USSBS Report 71, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan

8/2/2019 USSBS Report 71, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Fifth Air Forcein THE

War Against Japan

Military Analysis Division

June 1947


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Fifth Air Forcein THE

War Against Japan

Military Analysis Division

June 1947


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U. S. SUPERINTENDENT Of DOCUMENTS

OCT 14 1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the United StatesStrategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a morecomprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in thisreport must be considered as limited to the specific material covered andas subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conductedby the Survey.

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FOREWORDThe United States Strategic Bombing- Survey

established by the Secretary of War on 31944, pursuant to a directive from

late President Roosevelt. Its mission wasconduct an impartial and expert study of the

of our aerial attack on Germany, to bein connection with air attacks on Japanto establish a basis for evaluating the

and potentialities of air power asinstrument of military strategy for planningfuture development of the United States

forces and for determining future eco-policies with respect to the nationalA summary report and some 200

reports containing the findings ofSurvey in Germany have been published.

On 15 August 1945, President Truman re-that the Survey conduct a similar study

the effects of all types of air attack in theagainst Japan, submitting reports in dup-

to the Secretary of War and to theof the Navy. The officers of theduring its Japanese phase were:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice

Chairmen.Harry L. Bowman,J. Kenneth Galbraith,Rensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,Fred Searls, Jr.,Monroe E. Spaght,Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,Theodore P. Wright, Directors.Walter Wilds, Secretary.

The Survey's complement provided for 300350 officers, and 500 enlisted men.

The military segment of the organization wasdrawn from the Army to the extent of 60 per-cent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40percent. Both the Army and the Navy gavethe Survey all possible assistance in furnishingmen, supplies, transport, and information. TheSurvey operated from headquarters establishedin Tokyo early in September 1945, with sub-headquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima,and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operatingin other parts of Japan, the islands of thePacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of war-time Japanese military planning and execution,engagement by engagement, and campaign bycampaign, and to secure reasonably accuratestatistics on Japan's economy and war produc-tion, plant by plant,, and industry by industry.In addition, studies were conducted on Japan'sover-all strategic plans and the background ofher entry into the war, the internal discussionsand negotiations leading to her acceptance ofunconditional surrender, the course of healthand morale among the civilian population, theeffectiveness of the Japanese civilian defenseorganization, and the effects of the atomicbombs. Separate reports will be issued coveringeach phase of the study.The Survey interrogated more than 700

Japanese military, government, and industrialofficials. It also recovered and translated manydocuments which not only have been useful tothe Survey, but also will furnish data valuablefor other studies. Arrangements have beenmade to turn over the Survey's files to the Cen-tral Intelligence Group, through which they willbe available for further examination anddistribution.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTThis report has been guided by an original report prepared for the

United States Strategic Bombing Survey by Brig. Gen. J. V. Crabb,Commanding General, V Bomber Command. The information containedin this report is based on official reports of the Army Air Force, Far EastAF, Allied Air Force SWPA . General Headquarters SWPA, the Fifth AFand analyses prepared by the USSBS. Unless otherwise designated, theclaims in this report and the statistics used in discussion of enemy aircraftand shipping losses are taken from final claims of the Fifth Air Force basedon its combat records.The report has been primarily the work of these officers:

Col. William Hipps,Former A-3, Fifth AF and A-5, FEAF.

Col. Francis Gideon,Former A-3, Fifth AF, FEAF and Dir. of Ops., AAF.

Col. Benjamin Cain,Former A-2, Fifth AF, FEAF and Dir. of Intel., AAF.

Major William E. Johnson,Cartographer.

Contributors of special sections to this report are

:

Brig. Gen. F. H. Smith,Former C/S, Fifth AF and CG, V Fighter Command.

Col. H. F. CunninghamFormer A-2, Fifth AF.

Col. B. A. Schreiver,Former C/S, Far East Air Service Command.

Col. Alvin Pachynski,Former Signal Officer, Fifth AF and FEAF.

R. E. BEEBE,Colonel, A.C.,Former C/S, Fifth AF, FEAF & AAF.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPace

Section I. Introduction 1Orientation Map Facing P. 2 (1)Joint Chiefs of Staff Campaign Directives Facing P. 2 (2)Air-Ground-Naval Team, SWPA 3

II. Assembly and Composition 5Role of the Fifth AF in the SWPA 7Origin of the Fifth AF 8Organization and Channels 8Fifth AF Commands and Tatical Strength 11Aircraft Strength 13Personnel Strength 15

III. Air Campaigns 17GeographicTerrain suitable for Military Operations Facing P. 18Typical Missions of the Fifth AF 19Distribution of Effort 20Progression of Air Attack Facing P. 20Master Maps of SWPA Campaigns 23

Situation Map, 8 April 1942 Facing P. 24 (1)First Phase Facing P. 24 (2)Second Phase Facing P. 24 (3)Third Phase Facing P. 24 (4)Fourth Phase Facing P. 24 (5)

Phase I. Isolation of Rabaul 25Phase II. Preparation for Assault on the Philippines 31Phase III. Occupation of the Philippines 34Phase IV. Preparation for Final Assault on Japan 37Conclusions 38

IV. Total Fifth AF Effort and Results 41Effective Sorties Flown 43Aircraft Hours Flown (Bombers) 44Aircraft Hours Flown (Fighters) 45Aircraft Attrition 46Tons of Bombs Dropped 47Disease Incidence Compared with Battle Casualties 48Destruction of Enemy Aircraft 49Enemy Shipping Destroyed 50Low Altitude Radar Bombing Results 51Bomb Distribution 52

V. Fortunes of War 55Examples of Actions with Inter-Theater Importance:

Bismarck Sea Battle 57Attrition of the Japanese Naval Air Force 58Attrition of the Japanese Army Air Force 60Reinforcement of Ormoc 61Air Entry into Japan 63

Examples of Actions with Theater Importance:Cape Gloucester 64Capture of Corregidor 68Extension of Aircraft Range 70


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

VI. Operational and Technical Factors of Importance 73Ground Support 75Reconnaissance 78Development of Intelligence 82Troop Carrier Operation 85Air Defense in SWPA 87Weather Service 87Communication and Aircraft Warning 89Logistic Support of the Air Force 90

VII. Chronology 97

VI


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SECTION IINTRODUCTION


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PACIFIC AREA

SCALEiop__g loo 200 soo oo soo soo

STATUTE MILES

5 TH AF REPORT(SECTION I) FIGURE I


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,* \.^ LAKE BAIKAlrf-T t-*/ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCAMPAIGN DIRECTIVESIN SWPA AND POA OPERATIONS

< !r -SWPA FORCESse^^poa FORCES

*

.GILBERT ISLANDS

-^1.U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5TH AF REPORTSECTION I FIGURE 2


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AIR-GROUND-NAVAL TEAM, SWPABefore detailing the history of the Fifth AFits operations against the Japanese it is

to show the role the Air Forces playedthe combined all-force team play organizedGen. Douglas MacArthur. Essentially the

was of three forces, ground, navalair in combination, operating their special-in weapons to destroy a common enemy

in order to create a new Allied baserepeated operations.

Naval units permanently assigned to thewere small until late 1944 and battlewere restricted prior to the Luzon

The air forces, therefore, wereupon for more extended operations

would have been normal under otherTherefore, in addition to the standard

of the enemy normally accomp-by air action, the Fifth AF adopted

designed to readjust quickly to tac-situations occurring from the all-out

action of forces operating on littleno reserve. This led to tactics and methodscontrolling aircraft to make them all-pur-

In a war of maneuver a high degree offlexibility" is important, a point adopted

policy by the Fifth AF. The history of theshould be inspected for such actions asfour-day battle between aircraft and a large

convoy in the Bismarck Sea; anwhere a single cannon equipped B-25a destroyer in a gun fight; the isola-

of New Britain and New Ireland byair action ; the preinvasion prepara-

at Gloucester, Biak, and Corregidor wheretonnage almost alone reduced prepareddefenses; the use of fighter-bombers atBay and the Yamashita line to destroy

positions uninterdictable by artillery fire;establishment of air and ground bases at

Wanagela, Dobodura, and Laoag byir transport; the supply of food, fuel andammunition to scattered troops cut off from the

by terrain in almost every groundaction; and other points which make the cron-logy of the Fifth's air effort a constantsuccession of varied events.

In planning tri-force operations the mostomplex problem was the proper segregation of

forces to permit simultaneous operations. Theair-ground team became very cooperative and,after initial difficulties imposed by communica-tions in jungle warfare, the entire Air Forcestood in support of ground action when re-quired. Fifth AF support to the Sixth Armywas climaxed at Ormoc and Luzon. Air-navalcoordination was particularly effective withPT boats and later, in 1945, with submarines,but generally it was found best to keep navalsurface force operations apart from land-basedair operations, due principally to communica-tions requirements of the naval forces. Whenbeachhead operations were supported by navalcarrier-based aircraft the preliminary periodwas of naval responsibility after arriving atthe operation. No appreciable difference inoperating techniques existed but basic lack ofliaison to effect the necessary coordinationmade such joint operations impracticable. Thefull employment at one time of the forces avail-able for an operation was never feasible andhence required elaborate and detailed schedulesof separating forces, both in time and distance.Despite this, the preinvasion cooperation be-tween the Fifth Air Force and the Third andSeventh Fleet units was effective and withoutserious difficulty. The operation to seize'Legaspi in Luzon is a small example of this?-'

In combined operations the interval betweensuccessive operations was minutely calculatedto save every day of the Allied advance. Theabsolute necessity of the Air Forces to secure,in advance of combined operations, air su-premacy in Amphibious Force operating areas,the preinvasion isolation of the battlefield andthe destruction of beachhead defenses requireddaily maximum effort throughout the period ofthe war.Throughout the war in the SWPA, amphibi-

ous operations were supported entirely byland-based aircraft except in a few cases wherethe objective was beyond supporting range ofthe land-based fighters. Hollandia, Morotai,Leyte and Linguyan Gulf landings were furn-ished close air support by CVEs of the 7th Fleetfor a few days until a fighter strip could beconstructed ashore and land-based aircraftcould take over and allow the CVEs to withdrawin order to refuel, replenish their aviation

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and bombs and rest their crews. Attime responsibility for air support of the

and the ground forces would passthe Allied Air Force Commander. GHQ

plans in general called for constructionthis initial fighter strip by D plus 5 to D plusas the 7th Fleet never had sufficient carrier

to maintain continuous operations forperiods.

The historical notes and statistics in thiscannot, as a description of one air force,

adequately emphasize the complete coordinationof Southwest Pacific forces which was respon-sible for our successes. The Air Force part inthis achievement is on the records now beingassembled. The presentation herewith is pri-marily an outline to point out the pattern ofevents and the objectives of the Fifth's leaders,Generals Kenney and Whitehead. The com-plete story must wait the digestion of statisticalfacts and the issuance of a combined Allied,Army, Navy and Air history.


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SECTIONfllASSEMBLY AND COMPOSITION


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ROLE OF FIFTH AF IN SWPAThe campaign of the Fifth AF in operations

the Japanese was confined primarily toSouthwest Pacific Area and to preparing, rtwith other Army forces, for the^fmaf ?>*

on Japan. Maximum effort of all^"forces against a single enemy objective

a keynote of theater policy. This policy, em-along a single line of attack, requiredcoordination of air and surface operations.

of operating space and of forceshand required concentration of means and

the GHQ policy that the AmericanArmy, Seventh Fleet and Fifth AF wouldthe "spearhead" forces. The Fifth AF be-

by the turn of events the largest operatorland-based aircraft in the Pacific except for

This accumulation of air power undersingle command provides the student of mili-

history with an excellent example of aof highly successful campaigns in which

operations were coequal and coordinate withof ground and naval forces.

The policy of Gen. Douglas MacArthur tohis major forces as a composite team

land, naval and air forces, retained each

force as a complete entity and provided a con-centration of its means. With the exception ofanti-submarine units and certain transport air-craft all tactical aircraft in the SWPA wereunder the control of Allied Air Force. In turnthis required that the Air Force have fullability to support compatriot arms while con-tinuously engaging the enemy on the "AirFront." The Fifth AF was therefore "all pur-pose" in its composition. It was essentially afield operating unit, provided with the greatestflexibility and with freedom from administra-tive and service burdens. The composing ofmany air forces into Allied Air Force by Gen.George C. Kenney developed the policy ofassigning one major air force organization toachieve one major objective. The compositionof the selected air force or "Assault Air Force"as it was 'termed, was determined by the re-quirements of the assigned mission. Thecomposition of forces therefore was changingconstantly as bases shifted and forces reallo-cated. Emphasis was placed on complete andresponsible coordination between equal levelsof command. Figure 3 illustrates this.

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PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF JOINT OPERATIONSTHEATREBOUNDARY

GHQSWPA

ALLIEDLANDFORCES

ADJACENTTHEATRES

ALLIEDNAVALFORCES

OPERATQUNITS

OPERAT'GUNITS

MAJORTASKUNITS

SUPPORTSAIR UNITS

OPERAT'GUNITS

CONTROLCOORINATION

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

5TH AF REPORTSECTION nFIGURE 3


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ORIGIN OF THE FIFTH AFIn April 1942 General MacArthur had

an Allied Air Force under the commandLt. Gen. George H. Brett. This was a com-

organization of Royal Australian Airsquadrons, a few Netherlands Eastsquadrons and remnants of the Ameri-

Far East Air Force formerly in theThese units had been evacuatedAustralia and Port Moresby, New Guinea,

were operating in combination with eachwherever service of any sort could beIn July 1942, Lieutenant General Brett

succeeded by Gen. George C. Kenney. OnSeptember 1942 authority was received to

the Fifth AF from existing Americanunits in the Theater. Command was as-by General Kenney in addition to his

as commander, Allied Air Force.operations were delegated to Lieut.

Ennis Whitehead as deputy commander.operational RAAF and Dutch units were

under Air Vice-Marshall D. W. Bos-RAAF Command. National and servicewas retained throughout the war by

milar subdivisions under Allied Air Force.The growth of the Fifth AF resulted prim-

from a troop requisition submitted to theDepartment in early 1943. The troops

in the Theater during the latter part1943 and throughout 1944. Further sub-

increase in strength was dependent oncessation of hostilities in Europe and rede-

of European units. However, by theof major air activity in the South

Theater the Thirteenth AF joined thein June 1944. The Fifth and Thirteenth

Forces were then combined under the com-of General Kenney as the Far East Airon 15 June 1944, and became mutuallyby combinations of forces. General

was appointed to command the FifthFurther reinforcement of air effort was

with the attachment of certain Navalsquadrons and Marine air units to theAir Force as the campaign progressed.

almost all operations the Fifth was in itselfAllied force. This presentation is confined

to the organic assigned units al-its attached units were a considerable

in operations.

ORGANIZATION AND CHANNELSAir Task ForcesThe Pacific being essentially a theater of

maneuver, the ability to effectively shift opera-tional command from place to place was of vitalimportance. The initial growth of newly ac-quired beachheads required on-the-spot super-vision. The steady increase of sorties from anew base would eventually demand a commandheadquarters approaching the Air Force Head-quarters level. It was not feasible to suddenlyclose a large headquarters and quickly move itto a new location since transportation andduplicate equipment were not available. Fur-thermore, air operations were continuous andthe movement of communications was criticalat any stage. To meet this problem three com-mand echelons called air task forces wereformed. Essentially they were standard airforce headquarters units less administrativesections. Their mission was the establishmentof air force units at newly acquired bases orbeachheads, the conduct of air operations di-rectly affecting action at the new base, anddevelopment of the airdrome areas for opera-tions. The Fifth AF Headquarters wouldeventually supplant them and the Task Forceswould be prepared for new operations. If thenew base was to remain detached, the air taskforce continued as the direct representative ofFifth AF Headquarters and acted independ-ently only in local operations. In developmentof bases in conjunction with land and navalforces the air task forces were never respon-sible for the local defense, for the logistic sup-port of the base as a whole, or the constructionof airdromes. These missions were delegatedby GHQ to senior ground force commanders.Contrarily, air operations were not placedunder the local ground commander except foremergency defense.The initial need for an air task force (First

Air Task Force) occurred in April 1943, to in-augurate operations at Buna (Dobodura). InJuly and September of 1943 the Second andThird Air Task Forces were activated to par-ticipate in airborne operations in Eastern NewGuinea. At this time the use of air head-quarters in widespread airborne operations,coupled to relatively major sea-supplied bases,was comparitively new. To illustrate the fiexi-


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JVEWAK

5 th AIR FORCE DISPOSITION, OCTOBER 1943

.OHU.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY5TH AF REPORT

(SECTION TX)FIGURE 4


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ROLE OF 5TH AFIN SWPA

AIRCRAFT7TH FLEET

ALLIEDAIR FORCE

AIRCRAFTNORTHERNSOLOMONST

THIRTEENTHAIR FORCE

FIFTHAIR FORCE

Ii

i

>- RECCE

SEVENTHAIR FORCE

RNZA.F R.A.A.F

TROOPCARRIERWING

AIRSERVICECOMMAND

FIGHTERS

LT. BMRS.

MED. BMRS.

BOMBWINGHQ.

SERVICES

TACTICALPHOTO

FIGHTERS

I

RECCEWINS

USSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY5TH AF REPORTSECTION HFIGURE 5


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manner in which these task forces were usedOctober 1943 the geographical locations are

in Figure 4. Sea distances from Port(Fifth AF Hq.) to subordinate task

required radio communication, and re-on aircraft for transportation of critical

Forces Continued Throughout the WarThe need to continue task forces for futurebecame apparent. As a means of

authorized personnel and equipmentthree bomb wings (308, 309 and 310)

for the Fifth AF were used in lieutheir normal role to cover partially the task

requirements. Task forces were hence-designated as bomb wings. Tactical

service units were attached to bomb wingsto the mission and length of active

Units were selected from all Alliedcommands when Fifth AF units were notLack of staging facilities and con-

uous operation sometimes made the assemblyTask Forces a very difficult achievement.method of assembling these forces is given

Figure 5. Bomb wing headquarters wereinvolved in the administration of these

of CommandThe organization of the Fifth AF and its sub-

commands followed conventional

structure. The arrangement was consideredthe simplest method of administration, and theaccountability of supply. It was not entirelysuitable for operations due to the inability tomaintain the integrity of commands as unitsmoved forward. This difficulty was solved bydifferentiating between "operational control"and "assignment" of units. Essentially assign-ment carried the responsibility of administra-tion and for nonexpendable supplies for units,whereas operational control referred to thecontrol of units in combat, with the responsi-bility of tactical direction and furnishing ofexpendable supplies. Operational control of aunit was normally vested in the senior air com-mand conducting operations in the immediatearea of the unit and greatly reduced communi-cations and staff orders. Operational controlvaried with the tactical situation and could beredesignated on a daily basis if necessary.Administrative channels, however, remainedstandard regardless of the location of units. Itshould be noted that such frequent shift in tac-tical responsibility was detrimental to main-taining any large scale teamplay between sub-ordinate commands, and to the maintenance ofrecords, but it was largely responsible for theability to maintain flexibility in the arrange-ments of forces needed for operationalefficiency.

FIFTH AIR FORCE COMMANDS AND TACTICAL STRENGTH ACTIVATED INTHE FIELD OF OPERATIONS, SWPA, 3 SEPTEMBER 1942COMMANDERS

Gen. George C. Kenney, 3 September 1942-15 June 1944Lt. Gen. Ennis Whitehead, 15 June 1944^

SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (ACTIVATION DATE)V Fighter Command (11 Nov 1942). 54th Troop Carrier Wing (13 Mar 1943).

91st Photo Reconnaissance Wing (20 OctTask Force Headqarters (Air).V Bomber Command (5 Sep 1942).

V Air Service Command (Jul 1943).

85 Fighter Wing (Jan 1944).86 Fighter Wing (Mar 1944).1943).

308th Bomb Wing (Apr 1943).309th Bomb Wing (Jul 1943).310th Bomb Wing (Sep 1943).TACTICAL GROUPS

GROUPS


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en

Z>

t


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5TH AF 1ST LINE AIRCRAFT ON HAND BY TYPEJUNE 1942-AUGUST 1945

NUMBER OFAIRCRAFT2,500

2,000

1,500

ipoo

500

JJ A SONDiJ FMAMJ JASONDIJ FMAMJJASONDIJ FMAMJJA1942 1943 1944 1945

NOTE- ON HAND REPRESENTS ALL COMBAT AND TRANSPORTTYPE AIRCRAFT IN THE FIFTH AIR FORCE.SOURCE- FEAF, AIRCRAFT STATUS REPORT.

AFSSC

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY5TH AF REPORT(SECTION H)FIGURE 8

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J A gj-5TH AF, FIRST LINE AIRCRAFT ON HAND AND OPERATIONALBY MAJOR TYPE AIRCRAFT

JUNE 1942 - AUGUST 1945

NUMBER OFAIRCRAFT TOTAL - ALL TYPE AIRCRAFT

2000

1500

NUMBER OFAIRCRAFT HEAVY BOMBERS


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AAF PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF FIFTH AIR FORCEBY AIR CORPS AND ARMS AND SERVICES

NOVEMBER 1941 - AUGUST 1945NUMBER CfPERSONNEL

125,000

100,000

75,000

50,000

25,000

N D'41-JFMAMJJASOND

1942J FWAMJJ ASOHDjJFUAM^JASONDIJFMAMJJA

1943 1944- 1945-NOTE- ASWAAF WCLUOES ONLY PERSONNEL IN ASWAAF UNITS)ARMS AND SERVICES SECTIONS WITH AIR CORPS UNITSNOT AVAILABLE BY COMMAND AFTER JUNE 1948. DATABY ARMS AND SERVICES NOT AVAILABLE FOR PERIODNOVEMBER 1941 THRU DECEMBER 1942.SOURCE- AFSSC FORM 127

US. STRATEGIC BOMBMG SURVEY5TH AF REPORT(SECTION mFIGURE 10

1 "II 15


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SECTION IIIAIR CAMPAIGNS

17


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srw-^ 270,000 ?

TERRAIN SUITABLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONSHOWN IN SHADED AREAS

WmbM

JAPANESE HELD AND EXPLOITED THESE AREASANO REQUIRED SWPA TO LEAD INTO JAP STRENGTH FROM THEORIGINAL ALLIED HOLDINGS I J . THE SWPA SELEC-TIONS ^ WERE MADE PRIMARILY FOR AIRDROMES ANDHARBOR POTENTIALS BUT SERVED SECONDARILY TO CONTAINJAP GARRISONS ESTABLISHED AT POINTS NOT REQUIRED FOROUR AIR OPERATIONS. VERY LITTLE TERRITORY 1HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED BY JAPS IN THEIR SOUTHWARD MOVE-MENT. THE ADVANTAGE OF OPEN WATER NORTH OF NEW GUINEAAND ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH CENTRAL PACIFIC OUT-WEIGHED THE POOR SHIPPING LANES BUT BETTER AIRDROMESITES IN THE CELEBES AND BORNEO AS ROUTES TO NORTH.

245,000 }%*.via* ^^1^^ ^^^k am*

70,000 auT!5^

/

US strategic bombng survey5 th AF REPORTSECTION H.FIGURE II


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COMMANDS CONCERNEDANTI-AIRCRAFT ONLY

541b T/C WINGDIR OF AIR TRANSPORT,A.A.FAIR TRANSPORTCOMMAND, CIVIL AIR LINES.

FIGHTER COMMAND+A/A COMMAND54th t/C WING

FIGHTER COMMANDORNAVY CVE

AIR MISSIONPASSIVE DEFENSE

BULK TRANSPORT OFALL FORCES 8 CLASSESOF SUPPLY

ACTIVE DEFENSE

TACTICAL TRANSPORTCRITICAL SUPPLY

FITER COVER 24his./DAY

BOMB WINGS+FIGHTER COMMANDBOMB WINGSBOMBER COMM.FIGHTER COMM}

5 AFCOORD

GROUND SUPPORT

BOMBER COMM.FIGHTER COMM.ASSISTED BY

BOMB WINGSFIGHTER COMM.

ORBOMB WINGS

BOMBER COMM.

FIGHTER COMM.

915! RECCE WING

BOMBER COMM.AIRCRAFT SEVENTH

FLEET

UNESCORTED INDIVIDUAL UNITDESTRUCTION OF MILITARYPERSOMEL a MATERIELCOMBINED ESCORTED OPER-ATIONS TO SECURE NEUTRALI-ZATION OF SELECTED BASES 8CONTAIN AREAS TO BE BYPASS-ED. ENEMY AIR ACTION PRO-HIBITED.

FITER SWEEPS TO GAINAIR SUPERIORITY INALL AREAS.

ESCORTED HEAVY BOMBERSTRIKES TO REDUCEKEY BASES 8 SHIPPING

PHOTOS 8 MAPS FOR NEXTSCHEDULED OPERATION

SNOOPER, LAB 8 RECCETO SEARCH OUT ANDDESTROY THE ENEMY

Jfl


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tons aSORTIES20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

1,000800

DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORTTOTAL ACTION SORTIES a TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED 5TH AF

ANDSUPPORTING OPS TO SWPA BY CARRIER BASED AIR

SONDJFMAMJJASO1942 1943 DJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJAj.-^ \ 1944 7/ yg 1945FIFTH AF REPORT INCLUDES RECCE, FIGHTER, a BOMBERS, ONLY AIRCRAFT REACHING TARGET. FROMFORMS 34. NAVY REPORT FROM DRAFT STUDY U-S.S-B.S. WITH SOURCE UNKNOWN.BOMB TONNAGE NOT TO BE USED AS AN MDEX OF EFFICIENCY OF ATTACK.

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY5TH AF REPORT( SECTION II )

FIGURE 13


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USSBS Report 71, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan

Documents

Transcript of USSBS Report 71, The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan