa s p r od ! . Ic ed . Tlmsn ellm u Iu -ti"t! romo"lli of 8 pe!"CnnL oJ total capacity prob-ubly would Ilot lo n" e sign iJ ic nn lJ \' alte re d th en~noJ's production. .Tokyo Second ArsellalP l "n c~i ll !! ll y e l l prorlucliO!l il! tI'e T ok yo 'l Cc on d

amennl WIIS concerned w ilL tl.e I nu ll ut ne tl l' rc o fg l! hp ow d n r Grid c x p! o si v e, g. , n n d nJ IIlOSt I Il 1 t lo ep la l. ll is w e re o !" l3 < ll )u lp la nt s. T he d ia po l' ll io D p ro -20

grmH wns not ostensive (18 percent of tot:'~1 capue.iy) beeauso t be id IIstty was a In md J: J ai r!l'welldi~pel"S{'d due to its nature. In curr,l'lIlg out. thu, 'i sp e rs n I program ( 10 p ot ee n t of to ~ nI e.nplle!ty)there \\TM DO' sigllifiMn~ errcc~ Oil production smelleXCQIS Cllpllcity existed in the . imll lsl . ' ,) , duey.l p@I\kp ro d lie t io n h II"in!;" o c c u r ro d !I! e n r l ie r p e ri od s ,N~goyn Arsenal1'1'Od uc lion in th ~ N n Co ya arse nn [ c om p lo x w asto IIlarge "-'lent conecntrated in the mnin arseaal1>1n Is; tb@se fI(:C(I" n t e d ror 7 0 percen t 0f. totalo u t p u t wl,il B the re " 1 II i I Ii r oC :1 0 p e rc en t wn s 1 nth"h n n d s 0 f dviIi9.11 p in n ts, Plans w e.re m ndo todisperse 5 5 pon:ront- of arsenal production and 25percent of c;"ilirm plant production. In otherwords dispersicn WM planned for 1.3 pereeuroft.otal production. The dispers ion plans warn COD -QCIl t . " ' ; ted on the produee ion of Sill nUa rms andg round ru IU1111n i t io l l .' f h es o products, which com.p ose d ab out b lllJ o f th is arse nn l's L (ltu l production,were s ch ed ul ed . f or 75 percent rlispersal, Artil!or.l'p ro tlu cti o n w as also d ispersed bu b it WM of m in orimpo rtaaee, Aircraft 'Irma, the remnining cate-gory Ilf production, had. n o s iz ab le d is pe rs io nplanned. By .Jul y II ~5 tho a rs enal had necorn-p lish ed 9 0 p erc en t of is d i sp arsie n p i a ns, w hi Iec iv ili an p ll ln ts h nd mOI'cd about 25 porcent of theDlflchi.nVIOUS ~ '. . .loss of nirorMt armament f,rodueLlion.C oo c lu ~ i'On .

'1'1 ~ dilll)~!SIl! p ro grn m p llU m c,.1 fo rHI vapfll)Qsll . . - .~" r! t'- " '''8 1'~rn(lJlt o f l ot AI c ap .f 1< '. lt y u ' n oDQVmg Quoth ~ .~-~ ..

g ot u nd er \Vll.y u ntil M a.re b 1 94 5, am I. by the end oftho wa r on l y 50 Jl D re en to r th e rn a ch in cry p ln n ~ edfor rernovn I had becen removed (rom tho. faetones.OnJy n smnl] por tionof this WIl,S to he undergrounddispersion. There hod been ve~ li~de productian by thedispersed machiue capaciL)' by the r.nd of the \\',nr.D is jH ! rs al o f macnines interferred W I L l ' pmductionin ~wo ins ta nces. At S n gl ll l1 i t h e dispe,~ o[ C~-gi!lC p la nl8 d i l fr up tcup roc \ ucl ion l>y this "'''''" In.J un n. an d J uly IU Ld s o I.ln d little c~\:ct onthe w ur,A~ Kokur.n the manl!fuctttl"e 'O f airerait urms. WIlSeousidembly s lo w ed d ow ro by t ho d il lI )~ rs nl , b ut d uet o t he f ll il ur e o f t he n il -c ro lt industry to p r od n e? ,. a t0. high level, production in lIny event WItS suffiCientfor requirements, .. ..I n ass ess ing the _effeet oJ dispersion :t sb~ uld be. cm er nb ~r e! l t hn t if 01010"01 Q r mllchm~ IS con-s idered, ns equal to a decrease i n p r od u cl lo n , U~Clll Jl lp li ci lly i t bus been nssumed thllt pro~UCl: !onwould [,llVu been maintained nt full OOpl\Clty badther'e b ee n. n o dispersion. To the C:. \ :wut fl!nt fullcapacity was llGt maintalued by. such ,tbm~ asshortage 01 materials, lransport di.ffic~bes. tight-ness inskilled labor, ete., then dispersion .WIIS lessimportnnt Us a fflctor effecting prod~ctiou. Inmany i nd us tr ie s t he s ho rl a? c of ~alennl5 cI'lmtcdsuch excess copneitzy that d is pe rs io n p ro ba bl y hadlietlo or no I1ff'Wt.

BOloiB DAMAGE' 1 ' 1 1 0 n f f ( ) C t of d i rcet bomb d amnge Oll .J ! lpnncsa

a rm y o rd na nc o p lo u! !:s Ims b~illI nnnly~~dfrom thopoint of ,.,-jow o f p l'O dU c ho n capacIty. foukproductioll f or m o st piol.lltsWO~ tnk(!11IlS n measm:c0 1 their prnctien.1 pllak cnpaclty . B om b dlllll~geWIIS nn!lly>;1!d bo~h 0. ) Lb e i nl pn ir me nl t o p ro du ct ,o nand !lIse as Ih o. direct damsge to pia 11 t. TheseWQre both roCloneiled {!\ld e;"prcssed asa pcro


15/19

important exception to litis WIIS die dispersalprogrnrn ",b iah a1rec loo production eapaciLy.i ne e n o d at a 011 monthly OII1"hine r emo ,'1 l .1 s wereB ,raiJilblc no correction could bu m ade for thisfa tor. For the most PIlTt. however, lorge sCllled is pe rs io ll d id not, hike pIneo much bo(oro Junoso u'at it would not b. . . 10 0 im portant, ill thm o n th s JW l ua ry -M a y .Table ~6gil ' II.. p ot ce ll hl go o f peak CfIpllcitywbieb WIl eslinlllioo to be un 1 .

APPENDIX A

'00. .(II, . . ,'".' ' ' '.. ... ,to.', '".". ..'00100,00""=0>,.

14100U. .It". .. .'0011))'00:SOO i l >&>l o l l100~1.1

/l/~"Jh'1J llUU~'i' D J JOPlnll"" Armv 01tlrl.On~.f'.productiQ7I .. bnacJ on 194~priu_~. 10.11-46 jiol rJ~lJr.(Ion *~t:rqe Inonth_UDl

110'"m" '1'2In12\I:: ! 2 :

U.2" "m

u.~. . . .12:1,. .auI'", ."". .2"1

IS_"8nn.rnu .__....... _ ~& _,..rdl~ . ~.... + .A lr tl 1 lJ ", wm tl J] lt P I. ~ . O ro un d i tmm,u l) [Ho o . _ ~ ++ ,_ A.DU.ttCnn &wmmIUon_ AttraU .rnmLlllU [on.......... .Cc , l t l lb l lo l I , kDd1 ' l l I I ! t t! d '-(!hldts......OI~lI~ equlpwebl __ __ H . .. .. . .. .. .HM r.o utl C l D m m u n l O l ' l l ll o 1 J e q 1 J ' 1 p : m . rP I ~hi.r-(Ila trlLfLJlMkfl.allllD~uJlnn.(lIlL

I~! 18.11& 0 131" & f i I ,,13108 lOG;: : :Iil! j. 110114 113110 jd00; u.

I'", . , - _ ~ ~ ~ - - - z o ; a - . : ~ ; I : : < I ; . S ) : ~ ; : :. - ,. . ; : . .. .: ~ ; : - : ~ ; ; : : - :

1.

"WI. . .,0>" .. .30:u~

l 4 i 5 1

acI f . . ., 0 : 1. . , .-30UI.. ,. . .

. . .. . .1171mI,~~12

m10;91 ' S. ...I. . .III'" ',,.NIl

8 m l.l Il 1L rl nt ... .. ~ ~ .. _ _ ~ A rt 11m'~ , .. ~ ~ ~.. M . _ _ _ a .Alra.n. "1'1.I~tn' . _ _ .Oround ammunU[on . A tH1JLft1:flU 'L tmmunlt(a n.; .. i\ I rt Taf~ rL[l lml1hl ll an , , . _ . _ . 0 COUW"lllJJd ~I:d \ 61r cld OpUt tLhqutrUtUH( B M ro l in d r o mm u .a !m U " u ~U1P1D ( lD l . ,Ml l li t J: O 1 . r' a nt :f J lA l Jo n t H3 tL r p~n \

Tolill Army Drd.u .. n( a .


16/19

1'01". oj ,jrn,y .rIlM"" p ,.dud'"' ' by cal .oo'1l in 1946prl_. /94/_J9.j6-ConlinuodJ/a.lMy'inilita.t>/ Jopan". ilrlllM ."'n .... p","udion. ""...1 1946priao, /941-46 fi,cill ~'Gf.-Ccn!inued

' ' ' ' '' G ' J ,tdr: tfUI l ff JUr nl J .* ~ * .* A ~_ .. _ _ .. .. 17,a ILlA:rtltk.t'P~_.~"""""-" ----"" " 6.D 7.0A rn ll l. Tt lt tl ~f tl 't !f fl ln . - .- 1 !' 1. 1) 1 & ,. '"O ro un d ! I, mm un lt lo n ~ .. .. .. .. .. 1 1 3. 101.1AnllfllRmlt , mmu n1 Uo n " . &. . 7 7.2A lr ae J't I II mm ll fi ,I Llc m .. . - \ 3. 3 1 8. 0C(llfIbAlan4 tmct(!l1 \ehl cl Nl - IS-II !. 1 ;.0OpllerLtl;ulpt'1:l'l!DL................... 6.' o . . ' I i I]WI1o M il ( Qm tn 1. lrd Cli !U on e Q1 l. lp me til . 1 3- ., l &. .. ..Marlnotn.DJ POfI"llon . ~.- 10.8 1 ~;)HfCi:llutGU! -.-----.... 1,.7 '.6n . U O O Q bombf --" _ _.- "

16.'L3..3!7 . :a:1).&'0.12 & . '1 & . 'o~ .9. 7','

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6

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. . .U'0.1101140

l'.69 .'14 . . 1)'(1.0.'...II.!u..6.814.81.71

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17/19

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LI T OF REPORTUNITED STATES TRATEGIC BOMBING URVEY

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18/19

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18418Il188I 71I9100191192lo a)9419 510019719199

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l\l"dkal DI.Mon12 The EffC


19/19

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l iAS'. M.,erl. l. 1)lvl. lo"30 Coo.l and MetAl:! in J.llplln~ Wilt EcoJiomy

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Eloelrl. Power DI. lslon-1 0 ' rh c J!:!ec:tricP;Q"~'rludustry o r Jspn.n"1 TbQ Ef iric Power IndllBtrl' o r JlIUUl (l'Jnnt 1te..,>OrI~) , . 'i\J. n p. w er , Food n n d eMil . n Su PplJ"8 01"l8Ion

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USSBS Report 45, Japanese Army Ordance

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Transcript of USSBS Report 45, Japanese Army Ordance