USSBS Report 62, Military Analysis Division, Japanese Air Power

8/7/2019 USSBS Report 62, Military Analysis Division, Japanese Air Power

1/48

RESTRICTED (_

THE UNITED STATES(PACIFIC)


2/48

u s... 1. 'lrts

turthor 1l:t '. ret !1j , t

. ..

'r .. :', < l1 ' further...'I C\lL.",usiocs or

,1""C': 1",1unJ U!.l subject ~~1 _4 I l" .,tltUOS ~

FOREWORDThe United StlLtes St rategic Bombing Survey was establ ished by theSecretary of W&ron 3 November 1944,pursuant to a Directive from the latePresident Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct IUl impartial and expert studyof our lIer~d attack Oil Gennauy, to be used inconnection with ail ' a ttacks onJIJ;panlind to establish IIbasis for evaluating the importance and potentialitiesof air power as IIJl instrument of mili tary s trategy, for p lanning the future

development of the Uni ted Stntes armed forces, and for determining futureeconomic policies with respect to the national defense. .A _ summary report IIJldsome 200supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey illGermanyhave been published,On 15August 1945,President Trumnu requested that the Survey conducta. similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in. the war against Japan,submitting reports in dupl icate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretaryof the Navy. The officers of the Survey during its Japanese phase were:

FRANKLIN D'OLlllR, O h ai r- m .a n .PAUL H. Nl'I'ZE,fUNny C. AI.E. , .AlrDER, TTi( ) (J-Oha ir 'me-n .WALTER '\'iflLDS, Secl'eta1'Y'HARRY L. BOWMAN,J. K. GALBRAl'tll,RJ!lNSISLlKERT,FRAN x A . M c N .\ l\ (l )J ;l ,FluJ S E A R L S , Jr.MONROE SJ.>AOH'f,DR . Lotns R. TUOMI'SON,THEODORE P. WnJ{}>l'l', Directors .

The Survey's complement, provided for 300 civil'ians, 350 officers, and 500enl is ted men, The mi li tary segment of the orgnnizatiou was dra wn from theArmy to the extent of 60 percent , and from the Na, 'Y to the extent of , J,Opercent. Both the Army und Navy gave the Survey all possible assistunce illfurnishing men, suppl ies, tmnsport and informntion . The Survey operatedfrom headquarters established in Tokyo early in Ssptembar 1945, with sub-headquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshimn, and Nagasaki, and with mobileteams opel' fl.wng il l other parts of Japan, the isl ands of the P!lCific,and theAsiatic mainland.I t was poss ib le to recons truct much of wartime Japanese military plan-ning and execution 1l11gn.gemell t by engagement und campaign by campaign,nnd to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japnll's economy nud war-production plant by pJll-lIt,and industry by industry, III addition, studieswere conducted on Jnpan's overall strnteglc plans and the background of herentry in to the war , the internnl discussions l ind negotiations Ieading to heracceptance ofunconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among

iii


3/48

. tf t iv ess of the Japl Inese civ il ian defense OT-the civilian population, the ehec rven. b bs SeI)lu'll.tereports will be issued ti' and the effectsof t e atomic om .gamza on, dcovering each p111lSeof the stu y. tl 700 Japanese military, governmentThe Survey interrogated more ian d l l l ; c i translated many documentsand industrial ollicials. It a.ls: l1' :o :: e Survey, but will a lso fUl' ll j$h datawhich hun not only r n :en use u ts .' being made to turn over t he

't, t dies AJ'l'an"smeu .ne "" .valuable for other s u. ~ t, ey where they wil l be availnbleSurvey's files to Itpermlluent g~vel.nm~u ugen .for 'furthel' examination and dlSt.l,butlOn.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Acknowledgment is made to the Military Intelligence Sel'vice, 'War' De-purtment, General Stail' 2, the AAF His tor ical Off ice, lind A-2, FEAF formuch of the basic data upon which this report is based.Appreciation rs expressed to the Aircraft Division of the ul'vey fordefinitive figures on aircraft; production j to the O il and Chemicals Divisiontor statist ics on aviation gasoline; and to the Navn] Analysis Division forcerta.iu figures on JaplLllese Navy aircraft strength and losses, aswell ascertainother information, much of which was supplied by Commander Ihc!L\JID P.A=,US~'R.

Colone l Rom:wf H. ThltllU.L and Colonel R,\NS."y D. POT"l'Shud over-alldirection of IIhestudies which this repor t Covet 'S . TIle vuluu ble assistance ofLt. Comdr. W, I .k TER NXCHOLS , USNR ., Captain Dow PAllKF.S and 1st Lt.RICHARD L. SNBIDEll, who noted as interpreters in the interrogations fromwhich much original material has been derived, is deeply appreciated.

The report itself represents the combined efforts of a number of officerswho worked OIl Japanese Ail' Intelligence for the '\Val' Department GeneralStlltl' during the W!lI' and who conducted the interrogations. Those officers, inthe early dnys of the Survey, included Major NORER1' Bfu\uCrnJR, Mnjor JAMESR BURGBSS, Jr., lfnjor SllfUEL S. LOGAN, ~("jor J01:1N C.IIIBST and 1stLt.JOHN G. PALFREY. The report, in. both substance and final form, was preparedby the following officers,who served with the Pacific Survey since its activa-tion :

Major Eowr::; McELw~IJN, GS CSquadron Leader EDWAll 'N. BLOX]UJlt, O.E.E., I~AFOuptain OJI.\1US a. HASKLNS, lITOaptnin Cf!,\LlImnS M. Ron~n'!' , ACFirst Lt. DON"LD lIIElKLl!lJOH.N, ]U!


4/48

TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGEI. SUMMARY /..................................................... 1

1. Scope ................................ .,.......................... 12. Stages ot The Pacific \Var ......................................... 1S. Japanese Weaknesse.~ 14: . Salclde Force ............................ , , :. . . .. . . . S

II. EAlIILY BlSTORY OF JAPANESE AIR FORCES ........ 444445

1. Japanese Navy Air Force .............................. , ........2. Japnnese Army Alr Force . .

III. SITUATION ON 'I: DEOEMBER 1941 ........................... . ....1. Japanese Estlmate of the Situation .2. DlspO~itlons ; .

IV. THEJAPANESE .ADVANOE .LSummary .2. Pearl. Harbor .8. Wake and Guam ..4. First Phillpplnes CIImpaign _ .5. .Advance Into the Netberlands East Indle" . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. ..6. Malayan 'Campalgn r

;;55667899

7. Bunma .............. , .... -V. THE DEFE.A.T OF THE JAPANESE .AlRFOROES . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ..

1. Summary ................................................. 92. Doolittle Bald. .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . 98. Coral Sen 104. Midway ,....................... 105. Dutch Harbor and the .Aleutians 106. Solomons and Bismarcks 1.17. New Guinea .................................................... 188. 9" u trnl Pacific ........................................ 159. Second Philippine Ollmpnlgn 16

VI. SOUTHEAST.ASIA AND OHINA . 191. South..nat AsIa .. . ... 192. Chinn 21

V1I. DEFENSE OF' INNER ZONE ANI> SOUTHERN AREA ;).GAINST INVAsrox 221. General ...................................................... 222. Iwo Jhna . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . 223. UJlthl .4. Okinawa 225. Defense ot the Main Jstnnds ng.llIlst 1nvIISI,on ..................... 246. Defense of Southellst Asia ....................................... 25

VIII. DEFENSE OF JaP.AN .AGAINS'l' AIIt .ATTAOK ....................... 261. Early History ... .. .. .. . . . .. . . .. .. . 262.. nasic DI menltles , , . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . 268. Soule of Ell'ort 264. Success .......... ,............................................... 2i

IX. CONOJ,USIONvii


5/48

TABLE OF CONTENTS--(Cootinued)APPENDICES PAGE

I. PRODUa.rrolS, WASTAGE, AND AlEC RAFT STRENGTH.... ....... 2821 11. General .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

2. produertcn .. .. .. .. .. .. .. S. Aircrnfi Strength , ,4. Wastage ~ ~~~ r , .5. Se,,~~"blllty r Exblbittl ~....... , ~ , ...... ~....... , ........

11 . JAPA~'ESE AIR PERSONNl!lL .1. Generul :2 . rUr Tralnlng Before 1041 .B. SitlHltlon on 7 Dee8mber 1!)..l1. " . . ~ .4. Elxpun.lon In 1942 , .5. Expansion In 1943 lind 1944 ; .6. Sulolde Training .7. lIn.intennnce Personnel .S. SItuation at End of WtII ........................................Jlxlllbits .................... ,..............................

rrr, JAPA..'ESE AVIATION 1'U'ET .1. Generol .2. Prcducrlon. COo$.unptJon, !tnd ,Stocks . ................. ' .3,. Aviation Gusollne Substitutes ' .4 . EJree t of Short age Oil Comhitt Operatlons .5. 'Effect on Ernlnlng . _" .... + O. oonctustou ' .

IV. FIGH'.rER DEFENSlil OF J'APAN ..L, Introduction .2. Basic COncepts .3. Eurly History ...................................................4. Earll' B_"9 AUncks from Ollioo Bases .5. TIle PerlQ,1 of Greatest Activit)': NOl"emb..,r lll44 to Ap.1] J94G., .6. Per iod of Conse rvntlon : Apl' l] 1945 to August 19 45, ........... , . ..7. Wa:rn.log Sy~t.HnFL ................... _ , . ~ .... ~ ~...S.~'tghte.r COetTol . . . , . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ..9. Ceuelnston , .........................................Ex:hlhlts , ..........................................

v. ~nr(AZJ lJ ., .1. Introduction , , .2. The KalUikuze Stnte of Mind ,3. 1"lrst Phase : Peart Harbor to L.yte Gulf .4. Sel'ond Pbnae: PhiHppillea 0l1mp8lgo .........................5. Third Plmsa: RYlLksus Campalgn + 6. Fourlh Ph..se: The PIIIO!! at the Wllr's Elml7. Other Ph."", of Suicide Attack ::::: ..s. Con"lu~lons , " ................. : :: : :::: :: : : : : : ::: : : : :]O"hl l>l' " . . .. . , ." . .. . , . . , ' . , . . .. . , . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. ..

viii

282880818234M3< 1353585363636374141414141424245454545464748495051

606013 0Il26865Gi l727375

JAPANESE AIR POWER

1. ScopeThis paper describes the rise ami fall of Japa-ese air power with particul ar emphasis on Jupa-ese weaknesses ami mistakes which cont ribu tedo ultimata defea t. It does not consider the opera-ions of the A.med Air Forces excep t where neees-:try for an appreciation of ,Japa,nese nir opera-ions. Separa te r eport s have been prepar ed g iv ingletailad accounts of Allied opsrutions.. S tages of the Paci fic Wal 'The war with Jopan was not a sell nor a ground01' lID ail' 'war, but n combined sea, ground airI' n,r i n three dimensions, From the point 0'[ viewf the - Iapnnese A. ir FOl'C6S it had three distincthases :First: The period of the JnpHnese advance'hen the -Inpnnese Ail ' Forces gained supe rior itylli every theater ill preparation for ground andmphibions operations.Second: The period d l1L' ingwhich the , Jnp"neseI .. ir Forces lost u ir SI!periority ill Gvel'j' theuter~d the All ies begun to ndvanca, exp lo it ing the ir11 ' superiority.Thi l"d : The pe riod dur ing whrel : t ll e . Ju ll~meseurned their a,l tention til the creation of 11 special~licide nttnck force designed to tut-n bnck nn invu-1011 of the mniu . Iupanese Is lands .In the uccom I'll nyillg chal'!; (i..nside front cover)eh l'ol lo logy ( )1 :the Paci fi c war i s se t out ill suchwny us to show the connection between ail',

~1 l 'Oundaud IH1VR . 1 operat ions, and between e"enl sIItlilfllrellt thenlers.~. /apal1ese WeaknessesThe -Iapnnese neVOI' possessed, tile economic ]101li1ltinlOJ' t ,he widesp rend t echnieul skill 1t"t'e.'Sll ['Y01'the development of n n ni,.-[nTC" IIP preach in"h~ Allied Au' L'ol't'e8 0\' the Gernmn Ail' FOI'l'~ i~f reeli"elles~. The .In I'" nese .A iI ' Forces never I lie-

RESTRlCTED

ISUMMARY

less out numbered and outclassed the weak .AlliedAil ' Forces i ll th6 F Il )' El l t nt the beginning of thewar, and they therefore 'were able to eliminateAllied air opposition and then to provide decis ivesupport for the ground and sen forces advaucingto the south. Bot the Japane e were f or ced slowlyonto the defensive, and they begun to suffer fromthe weaknesses of their prewar concept of au'power and mistakes in their original planning,Mor eo ,' er, the I tigl1 command made It series ofnew mistakes in the development and employment.of the Jllpanese Ai l' Forces which Itns tened , Fina ldefeat. The most si gni ficunt of those weaknessesand mistakes a re "S follows:n. Baltic Concepts. Both the .]Rp"nese Army

and Navy recognized prior to the outbreak of \\"\1't I,e necessity for mmtrnli.zillg fill opposing .airforce when attempting a ground or amphibiousadvance, but beyond that bit ic concept. their al'p reach to the problems of n il ' wur fure was nar row.,Japanese Army Air- Force unit were subordinateto grouud force commanders who cousid red theairplane primarily 9. tnctical weapon for the im-media te support o f ground t.I'OOpS at short range .The J9.]lIIlle..


6/48

important con eqnences. In the Sulom~ns cam-Plli~, neither Air urm carne near the ~\hed basesof F. i!p iri tu Santo und NOlIDllla from '~'11ich theGuadnlclIllal operaeion was mounted. In NewGuirea a major factor i n t he.Allied advance "vasthe long range surprise attacks Oil Wewnk li ndHollmdin which the Japanese could not matc l lwith attacks Oil Allied bas e s . In southeast , Asia,the Japanese concentm.ted on groun[l SllPPOl't in-s tead. of such lucrative targ;!ts as 0l11CUttiland tllllHunp route. Once the Mal 'io.nas were tnken, B-29a tta~ks cou ld be Inunched on Japanese indus tlYwitlout ri sk of elIecti,'e sustained attacks on t heB-2~ bases . And nowhere cou ld the Japanese Ail'Fortes prevent the concent ra tion of Al li ed f or cesrelaively close to their objective or force theeos t iy dispers :t land otber defense m e a su re s w h ic ha t te . : ld the threat of heavy an d sustained air at-t a ck s ,In the air defense of the homela.nd, the Japanesepushed to the extreme their concept that the airunits should operate in immediate support ofgromd units under ground force control. The ail'defense of Japan was organized Oil au nel l. bas isunder ground armies, with Army air units con-f ined to the bounda ries of the ir par ti cu la r groundAmy, and Navy uni ts pr otec ting tar get s of part i-eular interest to the Navy. No fluid sy tam. forthe un if ica tion of a ll figh te rs into a s ingle com-mand having no ter ri torial boundar ies ever passedthe ta11.-ing stage.Rut even though tile two air arms were desi! !,nedto give immediate support to ground and seaf o r ce s , t h e Ja p an es e d id not fully appreciate t 1 1 1 1ne:essity for providing such support in evel,),g ro u nd a nd s ea operation. For e xa m p le , t he over-lund advance on Port MorMby in the summer of19:12was under taken vir tually without provisionta o nil' support. ~[ol'eoveJ:, tl\e immediate supporta(tuaUy provided by the Japnnese Ai r Forces waslimited. Wellkne$! ls in their system for air gronndcommunication and the lack of good f ig1llel' bomh-6~ made thu t support r elat ively ine ffect ive. Andth~ ~apanese never perceived the logis tical capu-b[ lt ie s of t rtmsport Il ir cmf t and 11Hel' employed.t l1em for the support o f ground force 011n s('al"remotely approl lCh ing the operatioIl s of Alliedtroop cal:rier lInd Bupply dropping units ..b.. E 8! l' m a tc o f Allied Air Potelltir tl . A t the be-~g of the ~vl1r , the ,Tapullese high comllllllld~~iled to appl'eclIIto t ,he significllnce of the displll"tty b et we en t he Japll.nese lind Allied air potelltillls.In194.1,the Japanese aircl'lIft indusLl'y produced

1\,088 planes whi le the United States, though n"lfu lly converted to a wlH,t ime economy, prod~ lc! 'd .19,445. Sinri lady , the ,hpanese t raining progrnmturned out about 3 ,000 pilot s in 1941 as compa r edwith 11,000 fer the U. S. Army and :ra,vy. T I l eJ ap llnese ini ti al ly could see only the .weaknes s Lthe smal l Allied Ail' Forces b as ed i ll the Po.cific,and they were lul led into a f al se sense of s ecuri tvby their enrly successes. As a result, it was not until]!,te 194'3 thllt t hey ma,de a ser ious e :i l' ort to bui lda l a rg e air force. By t lmt t ime it Wl\.S much to ol at e, fo r in 1943 the Uni ted S tates produced 85,433planes !IS oompared with 16,693 for the Japanese ,and 82,714 pilot s compa, red wi th 5 ,400 Japane .


7/48

IIEARLY HISTORY OF JAPANESE AIR FORCES

however, nndthe Navy did 1I0t pUI'ticipat.e in theborder fighting with the Soviet Union which tookph ce in 1939.2. j apm l e s e Army Air ForceThe J~l)a\lese .Army All' Force was also sub.

jected to French influence in its early ~e:eJop.ment. III101l two off icers reeeived au" training rnFr ance and other offi ce rs were soon sent 'there. In1919 (IFrench mission came to Japan, M Id in 1920the that A11ny Air School was established HITokorozawa near '];01,."1'0. Thereafter, the Ja,p:I'nese Anny .Ai r Force deve loped slowly . u l_ lt il itbeenme involved in China and Manchul'la In theperiod from 1937 throug~ 19~1. . .The oulbr'"uk of fighting lit China m July at1937 gu VO l the Jnpn,nese Army its .first ~hunce touse Its air force. But the Jnpanese enjoyed (\11'super iority f rom the f ir st , and Ohi.1Htnccord.inglybecame atrninillg area, ])mpllasls wns Iaid onground support, although Japanese bomber crew,g~ined some expe rience i ll bombing Ohul lgk1l1gand other Chinese ci t ies .The Jnpnnese AI'my Air Force received its Ij~"51test in the summer of 19:'.!) when it met the SOVielAil' Force on the northwest ~bnclllH'ia.n border.Itcommitted almost i ts entire strength to thoenea " cmcnt bu t suff er ed n r esounding defeat , 105'in; s~llle 500 pluries ,ul(1150 pilot s. The J "pUII~attribute their defeat to au infer iority in nurubersbut they elairn to have ninde drast ic changes in o~g :n1 i:()I1Uon,training, lind tactics w 1 1 i e 1 1 made the'losses worthwlrile, In any event, ..f ter the 6ghtlll~in Manchuria the .Tapanese Army began to expHPdi ts air force wit]] gl'eni rapiclity lind, by 7 Deccnrbel' Hl.J.l that air force had reached a peak 01efficiency never ufterwaa-ds attained.

1. J a ~a n e se N a vy A ir F or ceTh~ Japanese Navy A.ir- Fo.rce was estn.blish~cl

in 1!lL2 by certain office rs who had trained InFrance and the United States, In tllllt ye l1 1 ' [I,trlliuing schoolwas setup at 0PIlUfI1ll, near 1:'o.kosukn, but air operations


8/48

were perfected, and on 5 November, they becamea part 0 : a master p lan for operations againstthe Allieo if war should break out . On 22 No-vember the task force assembled in the Kurilesand on 25 November it put out to sea. On 2 De-cember tb Japanese set the morrdng of 8Decem-ber (Japnnese time) for the attn,ck,and the taskforCllllrrived at the take-of!' point 200miles northof Pearl Harbor on schedule.The air groups employed in the Pearl HlI.rboroperatio:lS wElre the finest in the In,pnnesll AiI 'Forces. Each was wel l trained even in 1940,andtlley we:-e reinforced for this occasion with spe-cially picked pilots from almost every group illJapan. pecial training was begun in Augnst1941 wish the problems of the particula r opera-t ion in view. Emphasis was placed on shallowwater topedo attacks in watl)rs no deeper thanPearl Harbor , and special horizontal and divebombing tacties were pmcticed aswell. When thegroups emba:r;ked in Novtlluber, they wer e amongthe most dangerous units ever assembled by anyair force.Six ngular carders with 414planes formed thenucleus of the Pend Harbor task force. 'I'he ac-tual attack, however, was made with 360 planes,54fighters being held back with the carriers 101'defense. The principal target WII!> the UnitedStates Fleet, but slightly more than 'half theattack force was employed against United Statesair fields as a defensive measure. In retrospect, itis remarkable that this most spectacular and sue-cessful attack should have been carried out witbdive bombers and torpedo planes having little orno arnot plate, no self-sealing tanks, 1,000horse-powet engines, c ruising speeds of about 150m. p.11 ., and maximum speeds slightly in excessof 21)1)m. . p. h . Only the Japanese f ighters ap-proached the performance standards of a moderna ir f (, rc a .The attack was planned and carried out in twowave!spaced at nn inlerval of about an hour, asfollows:

T Y J R I of &tta tk: T arget . B om b ~mhl!t-----I------~----__' 0 " ' _ '_ _ . .. .. .. ._ _

The resul ts of the Paar l HUIl'bol'at tack needlit tle conunent here. Suffice it to say that theJllp:tnesBAir Forces began the W\n: !l.t a peak ofperfection which they never excelled and sooncould not equal.3. Wake mzd GztamAt the beginning of the war, the Japanese Navyhad an ail' g roup with some 30 medium bombersbased in the llbt'shIlJls. That force had receiveds p e ci a l training ill over '"a te r n av i g ac io n, ro nc litIlt tacl ,ed Wnke on 8 and 9 December, destroying7 of the 12 nited States figl1ter5. But the firstJIlpal1ese attempt to Iand, on Wake was beatenoff on 10 December and, accordingly , on 22 De-cember two of the Pearl Harbor car rie rs werebrought in to carry out addit ional strikes. Thoseplanes wiped out the remaining .A.meHclln fightersand assi:;ted materially in the success of the Iand-rug on 23December. In support of tile Japnneseoccupation of Guam only a few flont planes wereemployed. As was the case with everymlssioJlcnrriAd out by the Japauese Ail' Porees at thebeginning 01 the war, both the '(>Vakeand Guamopera tions were conducted with the skill andfinesse which mark llighly skilledpersollllel andcareful planning.4. First Philippines CampaignThe fu"St Japanese sor ti e of the WItI' was flownbefore Pear l, Harbor. On 24 or 25 November"Japanese Navy reconn!lissance plane flew ow,'much of Ll1 'hOJI , photographing major Uni tedStates Army installat ions. A report had been. re-ceived t luough Jupnnese FOl'eign Off ice channelsthat United States FILl' East Ail: Foree st~ength ,in the Philippines amounted 00900 first l ine air-craft . On the basis of tl)e plJo t ogT lLpbs , th e Jnpn-nese estimated United Stutes Anny aircrn ftstrength in the Philippines a 300planes, most ofthem obsole t e . Actually them were on ly abou'160 combat planes the re including 29 obsolc 'vplanes of the Phil ippines Air Force. But in an)'event, the l'eConnaissance confirmed the origin,,1Japanese view that they would have I lllmeric:dand quali tative superiori ty, nnd they proceed.,laccordingly.The primary mission of both Japnnese Arnl)'and Navy Ail' Forces in t ;hePhil ippiaes was I .h~destruction of t lle United States nil ' power, nv!!their principal concern was bhllt the Far Ens t .AirForce would pos tpone it s defeat by flying nW") 'to the south. The', Japanese mission was v ~ , . y6 7

.,lyaccomplished OIl the first day of he Will'.~t 0930 on 8 December. 1941 (Philippines~e) , the Jo .panese ArJD!, usmg 32 medium and~ bombers, a.t tackedll ll 'fields and otber instal-lations at BILf:,'1Iloand 'I'uguegaraoln 1101'l;h cen-tral Luzon. The NIlvy wa s scheduled to attack a~dam\, bu t the weather was bad. It finally madean 'Attack about noon with about 75 fighters and100bombers on Clark and Iba Fields. This at-tack caught ~'lny United Sta tes planes 011 theground re:liueling I1Iter having attempted to inter-cept or to escape tbe ea.rlier Army attack. As I).~ 16 B-17s end 30 .tigllters were destroyedl e&vmg only abo~t half the original heavy bombe;f o rc e a n d two-thuds of the . tighter force.On subsequent days, the des truction of ni tedS~ air power in the Philippines was accom-P~ by further. attacks on Clark Field and air~ m the !d a . 1 1 l1 a . a re a , The Japanese Armyqmck ly ~blished a ll' bases a. t Aparr i and Vig!Lllan d provided c lose suppor t for the main Japn-nes~ thrust south from Linga .yen Gulf. TheUnited States FM' East Air Forcefurnished al-most no opposition, for it had been decided toremovethe remaining bombers to ' the south andto .conserve depleted fighter streneth for recon-nalssance missions. Meanwhile, t h : J ap anese hadsecured a foothold on Mindanao with air covel'f r o m : 2 SJl)all carriers, each with about 25 aircraft.WIth the faU of ~Ianila on 2 .January 1942,theJapanese were confident enough to withdraw theirO O s tA rm . . 1. Yunits WIt 1. about 50planes to Thailand~r use m the Burma C~ml}aign. Theavy soonvarted much of its strength to snpporc an ad-

vnnce south f rom Davao into the NethedandsEas t Indies . Del }, fonte Air Field on Mindanao;811 ~ed by Uni ted States planes 01 ' sporadic;m~mg .raids and evacuation flights until 29p.ril, but the Japanese did not consider it It~nous threD.t. Thus, by Q, combiuation of SUIle-nor skill . 'II . and organisaticn, weight of numbers,; : : r u : e II.Ild good fortune, Japan had WOI1 thet air battle of the Philippines.t As an aftermath, when operations against Ba-~ a . n an d Oorregidor had fallen behind schedulef early MaI'ch, 2 Army medium bomber unitsli~rn Burma with nbout40 aircraft replnced thep~ b~rnber unit which had been left ill tileSOrt' ppmes. The Burma units f lew about 200nirc:' Over Ccrregidoc, 10SDlg 9 planes t o I 1n ti -b o r n b e ft. The Navy 0.190 flew regnlar mediumdtUin r s ?r ti e! ; a.go.inst Batsan f ind Corregidorg this period.

5. Adv(mce into the Ne~herlal1ds East IndiesIn Jauuary alldFebl'uary of 1942the .Inpaneselaunched Slid .ompleted two imultaneous drives

to the south through the Mohlccr. 'ea and the MIL-~~Ssa.I St raits . The drives began on 11 Januaryvhen Jupanssa avy paratroops took lYIenado inthe Celebes and an amphibious force landed atTal'~kan on the east coast of Borneo. 'I'hereafter,Balikpapan, Kendal'i, Macassar, Ambon, andKoepang were taken in that order Koepan . .. .byNavy parasroops. III each opemtio~, air 8Ilp~ortwas provided ~y the .Iupanese Navy Air Forceiro:n bases built at the point taken in the pre-ceding operation.Ail' oP'p?SitjOJl to the Japansse advance was all

but negligible. The Allied warning system wasvery poor, and the Japanese time and againcaught Allied planes on the ground and destroyedthew. M~[e?ver, the Japanese enjoyed a numeri-cal supe riority of a t lenst 4 00 1 at every pointthey choseto attack , and thei r p ilots for the mostpart were more experienced than the Allied pilotsmost of them had had no previous combat experi~enc e .Even the possibility of efiecti"e Allied l1iroper-ataons ceased about 19Februa ry. On tha t day theJapl1:,eselanded on Timor and the next day ~okt?e airfield at Koepang which had been the prin-cipal st?P 011 the 1,300-mile ferry route betweenAustralia and Java. Also on 19February DarwintJ:e .A.ustraJill;n terminus of the ferry route. wa~hit by 5 of the 6 Japanese l 'eg ll .hu curri ers a s wel las by 30 medium bombers from Kendui. Thatforce overwhelmed the 10 in tercepting Uni tedS.ta~es ilght~rs, destroyed almost all importantfur installatious, warehouses and docks and sankvir tually every vessel i ll POI t Darwin harbor .bout a week later, .Iapanese land-basad bombers

5


9/48

StriklS or Ro.bau1: 5 Australian " \Vir rnways (slow,advanced trainers) sortied to oppose approx-imutely 100 a ttacki .ng J llpnnese ai rcra ft flown bythe supe rb ly t ra ined Pea rl Harbor p ilot s.6. Mal~yall C4mpaignThe operatious of the Malay:m enmpnign runk

with th o se of the SOlOI l :LOJ!S, the second Phil ip -pines ard, the Okinawa eampaigns us the largestlind mO!, t sustained n ir operations ever conductedby the Japanese }.ir Forces. As was the case inthe Phil ippines, the . Jupanese quick ly gained ai rsuper iority through super ior skill , org!lll iz 'l tio] l,weight of numbers, and better performance oftheir ai rcraft, lind they t hen axploited their nd-vantage by giving close support to the groundarmies which quick ly overr an ~ralnyn, nma tra ,and .Iava,The :i:[nlllyan campuign W(18 planned in Tokyoin 11,e summer of IOU, and m the in 11 o f that) 'lHlt, .~' lpam;se staii off icers surveyed adrficldsaud airfield s it es i ll French Indochina and Thai-l and down to the verr border of Malaya. TheJnpatuse Army Ai r FOl'~e began moving intoFrench Indochina in October 194,1, and by thefirst oi December some 550 A,rmy and 150 Navyui rcr af t wer ebased ther e. Some of the uni ts wer estut ior ed in Nor -t ll Fr ench Indoch ina and givenu plan 0 1 ' luge scale attacks on the Chinese a.irhasa a; Kunming as a security measure to keepthe red plan both from Allied "gents and fromthe Japnnese communders themselves..Abwt 3 December 1941 the plan for utl.ncks

Oil Kmming WItS formally cancelled, and allnvai labla n il ' st rength was eoueeut ru lcd in SOl l t .1 IFrauen Indochina. During the early morning of8 Decunhe r (Singapore t ime) . just n ftel ' the PearlHarber uuock. the Japanese Nat ') ' bCgUlt the JUI1-Iaynn campaign by bombing the Ri"gupore ai r-f ields. Dur ing the next 3 duys, the .]ul'une. e Armyf lew Lbon! '300 sor ties ng:Liu' lt air fields in Nor thMnllt;lll and a lmost drove the RA.F f rom the sk ie sill tbet . aren, ) 'Ieal1wl1i1e,A",ny .Air Force groundpe rsonnel hud been in the i i i 'S! ' W'' '' !! of the land-ings, ".1H.Lcaptured ai rfi elds wer e quick ly put inOpel 'dt . lOn. From these a irt ie lds. C1 0 5! l s u pp e r+wus gwen ground t rcops udvune i ng to the 50 \ ,1 t 1 \ ,lIud mOll the shortel ranged Arlll)' a il 'cr: ti 't welanble ,0 join the Nav. \ ' in mirllj 0]1 8i" ""IIP01'I l. '}"J".I1.(JI,erlltiol1s the RA.F furnished very lil lIe oppo.SltJOII.n pllsses."1 warning mighthuve been sent to Tokyo. Itwas accord ingly de-cided to launch thll planes inllnecliately eventhough t 1 . 1 e y faced at best foroed InmliDgs in therugged tanuin of Fuki ll ll o r Chekiang Pro \' :inc !!! iof Ghina.The picket boats in :fact sent a warning, butthe Jnpanese Navy concluded that the pl,mes;from the task :force were con\'en!, ional ship-based


10/48

types md therefore well out of range. Itpre-dicted an attack on the following day, and whenthe attack actually Clune that vet'y noon, bothArmy uid Navy wer e taken by surpr ise . A smullfigh te r pat ro l was i l l L 1 1 e air Itt about 00,000 feet,but the B->2iis came in low , a nd not a sinzle nitedStates p lane was lost to enemy act ion. The Japa-nese errriers, which were then near Formosa ontheir reun:n f rom ~he attack on Ceylon, atternpledunsuceass fu lly to fo llow and sink the hsk force.'Phe ra id was too smal l to do snbstan ti al physi-

cal danage, but i ts r llpel"eussions on the planninglevel O 'f the high command were con iderable,Fi1'St , an immediate a ir and ground oflensive wasd irected a t the Chinese airfields in ChekiangProvince where the Japanese had correctly esti -mated the raiders intended to l and. Second a tten-tion "'1lS focussed on the east ern approaches tothe h em e i sl ands , IIJ ld add it ional impetus g iventhe prewar plan to attack :Midway and the Aleu-tians. Third, the Japanese hegm to implementthe ir p lans for n ir defense of Japan which beforet.lJat t.me had r ec e i v e d sean t consi de ra tion . Twonew Army lighter grmlp8 were organized andbased in Japan, and three more were convertedfrom a training to R defense status. A total offour Army fighter grO\lps were held ]1 1 Japanthroughout 1942 and 1943 for the defense of thehomeland at 11 . time when tJle J apanese Navy wasurgently demanding that the ..IUlny send rein-forcements to the Solomons.3. C IT 4l S e4'I'ha first partial victory for Allied air power

in th~Far East came in the Battle of the CoralSea I . J : - S May 19~2rri er a tt acks on Dutch H!l rbor(3-4 JUlie 1942) and the subsequen t occupa tion ofAttu and Kiska were a part of the Midway plansand '\Vera designed to block Alli ed moves o,longthe northern route to Japan. The Dutch IInrbora t t ack s were made by 2 con ver ted car riers will 'a total complement of nbout 75 planes, of whicl1O J l J y I} raaehad the target on the first d(l ;y (3 June)and 32 on the second day (4.June). The landiJlgson Kiska and Attu (7-13 -Iune) were SCl'ee' lWl u J 'those ships, by another ]igl,t carrier and ]JY o "e

10 11

of the two reguhtl' carriers which had not par-ticipated In the i\lidway operation. This forcewhich included the bulk of Japan's remainin~earriers, WaSkept in the Nmih Pacific unnil earl;in July to protect Kiska and Attu from possiblecoun t e ra t t a cks .Japanese operations in the .A. leutimls neverI 1 5 S w n e d signill can~proport ious. Ai rfields werebegun on bot h isl ands, but no Japanese land planewlls ever based on eithel. Twenty-foru- float planesand si x flying boats were sent theue ill June 19i12,but most of them were lost before the end ofsummer as a result of weather hazards and con-tinual attacks by nited States planes, There-after, until the Allied occupation of Attu and theJapanese evacua tion of Kiska in the summer of1943, Japanese ail' operations in the Aleutianswere of negligible proportions.The Japanese rsconna iss auce of Seat tl e ha rborwas an interesting sidelight to the Aleuti.::mscam-paign. On 30 May, a seaplane from 11submarineflew over the [n-ell and reported no en triers orother heavy msn-of-wnr present.6 . S %m o 11 S a n d B ism a rc le sa. ( } l lada .lcq:naZ. During the spr ing of 1!142, the

Japanese advanced south from Rahaul throughthe Solomon Islands and finally Ianded on Gua-daleanal in JIU1e. Thi s thrust was mtended tocutthe supply line between the United nates andAustralia, and to counter it the Uni ted t a EMnrines landed 011 Guadalcanal on 7 Angust 19;102.There ensued n, series of nir operations whichweakened t~e Jupunese Na.V'YAi l" Force so serio.ously that It never agn in furnished suhstantialopposition to the Aflied ndvsnce.A t the time of the GuadalcanalIaudings, J l 1 pn -

nese air strength i n the Bismarcks-Solomons areaamounted to about 150 planes , based principallyo ,~Rabanl. These p lanes belonged to bat tl e-t ri ed~lr units which had operated witl1 grant sueIII the advance to the south The Il.V6mIYC pilot int~Ose units had (It least 6 0 0 ' flying hom: and con-SIderable experience with tropical weuther andoperational difliculties encountered in the B,S-: r c k s aren. An att empt wns made to neutralize(78 force on the elny of the G~lI1cJ!] ,lcanallnJ!dingb Auguat) by 111\ at tack on the Rabaul a irfi elds,u t Uni ted St l1 te s ai r power inAust ral ia was st il l~ IllnnU t h a ~ only 13 B-17s actna. Jly mnds thea tnck. 'l.' he Japanese claim thnt vel'S' little dam-a ge W n s done, a.nd they were able to execute a

SIIl'illS of heavy air attacks on Guadalcanal in thedays immediately following.J avanese los ses in those at tacks were yery heavy

-mOl'e than 50 pe rcen t of the ir Bismurcks-baseda ir uni ts . But the three regula!" nited Statescarri ers which wer e to provide air support duzingthe initial pha es of the action suffered opera-t ional and combat loss es amounting to 20 percentof their fighters and it was thought t ll ey ought ;not to remain in such fl. res tr icted area, w her e theJlLplt)1eSe had 5110wn so much air s treng th . Theyaccordingly were forced to withdraw !l:foor2 daysof action, and a lull ensued while the Japanesebrought in reinforcements and the .All ies tri ed toestab li sh land -based a ir st reng th on Guadalcana l.But even during that lull the Japanese ran l'egu-la.; small-seals air ra ids which achieved cons ider-able success in delaying the supply and reinforce-ment of the small forces which had basn landed.The lull WIIS broken during the last week of

Aug,l.1st by the Batt le of the East.ern Solomons.In that act ion, three .I apunese car ri ers ioined withJaplmesB lund-bused nir units in a duel with twoUni ted States cal 'l 'i ers and All ied land-based :UI "units, und Japanese losses were again heavy, in-eluding one bgM cill rier . An-Iii" reinforcementswere flown in, thi s t ime fr om southeast Asia, andplans were made for a maximum effort duringthe las t put of October.The Japanese air operations which took place

in October were part o f a coord inated ai r, g round,and navnl effort to dislodge United States groundforces on Guadaloanal. For this action, the Japa-nese brought out 2 regular carriers, 2 carriersconvertetl from passenger ships and 1 smal l car-rier, with" total complement of about 300 planes.The pilots iII. tIds force were the best pilots thenremaining .in the Japanese Air Forces, many ofthem veterans of Pend Harber, 00)'1011, arid l'.lid-way. In uddicion , the Japanese then had about150 first-line pluues a t Rabaul, and II, special staffoffice!: hnd been sent from Tokyo t o ensure t heireff icient employment. Thls off icer planned It5-dayser ies of E g h O O l ' sweeps which were to be fo llowedby bomber attaoks, the object being to neutralizeUnited Stat es nil' power 011 Guadalcnnal and toI1ssist in a ground off ensive. The car uier fOl'


11/48

heavy, lloweve r, and the Japanese soon los t m? l' ethan Ialf of their Innd-based force. Meanwhile,the J !lpanese ca rr ier s co ll ided wi th Uni ted Statescarriers in the Bntl1e of Santa Cruz on 26 Octo-ber 1Ql2, und nlthough the United States carrierBorna wns sunk, the Jupl1nese force suffered alos s o j mor e than 100 planes and pilot s.These two ope l' lt tion :; were the c limax of tile

n ir acsiou a round Guada lcnnnl , and (l ft er a se riesof surface actions euhninating in t he B"ttle o rGuadalonnal Oil 13-15 November, the Japanesenever'lguin threatened United StatllS positions illthe southern Solomons, The Japanese carriersretired a nd wen not ugn i n eommitted to o combatunt il :he Uni ted Stutes invasion of the Mrul' iaul lsin JUl ie of 1944. The Japanese carrier air "TOUPSwere eriously weakened, but the most seriousdamage WIlS done to Japanese land -based airpower a t Rabaul , In December of 1942, therewere Jess than 100 planes based there, and thema jOIi ty of the p ilot s were fre sh f rom Jnpun withan a,'el'ltge of less than 300 flying hours, onlyabout 150 of which had been spent in It. combatplaneb. flu! Role of th e Ja ,pa7W8e i J . ' rmy Ail' Force .ItWRS not until January 1943 that the JapaneseM'lllv Ail' Force became involved in the Solomonscampaign. Inthe fall of 1942, the Nlwy made anurges t cal l fo r re in forcements , g iv ing as one rea-son ~he excessive demands of Japanese Armyforce; in the area for ground support. In De-cemwr,2 of the best Army l ight er units, with ex-perience in tIle Malayan campaign, were dis-patched from Surabaya to Truk by carrier with100 planes. These units were flown down to RD.-baul from Truk, and elements from them inter-cepted It B-17 attack on Babaul on 5 Jauna;ry19J3. They were able to maintain an averageS t J " e l g t h of about, ~ Q . . . _ p J a I 1 P . . s until the Battle ofthe Bismarck Sen, 1-3 :March 1943. when two-Lh.ir,1l of their planas were lost and most of theres t ser iously damaged. They were soon returnedto Japan to root, llaving lost 98 aircmft, and 38pi l ot s s in ce their arrival "t Rabaul.. ~Ie~nwhile ill Tokyo, the Jap"nese Navy WIISl lIS lst Jng tba t the AmlY commit i ts st l' ll teg ic r e-set\' ;! of units based in Manchur ia s ince the begin-nin~ of the war. This the Army refused to dobut it ultimately compromised by SlInding in on~e~lrjenc.ed medium bomber u,1it, two partlytraned hght bomber units, nl1( l three inexperi-enood , poorly equipped f ig-Mel ' ull it~. I . .osses ofp]a 1e s ill fe rry ing W eN ? henvy Leell l lse of luck of

training in nn vigntion; one unit alone lost 18planes, half its st rength, on a ftigllt be~\'een Trukand Rabaul. Army ail' strengtJl in Rabaul l'al'elyexo;;eeded,60 f ighters and 40 bombers , the sewicc-abi Ji ty of which was so low tha t ope ra tions involv.ing ~01'1l than 30planes Were Tare.c. L an (& B asin g th e O a rr ie r G'/'(}UipS. The -Iapa-nese Navy soon decided that Army reinforcementsof subs tant ial si ze and qll!,.lity would not be fm-th-coming, It also decided that despite the less ofGuadoJcnnnJ, the centrul Solomons und Rabaulshou ld be held nt all costs in order to o protect thomain j~eet base at Truk, Having been chargedwith. this defense, Navy off icers ! , l o t lhbnul asser tedthat the ail' groups of the carrier force Will'" thBonly remaining 1 1 1 1 i t s in the Japauese Navy AirForce suff icien tly expe rienced to provide any sub-stantial oppo-si t ion to the All ied' advance , and thatthey should be employed f rom land bases , Officer sconnected wi th the carriers bitterly opposed thissu.gg ll st ion, insi st ing tha t the cur ri er fo ree shouldbe kep t intact . I"i 'hen the mutter was fh 'St b roachedinFehl'un,l 'Y of 1943, the high command decided to preserve the carri er fo rce. In March the dec is ionwas reversed, and n II fully trained carrier groupswere ordered to land bases in the Bismarcks.Those groups arrived about the firl'l.t of .ApT i iwith about 350 lanes and the best l ' emai l l ing

Navy pilots. .A t that time there were approxi-mately 200 Navy land-based planes in the area,milking n total Navy force of 550 planes, In thenel r e 2 weeks, that force attacked United Stalesshipping concentrations in the Solomons withthei r maximum operational strength, and made"smal l e r attack on MilDI I Bay in New Guinea. Anat tack on Port :Moresby hnd been planned, but th~Owen Stanley Mountains were considered to I J 4 itoo high for the aircraft available, At tJle CJ o t loi 2 weeks , the caa-rier groups had suffered n ] 5percent loss, and ill order to preserve them forfurther operations, the Navy withdrew them !GTrnk.A comparative lull followed the withdrawnll)(the two C


12/48

trnlinn air field at 'Ynu, IIm!:1 call WIISsent in forreinforcements. Those reinforcl'ments were di -patched by convoy from Rabaul about 1 ~[arch,but alnost all were lost when All ied aircraft sankmost of the COllVOY in the action designated tileBattle of the Bismarck Sen.Bctl the Japanese Navy and the newly arrivedsmall Jnpnnese Army Ail' .Fome lost heavily illattemyting to defend the convoy. The A.l1ny em-ployerl the full stJ:engtll of t.wo experienced figl1terunits vhichit had j ust brough tin from SoutheastAsia. md 40 of their 60 planes were lost. TheNavY also employed some 60 planes and l ikewise10 t about 40..\$ t. result of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea,

the Japanese Anny vir tually abandoned offensiveoperation in east K w Guinea and went on thedefensive. Because of the loss of the convoy,ground strength in the Solomons had to be de-pleted by reinforcements hurriedly sent to NewGuinea, But these l 'e infol'~


13/48

assembled some 500 llil'crafL there, and in n.ddiL~onilthen possessed a cl,l.l'I'ierstriking f01'Cewith .nmecarriers and anot her 500 planes whielt ha(~ beentr:tining ill the ingllpore area since enrly III theyear, 3nt the exper ience level ? f both land-bllse.dand csrrier pilots was exceedingly low. and Itshould lull' s been plain even t o the Jupttllese thatthe)' were mcapnble of furnishing efl 'ecti"e oppo-siti~n to fill All ied invas ion of the Un r ianns ,Jnpmese land-based ai r s treng th . in the Centl 'al

Pacific was seriously depleted just before tlH'1Marianas operation by an abortil'B attempt tooppose All ied landings on Bink , .A t t Il e t im e ofthose land ings Oil 27 Uay 19J..l., about hnlf o~ theJ l tPI1 .nese land-based a ircra ft in the Mar ianaswere di patched towards Biak hJ w~y of Palau,and n strong I011~o[r""Jtili,llnd SOllie 100 .JujJllllcse AI'my 1 ' 1 n J l L . ,WHe acconli Iwly (lisplL trhe d L O ]j1enndo (mel ofhrrlm~es n gm ' H ' ~ I; u th e l' !I to l1Ssistin l'epelling SI1C btill ntlaek . Ou 1 : -\ ep te ll lbcr 10 flllse rep(i)l' t,. W'~:I'e('~i"ed 10 Ihe I IJrecL t1mt an amphibious f(JI"

1 6 1 7

wIISabout to land on ll1indrLnull, a1)(1 nhe planeswel'I'imml'flillfl'l\' ,,,it 11(11'11\\'11 to bases in the Cen-trill Philippillcs. '1 '111 '11 . tlul"illg lhe second week inSeptember, many of them were surprised by IIUn it e d S t a te s NM'Y carrisI' strike which destroyedsome 300 planes, both Army and Navy. Prin-cipally because of these losses, 110 substantial adropposition was attempted when the All ie s landed(InMorotai on 15 September 19o14.No plan hadbeen made t o o p po se the simultaneous landings int h e P a la u group b eca use o f excessive range f romPhi l ipp ine s bases.The Iandings on Pelsliu and Morotai made its e em certain that land ings ultimately would beattempted in the Philippines, and the Japaneset ried to accelerate their pr epara tions for it s de-fe nse . B ut a s a result O l the September carri Iis t rikes , both the Japanese Army and Navy Ail'Forceshad reached a new low in combat effective-ness, and nei the r cou ld pos sibly r ecover in time.Moreover, the Army underestimated the speedwithwhich Allied forces could be regrouped afterthe Peleliu and Mo ro tn ,i c pe ra c io n s, and set somet ime in N ovem be r a s g, target date for readyi ngits defenses .b. Prepal'atm'Y Oa/~'i~ 8fJJ>ik~. Beginning on10October 19o14,United States carriers swept theRyukyus , Formosa, and . Luzon in !l. s e r i e s ofs t r ike s desi gned to screen the Leyte landings. Thecarriers were supported by B-29s from ChiJ11twhich hi t the main repair depots and a ir baseso n th e ferry route through Formosa to cut thelIow(Ifreplacement planes f rom Japan. The Japa-nese Navy Air Force units in Kyushu were ntf i P $ t taken by surprise, Dut 0),1 12 October theywent into action with a night torpedo and dive-bombing attack. The 'returning pilots reporteds i n k i n g 5 major fleet units, Mel tllel'eafter, allcaution was abuudoned and all available plunes'Were sent out ill an attempt to sink the UnitedStates Fl eet. III al l, some 700 sorties were flownfrom 12 to 16 October, and the Japanesepubli cwas told that there had been It resoulldiuO' vic t orywith 30 Allied ships sunk. Actually, no s h i p swe~ sunk and only 2 cruisers were dum aged,~hl1e the Jnpnnese lost at least 400 lll!mes anelpIlots. .Although vel'Y inexperienced by Al lied~~ards, the pilots pr,'abably were the best re-mll~llJng in the J!tpanese Navy .Ai l ' Force , a .nd~ell' less reduced ~llequality of the Nnvy Airc r e e even rurthel'.c. Leyte lllRldi1l{J8. L Ol 1c ll l1 gs 0 11 Leyte took

place on 20 Oc tober 19o14.At that t ime , despit.e

the heavy losses which they had suflered, theJapanese stil l had 4.00 first-line uircraft, in thePhilippines, and by 1 November they were ableto bring in more than 1,000 reinforcements nndreplacements. Tho e planes th y could operatefrom 71 air strips on Luzon and 51 on th e Visa,yasand Mindanao. On tbe Allied side, primary reli-anee was placed on carrier-based planes, JllT' thebeaches were out of runge of Iand-bused f ighters.The Japanese, tberefore, had the advantageswhich neces sa ri ly accrue to a lund-bused a irfo reeOlJerating against cal'l'i ers from u . large number offields 01"6,' an extended period of t ime.But the Japanese Air Forces failed to profit bytheir advantages, and their shortcomings were amajor factor in the J!Lpanese failure to repulsethe landings, By this time, both Army and NavyAil' arms were using pilot fresh out of school,some with less than 100 f1yiJl '" !tOUI'S, most of itin trainsrs (Appendix H). The Japanese air-craft iJ1.dUStl 'Y had expanded too rapidly and thenew planes Wlll'e arrivins in the Phil ippines wi th-out adequatef light tes ts 01' engine block tests (Ap-pendix I). New types of aircraft Wel'S broughtjute service before bugs had been eliminated.Radar and Wfll'l:\.ul


14/48

three light car riers, one batLieship, foul' cruisers,and several smllllel' vessels.e. .~uicid Attock s , During UU~Btltt le of LeyteGulf, .he Japanese for the first time used suicidenttnck. agllinst surface shills on R planned ba ~sand a substalltinJ scale. Previously, there badbeen i~s tances of i so la ted p lane e ra shes on All iedships. for the must part by planes which had beenshot ru t o f con tro l. ItW:l~ not until tue summerof 1944 , l;I'ftllr th e loss of th e }fnl'ialllls,howeve t ,that the J' tpanese high COlllnl(lnd be g a n to con-sider mass suicide crnsbes ns a means of t tuningback the Al li ed advance. The fi rst authen tica tedease of a pilot's announcing before take-off anintention to crash came on 15 October 194d whenRear Admi .ral Arima (poSthumOtls ly Vice .Ad-miral) made au abortive suicide attack on anited Sta tes canier f01'ce oK F01'llloslt. TIllS lita spark of patriotic larvol:, and suicide units be-glln to be formed from regular Army and Navyair units jn the Phil ippines. The f irst l arge at tackby tbose uni ts CMM on 25 October nt the beiglltof tie f i e e t notion. Considerable succe s s wasachillI'ad; an escort c~n'i er was sunk and sevel'alother vessels were damaged. Later, speci1~l suicideunits were formed in Japan, mainly from thep ilot t ra inmg organ izat ion, and before the Japa -nes e withdr ew from the Phi lippines, 650 suicidesort i> were flown which scored 174 bit s 01' dam-agin;t nellI'misses on Ul1i ted States surf ace ves-sels. (For a full discussion of Jnpanese suicideattaeks , see Appemlix V enot, led "Kamikaze." ]f. L$yte R e i n fo r ce m e n t O P 6 'l '( 1 .t iO n i l .The Japa-nese lost heav i ly during t,h" 10 days fol lowingUui;ed States landings on Leyte, but during No-"emoor they brou gilt in.more t1'lll.n1,000 repl nce-ments and continued to make amnximum ef fort todisbdge the invading forces. In this per iod, par -tielllu.r emphasis was placed on the protection ofresupply convoys moving troops from Luzon toOI 'Jl !\Con western Leyte. There were nine . suchcOIWOYS, but the unski l Jed JnpllJl8Se pilots provedunequal to the task of protecting them fromUnited States air atta.ck. In all, landbased andcan-iel ' aircraft sank. about 20 transports a.nd al1Iunher of escOI.1:s,with attendant J\eavy losses ineqdpment !llld moderate 101;885 ill personnel,

g. ilfilli/oJ'O and L i n_ qa l ll l n Op eM t i o ll s. In tl!emiJd le of December Ilnd during the fi rs t 2 weeksof J anua ry , the .Tapanese Ai l- Forces werc facedwit.h .t l~e duty of de~llndillg against two la,l'geamplnblOus forces wInch sailed f rom Leyt~ to theNorth. the first to Mindoro Ilnd the ~oond to

Lingayen Gulf. By this time, }Iowever,.l'll~cl-bascdaircraft, had secured control of the uir over tlleCentral philippines, h avy bombers from Palauhad begun to operate against Manila and MIGClal'k Field complex, and Uni ted States carrierswere operating with even ifl(kfi elds held the Japanese effort at a low level, " . l I din succeeding clays onJy two LS'1's were los t .On 4 and 5 Ju,nU!u'y 1945 the Japanese madedete~mined attacks on the Lingayen convoy , sanll0,11 escort carrier und did serious dnmage to an-other escort carrier, a. cruiser and II. destroyer. 0116 JI1l1UIl , l 'Y, they launched their largest attack-130 sorties-> and hit 16 United States ships, damaging 10 of them badly, This was the Iast Juajue fl 'o lt o f the Japanese .Ail' FOrces in the Philippines , nlld it is s ignific! tnt that it consisted nlmoslen ti re ly of suicide at tacks.h. Recap i tu7 . a l l ion . From the time of the pI'!)pa rn tory car r-i er s trikes on the Rynkyus unt il lb\l"it Ldrawal of the Japanese Air FOl'ces bOIll tl~Phili ppines in Janl la1'Y 1945, All ied a irc ra ft dst royed more th!ln 4,000 1Japanl)se planes, tlhighest SCOl'eachieved by nlly air force in all.t.heater ill a comparnble period of time . .A . In:\jcfactor i ll t J1 e Allied successes was t.he sup"rb tl'ai l'iug of Allied pilots and the quality of AlIiequipment. But .JoplJ,nese wea.lmesses wel 'S l l e l n '"s m11c11of Il. factor.Two weaknesses s tiLnd out ItS pn,r ticu1a.dy ilfl,pOl-tll.nt: 11001' pilot tmin illl); and the bl'e" k d o "I '('olul Jdl lA .n t! 'i iC )O; rs~~8 {rom All C Il u8~HI how.c \Tcr . we. rC BJl l1

hl ll . tI ly n,OO( lv[ tb's cumpnlgn (EJ:hibl~ In).

in th e In t e r stRge~ , , , e the cumpnigll or ~Jle ma i n -tonntlCG and !'il!"\'I


15/48

the WIll', the only attack"]!actunl ly el\ITierl out werea series of small-seals night raids with no morethan h planes made ill Lile" inter of 10


16/48

1!3 Hat parity was achieved. 'I:'he pri_m.arycause 0 : the American success was p ilot t rammg,~\.t the beginning of the war, the worst Japanesep ilot s were left ill Chinn. whi le the bet ter u n i t swent to the Phil ippines and ~1alay". In1942 and]1).1:3re?ll1cement pilots for China came hom the

bottom of the barrel and some hnd as little as150 110m'S. In 19:14 most of the best Japanesepilots were dead, and whe n the FOlllt:e en.tl1 Ai rForce had numerical ItS well as qualitative su-periority, it W(LS able to operate about as itpleased.

V1 JDEFENSE OF INNER ZONE AND SOUTHERN AREA AGAINST INVASION

1. GeIJera l.Afte: the withdrawal of their ail' arms from

the Philippines. the J'll)anese real ized that theycould Iiot compete with the Allied Air Forces iuorthodox operations, But they had learned, asthey tnought, one important lesson from thePhilippines cII .IDpn:ign- the power of organizedsuicide attacks n.gl),instsurface vessels. :'I{Ol'eo"(l1',with He ir main SUP})]y l ine to the south v irtua llycut oH , they were faced wit.h a fuel shortagewhich required lID immediate r edne tion in t rain-ing and an ultimate reduction in combat opera-tions 1S well, Under those circumstances, the,Japanese gave fi rs t p riori ty to the organ iza tionof a. s ti cide force, and they gra( lual ly reduced a llcombat activity in an attempt t o conserve planesand pJots for use by the suicide force in oppos-ing at invasion of the main .Iapanese islands:2. IW9/imaTh e iil' St important amphibious operation to

foll ow the Lingnyen landings was the i nvasi onof lwo J'ima which began on 19 February 1945.ThlLt operation was of e~ooeding importance inthe U'1' Will' against Japan, for Iwo Jima Iaterbecame an alternate base for B-29s returningfrom attacks on Japun proper 1I.l1d provided abase from which to run f ighter sweeps over Japan.But the Japanese A.ir Forces did very little toprevent i ts occupation, Almost no pl anes werebased the re or in the Bonins n iter the beg inningof re~ar earrier strikes ILDd heavy bomber at-tacks which preceded the landings, Moreover,the first United States carrier strikes on Japanprope r were t imed to coinc ide with the landingson Iwo, and the damage they did both to uircrnfl,and si r bases inc reased the d if fi cul ti es of u ttnckson Ivo from JIlplm bases.But the few attacks which in fact, were mude

011 Eni ted States su l' fu .ce ves se ls during the 1wo

.Iimu CRmp,U.'nwere very successful. In all , onlyabout 45 sorties, about half of them. by suicideplanes, were flown against United States forcesattacking 1 wo Jima. These uttncks sank an es-cort carrier with two suicide hits, did seriousdamage to a regular carrier, and hit severalsmaller ships. Such successes lent support to theview that mass suicide attaoks at shorter rangewould be ve ry e ffect ive, and an incr eased impetusw(IS given to the development of the suicide force.3. UlithiOne of the most remarkable sxploits of the

Japanese suicide force came on 11 March 19+5when 24 Japanese Navy medium bombers took ollfrom Kyu.slm ill an !littempt to make a 1,600-mileattack on the United States Fleet base ut lJ1ilhi.Bad maintenance (or poor morale) caused ~planes to turn back, and poor planning resultedin the arrival of the remaining 15 !l.t Uli th i af terclark. ~veJve planes then attempt ed suicide nt -tacks on surface units at Il)1ChOl' in the lagoon, n n dthe ot her three made orthodox bombing; f l . t t n c i ; s .One plane h it , and se riously damaged t Il e ca" l' l' ic l'Ra'1ll1()lph, and one crushed on an island in th Rutoll, bnt t,he ot her did not come anywhere Jle'"the target u rea . Thus, al though the f), tt ack demonstruted in an extreme degree the desperate c\lf"-nete1"of the su ic ide f or ce , i t IL l so demonstrated [lieexceedingly poor quality of Japanese aircnln ,pilots, maintenance men, navigators, and pJ ' I J l -ners.4. Okinllwa

a, ,Japanese Plan. After the wi tl rd ruwal oftheir ail' forces from the Philippines, the . T a p "uese began to prepare defenses against J anc1iJl~~on Fonnosa or in the Ryukyus, which they ( ' .51]"mated would take place some time in Mrurch 01April. They accordingly laid plans for a he~\')'

in~ in ail' streng h 011 Kyushu and he l~itthlapl&flese NILVYAll ' F leet wns rapidly expandedan d ultimately given operational control of allN a v y and Army units operating in defense ofOkinawa from Kyushu.The Japanese intended that the principal strik-ingweapons of the Fifth All' Fleet and its subor-dinate army command should be suicide units.B u t t he Japa.nesi). u l so r e co g n iz e d the necsssi ty f orproviding fighter covet' for inexperienced suicidepilots and raconnaissancs plunss to 'find the tar-gets , and they shiJl had a few ex:pe ri eneed pi lot swho could be used for orthodox bombing andtorpedo attacks. They accordingly organized thebes t of their remaining pilots into elite units forthe purpose of conducti ng orthodox opera ions inai d of the suicide at tacks.b. PreliminO!l'Y }lttuok{J. When the nitedStates Fi fth F lee t at tacked Kyu.shu in a. ser ies ofearri er st rikes beg inning on 15 March and leadingup to the Okinawa landings, it was opposed pri-marily by these elite units. A single dive bomberfrom one of them scored a lucky bit OJ) the carrierFr a n kU n through a break in the clouds. Hitswere also scored on other vessels. This was thelast time in the war that crippling damage wasdone major fleet units by orthodox Japanese ail'at taeks .Meanwhile, the Japanese were n embling allava.ilable suicide planes and pilots in Kyushu fo1'mass suicide attacks on the approaching amphi-bious force. Orthodox training had almost cometo a hal t some weeks ea rl ie r, and p lanes we t partly~ined pilots released ro)' the t ra in ing orgnnis a-tion had been formed :HltO units as rapidly 115possi bl e. Some of the8e units were seasoned withexperienced p ilot s fr om reg\1la1' a ir units, and theunit which made the 11 March n ttack on U1:ithi,despite its ILctUM ineffectiveness, WIlS composedo~ relatively experienced pilots, A few other sui-Cide attacks were made before und ut the time orthe la.ndings on Okinawa, which ook pla e 011 1April, but the bulk of the suicide force WIIS heldback for later mass attacks. .c. MlU8 S'Uio ide Attacklf. 'DIB f irst mas s u ic ide

a tt ack , p robably the larges t nnd most des truct iveJaplUlese air attack of the entire Will', came on6-7 A.pril, when over' a 36-hour period the J I~PI1 -:ese f lew OVe1' 350 SIlicide sor ties , nccompaniedy nea .rly the same number of cove l' , r econnai s-8 Q . n e e , and orthodox bombing sorties. More t h f l . n110JUliet! ships were hit, at J east 25 of th em bylIUicideplanes . Thereaf ter, the Jllpnne e Inunched

9 other mas s su ic ide nttaeks, spaced at intervalsof 2 days to over a week. ~one of them was solarge as the first, and they became, on the aver-age , p rogr es sive ly sma ller and further apart ,The periods between mass suicide attacks were

punctnatsd by small-scala attacks , both by suicideunits and by torpedo and dive-bombing units.During the a months of the campaign, 435 suicidemissions were flown in this fashion. About 250of these came from Formosa, despit e the l'egularFifth Air FOI'Ce attacks on the main Formosllnair bases which bad been in progress since mid-January.Tha following table gives the best available

figures on Japanese silicide sorties during theOkinawa campaign:

Numbi!f !\ "' ov . !. nn :r 1'01&1----1------11--1---)__ "" ApriL .________ 230Za. __ ~_.~~ __ J'2/13 A pr[l ~______ l%j3 _ _ .. ._ li\ t1 6A !>ri l .. _ _ ._ .. _ ._ . 1 204~~._~~~_. Z1flSApriL. . __ ( L $ "6 ;]/4 )111 1' .. 7,5.I!~_ ._ _ _ _ _ _ 10/11 May_-0._, ~~. 70,_ _ . _ _ 2Mo ' 01 >.s_~. ~_... ~J1$1I.f.aS__ .........._...... 6(J0. : J f7 J.. ,._ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 20]{] 2J/221unlL___________ 30

125 .' "to " I . ,J. I00 us00 L2.I80 "' "100 , e o80 UQao eoJO "1- ---"' " 1.465is Is.;200 2:;0&!O 1.Il00

T ot 31 ,o r I Om .n .s .5 Bt la cl$ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ 8 MIa.dQ:il'ional8uicldl! !Ori.l!8 beaween messIII.tL$W ~.~_ ......... 1,,0S ufc ld .o .s or Ue s f lo wn t ru m F or mD sa b B5 e$ _ 5 0I--~--.!---O nrn 4oo ta L_ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 1 ,6.:)0Dilling the Oki nawa campaign, increasing use

was made of pilots who had never even beengraduat ed from flying school. The percent age ofbi tes pe~ sortie nccotdlngly was less than it hndbeen in the Philippines campaign where mostpilots, thougb poorly trained, at least had fin-ished school and had had some experience with II.tactical unit. Tha following table compares theefficiency of the suici de units empl oyed ill thePhilippines lind at Okinawa:

PhUlpP[rm! Oh:mB' !VA

J,!)i.Iji2mI....j

e solj.(

,H.:S

6ul(llffi!;sortf~ ~~ ._ lilt:! Or-dlHIlfLglnlf nee . :r [n~ . ~ ._l)",,~u'" tJfl(!(l.llli'i.~ ._ . . _ - _ _ .

d. 1~'1Jtil'Uation. The Japanese plau, conceiveduftm' the Phil ippines campaign , en ll ed for su ic ideattacks in su.ff icient force to saturate Allied f ightel 'und an tiai rc ra ft de fenses, but the forces ac tual lyNl1ployed were never sufficiently large or concen-

.23


17/48

trnted in poin t o f time to achieve such satura-t ion. The r easons were threefo ld : ( 1) The Jnpa nese ,


18/48

VII IDEFENSE OF JAPAN AGAINST AIR ATTACK

types of aircraft in the attacking, formation,Ail'.borne radar was largely " " " 1 ' l 'l lUentnl f indwas installed in only II 'few planes. The Japa-nese did not employ radar identiHcatiOl l equip-ment (IFF) on 11l1Y 1'6gulal' buses , and ,n~). syste-mntie attempt WIIS mude to keep t rack 01' f ri endlyfightel'S. Accordingly, no vectoring ot ngl\tCl'5into posit ion wa s po~sihle, an d normally t.ho"' I' olmd cont ro l o ffi ce r did l it tl e more than tell uflight to assemble oyer" poi IIIbelieved to be inthe pa('h of t,he B-2!ls. .c. The Jlql!llleSIl never were nble to develop '1fil'st-c1m;.~,lugh-ultitllCle interceptor.d. By the time the B-20s b


19/48

k 'or: particular operations m!lll'rythemoul ill full. Aotunl production never re a chedplanned produc tion , Ther e were a ser ies of griev-ous J e rk s i n the pipe-Una from fnclory to forward",'1111. And once planes reached t J ' I J forwnl'd IIre:1,the number of Bort,ie~ l lc tmdJy f lown was smal l inJ 'c ln li cl l t o the number of "il~"nft 011 hondo Thisappendix descr ibes the nva ilahle s tnti t ics 011 pro-duclion, aircraf t ~trengl,h, 10s;, and rates ofser rie.abil ity and consi tlel 'S the rellsons for tiledisparity between the uctual .Tnpnnese seale ofe fft ll 't and t l, e p lmUled s ize of the two Japanese.Ail' F o r O O E ,2, P.,~dUCJj071

1\. Statistics. ,Tapanese c iv il ians d id not burntheir records after sur render IlS did the Japanesemilitary, and the figures given in the main paperand used illthis nppendix for aircraf t producl.ionar e brood on J 'lp llueSe factor y records , There ar e,however , no records of Japnnese plans for produc-tion fur earlier than 1944. Exhibit A shows therelatienship between actual 311(1 planned produc-tion, and also O\Ier -all production of combat typesand all types of aircraft from 1 ,January 1941to the end of th e wur.b. P'lan'fled P1 ' odlwt ion . As nppears from Ex-hiliit A .. aetun l product ion f el l f ar below plannedproduction, at least during the lust. yeur and nhnlt of the Wi ll '. The reusons for thi s d ispa"i ty goback to the beginning of the war and even befor eit" wlBll the ArlllY and Navy begun to competewit h Illel , othel' for !11w materi ll ls and ]Jl'odllctionfacililies. 'rherctdter, pI'oduction plans werebused On sepul 'l lte Army and N f L V Y l'equiremeutsand ml' ely had any relation to ac~ual st{)cks ofmute,;!).l or to protluct,io)l capllcit.y.In ~o"ember 19,13,the lI.lunitions ~Iillis(.ry was

orgu.n!1.


20/48

the cut in production cilused by B-29 IIttllt'ks anddispel'Sll of the aircru ft industry. ,4, WII;/ilgea. lIl/ialieR. All but IIfew Jupunese Army and

Nil"}' records rellttiJlg to losses IIIlVIjbeen burned,nnd the stlttistics 011 WltStl\gllfurnished b)' theJnpllJlEge IU'! based on almost. noth, ing but t~lem em ory of II , 'el 'Y fe\~ J"pl1nese o ffic ers . M Ol e -Ol'aI', dar ing the WI\L', ",\Jlied intelligence 011WU$t.-u re wrs much less rel i able tha II i n t el l i g l li l 1Cc 011a~'C!1lfl Stl ' 611gth 01'product ion. It11Ils. therefore,been irapossible to make 1111 ) ' intelligence chec:kson the Japanese figures and many of the loss fig-ures contained in this report may be subject toon erro- of 25 p er ce nt 0 1'more.The 'gUl'1l used in the main pllper for .ailcl'ltft

10 es ill part icular ope ra tions or oumpmgns a rebel ieved to be more re li . .b le than othe r . Iupanesestlltistics on losses . Those fig ure s a re bnsed forthe most part on the recoll ection oJ officers whopurtici r.atu(L

Over -a l l JUl'unese Arm y und Navy nil'CL "nf.tlosses as es t imlltad by Japanese .Army and r \U\ 'YAir Herdquurters are set out in Exhibits C andD. The fi.!Im'll given for total Army nnd Nllvylosses is 50,911.. aircraft. That figure checksroughly with the following calculation of wa tnh'ftmade from fi rm product ion figl ll 'es l ind a i. l' cr af~inventory figures in which t h el '1 l m l ly be 1IJ1 errorof 10pe rcen t or more :!n\ 'entor:r-7 December UHl.~.. .. ... .. ... .. .. , 7 ,500Pro~uctl .n-D""'f!1lI1JeJ 19H-AIl)(u"t l fJ4{j. .. . .. . ().; ,OOO

Tttfll ,...................... 7:2ll')OOL I > A A InwDtOl'r Hi August 1945 ............... l.8,r.OOWa.tll~e [,.. 000But t il e ,Japanese ArlllY and Navy est iml \t es of

oVIII 'nlllosses are inconsistent wit.h ellch other !llldwith .fa lJanese estimates of lOSSes ill purl.ieu 1 : \ 1 "clllnpn i~s in the followi ng respects:(1) ..lnny combu.t losses (including nircmfL

destrlly"d 011 the ground) are given ns 16,255.C o rr es po n di ng " N u ," y l o ss es ,ne only 10,370. ButNil,'.\' JloJlcombut losses are g iven US 16,570 corn-pured wit.h,Army noncombat losses of 7,580. Thereis no ILpplLrent reason for t lt is d isc repancy sin. cethe Nnry Snw US much or more act.ioll tllll.n toheAnny, l Ild sinee its 1 ' 1Ipni r and main te ll ance sys.tern Will lit leust liS good.

eng ine nurl n ight t 'e st s 80reduced,, W IIS of b en Ihe test fligl1b, and ;~loss rate was inevil' rLble.

~i1J(.Dtlltenall,~e and BelHJ,ir, Perhaps the mostrenson for hi"h J 'Lp>uUlse j'errying

and other ]lOU'ombat loss es was the f'Li ln reJapanese 1.0 develop all adequate mainte-repair system. Although 011 pnper bothand Navy supplied t11eir forward units

sect ions and sepurnte mobileup by f ield I' epni r and supply depots,

by base depots, in ope ru tiou the systeminllctequlue for the :folJuwi~lg reasons:the fl ls t IDOI'e f orward of tue ti cn 1uni tsthe early part of the war, the entire mni 11-

I IJ ld repair system became grelltly 0\'61'-Repai r j !,wi li tj es ]l Igged bah ind the ad-

and tJIO~ which did reach the forwardwere too thinly 81 read ou OVIlL' too wide 111 Ito be e ffect ive. Moreove r the re was n il inter-

faci li ti es between the Ar ll l)' l ind NfI"Y.A rm y uni ts ware opemt ing i Jl Hol lund in ,had to be Ilown. 1,500 miles for (lng-incbecuuse of lack o f equipment and me-although tlH~ N M T < 1 ' 1 l I1d mujor mninte-

Those los ses a re shown in tabulnr' form in fo.cilities as flW south (IS l~nbnul.hibit E according to the time per iods in wh (2) As the Jnpullese retl'eflted, t he repair sys-they OCCUlTed. T ha t e xh ib it indicates the becam e l e ss extended, bu t by 11 )


21/48

Exhibi t A

zo~o::>ooa: :a. .l-u,a ::oa ::C! ~w ~(/) '"W ~~I~ ;;:~ '"t3 ~zz_Ja. .oz_J::>I-o

N~. .

\~3~ -,'oI== l \1----~----~--_+----+_--_1rl.--~o1- -=~== l===1==~\ = 1 0I-- !tt=1==1~~~S; ..

\-+--+---I~-+' f--- :0---+---4---t-++---c---4------4-------~~i~---a\= + = = + = = + + t = j . .---t------4-------~_+~~_1.

---+---4----t--4~ ..---t-- ----4- ------! ----~\ ~~---t------4-------~--~:~-~..---+---4----t--4~.---t------~------~--~\~.--+--+---1---l-lH :0. .. .. .co . .. .. .. . . .ee. . . .o. .. . e. .. .. . . .o. .

EFFECTIVE A IR FORCEJAPANESE ARMY 8 NAVY AIR fORCES COMelNEO

(INCLUDING lA:AIHER& TAAN$fEfUEO TO TACTIC .. I.. !II SUICIDE USE)

'41 1942- INTIft'RO'ATIOH OF

o I. A. A. I. J. H. A. R' 0 F f I C E AS

1943 1944 1945

Exhibit CJ..ost. to Am~dnation NOTIopennfou l i lOYmo! . i a a Juans T~"ln. Grand

.---,---"T"'"---i ; : I i s wm )Loo t . 111eomb1lt Dij9. lr t lycd un grcundF n o To\nl Ii'1 1 .- - - - - - - - - - - - - _JJ n ]I o Tmal1 1 ) 0 ~ O O7 - 1 0 a o o600 .100

' i - O 1 ( ' )1.300 200100 40

! t oO 30100 ll(O: 1 . 1 0 ,0'50 r. o120 10UIO 30UI') ao:1M 80'20 ~O00 20S O ' " '.0 20

200 100 no200 J, ,NO 400200 r, 200 20020 .00 :w150 1. NO .00lO ISO .000 2-10 J04060 ' .00 1 31 1 1 100 20JW so 300 2000 liO 200 311100 130 21 )0 BO'0 ~O , ' 0 0 2020 100 150 00.0 ~Ii 116 &--I---I--J---I----------- ------

. .0050IQ: ! II""" "'":lil I"inIQ.010

, . ]O Q , .1 0 .". rso00 Joo 1 : 2 000 00 [,(]150 17tl 200[0 .60 so'0 .., $.120 100 lOO20 '20 l'U20 100 so15 (10 iO10 'U I "'0 .0 :lilIII .10 00)0 . ' i U et a.0 '10 :lOJO W tb

l ,u , 1 0

IiOr~so:!O30I~I~303Q2010'"'0'"1010Ii,

! . 'O UIO tao ~,Mro 2 f . H J u : o o 4,'ItlO40 'lLl) > I i I ) 3,2W:!II 0 0 . ' " S O O3(1 2.31 '1 ao o B, i . 1 J O'0 SO "" s oo10 bo O lf iO S:fO20 .. . 1 00 '.30030 200 HiO f.~1020 100 1III 000'20 JOO 1 '20 rooIII flU )00 6 0 0 '1000$0","l . ' i - D ! ! so t L - J i i10 ~ .00 ro o10 "'0 ):20 b .. ' iO10 :lil 10(1 ml

20 Io U ~ .. .1110 ~.. 2, 016 1.010 2.l . !IS '

' rf lL .u l O Om hl ll o l {: J! I. !I wr ~. ~ ~ .~ .~ .~ W.2!i;5j lt OL f~ ll l . . n cc m bn . . l o. s. 1( 1. .L ~~ '" _ .. -_ ~~ j ', lI SO

U - Bumbert 0 - a ttn. "f .8 3

OD8~81__ 1f)'_6


22/48

Cl'lIt and tlIe higher r a t es given by the Japanese1U ' t l thought to represent tlIe ratio:

Operalfonal plRfleaOperltlOPal plaoe8 piUSplaoe8 needing very mloor repairSrather UIlID the ratlo

Opcl'atlonll' plo"'"A ll p la oe 8 0 0 h an d

8ach lowrates of servicelLbilitywere primarilytlIe result of the defects in the maintenance andrepdr sys tem, poor airfield construction and theUke described in preeedlng paragraphs. EVIIIl ifpwes survived the ferry t \ights , reached frontline units, and never were counted as operational1 0 S 9 ! S . poor maintllIlanoo and many minor acci-den's made i t qui te l ikely that they would neverfly in combat.

ExbibitEof uni ts


23/48

JaplJtUM6 Noua' j Irorat ' LOll"', D ec em be r 1941-.4 UUIUt 1945 I IAllIou_r.l' ErPIDJlDmD

NO'l't!'- Cu.mblt IOl8esumve r of plAne l u:llenlled = 0 t1. 11para ooa 088l!1I'~l~ l F I II C II I I ( ) f a Flal I

~t}1 Ootll No,,)1 Dec. lan II Feb," ~far," Total A,'r,11 May JMBll July II A I lIJ ,II Sopt. Ollt." ov.Q Dcc,u Jail. F b,lI Mat Total Apr My JUJ1s lui)," ug. ptl1 Oct , .:--------------- ----------- ---.-- ------------,------ I- ------I-sa 1 :11 84 48 "7 25 2S 822 M ...0 79 03 10 8 134 11 2 loll) 12i S O J02 00 1 ,110 6() IiO 370 ~IJ 31 10 21 \- ------------------------- ------------------------------- ---~M 57 6G 10 M 73 78 7 1 1 8 gli 10 1 11 4 13 2 WI 1 2 J i ." 1 M 13 0 1113 1 6 4 J 7 1,1173 123 2 0 1 1 1M 8I J 1 00 220 27~13 10 3 & 8 10 7 3lI U 831 1 3 23 21 1 30 90 60 (0 70 2 .5 10 22 IB 3 6 1 20 00 220 2(1 4 0 30 1 : l f------------'--------------------------------------------------- I-II 12 12 10 g Ib 12 131 15 26 41 48 71 82 20 B l 71 81 1 1111 81 & 2 4 72 1 1 1 0 10.' liB 1 3 . 5 1 M III:u 25 30 18 23 :n 2J 2 1 1 1 8 21 1 28 20 16 ao 2-i 52 20 23 40 2(1 30 G 2 .5 25 11 8 26 14 (4 III--- ----.---------------------_.---------------- - _,---------;14 13 17 15 III I~ 12 174 11 7 36 67 51 !II (l '1 8 68 t J . 4 81 53 56 003 s. s 70 '" 76 70 80 ".

1 1 1 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1) 12 4 .t IJ I-- ---_-- ---------------------------0 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 10 3 II 8 II II II1 1 3 I 1 :I 2 20 " 1 0 2 3 2 2 4- a 2 2 0 2li " 8 II ~ 6 3 J--------------,-------------------" t 3 " :I 3 2 37 a 2 3 " 1 " 3 " 3 " . , :l 1 1 1 1 8 8 g 10 . . 8

39 28 7 10 13 2) 276 15 2S II 1 0 5 17 16 12 16 1) 8 IS 12 1M 15 82 70 16 20 21 _5---------'------,- ---------------------_-------- -Ii 17 13 12 13 18 14 170 1& 21 17 32 2 ' 22 30 1I2 92 27 32 iW 82S 16 07 28 iJ 2 31 47 6 i0 0 1 0 0 2 J 2 20 2 0 1 2 2 3 I a I 0 " 0 11 1 2 . . 14 1 2


24/48

h t th e l >; ,. ;l ,e r r a t e s given by the In.pnneseCl!l'i"f'flll ~ ~ thonglt to repre s en t the re.tio:Optalianal pllme3

Exhibi t E of unit s nsuni ts , W!);S respon-measure to I' t h IIem ui ency d isp luyed. Iapunese nil ' units nt the begil ll ling.A s t ime went by , it becnme more andto provi de t rain ing of this sort , and..mnlt,vn~eI'lt ill combat of pilots fresh fmrnunits was a major factor in the ultimntcin the quality of rujlJnpunese ail' units.

Operat ional pblDe!lpil l!!planeS needing , 'err minor repairsd " _ .... _

At the bsgimung of the war, the re wet'e aboutJapanese pilots who had been gradnntednil' schocls or training units. The Navy,3 ,500 pilots, was somewhat stronger than th e

which had only 2,500. Som e 600 of theNavy pilots, with an average of about s a ohours, were assigned to the CILTrier groups.A.rmy and Navy pilots who operated in the. . and in j ' j lalaya had an avemge of be-500 and 600 flying hours, and squadron andcommanders had much more, J 'apnnese offi-werereceiving about 300 f1yillg hours in train-units be fore being sent to It ta;ltical unit, AS

...",'~''''''....with 200:hours ill primary, basic andtraining then given to nUnited StatesAir Corps Oadet.. y 50 pereent or Jnpnnese Armyhad had actunl comb i l , t experience in O h U l [ Lthe border f i g11 t i ng ngnhls( ~11eSoviet Uniontook place in 1939, About 10 percent. ofbaaed Navy pilots also hod seen uction inThe experience in Chinn was not pnrricu-valuable in "jew of the luck of sarrous oppo-provided by ths Chinese Air FOI'CR, al-bomber crews 1111d ground support uni tssome train ing against l ive targets . Inwith the Soviets , however, the Japal leseAir Force met ser ious oppos it ion sud suf-

heavy l o sses , JapUJ1ese Army A i J . ' Forcenow attribute n considerable part of theof .Anny pilots during the first days of theto the lessons learned while . f ighting the

E xp dn u on i n 1942The Japanese Army had c pre&rranged plan for

the pilot tl'nilling program to meetThnt plun was put in to elfect in1941 and became operative in !ladyUnder it, 18new tI'nining units wene formedpurpose of providing about It yeo;l"sflyingfor reserve p eJ"SOn]1e I , bot il off eeras ndm e n . The program fOT regular officurs

uud enlisted msu remained about what it \,;l(1 beenbelot'a the w m- (Exhibit G )..at the beginning of the wur, the Jnpauese Xtll 'Ywas puoducing pilots ut t}lerete of 2,000 a ~'(llU'ascomparad with the Army's 750,and accordingly itruude no large chnnges in the s tructure 01 'size ofit s train ing orgnnization. Two new train ing air

g 1 'OUpS WSI 'e , however, put into operation la te in1942 lind early in 1943respectively,The 19,12expansion gIL"ethe Japanese ATmy ntraining organization which produced more than2,700 pilots it ) both 194,2and 1943. !lIC(L!IWhi Ie,the NIlVJI t n t in ll . lg orgnnization wasoparating atr.sl ightly increased tempo, and it produced 2,300pilots in 1942 arrd 2,100 in 1943 (EJo>hibit J).During 1942 and 1943, the f ly ing time of aver-age Al'my and Navy pilots befers entering combat

sll fl 'el; l: ld " sabstantia l decline (Exhibit K). Thedecline is attributable to the loss of 1). great mnjor-ity of the pilots wi th whom the Japanese beganthe war and to the necessity 01' employing pilotsl 'ecen~ly gr!tduated from training units withoutmuch operation or advanced train iug i ll comb"tunits, Meanwhile, A shortage of experienced flightand element leaders developed, particularly in theNavy, and this shortage made it more difficultto employ inexperienced replncement pilots effec-tively. As n result, by the end of 19.J.3,Japanesenir units had so fa r deteriorated tlwt they couldhurt but no longer ser ious ly challenge the All iedAir Forces.5, Expansio i-Il1943 aud 1944During 1942 and 1943, the Japanese Al'my andNILVYtogether lost about 10,000pilots, mainly inthB Solomons, Bismarcks, and New Guinea. More-over, the ail' potential of the Allie s had nnllybecome apparent to ~h(lhigh command and II sub-stantial ezpansionof the size of both air armswas decided upon. lv:. It part of this programand

also to replace their heavy losses, both Al'my andN!LV)' mo,de plans to expand their t l'aining pro-grums more t]lml three times their exist ing size,The JApanese Army plan 01" expunsion calledfor several cbJlJ."!ges in the training orgnnisatiou(Exhibit H). The units which had been formed,in 1942 to tmin rese rves were equipped to giveonly intermediate or basic t rain ing ins tead of allphases of training, and their number was in-creased from 18to 48. New unit s \Ve te formed togive primary t rain ing. Perhaps the most impor-taJlt deve lopment was the formation of opera-tional tminiug units to provide training incornbnt

85

!ircl'llft. Those uni t s were supposed to relieve It decision 1 .0 pluce its main l'eli,ulJJ(l upon sllicid~I~t. t.acks, which even unskilled pilots could llCI.


25/48

ftact icill units of the responsibi li ty for providing' n ew ly f lS 1 i ig n ed r il o ls w i t h s u c h tm i n i nA" . ! !- lt h ou g h\ L e itmHy t .h e y n ev er functioned with un y ( l eg r ee ofeffieiencv.The ,jupilnese Nilvy increased the number of itstruining air groups from 15 to 48., b ut it dirt not'mnteriully Id t er the structure of its training 01 ' -' g nn i 7. nl i o n . T h E S< !groupS Oliel'r . ted f ro m 6 5 b us es ,' 2 in the Phi lipp ines , ; ; in Fo rmo s a , 5 in the S inga -p or e u re a, u nd t he r em a in de r in J up an . The Armymoved fI milch h igblw perl :entnge of its Il'ailliJlgorg:ltliziltioll to the Phil ipp ines and the southe rn' Ill'ell with I'he iJtention of p ro fit in g b y the pl 'OX-.iuiity 1)1uviutico fuel , but t Il e re su lt was to expose.training buses 10)Allied air attacks amlultimntBlyLO isolation from J' tPllll.The axpnuded trnining }1l'ognl1ns were desiglledito produce n Mal of ova l ' 30,000 pilots 11 y e [ ), 1 ' ,'Ac tual ly , that . mte was never , tt tn ined , bnt a some-iwhat lower mb was reached by about September'of lll!! und maintn iued past the endof tlmt ye n I'.'The fllCl shoruge, which begftn late in 19M, un d; the A l li e d u tt u ck s 0)1 t ra ining bases were the prin-, c ipal causes of the fu ilur e of t ,he t ra in ing programI to a ch i e ve U H !scheduled output.A f lG r tlll' expanded t ru iu ing programs beganI to operate, tbt quality of J apanese pilots con", ti u ued to full ~ff conside rably, The bas ic reason~!lr tIm decline WIlS the redll~L'toll ill f1;1'i l lg truin-mglwl1l 's, espednl ly in tuc ti ca l uni ts (Eshibi t K).I Thur l'cduel WI' 'In turn was enused by shortujres innircmft, i n fuel (after SeptBUlbel' 19H), ill ill-~t.I"UCtOl~.nm l _ by AJl i ed llir a t t a cks oil trniuinginstullauons. _n uddition, the quulil.y of' the pilotsdech~e


26/48

ZW:1II1Il r:mllGDlvrsIOII( lt 1 O lX l H I m f . H ID I Il I )a m I M ~! lT S S C IB l O t. S(BIIO-~li 'L\1) SHll

11m) tftdto a.gIlllot 0,r f\e.1'I, .I

- - . . _ - - - " ' " Iloo_d fro" IIaoOakko; enl1.tl~trab.log elhinateclto p1'Ov1de toT 81- ....... .."...,o1.n o~ Ort'l t ....trAin1"" .. .

~IJ j .Y I Il l T l l. \ .1 1 l I' NG UJil i'S(mnll! mm~)

.II

1ilSHl'1 I II I I- IDK!III.l.llil

Exhibit IJAPANESE NAVAL. AIR FORCE TRAINING

ACOORDING ,.0 PROGRAM AT 8EGINNING OF WAR

~OTS , A ll t.h., tr&in1ll,g 1 I I > l l . . , rep........ od b7 b. . .. .. .ere "-~"IClblt&1(Air Grwp.), SllCh tho! 1IiI K-.1

SOOIilSSPllD'L lGRT PlW lARY AIIII B ASIC OPRAl'lD IlAL TACTICAL FL lIH l'l'Ta I.:IN IlIG FL lG IIT TRA IIID ll fL IOH T TlUDlDIG 'l'!lAW DIG(6 _ba all tro1n ... )(J.-6 I!Oh. all t....1n... )(3 ~ " " , 0cent... ..utrain )!!E9U 'lA A off'!;'; R

C.."OIOA' Es -G~&du-at.. ot J aV&l . . , .. .dOlV ( . '. .. . t :uvrttro1n1ng )

FL' i' '' ' TECHKICILI IU . . II TI D T II I: .. .. .. r.r...._.ront ~vyaurr.a.1'orc611

p I L O T S~::;:';;':_:'!'!:::.J\>" e-e-:----'"1.1n:.Ur:yl OFF. CE,"en 0' D' TE - C oUOS"greIl1Iat. _ . r

28 :yean ol;j

fLY'"1 .II"AIICH .It!..'lIlY!. IE:lILIS'l'I!DTU",U- At 1_8 JT810 publ1 choolo-"''''14JT8old

1 to 2 1l"d.pom 1 r I onage ""d.chool1rl

&8

II

JAPANESE FLYING PERSONNEL STRENGTHTHROUGHOUT THE WA.R

NAVYAVAILABLE ATUGIHING OF ~EltIOO

44 ,i

LOS T40

36

..JW 3.2ZZ0CI)a: 28WII..U. 240CI)QZCe n::I0 16%I-

12

8

I JAN ,1943TO I J,Utl'944.1JAI iI 1944TOIJAN 1t4 5

IJAN 11146TO15,(U;1I4&NOTE: "L'I' ING ~ERSONNE~ INCLUDES~ll.OTS. NAVIIATOIIS, 80N8.Io;ROIER5,8UNNEIIS, RADIOMEN," f \.16H.T EIIIINEERS

ExhibitK APPENDIX III. JAPANESE AVIATION FUEL


27/48

DECREASE IN PILOT FLYING EXPERIENCEIN JNAF AND JAAF1141---1'

100

- ."',". . . . - . . . . . . 1',"r-, I',,


28/48

rels, about 7 month'S supply at the monthly rate ofconsumption during July and 'August lOin, 01' 2months at the rate of consumption reached in thesecond quarter of 19, the highes t rate the Japa-nese ever achieved (Exhibit L). InI\ddition, al-t,hough pl'o(luction had declined sllltl'ply and ill"port s had ceused completely , the Japanese pro-duced during .July and August 1945 about one -fourth of the aviation fuel consumed by the Japa-nese Air Forces (luring the snrne period (EshibitL). InllsIDUc11 lIS the principal ail ' effort plannedto repel 1 \ 11 Allied invasion was to take the' formof suicide attacks against s l11 'face vessels , theJapanese would ha re run out of planes long be -fore they l'UJ\ out of fuel if there had boon an in-vasion inNovember of 1945. The 1,000,000barrelson hund at the end of the war would ha.ve beensullicient for some 200,000 suicide sorties of 5hours duration e!lch.

tEDe ct o n T r J n i 1 I gM, in an air iorceB,mining Ilccounted for by~ar the greater part of all gasoline consumption.~ccordingly, ID a aviation fuel shortage ha d itsm o st i mm e dia te e ft'e ct on the t raining programd made i t impossible for the Japanese at thed of the war I.J train Iltly sllbstllntial uumber ofigbly skilled pilots. Tbe fuel shortaf,re was thusan importlUlt f lc tor in the decision of the higllcommand to c reate a suicide' force and to give fustpriority to defe1se against invasion by suicide at-tacks rather than to the defense of Japan againstair attack.

JAPA NESE AVIATION FUELPRODUCTION ,CONSUMPTION, AN"O STOCKS(JAPAN, KOREA, FORMOSA. AND MANCHURIA)

,nlT--rr-rTl~~-'----'-__"'-----'I I I I I I J ILEGEND-- P flO DlIc ;T IO li a IMPORTS'--'- ARMY a U VY C ;O 'lS UM PTIO N6 . Co"cl u -s io r J.Although the aviation fuel shortage severelycrippled the Japanese Air Forces bJ vi rtue of the

curtailment of training, at the end of the wart.here was no immedill.teshortage of fuel whichwould have uttected plauned operations. TIleJaplUlese still had on hand in the Inner Zone

/I-.~


29/48

Quartl!1'lyA,peR.--.-

31 1 .000 ._ . _ _ . ,.6 S ,0 0 tllllyoontmually underestimated Allied cu.pubilities forsuch at~cks. Theil ' l ightel ' (teiense system wasalways Inadequate, and ollly on rare occasions didthe Japanesa Air Force infl ic t subs tant ia I losseson attaclcing Allied planes,

2. Basic ConceptsIn theory , the Japn-nese AI'my Air Force wasorganized to opernte over laud nnd the JupausseNavy over water. As npplie~lto the defense ofJapan proper , this doctr ine required the Arml'

:Jrotect all land targets fro:nAJJied air attaclesIe the Navy attacked carrrer task forces fromwhi llb. the planes might be. Jannched and in ter-cep t ed Allied planes whi le the" were 0.11'6hoI"6.In addi . "'tIOIl, the -Iapanese Navy Air Force was~r~ with the defense of tarrrets of peculiarlIlterest; ".to the N,wy such us naval bases, il.cetanchorages, and t,he like, III actual pmotice, the4 5

ti e, th e .Tapnllese Army Ail' Foret' ,set, liesame, im 'defense orj :!l\lIi1 .ut ion tOnalst,-4 E 1 B-29 A fJ ac ks fr om C hilla B ase s ar y " .

f . tt -ed photo r~('OnnlllsslLlice nus-T


30/48

Ip 11rlldlmentRry fur Cl f' ' I I f Ia r fizhter \111 it llnsed ut ,0 u, neargo OlleN}.,"1 .. ' rt:\'"okyo and 3 other I I i I 'un i t s . whiclt W l " l ' l l I ! (~ E r e h l 1 l b " tL , , tl er' lreu!! .;( I It' It l ' llinin" units, III 0 1 ,ipera rona .. 1 1 'n"llter"" The nirt 'rn fi st l' en1, rth 01' t 10re~ll It) ':), , d'(I 1 e s 1 1 m. ! the :~opernt,lolllllrmt did 1I0t excee ., I' 111 1 , lit beitraillin" units hulno more 1,IuIU 100 1l11'Cr~ e- I 'I tl Nit'" wus concert-tween them, M~nllw 11 e, ie " ,t ruti n tllB Penrl nn rhor attack \LI\d otherrra mil:" " 1 id little-pllll!!eS of the ,Jilplluese "dvllnce. a nt pa l

attention to f igJlIer de la ro sa , . .,'"'llIIll'\'er if my, mnylm\'e beenlhe mls~lVllIgs,,,. b ' . r ril,e wa r' of the h ig]' COm~llllld lit the u_ !!IRnllll! 0 ' the -h'itii~l . J l Ipt l l llSe S IICc . ;e ;; s e sse am ed to demo:,-st ra tu t hllt "it' nttueks on the milia .Tllllllnc. ' ll! IS't1 ,_ -'ll ote' otordil'l ",ly. the ,J ILly 1941110(", were,~ . "",,y " , 11 nil' defense OI'I)!l. Ilizat ion was not c1lnll~.-eilIII Iie. I ,S 0' the wa r and on 1 8 .A pn l1 9J3 theea r Y UlO llW J -" . ' 1. hp~llese were unprepared for Ihe DoolI tt le nuu .i :r llpnn was

to oh ni cn ll y b et ti n' i ll I fl ~l j t hl l1 l i n - W ' 1 4 , its proh"lam were simpler in 194-J. since only n limited11\1IJlber of t.I!'gel~ on KYllSfLU were wi f'h in l'n nge()f China baSed B-29s,

The Jhst B-29 strike from the i\{1" 'inll3s cameOil 24 NovlillIbex' 1!J4. .t"There followed a sai-ios ofdiLylight s t rikes from eX~l'eIne altitudes (ubout30,000 feet) dm'ing Decambai - , J 'amtar .l ', and Feb-t'lIlll'}' which in tum W\lI1l. followed by II seriesof m ediu n Inltitude (7 ,001J -10 . .OO0 feet) n igh t att lwks d'lIl'ing March und April These operationswere d ir ec ted a t economic targets, but they wereinterspersed during ;)III1'ch lind Apri] with aseries of attacks 01. \ Kyushu ail ' bases designedto s cr een the oper at ions 01 1 Okinawa. Also inFebruu1'Y and March , JltPlt!) was subjected tocurrier- strikes timed to snell II the Iwo.Jima lindOkinawa operatious,Throughout thi~ period, the inter ceptor uni ts

assigned to the defense of .Japan did theil' bastto stop the .Allied "it - assnu It, and thai r- Sl}l) l'e ofeflort was much higher than in tlll! last mon t h s(> T tile 11'>11' . The defense organization ramninadabout the same as in tha summer and fall of HI44,except that the Air Ttuining A!'my was redesig-nated the 6th Ai,. Army, relieved of its t ra iningfunctions, and charged with the defense ofKYllsh

USSBS Report 62, Military Analysis Division, Japanese Air Power

Documents

Transcript of USSBS Report 62, Military Analysis Division, Japanese Air Power