USSBS Report 36, Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 36, Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Coals and MetalsIN

JAPAN'S War Economy

Basic Materials DivisionAprU 1947


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Coals and MetalsIN

JAPAN'S War Economy

Basic Materials DivisionApril 1947


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.UCo3

,. S. SOPtmtOENDENT Of DOCUtTS

This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. StrategicBombing Survey in tlie preparation of furtlier reports of a more comprehensivenature. Any conchisions or opinions expressed in this report must be consid-ered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further inter-pretation ill t!ie light of further studies conducted by the Survey.


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FOREWORDUnited States Strategic Bombing Survey

established by the Secretary of War on 31944, purusant to a directive from the

President Roosevelt. Its mission was to con-an impartial and expert study of the effects

our aerial attack on Germany, to be used inwith air attacks on Japan and to estab-

a basis for evnluating the importance andof air power as an instrument of

strategy, for plamiing the future develop-of tlie United States armed forces, and for

future economic policies with respectthe national defense. A summary report and

200 supporting reports contaijiing the find-of the Survey in Cicmiany have been15 August 1945, President Truman requestedthe Survey conduct a similar study of theof all types of air attack in the war againstsubmitting reports in duplicate to theof War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

officers of the Survey during its Japanesewere:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander,

Vice Chairmen.Harry L. Bo\raian,J. Kenneth Galbraith,Rensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,Fred Searls, Jr.,Monroe E. Spaght,Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,Theodore P. Wright, Director.^.Walter Wilds, Secretary.

Survey's complement provich-d for .300350 officers, and 500 erdisted men. Tlie

military segment t)f the organization was (h'awrifrom the Army to the extent of 00 percent, andfrom the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Boththe AiTny and the Navy gave the Survey all pos-sible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, trans-port, and information. The Survey operated fromheadquarters established in Tokyo early in Sep-tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobileteams operating in other parts of Japan, tlieislands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartimeJapanese military planning and execution, engage-ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign,and to secure reasonably accurate statistics onJapan's economy and war-production, plant byplant, and industry by industry. In addition,studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-tegic plans and the background of her entry intothe war, the mternal discussions and negotiationsleading to her acceptance of unconditional sur-render, the course of health and morale among thecivilian population, the effectiveness of the Japa-nese civilian defense organization, and the effectsof the atomic bombs. Separate reports will beissued covering each phfisc of the study.The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa-

nese military. Government, and industrial-officials.It also recovered and translated many documentswhich not only have been useful to the Survey, butalso will furnish data valuable for other studies.Arrangements have been made to turn over theSurvey's files to the Central Intelligence Group,through which they will be available for furtherexamuuition and distribution.

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AcknowledgmentThe following report represents the combined work of three Sec-

tions of the Basic Materials Division, United States Strategic BombingSurvey (Pacific). The Section staffs responsible for the carrying outof the research in Japan and for the preparation of this report in Wash-ington were: CoalLt. Cmdr. David A. Burr, USNR, 1st Lt. RaymondE. Burnes, AUS; Coke, Iron and SteelU. Stefan H. Robock, USNR,Lt. (jg) Richard I. Galland, USNR, William Weinfeld, Howard F.Voigt; Light and Non ferrous MetalsLt. Robert C. Beyer, USNR, Lt.William G. Jones, USNR, 1st Lt. Arthur M. Freedman, QM, Donald L.Colwell.

The research conducted in Japan depended in large measure uponthe abilities and the unstinting efforts of the language personnel attachedto the Division, namely, 1st Lt. Bayless A. Manning, SC, who assistedin the preparation of the Coal report as well, 1st Lt. Paul J. Bohannon,SC, and Robert P. Alexander.

The report could not have been completed, however, without theloyal and intensive work of the enlisted personnel, both men andwomen, who were attached to the Division in Japan and Washington.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.Major, AUS, Chief.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PageSUMMARY 1Part I. COAL IN JAPANS WAR ECONOMY 5Part IL COKE, IRON AND STEEL 59Part III. LIGHT AND NON-FERROUS METALS 108

1 Aluminum 1172. Magnesium 1293. Copper 1334. Lead 1 435. Zinc 1486. Tin 154


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SUMMARYlic oulpiit of Japan's basic industries, wliicli had

its pcaVc early in 1944, had begun to declinemonths before significant bomb tonnages were

on the Japanese home islands. This declinebeen precipitated mainly by shortages of shippingcaused by blockade operations conducted bysubmarine, air and surface operations.inescapable and fundamental limitation upon

war potential was its serious deficiency innatural resources without which modern war can-be waged. Japan at home possessed in adequate

or quality practically none of the basic rawnecessary for the use of even her limitedcapacity to produce armaments. The fewwere impotent to offset the over-all defects

mineral resources of the islands. Coal existedquantity, but not of the right kind; iron was

in quantity; aluminous raw materials werelacking; there was some copper, but notlead, tin, nickel, cobalt and chromium were

inadeciuate. Only zinc, in fact, was relativelyplanners had long recognized the glaring

of the homeland as a base for a majoragainst the West. Many of their political and

moves had been designed in large part tothe deficiency in raw materials and to bring

containing them vmder direct control or domi-Regardless of what other considerations

into the decisions to conquer Manchuria andparts of China there can be little doubt that

important coal, iron, and other resources of thosewere major objectives. Peaceful infiltrationadditional areasthe Philippines, Malaya,

Indiesgained them access for a time tosupplies, but it left them at the mercy of hostileby other powei's. If Japan was to have the

to prosecute a major war, there remained,the necessity of developing its industries

on the basis of the most economical use ofraw materials, of making secure the lines of

to the northern mainland and ofas large stocks of metal as possibl to be

held in reserve. Generally speaking, it isthat coui'se which was attempted.

about 1937^ Japan .started to accumulateshe could of the seriously deficient metals, in-

steel (as scrap and ore), copper, lead, zinc, tinmost of the ferro-alloys. By late 1941 sizable

(juantities hati been acciuircd abroad and shippedhome for storage, amounting in some instances tomore than a year's needsbut coal and coke couldnot be stockpiled, and she had been unable to ac((uiremuch aluminum or bauxite. On the continent, in1937 an ambitious program was begun to developcapacity to semi-process materials thej-c' before .ship-ment to Japan. This program fell far short of itsgoals; for example, in Manchukuo pig iron capacityreached less than one-half and steel-making capacityless than one-third the planned lev(>ls. And because;finishing processes remained concentrated in Japanth usefulness of expanding mainland productionwas dependent upon its flow to the homeland.

In Japan, an enormous effort over several yearshad been put into expanding some industries, in-tegrating others, and making the islands as nearlyself-supplying as it was possible to do. The programin most respects (excepting in the light metals) hadbeen very nearly completed by December 1941although it had been interfered within some impor-tant features by embargoes and by the steadily in-creasing resistance of the occidental powers to Japan's,by then, clear intentions. Entering upon the war,however, at a date of their own election, the topJapanese strategists, misjudging both the characterand the duration of the fight ahead, felt they couldlook upon Japan's industrial resources with someequanimity. The fact that at that time Japan wasable to produce at best -no more than ten percent ofthe quantities of basic raw materials which the U. S.was producing was considered, but not very seriously.The first early successes, which soon provided all

but undisputed control over sources of most of theraw materials lacking at home, seemed to havefurnished the economic security and wealth whichwould place Japan beyond the reach of her antago-nists. All that remained to be done was for Japan tocarry home the coal, iron and semi-processed mate-rials from Manchukuo, the rich coking coal and ironfrom China, the equally good iron, manganese, chro-mite, and copper from the Philippines, the high-gradebauxite, tin, iron, and manganese from Malaya,nickel fiom Celebes, bauxite from the NetherlandIndies, and copper, tin, tungsten, lead and zinc fromBurma and Thailand. With the Navy guarding thesea lanes, and considering the distance from enemybases, this seemed a possible task.

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But almost before Japanese engineers and shippingfirms could reach the spots they were to develop, theAllied blockade had gotten under way and soonbegan to take a toll of the merchant and transportvessels assigned to the task. By September 1942 littlehad been accomplished, and from th'^n on the ship-ping situation (giving effect to the demands of mili-tary operations, the rising scale of ship sinkings andinefficient employment of available bottoms) was toact as an effective bar against the use of but a frac-tion of total cargo tonnage for the hauling of theresources which were available for the taking, Soonrecognizing the bleak necessity for concentrating herefforts, Japan decided in early 1943 to forego all buta few of the raw materials available in the southernareas and instead to attempt full-scale mobilizationof the nearer minerals, especially coking coal fromNorth China, and iron ore from the Yangtze Valleyand Hainan Island. For a while those efforts metwith success: coal and iron ore imports, which hadalready turned downward, were stabilized for afew months.A conspicuous exception among basic raw mate-rials to the above was a strenuous campaign under-taken to get high-grade bauxite from the south forthe critical alumimnn industry; 1943 witnessed thehigh water mark for bauxite imports. The largewindfall stocks of finished lead, tin and copper cap-tured in the southwhich required little shippingto movewere sent home when possible. But theiron of Malaya and the Philippines, which hadaccounted for 50 per cent of imports in 1940, had tobe abandoned. Of copper, manganese, chromite andother ores that could not be processed where mined,little or no shipments could be afforded by the de-pleted shipping pool. Then, as U. S. submarinesentered the Yellow Sea, even the vital bulk move-ments came under attack. To make matters worse,U. S. air forces began seriously to harass shipping onthe Yangtze River and along the dhina coast.Regardless of the amounts which were beingbi-ought in fi-om the inner zone areas, the Japaneseheavy industries were not able to maintain theiroperations without recourse to the stocks of rawmaterials built up before the war. By June 1944 cut-tjacks in production became necessarj' in nearly allfields; stocks were being stretched out, but they weredwindling fast. Some blast furnaces had to be shutdown altogether, at government order, because ironore receipts could not be parcelled out far enough.Drastic and difficult measures, often impractical,were resorted to; the aluminum industrv tried des-

perately to shift over at the last moment to the usfof North China shales in place of the bauxite forwhich its plants were almost wholly designed. SuK-stitutions in steel alloys to less and less desiraliliformulas followed one another in rapid succession.Copper refineries operated at diminishing rates.Only the zinc industry maintained its position, de-pending as it had for some years chiefly on domesticresources.The persistent and irreversible declining trend inthe supply of products basic to the economy enforceda downward scaling of the production of eml-products. It also tended to reduce pipe-line factoi>(stocks and work-in-process) to the minimum neces-sary to support existing levels of output. Pipe-limcushioning effects, as production of basic material,'continued to decline, were therefore minimized. Th(effects of the shortages soon spiralled through th:whole economy, as each industry, for want of products of the others, was able to produce less itself owhat the others needed. Moreover, the enforceiusage of increasingly poorer grade raw materials iian industrial economy characterized by its teclinological immaturity aggravated the difficulties resuiting from the quantitative decline in outputThese qualitative factors, stemming from the involuntary shift to unfamiliar processes, therel)-accentuated the effectiveness of the blockade.

In June 1944 the very long-range air attack n:the homeland and industries in Manchukuo begaifrom deep in China. Operating under as adversconditions as could be sustained, the small forceavailable attacked the coking plants of the steel industry on the basis of the consideration that the;were the most critical point in the industrial wamachine within range. But the steel industry iiJapan was even then already operating at less thaihalf of its capacity; no plants were producing acapacity. In view of this fact, the problem of inflicting any very serious and lasting damage wit)the force which could be brought to bear presentsextreme difficulties. Damage was clone, to be sureHowever, the loss in production which did resuifrom these raids was made up in a few months, an(thus no permanent cut in over-all output was effocti iby the China-based attacks.By the time the Marianas-based long-range force

could be deployed, the decision had been made tishift to other target systems and types of attackThereafter, until near the close of the war, the heaAindustries were not specifically attacked; they n"ceived secondary and incidental damage from attack


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othor targets, but not until th(> naval bom-in July and August 1945, just before tbewere any of them singled out as primaryof an attack in force.

by the end of the war the majorindustries had been reduced to -a state borfler-

on idleness. In July 1945 the coal supply was56 per cent of its wartime peak. Imports of

coking coal were cut off. The supplylectrodes for the production of electric steel was

exhausted after graphite from the mainlandno longer be brought in. Ingot steel output inhad already declined to a rate of 2,900,000annually, comparing with a top year of 7,800,-tons, and was certain to drop below 1,500,000as the full effects of the shortages and damagereflected in production. Aluminum output had

ceased as bauxite stocks were exliaustedbefore and the emergency measures had

copper, lead and tin output had declined to:50 and 10 per cent of their respective peak out-during the war (and although some stocks of

metal remained on hand, their use wasbj' the availability of steel by that time).

causes underlying the condition of the heav\^went far back into the combined attack

Japanese raw materials and their supply lines.the blockade noose had been drawn tighter and

around the main islands, access even to theby resources of Manchukuo, Korea and North

via the suppo.sedly inviolable Japan Sea hadendangered and all but stopped. The secondary

of the area raids aggravated somewhat fur-

ther the position of those; industries. The aeriamining campaign contributetl mightily to the diffi-cultiesespecially as it affected the vulnerable inter-island movement of commodities which was an im-portant characteristic of Japan's geography-dictatedtransport system. But even before that campaigngot under way in April 1945 the major damage hadbeen done, namely, the stock piles and surpluses ofimported raw materials held in Japan proper nearedexhaustion. Without them, industry had beenforced to cvu'tail its operations to the levels thatcould be supported by home-produced materialsonly, and in spite of enormous exertions the Japanesehad been unable to make their domestic resourcesfill much of the gap.The cumulative effects of the attack on shipping,

and mining of ports, were predominantly responsiblefor the condition of the Japanese heavy industriesat the end. In those industries improvization is oflittle avail; bulk raw materials must move in un-ceasing volume; 24-hour-a-day operation is a neces-sity; and when the whole series of manufacturing andfabricating industries which depend on the heavyindustries for their raw materials could no longer besupplied with more than a third or so of their require-ments, the war potential of Japan approached asimilar figure. This remaining fraction of Japan'swar potential was vulnerable to an attack on herrailroad network. Once transportation by sea hadbeen substantially eliminated, the heavy industrieswere wholly dependent on Japan's few rail lines forthe movement of even her inadequate domesticmaterials.


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Part ICOAL IN JAPAN'S WAR ECONOMY

TABLE OF CONTENTSPayt

I. INTRODUCTION yII. VULNERABILITY OF JAPANS BASIC COAL POSITION 9

L Importance of coal in Japan's war economy U2. Lack of self-sufficiency 103. Dependence on intcr-island transportation 10

III. JAPAN S PREWAR COAL POSITION 101. Domestic reserv(>s and production 10

a. Reserves 10b. Development of coal mining industry 11c. Rapid growth of production, 1931-40 13

2. Imports 13a. Vital dependence on imports 13b. Development of coal production in Karafuto, Korea, Man-

chukuo and North China 13c. Prewar imports 14

3. Exports 144. Consumption pattern 14

IV. JAPAN'S COAL POSITION 1941-45 151. Government policy and controls 15

a. Attitude of the war planners 15b. Coal Control Association established 15c. Subsidy program 15

2. Japan's wartime coal supply 16a. Decline of domestic production 16b. Causes of decline of production 16c. Drop in imports 19d. Coal exports 20e. Stocks 20f. Deterioration of the over-all wartime supply position 20

''). Dislocation of intei-island transportation 21a. Disruption of water shipments 21b. Increasing importance of railway shipments 22

4. Wartime consumption pattern 23a. Effects of the reduction in sujiply and the dislocation of

transportation 23b. The allocation system 23c. Changes in pattern of industrial consumption 24

V. CONCLUSIONS 241. Strategic significance of the coal supply 212. Direct attacks on coal production not feasible 253. l


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LIST OF TABLESTable Page1. Comparison of number and proportion of total production of various

sized mines in Japan proper in fiscal years 1932 and 1940 112. Coal production in Japan proper, by islands, fiscal years 1931^0 133. Coal production in Karafuto, Korea, Manchukuo and North China-

Inner Mongolia, fiscal years 1938 and 1940 144. Coal imports into Japan proper, fiscal year 1940 145. Comparison of selected major consumers of coal in Japan proper, fiscal

years 1933 and 1940 146. Major coal consumers in Japan proper in terms of the percentage of total

coal consumed, fiscal years 1933 and 1940 147. Coal production in Japan proper, by districts, fiscal years 1940-45 168. Composition of coal mining labor force in Japan proper, fiscal years

1938-44 179. Analysis of operations of 13 mines operated by Mitsubishi Mining

Company, fiscal years 1940-45 1810. Coal production in Karafuto, Korea, Manchukuo and North China-

Inner Mongolia, fiscal years 1941 and 1944 2011. Sununary of the coal supply position in Japan proper, fiscal years

1940-45 2112. Inter-island coal .shipments to Honshu by sea, fiscal years 1941-45 2113. Inter-island coal shipments to Honshu by rail, fiscal years 1941-45 2214. Coal consumed in Japan proper, fiscal j'ears 1941-45 2315. Coal consumption in Japan proper by districts, fiscal years 1944-45 2316. Comparison of selected major consumers of coal in Japan proper, fiscal

years 1941 and 1944 2417. Relative consumption of coal by selected industries in Japan proper,

fiscal years 1941-45 24

LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES1. Coal reserves in Japan proper, 1 April 1945 252. Coal production in Japan proper, by size of mines, fiscal years 1932-44 . 263. Coal mines opened and reopened in Japan proper, fiscal years 193144. 274. Number and capacity of coal mines closed in Japan proper, fiscal years

1941-45 275. Coal production in Japan proper, by companies, fiscal years 1931-44 . 286. Summary of the coal position in Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45. ... 287. Coal production in Japanese-controlled areas, fiscal years 1938-44. ... 288. Coal production in Japan proper, by islands, fiscal years 1931-45 289. Coal production in Japan proper, by 10-day periods, April-September

1945 2910. Coal production at individual mines in Hokkaido, fi.scal years 1940-44. 2911. Coal production at individual mines in Honshu, fiscal years 1940-44. . 2912. Coal production at individual mines in Kyushu, fiscal years 1940-44. . 2913. Daily coal production at Miike mines, June-August 1945 3014. Coal mining labor force, production, and output per employe per year,

in Japan proper, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-45 3015. Analysis of changes in coal mining labor force, fiscal years 1941-44. . . 3116. Average coal production per employe per year in Japan proper, fiscal

years 1930-44 31


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Table Page17. Coal inininfi materials required, allotted and aciiuired by mines in

Japan proper, fiscal years 1941-45 3218. Average price of Japan proper c'oal to consumers, October 1940-

September 1945 3219. Total subsidy paid to coal producers in Japan proper, fiscal years

1941-44 3220. Average subsidy per ton of coal produced in Japan proper, fiscal years

1941-44 3221. Average subsidy per million calories of coal produced in Japan proper,

fiscal years 1941-44 3222. Transfer of labor and materials from Karafuto to Japan pi'oper, August

1944-September 1945 3223. Coal exports from Japan proper, by destination, fiscal years 1940-45. 3324. Coal arrivals at ports of Tokyo, Yokohama and Kawasaki, August

1942-July 1945 3325. Coal position in the districts of Japan proper, fiscal years 1940-45. . . 3326. Inter-island movement of coal to Honshu, by source and type of trans-

portation, fiscal years 1941-45 3427. Inter-island movement of coal to Honshu, by type of transportation,

fiscal years 1941-45 3428. Movement of coal from Hokkaido to Honshu, bj' type of transportation,

fiscal years 1941-45 3429. Movement of coal from Kyushu to Honshu, by type of transportation,

fiscal years 1941-45 3430. Coal imports into Japan proper, by source, fiscal years 1939-45 3531. Coal stocks awaiting transportation in Japan proper, by districts,

March 1944-October 1945 3632. Loadings of coal and coke by Japanese Government railways, fiscalyears 1936-45 3633. Consumption of coal in Japan proper, by industries, fiscal years 1933-45 . 3734. Consumption of coal in Japan proper, by industries, in percentages of

total consumption, fiscal years 193345 3735. Consumption of coal in Japan proper, by industries, monthly, April

1944-September 1945 3836. Consumption of coal in Japan proper, by industries, in percentages of

total consumption, April 1944-October 1945 3937. Army coal consumption in Japan proper, fiscal years 1940-45 4038. Comparison of coal allocated and consumed, by industries, quarterly,

fiscal year 1944 4039. Allocation of coal in Japan proper, by industries, fiscal years 1943-45. 4040. Allocation of coal in Japan proper, by districts, fiscal years 1943-45. . . 4141. Allocation of coal to iron and steel industry, by districts, fiscal years

1943-15 4142. Consumption of coal in Japan proper, by administrative regions,

monthly, April 1944-September 1945 41


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LIST OF ANNEXESAnnex A

PageCoal Position of Karafuto, Korea, Manchukuo, Formosa, North

China-Inner Mongolia and Central China 42Annex B

Effects of Air Attacks on the Miike Collieries, Omuta, Kyushu... 50


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mary fuel for the railway network. Disruption ofthe supply of coal would inevitably have resulted inwidespread paralysis of the nation's war production.2. Lack of selj-si/fficieticy

Consitlering the extent of her dependence uponcoal and her limited resources, Japan was poorlyequipped to engage in a life and death struggle witha major industrial power. Coal reserves were smallin comparison with those of the world's great coalproducing nations. At no time did production inJapan proper attain the minimum goal of 60,000,000tons' set by the govermnent early in the war, onlyabout ten per cent of the output of the United States.Nearly all coal produced in Japan proper is medium-to-low grade bituminous; practically none is suitablefor making good metallurgical coke unless blendedwith imported coals.Japan was vitally dependent on coal imports to

supplement her domestic supply. Of especial im-portance was coking coal from Karafuto and NorthChina-Inner Mongolia, without which the Japanese

I Metric toDS and fiscal years (April-March) are ii.sed throughout thisreport, except when otherwise noted.

iron and steel industry could not hope to functionefficiently.

3. Dependence on inter-island transportationThe coal fields in Japan proper are poorly situated

with respect to major centers of consumption, withthe exceptions of the industrial area of northernKyushu and the much smaller steel industry olsouthern Hokkaido. The location of the industiiaconcentrations of central Honshu formed one of tinweakest links in the production-consumption chainHonshu's wartime coal output, never more thai15 per cent of the total production of Japan properfurnished only about one-fourth of the coal user! orthat island. The bulk of its coal supplies had to 1mcarried 250-600 miles from mines in Hokkaido aiuKyushu and the other Inner Zone areas along shipping lanes which were partially accessible to ,sulimarine attack from the beginning of the war, amwere within range of Allied air attacks in the fiiiamonths. In 1941, for example, 13,823,000 tons othe 31,862,000 tons mined in Kyushu were sent t(Honshu, as were 7,329,000 of the 15,747,000 tonproduced in Hokkaido. Prior to the war, all shipments were by water, and extensive handling facilities existed at ports of origin and receipt.

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JAPANS PREWAR COAL POSITION1. Domestic reserves and production

a. Reserves. Considering the indispensability ofcoal to the Japanese economy and the limited quan-itty and inferior quality of her coal resources, Japan'sindustrial pyramid even at the outset of the warrested on a surprisingly narrow base. According todata submitted by the Fuel Bureau, Ministry ofCommerce and Industry, known remaining coaldeposits in Japan proper, as of 1 April 1945, wereestimated at approximately 9,200,000,000 tons, orabout 5.8 times the amount mined prior to thatdate. The combined coal reserves as of 1928 in theUnited States and the United Kingdom, on the otherhand, totalled 3,402,000,000,000 tons. Of the knowndeposits in Japan proper, bituminous coal accountedfor 88 per cent, and semi-anthracite and lignite forthe remaining 12 per cent. All but a trifle of the

reserves were located in four areas: (1) northwester)Kyushu with large fields of medium grade bituminous, (2) Hokkaido with extensive deposits ohigher quality ga.s-preducing bituminous, (3) Yaniaguchi prefecture in western Honshu with limitiMreserves of lower grade bituminous, lignite and semianthracite, and (4) the Joban fields of easteriHonshu with some sub-bituminous and lignite(Appendix Table 1). In general, the bituminoucoals mined in Japan are unsuitable for th(> manufacture of metallurgical coke although some of thicoals of Hokkaido and Kyushu produce a satisfactoricoke of metallurgical quality when blended vvitlimported coking coals.

Coal seams in the Hokkaido fields are for the iiiospart thick enough for efficient modern working, Immost of the deposits in Honshu and Kyushu are iithin seams, and nearly all of the seams are shaq)l,>

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Many of the mines are deep and wet,extensive and continual pnnipinf;;. The

mines arc newer and better engineered,have great gas hazards. Temperatures in many

mines of Kyushu and Honshu are very high,considerable fluctuation in winter andproduction. Extreme low winter tempcra-

in Hokkaido have also imposed serious sea-handicaps on mining in that region.Development of the coal mining industry. (1)

of the industry. The large mines were, withexceptions, operated by a handful of large min-companies owned or controlled by the Zaibatzu;among them were Mitsui Mining Co., Mitsu-Mining Co., Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship

(Mitsui controlled), and Sumitomo Mining Co.four alone accounted for 48.5 per cent of total

in 1944 (Appendix Table 5).feature of Japanese coal mining was the great

of veiT small mines producing from a fewto as much as 50,000 tons per year. These were

independi'ntly operated by small enterpriserstemporary loan financing by banks or dis-

Their operations were immediately de-upon favorable market or subsidy condi-

In this number are also undoubtedly somewhich were actually not in full operation, as

pits were not invariably excluded.is noteworthy that of 640 mines opened or re-

during the decade 1931-40, only two had anannual production" of more than 300,000

and only 22 were expected to jdeld betweenand 300,000 tons per year (Appendix Table

In 1932, there were 361 mines in operation inproper. Of these only 24, or 6.6 per cent, had

annual output in excess of 300,000 tons, and theyoduced 53.0 per cent of the nation's total. By

the total number of mines had nearly doubled,the 45 largest mines accounting for 64.5 perof the entire output for the year.Technical developments. Coal mining methods

Japan were extremely primitive until the earlyBy 1910, a few of the most modern mines

using some electricity for pumping and hauling,were operating on the longwall principle. WorldI, which boomed production to a level notattained until 1934, spurred the adoption offeatures of Western technology, and also com-the Japanese to start the manufacture of manyof mine supply which formerly they had im-Although the end of that war temporarily

the demand foi- Japanese coal, the industry

continued to make steady progress in the followingdecade.Table 1. Comparison of number and proportion of total

jxroduction of various sized mines in Japan proper in fiscalyears 1933 and 1940.

Il'roiluciion in thousands of inelric Ions]

Size of annual production


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1940 was only 173 tons. This trend, in the facemajor advances in technology in the large mines,

the meagerness of Japan's resources andof skilled mining labor, as well as the drive

increased production at any cost. Each yearand more low grade, ill-equipped and poorly

mines were brought into production.nd each year the galleries of the high-grade minesere pushed deeper and deeper. The pressure forimmediate production demanded sacrifice of soundong-range development of such resources as werevailable. Absence of this developmental ground-work was to prove one of the obstacles to achievingreater prodaction during the war years.(3) Japan's supply of coal mining labor. Coal min-

ing has long been an unpopular occupation in Japan.he mines are extremely hazardous because of thesual presence of explosive gas and lack of safetyaintenance which would be considered essential byccidental standards. Volcanic hot springs raiseemperatures in many mines of Kyushu and Honshuell above 90 degrees; in Hokkaido mines, sub-arcticinter temperatures produce the opposite extremef discomfort. Wages in the prewar period wereotoriously low.As a consequence, turn-over of miners has normally

been very high. \Miile some 20 per cent of the under-ground workers could properly be termed permanent,the turn-over rate of the remainder was as a rulewell over 100 per cent. Prior to 1940, most of thiscasual segment of the labor force was composed offarmers who worked in the mines only long enoughto accumulate a few yen before returning to thefields. Training to achieve proficiency in the usi^ ofmechanized equipment was variously considered totake from six months to two years. The resultantinadequate level of general skill is obvious.

After the beginning of the war in China in 1937,the situation became progressively more critical asexperienced miners were called into military service.In 1939 the shortage of husky Japanese for work inthe mines had become so acute that "enforced collec-tive immigration" of Korean contract laborers wasbegun.

(4) Supply of mining materials and equipment. Oneof the most critical factors in Japan's coal productioncrisis late in the war was the shortage of steelproducts, cement, and rubber. The industry was alarge u.ser of rolled steel shapes for props and minetransportation facilities, and of steel cable. Cementwas an essential of efficient operation, and rubberwas necessary particularly for the many belt con-

veyors. Explosives were indispensable, but availahlrin required quantity. Mine timbers and supplies nflumber were fairly plentiful in the coal field areas andnever became a critically short item.

All of the better mines were highly electrified, anddemand for heavy electrical equipment was great.During the 1930s, the more important mines con-verted to use of specialized heavy equipment suchas cutters, picks, and drills, and the mines becaint-more dependent on washing and sorting installationsMost of this specialized equipment was manufac-tured by a handful of suppliers such as Hitachi,Mitsubishi Denki, and Yasukawa Denki. Several n\the larger mines had machinery plants at the col-liery, as for example those at Miike, capable otmajor repairs and some fabrication. Repairs nmachinery for most mines, however, were done inlarge part by scattered foundries and machine shop^throughout the coal regions.

(5) The government's relation to coal mining bcfon1940. Exploitation of Japan's underground mine raresources was subject to license and concession olthe Imperial Government. Prospecting rights aiKmining rights were issued by the Fuel Bureau of tinMinistry of Commerce and Industry, which requin'(submission of periodic reports of operations an(pi-oduction.

Prior to 1940, however, direct governmental control of actual production and distribution was largelylimited to various licensing and supervisory measure,incident to enabling operators to exploit the coareserves. Most important regulation was effectc(through a government-sanctioned cartel formed h-^the large mining interests, known as the Federatioiof Coal Mine Owners, which had been established ii1921, the chief policies of which were directed to pricistabilization and control of production. In 1932 th(Federation organized a subsidiary, the Showa CoaCo., which assumed a practically complete monopolyof sale and distribution of domestically produced amimported coal. When a coal shortage appeared ii1937, the government stepped in to fix prices amregulate distribution, acting through the Showa CoaCompany.The increasing inability of domestic coal produc-

tion to keep pace with Japan's industrial expansioibecame really critical for the first time in 1939, wherabnormally low rainfall called for unusually higlcoal consumption in thermal electric power plantsTo enforce a stringent policy of control of prices tcconsumers and to encourage maximum production.]the government passed in 1939 the Coal Distribution;

12


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Under its terms the Showa Coal Co. wasin April 1940 into the Japan Coal Co.,

half by the government and half by theinterests. This quasi-governmental agency

given a total monopoly over sale and distributionProduction and imports were purchased by

company at prices based on cost-plus-bonus tooutput; sales prices were frozen as of 1 April 1940.1940 the government's policy of pressing for

output had begun to be reflected in theof mines and decline in efficiency which was

to result in a collapse of the nation's coal pro-capacity. Construction and repair werebeing neglected in many of the mines asand skilled manpower were turned to

and end-products uses. Consumption offor mining fell 18 per cent from 1936 to 1940,coal production increased 37 per cent. The

of miners employed rose from 251,000 (allin 1938 to 338,000 (including 45,000in 1940. Despite the slighting of develop-

and maintenance workand with a larger pro-of the labor force engaged in actual digging

average annual output per miner fell from 193in 1938 to 173 tons in 1940.Rapid grotvlh of production, 1931-40. The de-

years of the early 1930s saw a definite slumpproduction of coal in Japan proper. Totaldropped from 34,258,000 tons in 1929 to a

of 27,987,000 tons in 1931. Thereafter theswamg back, and by 1936 domestic pro-

had risen by 50 per cent to 41,803,000 tons,outbreak of the China Incident in 1937 ushei-edperiod of rapid expansion for the coal mining

Domestic production was stepped upand by 1940 had reached an all-time high of

tons, a level more than twice that of 1931.greatest gain took place in Hokkaido where

jumped from 6,134,000 tons in 1931 totons in 1940, when it contributed 26.8

cent of the total output.

Vital dependence on impoHs. As previously noted,imports were essential to the war economy ofproper; the iron and steel industry was es-dependent for coke on the higher gradecoals mined in Karafuto and North China,

quantities of other types of coal wereneeded to meet expanding industrial require-

T.\BLK 2. Coal produclion in Japan prnpi'r, hi/ islands, fisc/tlyears 19SI-J,0

|ln thousands of metric tons)


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by the Japanese to increase production in those areasmet with considerable success during the years im-mediately following, and by 1940 the amount pro-duced had risen by more than 60 per cent above the1938 level to 51,659,000 tons, as shown in thefollowing table

Table 3. Production of coal in Karafuio, Korea, Manckukuoand North China-Inner Mongolia, fiscal years 1938 and 1940.[In thousands of metric tons)

Area


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IVJAPANS COAL POSITION 1941-45

Goternmetit policy and controlsAttitude of the war planners. The (ioursc ofJapanese policy toward coal production prob-

(lurina; the years after 1937 was determined by(iptiniistic gambling attitude of the war planners.

expected that ample supplies of coal would befrom Karafuto, Manchukuo and North

and tended to ignore the realities of thesituation in Japan proper. That resulted in a

avoidance of the drastic measures whichcould have secured the maximum sustained

of domestic coal resources. Not untilin 1944 was the full portent of Japan's weakness

basic material realized, and by then the situa-had deteriorated beyond remedy.70,000,000-ton goal for annual coal productionthe mines of Japan proper had been set as early

despite the industry's protests that 60,000,000was the maximum possibly obtainable under thefavorable conditions which could be expected,

even that contingent upon complete cooperationthe mine operators' demands for labor and

It was explained that such a rate ofcould only be achieved at the expense of

maintenance and development, and by con-on short-range exploitation of the richest

resulting in an inevitable collapse of produc-capacity until the mines could be restored.

in the mining industry voiced a persistentthat officials in the war production agencies

the government and the military lacked theand experience necessary for practical

of the problems of the industry. This chargeto have been fully justified by the policies

the government adoptedor failed to adoptregard to such decisive matters as supply ofmaterials and equipment, and exercise of

to promote rationalization.Coal Control association established. The secondstep in extending centralized control over theindustry after the formation of the Japan

Co. in 1940 was the creation of the Coal Control(SEKITAN T0SF:I KM) in NovemberThe TOSEI KAI supplanted the former cartel-

Federation of Coal Mine Owners, and wasas part of the "Economic New Order"

formulated by the Konoye government in

December 1940. It was given on paper widepowers to encourage efficient practices and to pro-mote rationalization by mergers and pooling offacilities. It set prices to be paid individual pro-ducers under the cost-plus subsidy program, andquotas for operators. A chief function was to act assupervisor in allocation and acquisition of materialsand labor. Although the avowed purpose of theTOSEI KAI was that it .should be the policy-makingbody for the industry, staffed by experienced miningpersonnel capable of expressing the industry's pointof view in counterbalance to the admittedly bureau-cratic ministries, it was in fact never able to exercise adecisive influence on high economic policy, and be-came progressively more of a subordinate executiveagency for carrying out decisions of the CabinetPlanning Board and Mobilization Bureau. Its pres-ident was occasionally consulted on policy, but thepromised authority never materialized. To whatextent this was due to the weakness of the TOSEIKAI's staff is not entirely clear, but it is apparentthat few of its demands or recommendations wereheeded. The harmonious relations between the in-dustry, the bureaucracy and the military which hadbeen the objective in establishing the TOSEI KAIwere never achieved. Interested chiefly in reachingimmediate production quotas, the ministries pressedfarther the short-range policy of extreme exploitationwith the result that mines were flagrantly abusedand the quality of the coal deterio''ated to such anextent that production figures became misleading.Warnings of the mining engineers were passed over.In line with the general policy of favoring end-products industries and the military forces, adequatemeasures to supply labor and materials for coalmining were not adopted.

c. Subsidy program. Government subsidies topermit fixing of coal prices to consumers and toencourage production had been begun in 1938, andassumed increased importance through the war years.Bonuses were paid in accordance with quotas appor-tioned by the TOSEI KAI. Operators submittedestimates of their costs to the TOSEI KAI for six-months periods; these estimates, revised after threemonths in light of actual operating costs, formed thebasis of the cost-plus price established for each mine.Until October 1943, price varied with the grade ofcoal, but thereafter that factor was eliminated, with

15


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an effect on quality which became extremely seriousdespite policinji efforts of the Japan Coal Co. tomaintain standards. Total subsidy paid to producersin Japan proper rose from 48,194,000 in the firsthalf of 1941 to 405,805,000 in the latter half of1944, although during that period productiondeclined11.2 per cent (Appendix Table 19). The extent offinancial inducement given to spur production of the('on\'eniently situated, but low-quality, lignite ofeastern Honshu may be seen in the fact that theaverage subsidy per ton of coal paid to those pro-ducers in the latter half of 1943 was 10.06 whilethat for the far better biuminous of Hokkaido andKjoishu was 4.95 and 7.41 respectively (AppendixTable 20). ^A^len translated into subsidy' per millioncalories, the variation is even more striking (Appen-dix Table 21). It is noteworthj^ thatnotwith-standing the considerable increase in production costsbecause of rising wages and black market pricespaid for some materials and equipmentthe majorJapanese mining companies found wartime produc-tion highly profitable.

2. Japan's Wartime Coal Supplya. Decli7ie of do7nesHc production. After reaching a

peak of 57,309,000 tons in 1940, coal production inJapan proper slumped somewhat the following yearto 55,602,000 tons. During the next two years the.lapanese were able to maintain a fairlj' consistentrate of production only .slightly below the 1941 level.In 1944, however, a sharp drop took place, and thetotal coal mined fell by 11 per cent to 49,335,000 tons.This downward trend continued into 1945, as theamount produced during the April-June quarter,when converted to an annual rate, declined to43,508,000 tons. Thereafter, a disastrous collapseoccurred. Production in July dropped to 2,712,000tons and in August to 1,617,000 tons, or less than20,000,000 tons annually. Data on production byislands disclose that from April 1944 to July 1945Hokkaido's coal output fell 27.6 per cent, Honshu's54.8 per cent, and Kyushu's 43.8 per cent (AppendixTable 8).

b. Causes of decline of -production. (1) Shortageof skilled coal m ining labor. Ranking very high amongthe causes of the decline in production in Japan|)roper in the years from 1941 to 1945 was the criticalshortage of strong, experienced mining labor. Thisproblem was by no means the result exclusively ofwar conditions or government policy, but it wasseriously- aggravated by ijoth.

T.\BLB 7. Coal production in Japan proper by rli.tlrfiscal years 1940-43

[In thousands of metric tons}

1940-HMl -.194219431944

IIIIllIV..

Total1945:

IJulyAugust...

Total

.'\raount n tof total ^"'^"^

15,37815,74715.65615,6473,9073,7043,5583,240

.Amount n ,f...i Percent

1,9731,8551,7521,815

Amount p.,of total P"'33,05531,86230,54431,2957,3446,4527,054

Source: Compiled from data submitted by the Coal Control association (SekitTosei Kai), November 1945. .\ppendix Table 8.

Although the Army and Nav^', as well asplanning boards, professed great concern over thcoal supph', no effective measures were taken tcounteract the movement of essential miners frorthe pits. Not only were skilled and unskilled minencalled into military service without deferment, bueven specialist technicians were drafted for nopspecialist dutj'. A major obstacle to a realistic policiof exemption was the tradition, particularly stronin militarist Japan, that every man is first of all iwarrior.By the end of 1942, an estimated 50,000 minei

had been taken by the Army alone, and this figmincreased by about 10,000 per year in 1943 and 1944During these two years some 4,000 were discharge!for various reasons, but the majority, preferring othework, did not return to the mines. In June 1944, tbArmy issued orders for the release of some 5,00miners from troop units stationed in the home islandsand this number was finally released during the lasfour months of the j'ear under orders to return tmining. In latter 1944, further conscription of toclinicians was halted, and finally, in early 1945, aconscription of miners was ended.

Furthermore, miners were free to leave the minefor more attractive and better-paid jobs in otlifindustries. Various government measures controUin;movement of workers had little effect. In 1939, thRomu Teicho Law had instituted a requirement thaworkers be registered and carry an employment canshowing their occupation, and in 1940 the laboadjustm(>nt law had applied further restrictions tithe hiring and firing of labor. Neither of thcsi

16


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restricted the movement of minors. Coalwages were fixed by the wage control laws

1940-41 and subsequent regulations, and no in-was permitted until 1943, when a 20 to 30

cent rise was granted. These measures werethe jurisdiction of the welfare ministry. In

to maintain an over-all stabilization, it resistedfrom the mine operators for higher mining

and apparently did not appreciate the impor-of preserving the mining labor force intact.of the operators to compensate by fur-

improved living conditions and food werepartially effective.

During 1942 and 1943 a debate on the question oflaborers to work in the mines raged in the

cabinet. The premier and the welfare ministerdemands for more stringent compulsionof fear of the general unrest which mightThe Fujiwara cabinet also sidestepped the

uc.Meanwhile some relief had been obtained by the

of Korean contract labor, which, thoughefficient, contributed importantly to production.Januaiy 1945 Koreans made up 32 percent of thelabor force. Considerable difficulties were also

in the unwilhngness of the Koreans toin a particular mine. The Army was occa-called in to "maintain order", and in general

major incident occurred until the end of the war.were paid the standard wage scale forminers, and supposedly given equal treat-A much smaller number of Chinese and

of war labor was used in some of the mines.By 1944 the coal supply situation had deterioratedsuch an extent that a more serious attempt to

mining labor was made as coal was put on theof "essential" industries. Some dechne in turn-resulted, but the mines had already lost most ofefficient miners. Even then the law was indif-

enforced, and losses to more attractive typeswork continued, in some cases with the connivancethe military who would rob the mines to get laborconstruction of airfields and other installations.this time also, the food production problem

the critical stage and agricultural laborno longer be recruited for the mines.

While drastic compulsory measures to supplylabor were not adopted, ageneral propaganda

based on the patriotic appeal that "coalis also in the front line" was launched. Thisrather flat, but a movement to enlist students as

part-time workers succeeded in adding several thou-sands to the employment rolls.

Thus, while the total of those employed by themining industry increased during the war years, thecomposition of the labor force changed radically.With this went a drop in efficiency, as shown byannual production per worker of 164 tons in 1941 and119 tons during 1944.Table 8. Composilion of coal viiidng labor force in Japanproper as of end of fiscal years, 193S-44


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dpiiionstratpd by the exporionce of the thirteenof the Mitsubishi Mining conipanj-, as analyzed

the following table. Their histoiy is particularly

striking in view of their position in a combine withample financial resources and their close affiliationswith materials and machinery suppliers.

9. Analysis of operalions of IS mines of MitstiMshi Mining Co., in 1940, producing 13.5 per cent of total coal ontiml inJapan proper, fiscal years 1940-43


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time to cnnippiifsatr for the loss in iiiiiiKHliatcwhich would be suffoird during the period

transfers. The most that was accomplished was adiversion of new materials and men to themines.

(.')) Effects of air altuck an cikiI miniixj. Only twoairattack directly on coal mines occurred,

during the final weeks of hostilities. On 31 July1 August the surface installations of the threemines of the Mitsubishi Mining company

the small islands of Hashima and Futago, somemiles southwest of Nagasaki, were bombed.

account of this attack has been found in anyAllied records. These two raids destroyed

powerhouse and damaged or destroyed manybuildings. Loss of power resulted in flooding

pit so completely that there is no prospectits being restored. Production at the other twowas fully stopped, and operations were not

to be resumed for a minimum of fivenths, with full capacity unlikely for a minimum ofyear. Damage to the installations was assessed

12,000,000, loss of production at 10,000,000,loss of workable coal at 1,750,000 tons. Produc-of the three mines had totalled 48,000 tons inand 31,200 in July. The mines offered excellent

and low-level targets, as the installationscrowded on the small area of the islands.

he second example of direct attack was that of themine at Omuta, on the eastern shore of Ariake

in west-central Kyushu.' Here was the largest,one of the most modern, coal developments in

around which was centered a well-integratedsynthetic fuel, and metal refining complex

prime importance to the nation's war production.mines extend far under the sea, and are keptflooding only by continual pumping.

he city of Omuta was subjected to two area in-raids, and the high pressure chemical plants

an HE attack. On 18 June, 116 B-29s droppedtons of IB from 8,000 feet, burning 0.217mile of the built-up area, or 4.1 percent.of power lines halted production at one pit

18 hours and for six hours at the other three.which had averaged 9,643 tons per day

the first 17 days of June, dropped to a dailyof 7,222 tons during the period 19-30 June.On 27 July, a second raid of 124 B-29s bombed the

with 964.6 tons of IB from 14,500 feet. This2.05 square miles, or about 38 per cent, of the

area was destroyed. Surface installations ofAnnex B presents complete available details on these attacks.

flic mines suffered scattered damage, but the mostimportant result was the burning of several powerlines on which the mines depended for pumping.Operations were halted for as long as five da.ys, andwidespread flooding of galleries and e(iuipment re-sulted. Average daily production fell to 3,226 tonsfor the period 28 July-6 August.The two raids resulted in putting an estimated 30

per cent of the galleries out of operation for anextended period.

Spillover of a few 1,000 lb. HE bombs from a raidof 17 B-24s directed at the chemical plants cau.sedminor damage to surface installations and a sliort in-terruption of power on 7 August.The urban destruction from the Omuta attacks had

a large but indefinable effect on the production of themines. Operations were further harassed by the al-most hourly alerts to which the community wassubject during the final days of the war, and by thegrowing restlessness of the large foreign componentamong the mine workers.

c. Drop in imports. Besides the falling off ofdomestic production, an equally serious factor af-fecting the coal position of Japan was the precipitousdrop in imports throughout the war years. Ship-ments from all areas to the home islands, which hadrisen to an all-time high of 10,123,000 tons in 1940,declined to 9,585,000 tons in 1941 and to 8,748,000the following year. During 1943 total imports fell by31 per cent more to 6,029,000 tons, and in the follow-ing year slumped to 3,135,000 tons, a drop of 67 percent from the 1941 level. Detailed figures on war-time imports (Appcnidix' Table 30) disclose the fol-lowing significant facts

(1) In the April-July period of 1944, monthlyimports averaged about 462,000 tons, or an annualrate of 5,544,000 tons. During the rest of the yearthe monthly average dropped sharply, falling to about200,000 tons in the August-December period and to1(J2,000 tons a month in the final quarter. Shipmentsdiu'ing the April-June quarter of 1945 declined stillfarther to about 63,000 tons per month; they thenceased entirely.

(2) All through the war, shipments from NorthChina-Inner Mongolia made up about 50 per cent ofthe total coal imports. Since the very existence of theiron and steel industry depended on coking coal fromthat area, back-breaking efforts were made to main-tain that vital supply line. Yet by 1944 deliveriesfron: North China-Inner Mongolia had skidded to1,515,000 tons, as compared with 4,539,000 tons in1942. The Army, which controlled most of the ship-

19


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ping to and from the continent, urged the iron andsteel industrj' to use poorer coal from Manchukuowhich could move over the shorter, less exposedJapan Sea lanesbut that industrj^ in its despera-tion, preferred smaller quantities of the North Chinacoal.

(3) The importance of Karafuto as a source of coaldeclined steadily after 1941 when exports to JapanProper came to 3,310,000 tons, or one-third of totalcoal imports in that year. During 1943 shipmentsfrom Karafuto dropped to 1,650,000 tons, but stillrepresented 27 per cent of all coal imports. Deliveriesheld up fairly well through July 1944; then theydwindled away to a negligible figure in August andSeptember, and stopped entirely thereafter.Although the Japanese managed to increase coal

output in Korea and Manchukuo during the waryears, declines in Karafuto and North China-InnerMongolia brought total production in the four areasduring 1944 to 5,700,000 tons under the 1941 total.Table 10. Production of coal in Karafuto, Koreji, Manchukuoand North China-Inner Mongolia, fiscal years 1941 and19U-

Iln thousands of metric tons]

Area


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year1,473,000 toiis, (2) production57,309,000and (3) net imports -8,632,000 tons, ainountod

67,414,000 tons. Th(> following; year, liowcvcr,the beginning of th(> downward trend in supply

steadily accelerated during 1942-44 and thenprecipitously in the final months of the war. By

the total supply had dropped to 55,572,000in July 1945, while stocks had risen to 4,036,000production and net imports were eciuivalent toannual rate of only 32,544,000 tons.11. Sum/nary of the coal supply posilioit itt Jujmti

proper, fiscal years 1940-45[In thousands of metric tons]

Period


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of the rear-Honshu ports and impatient withgovernment's faihn-e to take any action, under-on his own initiative a survey of the facilities atports and submitted a comprehensive report of

findings to the government. A translation of hisis available in the survey files. He stated that,

his survey was submitted early in 1944,than a year elapsed before the government took

steps to correct the situation. Bj- that time, ofit proved impossible to assemble the necessary

and, when the war ended in August, nohad vet been accomplished.

Allied air power did not reach the inter-islandlanes until after the start of 1945. Thecollapse in water transportation which

place in the final months of the war did, how-result in large part from highlj- successful

air action. The mine laying program ande anti-shipping forays in the Moji-Shimonosekithe Inland sea, and poi'ts on the Japan sea,

were carried on with (n^er-increasing intensityJN'Iarch 1945, aided substantially in reducingsea shipments from 825,000 tons in April to

tons in July. Particularly hard hit by suchwere the coal shipments moving through thesea from K^iishu. Prior to 1945, such wartime

had held above a monthly level of 400,000Yet during April and JNIay they dropped totons and 260,000 tons respectively and in

sank to 189,000 tons. By that time, even themdustrial center and shipping terminus of

was entirely dependent on the railwaj-s for itssupplies

b. Increasing importance of railway shipments.the problems of sea transportation multiplied, the

resorted more and more to the railwayfor delivery of the coal so urgently needed by

in the industrial centers of Honshu. Thismade possible chiefly by two developments: (1)opening of the Kammon tunnel in Septemberwhich provided the first direct rail connection

Honshu and Kyu.shu ; and (2) the increase innumber of special train ferries between Hakodatesouthern Hokkaido and Aomori in northern

from seven in 1941 to twelve in June 1945.During the fiscal year 1941, of the 7,329,000 tons of

shipped from Hokkaido to Honshu only 13,000by rail, and only 444,000 (by ferry across

straits) of the 13,823,000 tons transportedKj'ushu, for a total of only 2.2 per cent of allmoved from those islands to Honshu. In theyear 1942, during half of which the Kanunon

tunnel was in operation, rail shipments accounted forless than ten per cent of such coal movement. InJune 1945, rail shipments of such coal amounted to54.1 per cent of the total.T.\BLE 13. Inler-islawl coal ^hiijincrds to Honsltu by rail.

fiscal years W^l-^S[In thousands of metric tons]

194.3...1944..-.1945:

April.

From


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in July and August, by sinking the rail ferries,the direct rail traffic from Hokkaido; the

traffic suffered only indirectly as a result ofarea attacks and general deterioration of the

system.

Wartime cousiimpt'iou patterna. Effects of the reduction in supply and the dis-

of transportation. The paralyzing decline incoal supply was clearly reflected in the war

consumption pattern. By 1944, the 47,471,000of coal consumed in that year (excluding the

used at the mines) was 21 per cent below thelevel. During each quarter of 1944 and the first

of 1945, the rate of consumption fell steadily.completeness of the collapse in the coal supply

in Japan proper which occurred in the finalof the war is clear from the fact that thetons consumed in July 1945 represented

about half the quantity of coal used in June 1944approximately one-third less than the amount

in April 1945.14. Coal consumed in Japan proper, excluding theamount used at the coal mines, fiscal years WJfl-^H

[In thousands of metric tons)

Year


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c. Changes in pattern of industrial consum'ption1944, all major consumers, with the exception ofrailways and the industries manufacturing liquidand machinery, were using substantially less coalthey had in 1941 . The following table sets forth

data on the amounts of coal used duringand 1944 by the eight consunier categories whichthe largest in the latter year:16. Comparison of selected major consutners of coal inJapan proper, during fiscal years 1941 and 1944

[In thousands of metric tons]

Industry


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whole fabric of Japan's war production was,stretched far tighter than most Allied strate-

had assumed, and the relationship of th(! coalto the nation's war-making ability was muchthan had generally been believed. Cutting offimports effectively canceled all but a small

ion of the iron and steel industry, regardless offactors; innumerable industries were geared toof coal for fuel and power, either directly orgas; much of the electric power supply wasfrom coal, especially in the dry season. Most

perhaps, was the almost total dependencerailway system on coal for motive power, and,

the dependence of the entire economy onmeans of transportation for production, recu-

and for mobility of stocks in its industrialmanpower reservoirs.

attacks on coalproduction notfeasibleattacks on coal mining facilities would not

jjrovided the most efficient method of effectinga dislocation. In the final months of the war,

over Kyushu did contribute to a drop inby (1) damaging the power supply re-

for essential pumping operations at the MiikeTakashima fields and (2) undermining the moraleefficiency of the workers. By the time those raidsjjlace, however, the cumulative efTect of theproduction factors was already taking its toll.

Japan's coal production capacity involvedseparate minesand destruction of the

installations would have required so pi-ecise an.that any substantial reduction in coal outputmethod would at best have been a long and

undertaking.

vulnerability of coal transportationthe most vulnerable target in Japan's coal

was its transportation. Bj' June 1945, theshortage and the interference with sea lanesalready practically cut off all imports of coal.

Inter-island movement of coal to Honshu by waterroutes had been reduced to only slightly more thanone-fourth of the 1942 volume, resulting in an acutedependence' on railways. Thc^ character of the rail-way system in Japan proper and the fact that all coalgoing by rail to Honshu had to funnel through theHakodate-Aomori rail ferries and the Kainmon tun-nel made this traffic highly vulnerable to Allied attack.A concentrated campaign against Japan's sea andrail transportation system thus offered the logicalmethod of further reducing her coal supply, withresultant general paralysis of industrial activity andvirtual immobilization of her remaining resources.Had such a campaign been feasible operationally,it might well have resulted in an earlier and moredestructive blow to Japan's economy than could beachieved with similar effort in attacks on enfl-products industries.

Appendix Table 1. Coal mined, and reserves remaining, inJapan proper, by fields and type


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Appendix Table 2.-


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Table 3. -Conl minex opened and reopened in Japan proper, bi/ districis and by size of experird uniniid iirodnclion,fiscal years 1.931~44


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Appendix Table 5. Coal production in Japan proper, bymajor companies and associations of minor companies,fiscal years 1931-44-

(In thousands of metric tons]

Major companiesMitsui Mining Co.-Mitsubishi Mining CoH'ikkaido Tanko-kisen CoSumitomo Mining CoUbekosan Co. (Okinoyama)N'ittetsu Mining CoMeiji Mining CoKaijima Coal Mine CoFurukawa Mining CoNippon Mining CoJoban Coal Mine Coiso Mining CoKishima Coal Mine CoYubetsu Tanko-tetsudo CoToho Coal Mine CoKoho Mining CoTaisho Mining CoShowa Denko CoTaiheiyo Coal Mine CoDainihon Coal Mine CoHigashimisoDie Coal Mine Co..Iriyama Saltan Co

TotalPercentage of total production.Associations of minor compani

t^Tosci Kumiai), by districtsKita-kyushuNishi-kyushuYamaguchiTohokuHokkaidoTobu_ - --.Seibu

Total --Grand total...

7.37327,987

1935 1941 1942 1943 1944

5.5043.8733.0591.4511.1541.4501.3021.S70907746

10.07937.762

7,8344.9582.2021.263

1.2041.0071.455

1.0761.6441,853

1.8511.1391.256

9.5777.5845.1792.2281.1731.8191.8821.8701.4S71,542

6.7105.2802.2552.0541.6791,6071,5901,4031.2051.1971.049815742

. Indicates data not i

Appendix Table 6. Summary of the coal position in Japanproper, fiscal years 1931-4-5

|1d thousands of metric tons)

Year


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rioN'Dix Table 9. Production nf coal in Japan proper, hi/10-day periods, April-Seplemher t94n '(In thousands of metric tons)

1,1041,1581,210

nly, constituting more than 90 percent of the

: Compiled by the Coal Control association (Sekitan Tosei Kai), November

Table 10. Production of coking and non-cokingat principal mines in Hokkaido, fiscal years 1940-44

[In thousands of metric tons!

3,39615,378

2,1031.5951,425

2,1651,5971,441

2,71114,409

Ls" indicates that a partciular mine produces some coal of coking quahty; it doesthat the entire output of that mine, as represented by the data given, is cokingCompiled by the Japan, Manchukuo, China Coal federation (Nichi ManshiRemmei), November 1945.

.Ai'PENDix Table 11. Production of coking and non-cokingcoal at principal mines in Honshu, fiscal years 1940-44


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Appendix Table 13. Daily coal production at Miike minesduring period of air attacks on Omida, Kyushu, June-August 19Jf5.

lin metric tons]

Date


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Appendix Table 15. Analysis of changes in coal mining labor force, by type, monthly for fiscal years 1941-44


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Appendix Table 17. Coal mining materiah required, allotted,and acquired by all coal ynines in Japan proper, fiscal years1941-40 K

RequiredAllotted..Acquired.Cement (in thousands of metric tons)RequiredAllotted.Acquired

Required.Allotted-Acquired.

RequiredAllotted..Acquired.

Rare rubber (in metric tons)Required.Allotted-.Acquired

' "Required" is company demands after adjustment by Coal Control association inline with "estimated national supplies of materials."

"Alotted" is amount assigned under Mobilization bureau's periodic plans."Acquired" is amount actually received by mines.Source: Compiled by the Coal Control association (Sekitan Tosei Kai), October 1945-

Appendix Table 18.^ Averq^pe price to consumers of Japanproper coal of average calorific value (6,000 calories), October1940-September 1945.Iln yen per metric ton)

Period


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Table 23. Exports of coal from Japan proper, bi/(tenlinatinn, fiscal years 1940-4''>

[In thimsandfl of metric tons)

AppKNDix Table 25. Coal supply position in the districtsof Japan proper, fiscal years l9Jfl-/iB

Year


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i)ix Table 26. Inter-island movement of coal to Honsh u,by source and type of transportation, fiscal years 1.941-4-^

IIn thousands of metric tons]

Appendix Table 28. Movement of coal from Hokknido InHonshu, by type of transportation, fiscal years 1941-4-''Iln thousands of metric tonsl

Year


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Appendix Table 30. Coal imports into Japan proper, bysource, fiscal years 1939-45

[In thousands of metric tons)

Year


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Appendix Table 31. Coal stocks


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9o= f- IcS'S^l-Sl

38


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198:$

?SSuwo6r"3i3mZ o


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Appendix Table 37. Army coal consmnption in Japan proper, fiscal years 1940-45 ^[In thousands of metric tons]


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Table 40. Allocation of coal m Jtipnndislricls, fiscal years 1943-46

[In thoUHands of metric tonsl


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ANNEX ACoal Position of Karafuto, Korea, Manchukuo, Formosa,

North China-Inner Mongolia, and Central ChinaTABLE OF CONTENTS

I. KARAFUTOTable Page1. Coal supply position, fiscal years 1935-44 432. Planned and actual production of coal, fiscal years 1938-44 433. Coal produced at principal mines, fiscal years 1940-44 444. Coal exports, fiscal years 1939-44 445. Coal consumption, by industry, fiscal years 1935-42 44

II. KOREA6. Coal supplj' position, fiscal years 1940-44 457. Plamied and actual production of coal, fiscal years 1940-44 458. Coal produced at principal mines, fiscal years 1940-44 459. Coal imports, by source, fiscal years 1940-44 45

10. Coal exports, by destination, fiscal years 1939-44 45III. MANCHUKUO

11. Coal su]iply position, fiscal years 1940-44 4612. Planned and actual production of coal, fiscal years 1937-44 4613. Coal produced at principal mines, fiscal years 1940-44 4614. Coal imports, by source, fiscal years 1940-44 4615. Coal exports, by destination and route, fiscal years 1939-44 46

IV. FORMOSA16. Coal supply position, fiscal years 1940-44 4717. Planned and actual production of coal, fiscal years 1938-44 4718. Coal exports, by destination, fiscal years 1939-44 47

V. NORTH CHINA-INNER MONGOLIA19. Coal .supply position, fiscal years 1940-44 4820. Coal produced at principal mines, fiscal years 1940-44 4821. Coal exported, l)y destination and njute, fiscal years 1939-44 48

VI. CENTRAL CHINA22. Coal .sui^ply position, fiscal years 1940-44 4923. Coal imports, Vjy source, fiscal years 1940-44 49

42


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Part IICOKE, IRON AND STEEL

TABLE OF CONTENTSI'qkc

I. INTRODUCTION 02II. THE STEEL INDUSTRY BEFORE THE WAR 02

1. Dcpt'iuleiicc on imports 022. Sources of raw material impoits 033. Steel-making equipment. 034. Expansion plans for steel 635. Success of expansion plans 040. Government controls are applied 007. Steel consumption pattern: 1937-41 00

III. THE WAR PERIOD 071 Steel goes to war 072. Attack on raw materials and countermeasures 683. Too little and too late 704. Capacity versus pi'oduction .' 715. Special steels and ferro-alloys 710. Technical operating difficulties 757. Labor difficulties 708. Administrative conflicts 779. Steel consimiption pattern during the war 77

10. Production without imports 78IV. EFFECTS OF ALLIED ATTACKS 78

1. Steel as a direct target 782. Direct attacks 79

a. The Yawata Works 79b. Showa Steel Works SO

3. Urban area raids 814. Spillage damage 825. Naval bombardment attacks 836. Recapitulation of aei'ial and naval attacks 84

V. VULNERABILITY OF STEEL INDUSTRY TO AIR ATTACK. . . 85VI. CONCLUSIONS 85

1. Significance and characteristics of the steel industry 852. Strategy of the attack 863. Success of the attack 86

LIST OF TABLESTable1. Major steel producers of the world, ingot steel production, 1937 622. Iron ore and scrap iron and steel imports related to consumption, fiscal

years 1937 and 1940 623. Major sources of raw material imports, fiscal years 1937 and 1941 .... 634. Five-year plan for the expansion of capacity of the Japanese iron and

steel industry, fiscal years 1938-42 64

.. . 59


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Table Page5. Stockpiles of iron ore and scrap iron and steel in Japan proper, fiscal

years 1937-41 666. Geographical distribution of 1944 metallurgical coke, iron, and steel

capacitj- 677. Coking coal, iron ore, pig iron, and scrap iron and steel imports to Japan

proper, fiscal years 1941-45 688. Supply of iron ore and requirements for capacity operation of blastfurnaces in Japan proper, fiscal years, 1940-45 709. Metallurgical coke, pig iron, ingot steel, and finished steel production,

Japan proper, fiscal years 1941-45 7110. Percent of requirements of alloying elements available in Japan proper,

fiscal years 1940-45 7411. Ordinary rolled steel workers, and index of annual output per worker,

Japan proper, calendar j^ears 1941-44 7612. Finished steel distribution, Japan proper, fiscal years 194245 7713. Production at Yawata plant, Japan Iron Manufacturing Company,

June-December 1944 7914. Index of post-raid production at the Showa Steel works July 1944-

March 1945 8015. Production losses due to air raids at Showa Steel works 8116. Production lost due to air raids and other causes, Tsukiji plant, Daido

Steel company, Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945 8217. Ratio of production to capacity at the Kamaishi and Wanishi plants of

Japan Iron Manufacturing company compared to the national aver-age, June 1945 83

18. Annual rated capacity, before and after attack, Japan proper 8419. Index of ingot steel production in all plants and in attacked plants,

Japan proper, October 1944-Juno 1945 84

LIST OF CHARTSChaH1. Metallurgical coke, iron and steel capacity and production Japan

proper, Korea, and Manchukuo, fiscal years 1937, 1941, and 1944. . . 652. Production of pig iron, ingot steel, and rolled products, Japan proper

(by months), April 1942-June 1945 723. Ingot steel production by quarters, Japan proper, fiscal years 1942-45 . . 73

LIST OF APPENDIX TABLESTable1. Coking coal imports to Japan proper by source, fiscal years 194045 . . 862. Iron ore imports to Japan proper by source, fiscal years 1931-45 873. Iron ore production by mine, Japan proper, Korea, Manchukuo and

China, fiscal years 1931-45 884. Iron ore, iron sands, and pyrite sinters supply in Japan proper, fiscal

years 1931-45 905. Metallurgical coke production by plants, Japan proper, Korea and

Manchukuo, fiscal years 1931-45 916. Pig iron imports to Japan proper by source, fiscal years 1931-45 917. Pig iron and other iron production b}' plant, Japan proper, Korea,

Manchukuo and China, fiscal years 1934-45 9260


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Table PuKP8. Scrap steel ami iron supply, consumption, and stock piles, Japan proper,

fiscal years 1931-45 939. Ingot steel production by type, Jajian proper, Korea and Manchukuo,

fiscal years 1931-45 9410. Metallurgical coke, iron and steel annual capacity by plant, Japan

proper, Korea, Manchukuo, China, 1937, 1941, 1944 9511. Rolled steel products, annual capacity, Japan proper, Korea and

Manchukuo, fiscal years 1937, 1941, 1944 9012. Finished steel production, Japan proper, Korea and Manchukuo, fiscal

years 1931-45 9(i13. Rolled steel production, by product, Japan proper, fiscal years 1935-45 9814. Finished steel distribution, Japan proper, fiscal years 1937-45 9915. Finished steel distribution, Japan proper, fiscal years 1937-45. (Summary

of table 14) 10216. Finished steel, balance of supply and demand in Japan proper, fiscal

years 1932-45 10317. Ordinary rolled steel distribution in Manchukuo, 1942-45 10318. Foundry pig iron distribution in Japan proper, fiscal years 1937-45. . . 10319. Pig iron distribution in Manchukuo, fiscal years 1943-44 10320. Production of ferro-alloy ores, Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45 10321. Imports of ferro-alloy ores, concentrates, and metals by source and

type, Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45 10422. Production of ferro-alloys, Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45 10523. Production of ferro-alloys, Korea, Manchukuo and Formosa, fiscal

years 1931-45 10624. Imports of ferro-alloys, Japan proper, fiscal years 1935-44 10625. Exports of ferro-alloys, Japan proper, fiscal years 1935-44 10026. Production of finished special steel (alloy and high carbon) by type of

plant, Japan proper, fiscal years 1931-45 10727. Production of finished alloy steel in civilian plants by process, Japan

proper, fiscal years 1940-44 10728. Ratio of coke consumed to pig iron output in selected Japanese iron and

steel plants 10729. Pig iron, open hearth and basic bessemer ingot steel, and rolled steel

products production by months, Japan proper, April 1942-June 1945. 107

61


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INTRODUCTIONOn 15 June 1944, the strategic air assault against

the productive vitals of the Japanese homeland gotunder way. Approximately 67 of the B-29's of theTwentieth Bomber Command from bases deep inCentral China flew 1,400 miles to drop 95 tons ofbombs over the giant Yawata works of the JapanIron Manufacturing company, aiming at the vulner-able coke plants. During the next three monthsAllied plans to cripple the Japanese war potential bythe destruction of the coke ovens of the steel industrycontinued to occupy the valiant, but painfullysmall-scale efforts of our B-29 bomber force in China.

Bj' the fall of the year, the availability of new andlarger-scale bases in the Marianas permitted thewithdrawal of the China-based forces which had beenacing insurmountable supply problems and opera-

tional difficulties. Concurrently, a reevaluation ofstrategic bombing policy resulted in the decision toshift the primary target system from the steel in-dustrybecause by then a considerable cushion ofexcess capacity was known to exist and for otherreasonsto the airci'aft, oil and other end-productindustries, and the urban areas. From that timeimtil the naval bombardment of the Wanishi andKamaishi steel plants in Northern Japan in July andAugust 1945, the steel industiy was not the primaryobjective of any air raids. However, the incendiaryattacks against urban areas including industrial con-centrations, rising to a crescendo in the summei' lif1945, resulted in some damage to steel plants and toa minor extent affected steel production.

II

THE STEEL INDUSTRY BEFORE THE WAR1. Dependence on importsJapan long ago recognized that its undeveloped

industry was the principal obstacle in the wayrealizing its ambition to become a major industrial

ation and to rate as a world military power. Inas recently as 1937 it ranked near the foot of the

ist of the chief industrial countries of the world iningot steel production, as shown in Table 1.T.\BLE 1. Major steel producers of the world, ingot steel

production, 1937IId millions of metric tons]

Country


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The geographical location of the steel industryJapan proper reflects this dependency uponand sea transport. Initially, plants were

in relation to sources of domestic raw materi-The Kamaishi plantthe first established in

(1874)was located close to the northerniron mines; the Yawata plant (1901) wasclose to Kyushu coal, and the Wanishicompleted during World War Iwas located

to Hokkaido coal and iron ore. As the industryand imports became indispensable, new con-

t rations sprang up in the seaports of Centralnear to the steel-consuming centers of Kobe-Nagoya, and Tokyo Bay.

The paucity of suitable domestic coking coal andore, the two most necessary raw materials for thefurnace, account for the heavy Japanese reliance

scrap instead of pig iron in the making of steel.was the usual practice in the prewar period to useratio of scrap to pig ironor even higherinopen hearth steel furnaces and almost all scrap inelectric steel furnaces. However, as Japan wasin its infancy, so to speak, in the use of steel, the

or installed, amount of steel from whichannual supply of scrap could be obtained was

small. So, imports of scrap, which came mainlythe United States, were essential.

Japan has always relied on foreign sourcesmost of its ferro-alloy ores. Although productiondomestic manganese, tungsten, chromium, and

ores was increased markedly betweenand 1941 (Appendix Table 20), that was not

to provide for the country's expandingAccordingly, the prewar ferro-alloy require-

of the Japanese steel industry could only beby substantial imports of molybdenum, nickel,

vanadium, chromium, cobalt, and man-ores and concentrates.

This lack of domestic raw materials, then, madeJapanese steel industry almost completely de-

upon water-borne imports. In modernterms this can be characterized as high

to economic strangulation by blockade.Sources oj raiv materials imports

major prewar sources of the bulk raw materialsthe steel industry in Japan proper are shown in

3 below and in Appendix Table 21 for theNorth China supplied almost all the

coking coal96 per cent of the imports inAfter the iron ore shipments from Malaya and

the Philippines were stopped by economic embargoin 1941, China (including Hainan Island) also becamethe largest supplier of iron ore. Manchukuo, withits natural njsources under Japan(ss(; control and(exploitation, had a growing steel industry of its ownand therefore was a noteworthy source of pig ironand some ingot steel. The steel industry of Koreawas much less significant, but some pig iron andincreasing amounts of iron ore were provided toJapan. The United States was the principal supplierof scrap iron and steel to Japan before the war.Table 3. Major sources of raw material imports, fiscal years1937 and 19^1

[Expressed as percentage of total i


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tax concessions, subsidies and tariff protec-Later the government promoted cartels and

transportation important to the steel in-These policies succeeded in increasing ingot

production to 1,883,000 tons in 1931.Following the 'Manchurian Incident' in 1931,

greatly accelerated the expansion of all heavyadmittedly to provide the backbone ofdefense. All of the plans for expansion

two goals: (1) over-all expansion of capac-and production and (2) self-sufficiency withinJapanese sphere of influence. First, specific

in the steel industry took place in the creation1934 by the government of the Japan Iron Manu-

company by compelling the merger of theleading concerns. This new steel giant was

76 per cent owned by the government, andits inception reflected the policy of the govern-and acted in its name.

Second, the Iron Manufacturing Industry LawSeptember 1937) provided for the licensing

iron and steel producers and for government direc-of all expansion in the industry. Colonel SATO,of the Military Affairs Section of the War

has commented on that law as follows:Whereas the puipose of steel controls had hitherto been the

fostering of the industriahsts' interest, the newly. . . law had as its primary object the rapid expaasion

steel producing capacity and the creation of a self-sustain-steel industry . . . entering upon a period of military

The primary production expansion plan, formallyin January 1939, was the Cabinet Planning

embodiment of detailed plans for strengthen-the critical industries. In it the expansion ofcapacity was given top prioritj'. The period

by the plan was five years, from 1938 throughIts scope is shown in Table 4. Pig

USSBS Report 36, Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy

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