The Soto Sect and Japanese Military Imperialism in Korea

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Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 1999 26/12

The St Sect and JapaneseMilitary Imperialism in Korea

Nam-lin HUR

The St sect was actively engaged in Buddhist propagation in colonial Korea after having succeeded in establishing its rst missionary temple in

Pusan in 1905. By the time it withdrew from Korea in 1945, the St sect had secured an extensive propagation network connecting more than one hundred temples. Despite its successful Buddhist polemics, Sts Buddhist teachings in Korea were basically political propaganda viable only within the framework of Japanese colonial imperialism. The St sect in colonial Korea was deeply involved in the cause of Japanese imperialism by carrying out three major tasks: Buddhist services for the Japanese military, promotion of the kminka (transforming [the colonial peoples] into imperial subjects) policy, and the pacication of colonial subjects. Not sur-

prisingly, none of these goalswhich were promoted in the name of Buddhist compassion and non-selfhood in the tradition of Zen Buddhismcould survive the collapse of Imperial Japans claim to universal benevolence that had been premised on the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

Keywords : St sectimperialismcolonialismKoreaTakedaHanshikminka movement

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ST SECT(Stsh g ; ) in Korea was late com-pared to that of other Japanese Buddhist sects. Although its rst tem-ple was somewhat belatedly established in Pusan in 1905,1 this was aresult of the strenuous efforts of some zealous St priests that had

1 Japanese Buddhist sects that succeeded in establishing their bases for propagation inKorea earlier than the St sect are listed below in chronological order:

Sect Year LocationHigashi Hongan-ji 1877 PusanNichiren 1881 PusanNishi Hongan-ji 1895 PusanPure Land 1897 PusanShingon 1905 Kyngsng

See H AN 1988, p. 59.

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been launched several years earlier. In 1899 several key members of the St sect, including Watanabe Dsui 9 v (head of Ansh-ji)and Kinoshita Ginry4 E P (head of Ssen-ji), had already formeda private organization for the overseas propagation of St and haddispatched a St priest named Muramatsu Rykan d to Korea.Muramatsu, who would eventually be recognized and appointed by the St sect as the rst ofcial missionary monk, had set Stsfuture propagation in Korea on a firm footing by the time he died of a sudden illness in 1904. Inheriting Muramatsus legacies, NagataKanzen , ? 7 , the second missionary monk assigned to Korea, suc-ceeded in establishing the rst St temple in Korea, which wouldlater be named Chongchnsa (in Japanese, Ssen-ji r ). Two years later, in 1907, Nagata was ordered to take a more aggressive leadin St propagation in Korea.

With full support from headquarters in Japan, St propagation inKorea entered a new stage in 1907. Its vision is summarized in thePrinciples for the Opening of St Teaching in Korea (Stsh Kankoku kaiky kitei g ; H y ), a set of propagational goalshammered out by Nagata Kanzen and Arai Sekizen G m 7 , the aca-demic director of the St sect (SKKDHI 1980, pp. 3234). This mis-sionary strategy specied the targets of St propagation in Koreaand instituted a master plan for achieving them. St activities inKorea were, according to this strategy, focused on the following fourtasks: to spread St teachings to Japanese ofcials and residents; tocomfort Japanese soldiers stationed in Korea; to proselytize Koreanofcials and people as well as to guide Korean monks; and to educatethe children of Japanese residents and of Korean families by establish-ing educational institutions. At the institutional level, the St sect planned to establish seven propagation bases (including the already existing Chongchnsa of Pusan) as rst-stage regional hubs forfuture expansion and to supply these bases with missionary monks.These monks would be supervised by a director based in Kyngsng. All these bases were expected to be nancially independent withinthree years of their establishment, and they were to be branch templesof either Eihei-ji r or Sji-ji r , the St sects two head templesin Japan.2

2 Eihei-ji and Sji-ji had been involved in quarreling over the status of the sects headtemple (honzan [ ) throughout the Tokugawa period. In 1868 the Meiji government rec-ognized the two temples ashonzan but ranked Eihei-ji above Sji-ji because the former wasthe ancestral temple that the founder of the St sect, Dgen, had opened. Eihei-ji and Sji-ji,however, continued to squabble so much that in 1872 the government was forced to recognizethe two temples asdai-honzan [ (great head temples) with equal status and to arrangefor them to assume the headship of the sect by turns. Nevertheless, the headship dispute

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The propagation strategy of 1907 took full advantage of the reli-gious policy of the Japanese Regency General of Korea, which hadalready given ofcial sanction to the spread of Japanese religiousteachings in Korea. In a bid to incorporate the missionary activities of Japanese Buddhist monks and Shinto priests into its Korea policy, theRegency General of Korea introduced Regulations on the Promulga-tion of Religion (Shky no senpu ni kansuru kisoku ; + F y ). Through this legislation, matters pertaining to missionary appointments and religious buildings were integrated into the colo-nization policies of the Regency General led by It Hirobumi. TheRegency General had power of approval regarding matters concerning Japanese religious teachings. Once approved, the rightsadministra-tive or institutionalpertaining to these religious activities wereofcially protected.

Under political protection provided by the de facto colonial gov-ernment, the St sect soon saw a steady increase in its Korean tem-ples and followers. Needless to say, propagation was focused upon theseven regional bases chosen in 1907Pusan, Kyngsng, Yongsan,Inchn, Pyngyang, Yongampo, and Taejn. In the capital city,Kyngsng, the monk taka Daij N opened in 1908 the rst St Buddhist hall, Ilhansa, and Takeda HanshiD , (18631911),as the director of St promulgation in Korea, initiated an aggressiveproselytization campaign. Two years later, in 1910, Takeda was able toerect a grand-scale temple known as Chogyesag V , which wouldserve as the propagation headquarters of the St sect in Korea. InInchn, where more than 10,000 Japanese had already settled, anambitious missionary monk, Isobe Hsen r H , was able to secureSt patrons from approximately 130 households and to establishHwamsa. Thus, by the time of Japans annexation of Korea in 1910,all of the rst-phase bases for propagation (except for that in Pyng- yang, which would be established in 1912) had been set up as planned. At this stage, the majority of St followers were still Japanese residents who had had family afliations with the St sect prior to migrating toKorea.

Assessing the initial phase of opening teachings in Korea as a suc-cess, the St sect revised its propagation strategy in 1911 to keep it inline with the new political environment of colonized Korea, and it

appointed Kitano Genp as the new director of the propaga-tion bureau. The new strategy aimed at opening nine more propagationbases (Kaesng, Masan, Chinhae, Taegu, Chinnampo, Uiju, Kunsan,

continued until 1895, when the two temples agreed to unite and establish a single, centraladministration (calledshmuch ; Y z ) in Tokyo.

HUR : St Sect and Japanese Imperialism in Korea 109

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Mokpo, and Wnsan), directing St teachings more aggressively,and inducing more Korean monks to enter the St order (SKKDHI1980, p. 35). The opening of nine more bases was an ambitious taskdesigned to cover all of the major urban centers of Korea and toreach out to its colonized people. For this task, Kitano brought tenelite St college graduates to Kyngsng for their Korean languagetraining. Upon receiving this training, these graduates were to spear-head St propagation. All plans proceeded smoothly, and the num-ber of Korean converts gradually increased. Once converted, thesenew followers were organized into suitable units of lay confraternities(such as a womens association, a Kannon worship group, and a pay-ment of favor [hon 0 ] confraternity). By the end of 1911, sometemples boasted large congregations. For example, Pusan Chong-chnsa claimed to have more than 1,500 faithful: Yongsan Sryongsa

800, Inchn Hwamsa 700, Taejn Taejnsa 500, Kyngsng Ilhansa400, and Kunsan Kumgangsa 300 (S AMBOH AKHOE1994, p. 27).Of course, it goes without saying that the remarkable success of

St propagation in Korea was owing to the protection and support of the Japanese colonial government as well as to sectarian endeavorsand strategies. In fact, the Government-General of Korea was so sup-portive throughout the 1910s that it permitted the St sect to buildBuddhist halls and other related facilities on state-owned lands. Forexample, when the St sect asked for public lands in 1912, the Gov-ernment-General of Korea allowed, at no cost, the use of a parcel of state-owned land consisting of 6,000tsubo (approximately 2 square

kilometers) in Hoenyng (Hamgyng Province) for the constructionof Hoesnsa. In the late 1910s Chogyesa Temple in Kyngsng waseven allowed to use the historic buildings (e.g., Sungjng Hall,Hwanggn Gate, and Hoesn Hall) of the Chosn court when it wasmoved to a new location. The delighted St sect did not waste any time in transforming these historic buildings into the headquartersfor St propagation in colonial Korea (SKKDHI 1980, p. 39).

Amid the rapid spread of St teachings in Korea, in 1915 Stheadquarters in Japan began to dispatch high-placed monks to Koreafor what was known as personal preaching (goshinge : V 5 ). Thedirect teaching of prominent monks proved to be a great encourage-ment to missionary monks, who were somewhat isolated in their localparishes. As time went by, St monks gained more condence intheir missionary activities and expanded their missions to includesocial projects related to recreation, education, politics, agriculture,and even commerce. Many St temples became regional centers that managed auxiliary social organizations, confraternities, and educa-


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tional institutions such as libraries, kindergartens, and Japanese lan-guage schools.

All of the second-phase propagational temples were successfully set up by 1927, culminating in the establishment of the Uiju temple onthe northwestern tip of the Korean Peninsula. This meant a compre-hensive St network covered the entire peninsula. In fact, by thistime the St sect had penetrated deep into Korea, as additional tem-ples and propagation stations (Kor. pogyoso ; Jpn. fukysho + ) wereestablished in almost all major cities and towns, including, in chrono-logical order, Chinju, Chlwn, Chungju, Kyngju, Naju, Kyngsan,Tongyng, and Pyngtaek. In the midst of the ongoing increase of St temples and propagation stations in Korea, the propagationdirector held a special meeting in Kyngsng in 1929, to which not only St missionaries but also Korean monks were invited, in order

to extend the compassion of the St sect to declining Korean Bud-dhism. As Japan took control of Manchuria in the early 1930s, Japan-ese Buddhists in Korea intensied their missionary efforts among theKorean people. As if commemorating the legacies of It Hirobumi Q n N k (18411909), who had played a critical role in Japans conti-nental expansion (particularly with regard to the Korean annexa-tion), in 1932 the St sect erected a grandiose temple in Kyngsng just when the de facto Manchurian colonization took place andnamed it after himPakmunsa N k (Hirobumi-tera in Japanese).Each year a memorial service for Hirobumi was held at this temple(SZK 1970, p. 708; 1973, p. 6).

It is, therefore, no wonder that Prime Minister Sait Makoto pre-sented a statue of Kannon to the St sect in Korea in 1934 in recog-nition of its attempts to provide the Korean people with spiritualguidance. Upon its presentation, the St sect erected a Kannon hallin Yakcho-chng (SKKDHI 1980, p. 42). This kind of politicalacknowledgment clearly illustrates the relationship between the Stmissionary enterprise in Korea and Japans colonial rule. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s the growing St sect became more andmore involved in assisting the cause of Japanese military imperialismin Korea. By the time the St sect ofcially withdrew from Korea inSeptember 1945 upon Japans defeat in the Second World War, there were 103 active St temples in Korea (locations and names are givenin the Appendix). This was a signicant number, especially when oneconsiders that the total number of Korean Buddhist temples was lessthan 1,000.

No matter what Buddhist polemics one applies to this situation, theheavy presence of Japanese St temples in the Korean Peninsula


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between 1905 and 1945 was basically a political phenomenon: it started with Japans intrusion into Korea and ended with its withdrawal. In a word, St propagation in Korea was viable only within the frameworkof Japanese colonial imperialism. When Imperial Japan began toexpand its political foothold in Korea in the late nineteenth century, Japanese Buddhists were able to launch their enterprises in Korea. When Imperial Japan came crashing to its end in 1945, Japanese Bud-dhism disappeared from Korea overnight. None of the Buddhist teachings transmitted to the Korean people during this period couldbe separated from Imperial Japans political enterprises.

Exactly how was St propagation in Korea linked to Japaneseimperialism? What roles did the St sect play in supporting Japanspolitical ambitions? In what manner were Buddhist teachings incorpo-rated into the political agenda of Imperial Japan? Of course, these

questions can be asked about any of the other Buddhist sects active incolonial Korea as well, since they were also involved in the cause of Japanese imperialism in one way or another. But as far as the St sect is concerned, its Buddhist politics in colonial Korea seem to haverevolved around three major tasks: Buddhist services for the Japanesemilitary, promotion of the so-calledkminka y W 5 (transforming [thecolonial peoples] into imperial subjects) policy, and the pacicationof colonial subjects. Needless to say, all these tasks were closely interrelated.

At the same time, it should be noted that these political roles of St Buddhism in colonial Korea were perfectly integrated into a largercontext of Zen imperialism in prewar Japan. As Brian V ICTORIA most recently documents in detail, Zen Buddhism played a substantial rolein nurturing a spirit of fanatic imperial militarism by twisting Buddhist teachings about compassion and non-selfhood (1997). The politicalexpediency of Zen Buddhism was indeed far-reaching and totalitarian.This essay adds the relatively ignored case of St Zen in colonialKorea to the larger current debate on Japanese Zen and nationalism(see also HEISIGand M ARALDO1994, and ISHIKAWA 1998).

Monks and the Military in Imperial Japan

In its initial stage the primary focus of the St sects propagation inKorea was overseas Japanese migrants who were struggling to deal with unfamiliar living conditions. Many Japanese, including mer-chants, laborers, manufacturers, and farmers, began to migrate toKorea in search of new opportunities and quick money when Koreastreaty ports were opened in 1883. A sizable number of government ofcials and their families, amounting to more than 15,000 by the late


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1900s, made a noticeable mark on the Korean landscape. By the timeof the 1910 annexation, the population of Japanese migrants in Koreahad reached more than 150,000, most of them settled in Kyngsng,Pusan, Inchn, and other major port or railway-station cities.3 As their promotion strategy spelled itself out in the late 1900s, theSt missionary monks initially concentrated their efforts on the Japanese residents of these major urban settlements. For Buddhist missionaries, Japanese residents having difculty coping with isolationand cultural difference must have provided fertile ground for prosely-tization. Responding to the predicaments of these Japanese residents,St monks, red with missionary zeal, were from the beginning quiteexible, insisting upon neither Buddhist principles nor sectariancharacters. According to the needs of the residents, St monks per-formed funeral ceremonies, memorial services, preaching, and prayer

rituals; led gatherings of meditation and recreation; offered publiclectures; ran Sunday schools, nursery schools, and other educationalprograms; and sometimes even offered advice regarding commerceand agriculture. Converting Koreans to St Buddhism was a task that would require time and an acquaintance with Korean culture and lan-guage.

While hammering out plans and tactics for promoting St teach-ings, St missionaries paid special attention to Japanese soldiers sta-tioned in Korea, approaching them by appealing to their absoluteloyalty to the emperor. When the wave of nationalism began to surgein the late 1880s, all of the Japanese Buddhist sects, without excep-tion, competed with each other to demonstrategokoku Bukky D [ (Buddhism that protects the nation) and so to show that they wereauthentic instruments for promoting the nationalistic interests of Imperial Japan. In a sense, it is easy to understand why all of the Japanese Buddhist sects eagerly embraced political nationalism at thistime. Buddhists, who had endured harsh suppression in the early Meiji years, were, thanks to Shinto ideologues, still subject to hostilepublic perceptions, and they desperately sought opportunities toescape this position. The tide of nationalism, which focused on effortsto revise unequal treaties with the West, offered them long-awaitedmomentum. When, in the late 1890s, the Meiji government tried tointroduce a religious law that promised equal treatment for all reli-gions, especially Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity, Buddhist leadersinitiated a campaign to demand more than just equal treatment: they wanted Buddhism to be designated as a public religion (kninky


3 For a detailed discussion of Japanese migrants to Korea between 1895 and 1910, seeDUUS 1995, pp. 32463.

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set up a system for training these personnel on a grand scale (SJYSH1993, p. 22). Two years later, in 1902, the St sect ofcially adopted apromulgation guideline designed to more effectively serve the mili-tary: Regulations on the Propagation of [St] Teachings to Sol-diers (Gunjin fuky kitei t ^ + y ). According to this guideline,the St sect dispatched ve battlefront chaplains to Manchuria when war between Japan and Russia broke out in 1904. As the war zoneexpanded into the Korean Peninsula, so did the number of chaplainsdeployed.

The Russo-Japanese War of 19041905 was a testament to the impe-rialistic character of Japanese Buddhisma Buddhism that arousedhostility and inspired belligerence towards neighboring countries. Although there were some Buddhist groups and activists who tried topromote spiritualism and who criticized Buddhisms involvement in

the war efforts, the majority of Japanese Buddhists supported the waragainst Russia.6 In a collection of his essays entitledSenji Bukky enzetsu [ (Wartime Buddhist lectures), Kawasaki KenryI 2 U , a prominent preacher of Higashi Hongan-ji, captures the essenceof Japanese Buddhist polemics regarding this imperialistic war.

For us, this war really signies the teaching of great religious virtues (zenchishiki 3 F ). We do not have to feel sad. Instead, we should be joyful, for [this war] is a grateful teaching .... Nomatter what happens, we should defeat the Russian enemy inicting agony upon us. Under the great authority of theBuddha and the valor of Buddhist repentance, we should

achieve the glory of a complete victory.... No matter how many enemies [we] kill, I do not think, even in the slightest degree,that it is a violation against the will of the Buddha. When Icontemplate the will of the Buddha as revealed in the entireBuddhist scriptures, I am convinced that my humble opinionis perfectly correct. (K ASHIWAHARA 1990, p. 165)

Japanese Buddhist support for the war efforts of Imperial Japanincluded not only the dispatching of chaplains and the offering of death rituals, but also the donation of funds for military use and/orthe purchase of military bonds.

Right after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese army established a

garrison in Yongampo in northern Pyngan Province, at the site where the Russian military had previously run a quartermaster head-quarters. Drawn by the presence of the Japanese military, Japanese


6 For a detailed discussion of antiwar movements during and after the Russo-Japanese War, see Y OSHIDA 1959, pp. 33543.

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migrants began to ow into the city. A St monk, Hirayama Jinhr [ _ , soon targeted these soldiers and new settlers and launcheda mission of spiritual comfort. He was well received by the Japanesearmy and migrants. The army headquarters even granted him the freeuse of an empty building, along with warm words of encouragement:In celebration of the [Japanese] Apnok (Yalu) garrisons successfullanding [here], we extend our support to you to successfully carry out your missionary enterprise for a long time (SKKDHI 1980, p. 34).Thus the missionary zeal of St chaplains was well nurtured in thebarracks of the Japanese military.

In the 1910s Christianity joined Buddhism in promoting the colo-nial ambition of Imperial Japan. In 1912 the government maneuveredthe leaders of Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity into jointly pledg-ing to cooperate among themselves in serving the national interests of Imperial Japan as well as in guiding public opinion. The wave of Taish democracy was unable to deter the nationalistic tendencies of sectarian Buddhism (kydan Bukky ; [ ). Moreover, in an attempt to coordinate sectarian efforts to promote national interests, Buddhist leaders formed a sort of pan-sectarian organization, rst called Buk-ky Rengkai[ l (The Federation of Buddhism) and latercalled Bukky Gokokudan[ D : (The Buddhist Coalition forProtecting the Nation). They then made a collective effort to furtheradvocate, in the name of protecting the nation, the unity between theLaw of the King and the Law of the Buddha. In theory, protecting theLaw of the Buddha (goh D ) now meant protecting the nation(gokoku D ).7 In this sense, the nationalistic endeavors of Buddhist leaders were in line with the ideals of State Shinto. They even defendedthe argument that Shinto was not a religion, which made the Christ-ian West very uneasy.

Throughout the Taish era (19121925), the St sect in Korea wasa faithful vanguard of nationalistic Buddhism and was particularly concerned with caring for the well-being of the imperial military. When Imperial Japan took control of Manchuria in 1932, the Stsect set up anad hoc task force in order to provide the Japanese mili-tary, who were deployed along the routes of the Korean Peninsula asfar as northern China, with emergency comfort and spiritual guid-ance. For the military, the presence of St monks, well trained inconducting funeral and memorial services was most helpful in regard

7 These pan-sectarian organizations basically sought to integrate all Buddhist sects intothe state in the name of returning to the treasured ancient tradition of saisei itchi s O(the unity of administration and rite). In particular, the Bukky Gokokudan declared that it was determined to sanctify the benevolence of our emperor by organizing all Buddhist priests and their lay followers (K ASHIWAHARA 1990, pp. 199200).


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to dealing with war casualties on this remote foreign soil. As war withChina broke out in 1937 and battlefronts rapidly spread, the St sect,like other Buddhist sects, was, in keeping with the campaign of Konoes cabinet for general mobilization, dragged further into the war operation. The history of the St sect states that ve days afterthe start of the Sino-Japanese War, ve chaplains were quickly dis-patched to the battlefronts of China; ve days later two more chap-lains were ordered to follow the advance party, and two more weresoon sent to the Manchurian front (SJYSH 1993, pp. 1820). Theaction of the St sect was swift and decisive.

In 1939 the Diet nally passed the controversialshky dantaih ; : (Law on Religious Organizations), which the government had been trying to put into effect since 1899. With this legislation, thegovernment was able to rmly control all of the religious organiza-

tions (including Buddhism) and mobilize them for an all-out conti-nental expansion. Buddhist sects and other religious organizations were all integrated into an ultranationalistic agency that was to be amere tool of military imperialism. In 1942 all of the Shinto, Buddhist,Christian, and Islamic organizations were absorbed into the ReligiousFederation for Asian Prosperity (K-A Shky Dmei ! ; | h ),and its head was the former four-star general Hayashi Senjr n / Y (K ASHIWAHARA 1990, pp. 241, 24850; OKADA 1977). Under these cir-cumstances, nobody dared to raise a religious argument against or adoctrinal question concerning the solemn duties of imperial Bud-dhism (kkoku Bukky y [ ). Until everything came to a crashing

halt in August 1945, Japanese Buddhism, including the St sect,blindly followed the absolute religion of Japanese military imperial-ism. And the military chaplains of the St sect in Korea served asloyal vanguards of imperial Buddhism.

St Missionaries and the Making of Imperial Subjects

From the outset, the propagation of St teachings in Korea was morethan a religious missionit was also a political enterprise. Accordingto its ofcial missionary history, the St sect claims that the openingof St teachings in Korea actually occurred with Takeda Hanshiscrossing to the Korean Peninsula in 1890, fourteen years prior to theappointment of the sects rst missionary, Muramatsu Rykan, in 1904(SKKDHI 1980, p. 31). Although he had been trained as a St priest, when Takeda crossed to Korea in 1890 he was not an active priest, andthe purpose of his travel was not religious: he was a drifting right-wingpolitical activist who was interested in promoting Japanese inuence


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over Korea. Nevertheless, because of his pioneering contributions toits promulgation, the St sect considers him to be the most impor-tant of its missionaries in the early stages of its advance into Korea.This perspective reects the character of St propagation, and it isonly because of this that Takeda Hanshi deserves our attention.

After crossing to Korea, Takeda Hanshi joined Genysha , anationalistic society organized by pan-Asianists, and soon became akey agent of Tenykydan : , a secret suborganization of Geny-sha. At that time Tenykydan was expected to instigate war against Ching China, which had already been dragged into the turmoil of the Korean Tonghak X peasants rebellion. The Sino-Japanese Warover control of Korea broke out in 1894 and ended with Japans victory in 1895. But dissatisfaction provoked by the Tripartite Intervention inthe aftermath of the war frustrated Japanese right-wing politicalactivists. Their anger was immediately directed towards Queen Min, who led an anti-Japanese faction in Korea. Takeda Hanshi was amongthe mob of Japanese right-wing political activists who, in late 1895,assassinated Queen Min. The politically embarrassed Japanese govern-ment repatriated the murderers to Japan, and Takeda was imprisonedfor some time. Soon after he was freed from jail, Takeda joined Koku-rykai O l , a pan-Asianist society under the leadership of UchidaRyhei , d r , and crossed to Korea in 1906, charged with the mis-sion of creating public support for Japans annexation of Korea (DUUS1995, pp. 10812, 23541; K INOSHITA 1940, pp. 311). This time Takedaapproached Yi Yonggu 5 G and Song Pyngjun [ 3 w , two key pro-Japan Korean ofcials in the court who had formed a politicalsociety known as Iljinhoes Z l in order to advocate Japans annexa-tion of Korea. Eventually, Takeda became Iljinhoes advisor. At thesame time, he launched his own project to promote Japanese Bud-dhism in the hope that this would appease the almost colonized Koreanpeople. His efforts bore fruit in the form of a grand-scale temple,Chogyesa, which was erected in Kyngsng.

Swayed by Takeda Hanshis impressive achievements, the St sect decided to appoint him director of the newly established Koreanpropagation bureau in 1908. It was a calculated step for the St sect, which wanted to take advantage of Takedas political connections inorder to facilitate the spread of St teachings in Korea. This

approach, as expected, turned out to be a great success. Helped by Yi Yonggu, chairman of Iljinhoe, Takeda became a special advisor forthe newly organized Korean Buddhist order, Wnjong ; (the Wnorder), a position that enabled him to exert enormous inuence overKorean Buddhisminuence far beyond the scope of a JapaneseBuddhist missionary. Ever ambitious, in 1910 Takeda attempted, in


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collaboration with the Korean monk Yi Hoegwang 5 { M (chairmanof Wnjong), to absorb the Korean Buddhist order into the St sect.In practical terms, the absorption, if realized, would have meant that the St sect of Japan would have a vast majority of Koreas powerfultemples and priests under its commanda sort of private coloniza-tion of Korean Buddhism. Takedas preposterous endeavor, however,failed as a result of strong opposition by Korean Buddhist leaders, who soon came to understand the implications of his scheme.8 Never-theless, the St sect made use of Takedas political skills in Koreauntil he died in 1911. No doubt, Takeda set the tone of St preach-ing in Korea, and the sect leaders eagerly embraced it.

The St sect never diminished its political interests in Korea aslong as they were useful, either directly or indirectly, in promoting Japans colonial rule. This pro-colonial stance was not, of course,

restricted to the St sect. Other Buddhist sects active in Korea, suchas Higashi Hongan-ji, Nishi Hongan-ji, and Nichiren, were all enthusi-astic supporters of Japanese colonialism. The St sect was not abnor-mal in engaging in programs that were geared to transforming theKorean people into faithful colonial subjects of Imperial Japan. Sttemples began to run Japanese language schools for Korean followersand taught them what Imperial Japan considered desirable withregard to morality, attitude, behavior, and practical skills. For exam-ple, in the early 1920s a missionary monk named Mitsuhisa HiroakiM N g (at Poksusa in Masan) incorporated a wide range of educa-tional programs into his mission and made an effort to mold lay Koreanfollowers into loyal imperial subjects. To that end, he organized thelaypeople into three subgroups and, in the name of social enlighten-ment, set up various programs pertinent to each group (SKKDHI1980, p. 39). Educational programs, not Buddhist preaching, were,indeed, the primary concern of many St missionaries working in


8 In 1908 fty-two representatives of Korean temples, who were worried about the deteri-orating political situation in Korea, convened at Wnhung Temple in Kyngsng andformed an organization called the Wnjong order in order to protect their collective inter-ests. The monk Yi Hoegwang, who maintained political connections with pro-Japanese col-laborators such as Yi Yonggu, managed to get elected as leader of this organization. Soonafter Korea had been colonized, Yi Hoegwang and Takeda Hanshi conspired to take over the Wnjong order and to expand their own power base within Korean Buddhism. When thesubversive terms that they hammered out with the St sect for the merger were revealed tothe Korean press, Korean Buddhist leaders were shocked at the selling off of Korean Bud-dhism to a Japanese sect. Anti-Japanese monks such as Pak Hanyng and Han Yongunimmediately countered the merger attempt with a nationwide campaign to restore a spirit of independence to Korean Buddhism. Amid this ongoing scufing, in 1911 the Government-General issued Sachallyng (Laws for Temples) and brought Korean as well as JapaneseBuddhist temples in Korea under its control. For more detailed discussions of Takeda Han-shi and the merger episode, see T AKAHASHI1929, pp. 91840; and CHNG 1994, pp. 6569.

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colonial Korea. What was really at stake was not the spread of Bud-dhist teachings but the thought and behavior of the Korean people, which were to be compatible with the cause of Japanese colonialism.

Beginning in the late 1930s, the ultimate goal of the St sect inKorea was to make Koreans loyal subjects of Imperial Japan. OnceImperial Japan began to expand into China in the 1930s, anythingthat might work against that objective could not be tolerated. Withregard to colonial Korea, the mandate of Japanese military imperial-ism was, quite simply, to fully mobilize Koreas available resources,spiritual or material, for the purpose of carrying out Japans continen-tal ambition. The Japanese colonial government was now determinedto suppress and deny the Korean peoples ethnic identity on the onehand and to incorporate them into what it euphemistically gloried asa one-family nation (kazoku kokka B B ) on the other. These poli-

cies culminated with thekminka movement that came into full swingin 1937 when the colonial government imposed the Oath as Subjectsof the Imperial Nation (kkoku shinmin no seishi y S W u ) uponthe Korean people. Colonial leaders at the Government-General of Korea vowed to transform the Korean people into true loyal subjectsof Imperial Japan. In other words, thekminka movement aimed toeradicate the Koreanness of the Korean people and to convert theminto colonial subjects who would eagerly repay His Majesty [the Japanese emperor] as well as the country [Imperial Japan] with loyalty and sincerity.9 It was, in a word, a brainwashing campaign. The colo-nial government targeted language and religion. Needless to say,these targets were precisely the things that, for a long time, JapaneseBuddhist missionaries in Korea had been concentrating on. Japansattitude towards language and religion provides a historical context for seeing how the propagation of St Buddhism became part of thepolitics of colonial rule in Korea between the late 1930s and 1945.

The acceptance of Japanese as the national language was consid-ered to be a prerequisite for being a loyal subject of Imperial Japan. As a way to boost the national language, the Government-General of Korea not only enforced Japanese upon all Korean students but also,beginning in 1938, launched language outreach programs for thegeneral public. Furthermore, the colonial government removed theKorean language (which was thought to nurture Korean nationalism)from the school curriculum in 1941.10 Not surprisingly, the St sect,

9 For more details, see CHOU 1996, pp. 4145; P AK 1994, pp. 17879; and N AKAN1977,8891.

10 It should be noted that the national language movement eventually led to the name-changing campaign known assshi kaimei S y e (to create family names and change ones


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which had been steadily promoting the Japanese language to Koreans,fully cooperated with the national language campaign by furtherexpanding its role in language education. More Japanese languageprograms were set up at St temples and other propagation centersin order to reach a wider audience of lay followers, and Korean wasabandoned as a medium of proselytization.

The kminka movement also promoted State Shinto and suppressedthose religions that resisted itmost conspicuously, Christianity. Afterthe establishment of Grand Chsen Shrine (Chosn Shingung 1P ) in Kyngsng in 1925, Shinto shrines in Korea rapidly increased.By 1937 there were 368 Shinto shrines in Korea. Condent of Koreansacceptance of Shinto, in 1937 the colonial government nally decidedto establish at least one shrine in each local district (ormyn s unit)in order to force all Koreans to conduct a daily ceremony of alle-

giance. This ceremony, which was conducted every morning facingthe east (where the emperor presided over the one-family nation), was known astongbang yobae (th yhai X 0 ). Shinto shrines inKorea, both large and small, numbered more than 900 by 1945(H ARDACRE1989, pp. 9596). From this time on, Japanese Buddhist sects, which had always been supportive of State Shinto, were morepreoccupied with the task of creating loyal Korean subjects than withspreading Buddhist teachings.

The St sect was no exception. When thekminka movement wasinitiated, the St missionary Kawamura DkiI ^ assumed theheadship of the Pusanjin temple. He soon approached the principal

of Pusan Second Commerce School and persuaded him that St-style sitting meditation would be the best form of meditation to use totrain Korean students as loyal imperial subjects. Half a year later, theSt sects missionary history claims that people were really surprisedat the changed atmosphere of Pusan Commerce School (SKKDHI1980, p. 43). The Pusan Second Commerce school thereafter servedas a role model for how best to raise imperial students in Korea. Thepractice of St-style sitting meditation was widely mobilized as ameans of promoting the spirit of Japanese military imperialism.

It is, therefore, not surprising that, in the late 1930s, some Stpriests began to propose a thesis concerning the unity of Zen and thespirit of Japans imperial state. For example, in 1939 the eminent St


given name). It was enforced in February 1940 as a last-ditch attempt to convert Koreansinto loyal Japanese subjects. By August 1940 more than three million households, approxi-mately three-quarters of all households, adopted new family names. Those Koreans whorefused to change their names were deprived of job opportunities or ousted from their posi-tions, and their children were denied entrance to school. See CHOU 1996, pp. 5861.

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scholar Nakane Kand_ 0 } (18761959), a future president of Komazawa University, argued in Totalitarianism and Zen (Zentaishugi to Zen 6 o 7 ) that the quintessence of Japanese cultural tradition was to be found in the unity between the emperor and the people.Such unity, he continued, could be furthered when one realized thenon-selfness of Buddhist spirit, a Buddhist truth that was attainablethrough the practice of St-style sitting meditation (SJYSH 1993, p.29).11 Nakanes St Zen polemics were, in a word, meant to sanctify the Buddhist tenet of non-selfness in order to aid the political ideolo-gy of Japanese military imperialism, according to which people (asloyal subjects of the emperor) were urged to discard their small self-ness for the larger glory of the imperial state. The St sect tried topresent Buddhist ideas and practices as authentic and privilegedinstruments for the glorication of Imperial Japan. In 1941 the St

sect subjected the rationale of its Buddhist teachings and practices tothe political ambition of Imperial Japan by voluntarily revising itscharter in accordance with the Law on Religious Organizations. Inthis charter St meditation was clearly dened as a form of discipli-nary training whose purpose was to encourage Buddhist followers tosacrice their individual selves for the larger collective self of Imperial Japan (SJYSH 1993, p. 30; HIRAYAMA 1992, pp. 5037).

Ironically, however, the Buddhist appeal to Koreans for non-selfnesscould not be promoted without force, even within the context of war.St monks themselves doubted Korean compliance with the call fortotal sacrice. And yet the St-stylekminka movement continued itsexperimentations until its withdrawal from Korea in 1945.

St Monks and the Pacication of Colonial Subjects

Throughout the colonial years aggressive efforts to transform theKorean people into subservient subjects of Imperial Japan were sup-plemented by less forceful efforts. Whereas the former featured theenforcement of brainwashing measures and the outright suppressionof anti-Japanese elements in Korean society, the latter featured theattempt to placate the anger, frustration, and psychological resistanceof Koreans through persuasion. This dual approach to pacication was a lesson that Meiji political leaders had learned through trial and

11 At that time Nakane was one of the key speakers mobilized in support of the Stsects public campaign, known asSeishin hkoku kenkai P l (Lecture series forspiritual patriotism), which advocated Imperial Japans continental expansion. His other works includedKatei to Zen B o 7 (Zen in family life),Kyiku to Zen p o 7 (Educationand Zen), and Katei to shky B o ; (Family and religion).


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error before they attempted to extend colonial rule over Korea. Inorder to subjugate Korea in the late 1900s they had to quash anti- Japanese struggles led by Confucian literati and local activists. In theirattempts to eliminate such opposition, what the Japanese imperialistsfound most troublesome was not so much the military strength of Korean righteous armies but the burning hatred towards Japan. Thepsychological resistance put up by the Koreans was not easily over-come by guns and swords, and it persisted even after the subjugationof most of the independent activists. This was what the colonial gov-ernment referred to as the problem of public thought. On the sur-face, in the 1910s rule by bayonet seemed to work, but colonialgovernment ofcials were worried that Koreans were far from beingfully reconciled to Japanese rule. Korean anti-Japanese sentimentsseemed unpredictable and potentially dangerous enough to interrupt the smooth passage of Japanese imperialism. With the March First Movement of 1919, this anxiety proved to be a dismaying reality. Thisnationwide disturbance, the colonial leaders gured, stemmed inlarge part from the problem of public thought. The so-calledpacication (senbu C ) policy, which the colonial government pro-moted right after the annexation and pursued far more vigorously after the March First Movement, was born out of concern with thisthought (shis ` ) problem.12

The colonial government found that Buddhism could be mobilizedas a vehicle to carry out the campaign to pacify the anti-Japanese sen-timents of Koreans. And besides, Buddhism was the only option avail-able in Korea. Other organized religions, particularly Christianity,remained staunchly anti-Japanese and were precisely what the colonialgovernment wanted to dismantle and replace with State Shinto. Incontrast, Buddhism, which had previously been a sort of social outcast in Korea, was stimulated by Japanese Buddhism. After the prolongedperiod of ridicule and abuse that Chosn Buddhism had endured, it suddenly seemed full of political possibilities. Furthermore, Buddhist monks, subjected to unbearable suppression and humiliation in Chosnsociety, were eager to take advantage of opportunities to enhancetheir social status (CHNG 1994, pp. 925). At this juncture of reli-gious transition the colonial government realized that Japanese Bud-dhists had the potential to play a leading role in the pacication of

Korea. For Japanese Buddhists in Korea, this expectation was a bless-ing that would aid in their expansion. Clearly, Japanese Buddhism incolonial Korea owed its prosperity to being a political agent serving


12 For more detailed discussion of the March First Movement and the Korean thought problem, see N AHM1988, pp. 26267.

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the cause of Imperial Japan rather than to being a religious organiza-tion dedicated to Buddhist teaching.

In 1912 the Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi Masatake p , stated in his New Year message addressed to the head monks of the nations thirty main temples that Buddhists were expected to play a leading role in placating the minds of the Korean people. His state-ment clearly showed why his colonial government enforced the Law for Temples (sachallyng | ), which controlled the administrationof Korean Buddhism until 1945. According to this law, which cameinto effect in 1911, all of the Korean temples were organized into asort of parish system that was divided into the territorial units of thirty main temples. The colonial government held supreme executiverights concerning the appointment of head monks and the control of temple properties. After Korean Buddhism was firmly under control,the colonial government began to mobilize it for the pacication of public thought. As all of the successive Governors-General and highofcials repeatedly emphasized, Buddhist priests were expected tomollify Korean antagonism towards Imperial Japans colonial rule(CHNG 1994, pp. 7990).

In fact, Japanese Buddhist missionaries, with the support of thecolonial government, were enthusiastic agents of the pacication cam-paign. They were not only directly involved in propagating the everrising glory of Imperial Japan, they were also engaged in channelingtheir ideology into Korean Buddhism. In this endeavor there were noparticular sectarian distinctions between Japanese missionaries inKorea. Obviously, the St sect was an integral part of this indoctrina-tion campaign. St missionary history describes, for example, how it was able to secure its foothold in Korean soil in the Taish era.

Although it had met various difculties, the opening of teach-ings in Korea became suddenly energized in the Taish era.Temples and propagational centers were erected one afteranother. The propagation was on the track of tremendous suc-cess, enabling the St sect in Korea to see its missionary enterprises steadily expanding. One of the factors that madethis possible was the doing of the Governor-General, who triedto dissolve the political dissatisfaction of the Korean peoplethrough religious education, in particular through Buddhist

education. For that end, the Governor-General showed, directly and indirectly, a favorable attitude toward Buddhist temples. After the problem between Japan and Korea [a reference tothe March First Movement] had surfaced, uprisings frequently broke out here and there. The primary reason [for the revolts],as the Governor-General understood, stemmed from the prob-


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lem of public thought. For the guidance and edication of public thought, some government ofcials thought that it would be best to rely upon Buddhist missionaries. For that rea-

son, it can be said that Buddhists came to receive special pro-tection [from the government]. Thanks to the favor of theGovernor-General, the propagation enjoyed considerable free-dom. (SKKDHI 1980, pp. 3738)

In dealing with Korean antagonism towards Japans colonial rule, theSt sect delivered the message of non-self resignation, urged compli-ance to and acceptance of the changed world, and provided a widerange of communal services to make Koreans feel good (e.g., educa-tion, religious rituals, social work, and charitable activities).

In 1925 the St sect became a founding member of ChosnPulgyodan 1 [ : (Association of Korean Buddhism)a nationwide Buddhist organization that Kobayashi Genroku, Yi Yunyong, andother pro-Japanese sympathizers had organized to promote harmony between Korea and Japan in the name of the universal compassion of Buddhism. Chosn Pulgyodan soon launched all kinds of projectsthat Governor-General Sait Makoto tersely dened as being neces-sary and helpful in realizing our hope (CHNG 1994, p. 181). TheSt sect, other Japanese sects, and Korean member temples were allinvolved in carrying out pan-sectarian projects designed to reconcilethe colonizers and the colonized. These projects included: public lec-tures; the showing of enlightenment movies; the training of KoreanBuddhist missionaries; the publication of journals, books, and posters;

research on Korean Buddhism; language education; social programs;and the sending of young Korean Buddhists to study in Japan. Amongthese, it was the publication projects that the Chosn Pulgyodan pro-moted most aggressively, for it was believed that they exerted thelargest impact upon Koreans. The associations ofcial journal,Chosn Pulgyo [Korean Buddhism], played a leading role in bringing Koreansinto the political mold of Imperial Japan (CHNG 1994, pp. 17980).In the name of Buddhist friendship and spirituality, Japanese Buddhistsin Korea, including St monks, helped to mollify the anti-Japanesesentiments of Koreanssentiments that the colonial government hadfound it too difcult to deal with through physical violence alone.

The Buddhist campaign of pacication intensied as Imperial Japansunending continental expansion continued to incite anti-Japanesesentiments and local protests in northeastern Asia. In this situation Japanese Buddhists were naturally dragged into the bat tleelds.Throughout the late 1930s to 1945 the Japanese military continued touse Buddhist missionaries for its propaganda efforts (senbu ksaku


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C ^ 6 ) at the war fronts, where the most effective propagandisticactivities were conducted by St missionaries. The St sect praisedthe patriotic operation:

In various parts [of Asia], [they] are wholeheartedly engagedin religious cultural operations such as serving the spirits of departed war heroes, providing war refugees with medicineand medical treatment, Japanese language education, and soon. Our religious warriors (shky senshi ; w ), who have vowed to assist the cause of the Prosperity of Asia (k-A yokusan ! h ), are steadfastly devoted to enhancing the spirit of ourorganization at the forefronts of the continent.

(SKKDHI 1980, p. 96)

Religious teaching was now referred to as a religious cultural opera-tion (shky bunka ksaku ; k 5 ^ 6 )a denition that gained itsfull meaning in the context of the colonial pacication campaign.Buddhist missionary warriors turned out to be loyal vanguard-agentsof Japanese military imperialism.

In 1938 St headquarters in Japan dispatched chief emissary Yamada Ekih[ , d to comfort Japanese troops stationed in Koreaand began to assign more missionaries to Korea as the Sino-Japanese War intensied. Even though battles did not actually take place onKorean soil, the Korean Peninsula was strategically crucial, as it wasthe channel through which troops and logistic materials were sup-plied to northern China. As war fronts expanded in China, the Japan-ese government built more and more barracks to house reserve

armies in the Korean Peninsula and stored more and more war sup-plies at various strategic points, thus creating a general atmosphere of crisis. Any anti-Japanese agitation in such a strategic supply base couldnot be tolerated. The colonial government made every effort to boost the spirit of nai-Sen itchi 1 s O (the unity between inside [Japan]and Chsen) through pacication operations (N AKAN1976, pp.2058). Following the lead of the colonial government, in 1939 theSt sect established an education camp for training missionary war-riors at Komazawa University and began to take part in the GreaterEast Asia Coprosperity Sphere.

Conclusion: The Buddhist Mission and the Politics of Cultural Hierarchy The missionary enterprises of Japanese Buddhists in Korea came to anabrupt end with the defeat of Japan in 1945. All Japanese monks andmissionaries withdrew to Japan at the moment of surrender, as if res-olutely renouncing all of what they had achieved in colonial Korea.


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On 1 September 1945, the Kyngsng headquarters of the St sect ordered all St personnel to immediately evacuate Korea. With thisorder, the St sect permanently ceased its assiduous efforts to pro-mote Buddhist teachings to Koreansefforts that began in the lateMeiji period. Thirty-ve years later, in 1980, the St sect looked backat its past missions in the Asian continent.

Including devotion to the pacication operations that weredirected toward the local residents of conquered territories,the solemn enterprises of [our] Buddhist teachers, who had wholeheartedly promoted the sincerity of universal benevolence(ittshi djin s | _ ) [under the emperor], completely vanished with the defeat. We should, however, remember the heroictraces of these virtuous pioneers forever. (SKKDHI 1980, p. 8)

Nostalgic praise lingered long. The sect considered St propagationin colonial Asia to have been a solemn enterprise ( jgy % , literally,a pure business) deserving perpetual honor and respect.

It is true that this exaltation was later openly criticized from withinand was ofcially negated. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Stpropaganda in colonial Korea was closely intertwined with the politi-cal agenda of Japans military imperialism. In fact, the political instru-mentality of the St mission in colonial Korea was clearly illustratedin a series of resolutions that the St missionary headquarters volun-tarily imposed upon its members once Japan entered full-blown warstatus in the late 1930s. One of these resolutions, adopted in 1940,included two politically oriented recommendations (in addition to

half a dozen admonitions regarding temperate lifestyles) that pointedly directed the St missionaries to work for the good of the GreaterEast Asia Coprosperity Sphere. One recommendation was to organizeunemployed lay housewives and to teach them specially designedcourses dealing with such subjects as manufacturing skills, hygiene,nursing, and so onall of which were useful for the war effort. Theother was to establish organizations that would help to realize theprosperity of Asia (k-A hkkai ! N l ) (SKKDHI 1980, pp. 4344).The St sect found that its Buddhist mission of universal salvation was closely tied to the cause of the coprosperity of Asia in Korea.The nal destination of this missionary zeal was a political one. Kore-ans had little defense against the penetration of colonial Buddhism.13

In retrospect, the slogan the Japanese Buddhists voiced when they


13 It is true that the political mission of Japanese Buddhists in colonial Korea owed muchof its success to the active collaboration of pro-Japan Korean monks and opportunistic Koreanlay followers. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of Japanese Buddhist sects, the roles of these people were secondary, for they were themselves the rst subjects of colonization.

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rst advanced on Korea at the turn of the nineteenth century was, infact, concerned with the spiritual enlightenment and universal salva-tion of Buddhism. From the outset, however, their Buddhist teachings were destined to be both imperialist and racist: imperialist in that they served the political interest of Japan, and racist in that they targetedparticular racial groups for enlightenment. When we compare Japanese Buddhisms imperialism with its racism, it must be said that its mission in colonial Korea seems to have been dominated by theformer. Obviously, the political mission of Japanese Buddhism inKorea ended in 1945, but what lingered long after was the legacy of itsracisma racism that had been deeply embedded in it during Koreascolonial years. Japanese Buddhist missionaries, who perceived them-selves as being ethnically superior, incorporated race into theirpreaching on Buddhist compassion and enlightenment. This exerted

a grave impact upon Korean Buddhist culture.For example, language was a cultural pawn that served as a yard-stick of racial superiority.14 Why were Japanese Buddhist missionariesso eager to open Japanese language schools in colonial Korea? Theirintention was obviously to lure more Korean followers, relying uponthe hidden political expediency of the Japanese language. At the sametime they were serious in contending that Buddhist truths could bebetter transmitted through the Japanese language. This attitude belit-tled Koreans and, by extension, Korean Buddhist culture and tradi-tion. Koreas traditional Buddhist ideas and customs were devaluedand readjusted during the colonial years as a result of the presence of

a more modernized and better transmitted Japanese Buddhism.Two particularly revolutionary changes were applied to Buddhist priests in the early 1910s: the freedom to eat meat and the freedom tomarry. Despite erce opposition to the attempt to abandon these twocardinal precepts, many Korean monks were persuaded to embracethe enlightened practices of Japanese Buddhism.15

14 In addition to the language matter, there were more direct indications that the Japan-ese thought of the Korean people as an inferior race. As the St sect acknowledges, its mis-sionary monks in Korea usually called KoreansSenjin 1 ^ , a derogatory ethnic appellation. At the time of annexation, the Japanese used to refer to Koreans asKankokujin H ^ , Kan- jin H ^ , or, rarely, Chsenjin 1 ^ . Kan H was a character indicating the ethnic identity of

Koreans, but it was gradually replaced with the second charactersen 1 of the lost dynasty Chsen 1 . This aroused strong resentment among Koreans, who regarded it as a form of ethnic humiliation.

15 It is true that some Korean monks strongly supported these changes under the pretext of reforming Korean Buddhism. In particular, in 1913 a Buddhist reformist, Han Yongun,asserted in his Chosn Pulgyo yushin ron 1 [ d G (A thesis on reforming Korean Bud-dhism) that in order to revitalize Korean Buddhism monks should be allowed to marry. The


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In the long run, these changes, claimed as a benchmark of modernKorean Buddhism on the one hand and disclaimed as a symbol of Japanized Korean Buddhism on the other, seriously disrupted the world of Korean Buddhism long after Koreas liberation in 1945. Theissues of meat-eating and marriage, which had been triggered by apolitics of race, caused sectarian disputes and inghting within KoreanBuddhism for decades.

The Imperial Way Buddhists of St Zen have left an indeliblemark on Korean Buddhism. In particular, given that Korean Bud-dhism has been dominated by the Sn (Zen) tradition, the impact of St imperialism was especially deep and far-reaching. In this sense,the task of understanding the multifarious dimensions of Zen nation-alism requires multifarious approaches not only beyond the geograph-ical boundary of Imperial Japan and its people but also beyond the

scope of political instrumentality. A PPENDIX: ST TEMPLES INCOLONIALK OREA

(SKKDHI 1980, p. 30)

1 Kyngsng pylwn 2 Chogyesa g V 3 Wnsansa [4 Sryongsa P 5 Kumgangsa 3 s 6 Poksusa S 3 7 Hwamsa T 8 Tohaesa }

9 Anguksa H 10 Taejosa 11 Ppsusa D 12 Hoesnsa l 7 13 Yesngsa 14 Kyngsusa D 15 Pojangsa


stubborn refusal to allow Buddhist monks to marry, he argued, had done serious harm tothe development of Korean Buddhism in four respects: (1) it was ethically wrong becausecelibate monks disrupted the natural ow of generational reproduction; (2) it had a nega-tive impact upon national strength because it decreased the population; (3) it inhibited thepropagation of Buddhism because many monks gave up celibacy in favor of normal lifeand so withdrew from their Buddhist careers; and (4) the blind suppression of one of themost basic human instincts could lead to scandals and crimes.

But most Korean monks had two arguments against these sudden changes. One was that meat-eating and marriage were outright violations of the two most important Buddhist com-mandments: the prohibition on killing any sentient beings and the strict ban on lewd andunchaste conduct. The other was that these changes were a product of degenerate JapaneseBuddhist practices and would destroy Korean Buddhism.

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16 Unhungsa 17 Taehyusa 18 Chongchnsa r

19 Sngdosa 20 Namsnsa 7 21 Chngboksa S 22 Yngwnsa 23 Hungboksa S 24 Hungsnsa 7 25 Kyngchnsa 26 Taejnsa ) 27 Yongsnsa P 7 28 Taegaksa 29 Tkhwansa K 30 Taejnsnsa 7

31 Pongsnsa 7 32 Pakmunsa N k 33 Yakchosa u 34 Chinju pogyoso H ? + 35 Chlwn pogyoso + 36 Pusanjin pogyoso [ + 37 Yngsanpo pogyoso [ + 38 Kyngsan pogyoso [ + 39 Tongyng pogyoso j + 40 Sinanju pogyoso G H ? + 41 Pyngtaek pogyoso r + 42 Kampo pogyoso 1 +

43 Chngjin pogyoso + 44 Kymipo pogyoso + 45 Tamyang pogyoso : + 46 Puy pogyoso 0 + 47 Chochiwn pogyoso O + 48 Kosng pogyoso + 49 Chngju pogyoso ? + 50 Hyesanjin pogyoso [ + 51 Chinyng pogyoso Z + 52 Kongju pogyoso N ? + 53 Kyngsan pogyoso [ + 54 Yongampo pogyoso P R +

55 Hongwn pogyoso t + 56 Ssan pogyoso [ + 57 Uijngbu pogyoso ,+ 58 Hungnam pogyoso + 59 Yiri pogyoso ;= + 60 Onyang pogyoso 1 +


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St temples in Colonial Korea

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61 Kangnung pogyoso s h + 62 Sunghori pogyoso = + 63 Ysu pogyoso v +

64 Yngdk pogyoso + 65 Changjn pogyoso V2 + 66 Chodongjong pogyoso g ; + 67 Unggi chujae pogyoso _ l $ + 68 Taesngdong pogyoso + 69 Kwanum kyohoe pogyoso ? 3 l + 70 Sariwn pogyoso = + 71 Yangdk pogyoso + 72 Najin chujae pogyoso l $ + 73 Yngdungpo pogyoso : + 74 Noksu chujae pogyoso v l $ + 75 Yngju pogyoso ? + 76 Chngju pogyoso m ? + 77 Chunghwa pogyoso _ + 78 Kiyang pogyoso c + 79 Huichn pogyoso w + 80 Andong pogyoso H X + 81 Sri pogyoso = + 82 Snboksa 7 S 83 Haeju pogyoso } ? + 84 Kaesng Kory pogyoso + 85 Kilju pogyoso ? + 86 Uidong pogyoso +

87 Hongsng pogyoso t + 88 Kown pogyoso + 89 Kochang pogyoso + 90 Kohung pogyoso + 91 Kangjin pogyoso d + 92 Chulpo pogyoso Mm + 93 Samchk pogyoso X , + 94 Sunchn pogyoso + 95 Sngjin pogyoso + 96 Chodongjong pogyoso g ; + 97 Tanchn pogyoso 2 +

98 Changhang pogyoso +

99 Changhung pogyoso + 100 Namyang pogyoso + 101 Posng pogyoso + 102 Yichn pogyoso 2 + 103 Ynhyo pogyoso [ +


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CHOU, Wan-yao1996 Thekminka movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and

interpretations. In The Japanese wartime empire, 19311945 , eds.Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, pp. 4068.Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DUUS, Peter1995 The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea,

18951910. Berkeley: University of California Press.H ANSkhu i (Han Sokki)H O1988 Nihon no Chsen shihai to shky seisaku u 1 9 o ; @ .

Tokyo: Miraisha.H ARDACRE, Helen1989 Shint and the State, 18681988 . Princeton: Princeton University

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The Soto Sect and Japanese Military Imperialism in Korea

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Transcript of The Soto Sect and Japanese Military Imperialism in Korea