USSBS Report 28, Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 28, Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

ishikawajima aircraftIndustries Company, Ltd.

(Isfaikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)

CORPORATION REPORT No. XIII(Engines)

AIRCRAFT DIVISIONDates of Survey:

26 - 27 November 1945Date of Publication:1 November 1946


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

ishikawajima aircraftIndustries Company, Ltd.(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)

CORPORATION REPORT No. XIII(Engines)

aircraft divisionDates of Survey:

26-27 November 1945Date of Publication:1 November 1946


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illo ?J^

0. S. SUPERINTENDENT Of DOCUMENT

NOV 21 1946

Tliis report was written primarily for the use of the United States StrategicBombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensivenature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be consid-ered as Hmited to the specific material covered and as subject to further inter-pretation in the light of further studies conducted by the survey.

H


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FOREWORDThe United States Strategic Bombing Survey

established by the Secretary of War on '.^1944, pursuant to a directive from the

President Roosevelt. Its mission was to con-an impartial and expert study of the effects

our aerial attack on Germany, to be used inwith aii- attacks on Japan and to estab-

a basis for evaluating the importance andof air power as an instrument of

strategy, for planning the future develop-of the United States armed forces, and forfuture economic policies with respect

the national defense. A summary report and200 supporting reports containing the find-of the survey in Germany have been

On 15 August 1945, President Truman requestedthe survey conduct a similar study of theof all types of air attack in the war agamstsubmitting reports in duplicate to theof War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

officers of the survey durmg its Japanesewere:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander,

Vice Chairmen.Harry L. Bowman,J. Kenneth Galbraith,Rensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,Fred Searles, Jr.,Mom-oe E. Spaght,Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,Theodore P. Wright, Directors.Walter Wilds, Secretary.

The survey's complement provided for 300civilians, .350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. Themilitary segment of the organization was drawnfrom the Army to the extent of 60 percent, andfrom the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Boththe Army and the Navy gave the sui'\'ey all pos-sible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, trans-port, and information. The survey operated fromheadquarters established hi Tokyo early m Sep-tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobileteams operatmg in other parts of Japan, theislands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mamland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartimeJapanese military plamiing and execution, engage-ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign,and to secure reasonably accurate statistics onJapan's economy and war-production, plant byplant, and mdustry by industry. In addition,studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-tegic plans and the background of her entry intothe war, the mternal discussions and negotiationsleading to her acceptance of unconditional sur-render, the course of health and morale among thecivilian population, the effectiveness of the Japa-nese civilian defense organization, and the effectsof the atomic bombs. Separate reports will beissued covering each phase of the study.The survey mterrogated more than 700 Japa-

nese military. Government, and mdustrial officials.It also recovered and translated many documentswhich not only have been useful to the survey, butalso wOl furnish data valuable for other studies.Arrangements have been made to turn over thesurvey's files to the Central Intelligence Group,through which they will be available for furtherexamination and distribution.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

Corporation and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry 1Air Attacks ' 3ucTiON Statistics 4

OF Pre-Attack Intelligence 5Item 5

A. Tomioka Plant: Plant Lay-out and Production Flow facing 6B. Organization of the Corporation, August 1945 facing 6C. History of the Hidaka Plant 7-8D-1. Employment Statistics. 1941-45 - 9D-2. Employment Graph, 1941-45 10E-1. Man-Hours Statistics, 1941-45 11E-2. Man-Hours Graph, 1941-45 . 12F-1. Labor Turnover Statistics, 1941-45 13F-2. Labor Turnover Graph, 1941-45 14G. Dispersal Data 15H. Air Attack Data 16I-l. Engine Production Statistics, 1941-45 171-2. Engine Production Graph, 1941-45 18


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Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Co., Ltd.

THE CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRYINTRODUCTION

Ishikawajima Au-craft Industries Co., Ltd.Koku Kogyo K K) was one of four

companies which made the Ha-.35 (Sakae20-, and 30-series) engines used to power the

Zeke, Rufe, Lily, Oscar, and Irving air-In 1944, the peak year of Japanese air-

engine production in general and Ha-35in particular, Ishikawajima's output was

percent of the total and 10.9 percent of theHa-35 engines produced.company was founded in 1937 as a branch

the Ishikawajima Shipbuilding Co. (Ishikawa-Zosenjo). Initially this au-craft branch made

aii'craft engine component parts. In 19371938 it expanded its parts activities to include

and final engine assembly.main Tomioka plant, in the Isogo Ward ofa suburb of Yokohama, was planned

in 1937 and the foundry of this works wasin September 1938. The original plan

been to make components for the Tempu andengines for trainer planes. Beginning in

however, parts were made for the Kinsei andengines.

of tlie Tomioka machhie shops wasearly in 1941. This was the company's

expansion project, intended for both pro-and repair of Sakae engines for the Navy

general repair of other engine types.first repair was earned out in Dec(>mber

and tlie first new engine was assembled in1941. The Tomioka plant was Ishi-only engine assembly plant for new

(appendix A).September 1941, The Ishikawajima Aircraft

was reorganized to constitute an independentwith stock ownership vested in the

Shipbuilding Co. Capitalizationthereafter and eventually reached ayen total.

With the impetus of government demand, ex-pansion of the Tomioka plant was almost con-tinuous and new plants were purchased and built.Excluding dispersal miits (covered later in thisreport), at the time of the Japanese surrenderIshikawajima consisted of four fabrication andassembly plants, one of which was not yet inoperation, and tlu-ee accessory plants. Thesewere as follows:Fabrication and assembly plants:

Tomioka plant, in Isogo Ward, Tomioka, asuburb of Yokohama.

Chuetsu plant, at DeMachi, Higashi TonamiCounty, Toyama Prefecture.

Hidaka plant, in Wakayama Prefectm-e.Yamato plant, in Yamato Precinct, Koza

County, Kanagawa Prefecture.Accessory plants:

Nakamura-Bashi plant, in Minami Ward,Nakamura Precinct, in Yokohama.

Adachi plant, in Adachi Ward, Kono Precinctof Tokyo.

Amakami plant, in Kami Precinct, NishiNegishi, Yokohama.

In addition to these seven works, the Ishikawa-jima Co. owned several warehouses, used for thestorage of parts and tools, in the Yokohama area.The Japanese Government at no time directly

controlled, operated, subsidized, or owned anypart of the Ishikawajima Co. Governmentalrelationship was indnect only, in that it (a) loanedthe company about 30 percent of its plant ma-chinery, (6) loaned the company money fromgovernment banks, (c) established price controlsand, of com-se, {d) granted material priorities andallocations, (g) furnished labor, and (f) inspectedfinished products. A stafl:' of nine naval officerscomprised the company's inspection staft': thisstaff was headed by Captain (Navy) MasukichiKondo in 1945.


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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONKey executives of the corporation are listed

below:President Hikosuke Araki.Chief director Kensuke Nagano.Managing directors^ _ Kiyoshi Matsukasa, Kazue

Sano, Koichi Kanda.Directors Itsugi Kasehara, Ichiji

Otsuka, Tsuneo Nonaka.Auditor Masanori Nakayama.Business manager Kazue Sano.Personnel chief Tsuneo Nonaka.Planning chief Kiyoshi Matsukasa.

The organizational structure of the Ishikawa-jima Co. was built around the Tomioka plant asthe major fabrication and assembly unit. TheChuetsu, Hidaka, and Yaniato plants were in-tended to supply parts and assemblies to Tomiokafor final assembly of HA-35 engines (appendix A).Hidaka was, in addition, to produce turbo-super-chargers for the Navy. The tliree small accessoryplantsNakamura-Bashi, Adachi, and Ama-kamicomplemented the organization of thecompany (appendix B).The Tomioka plant was the original and largest

unit of the company, and the only works at whichnew engines were assembled. It also repaireddamaged engines and fabricated various engineparts for other manufacturers as well as for itsown assembly operations. No assembly linetechnique was used ; job shop practices, only, wereemployed.The Chuetsu plant, a fabrication and assembly

factory, repaired damaged engines, fabricatedparts for the Tomioka plant, and heat-treatedcastings for the Navy. It was acquired in Novem-ber 1943 and operated continuously thereafteruntil August 1945.The Hidaka and Yamato plants were intended

to be the remaining two major fabrication andassembly units. The Hidaka plant was convertedfrom a factory of the Chuetsu Textile Co. in Sep-tember 1943 and began small-scale operations inDecember of that year. It originally had beenintended only for the fabrication of exhaust turbo-superchargers for the Navy, but several changes ofplans and orders by the Navy prevented this beingput into effect. Hidaka's role, consequently, waslimited to production of parts for the Tomiokaplant (appendix C). The Yamato plant wasstarted in May 1943, but construction was notcompleted before the surrender to the Allies.The Nakamura-Bashi, Adachi, and Amakami

plants were small accessory producers, supplying

parts or services for the Tomioka plant. Naka-mura-Bashi began operations in August 1943 as aheat-treatment unit. Adachi, organized in March1944, was a metal-rolling mill. Amakami, ac-quired in October 1944, was the company's lumbermill.

Principal suppliers of raw materials and com-ponent parts, numbermg approximately 70, of theIshikawajima complex were almost all located inthe Tokyo-Kawasaki area adjacent to the plantand only a few were as far away as Kobe or Nagoya(reference item 1).Employment increased steadily and gradually,

both in numbers and man-hours worked, untilNovember 1944. In December 1944 the numberof employees declined gradually, and beginning inDecember 1944 man-hours worked began a longdecline which became precipitous after the disper-sal program was started in April (appendices D-1,D-2, E-1, and E-2).

Percent of man-hoiu's of work lost, for all rea-sons, was high and erratic, varying from a low of14.6 to a high of 48.4 percent (appendixes E-1and E-2). In the last 4 years prior to the sur-render, 11,843,860 man-hours, or 27.5 percent ofthe total, were lost. Since there were no direct airattacks on any works, that factor did not affectman-hours lost. Indu-ect air attacks had littleeffect on lost time increasing the total loss from 1to only 3 percent except during the final month ofAugust 1945, when this factor caused a 14.8-per-cent loss. Table 1, below, indicates the yearlytrend of lost time.

Table 1. Employee and man-hour trends


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The ration of iioiiproductivo labor was faij-lyconstant, declining from a high of 50.2 percent inDecember 1941 to a low of 29.7 percent in October1944, and averaged about 35 to 37 percent, a valuequite comparable with the average Americanworks of this approximate size (appendices D-1and D-2).

Multiple, round-the-clock shifts weie inaugu-ated in October 1943, immediately after theHidaka plant was placed in operation, and priorto accjuisition of the Chuetsu plant. Thus, thepercentage of night-shift workers had relativelyittle efl'ect on plant efficiency. This percentagencreased rapidly to a high plateau of an averagefrom 16 to 18 percent from February through

ovember 1944, and declined rapidly thereafter(appendices D-1 and D-2).Labor tmiiover (new employees to total em-

trends were erratic and abrupt, from aof 0.2 percent to a high of 26.7 percent. Dur-

ng the last 14 months of the war, however, laborsteadied at a relatively even low level, iir

of the fact that the number of employeesremamed erratic and relatively high

(appendices F-1 and F-2). The term "dis-employees" includes all persons released

various reasons.THE DISPERSAL PROGRAM

Prior to the directive of the Central Section forDefense of Production (Rinji Seisan

Taisaku Chuo Honu) of the Munitionsof 4 April 1945 which ordered all au'craft

to disperse their activities, theCo. had asked the Government to

allowed to disperse some units and on their ownplanned and cariied out one dispersalnamely; some machme shop processesfrom the Tomioka plant to an urder-

gromid site at the Chuetsu plant. After the 4April order, disjjcrsal was undeilakeu with maxi-mum effort.At the time of the dispe7-sal order, construction

of the Yamato plant was incomijlete and theChuetsu plant had not begun to ])roduce turbo-superchargers. These works, thcu'efore, togetherwith the thiee small accessory plants (Adachi,Amakami, and Nakamura-Bashi) were not dis-persed; the Tomioka and Hidaka plants were.

Ishikawajima's dispersal was carried out in twostages. The first, as a result of the 4 April order,involved the moving of activities from the Tomiokaplant to underground machine shops at the follow-ing locations: Chuetsu, Sugita, Negishi, Sobu,Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, Sanuki.The second dispersal, as a result of the Muni-

tions Ministry order of 22 May 1945, for protec-tion of production facilities in the Kmki area, in-volved moving machine shops from the Hidakaplant to the Tomioka plant and to the Chuetsuand Sanuki undei'ground locations.

Plans also had been drawn to disperse the heattreatment and assembly processes to undergromrdplants at Nakamura, near Negishi, but these plansnever materialized. Of the company's total 1,318machine tools, it was planned to disperse all;actually, only 887, or 68 percent were dispersed(appendix G) . Korean labor was used extensivelyin dispersal operations.The above-mentioned undergromid shops, ex-

cept at the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal and Sanuki,were all relatively small cave-type, mountamsidetimiiels located m the vicinity of the Tomiokaplant. The Yokosuka Naval Arsenal was locatedabout 3 miles south of the Tomioka plant. TheSanuki underground location, near Cliiba, wasaccessible only by water across Tokyo Bay.

THE AIR ATTACKSAIR ATTACKS ON URBAN AREAS

The Ishikawajima Co. was neither selected noras a primary target. Units of the com-

however, were struck three times in attacksadjacent url)an areas (appendix H). Data of

attacks were ascertained from records of theService Section of the United StatesBombing Survey.

The attacks upon company mstallations, exceptthe case of the Tomioka plant, did not afi'ect

production (appendix H). Damage of Tomioka'sgas supply system m the 29 June attack caused asuspension of heat treating operations and resultedin a production loss of about 90 enguies in Jidy.Effects on other mstallations was limited to mcen-diaiy damage and destruction of warehouses, tools,and material stocks. No fatalities were sustained.

Generally, attacks of the Yokohama-Tokyo areabecame so effective beginning in March and April1945 that the IshUiawajima Co. found it impossibleto carry out planned operations and engine pro-

7088604(V-


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duction was reduced about 25 percent in thoseonths. The 29 May attack destroyed the homes

of 2,500 workers and caused a loss of 30,000man-hours of work.Morale had been generally good until 12 June,

when a nearby plant was struck by HE; Ishikawa-jima workers saw casualties at first hand, heardmany stories and became nervous and "jumpy"as a result. The increased bondjings of July madethem feel they were continuously movmg closerto their own turn, and nervousness and inefficiency

increased. As a rule, HE was dreaded more thanIB attacks.Day and night attacks in June and July sloweddown dispersal activities because of disruptions totransportation and workers' homes, and produc-tion declined rapidly to about 50 percent of itsMarch value. Practically all suppliers of rawmaterials and component parts were located inthe Yokohama-Tokyo urban area and contmuedattacks in this area served to reduce and denyreceipts from these suppliers. New supply sourcescould not be found.

PRODUCTION STATISTICSIshikawajima's capacity for production of

engines rose steadily from 25 in September 1942to a level of 210 in November 1944 and remainedconstant thereafter (appendices I-l and 1-2).This steady increase was based partially on antici-pated receipts of machine tools promised by theGovernment. The acquisition and operation ofthe Hidaka and Chuetsu fabrication and assemblyplants in September and November 1943 and thefour accessory plants between May 1943 andOctober 1944 did not in any case sharply increaseengine production capacity since none of theseplants were final assembly works: the Hidakaplant, as a matter of fact, had been intendedsolely for the prockiction of exhaust-driven turbo-superchargers for the Navy.Government demand, or orders, was entirely

inconsistent with Ishikawajima's ability to pro-duce engines. Orders initially wei'e given for Gmonth periods: in April 1944 this was reduced toa 4-month short-term form of order. Thesedemands increased in relatively small amountsuntil Ishikawajima's ability to produce exceededGovernment demand in the first quarter of 1944:lliereafter, demands skyrocketed out of all pro-portion to the company's ability to produce andicaclied a high demand of 420 engines per monthin February and March 1945. Thereafter, de-mand declined abruptly to below theoreticalability to produce (appendixes I-l and 1-2).

Contrasting both plant capacity and Govern-ment demand, actual production at no timereached either ordered or capacity level. Ini-tially, Isliikawajima had insufficient technicallytrained and experienced workers to carry out amass production plan. The first Governmentorders failed to take this into account. Thereafterthe Government failed to provide promised ma-

chine tools (especially internal grinders) in timeand this resulted in production schedules beingset back about 6 months in 1943.

In 1944, shortage of labor was the most seriousproblem: many experienced production men andyoung engineers were drafted into the services.As a result of this industry-wide shortage theGovernment instituted a program of drafting stu-(h'uts and soldiers into factory labor jobs in April.Isliikawajima thus suddenly received a large num-ber of untrained laborers. As a result, fabricationrejections because of poor workmanship increasedto almost 30 percent.Beginnmg late in 1944, nickel-steel became

critically short in supply and substitute materialswere used. This resulted in many complications.The use of softer, lower grade steel in such engineparts as reduction gears, which require a highdegree of hardness, caused repeated engine failuresin test and acceptance.

This condition was a material factor in the pro-duction decline late in 1944 and e.arly in 1945.Also, in the beginning of 1945, receipts of partssuch as rocker arms, inlet valves, and push rods,from the Chuetsu plant in Toyama Prefecture,dropped materially. This was caused by rail dis-rui)tions resulting both from effects of Americanboinbmgs and heavy snowfalls during that winter.

Analysis of production curves shows that out-put increased steadily from tiie first engine assem-bled in December 1941 until the peak of 150 wasattained in June 1944 (appendixes I-l and 1-2).Production declined sharply in July and Augustbecause of difficulties in obtaining raw materialsand because of the loss of experienced and keymen to the military services, mentioned above.Recovery was further retarded during the winterof 1944-45 by dispersal of some machining opera-


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HE T TREATMENT 1SHOP I

OYLI NDERBARRELS y

COMPLETECYLINDERS

/ I ^,VLINOE R HEADS

JIG SHOP

CONNECTING RODS T\\

CRANK SHAFTS

\ /\ ^ 1

HD

// /-1 h\ \. I ^

WAREHOUSE -^

\ SOB-ASSEMBLYI

\

//

1/

/^MACHINING /?: /r-l

^< 1 4 ^^t I FIRST ASSEMBLY

SECONDASSEMBLY

"^ U 1^ I aa II zi | [jg] | BPLANT LAYOUT a PRODUCTION FLOW

TOMIOKA PLANT1945

NO


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX B

Ofoonliofion oi the CorporationAugust 1945

Uhikowaiima Aircraft Co.[ Ishikawajima Shipbuilding CompanyParent Company: Vested Stoct< Ownership

IshilinwQJima Aircraft Industries Co., Ltd.Became independent in September 1941Capitoliialion: 42,000,000 Yen

Fabrication and | Assembly Pionts

TOMIQKA PLANTisogo Wotd, Tomioita, Yokohama

Consttucticn sfcited lotc ?937.Foundry completed September 1938.Mochinc shops completed early 1941. First

cxponsion. April 1941 to October 1943.Second exponsion, November 1943 to Au-gust 1945

1. Assembled SAKAE engines for 2d NcvolAlt Aficnal, Nal


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to tlic distant Chuetsu underground |)lant,again reached the 150 per month [feak in

1945.April, May, and June, increasing air

continued to disrupt transport at ion andmorale to such an extent that jirochiction

about 25 percent. Thereafter, the com-attempts at large-scale dispersal brought

parts pioducing units to a virtual halt, andproduction declined sharply to (57 percentand zero in August.Tomioka and Chuetsu plants, in addition

heir fabrication activities, also repaired Sakae,Tempu, and Kotobuki engines (table 2).Table 2. Engine repairs completed


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX CHISTORY OF THE HIDAKA PLANT

The Hidaka plant of the Ishikawajima Aii'craftCo., Ltd., located in Hidaka Gun,Ken, on the north coast of Honshu,

prior to its piu-chase in September 1943, afactory of the Chuetsu Textile Co., Ltd.,main offices and plant were located in

in Higashi Tonami County in Toyamathis purchase, the Ishikawajima Co.,

had been carrying out its experiementalon aircraft engines and turbo-supercharg-m its Tomioka plant, transferred these activi-

to the Hidaka plant. This transfer begim in1943, involved 50 machiiie tools and

employees, and was carried out in small incre-lasting 1 year. At that time, experimentalhad progressed to the stage where the com-was prepared to start work on production of

i ET model 5 2,000 H exhaust-driven turbo-for the Navy as an experimental

production problem initially was primarilyacquisition of machine tools to equip this fac-for production. Some all-purpose machinewere on hand, but production schedules de-

various s])ecial-type tools such as specialto finish turbine blades. However, since

companies were being expanded at the time,tools could not be obtained rapidly.the meantime, military demands for tm-bo-

became pressing. In March 1944Munitions Ministry ordered production of

Model 2 1,000 H exhaust-driven turbo-a type considered moi'e generally

to combat. Accordingly, Ishikawajimaup plans for producing 450 of these imits per

using 250 machme tools and 2,060 employ-by March 1945, and because of shortage of

tools, adopted the three-shift system ofProduction was to have begun in Jime

of materials proceeded fahdybut it still was found to be impossible to

the requii'ed machine tools. Only in theof the heat treatment shop was good

made, and this shop was completed byPlant operations dm-ing that time wereto making tools for large-scale production

both the Mitsubishi Model 2 and the I ET

Model 5 turl)o-sui)erchargers, and tiii^ training ofnewly-hired inexperienced woi-kei-s. However,most of these new employees were also used inconversion of plant structures and reclamation ofadjacent laud purciiased for expansion of llicplant.Work progressed slowly through June, and inJuly, as sheet-metal parts and forgings were beingreceived, the Mmiitions Ministry suddeidy orderedproduction of turbo-supei-chargei-s iuilted andexperimental work begun on a tui-bine rocketmotor known as TR. CurreJit production plansaccordingly were di-opped, and this resulted in asurplus of employees and trainees. To absorbthis excess, the Hidaka plant in August took oversome subcontract fabrication of fuselage parts ofthe fighter George for the Naruo plant of theKawanishi Au-craft Industries Co., Ltd., and fab-rication of JZKI bulletproof cockpit-frame wind-shields for the Navy.

In order to obtain needed machine tools for theproduction of the TR turbine rocket motors, theShibayama Steel Woiks in Wakayama was pur-chased in September 1944. This ShibayamaWorks had been engaged in production of slottingmachines, and this acquisition added about 100machine tools, a large amount of stock parts, andabout 50 employees to the Hidaka plant rolls.These machine tools, however, were so old that aconsiderable peiiod of time was required for recon-verting them for TR production.

In October, a labor capacity surplus still re-maining, it was decided to use some labor tofabricate small parts for production of the Sakae20-series engines bemg made at the Tomiokaplant. It was intended to produce 16 differenttypes of small. parts, the largest being the articu-lated connecting rod. Production was to havebeen started in January 1945.From October through December, some ma-chine tools from the Shibayama Works and a fewnew tools of the Miuiition Ministry's allocationweie obtained. The Shibayama tools, however,were unfit for use without extensive reconversionwork expended on them.At the end of December, when experimental

work on the TR turbine rocket motor was nearingcompletion, the Munition Ministry again sudden-ly ordered all work on this project stopped. TheIshikawajima Co. then decided to concentrate allits Hidaka plant facilities on manufacturing parts


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for its own Toinioka plant and accordingly gaveup its subcontract sheet-metal work for Kawanishiand bulletproof windshields for the Navy.

Pai'ts production, which had been scheduled tobegin in January 1945 was delayed by typicalJapanese bmiglmg and finally was begun in March.Using the machine tools which had been intendedfor the production of the TR turbme rocket motorsHidaka produced master connecting rods, pro-pellor shafts, reduction gear housings, pinion cages,and other large parts, in addition to the smallerparts originally planned.

After AprO, that part of the Tomioka plantwhich had fabricated master connecting rods,articulated connecting rods, and wristpins, wasmoved to Hidaka. At the same time, since theTomioka plant was suffering from a labor short-age, and also to reduce the number of trainees at

the Hidaka plant, Hidaka shipped ahnost all of itsstudent laborers and a small number of its experi-enced workers, about 350 people in all, to Tomioka.In June, after the above mentioned part of theTomioka plant moved to Hidaka was placed inoperation, these 350 workers were recalled.

In April the Munitions Ministry's dispersaldirective forced Hidaka to abandon completelyall current expansion plans. On 22 May the for-mal dispersal order was received and the Hidakaplant was completely dispersed to the Chuetsu,Tomioka, and Sanuki locations. Duruig thisperiod of dispersal, air attack alerts and attackson nearby installations delayed movement activi-ties to the extent that dispersion to Chuetsu andTomioka was not completed before the end of thewar.


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX D-1Employ menl data

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

Male

1.9361,9911,8822,188

2,2112,2362,2652,6142,5772,5762,5742.8332,7942,8172,8212,829

2,8652,8882,9112,8863,0983,2573,3413,3343,4483,7003,7224.157

4.4784,4424,353

Female

108120128133

155181199289271250246247213214212210

210202203195225219221215202208243270

354377401

Percent

5.66.36.86.1

7.08.18.8

11. 110.59.79.68.77.47.67.57.4

7.37.07.06.87.36.76.66.45.95.66.56.5

8.59.2

Students

300448458

1,0211,0211, 2131,4311,4751,707

1,9411,9411,9411,6591,4571,7921,8832,001

Soldiers

3919120179242118

123199224216239275271270

2. 0442, 1112,0102,321

2,3662,4172,4642,9032,8482,8262,8203,0803,0073,0313,0333,039

3,0753,0903.1143,0813,3233,4763,5623,5493,6503,9083,9654,427

4,8324,8194,7545,4646,8886,4275,9655,9506,8976,2136,2426,188

5,9445,9845,9175,6075,4565,7635,6085,936

Produc-tive

1.0771,1101,0711,154

1,1851,3671,4141,7101,6951.6901,6801,8261,8151,8201,8251,859

1,8651,8951,9621,9402,1102.2592.3302. 3.S02.4802.5482.6252, 805

3. 0193, 1613,1463,4063,6643,6244,0684,0974, 0944, 3654,3774,302

4,0724,1064,0033,7243,5933,8493,7263,976

Nonpro-ductive

9671,001

9.391,167

1,1811,0501,0501.1931,1631,1361,1301,2651,1921,2111,2081,180

1,2101,1951,1521,1411,2131,2171,2321, 1691,1701,3601,3401,622

1.8131,6581,6082,0582,2241.8031.8971.8631,8031,8481,8661,886

1,8721,8781,9141,8831,8631,9141,8831,959

Percent

47.3147.446.750.2

49.943.4.42,641.140.540.240.140.739. i40.039.!38.8

39.338.737.037.036.536.034.632.932.134.833.!36.6

37.634.433.!37.737.133.231.831.130.629.729.930.5

31.631.332.333.434.133.233.633.0


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(NXQOh


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX E-1Alan-hours

.

1941

1944

Total..

Percent ofrequired

14.918.315.426.929.030.546.439.445.042.649.54S.8

71.176.976.057.762.840.641.844.645.933.237.935.8

33.934.530.663.358.554.350.514.7

Man-hoursworked

446,336441, 429470,931555, 504

475, 224.566,711.535, 316612, 134642, 1S3649, 917533, 593583, 305602, 061569, 422622, 348630, 658

540, 695661, 320554, 406667. 105720, 256757, 217753, 320685, 974783, 124882, 179

1,025,4561, 059, 967

1,087,2301, 176, 4371, 162, 8591,228,6061,337,9161, 364, 5921, 284, 2741, 370, 7381,408,0241, 403, 8991,601,1201, 516, 184

1, 383, 0711, 408, 4011, 247, 0381, 347, 8741, 247, 0731, 156, 5881,076,323

312, 746

43, 149, 084

Total man-hours lost

114, 280111,01088, 26080, 850

87,01096, 660116.010133, 140158,310161,810185, 9.30225, 070207, 460223,170202, 910234, 3tfl

261,560237, 580248, 950257, 190273, 260278, 160267, 360327, 940258, 230266, 7502.53, 180299, 3.50

370, 000280, 710316, 720321. 760327, 0003.50, 000355, 000416,810324. 000316,000273, 000259, 980

289, 000264, 000290, 0003.59, 000250, 000.387. 390358, 000180, 160

11, 843, 360

Percent

25.625.118.714.6

18.317.121.721.824.724.934.838.734.539.232.6.37.2

48.436.944.938.637.936.736.547.8.33.030.224.728.2

20.918.723.319.220.03.3.533.3.34.6

27.5

Man-hour.slost a/cattackalerts

69320. 537

10. 36720, 81616, 58319,60022,50333,64637,13046,280

Percent Man-hours(planned)required

0.041.4

.81.51.31.51.82.93.414.8

3. 610. UOO3. 610. 0003. 610, OOO2, 480, 0002, 480, 0002, 480, 0001,660,0001, 740, 0001, 740, 0002, 070, 0002, 070. 0002,170,000

1,530,0001,530,0001,530,0002, 130, 0002, 130, 0003, 360, 0003, 070, 0003, 070, 0003, 070, 0004, 230, 0004, 230, 0004, 230, 000

4,080,0004. 080. 0004. 080. 0002. 130. 0002, 130, 0002, 130, 0002, 130, 0002, 130, 000

11


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I

mX[

Q


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX F-1Labor turn-over

1941

1942

_.

1943

New em-ployees

10211992619

8622858

541403719

26935271713

762848297244183120133

Employeesdischarged

5950193308

4017111

1029559259

108315

401324452

3024147

Turnover

Percent5.05.64.626.7

3.69.42.418.71.41.3.7

8.71.2

2.0.91.59.77.45.33.43.8

1943SeptemberOctober ,NovemberDecember

1944JanuaryFebruaryMarch.AprilMay...JuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovember.December

1945JanuaryFebruaryMarch _.AprilMayJune.-JulyAugust

New em-ployees

33426385

510

45711611152634342884483442126

25211050369

28109

EmployeesdiscnarKed

2868

521034611667613152211157105

60857102707

33

Turnover

Percent9.26.72.11.5

9.62.42.3H.66.8.71.5

. 71.4.7.3.4

.4

.3

.2

.9

.6

.2

.6

13


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(NXQma.


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX GDispersal data


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX HAir attack data

Date, attack air force,target

3 Apr. ly-l."'. 2U \, Ka-wasaki ui'ban area.

15 Apr. 194fi. 20 AF, Ka-wasaki urban area.

2A May 194.'>, 20 AF,Yokahama urban area.

Installation damaged

Takashima Machi warehouse,Yokahama.

Nakaniura-Bashi plant, Yoka-hama.

Yawatabashi warrhonsc, Yoka-hama.

Toraioka plant, YokahamaSuekiehi warehouse, YokahamaTakashima machine warehouse,Yokahama.

Sakurajieko warehouse, Yoka-hama.

Extent of damage

Warehouse burned; officeand oil house damaged.

Office, warehouse, 1 shopbuilding burned.

Warehouse and billet burnedNo recordWarehouse burned.-.do,...do

Materials damaged

Cement stock, office supplies de-stroyed.

6 machines destroyedTools and instruments destroyed-Gas supply system damagedAlloy steel stocks damagedGraphite and cement stocks de-stroyed.

Lead, zinc, tin, chemical stocksdestroyed.

Man-hours lost

None9. 120

None30.000

3fi, 800

Production loss

None.None.None.About 90 enginesNone.None.None.

16


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ISHIKAWAJIMA APPENDIX I-lIlA-35 engine pruduclion November 19/,l-Augusl 194^

1941- . ..

Total1942

.,_.

Total

1943

Actual Ordered Maximum

29

82828295969S95100100100

1943November.December

t

Total1944

JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctober...November...December

Total

1945JanuaryFebruary ,MarchAprilMay..JuneJulyAugust

Total

Actual

390

057010070130150110608012093107

951011501101189167

Ordered

100105

1,131

2,705

370420420160160160160160

Maximum

90100

105


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(NIQ


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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYLIST OF REPORTS

The following is a bibliography of reports resulting fromSurvey's studies of the European and Pacific wars.

of these reports may be purchased from the Super-of Documents at the Government Printing Office,

D. C. Permission to examine the remainingmay be had by writing to the Headquarters of tlieat Gravelly Point, Washington 25, D. C.

European WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

1 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum-mary Rep


28/31

Abrasives Branch Submarine Branch5152

The German Abrasive IndustryMayer and Schmidt, OfEenbacli on Main, GermanyAnti-Friction Branch

53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings IndustryMachine Tools Branch

54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany56 Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION59 The Defeat of the German Air Force60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign61 Air Force Rate of Operation62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera-

tions in the European Theatre63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and MediumBombers in the ETO64 Description of RAF Bombing64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo-

gistics MORALE DIVISION64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale

Medical Branch65 Tlie Effect of Boml)ing on Health and Medical Care

in GermanyMUNITIONS DIVISIONHeavy Industry Branch

66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany67 Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, & D68 Gutehoftnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheiuhausen, Germany70 Neunkirehen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-many71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf,Germany72 August Tliy.ssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany73 Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger-many74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund,Germany75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G,Bochum, Germany

Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report78 Tank Industry Report79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris81 Adam Opel, Russelsheim, Germany82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany83 Mascbinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Ger-many84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedriehshafen, Germany87 Voigtlander, Mascbinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany88 Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger-

many91 Friedrieli Krupp Grusoiiwerke, Magdeburg, Germany

92 German Submarine Industry Report93 Mascbinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augs-burg, Germany94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany95 Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger-many97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft. Kiel, Germany98 Howaldtswerke A G. Hamburg, Germany99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany

Ordnance Branch101 Ordnance Industry Report102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G Magdeburg,Germany103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bo-chum, Gei-many104 Hen.schel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf,Germany107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, GermanylOS Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany

OIL DIVISION109 Oil Division, Final Report110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix '111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Prp-

pellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (MinisterialReport #1)112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger-many113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team

78114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals

Oil Branch115 Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Ger-many2 Appendices116 Braunkolile Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany

Wiiitershall A G, Luetzkendorf, Germany117 Ludwigsliafen-Oppau Works of I G FarbenindustrieA G, Lndwigshafen, Germanylis Ruhroel Ilydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany,

Vol. I, Vol II119 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg Re-

finery, Hamburg, Germany120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook

Refinery, Hamburg, Germany121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelmsburg

Refinery, Hamburg, Germany122 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, VolI & Vol II

123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Ham-burg, Germany

124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham-burg, Germany

125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Svnthetic Oil PlantVol I& Vol IIRubber Branch

126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main,Germany127 Continental Gummiwerke. Hanover, Germany128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant129 Ministerial Report cm German Rubber Industry

20


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Propellants BranchElektrochemiscliewerke, Munich, GermanySchopnebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose SprengstoffWerke GmbH, Bad Salzemen, GermanyPlants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co,

Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg,GermanyDeutsche Sprengchemie GmbH, Kraiburg, GermanyOVERALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISIONOverall Economic Effects Division ReportGross National Product 1 Special papers

Kriegseilberichte I which togetherHerman Goering Works [ comprise theFood and Agriculture I above I'eportIndustrial Sales Output and Productivity

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISIONPhysical Damage Division Report (ETC)Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, FranceRailroad Repair Yards, Malines, BelgiumRailroad Repair Yards, Louvain, BelgiumRailroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, BelgiumRailroad Repair Y'ards, Namur, BelgiumSubmarine Pens, Brest, FrancePowder Plant, Angouleme, PrancePowder Plant, Bergerac, FranceCoking Plants, Montigny & Liege, BelgiumFort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, FranceGnome et Rhone, Limoges, Frauce

6 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, FranceGnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,FranceKugelfiscber Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, GermanyLouis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, FranceS. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, FranceA. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, FranceV Weapons in LondonCity Area of KrefeldPublic Air Raid Shelters In GermanyGoldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap-

sack, GermanyBrauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau-weller, GermanyStorage Depot, Nahbollenbach, GermanyRailway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, GermanyRailway Bridge, Eller, Germany

Gustloff-VVerke Weimar, Weimar, GermanyHenschell & Sohn G m b H, Kassel, GermanyArea Survey at Plrmasens, GermanyHanomag, Hauo^er, GermanyMAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, GermanyFriedrich Krupp A G, Essen, GermanyErla Maschinenwerke, G m b H, Heiterblick, GermanyA T G Maschlnenbau G m b H, Mockau, GermanyErla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Mockau, GermanyBayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, GermanyMittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Tauclia,GermanySubmarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, GermanyMulti-Storied Structures, Hamburg, GermanyContinental Gummiwerke, Hanover, GermanyKassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, GermanyAmmoniawerke, MerseburgLeuna, GermanyBrown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, GermanyAdam Opel A G, Russelsheim, GermanyDaimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, GermanyValentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, GermanyVolkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, GermanyRailway Viaduct at Bielefeld, GermanyShip Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, GermanyBlohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany

184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany1S5 Synthetic Oil I'lant, Mecrbeek-IIandiurg, Germany186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, GermanyIS!) Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Germany190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany193 Fire Raids on German Cities194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigsliafen, Germany, Vol I& Vol H195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany196 I G Farbendustrie, Leverkusen, Germany197 Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hanun, Germany

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION200 The Effe-\'ts of Strategic Bombing on German Trans-portation201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations InRegensburg, Nurnberg and Munich E)ivisions.203 German Locomotive Industry During the War204 German Military Railroad Traffic

UTILITIES DIVISION205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report206 1 to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports"207 11 to 20 In Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports"208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G

Pacific WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

1 Summary Report (Pacific War)2 Japan's Struggle to End The War3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima andNagasaki

CIVILIAN STUDIESCivilian Defense Division

6

Field Report Covering Air RaidSubjects, Tokyo, Japan

Field Report Covering Air RaidSubjects, Nagasaki, Japan

Field Report Covering Air RaidSubjects, Kyoto, Japan

7 Field Report Covering Air RaidSubjects, Kobe, Japan

8 Field Report Covering Air RaidSubjects, Osaka, Japan

9 Field Report Covering Air RaidSubjects, Hiroshima, Japan-Summary Report Covering AirAllied Subjects in JapanFinal Report Covering Air RaidSubjects in Japan

Medical Division12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Serv-

ices in Japan13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and MedicalServices In Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Morale Division14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale

1011

Protection and AlliedProtection and AlliedProtection and AlliedProtection and AlliedProtection and AlliedProtection and Allied-No. 1Raid Protection andProtection and Allied

21


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1516

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

ECONOMIC STUDIESAircraft Division

The Japanese Aircraft IndustryMitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. I(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK)(Airframes & Engines)Nakajima Aircraft Company. Ltd.

Corporation Report No. II(Naliajima Hiliolii KK)(Airframes & Engines)Kawanishi Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report No. Ill(Kawanislii Koliiiki Kabushiki Kaisha)(Airframes)Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc.Corporation Report No. IV(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo KabushikiKaisha)(Airframes & Engines)

Aichi Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report No. V(Aichi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division

Corporation Report No. VI(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, PuroperaSeizosho)

(Propellers)Hitachi Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report No. VII

(Hitachi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)Japan International Air Industries, Ltd.Corporation Report No. VIII(Nippon Kukusai Koku Kogyo KK)(Airframes)Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing CompanyCorporation Report No. IX(Nippon Gakki Seizo KK)

( PropellersTachikawa Aircraft CompanyCorporation Report No. X(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)(Airframes)Fuji Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XI

(Fuji Hikoki KK)(Airframes)Showa Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XII(Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK)(Airframes)Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd.Corporation Report No. XIII( Isliikawajinia Kokfi Kogyo Kalnishiki

Kaisha)( EnginesNippon Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XI\'(Nippon Hikoki KK)(Airframes)Kyushu Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XV(Kyushu Hikoki KK)( Airframes

Slioda Engineering CompanyCorporation Report No. XVI(Shoda Seisakujo)(Components)Mitaka Aircraft IndustriesCorporation Report No. XVII(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)(Components)

33 Nissan Automobile CompanyCorporation Report No. XVIII

(Nissan Jidosha KK)(Engines)

34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air DepotsCorporation Report No. XIX

(Airframes and Engines)35 Japan Aircraft Underground

Report No. XXBasic Materials Division

36 Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy (Vol. I)Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division

37 The Japanese Construction Industry38 Japane.se Electrical Equipment39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry

Electric Power Division40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re-

ports)Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division

42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Util'zation of Manpower

Military Supplies Division43 Japanese War Production Industries44 Japanese Naval Ordnance45 Japanese Army Ordnance46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding

Oil and Chemical Division49 Chemicals in Japan's War50 Chemicals in Japan's WarAppendix51 Oil in Japan's War52 Oil in Japan's WarAppendix

Overall Economic Effects Division53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's WaiEconomy (Including Appendix A: LI. S. Economi(

Intelligence on JapanAnalysis and Comparison;Appendix B : Gross National Product on Japanand Its Components; Appendix C: StatisticalSources).

Transportation Division54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941-

1945Urban Areas Division

55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy(Summary Report)56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawa.saki-Tokohama57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-K.voto59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima

22


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MILITARY STUDIESMilitary Analysis Division

Air Forces Allied with the United States in tlie WarAgainst JapanJapanese Air PowerJapanese Air Weapons and TacticsThe Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground ArmyLogisticsEmployment of Forces Under the Southwest PacificCommandThe Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom-bardment in the War Against Japan (TwentiethAir Force)Air Operations in China, Burma, IndiaWorld WarIIThe Air Transport Command in the War AgainstJapanThe Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan

0 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the WarAgainst JapanThe Fifth Air Force in the War Against JapanNaval Analysis Division

The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and11)Campaigns of the Pacific WarThe Reduction of Wake IslandThe Allied Campaign Against RabaulThe American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap,Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III)The Reduction of TrukThe Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against JapanReport of Ships Bombardment Survey PartyFore-word, Introduction, Conclusions, and GeneralSummaryReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure A), Kamaishi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure B), Hamamatsu Area

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure C), Hitachi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure D), Hakodate AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure E), Muroran AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure F), Shimizu AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Areas

87

88

89

009192039495

96

979899

100101102103

104105106107108

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure I), Comments and Data on Effectivenessof AmmunitionReport of Ships Rombardment Survey Party (En-closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy ofFiringReports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments onJapanese War Potential

Physical Damage DivisionEffect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (aReport on Eiglit Cities)The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb onJapanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents)Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, JapanEffects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, JapanEffects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa-

nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents)Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and FiveHundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (aReport on Eight Incidents)A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (SummaryReport)

(J-2 DivisionJapanese Military and Naval IntelligenceEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive ReportEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part II, AirfieldsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomt PlottingEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area AnalysisEvaluation of Photogi-aphic Intelligence In the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part V, CntnouflageEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part VI, ShippingEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part VII, ElectronicsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach IntelligenceEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part IX, ArtilleryEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and RailroadsEvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

USSBS Report 28, Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company

Documents

Transcript of USSBS Report 28, Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company