USSBS Report 77, Reduction of Truk

8/3/2019 USSBS Report 77, Reduction of Truk

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THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

THE REDUCTION OF TRUK



· THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

THE REDUCTION OF TRUK

NAVAL ANALYSIS DIVISION

FEBRUARY 1947

F o r : 5 !I ! c b , 1 ), e S!lp~l;'i!lc,endll',[uQ(Doi;ume.rLu;t U~S~GO! ~fnm!1U Pri . cu: i l : l l l Offi~

W l i I . .! i h i ,p , 0 1 : 1 2 ,! D . C . P ric e 3 0 c en t! :



This report was written primarily £01' the 1I e of the U. S. Strategic Bomb-ing ux 'veyin ths preparation "O f further reports of a more comprehensivenatUre. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be eon-sidered a l imited to the speci fic mater ial covered and as subject to fur therin erpretation in the l igh of fur ther tudi - conducted by the 'm·vey.

FOREWORD

The 1 . . : uited tntes Stl"l ltegic Bombina Surveywu estublished by the Secretary of Wil l' on 3 No-vember 1944,purSlltlut to a directive from the lutePresident Roo sevelt. Its mission was to conduct

an impartial and expert stu ely of the effec t of 0111'

aerial attack Oil Germa uy, to be used in connectionwith air attacks onJapan and to establ ish a basi sfor evaluating the rmportance and pot ntialit iesof nil 'power as an Instrument of military trntegy

for planning the future development of the UnitedStates armed forces and lOI determining futureeconomic policies with respect to the national de-

fen e. .A snmmary report Ilmdsome 200 support-in" reports containing the findings of the Surveyin Germany have bean published.

On 15August

19 5,Pl 'esident' Truman re-quested that t tle Survey conduct IIsimilar- study

of the eff ects of all types of air attack in the waragainst Japan, submi ting reports ill duplicate

to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of

the Navy. The officers of the Surv y during its

,J!tpaue.e phas wen):

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman,

Panl H. Nitze,

Fleury C. Alexander,

Vice Chairrneu.

ILUTY L. Bowman.

J. Kenneth Galbraith,

Rensis Likert,

Frank A. McNamee, Jr. ,

Fred earls J,'.,:Mollroe E. Spaght,

D,·. Lewis R. Thompson

Theodoi- P. 'Wright,Directors,

Walter Wilds. Secretary.

The Survey's complement provided for 300civilians, 350 officer, and 500 enlisted men. 'fhemilitary segment of the onranlxntion was drawnfrom the Army to the extent of 60 percent endfrom the Navy to jhe extent of 40 percent. Boththe Army and the , ;Tavy gnve the l lrvey all pos-

sibl assistance in furnishing men, suppli trans-

port, and information. The urv y operut d

from headquarter establi hed in Tokyo early ineptember 11)45,with ubheadquartars illNagoya,Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and with mobile

teams operating in other parts of Japnn, theislands of the Pacific, and the A intic mainland.Itwns possible to reconstruct much of wartime

Japanese military planuing and execution, n-

gagement by ngageme.nt and campaign by earn-

paign, and to secure reasonably ac urate statist icsOil Jnpan's economy and war production, plant by

plant, and industry by industry. In addition,studi were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-

t gic plans nnd the background of her ntry intotbe war , tha internal diseu ion und negotiationsIeading to her acceptance of un ondit ionnl sur-

render, t .h COUJ'se of health :1 . nd moral e amorur theei\ 'i lh~. population, the effectiveness of the Jap-anese civilian defense orgnnizatiun, and the elIl'Ctsof the atomic bombs, Separate repor ts wil! beissued covering each phase of the tudy,

The urvey iuterrogated more than 700 JIlP-anese military government, [mel industrial om-

cials, Italso recovered and tranalated muny docu-ments which not only have b n useful to the ur-

vey, but also will furni h data va luable for otherstudie s. Arrangements have b en made 0 turn01 r th Survey's files to the Central Inte.lligellceGroup, through which they will be.uvnilabla forfurther exarnination and distribution.

III



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PUt

I. INTaODUC'I'ION "" __ " " ""_ _ __ _____ _ 1

II. RlSTOltY, STRATECW IMPORTANCE ANP D);JVELOPMEN'I' OF TRUX

PJ!UOIl TO TlU l FmST ALLU)]) A~ACK___ _____________ ____ 2

III. A'LLIE]) CA!oIPAlGN ACMNsT TRUX • .. "_ _________________ 11

IV. PllYBICAJ" DAMAGE AND AREA STU])Y," " _" • " __ 17

vv



1. INTRODUCTION

III ordur to Ilmlre I< com preheusi ve report 011 the

reduc tion of ' f1 '111 , it wus necessary to a em-

hle infOl' Il 'Hl tiol l on (1) the hi l:ol"Y and mseitu-

rions of 'I'ruk, (2) the mission and planned em-

ployment of the military facilities and armed

forces based there lJ) the part of this base actu-

lilly playe I in carrying out the Imperial General

' tu ffs over-a ll s t, l'Utegy (4) All ied and Japf l,ne~e

reports and infomiutinn of attack und defen ~

measure , ami (5) P. tudy of th island installa-

tiOI1S-)lOt only to record bomb damage, bu also

to catalog the installations on 'I'ruk and to assess

the il ' valne to the Japanese war el l' or t,

This information w a s o bt a in e d by an a.xaminn-

I

on of Japanese records,by

(waln;)ting writtenI'~[ )l ie s to speci fi c que , t ions asked of importun t

Jnp:me~e Army, N,wy, and civil govemment offi-

cials , and by the findinzs of a Survey team whi ·h

personally toured Truk's hrgel' j lands and tnd-

lad the h i tory and. condi tion of Jnpauese n irfi el rl s,

'buildings, installations, and facilities Iocated

thereon,

At ali times he Japllllese were 1110, t coopern ive

in complying with the many demands; the meager

records ramair. ing after the bombings were readily

given 1lp' th~y diligently worked nigh and duy to

prepare all written information requested; and

t il ey answered < l.veryquest ion a ked them dur ing

orul interrogations. Th y behaved in !1 . fort~u'ight

arul honest manner ut al l t imes, al though admi t-

tedly they did not have mnny records available

for reference and as u result found it difficult at

time to recall axaet dates or i ncidents, When rec-

ords were not availabl t.h y readily gave their

ow n p e rs on a l opinions. All ill n11, it is believed

that ths l'o were few .if any attempts on the part

.o f 111lY high Japanese ofl ie in ls de libe l'nle] y to rle-

ceive question I~ or to witholt l infor rnation.

This report consists of two major pal s :

(1) J . . \ . narrative covering tbehistory, strategic

importance, and d valopment of Truk prior to III

F bruarv 1944 an account of Allied operations

',,jfecl"ing ], reduction of 'I'ruk, und the urv ...yof

~l l ·e.n .da . tT Inge .

(2) Enclosure, annexes elc .. which conbn i n

the sour 'e mat rial £01' til primary narrative.

Contain d also iJl thi s se . t. ion a re numerous inter -

estinrr details on other combat action lind milch

information rega,r,(ling general strategy of the

Imperial General ta If obtained durinc I ;he many

interrogation and discu aons with the seniorJapanese Army and :fa,'), officers, Till informn-

tion is not incorporated in the narrative because

of its negative value as regardsth reduction ')£

Truk, but it is, ubmitted under sepnrutecovar ns "

supplementary repor t.

Early history of Truk i almost entirely lackine

because th r eems to have been little prewar

activity ut this supposed stronghold. and no in-

formed ,individuals remain' whose knowledg« ex-

tends back to thnt period, El'lm the history of

the early duy of til WIll" is vague and wa ob-

tained in a I IJJ :gemeasure fr om the hea rs ay knowl-

edge of the JU'punese statioued Oi l Truk ut the

war's end, The story ,I In -e ented in thi s r eport

represents the most accurnt IlI'niJnhle account of

the subject and is sub tuntin lly COITect .

Truk's Ill; ion, while conceded to be 1\ rlefenaive

one is too intimately a sociat ed with the chauzine

fortunes of th orgnniaat ious wlrich O}> I 'l l (1 Itt

01' from Truk to permit the expre ion of a hard

and fast opinion 011 the ubject,

1



11, HISTORY, STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRUK PRIOR TOTHE FOOT AllIED ATTACK

General Descripuou and History

TI'uk, known as the Jupunese Pen rl Harbor,

came under Japanese conrrcl in lOl .J" shortly n [tel'

World War I begun. Aftel' the J~pnllru;e Nll"Y

seized I).U of the C~lItrnl Pac ii e i slunds exeep i

Guam, Jnpnn insiste(l, ut the Vel'" '' i l les Confer-enee · O J f 192'2, that !l\(\Sl! islands be bel' right f\1I1'O>"

sessi ens ns 'ifas agreed in a S!'C ret t reo ty \ \ 1 ' thF I' Dn cc a nd . Englnnd, H ow lw er . J np an 'HIS 00111-

palled to accept rhe islunds under a mnndnte

I'ather than us an outright. possession. Tnder

terms of the !IlnndntJ l. Jnp"l l was r equi red to IC-'

part !'Ilgul:trl,r- to t .beLenglle Df X .. nons concern-

illg thei re i s lands and to l't'fl'U in f roru fal 't i" fying

them, Fo!' OJ . t ime Japenobse rved tbese re su-ic-

t ions and e"lll lnpon withdrawing from the League

apparently made no nttampt to fortily Truk al-

fhough at the same l ime she mnde everv effort to

develop ,1large Na"y which would use Tl. 'uk ns its

advanced base.

At t he o rr tb re n k of h o sr il jt ie s, n n \ " 11 1m a n esti-

mated 'I'ruk to be th e sh'ongest ]1;1\ '111base il l t ll e

Paci fi c wi th the !.:xcaption of Pearl Harbor, H

this is true, natural defense~ and not rnan-madeiortifieatiolLS made it so, The T1'1Ik grou p is a

cluster of U~ i sl an ds l yi Jl :; ! within" lagoon up-

proximntely 40 miles in diameter. This lagoon

is formed by a coral red roughly 140 mill'S in cir-

curnference, Encom passed by t hi s reef is 011e of

tha best natural :mr:hQ!"gesin tbe world.

Actna lly, man-made fort ifi cat ions could have

improved Little on the work of natll~e. TheJ'e is

no need for conorete for tiIiet lt iolls where alre:"dy

s to l le c l if fs ri~elnmdr ... ls of foot inl.o ll'e n;r: tJ..ie!:'"

is no llB<ld for n ~a wnll wilen Il "oral reef. with

only l ive n a v -igable p l l S 5 e S , will serve the ' same

purpose, especially \~nel11'igh islands guard eachof the pas ses, When tbe reef does brl.'nk the

sudnce to fo tn! s .m n 1 1 i s II In d s i ts l 1l !f l p o l 'U ; n l' e 15

feet high along the 0 IItel' edge. an d po It11(1ng

swell~ would dl'h,c inl '" ,l ir ll!: nssnnlt bottls to de.

s tt u ct i OD ug a. i Jl s t is 1."11if~·li1;:e C(} l-U I. rill;-i rle the

lagoon Truk's perfect "alllnI anchorage could

nccommodute tlle ellt ire ,J"rail""" Jile"t, nlthOlwh

even SlI llIU-boat nuvigutioD. without accurate ~d

complete ch"rts, is hn7.llnlolt.s bel:au.!'e of eorul

beels, Thus, it mny be seen that wit.hout uny im.

2

provement, whether to the nu t tJ rn l defenses or, to

the nuehomgc, Tmk was un e x c el l e nt find formid-

uble naval bose,

Naval Importance

AlthollgI , ' I' rnk was potentiullj ' one of [he grel1t·

e st naval buses in t Il e Paci fi e, All ied ava lunt ionInl'gt'ly overmted its strength and hcili ties. Vice

Admiml Harn, the last commllmler in chiot of tho

Fourth Fleet. staled thHt Japun's policy was to

put its limi led budget into a Inrge mobile Ileet, 1I11l1

Dot into defensil'e instullafions. To build Truk

into a fi rst -clns s nnrn l bnso wot lld have involved

/-''''CI't eX}lllnSe in ti le construction of piers , a r}'docks , power p lu u ts , r "p ll .i r shops of sui ta hIe size,and alm'l1ge space for the mau. )' requ irements of"

lnrge, modern (teet, Ordy to a Jim i ted degree was

this accomplished and, Sll rprising1y enongh, it

was not unt il long' after the wur sta rted that' I' ruk's peak of development was reached.

The Four th F lee t WIIS ol'gnnizccl on 15 Novein-

be r 19S!), and was chmgsd with the mission ofpl-01e<<ting the manda ted ,~In :l lds a rea , To do thi s

" f leet .base was necessary nnd 'I'ruk, located i ll the

center of the mandated uren W Id contair ring its ex-

rellent.nll.tllt'lll [m(o]lol'llge,was the logical location

for Fourth Fle,- t l ieudquur ters , Und<ll' command

of the Fuurth Fleet W!lS the Fourth Bnsa Foree'tlt Truk, controll LU g naval gnl 'l 'isous and instnlln-

t ions in a11 the Caro line Is lands, the Fi ft .11 Base

Furce. "t Slli pun con tro ll ing t il l the j\,{n:t'imllls Is.

l auds, and the Si xt h Base Force at Kwaj nl eill con.

troll i ng the 71·ial'slm Il s, Af t.n ' the Gilbe rt Islands

we!'c oC()t!pie<lby tJw Jnp91!eSe ( lnl' ly ill 1942 the

Third SpecinI Buse Foree, under tIll, Foul'll. Fleet,

wus set "I' at TurnWIl and "lSI) gflrrillOllcti -Wnke.

Naul'u, aJld OePIlH Islmu:k -A.ft!!], tIn" FOOllth Fleet W[IE orglUli~ed at Trll.k;

thc Hn l ', ., l c o n" tnm tiol1 dlll'nrtm,mt commellcl)d

Imilding with plans fOl 'a sealJInll(l base und beili.

li~s til rel'l~l1i~h n rlppt at a.nC]lOl', Th~\'e \Vel'llonly

'1,000 lliell III the construction depllttmen t I tt the

be,!!:iJning of i l s ope rn t ions , bl lt u t I he outbre ll l,

<IfIhe Will" tbe fm'Cc.was i.ncreased to 10,000, This

departmellt handled all of the !>cmst: l ' l Ic tiol l ot

fortificutions, bllildings, lind engin!lllring facilitiesfor the Na"y,

The fnei li ti (lS of the llIL1'n.1 base were very Iim-

ited up to Lbe bBgim:ring o-f the Will', As fur !IS

eau be determined, Truk WM only an anchorage

ill which the .fiellt could obtain limited replenish-

ment. The supply deparunent was not in opera-

tion unril December 11)40, and did not reach its

peak until th@ l ntter purt of 1943. Since there

wet 'l l no piel's which would accommodat e hn-ge

ships, nor enough cranes to handle stores in quan-t ity, goods were slll,lttled between ship nnd shoreill manual ly loaded sumpuns and barges. Fueling

pi'esented t.hs same problem. Although thet.·e

were about GC.l'lindl'lcal fuel stomge tanks total-ing roughly 49,000 tons cnpacity on Dublon Is-

lund, there was only 0. single pier equipped "for

loading t he bel barges which serviced tile ships at

anchor, Before the f irst Uni ted S tdtes carrierstrike 0)1 ' l'ruk in February 19M, there was a tot.'],l

of about 50 sampllJlS, ten 15·ton tugs, t hree BOO-

ton tugs, one 600· to .n tug , 3 water lighters, 3 fuelbarges of 500"( :.0n eapnci ty Q) less and abo II 17

small yard craft, At this period 'I'ruk had

reached i .t s peak of ubi lity to service a full grown

f l ee t ,

The Jnllam,se never llittl intended t o use TrukItSa major repair base for the [teet, since the cos t

ofdl'ydock 'facilities and heruvy repair instn 1Ia-

tions would have been too grea t for J"'Pan '. s Iim -i ted budget. This was especially true because theshallow t'oof surroundingeach island ill the atollcreated all expensive engineering problem ill theeonsn-uction of adequate piers and docks. In the

ear ly d:J .Y5of the wu I·, mpair CII ,P aci t y was t- w 0

destroyers und abe II fh'e subch ns er type ves se ls

Qt!l.lly one time, Repair work was augmentedby

r epni r sh il ls and te:nc1!1rs stnt ioned in tbe hm'bor,

but they never were ablo to handle !T In jor c1a .moge,

Repai rs beyoml T l'uk 's cnpnbilities Wel'e sent toyards in the home isl ll llds ,

At . the heigh t of i ts act i" ity ther e were .70 l 'epa il -

. 1 1 O p S ill oPlll'rution en Tl. 'l lk, with attendant fa·cili·

ties sllch liS small rnnri .t le rail ways UI) to 35 tons;

one 2,500-ton floating dl'ydock whiClh was im-

p O , l ." t ed f , - o - m Japnll il l 1941; 0 1,000 -kw, ger,erQ-

tOI'; a l'6pnll' ship with Cl'1tilej amI a gener ator

ship which aI'l'ivec1 ill Trull: in 1943. Only 1,000

pel'Sonll el were omployed in the r~pfiil' Ylll-ds.

Though llllllletOu8 cliscrepa.ncies ha ve been 101md

i n the coml,i1ation of duhl on t1,e tepn i..u.cilities,

it can b~ Blll'mised tlmt a lo. l'gc - fleet nt "Ill' wOlllcl

find 'l'ruk lacking in the necessary facilities to

keep thut fleet operating at full streagth,

Naval Defense

Unt il the end 011940 t l. 1e re were no actual forti-

f ications at. 'I'ruk, In November 1940 a dafsnse

unit o·f 850 men, under command of the Fourth

Fleet,. was astublished to man the fell' guns then

being installed, Among the ikst guns ins ta .l led on

Truk were five or six 1895 Sino-Japanese 5·1nehto G·inch guns, which were Iocated for coast . de -

fanse on the i slande of 'Pol, Moen,a.nd Uman.There were four twin-mount, dual purpose, anti-

aircraft 12,7-cm, ship guns mounted o n Dublonand Eten. Eleven S·cm, surfaes guns were placedar ound the reef islands near ti le ohannelentrences.

These, with two B·em, nntial1'Crnit and 'various

25·mm, and 13-mrn, machine guns on Fafan and

Ete.llcom p rised the defensive fortifications of

Truk before the WILl', and although construction

of these gun emplacements was started in 1940

i~ is doubtful if 1m)' were ready for use before the

end of 19U, When Rabaul was taken by theJapanese, the guns then nt 'I'ruk were moved to

Rabaul, but these were Inter replnced! by gun£intended for Rabnnl,

In November 1941, six naval patrol craft ar-

rived and were attached to the defense unit, Dur-

ing 1942, mine layers and mine sweepers came in,aut! in April of that year the personnel of the

defense force WIlS increased to 1,460 men.

In prepara tion for an expec ted A.l li e.d invasion

the army moved into Truk fo r t il e fi rst t ime in Jan-

uary 1941, It iminediataly started the construe-

lion of pillboxes and beach defeuses, and set up

Wiles of defense and n plan to repel any lrulding

assault; however, the lIn.vy mll.lllled £lIld wain·

tained the large coas.t-def(ll'ls!I bntteries and nll.anti.

aiI'CI'Uitgnlls, At this time a In.l'ge i=re liSe in the

n \tmber of coas t de: feu&e guns was made when in·stallations WeI'e stm·te(l on 12·cw, 15,5 em, !IUd

four 20·mm bat.Lel 'ies , These WEll'll located on the'

wuin hlullrls of Tl'ltk, and dllring the spring of

that yen I' all of the red i slnl1d but te ri es wer e

moved into mor·a protected positions on the m'ain

islands, Between December 19!1:3 and the end of

Lhe Will', auti,rUl'cl'aft emp lacements. weI'll installed!

in qmlJlt il-y, Thill'll were 80 positioll5of 25-=

rn!lchine gl1l1Sand twl ITl ty 12-clll guns. Other guns

of smaller caliber wm' e b.st ul led during the same

pel'iod, but ill lesser numbers,



Durin g this period the nll<1>'y~statsd to prepa re

home-made be r ub L aunch e rs n n d_ installed rocket

launchers impor ted from Jn.PILIl.

Torpedo boar s wer e nnothar ~ iI~ment in the de-

femse ·of Truk, Stations wara placed on lfooL1,

Uman, Udot (not complet ed), and Tol Islunds,

The boats were slow lnnding craft with OM tor-

-pedo urtaehed to each side, In conjunction with

t l l C l S 0 Were eight s.tations for "one-mull torpedoes"which were mtended fur lim in surpri se n ight Ilt-

t ack on e ne my sh ip s, w hi ch might na.ve I\J1.chGl"Cd in

the lagoon. _

Detectorc oils nn d r ui ne s g l l. fL t xl .e , t tbe reel

pusses. (A descriPtiou of ilie one-man torpedo

. .nd i ts ope ra tion and the detec tion devices i s con-

tained in the Physical Damage and Area Study

in All!!ex I to EDclOro"lIDl. and in Inter rogation

No. 13----Anue" I E nc lo s n re . . : 1 . . ) .

Truk, as may be seen from the forego ing, actn-

ally "'lIS not strongly Iortifiad until19ibl, TIt~ sit-

uation at Trull : wa s- w e l l described by Vice A.dmi-

rnl Ha rot whom he said that he would l isten to the

Americrrn radio proclaim Truk the impregnable

bastion of the Pacific" and t hen he would becomeIIpprehensi ve thn t the ITnited Stat6!! migh t learnthe .real truth.

Naval Operations

The operations of the Jap!lIlese Fleet in and

around Tr-uk ware quite extensi va CO ns ider ing the

lack of favorabla f ac il it ies in the harbor, The

combined f l ee t operated outo! Truk from July1942 unt il Febrl ll lry 19ibl . This fieet was com-

posed ·of ships of the F ir st , S e co nd , and Thh. . : l.

F lee t s and the Sixth Subwilrin.e Fleet, and con-

tained approm atel y :I or 4 battleshi ps, 4001"l"iern,

12c.l 'uisers, and destr :oyers 'of the Second Escor tForce,

The combined f leet , undercommand of Admiral

Yamilmoto whose Jln.gsJtip was th e MWiash i , oper-a ted between Truk and Babaul , r etur ning to Jap!lll

. for drydoclring, overhaul, Dud personnel replace-

ment. InTrnk the f lee t repleni shed and rested a t

unehor. After Admiral Yamamoto was killed,

Adminl Koga took command of the combined

f leet , retaining the YIL$rJI;kj, as flagship.During the American invasion of the Gilbert

Islmuls 11 part of the combilled fleet steamed to

Kwajnlein., but fearing Americil n Cil.rder (Lir

power l' eturnedlllmost immediateJyl: o Thuk.

United St. .' ltes submarine activity betwwHI Truk

4

and the Empire bad been increasing and w.as

soriously h inde ring the f low of f uel and ~l1ppl i~

to Tl"uk. By the end of 1943, when ' I' ruk s ~Jh)'S. l.

cal d\!NelopIllWlt wus at its ' IC lI ' lO, lJle resrockiag of

s up pl ie s n "Om the Empire ha d become a s er io us

problem,

On 4 February 1944, u .- single Amer ic ILn PB4Y

(Marino) f lew high over 'I'.l'uk on 0. photographic

mission; his event W!lS recognizlld by the J!tpa-nese as It-warning not to be ignor ed . ItmotivatedAdmiral Kogu. 's doois ion to move his fleet awily

f rom the threut, of Atull ri can u ir power and int i-

dentally to <1 better source of suppl y, In the

m e an t ime, tho AmeriC!lllS had moved into the

lI.frll'Slmll Islands with II gten t car ri er st riking

foree, Truk "-IlS s tronger thall it hnd ever been,

but s ti ll thi s W:lS not enough to puotect the Japa-

nese fleet, On 10 Febru!!'ry the combined fleet

st~"'mOO:out of Truk for Palau , and f rom the re it

split up; part of it W6Ut to the Philippines, part t o

Singapore, and the M'I4r J1;h i proceeded to Yoko-

suka , J apan . A eons ider eb le number of mer chan t

sh ips wer e f orced to rema in at Truk because of [L

shorta, ,"1! of fuel and wl1t!>,r, and because of highwinds which delayed tlleir unloading. Naval ac-

t iv ity fr om Truk almos t ent ire ly cea: sed !IS of that

date, with the exception of operations by Hie Sixth

Submarine Fleet.

Tn order to comple te the p ic tu re of naval ope ra -

tiollS lip to the time of the first ail' attack on Trull:

it is necessary, at this point, to daseriba briefly

Japlll ll ls II submarine activit ies in the 'I'mk area.

Before the war Tl'uk was not a submarine billie;

in fact t i lll only submarine base in the manda ted

j sl~l ldE area was loca ted a t KwajaJ. eiu, a lthough

j ll st p rior to 16June 1944 the Seventh Submarine

Flot il la , which hod headqnarters a t Rabau l, ope r-

ated a submarine tender, the Jingei, in Truk.This tender serviced hut a. few old shol't.-rl1nga

cmft used only f01' obseevl1tion.TI·uk's subma-rine act ivity did not begin until the Sixth Sub-

marine Fleet, organized in Japan on 15M!l .y 1942

arrived at Truk on 16 ,June 1942, Tr~ w m :equipped merely to service eubmarines but not

to rep?i r. them j :wd e from tbi s only a torpedo

r ep leni shing st~t lOn and two torpedo I ld jus. ting

shops wern provided, CrelVli could l 'eLo.xnCfl l·e.~tcamp on Dubion IsID.ud between Will' patrols.

The Sixtb Flee t inai llded subma.l"iJ-les of 2000

and .3,000 tons n .nd poss ib ly a lar ger tYl le :whlch

CIlI"I'letl ubser vat lon senp1anes . Oper at ions wer e

conducted from Au.strdia to Hawaii an waters and

possibly between Hawaii Imel the west coast of thnUnited Sl; .ates,

Th.e submnr ine,sel '\ 'icing base on Du blon Island

employed 130 ' per-sons, arid handled only 22 tor-

pedoes a week. There were two adjusting 8hOl)S

fo~ torpedoes, and submarines could replenish

t o c l 1p n i :: - i~ y hom these shops wi thout unloading

IIny of their remaining torpedoes to be adjustedon s110r6, SiIlGBno submarine pens were provided

on Truk, submnrines weI'!! expected to submerge

and Jie on the bottom fo\" protection during air

attacka, Aite!' the cartier attack in Fehrul):ry

1944,although the torpedo shops were not hit,

excava.tion was st arted with the view 1:,0 plrHlhlg

t hem undel'ground, but this project. was not corn-

pleted until July 11)45. InApl'il1944 carrier at-

t ack, 40 per cent of the bui ld ings l l ..nel25 per cent of

the torpedoes wel"e destroyed,

Submarine operations wel'e greatly reduced at

' I'ruk by the fuel shortage caused by United States

submarine activity and by the destruction of tlie

supplies during carrie" strikes. and subseq ueut

haavy bomber raids, Long range patrols werestopped, and ill the spring 0']' 1944 t be Sixth Sub-

marine Fleet moved to Saipan, The Seventh

Submarine FlotilJlt moved . from Rabaul to 'I'ruk

when the o ld Sixth F lee t was l iquida ted I1t the frtll

of Saipan an d a new Sixth Fleet was organized in

.J apllJl. Thera were only ubont six ships in the

Seventh Submarine Floti lla and they carried out

observations on Uhthi unt il the fiot il l!L W!'IS dis-

solved in S~ptember 1944. The dates of these op-

erations were confused in. the minds of those

inter rogated, butone Japanese claimed that sub-

marines of the Seventh Flot il la , car ri edou t at tacks

on United States ships during the landing at Sai-

pan. This would indicate that this squadron was

moved from Rabaul to Truk very shortly Il;fterthe Sixth Fleet moved out.

Air Bases and Installations

Since Truk was a nav il l base, its air iustallntions

and facil it ies were constructed and operated by the

Japanese Navy, The history of their develop-

ment, and of the vurious organ i : !l at ions of the naval

u,il' force which opera t ed f ro.m them., is limited by

the lcs s of I' Il aords and by the nonavaUabiIi ty of in.

formed perron1l61. The entire island group h.ad

11toto. ! of tbree ILis tl 'j ps, one se!tplu:ne bose".and

OUB combined iiI'strip and seaplane ba.se. The

airstrips were Eten Field, on Eten Island; Moen

No, 1 on the northwest tip of Moen 'Island j endParnm Fieldon Pnram Island. Moen No.2,

the combined seaplane. b as e a nd l ig M .e r stri p, WIlS

located Oil tho southern end of ~loen Island, and

the main seaplane base on Dublon Island.

Work had b e en started Oil cleu,t'ing t r ees for a

lighter strip on MesagOIl, one of the outer I'eel

islands, and soma work accomplished in convert-ing the apron at Dublon seaplane base into an air-

strip, On Dublon, adjacent to the seaplane base,

was an aviation repair and supply installation

known iIS the One Hundred and Fourth Naval AirArsenal. Descriptions of these air facil it ies arecontained in Annex II to Enclosure (A) and in

Physical Damage and Area. Study Reports in An-

nex I to Enclosure (B). The latter also de-scribes

the damage sustained from bombing,

The Dublon seap lane base WIiS the ouly a ir f ac il -

ity on Truk in use befcrs the war. Const ruct ion

on this base was con tinued until the spring of 1944 .

Moen No.1, a 1,200-meter strip, was started in

November 1941 and essen tial ly completed by De-

cember 1942. The seaplane base at Moen No, 2;

was started in Novembc .\ · 1941 and fini shed inApl'i11943, and the 1,000-meter air strip WIIS built

iV the spring of 1944. The date of the initial

work on Eten Field, the principal fighter base, is

uncertain, but it was substantially completed in

December 1943_ Par am Field, p rimari ly a bomber

base, was started in Jnne 1943 and was completed

_as 0. 1,200-meter strip in Januruy 1944, .. Shortly

thereafter it was extended to 1,430 meters. Con-

s tr uc ti on o f the major faci llt ies on the One Hun-

dred and FOll rth Nava l Air A.rs el ll l>lwas begun in

JIlly 1942, and this IUUtwas operating in Novembm'

of that yeaf, Additions were mads in thefall of

1(143 and again in the summer and fall of 1944 ..

Its functions were roughly equivalent t o those ofa combined assembly and repair department and

al l a:viation supply acti-vity, and nt one time it W!LS

capable of overhauling 15 (literaft engines per

month, T Il ls organization 'VIIS originally {l.branch

of fhe Southeast Area Naval lUI' Al-senn1, the

headquarters of which ware in Rabaul until March

1944 when it wns transferred to Sfripan. Truk

becllllii/. the hendquo, l ' t llrs in August 1944" af ter the

l n s s of the Marinnas, n.nd Itt that t in1.e it came u n . -

d e l' t he (lonU'ol 0: £ the commllndBI 'm ahief, FOllrth

Fleet. The personnel strength of the One Hun-

5



dred and Fourth Na"n] Air .ttl'S&nllj r ose from 100

men at the st.art of the war to It peak of 1,100 in

ISiS, However, at no time wns thlll'6 more than

a. lu' l1dful of properly trained nirornIt teclmici om s

in this complement,

The Truk-Imsed nnyn! ail ' organizatiou, known

as the ERst GI l l 'OL inesNU'\'al Air Corps, hendqual'-

t<!l'S at MO\ill No, 1, was acti'l"nted in the :fill of

1944 as n reslllt of tile teorganization of NineHundred and Second Nava l Ail' Corps, which had

been established at Truk in December 19U, Var i-

ous other organizations were based, at Truk during

tbe war, These included , the Twenty-s i~th Ail '

Flotilla, which came in fl'om Babnul in Decem-

be r 1943 und moved to Palsliu in MU1'ch19M, and

the Twenty-second Ah Flotilla which was t rans-

ferred in Februa ry 1944f ro ln Tminn l ind then was

deac tivated in November 1944, Unfor tunately"

almost all records hav,e been dest.royed, and there

were no wel l-inf ormed nava l a ir f orce personnel

on Truk, at the rune the !illITeywus made, ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 1 0

Wlll'll. present duLing the early pP.:rt of the Will',

Consequently, the story o·f the opera tionsof these

uni t s is not avnilabla 01 the 1,982 officers and

men of the East Caro liues Navul Air Col'PS who

wel'll. oa.Truk at the end of the war, only two were

p ilot s who were pmslU)t during the f irs t cn. rri :e r

attacks, an d they were enlis ted seaplnne pilots with

lit tle accurate knowledge of landplane operations,

The bes t sing le source of informa tion on ar opera-

tions is probably R l l a r Admirol Sumikawa f 0 1 ' -

merly chief of s taff to commander in chief, Fourtb

Fleet, and prior to that time commande~ of the

Twenty-second Air Flotilla, However,.h.iE knowl-

'edge of ' I'ruk is for the most part limited to theper iod I l, ftor his arr i val inJanunry 1944,

The Mission of Truk- Based Air Power

The miss ion of the Truk .AiJ:, Force was to pro.

t ee t the Truk Nuval Base, As far lIS can be de"terminad no purely ofi!! Il l; ive f lights ever took D iE

from Truk, It is not definitely eerta in tha t tlie air-craft COilIlW'llttn.cli:ing Our carziar task force 011

tho n.ightof 113-17F ebruary ilnd the morning of

30 April 1944 took oIr from Trnk Jields, Renr

Admiral SU,mikawa stated e h v . t about six plancs

took off from Parltm Field on the night of HI F eb-

ruary to attack t he. Americlln Fleet Ilnd did -Dot

remrn, However , OfliooT'S who wel 'e s tH.tloned nt

the v lJ , r io l lS f ie ld a t tbe t ime knew not l, jJ lg .of the

a tt ack :md sugges ted tbe p(}!! sibi Ji ty thn li t came

6

from Rnbuul 01' Tiniun. N,othingcolLld be learned

regal 'ding tho utt,llck on the rnol' lu:lg of 30 April

eNcept tImt one aviati on stll1I?lliool', who "',as

newly arrived at .Tl'uk at the time of the raid,

stated thltt four attack bombers , hall tuken oJl on

the evening of 29Apri l, and about 0100 Oil the 30th

two or three more attack bombers had til-ken o:ff.

Not a ll of these planes returned, and hodid notknow what their mission had been, Late in the

war, in June 1945, an oJi'onsive operation was

p lauued but 1Ie, 'e1' carri ed out , Orders w&'e re-

ceived from Tokyo to prllpf~re Param Field for

use in l aunching suicide att acks ng)Unst Uni ted

Stales ships u .LUlithi, but the f ield wa s bombed so

continuously tbu.t it could not be used; in fact,

the Jl -j l' tIl ese wonder ed i f Unted Stutes intel li -

geuce hurl learned of the plan, and had CO!ICBn-

tmted the attoelrs on Parnm for that reason,Routine seurch miss ions were Ilewn from Truk

until June 1944, a ft er w h ic h time t here were not

sufficient nircraft uvnilable, Both Iand-bassd a ir-

cnLi t and seap lanes wer e employed in search oper-

ations, Laud-based planes concentrated lJlostly

on the a rea from !!'O"to 2nD" (this may huve been

t rue only dur ing the late SPl 'ing of 1944) ; bombers

and recommissance p l!mes sea rching to 600 mi le s

and fighters to 300 miles, At dawn each duy v .

12-plane search flight WIlS l!LU11chedfrom the sea-

plan e b ase. Six sec u t sea p lanes (Jakes) each cov-

erad (J. sector of abouj 150 miles radius with a

30"mile cross leg. These sectors were varied daily,

SL>;obse rvat icn seap lanes (Pe te s) Il ew an ant i-

submnl'iull patrol to a distance of 90 miles, All

search planes carried a light bomb load in case

of submarine contact. It was stated thll- t several

at tacks wm~ ~nl lde on 01U submacmes , hut 1\0 de-

tails could be obtained. Dlldllg the last year of

the war, SI lVB!'111 long-range reconnaissanea mis-

so ins were f lown from Tru lr, to Ulithi, Guam" and

Eniwetok,Truk was also a 'Staging point fOl' a irc ra ft f er -

ried from Japan to the South Pacific. A majority

of the p lanes WllI'll.brought to Truk by auxiliaryaircraf t carners I lnd were miloa.dlld thore to awaitt.he ud-vtJl of pilots fl 'Om ot her bases, chiefly

R~bOl:uI,wllo flew them to thell' filll.l destil~fI,tions.

Ail'CI'llft wore also flown fiom JUl)fln via Truk to

Rab[L1l1md othel' bases, Va,riolls' routes w~l'e

used ~n these f el 'l 'y f ligh ts, a lthough bombel 's and

other 10ng-r '1Ulge plnnes sometimes flew dil'ect from

TiJ1inn CIl· Sa ipun to Rabau l. ReCOl 'C lsof fe l' ;'Y

opero,i ;ions were dostroyed, and the :l'oHowillg ap-

proJ1imate figures UJ'O the re su lt of reco lleebious of

persons new I 1 . t Truk, Stat is ti cs pr im' 1 :0 December

1943 ura completely lacking,

Nu m M!f nnd l : ! r ' f I i I I '

- The entire atoll could boast about only 40 anti-

aircraft guns, and these were not equipped with

f i re- ccn t ro l rnd Itr , b e e n u se t hi s squi prnen thad bean

aboard a ship which, while enroute to Truk, wa s

sunk by one of OU_i ' submarinaa Radar coverage

was genernily gcod, although t ll!! Japanesasaidthat unsatisfactory loca tions of thea .n tennae

caused al l s ta tions excep t O)1e to be ent ire ly unre -

llabl e ill detec ting ra j ds ,n'om th 10 ~fa,riaJlllas,

whereas severa I stations could track planes up"

preaching from the Marshulla mlfective radar

ranges of as much as 150 mi les were reported to be

customary, but this figure is. believed to beex-

aggerated. In this connection an interesting

statement was made concerning the detect jon of

B--24s, by R,enr Admiral Sumilrawa w ho sa id that

B-24s evidently firm nt conside rable a lt itude, de-

scending to tho surface at a distance which they

apparently considered to be fur enough outside

enemy radar I'lllIge to allow them to complete

tbeir> approach undetected, Usually t ll ey wer e

dot-Beted prior to thair descent and conseq uent ly

the Jupaness had considerable warning of their

approach, Voice communication with fight-01's

was maintained by one of the stat ions nt Moen, but

Information suppl ied to the f ligh t l eade r consi sted

only of range and bearing of enemy uircraft,

The flight leader made his own decisions us to

action to be tnken, and fighter direction as the

&meriC(Lll Air Forces knew it apparently wns not

employed by the Japanese,

Ther e i s some doubt a s to the condi tion o tre ll .m-

ness normally maintained at 'I'ruk, One officer

stated that a flight of 4 lnnd-basad fightel'S' was

airborne at down daily, with all ndditional 20

fightersalerted for inst ant, t ake-off. Pilots who

d idnot to ke 01I promptly were l ikely to be beaten

when they returned, The seaplane unit man-

t aiued no spscinl condit ion of readiness until ai ,er

th e February 19i14 attack. From than on three

fighters were kept on inlmedinte a le rt .

Wh.en fighters were urmed with machine guns

only, they would attempt to intercept l l.ppronchin. ,.

raids (Lt some distance from t.he base, Many of

Lbe fightru' S were armed with me>: hanical time-

fuzed bombs for a ir-to- ai r bombing. , These pImesfound it neCCSS!ll.'y~o wait uutil the bomb~I'SlVel'e

making their final nppl'onchOll a steady course

before they Gou]d ml lke an a ttack wi th nriS chance

1

In mid-.J.a1t'llaI 'Y 11144two carriers unloaded about

120 planes of several types,l1l1(l ill February 1944

one canier unl oadedabout 30 J'i lls,

There i s some indication t hat squadrons from

Rabaul occasioun lly bused n;t TrW( for training

purposes, nlthough this impression may have

l'ltsult.ed only from the :factthat the Twenty-sixth

Ail' F]otilla, which was t emporarily stationed at

T ru lr in eady 1!). j_4,had no dnties thHe other than

t.,ra:inin grocti viti es, 0 ther av ia tion t ra in i ng acti v-

ities ut TJ:lJk consisted only of routine combattraining flights, familiarization i n new ,drcl'(tft,.

and minor ground school mstruetion conducted

wi th in the squadrons,

Air Defense

The ail' defense of Truk W1l.S not considered

adequate by the Japanese stationed there. At the

time of OIU' fh:st attack, 16,Febl'llary 1944 (west.

IOllgj:tude date), Rear Admiral Sumikawa was in

Tokyo a ttampting to get a ssi st auea to s treng tben

his defenses, Throughs, blunder or oversight by

h:igher hendquartars, the TWlllltyosjl>-" thAil' F lo- ,

tilla had not been made subject to orders from the

T r uk ccrnman d. This p artiom nr shortcoming cost

the JI1PIlll6Sl) dearly on the morning of Febru-

111'Y 16, The commander of the ' I'wenty-s izth All ,

Flotilln, who was the only officer ut 'I'ruk with theauthorit y to order these plnnes into thsail', \VIIS

not at the fi eld wi th h is p lanes and because of com-

DlllnlOation dif ficult ies could not get word to themto take off. Even if he hn.d beon uble to get his

order through, , 'e1 'Y f ew of t l"Ulp lanes cou ld have

taken ofl ' since h i§ ai rp lanes were r : 1 l 1 Eten Field

and most of his pilots wero on Dubloll Island.

Actua lly, the re wero t~w fighter ail'cl':.,ft available

for defense ,



TABLE B .-UJ-t7 F .bM14ry 1944

of lIC ess, Air-to-air bomhin ...wa con idered to

00 somewhat successful against B-24s, bnt the

B-29s f lew SO high that tho ' I'ruk fight er plUMS,

which fur the most pa rt war e o ld patched-l ip c raf t

which had been damaged in previous rai ,could

not ClUTYbomb to the a lt itude flown by the lIper-

for tresses, '1'he Japanese attempted, UUSUCCI15 •

fully to install SO-mm. gun in place of 2.Q-IlI.lll.

guns in their fighters for use against tile B-29s.Actually there w [a few attacks made on B-29s

because the Japanese were bowing what few air-

ctn.f t remained to them.

A few Irvings were nvuilab le f or use as night

fi zhtees, They were not equ ipped wth radar IIl1d

were dependent solely on non-radar-controlled

searchligh t cocper a t ion. These p lanes had a f ixed

machine gun mounted aft of the pilo set at -au

elevation of 30·. As the pilot approached the

ttu:get from below and astern, the gunner:, in the

rear: seat, fired the gun when his sighe came on

the target . Al though this method appears t o 00

extremely crude, the Japanese claimed fair success

unt il the B-24s began to e.mploy evas ive ac tion lIS

soon as they were picked up by a searchlight.Japanese es tima tes ofUni ted States p lanes sho t

down could not be obtained. If there were NC-

ords they had been de troyed, and Rear .A.dmiml

Sumikawa considered the claims of his pilots, as

well as of ours, to hnve b e en absurd and Dot worth

considering.Es timates of numbers of Japunese ai rcra ft p .r es -

entat the times of the two nited States carrier

IltblClal, numbers participat,i:ng ill ,engagements,

and numbers dl'lStl'oyed were obtained from several

sources , 1I0ne of which, unfor tl ll lotely, l ire consid-fl'od to be reliable. The figures gi ven by Rear

AdmirRl Sumikswa shown in table A, are prob-

ably the most accura te , Tl l, b16B is a compilat ion

of statements made by various ind iv idual s W]lO

had some knowledge of events when they occurred,

but W11Q {orgut the exact detai ls ILDd figures as

time passed, Table C is an ever-all estimate by

Rear Admil'lll Sumiknwa of uireraft present at

Truk during va rious periods fr om February 1944

to the end of the war. Part of it is a duplication

of informacion included in table.A.. Considerable

disparity between tables A and B is apparent, It

is obvious, too, that in many cases individual col-

umns could not be r econci led to the ir total s so that

itwas necessary to insert approximate f igures inthe totals to make the statistics agree as much as

possible.

TOfikl!l:l!

T,ILE A-J6-17 Pebruary 1944

'100

19-50 April 1944

Dublan ScoPl!u lfi n £ L ' j B ~ ~Ete n._ ~ ~_~ _ _ ~ _.~ ~.

1IIJoenNo. L_r ~•• ~ .... _ _

~:~~~:~:.::::::::::

2Zsb.<Uvln.g .

&Judy.

8

Tooko.r.r

~~t:~~~:;~:~~¥~:~!::~~T A 1 J . .1ll .-Truk's·"ir .!tengti. at ~iunifi<IJ"! 1,.riad. during can'l'aign-A. r! ; ]JoTtedbyRear Ad,, ,;, al Sum ikawa Ci nC Tw It

secotui Air FlotiUa • '" I/'"

' " F ob . 1 ,1 H< -Fd"r to r:arrJ(r !tt. ti .ck: HJ-

17Feb.

o Jud:y 12.

2.Kl.t6.JI Zei:e.

t l tvlD.; : n,

2Pf!lteU~E1lnko.

.. A/O

. Aircraft b.Wngill~ 10 7'rukc/Ju! slatirmw at oth",. baa. .

~~:::::~::::~:::~::::~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~:~t~·~:~:~:~~::~~~~~~~~~~ . ~ # ¥ f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:i~~~~~~~_~ .__ . .0 • • • P . ~ • ._ • ~_ 2t Jlldy 12s••• d~ ' ._

'l'otnl., otjme uas .... _. . •.. ._._ •• Zl Ale 01djO 71AIO

Army Forces 00Truk

The Ar:my 's miss ion 011 'I'ruk was purely de-

fensive, und its work would begin only o.t such

t ime as a landing actua lly WI1S uttempted by enemy

troops. It had no other l' pons ib il ity. No offen-

sive operations were launched from Truk nor

were aJ1Y planned. Truk was not even u ed as a

troop staging area, nor as u training center. Since.

no Al lied invasion was ever made it would a.ppear

I'ha t the value of Itl"llly forces at Truk WtlSnot only

negl ig ib le hut ac tnal ly l lcglLt ive, since they con-

sumed much needed upplies and in no way were

able to ju tify thei l' exi stence on Truk.

In September 1943, tha Fifty·second Divisi on

was mobilized at Kauuzawa, Japan, for duty in

the ElL tern Carotin . The fir tmajor ecb. Ion of

this divi aon nni ved. at Truk enrly i n January 19±i

and was stationed OIl Dublon , M.o 11, and Tol Is-

lands, wi th headq ua l"tCl'S on Du b lon, Prior to this

t ime ther e were no lU'rny forces on Truk other than

an advan 'e party of 300 officer and mel) of this

arne division which had arrived ill I 0\' moor

9



Hl!3. The Fifty· econd Division was under the

command of ilia Eas tern At'my, with headquar-

tel'S inJnpan, a nd n lso under l ll l~command o f the

combined fleet . The .exac t command del inea tion

is not ent irely c 1 e a L ' hut t l 1 1 1 i nference i s l h: )t i li a

commander of. the combined fiee ,\"ItS the immedi-

ate operational senior and the commander of the

easte rn a tJny ex-Il rc ised administrat i ve command.

Locally, neither' the filmy nor the navy eserci ed

juris diction, over the other. Coordination was

obt ained by coopemt ion . Major dec i i on s af fec t-

ing both services w re made in joint conference,In the latter part of February (after the 16-1 '1

February carrier attack} a second Jarge echelon

of 1;]10 .Fifty-second Division stnged from Ujina ,

Japan, and arrived at Truk after surviving with

ome 10 , a torp do attack en route. At this

t ime a red is tr ibut ion o f forces p la ced gnr ri son s on

Dublon, Moen, Fefnn, and Uman, with a very

small unit on Toland a few members of the con-

trol, or war ning oraanization on each .island. On

8 March 194<1 ,another de ta chmen t ar ri ved f rom

Ujina , a nd the i sl and s illthe western part of the

atoll were garris oned, At this time the scope of

the Truk command was br oadened to include ra-ponsibility for all gll lTisl)n in the Carol ines from

Ponape to Enderby. Toward the end of :llll'eh

an ant ia ir cr af t uni t r epor ted f ind was d is tJ :i bu ted

throughou t t he p reviou sly gar ri soned i sl ands and

Parum, This unit WIIS shortly thereafter trans-f er re d to the ' a; vy for cont ro l in order to keep all

ant ia ircraft defense units under Navy command.

On 1 J"l1I1ea detachment of troops fr om Mort-

l ock I sl and was spread through the smal le r 'I'mk

Islands . Anothel' detachment from MortlQCk in

November 1944, and 9. bat ta ll ion from Enderby in

J"lIDuary 19{5, completed the Truk ga re ison a it

exis ted at be end of the war,

In Angus t 1944 the Commander of the Fifty-

e eond D iv is ion, L ieut enan t Gene ra l Mug ikur i,

as sumed the title of Commander, T hi rty-firs

Army. This army, whose headqumters was on

aipan had been wiped out in the MarillIlllS CD.m-

pllign, with its commanding general killed on

Gnnm. Actua lly the new tit le made no di: fl 'e renee

to the commander of the Trukforce ince it placed

no new forces under his command, nor d id i t al te r

his duties.

At the time the army arriv din Truk, no fortif i-

cations had been built other than those which r e-

10

mained under navy contr ol. Further, there were

no barracks avnilable for nrmy use. T rol)ps were

quartered in civilian buildings (sch~ls lind

houses) in n few navy buildings, and ill a tentcamp. Con tl'udioll of field fortificntions W!lS be-gun immediately, After the cardel' trikes of 16-

17 February 11)4.1tr oops were mov d into small,

crudely constructed, partially underground houses.These were of i nfer io r qual it y s in ce no bui ld ing

mater ial s were avai la bl e except f rom scl ll lt y Ioenl

resourees. Because the navy was charged with

supplying the army wi h mnter ial s, i nclud ing n ll

types of supplis , ammunition and clothing, the

army had not brought building materials with

them. Since Japanese supply lines were severed

completely about this time they were never able

to receive supplies fr om JapllJl. Constr uction of

ai r- ra id shel te rs wa sa lso begun a t this t ime; these

cons isted of one or more large, bombardment-

p roof tunne ls on e ach i sl and, e ach c apabl e of shel -

taring a large number of men.

In August 1914" as n result of Ie ons learned

in the Mnri llDllS campa ign, t he army dec ided tomake everything bombardment proof. Troops

worked dill' and n igh t pl ac ing a ll he avy weapons,i nc luding heavy machine guns, i n caves , a nd d_ ig -

gin interconnec ting tunnels between gun posi-

tions with as many ILS .6."e a lterna te emplace-

ments con tructad for each gun. Empha si s wa s

also placed on the cons truction of tank traps lind

barriers I l 1 1 d the planting of beach mines. From

this time until the end of the Will' the troops l ived

in or near the eaves and tunnels which were also, t he ir b at tl e s ta ti ona

inee no amphibious assault ever materia lized

the a rmy' on ly ope rat ions cons is te d o f p repar ing

the defen se o f the i sl ands , a nd g rowing food which

wa s woeful ly scarce. The only no tabl e except ion

to tills was that aImy personnel manned soma of

the hea-vy machine guns which were employedagainst low-.flying'o,ircraft.

ma ll scal e t ra in ing exerci se s we re co! lduct ed

o~ly occasiona lly, since ammunit ion was not plen-tif nl, T hey had only the ammunition which they

hlld brought with them from Japan, and some o'f

tha t was destroyed by air a,ttacks.

Tb~ plan envisioned for the defens e against

. nmphiblO~ ass ault included nwnerous fact or s.

Coast artillery, emplaced on main islands and

manned and controlled by the navy, was charged

. f

with the task of .engaging" ships at.tempting to

operate close outside the atoll reef or trying to

enter any of the passuges. Naval mines lllid in

the po es !I,ll,dchunn Is , p rovided udditionnl pro-

t ec ti on, a nd nnt isubmar im, and l \n ti to rp IOdo net s

were placed, by the navy, around docks and cer-

tain nncb.oro,gll to guard agains tbe forms o'f

attnck. As landing craft nppeoacaed to within

1 ,000 to 2 ,000 meter s o f (Lny is la nd , n. rmy Ill'tille1"J '

wonld open fire but its volume was r est ricted byshortage of ummumtion, 'I'.he nn.vy 11Ml some

rockets with a rullge 1 )£ 800 meters. The indi

v idual r ee fs IV hieh surtound ea ch : i sl a nd were

p lan te d w ith about 4,000 nntiboat mines, some putt he re by i;he army and some by th e. navy, l IIO t ly to

protect the bes t landing b aches . As landlnzr craft

a ppronched the se reef s. ..-w hi ch averag d a ill tnnca

of 200 to 300 meters 0 : 1 1 shore-morta l's, machine

guns, antiboat guns, and small arms were e o open

lip with a heavy crossfire from w ll-established

positions. Tl'OOPS were to be dug ill along thebeaches of the main islands and could fall buck

to preconstructed secondary positionsui c ase o f

nece ss it y. Mll clUne guns, l igh t mobi le a rt il lery,

and 37-mm. hand-drawn antitank guns had aboutf ive alternate and supplementary positions pre-

pared , and l'e!!ulm' shifting of these zuns was

planned, A.nllU1IDit io ll shortage required sparing

use of these guns , Mos t gun .poaitions were inter-

COJJJl cted by tunnels. Barbed wire WIIS used

mos tly in a protective capa ity around the gunemplacement ; however, use of tactical wire with

Iuues fol' machine gun fire was also planned tosome extent. There were 110 tanks on 'I'ruk, nl-though the pet· onnel of a tank nuit were. there,

servi ng as infatl tty.

The plan o f defen se a cc ep ted t empo ra ry with-

drawal to reform and countercharge but thep rima ry p lan , in case of Iack of orders to the

contrary, was t o f ight f rom caves nnd reaches

with the same tac tics a were employed a Iwo

Jimll. and Okinawa. There was no plan for mov-

ing troops from island to island and Jack of water

craf t for t ran spo rt at ion wou ld have prevent ed this

ill [my case. There wer no special precautions

agains t a ir -horne l anding s s in ce . it lVIIS collsidBred

tha t t he nature of t he t er rai n. o ff ered suf fi ci en t, pro-

tection ngain this form of at ta ck .

A summary of Ilrmy trength at Tr uk follows :

End of Februnry 1944 1.541

End of Mn.reh ll.l'l4 12. 356

Elnd of April lil'JG 14,2!JS

This last f ieure is the total final number of Ill'myper sonnel on 'I'ruk, as there were no further re-

ceipts or transfers, Total army casualties from

air attacks wet' !! 234 killed and 19 wounded.

III. ALLIED CAMPAlGN AGAINST TRUK.

l

Photographic Mission

On 4 February 1944, an American PB4y

(Ml tl ;i ne ) f lew ove r Truk at a pprox imately 20,000

feet. ACCOl'diJlg to one source this airplane was

first observed v isua ll y, a nd f ir ed upon, by a ba tt le -

ship in the harbor, 0 Japan e fighter planes

WB~1l nir-borna when this photo plane was Ihstsighted but several took off in pursuit. The Jap-

anese fai le d 1 ;0 in tercept , a lt hough one f lo at pl anewas reported to have come almo t within fir ing

range, but the PBiy escaped by diving away.

The J apanes e correctly interpreted the s ignifi-

canoe o f the reconna issance p lane a s u , fo re runne r

of a ttack, as evidenced by the withdr awal, 6 days

later, of the Japanes e Fleet to Palau, and the de-

pnrture of A.dmirals Koga and umikawa to

Japan. Kogn left in his flagship, MU<Jaah i vin

Palau. For s ome undetermin (1 rea SOli t he Jat -

a ness conc luded tha t t hey should expe ct an attack

about 21 February, and the one that greeted them

in the early morning of 16 February caught til m

totally unprepared.

Carrier Attack, 16-17 February 1944

Two days before the first carri r attack one of

four Bettys failed 0 raturn to its base f rom 11

routine search fli",ht. The Japanese "feured thatenemy aircraft were responsible and to add to

the ir apprehension, the Japnne. ..<e radio . in te reept

group picked tIP voice transmi ions 'which were

identified as concerning United Stat aircraft

carr ier operations , becau e they COli a ined "color

base' 01,119. Chamcter of the transmiss ion indi-

cated that the cm-riars miaht be close by. On the

strength of these two incidents !Jle island group

wen on the alert .

Ent 'l yon the morninc o f 15 Feb l1. lIU1 ' a spe ci al

arch flight of G aircraft cover d an area 30" to

each side of north for a distancs of 300 miles. The

11



s earch resulted in it nl!(rntivc report, and th is ,

coupled with the I alarming result of radio

direc tion findin IT hearings on the previous calls,

made the JItpanese dec ide tha t t J 1 1 l t rnnsruissions

o ri gumt ll cl somewhe re between Kwa jnl ein and

Eniw~ ok , Wbl ll "110U 1111h a n ds r e la x e d vigilnnce,

Due to conf li ct ing repo rt s. exac t c hronology o f

the se foregoing even ts ~re not known. bl lt oc cu r-

lWOO have boon S ll ti sf ll ctodJy v r if le d. Tho lIiF brun rv dnwn-f iz ht er sweep Iuuuched f rom f ive

Americ.;n .Cll.l'ri,:U;caugh t the Japilll)Se unpre-

pared, As fur IlS can be de ermined 110 clefen lve

fighter were air-borne when the Jap nnesa first

b ecame aware of the impending at ta ck

.LUthough the attacking; onr rier plane were

, picked up by r.1nar almos a minu prior to

the ir a rr iv al ove rhead, t here appea l'S to have been

some de lay in spreading the alarm to an arens.

By querying personnel tationed at the fields it

was found that altbough Po ram had 30 minutes

notice Eten had only 10 minutes wnrl1ing and at

I 11 0e n N o.1 t he fi rs t 1 ig ht -e J"wave arrived simul-

ta.neously with the sounding of the alarm, Fur-

t he r c au se s for t he l ack o f readine ss l ie in the fucts

t :hnt I1J dar ' I l"1 lS not proper Iy manned, p il ot s were

on Dublon Island while their aircraft were on

Moen IUId :Et en I sl ands , and the t el ephone sys tem

'l'l'll not functioning properly.

According to the tac tica l-plan of a ttack, the fir t

Amer ican obj ect iv e was to attain air supremacy

over the target, to be accomplished by total de-

s truct ion of the Japanesa ai r c omponent at ' I' ruk ,

Five American carriers launched a total of 70

f ight er s at 06i iO 1hou r and 20 minu tes before sun -

rise on 16 February. Curriers and numbers of

pl anes par ti ci pat ing were: Bunk-er Hin (22),

Yorktollm (12), En terp rille (12) I n/lrepid (12),

and Ess8:/;(11). Inaddit ion, the Bunker Hill fur-n ish.ed one a ircrra ft with its f ight er s as ai r t arge t

observer.Planes of the 8 task groups nrrived in the tar-

get ar ea approximately at sunrise. nited States

med ium- and low-al ti tude pl anes we re a tt acked

iJnmediate.ly by enemy fighters, and during the

attnck more enemy planes were observed to bo

taking off . In all, it is e st ima ted tha t t he enemy

llad as mllny Ill! 80 planes air-borne dur ing the

at ta ck , Japanese repor ts concerning the number

of Japanese planes a iJ '-borne during the opera tion

vary between 25 and O.

iz

During t hi s n tt nc k 0\11' f ighters divided the ir ef -

forts between s t.r afing u iL-craft on the gr ound at

euemv fie lds and s.eaplo .nc buses, and fig1l ting the

eneml' s a ir -borne pl ane s. .Ai rcraf t on the g round

were oft 11 parked nose to t il l) outside revetments

m ilking exce ll en t t arge ts . In t .h e ui r, the enemy's

efforts lucked coordinatiou and many of their

pilots appeared to be inexperienced.

Immediately following the fighter strike atplanes on the gi'Qllnd, attacks were made on dis -

p er sal a rea s at Moen , Et~, and Puram air bases,

by 18 torpedo bombers, 6 from each task group,

loaded with fr·rtgmeutation clusters and incen-

d ia ri es . Thi s a tt ack was des igned to rende r fields

and in tulln tion un ervics able lind thus pr event

attack on our task force dnrillg the night.

A s a 1 '1 lS 1l ILo f t he se ven ts and n ditio ns th e

f ighter sweep was entu:ely succes sful. In the air,

56 enemy planes (51 of them fighters) were

c la imed to bedestroyed, and by American est imate

s tr af ing a tt acks des troyed an add it iona l 72 enemy

planes on the ground. Thls figure is the more im-pressive when it i s compa red wi th our own losse s,

in this weep, of only 4 fighters f rom all causes,1 1 . . total of 125 operational wing aircraft and 110

a ir ar senal ai rc raJ t were burned o r ser ious ly dam-

aged on the ground, The refore, o f t he 365 a ir craf t

on Truk lit the time of the raid, less than 100 reo

mained unscathed . Tbe Japane se were abl e, how-

el'er to rebuild 80 ZElkes f rom parts of the dam-

aged aircraft and bring to approximately 80 the

ultimate po t-ruid total of flyable aircrnft, The

ef f~ ti veness o f t he air arsenal WItS reduced by an

estimated 80 percent, and the Param strip was

out of commission for 20 days. The American

forces had accomplis hed their initial miss ion of

knocking out enemy ail ' opposit ion.

Sh ipping wa s the pr imary t arge t immed iat ely

after the early-morning fighter sweep was com-

pleted. Carriel' ffights were staggered to keep

a continuou flow of hips to the target. Approx].

mately 30 s eparate flights of 1 to 30 aircraft each.

inc luding torpedo planes, d ive bombers, IUIdescort

fightru were lhl'OWD at sDemy shipping during

the cngagemenc, Bomb Ioad ings var ie d through-

out he day. The usual loads were 500.pcund

hom U S, of which 498 Wel'e dropped, ol'l,OOO-pound

bombs, of which 369 were l'elensed. A few 250-,

] . (100 - and 2 ,000 -l lOUDd bombs we re d ropped,

Only 66 torpedoes were expended,

The. u ri kes agains t. shipp ing complet ely w iped

out all Japanese naval ships ill anchorag at the

time of the uttaclc, lind in addition sank 31 mer-

chnnt s hips, for n, t ot al o f approxima tely 200000

ton, Nllvn.! ahips des troyed included three lir rhtb

cruisers, Naka, Ag(l,no, and Eatori; tlll'Cll des roy-

ers YttbtlJre Oikcse, and Nagatlluhij t h seapl ane

tender, Al rJ i t su41/ i , ima, . and the submarine tender,

Heian Maru.On 1'7 Fabruury, lnck of suitubl targets made

further attacks en sllipping unprofitable. Al-

t hough ai r-bo rne opposi ti on had c ea sed the Ame r-

ican force withdrew extensive a ttacks 011 thehore

ins ta. l1 at ia ns . Damar rs t o ins ta ll at ions , r Jt hough

relatively light, included the f ollowing: d true-

t iO !l o f O I, e o r two hangar s on Moen , des truc ti on

o f three fue l- st oruge t anks 01 Dublon ~11(1others

on Eten, and the destruction of ammunition

dumps all Dublon.

During the night of 16-17 February six or

seven Kates uttaeked tbe carrier force, Only one

of thes e penetrated the radar screen and launched

J). torpedo which struck he starboard quarter of

the carrier InfJrepid. Conflicting evidence makes

it difficult to ascertain whether or not radar was

used by these attacking planes. Re;tr Admiral

Sumikawa, who" i s ac cept ed a s t Il e f ina l au thor it y

for the purpose' of this report, Insists that these

planes took off from Param field, although other

sources maintain that no aireraft, took off from

Trul l: dur ing that n ight a nd that t he nt tn .ckmg a ir -

oraft must have be n from another island ..

American losses for the raid totalled four air

craft. The consen su s o f Japane se f lying per son -

nel as t o th e reason s for t he d ispropo rt ionat e Jap-

anesa losses i s: (1). inferiority in numbers, (2)

surprise (3) the tactical disadvantage of takin ir

off in the face of astac lc iug a ircraft.

'IIVO .hundred aircraft present at Eten Field

were awaitinz either fatTy pil ts to fly them to

thei r f in al de st in at ion o r t .r an si er t o the ai r I1l"S6nU

to b readied for service. According to Rear .Ad-

rniml Sumikawa only 41 s rvicenble airplanes

were available to the Tr uk command to rep I the

at ta ck . At Truk we re 12 !J ,a ir cr af t, u sed for t a- ain-

mg pur poses and belonei ng to the Rn b n ul cOJ'!1-

maud but authorifis d to be used to defend the atoll

shonld it be attacked. Tb 200 uircl"nft at Eten

were parked nos e to tail outside the revetimlluts,

whi ch made i t possibl e f l' flam to spread from

one aircraft to the other thus accounting for the

great loss of aircraft on the gronnd. Cause of

poor rlispersal i t raceable to three fac tors: insufli .-

ci ent spa ce on the ai rf ie ld, l ac k o f fer ry pi lo ts f rom

Rabaul, an d the fact that the two auxiliary air-

craft carder captains who brought the nircraft .

foo li ng the <lelay at Trull: to be dangercn , dis-

charged the ir ' ca rgoe s haphaza rd ly and hur ri ed ly

departed.Tbe Unit d lntes timate of total damage to

e ne m y a ir cr af t d ur in g this 1"1I1dwas apparen tl y not

much in error, Howev~r, the destruo ion of air-

bor ne planes was much less than. claimed and the

on- the-ground losses were cons iderably higher.

United States e tim ate : 129 sho t down 152 de-s troye-d and damaged on the ground ..)

This well-executed, 2-day attack by the Amer-

ican currier task force left Truk practically de-

fensel ess. Supp li es had not boon put underground

and were extremely susceptible to air attack, and

radio and radar instillations al 0 were damaged

materially. The Japanese were surprised and re-

lieved when the attack ceased on the second day.

Following the trike the Japanese e.ffected such

repairs to their fields and installations as were

easily made, and began a belated but intensive

effort to place everything po iSle underground ..

Carrier Attack, 29-30 April 1944

Early on thB morning of 29 Apri11944 (west

longitude time) an American fast carrier task

force battered Truk for the second time. The

primary objective ill thi sweep was g round in-

stallations and buildings. The American planes

were picked up by r adar when still 30 minu tes out

and thi s i nt erva l p roved suf fi ci en t for t he Japanese

to l aunch a cons ide rabl e numbe r o f f igh ter s.

Five Japan planes, out on their normal

routine sBorch I1Jld patrol mission failed to con-

tact the American fleet ill time to warn the homebase, although hortly after the radar warning

Wll received one of them attempted to make radio

contact. Communication with this plane was lost

before the report was received intelligibly and

none of the five pabrol planes returned to the bas e,

' I'he first wave of a ttnc lr ing Ame:r:iCIlI l a ircraft

a rr iv ed at 0450 and the SO-minut e warning enabl ed

th .Japanese to throw 57 intercept ing aircraft atthis firsta rmlt wave, Moen No.1 contributed

20 Zekes, Eten 29 ~es. and Parnm Kates, in

!3



addition to the 5 Ko tes on pn t 1 0 0 1 . Altogether,

2 200 sorties were flown by American a ircraft, dnr-

ing the _-dllY operation. Of these 467 W re by

fighter-bomber aircraft, Bombs dropped totaled

74 8 tons,

The Jnpnnese had 1 ui rcraf t d ispe rsed a t fou r

island fields at the time of the raid. These were

deployed nsfollows: Moon No.1, six Bettys and 20

Zekes' Eten 10It 'Ving (night fight 1'8), and 35Zekcs' Param 12Jud'ys (carr ie r reconnaissnnce},

l ind 13Kates ; Dublon , 8 (ob sen. at ion and recon -

nai ssanee}. F if ty -n in e Japane se aircraft were

de h-oyed in the mid (including the 5 Kat on

patrol) itnd 34 were destroyed on the gr0U11d for

II. totcl of 93. h'tLlmel'ous other aircraf t were

damaged by str afing. From photo interpreta-

tions AmeriCllllS estimnted 16 T enemy aircrai t

present of wW e ll 6 3 were d trnyed In the a il ' IIud

60 on the ground.

In the ent ire island group, !23 buildings and 6

hangars wefe desb'6yed and 44 buildings were

damaged, Thes e figur es were obtained fr om in-

terpretations of photographs made at the time of

the raid.

The p e r ee n t .a g e o :f d amage to ins ta ll a t ions 011

principal 'islands ¢er the raid wa estimated to

be as f ollows: Duhlon,,w percent; Eten, 80 per-

cent ; ! fo en, 75 percent ; Fdan , 20percen t; Param ,

15 p ercen ; and Illalu 0 percent: These figures

were al c made from photographie 'interpretations

and donot inc lude damage enused byprior a t tacks.

hipping losses inc luded the H in o M a l' U, 11.1,500-

ton patrol craft; the Sapporo 1J[aru. a 6oo-ton

cargo ship; the Minaei j llaro a 300-t{ln 001'''0 ship ;

lind Ilpprorin:tately 20 other small craft." ,

Amw:iClln carrier losses amounted to 22 aircraft,

Two were los t on the inital f ig ll te r sweep while 20

were lost to antinu-cruft fil1l. Thirty-three uir-

craft were damaged.

Thi s c ar ri er a tt ack v ir tu ll ll y nul li fi ed ' I' ruk' svalue as a supply and air base, As n navul ba e

i t h ad been unt enabl e s in ce the f ir st c ar ri er s tr ik e

and its value to the J.pane. .o .e W'lr effort after 30

A.pril was negligible., 'I'hi does not mean that

the mmung B-24 and B- 29 r aids were value!

for without , the il ' harrassing effec t Truk undoubt

edly would bavs been able to replaoo its aircraft

l osse s to some ex tent .. I n : fu. ct ., de sp it e. t he B-2!

raids its nil' str ength was b_uilt up mater ially in

Ollr!y May. Japuuese rea liza tion of T~uk's deolin-

ing val LIB WIIS admit ted when lo,w m May the

Tr nk command was ordered to send 71 pl anes ,

i nc luding 59 f ight er s, t o Yap and Guam-e -ngain

reducing Truk to a low level. This order was ex-

plnined 11 II·measure to rec ti fy strategic misoa leu-

lntion by the Japauese high command, At first,

on the 8. ump tion tha t Al li ed major e ffor t would

be through the South Pac if ic , they distr ibuted the ir

ail' str ength in tIle Central and South Pacific in

a 40 and 80 percent proport ion respect ively.

When they decided that the next major effort

would be f arther north they s tripped Trnk to rein-

force Guam and YaIJ.

Britis h Carrier Attack, 16 June 1945

No All ied reports a re ava ilable concerning t h i sattack and information is derived solely from

Japanese sou rc es ; opinion s a re Japanese ns we ll .

One or pos sibly two B ritish carr iers f ormed the

a tt a. ck i: og force. The at ta ck was d iv id ed into two

waves=one cominrr in the late morning and the

other in the early afternoon, In t he f ir st wave, 18

to 2,j, Spi tf ir es ci rcl ed the a to ll a t a very h igh a lt i-

tude and then returned to t he c ar ri er , but 15TBFsand SBDs es corted by 6 to 9 Spitfir es arr ived as

the first flight departed. The second wave com-

priss d 15 FBFs and SBDs es corted by 6 to I) Spit-fires. .

T he attacking waves broke formation outside

the reef and ci rcl ed the ma in i sl ands a .t 9,000 feet.

They gradually descended to 3,000 feet and be-

gU ll t he ir a tt ack s at this altitude, Unlike .Ameri-

can aircraft they did not appr oach the target rap-

idly, but stayed at high altitudes f or a cons ider-

able length of lime surveying the area. Then

they bombed und Lrafed insignificant targe ts.

The SBDs und TBFs bombed from a 30° dive re-

l ea sing ' th ei r bombs at 1 ,500 fee t. The Spitfu.es,

,\Ctmg as top covel' while the bombing was' inpr ogress , dropped down when the TBFs and BDs

were ID I ished , a nd s tr afed a t ve ry low u lt it udes .

T he attack, principally against Dublon, E ten,

and Moen, caused practically no damage. The

bombiog , howeve r, d id p lU 't in ll y des troy reco rd s

nnd the Japanese, fearing that the attacks were a

prelude to an amphibious a s ault burned their r e-

maining files. Tlris fear was enilanced when on

17 June, a Bingle cruiser bombarded the is la:lds

although no invasion a tempt f~JJowed. '

No . Japane se f ight er s met t he a tt ack ItS it was IJ,

complete surprise, t is doubtf ul if the attaci[

~vould.h .a v~ b. e n o~posed bad. an al er t b e n g iven

m suffiCIent tame smell only SIX 01' seven ahcrnft

wel 'a eperatiollal on 'I'ruk at the time. The BI·il;-

i sh los t; f rom one to fou l' Spi tf ir es .

8-24 Attacks Against Truk

Attacks on 'I'ruk by llLud-based American B-24c

air crnft were made 01' the first time inMarch1944 and continued collsis tently until October

1944 when B- 29s began their experimental raids,

These] Inn were both 'elltC!1L Pacific and outh

Paci fic based, Because of the distances from

KwajnJ ei:1l nnd Empr es s Augusta Bay to Truk

( 900 to 950 miles) the bombers had to carry extra

gasoline ut the expense of their pity bomb load,

During that period more than 4 ,0 00 t on s o :f b om b s

were dropped on Truk installations. Size of the

attackinrr forces varied between 15 and 30 ai r-

craft, and bomb loads consisted primarily of 500

and 1,OOO-pounclhigh explosiva bombs and incsn-

diary clusters.

Althongh ( It .dy warning r adar usually picked

up t,he attacking formations 75 to 100 miles outand tracked them all the way ill on occasion the

B-24s evaded detection and encountered little or

no intarcepsiou. As an antidetection measurn the

a ttacking :force sometimes descended to minimum

altitude at a distanca of 150 miles out. This de-

c ep ti on wa s not rLlwayssucc essful i nc a under fav -

orable conditions Japanese radar could pick up

the bombers before they began thei r d escent .

At the time of the first B-24 rnids 101 nircraft

were based at Truk, more than 100 of which were

fighters. During April losses from combat and

cons ta nt bombing s reduced thi s force to 10<1tot al

aircra:ft including 65 fir st-line fighters , By May,this number wa cut to 11 air craft of which only

3 were operational, The carrie. raid of 29-30A .pril aided ma ter i It11y in briugin g this f igUl'e to

its low level .

By 13 June immediately pr ior to the Mariannas

campaign, Truk's strenath WI!.; increa ed to 25

f ight er s and 34 o f othe r t .ype s, bu t when the ~1n l' i-

annas campaign b gnn, all all' raft, with the ex-

ception 01 l es s t hun one-ha lf doz en observat ion

p lunas , were det ai le d £01' pnrtioipn MOll in that

campaign. None of these r eturned,

Fol lowi\lg the Mariannas enmpaigu, 35 ,w:cl 'l If t

were I1lust\Jred Itt Truk ; 8 were f ight er s acqu ir ed

from Palau and the remainder were patched-up

craft which had been damaged on previous raids,

Of the latter, only six or seven were operational at

anyone t ime,

F igures on losse s on ei th er s id e a re unavai la bl e.

Japan e verbal sources are i Jl de fu ti te a nd p rob-

ably 1lJI reli able,

No B-24s wer e seen to fall within the atoll dur-

ing the day but the Japane su pect that some

fell outside the reef because flak crippled many

over the islands. At night "five or six" were seen

to explode and burn over the . lands and pilot

report shooting d wn f ive to s even B-24 outs ide

th e atoll. Fighter interception dropped of!' per-ceptibly in enrly J1ll16 because al l avai lab le Jap -

nne se f ight er ai rcr af t; were commi tt ed to the Mar i-

1I.Il.Il1lS cnmpaign,

Japanese fighters utilized two principal attackt echniques for dayl ight operat ions : (a) air-to-

air bombing and (0) orthodox machine gun at-

taeks , 1Vhan 20 or more fighters were air-borne

to oppose the bombe r forma ti on s app roxima tely

two-fifths of thes e carried air-to-air bombs. In

f ight er force s o f l ess t han seven , allplane carried ,

these bombs,

By Japanese estimnt 30 per cent of B -24 los ses

were due to air-to-air bombing and 70 percent tonght el ' p la ne machine !!UJlS. LOsses due to fink

were negligible, they sta te .

By the end of ~Iay the B-24 attacks, with tit

uddition of the two car rier attacks had neutral-ized Truk, However', the proximity of Truk to

Guam made advisable, if not necessary, heavy at-

tacks dur ing June, to eliminate what minor value

Truk might retain and materially to assis in pre-

ventine Truk from rendering worth while aid to

the J apanes e forces in the M:adanns. For harass-

ing pm'pos es , Central Paci fic bomber'S dropped

569 tons of bombs 011 Truk during JUlI e. Thes e

were augmented by an additional 900 tons ofbombs fr om the Admitalty- bns ed 'I' hir teanth Air

Fol'OO bomber'S. Raids were made almo t everyday , mo tJy during dnyligh until 19 JUlle.

Attacks after J\ule obviated the pos sibility of

rehabilitating airfields and fac il it ies suf fi ci en tl y to

u se them as base for r econna issance Bight s.

8-29 Experimental Raids on Truk

InOctober 1944, Truk was sel ect ed a s the t arge t

£ 0 1 ' a series of asperim ntal bombing attacks by

B-~W's newly bused in the Mariunas, These at-

15



tacks later becaml> routine tralning' missions nnd

outinued until the end of the war with size of

a ttacking forces varying between one . ll .I ld30 a ir-

craft, On 32 missions throughout this 10-month

pe ri od approxuJ l9 .te ly 1 .727 ton o f bombs were

Uropp.:cr . A few attacks were made us ing bl~d

bombing methods . Exac t f igu res on these t rai n-

jn" missions ,U"Il not avn.i lnble aud only approxi-d.tions can be made f rom available stat! tics .

From July 1944 IJ1It il th\ )war's end only 35oper-

ational aircraft were ba d on 'I'ruk, 1 of which

we.re f ighters . Of the totnl, never morn than six

or seven were Rj"able nt anyone time. Many of

these were rebuilt - 0]" patched up after damage

from previous raids, which inqual it y and num-

her s, made the Truk-based f igh ter pl ane compl s-

ment a decidedly inferior force. Truk's ground

defense included only 40ant in ir er af t gnn o f poor

qui ll ity and without radar control .

Japanese r epo rt only one B-29 d tl ll lf tg d by f la k

and none lost to anti aircraft fire 01" to fighter .

A.ir-to-air bombing WIIS at temp ted dur ing the first

f ew B-29 at ta ck s bu t was qu ick ly di arded sine

against this type aireruft the inferior Japanese

lighters could not c limb to a lt itude quickly enough

nor maneuver with enough facility to make the

ILttam e i fo o ti v e .

No sta tist ics ure ava ilable 011 Japunese losses.

Iti bel ieved tha f ew plane s we re los t in aerial

combat for two I"IlD.SOllS: (a) .T apanese pilots were

reluc tant to a ttack and (b) a ll f lyable aircraft were

orde red to t ake o ff a nd d isper se I J1I tl l t he a tt ack s

were over.

. .l .c tnnl ly these bombing nttacks had litle mu-

t er ia 1effec t on Truk b e c a u s e there were no longer

( lilY worth-while targets . However, they pre-

vented reconsrruet ion of above-grouud insta lla-

tion , and the Japanese officer consensus was tha t

Truk could have made a grndual , small -sca le come-

back were it not for the ince sant, aCCUTIt te a t-

L l t C J . . . " S of the B-29's. Tokyo bad planned to use

Param Field n a ba e for suicide attacks on

Dl it hi bu t the B-29 attacks kept the field in 11

state of dis repair and th" pInn WIlS finally aban-

doned. Japanese descr ibed t.lle accuracy of the

B-29' s a "e. xool le nt " aud they expressed admi ru-

tion over the effective coordlnution between photo-

reconnaissance and the B-:29 attacks,

16

S of Effectiveness of Allied Operationsu.mmary .Against TrukDur ing the entire ' I'I·uk campaign more than

416 ai:rcraft were destroyed. Naval a nd m e rc h u, nt

shipping de st royed mc luded three J igh t crui se rs ,

four d troyers, one !;(!itpl!llle tender, one sub~-

r il le t ende r one patrol v essel , 33 merchan t ships ,

nnd nume rou s sma ll cr af t and f ishing boa ts .Ai r. 6eld faci li ti es were comp let ely de st royed

e ar ly in th campaign. Wel l- cons truct ed or ig in al

bui ld ings were replaced with Rimsy wooden struc-

tures in in r anees where replneements were made

lit a ll : Wheuever possible, suppl ies and equipment

Wille moved into bombproof caves . All airfields

were intermittent! y in a li t! out of commission after

t he- fi rs t c ar ri er r ai d. "Po st -hol ing " the oJ rf iel ds

with 100- and 250-pollucl bombs \Vl),S the best tactic

to neutralize all the a irfields except Param, where ,

t he he av ier bombs proved to be more ef fe ct iv e, for

due to t he f ie lds insuf fi ci ent el ev "t ion above sea

lev 1 the deeper craters would 611 with seeping

water. Moen No.2 airstrip was ulmost ent irely

abandoned after the ]6-17 February 1944 mid,

Eten was ellti rely abandoned after tile raid of

29. ..aOApril , and Pararn WItS abandoned in July

1944.

Island Installatlons were roughly 90-95 percent

destroyed except for a few which were under-

ground In bomb-proof caves,'

Rationing of f uel provi ions , and ummunition

began early in 1944. Although bombing attacks

wer responsible, in part, for acute shor tage, sub.

marine warfare wa said to be the pr imary c au se .

A ft er Ju Iy 1D44 , "II officers, enlisted men, and civil-

Jans were formed into groups und given a small

area of land on which each group was responsible

for planting. culti vuting, and harves ting its own

food.

AS {L navul base Truk lost its effectiveness on 4,

Feb ruary 1944 when the ' I' ruk -based f le et e vucu-

ntsd following the an-ivnl of the B-24 photo-

reconnaissance ship.

'I'he firs t carrier mid of 16-17 February 1944.

minimized Truk' s va lu e lIS a supply bass. The

Fourth Fleet; Supply Base (which served both

urmy and navy) W(lS unable to complete its mis-

s ion af te r t he ini ti al r ai d in which. l osses included

prov is ion s, 7 !i pe rcent ; fuel , 70 pereen t ; a vi at ion

s tores, 65 percent; clothing, 60 perceut; and am-

Inunition, 35 percent. As I~ de fen se mea sure the

~'I lmll in ing ru:nrol~t ion.wus stored in d am p C (L Ve S,

and 40 petC0I!t of this was destroyed tlu·ough

detcriorn.tion.

As It fa1"1"Ydepot aud nil ba T ruk 10sL lts vulue

niter the Febl"lmry 1944 cllrrier attaek. Only a

hand fu l o f a ir crn. it were f lown th rougl l T rt lk f rom

the Bmpire. a defensive fighter base, it be -

came inefi'ecti ve in s urly May 1944, and its value

otally disappeared in June 1944. Aiter July

]944, only 35 ,.ircruft were based on Truk llJl~ of

rhasa only (I 0 [·7 were opemt iona l at ! lny one tOO!! .

IV. PHYSICAL DAMAGE AND AREA STUDY

This study was made OIl the eight lal"O"estand

mos t s trategically important islands in the Truk

gr oup-.Dublon, Moen, Etell, Purum, dot, Fefnn,

Ula lu , and Um,m. "tudy group members, accom-

plluied by Jltpullese l ia ison officers (1I1dinterprs-

ters, visited both dnmaged and undamaged in tal-

lations. At each instnllation tl1e Japanese officer-

ill-charge had prepared, ItS previously requested

u plan showing the origiunl installation and bomb

damage incurred. Unfortuna ely, i n. some Cl1SCS

the bet te r- infol"moo p arsonnel had J . , . n evacuated,

end only henr say informa ti on wa s ava il ab le; how-

ever, descriptions of raids, num hers of aircraft,

and damage resulting f rom al.tacks are Japanese

"ou the scene" " ! D . ions . Japun se wer extremelyCOUTteoUS und coopsrutive in answering quest ions.

Island l · O : 1 - d S were narrow and in extremely

poor condition. Almost !,U important buildings

had been deseroyed 01' extensive ly damaged, and

all available lana W1 under ult ivat iou .0 grow

vegeta ble s for food .

A.ccording to Survey team observations nod

Japanese information it uppears tha t:

(a ) The currier raid of 16-17 February, for the

most part, neutmlized ' I'ruk us a major enemy rUr

and naval base.

(b) The second carrier raid destroyecl the im-

po r t au t sho re inat al lu ri ons and complet ed the . d e-

s truct ion o f Truk as a major air base.(c) High-alt.it:nde bomber maintained, to. a

marked degree, the nautrnlization of T'ruk's U1r-

fields.

(d) The defeu asof fink, both [!Dtiuil"Cl;trl~ and

coastal were highly ovenuted and consisted

mos tl y' o f outmoded equipmen t.

(e) Af ter the 16-17 February carrier raid, the

Japanese had until 29 Apr·il to move underground.

Itappears tl1at they utilized this time to gt"llat

o .a vantllge.

Dublon Island

The or ig in al Fourth Communication~ Corp

ell tee consisted of several frame buildings on

concrete foundations, two concrete shelters for

radio receivers and rerno e-control transmitting'

pos it icn s, and two 30-met sl · s te el a nt enna towers.

Fir t damage occurred on 15 March 19H:, when

attacking B-24s jnflicted about 10 percent dam-

nge--pal"tially destroying 2 buildings. Addi-

tional bomber attacks occurred In June and Au-

gust 1944 and by the end of the latter month all

buildings were destroyed.

Fou rth F le et Headq ua rt er s cons is te d o rigina ll y

of th re e wooden bu il ding s wi th concret e fot ll "l d( l. .

ti ns. The fir t attack to administer rious dam-nge OCCUlTedon 1 April 1944. B-24:s using 500-

pound G. P. bomb destroyed. about 40 percent 0

t he bu il ding s, a lt hough about 25 percent r es tora-

tion was accomplished by 1 May. At che ime of

this attack, Fourth Fleet Headquarters was evacu-

ating tile building so damage was not seriou .

The accounting section took over the buildings

and during its tenancy a s cond attack occurred on

12 June 1944. Al though. bui ld ing s were pa rt ial ly

res to red even af te r this uttack, the greates t blow

wa to records and offi.ceequipment .

New Four th Fl eet . Headquarters was housed in

0PIlIl air buildings .10 by 30 meters with frame

cons truct ion, c oncret e foundat ion, wooden f loo rs ,

and corrugated iron roofs, Al though the c ar ri er

raid of 29 apl"il effec ted about 50 percent damage,

repair wus made ill 5 days. A.gain, 110We1i 'er,

records were destroyed and communications dis-

rupted.

:J!:ight frame barracks and three food store-

houses made IIp th fourth construction depart-

ment headq unr ters and bnrracks, Buildings were

f rnm e with concrete foundat i ons and galvanized

iron roofs, Located in the open, the unit was

17



au e asy bu. ·g et a nd 0 Iate .Ul1reh l!l ,b l, B-2J raid

caused 80 percent d truetion to the bnrrnck .

Warehouses wer e d tr oyed in May 19M. Fol-

l owing the :Ma rch raid personnel relocated bar-

ra I.5 areas in the bills and coustru ted shacks

from salvaged material, The mid on the ware-

house destroyed 1000 tons of r ice, 15 percent of

the i l I J 1 d grou p s total store.Ol-iginally, the naval base=Forty-fu (; Navul

Guard Un. it .- -inc luded one headquarters bui ld ine

l'.ig11tbnrrncks five !!lU"age~and one sick btLy.

Cr uhj'lg blows to this in tallaticn were ndmin-

istered on 29 April 11)# (20 percen t damage) and

in mid-July 1 ~ (60 percent damage). Bepau

were not attempted I I1ld per sonnel were d riven to

the hill where they cons truc ted sha cks f rom sal-

vaged material, On 30 Octo bill', 60 percen t o f t he

remll in ing bui ld ings were destroyed or damaged.

The finaJ attack made by B-29s on T August

des troyed 11bui ld ing s and par ti al ly des troyed a.Thi s o rgar ri za ri on ' wa ter supply system wa

eliminated by the latter raid. Fresh water had

been obtllined by a system of gutter s and piping

which collected min water from the roofs and

stored i t in concrete tanks . With the destruction

of the bui ld in it became nec essa ry to p ipe f resh

water from another source, and installation of

p ipi ag for till purpose took 3 months,

The transportation department, charged with

the r ponsibility of unloudins s upplies for stor-

agE! and redistribution, WIIS located in t he dock

urea and WIIS housed in l ight frame bui ld ings with

concrete foundat ions used lIS both wurehousas and

Iiving quarters.

Although fire bomb , which were used exclu-

sively a ainst thi5 i ns ta ll u ti on, de st royed only

seven buildings the mos t crippling damage was

against the water craft used for unloading sup-

plies. Of 50 sampans, 20 were destroyed I\11d 20were rendered uns erviceabla Three 10- to 15-ton

Diese l tugs IIJ1d six gasoline launches were de.

strayed. As mentioned previously in this report

lack ofpiel 'S or wharfs prevented direc t nuJoadin~

of large vemels Ddld t he los s of tlle sampans, the

best means of shuttling upplies £Z'om ship to

sho re, was a c ri ti cal one .

The Trnk fuel supply bnse consisted of four

10,OOO-tonk'lnks, one 7,OOO-tontank, one 2 OOO-ton

tank, ~d On 5~0-ton btnk. All underground sys_

t em p lped gusol in e to !lfue l-pump ing s ti lt ion on a

18

nearby pier where it was loaded on fuel barges

which refueled both surface erll£!; lind submarines,

The barg Ileet consisted origin~y of one 50?-

ton craft one 200-tol1, and one 50-ton. Pre-mid

transf er of the largest to Palau and des truction of

the 200-toll barge in t he 30Apr il c ar ri er raid leftonly th mallar barge for all refueling. The 17

February carrier raid wiped out 60 percen of thelank instnllntion and 90 per cent, or 16,000 tons,

of Truk'a entire fuel oil upply, Two 10,OOO-ton

t anks we re de st royed l ind several o th er s damaged

by f r ng1 11 lm t 1 1 01 e . A l IO t! JO I'lO,OOO-tontank and

the two mallest tanks were badly damaged in

April 194-1. Th pier fue l-pumping sta tion WIIS

destroyed by a heavy bomber mid late ill 19\14,

although the IT February raid already had

knocked out Truk comple aly as a f ueling station,One hanga r, approx imately 12 bar racks bui ld-

ill!!S seve ra l smal l r adio t ral lsmi tt ing bu il dings ,

and n field control tower made up the seaplane

bnsa, The f ir st c ar ri er r ai d reduc ed the f iel d oper -

at ing value to 30 percent o f t he or iginu l c apa ci ty .

A dir ect hit on the contr ol towel' by incendiary

bombs completely eliminated that fllcility and it

was never rebuilt.

Raids of 30 April and 1 May 1941 totally de-

stroyed the hangar lind 12 barracks buildings,

The a irfield opera ting capac ity, even with repairs,

never rose above 50 per cent of its original figure.

All major engine overhaul wa dons at the airsupply and repair department lind for that pur-

pose a number of hops compri ed the pre-raid

ms talla tion. Thes e included strnctueal repair,

p l"op~er repair, enz ine l :epl l; ir , inst rurnant repair,

welding, carpenter service, for ging, electric r e-

pal l' , o xygen generat ing and ref il li ng , sme Jt il lg ,

expl i,'e torage, three aircraft pare parts build-

ings, IL power p lan t, a nd f iv e bar ra cks .

Currier raids of 16-17 Febrnnry reduced the

usefulne ss o f t he repai r d epa rtmen t by 80 pe rc en t

when the s truc tu ral , propel ler , e ng ine, a nd ins tru>

men t repai r shops ! lnd two supply bui ldin! !S werecompletely destroyed. '"

The c ar ri er r ai d o f 29-30 Ap t' il comp let ely neu -

traliz",d the value of all r emaining bui ld ing s ex~

cept t he powe r pl an t 8 JJd the oxygen g ll ner ll ti ngplll;nt.

The ship repnil' ba , also known as the fourth

llnval dockyard, mnde emergency repairs on de-

s tl 'Oyer s l ind smal l \ ·essel s. I t wa kep t b .u sy p rior

to I,he r aids by.repairing s hips damaged by nited

Stlltes suhmarines 8n ~ n;fte r the mids by repairing

bomb dnmaae. ~t tlll.s IIlstl1.llation was a drydoek

en,pabl e of dock1 l1g ships of 2 ,500 ton s n lt houg ll i n

prnciJ '8 2,?DO t on wa the limit set by the Jnpa-

nes: Until J.O Febl'Illll'Y 1944 u repair ship was

Itl'uLlable but It departed with t.he fleet for PalauOJl tha t date,

TIllS ure a w u not attacked in the raids of 16-]7

FelmHlrY,bllt· it , did fore . the Japan e to move

the ship repair fa ' ilil.y underground, In 3months

II we ll -c nmonf lnged underground shop resul te d.

D spite this precaution howev r, ill 2f)-30 April

n tt ack c au sed n dal l1! tge o f upp roxima , ely 25 per -

cent a nd tl d ive -bombe r di rec t h it 011 the mnchins

shop de troyed 30 perc nt of the equipment nnd

knock d out the repair buse fOl ' a month.

The submarino bu e consi ted of II t orpedo re-

plenishing; adju,ting, and upply tation and

prncticallj' no overhaul or repair work was done.

This area was no hit in the Februaty 19M raids

und, [isw ith the s hip repair ba e, t he Jupunese im-

med iat ely began cons truc ti on of an unde rg round

tution for adjusting torpedoes , The submarine

base was first hit in the 2n-30 Api- il r ai d nnd sut -

fered 10' es of 40 percen 0 buildings find 25 per-

cent to torpedoes, In JUly the surface sta ion for

torpedo udjusting was hit und damaged. Subse-

quen t rn ids wiped it out completely bu the under-ground 8 tn t; O il was still ituct when the tudy

was made,

Moen Island

Moen No.2 airfield which wus [I. aplune base

prior to the 16-17 February 'o;rrilll' raid hnd a

single l lhstrip 1 ,000 meters long-Ql1e-thi l' ,l W!lS

concr te and two-third wns crush (1 rock. Ill-

stallution included 2 hunger s sever al mull udju-

cent l'IUlJPS, 2 control tntiOHS 10 bnrmcks and

misce llan ous struc tures.

Tni t i n1 dumuge wus sus t« ined by t hi s f ie ld elm-

ing the 10 FebnllH'Y lIN4 'aI Tjer rnid. Fourteen

p!ttnes, the entire field complement nt the illl,were ,set onrB by stl"llnng nml the field contr ol

I'ower WII comp let ely de t r·oyed . . One hange r was

t...ullJ' destroyed filld t,)10other reca l" ee l 0 percent

damage.

Fol lowi ll a t he f ir t a tt ll ck the Jop ll ll esemude no

at telllp l; to ~hl1bjlitate the field as a s eaplane base

but contiuued wOl"k on the lUI' trip with the idea

of using it as IL . fighte r &trip and elDe! 'gency fie lr l.

The raid of 29-30 April finished off almost nil

of the reruaining usable in tallations. III Ihi ut-

tack the bnrracks power plant lind torehouse

were completely d troyed. Repairs to the dam-

'(ga were never made Rlthough a new control sta-

I ion l ind '1 Jl w billet were con tructed, The con-

t rol t ut ic n WAS partly damaged und th new billet

corn pletely demolished in nn attuck of 1 Fehru-

'lry 1fI45. Th ail·liel ~ proper WIIS damaged III

on lhn. t date and could operate at only 60 percent

elliciency thereafter.

Moen ~o. 1 airfield, one of th most importantin the area, inc luded ,1 1 200 meter runway COIl-

structed of 4- to 6-inch thick r inforced concrete

and II total of mol' than 0 buildings uch as han-

g.•I"S, cont ro l s tat ion, b ar racks , a nd mi ce ll nneous

mall tru 'tures.

Moen o, 1 was first attacked on 16 February

19i4, when cnrrim- planes mad It sh'aling attack

on the parked planes, The attack, which cam as

n complete surpri e , destroyed 1 1 1most al l of IL 50·

plane contingent on the ground, about one-half of

which were shipboard-type plan 1 ft by a car-

r isr' which had departed "ball a week before.

A B-24 h ir rh a lt it ude Itt a ck, on 29 March I f) ,) ,4 ,

des troyed 10 fr ame bur-rack and fill uncompleted

hangul'. Of the barracks, six were burned unci

four were demolished. ix B tys were burned

011 the ground j n tli 29-30 April 19,),4 m id and

oue B tty and two fighter were des royed du ring

II raid ill :Mayor June 19-14. ubsaqu nt raids

were s o numer ous that the Japanese made 110fur-

ther e : ! i O l · t to k p t ra ck of the i Ie number nnd elf ct.

The longe t interval dw.·illg which tI,e field was

1l0~ operational was a 20·day paciod followina a

high nlritu Ie heavy bombardment in pril 19!5.

All 1"U i ds uecount ed for It total destrnctiou of 33

barracks, -wnrdroorus, '2 con 1"01 ration , '2 ready

1" am ,1 hnnear and 4 temr orarybnrrncks. Dum-

uged but no t dest royed were 26 temllOral"Y bar-

racks.

Eren Island

Tl lC uir st:ri p on E tcn I land "11 one f he be t

cOllsb'ucted ill the Truk I lund group. Its dimeJ1-

sion were 1 0 00 by 0 weters with a eU'culal' t l L ' \ U

loop COllDe ting t.he ends of the trill. Tbe stril)

was sudnccd with a 5·oontimeter thlckness of

Ilsphult-cemeut-l'ock mix on a olid. rock fill.

19



El IIs smull ize nllow d {Ot' few parking r evet -

meuts , Old el l rib-filled fuel drums, cnruoutlnged

wil h growing 1'3S-<;eS and vines provided some

prot et ion for the disper ed planes, TI le admin-

i st ra ti on b ui ld in g, adjac nt to the nirstri] . was of

modern des irru and of !lXt rn he9.VY re inforced

concrete eonstruericn.

TIm raids of 16 Febrnurv 1!)44 came with onlv

10 minutes' W lll 'l l ing to tl 1!1 Ju pa[w se on Et",;,Although damage to instnl lu tions wa only minor

the .Iupanese air force;in that sector of the theater

wn dea lt 9. crushing b low when 110 out of 200 V O 1'-

iou types air l"aft, awai ting fe rry p ilot nt Eten,

were trafed and burned. The attack on Eten on

17Febl'tllllj wn negligible. since these forl\ys were

pri rruu-ily against shipping, Although the air-

srr ip, which had undernone only minor damage,

\\"11 repaired in 2 days the taxi-loop wa 0 heav-

ily pock-marked that it repair never was at-

tempted especially in view of t he fact that repair

work was hampered by water seepage caused by

the small dif fere.nce between the f ield elevation and

the sea at high tide,

The next important mid took place on 1"March 194!, when hmvy bombers using 500 1,000·

pound genernl purpose bomb , caused the fo llow-

ing dnmaga : even plunes des troyed , 19 p lan

dlllDnged, and 1 hangul' damaged. Eight more

planes were d troyed and damaged by u B-24raid on 28 Mo..reh.

Th currier mid of 29-30 April "vir ually unlli-

lied this field for further operations when 11

f ighter pluues wen destroyed "II barracks de-

s trayed. 2 h'Lllgllt'S dcstroyed, 50 1 I . i rcra it enginesde troyed and the admini tration buildi ng dam-aged.

Param Island

, Aside frOID nnt ini rcr aft defenses, Pa ram a ir-

Ii Id. was the only im;t.allulion of impor tnnce 011

the )~nnd. Its runway, originally 1,200 1DC er~

long III January 19!!, WIlS l engthened to 1 ,430

meters by Api'll of thnt yenr to uccommodate

Iaruer ~hcrn1t. A taxiway wa compJeled:lt the

same time and by July 19!! 17 rev tments fOI"

sma ll p lanes and 3 for medium-s ized p lanes ~" Il r~

const ruc ted, Only smal l bnrr acks were bu i l t dueto luck of tir,neand maoorio,ls,

20

DllI·illg the J6 February r u i rl • • \ .me l ' ic .m plau~s,

lL"uHnglind bombing, el i posed of 17 J(lP'UI(!SCuir-

crnft OIl the gL"OlU\d,1 mess hu ll , and ; \ t rucks,

0111y "nil minor intervening T~ -2 4 mid oc nirred

be fore the curri er mid of 2 :1-30 Apri l, the e ffect s

of which deal t Ilcrushi ng blow to the island ta·

d] i t ie s, Six p lanes wer e des troyed 011 tJIG ground

by $tnlfu, lg, 4 (Oil of provision" 15,000 liters

of '" inrion !!llsolillll, lind 1 ton of engines andp'". p,u't were rendered useless. In addition.

d ivs bum bel'S rnnti luted the !'lLn\I·I1)' and tax i Wlty,

1 I' 1u (, h d o.magll wns anhauced by the dilliculty to

make runway repa ir 011 the i81"" ,1. In ."ddition

to the fact flUlt low elevutiou caused the bomb

crate rs L o lill with wntpr t he only I111'nnS o 'E L ' e p l \i r

I\"~Sto lilt ill i li e holes with c rushed rock, todiou 1)'

t ransported fr om another i sl and, TO s tock pile

() r crush ed rock had be e n established for 6JIJer-

:re l lcy und thi s oversight, too, added to slowness

of repair.

Consistent hurassi I1g high a lt itude bombard-

nwn.~ rni r. lJ. kept the l ip id i ll a s ta te. o f d isr epai r

whi 'h ultimately caused the J"'i'ilJlese 10 abnndon

their plan to use this field as a buse for gil icide

uttueks on ships nt Ulithi.

Felan Island

The n01'111111 eomplerueut of F fun was 2,700

lu',ny troops and l,50( ) navy personnel ( Including

some Jnpucnese and Korean civilian workers}.

sed principally us a SUIJply point , the i sland was

equipped with one of the best piers in the atoll for

unlonding SI\\Il.U O OR t an d insl"llittions included

10 provision wurahousas, 10 large ammunition

dumps and Ii tamporm-y ill dium sized umnnnri-

tion dumps.

,F fan o bv io usl y w as not a main target for any

r aid a lthough concen tr ated a tt ack on the Ih'St raid

!Duy ItILl'G wiped out, extensive supplies: especially

ammunition. since niter th initial raid ammuni-tion ws moved from open topped dumps and

tor ed in tunnel s lind caves 01 " t ransfer red to all-

other island.

Sight-l'uitli11g B-24s truck the ini ti al b low

against the i~an(~during the lat te r par t o f M9.rch

1?44. ~ll ammunit ion dump was dest royed by th~

direct hit, of the only bomb to strike the island.

On a second B-24 night t'll id in April another

laue 100mb set alire a provi tons IVII,l· house and

deStroyed ([,\1 ammunition dump.

'rile Mt'l"ie"l· mi d of 29-30 Apri! dsmolished two

open- type provi ion war ehouses, and .lUO her pro.

visions w!ll'eh?u ', In addition, dllmage W[lS i11-

f licted ~oan a.ir raid shelter !t11c1 a torpedo dump.

I ut er Jl ]l tt en t 1 '1 11 (1 6between May 1944 nne] July

1 94 5 n ce o un tc d £01' tInea opell-I 'J 'pe ummunieiou

dUl11ps, It sawmill, Ami a civiliun barrack .

UWu Island

A.JIY strategic value that mi"'h~ be attributed to

I;bis island Jay in th presence of its radio dire -

tiou-f inder s tation. This equipment WIlS used

solely £01' homing ail ' ·raft , and a continuou watch

was J10t kept-nor Wl\S moni tor ILlg a tt empted, AI -

tbot1gh t he e qu ip me nt \VIIS en y to maintain i

was not conside red dependab le or nCCUl'ate und i ts

succe ful operation depended 010 tly on the

abi li ty and expe rience of the opera tor .

Fi l'St n ttac k on this ilsto 11L t i011 WI lS a strafing

wave follow d by clive bombers 011 17 February

1044 which wiped out rhr eRDF units and burned

sever al war ehouses. The : ., 9-30 Ap ri l. C l U Ti er mi.l

destroyed all lnr rrueks unr l wllrehollsell , and Ivhi l l l

tlm I'Cmainulg RDF unit wus not knocked out its

VIII u e H Ireu tly h nd be e n d estroyed i11 the first

attack, a !though the one remaining unit could

till be used for lloming p U l· pO S S nnd I' certain

conditions,

Uman IslandMi1itm'y personnel 011 thi s i sl and was composed

of 1,330 navy nnd 50 army. Principal in tallu-

t ious of sh'jJ.tRgic importnnce were he rad io tr t l l lSr

lTDting station, IIrndur s tation, coest defense guns,

and a watch tow r for ubmarine loop",

Although the raid of 16-17 Fehrmll'. . truck

nea r Umun. und sunk seven ships e li I' rs er l 1 H ; ! U ' b y ,

Ibe island itself was not attacked until the carrier

raid of 30 April. LI thi s raid 011 t ransmi tt er

building was bum done demolished and nine

transmitter were destroye I. 'I'his effected vir-

tual tota l al imination of the tmnsmitt ing faci l-

ities since the radio station w as not rsparable and

was navel' replaced.



UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LlST OF REPORTS

The fol lowing ; ._~ biblio,gn>l'_hyof reports result ing fromIhe Su.~.y'.stu die s of th e Europesn "",0' Paetbc warsCortain 01these repor-ts may be purchased [rom the , U l>"r :Into"~":"t"f Doeuments etrbe Gevernrnent Printing Office,WJlsbil1gtOll.,D ,. C . Perm.¥oll to eaemlne the remaining"'ports may be fu>dby w rt tmg t o th eH l! ll d~I lA rI "m o f lh eSUIVey, t he p ,, "t ogo" , W"elL lngton 25, D . C .

European Wa.r

OFFICE OF THE CHAIR:\UN

The Unit ed S ta t e e S [. ",t q,i c Bomb ing Surve e- Sum"m"l)' Report lElltOpe8D 'IV at) -

2 Th". Uni ted St. at il 'S81ml "' ;0 Bomtl iDg urvev: 0 ," ", -"U RepOTt (E=pean \\-ar) .

3 The EHoom of Str ato gio Bombing "" lh e GmmanW n,r E<ooomy

AlRCR.~.PT Dr.'lSION

(By Divtoi<m and Branoil)

4 Ai•• mr~ DM.lon Ind ustey Report5 1ll9[>OOliol1 Visit> to \'snolL'l Targnll; (Special' R.opo,c)

A i: rf ra m es B : ra .D c _b

B Junk"", Alr.ra ft a nd Ae ro E1lgin e Wor k>! Desss uGermanv I I

7 Eda~"1" , -eh inc . ", .. " . ke C m to H Hel to,bH ek, Oerman8 "T C )1o.sehinen!mu, G m b 'H , J"';pzig (Mool;au)

Gmn!lnv I

100 Gc thae r \Vaggon.rnbrlk A COoth.. Oo,=y

Foeke lYulf Air~rn.ft Ffunt , B~amcnJ Germany-

{

OV"'"81J ReportII l>I""""",.hmltt Jl. 0, Part, A -

"u!l"burg, CCrutl!JlT Part, B

_ , , ' . . " - " p e D d io " " I, n, J II12 DCo rmor \-l-_~ru, Frtcdneluthaf<m & ~'hmich, Oem,,,,,y] 3 ~r!mtd Flescler Wer k " C m b H, Kn.sscl, G erman vI oJ . W reuer .N eustaedt or Flugae ugwe ekc, W ione, N c u -

.lJId 1" A ""Iria

Aero Eng]neo Branch

1 5 B"~Dg NAG. Ph,g"wi.orenwer k~ G m b H llr llDS-"., ek, Gennnny ,

16 M~~,; ,~)~\!ta.hQ l\Iolorcnw.,ke a m b H, '1'U"ohn,

1 ' ' 7 B I 1~ a :. rj un ~ r ot or \ V or ks T : nc , E . L: m 1l 8 cl t & . Du:rr~r}mrGe.M .I1o.oy . -,

IS Bny"riocbe Mo(ur onw".ka A G (13~IW) M" nioll_ G4J r lt l .n :ov t

19 fl<m'OI101 1 ' 1 " gmtI\Oren work. , }(_ol, G"rmtl.ny

Ugh! M " ta l ' B .r ..n<b

20 Light Io-Iotal. InduBt, y{Pl Ir t I A luminumor Germany Pnrt It, Mn!!ll""luru

22

21 , \ " r " e . r e i n i g t c Deu l sc h u l I e !; I !. t ti , ~ ·, c .r k j) , Iltldcshcim, (Jer-

IPQI\Y22 , \l et angu", ,~ Il ';Ql ta .r t. GIn b 11, ' ", II '. IK , GermanyZ3 _~Ium.i"il!m,,-crk G ttl b H , P lnnt ).l". 2. llj~t"rlald,

CPJrm1l.n :}~

2 ~ , G c bn ie ! l< ; r· Ginti,,; G m b I I, L u dw l gs h nf un Ocrn:mnr'2;; L"ft""h.ilfb~u Z o_ pp el ln G m b 11" ~'tlcclri.h.h"ren

all Bodensee, Geno:ii.:n,·28 Wlemod Wer!. :e A G, Ufm, Oer", ', ,1Y27 R "dol p h Ra u ta nb ach I ",tcltmelJ\n!ll~_ rol en , Sol !n-

_ gen, GermanyZ S L ip pu we rk e Ver e inig : t e A l um i 1' Ji uH l \" 'c r k! ,. l A 0, Lnnon,

Germ.&IlY29 Ver ein lg te D eu ts ch e ~ [" ta tl w"t ke , H edde rnho lm ,

GormruLj·30 DU""D~rMotall \!""rke A G, Duren Wi~\elm"-.B,, tl i"

" , f . : '~.tulen~ Germany

AREA STUDIES DIVISION

31 A .. .. S tu di .. D iv is io n Repor t32 II Q"!8i1ec:1 Studl' of the ElI •• " , of Are l l Bombingon Hamburg

33 A Det ail ed S tu dy o f t.ho ElIoel~ or Aren Bomhingon WuppetUlI

3 '1 A Det ail ed S tu<l .v o f ~h " Em" cls o f A_ ro ll B ombingon Dueseldorf .

35 II Detailed Stud)" of the mfe. ts Qr Arn" Bombingon&Ii"So"

30 A Detailed Stu<! r of the EI f ec I, of Aro< >Bombingon Re rnsobe id .-

37 II DoWiled BLUdy o f rhe 11:ffacts o f Ar "a B om b ill gon DSTm!i!ndt

3S A Detailed Study Q f th..E;ff"ol~ of Area Bombingon Lubeck ~

ag A I !r i~ 1 S~udy Q I th e E IJ "" t,, . o f A re a Bo,n iJ in g onBerlln, Au~gsl:IlI.rg! DOU~UIl:U., r~ipz.igr Hagen, Dort-I II 1 1nd I Dber hnu BCD, Se l l "VCI n fu r t, ill]d B OO .m a11

CIVl].JAN DEFENSE DIVISION

JO Ch' il ia o Det en se Di vis io n-Fin n) R epor l,4 1 Cologn . Field R"pe r \

~2 Bon', Field ]lepnrt48 HilO)ovI>rFjold-RaporL

44 H n " : l ' O b l l r g F;cld.R"J><'rt -Vol l, Text· Vol IT E"hibllJ8:~ n.u. ld.. loe FIeld Report ' ," Augsbu rg Field Uope , ~

41 llcoopt.Ji01l A.ro:as i f . ! B.[I:,varia., Ce.rmn.ny •

EQUIPMENT DIVISION

HIc clrl.oJ Branoh

~~g~~~~:n~~,~iir!~ b ~ ~ K r . . ~ ; ' bi~~~!!r~llt"p_ort- "" LJ w.J ' G e r m _ P o n y

Optic.] and h o"'81on l"llr ume nl Br a~ch

50 Opli"",l and Proei$io ll l!l.tn.tmen~ l- d " Rn u.s"ry epoFL

Ab.ushes Branch

M Tho 0 crml>n Ab,,,,,; ve I ndu s ky.' i2 , ,' Ia_ve , and SchmIdt, OlTcnb l lch on Ml>in" G."",,"y

An tl- Fdel ion Brnneh

r ,3 T llo a crm, ," Antl -, Ftl cWnn Bea rin gs j" '!UB I 'y

Maehi ue Too t. B ra nch

64 l I' ll l"h~ ll e Tool. & M~Qhio'"r)' II.'! Cnpitnl Eqllillmc"t55 l \' fl lch; "" Tcol Inc l\ l" try tu Germ~oy

,;6 H"rwal\ Kolh ce, Cologne, Cerroa,,),57 Col le t . . nd .E l1g~lhn ,d , OlJc l I "<lCh , Germtllly5 8 N fl :' -i :O :SUnlcn, ' Fr ll nk r. or L o u :v rn i n . J Germany

MlLlTAItY ANAI.YSIS DIVIS10N

oll 'I'll" l le r. ,i l. ~ of ~bc G."nuTI Air Force60 V -Wcapo !J " (Cros sbow ) Campai gn61 Nr For"e l in[.(l of Operat ion62 Well t her Factors in Com b at, Born bardm Of! I' 0 pnrn-

t io ll s i ll t he Europeau TheaLnla 3 Bombing Accuraoy, USAAF IIea"y and Medj"",

Bomber s in the ETOM Descr lptlon o[ ItAF BombingMil The Ilnpsot o r th o A ll ie d A ir E lf ot l o n Go rman Log -

i'stic;s

Mo.RALE DIVISION

Mil Th e E ff "" _,, , o f S tr at eg i" Bomb ing on Ge r" '" " Morale-Vol. I & II.

M.d!."1 Branch

65 The Effect o[ Bombing on Health and Medlcul Ca rein Oenllil-ny

MUN1TfONS DIVISION

Heavy Indua!ry Brnnah

66 Tile Ca k.lng I ndustry Report 00 Go.rmanl'67 Coking Plnn\ fuiport No.1, Soe~ion" A, II, C, & D68 GU\choffnll"!l' Ilmelto, Q'be.rh""O<lll, Germa",,·69 Prledr'ich~AI[tcd Huette, Rh~in.btn~se.nj Germany70 Naunklrehen . E iS ( !: lH v' l ar k e A G, Ncunkir chen , Ge.r~

mauy71 Reiehswerke Hermann Goering A G1 Hnllendorf,

G-ernlnny72 Augw.t Thyss "1I Hueute A G, H"",born, Germany73 Friodrich Krupp A G, Burback PI~n~, Esson, der-

m o a n } !74 Dor tmund Hoe rdor HI l. tl c,w er ei. n, I I C, Dc rhnund ,

German)'75 Roesch A G Dor tmund, Ge rr ueny70 Boehume r "Olrein ruer Cuss tn hlJ a:b r;k aUon A G :

Bochil,m, Germany

Molor Vehieles and Tanks Br anch

17 G "rm a" Mo!.or V"l1i cl cs l nd "s" ' )' I IeI,,,r l,78 Tank Indu"(,,' R~rt7 9 Da ir olo r DO,Dz· A G. U nt cr tu rk .b ei ~u ~ G or r1 .l an _y , .80 T\on""l t Motor V"b .; cl es l' IImt ., BUI""L" ,, ,, t, Pu".81 Adam Opel, . T \ussel sna; "" q"nna J1\ _ ~ _

82 DIl j" ,l .r Banz-OnU""au \\t.or1;;5, GIIIl,onall, ~i<)rmuoysa MnsohiMIl[abrik , ,-ugsb"'l!·NuJ'llbo,g, NtlI'nbc"'g,

Co.rmany8 4 A ut .o Uu iol :L A G ! Ch ,e mn i~: ;r ,; a :nd Z",";CkllH , Oermll.u:y

85 H"m;: .hel , .."SOhll , . .Kassol, O()rmun), .SO Muybnch ;V [o i. or WorkS, ])',iedrlob.hafen, Germany87 VoiI\Ma.nd"t, l I'III£Ohi"ell iflb,lk A G, Plonell , Germanys a Volk.w,,~enw<:J"ke, Pnllc,sleboll, Germany80 BLl~[ng NAG Brun."3;wiGk~ aerL~.ilny . ~90 Muohle .n l" ,,, I nd ,, "t1 :, e A G (M, ug l B ," "f \S ",c k, G er -

0. I P ' r ? r ; d ~ ~ hKrupp GrIISPTDw,erko, i r . , lngdebL l1 "g ,Gr . : : ; rnmny

. submarino Branch

92 German Bubmar inc Indus tr y Boport,93 Mns"bin"n[~brik A"g.bu-g-Numherg A G, " - " g > -

bll"g' , C"'-!l1any94 Blohm amIVo611Shll'),arda, Hamburg, COrmAny95 O. utscbcwerkc A G, Kid, G. rrnn " Y96 Deu ts ch e S .I !. iI J \IO ldMeachl nenbnu , B remen, G er -

)!]BUY

07 Fri .edr ic .h Krupp Gerrn .aniO\wern , K ie l, Germany98 Howaldts wer ke A G, Hambur g G.ron n"y99 Submari r, e A", e" ,b l~ · ShelLer , )~I lrge , Germnny

I 00 Bremer Vol k no, VegCSllcIt, C e r ma ny

G rd ne nc e 'B rp ,n c: h

tOI\02

tU3

IO~105106

107I D S

o rdnance Industry Repor tF ri ed ri oh K rupp 0 -usonwe rk e J\ a Magdeburg,

CermanyBochumer Vcreln fucr GUS8t"hlfnbrik"Uon A G,

B n cl iu rn O e )" ]] la _ n_ yHellllc._hOlI & < Soho, K"",oJ, GermanyRhelnmetalt -Borsig, Du sseldorf, GermanyHermann Goerl ng \Verke, Braunschweig, Hal lendorf.

GerrnnnyH l l n .f i ov e r is c b e : M e s e h fu e n bau , Hanover, GermanyGusst ah lfebrt k Fri edri ch KrOlPP, Essen . Germ.nn) '

OIL 'DIVISION

109110

111

011 0\viel Oil , l~innl ReportO il D ivfs ion. , F inal Repor t, AppendixPo.",der, EXP1".S'V<liI ' lSpeciol Rockets 8ndJet Pre>-pall ~D ts, War Oases 6 nd Smok e Anid (M i Dis lew IR epor t # 1)

Unde rgrou nd a nd Dlspers nl PI ",,! .. In Greater Ger -

'1'h~a6~rlDnn Oil Industry, "'linisteri~1 Repor'~ Team

78~.Jinlsterial Repor t on Chemicnls

112

113

114

Oil Brano.h

115 Ammonlukwerke ~I e"",b urg G m b H, Leuna, Ger -m&ll)'-2 AppendioC$

B raunkohl e B en siu I I G, Z elt z u nd Boh le n, O.rmnnrW'"le:rs.hai l A G, LUIltt.kend.orf, Germany

Lud '.i~ fe n-O ppa u -Wurks or r G Farbc"j,.,d u s L r i eA C, Ludwigl ihafen, CerIna.uy

Ruhroel HyO'rogenntioLl Plant, Bottrcp- Bo y, Ger-

many, V01 I, Vol. IIRlleMrus ussng MUI"",loeiwerh A 0, HarburgRefinery, Hamburg, Germany

Rhaun uia Ossa g. M ine raloel werk. A 0, Gr(ljjbro<! kReBDer) , Hamburg , Germany

Rheoani a Ossag Miu . .ral oo lwe,ke A G, Wllh" lmabL"g

Refill.ry, H.atuburg G ermany . •Ce,,"erk..ohnft Victor, C l li lt ro p -R a .l l xe l ., G c rl l l& D Y , Vul.I&: VoL II -

E ll " , paei "oha To" kl. ager l lnd Tr: o. ospo . .t I I G, R"m.bnrg.t G-ermnny -

Eb sL lO A" I ,u n l t Wcrke A G, l I.arburg ReGnery, Ham-bUl"g, Germany

M"""rbeok RheiDpto<W3QIl Syohhatic Oil Plnot-Vol.l&: Vol . n

H6

117

118

119

l~ O

.12!

122

)2-3

12~.

125

Rubb . . , B rauch

126 D~utscho DUl110P GUl l. l. Ii li Co .• H_s.mlu on. ~[.o.iu.

Cermany127 Couulnent io.l Gummiwerk<>. gnnov,, -r, Gel"mm,y12S Hne I . S yn th eti Q Rubbe r P la ntJ29 Nli"l.L"rbl R"por~ on O"r=n Rubber Industry

2 3



Propullunts Braneh

13 0

lal

EI"k trochcm lsehewerke, III" nlch Gorum"'"Soho"",cb.ok E."Plosh·~ Plnn I. l igtl . ,a. .S p ronl!"toffWork" G onb H , B ad So. l, emon Go r tn "ny

Pla"t:o of Ilyn"mit A G Vo=l, Alfre d Nor' ol &; Co,Trolsdon ClfLl ls thnC, Dmrumel !Uld Dunaberg,GorL l l an ) '

D o" ts e b o S Pr il l, g ch er nl e G o n b II, K ""Ihn.g, G .,,,,,,oy

13 2

133

OVER.ALL EGON01l 'I IC EFPECTS DIVISION

134 Over-nil Economic EIf.cts Dlvlslcn Report,

G ro ss N atl ounl . .P ro d,, «t ,, }SPO?C i" " 1'''1'.'''Krieg"""ilb.ri~It\. __ • _ __ . _ whio:h togetherECInean Goe .r lng Works •_ w com prise theF o od fill d A g - r :i c u l tu re ' OJ beve oopOrL

In dustrlal &los au t pu t a nd P ·r od ".til'i~)

PHYSICAL DAMAGE D1VlSION

ECONOM1C STUDIESL8~ D l ! . ltnler-Bcn Zi A G, ~'lilnuoun, G e nn a u yIS5 Sy!1!ha ti o Oil P laut , Me. rb<tok·Bamburg , O .""a l'y186 Cowor'"oIulIt Viator , Cn:ltrop:Rauxel, G""ffia!lY[57 Kleckner : a: "" ,bohlt n,mt., Ulm,. Gormany·ISS nu l l , . . , " ' Hydrogenat ion Plant , Bot tr?p-Boy Gormnny[159 Naukl rehen EiS<!n\verke A G, Nuukt rchen, Geron . ."yJ 00 ruil,. ..y Viaduct a t A lt enb"~k .n , Germ. .."y191 Rai lw . .y V i ad uc t a.t Am.lmrg, Garmany192 De"r. ng-Norng I le fi neri es , Mlsburg , Germany193 Fi"" Raids on C err uan CiUco104 1 -G Faroonindustrie, LudwigshM.", Germa"Y, Vo l I

" " V ol U!O5 Roundhous e i n Mar sh al li ng Yam . U lm , G ermany196 . I G Farbcndustr ie , Leverkusen, Germnn) '197 Ch.mi .oh . .. .W.rkn , Heuls Corman) ,IgS Gromb<:rg M!>J'i; lmll ing Yard, Gremoo,g, Germany199 Loc cmoti ve Shops and B rid ge . a t U ",mm, Ge ,m an )'

Aircraft OI"ls.lo"

15 ' Ih o J al 'n ~" "" A ir or af t J ndus tr yIG Mit",,,b,,,l,, U.a"l:.lud"stries, L!<I.

e or p or/l!ion ft"l,o,t No : I(Mtsub'.·Bhi.r"KOgyo KK)(Ai,frames & EngiM")

17 N<l ku j. lm a A ir er nf , CompMy , L td .Carporafiml Ihl""1 No. II

(N"knjinlll HikoH. KK)

(ALr(,a:m.. & . Engin",,)1S 1(a", ,1O; .h i A ircral t CompanyCDrpo,ul"i<m Re, ," ,! No. I II

(Kl1wn"i.9hi Kokuki Kabushlk; Rai .lon)(Airframes)

10 Kllw"",ak', Aircmft In<iuJ;tti", Compnny, 1 " " .Cor'Pora! ian 11 , .PQr~ N o . .I 7

(I(,,'" usa I< i Iro kuk i Kog)'o Ka,b" ,hi k!1{aiil!Ul.)

(AMramo8 & . "Engiyc~)

20 Alchi AJro,,,,rt Comp'''''YCO'l, .rfl!im,_n. 'pork No. r'

(Ai.hi ltoHuki I{I{)

(Aic['''mos & . EnginCl<)

21 Sumltnmc M~te. l Industr lea, Propell er j ); "i :S ionCarpnratM1l Roporj N». VI

(Smn: it onJ 0 1(1nsoku I{ogyo JOe, P uropornSai.o.hol '

(I'ropoll"",,)22 Hitnch. i A.irarflft Compnny

Corpo,."t io" l~.l'.rlNo . v IfCIIitO-ahi hokuld KK)(.Airfrom,," & EllgiP".l

2 3 J ap an Int er n .. ~i oD lll . Atr Industries, Ltd,Co r po r a t' (m R e p. r l No. ]FIll

(N. ippon Kokusni J{okto 1(0gyo KK)(Ai,.r,,,,,ncs)

2~ J ap an MUI<jc al I n str ument Manuf ao tu ri ng CompanyCo r potation Rc p ort N o, I X

(N;PPOll o . , : k ki &i"o ICK)(P,,,pclln,;;)

25 Taohikawa Air"r !l .r~ Comp"") 'CQr poru! ; on Repor t . 1 \ 1 0 . X

( 'Iacbi bwf> Hil<oki I , KJ(AIrframes)

2ti Fllj i Airl>l<mc Com pun yCorpo ro i iQ" r'.pvrl N o. X l

(Fuji Rlkokf _[(1{)

(Airfr"'ffies)'27 Bho\\ IH .AirphJ.l le Compull j'

Corpcralio" 'R"p'0rt .No. XII(Shown Ibkok, !<ogy<> KK)(A-"fralles)

2 8 T s hl :k u .w n .j il n a. A i r cr a ft Industrles Company , Ltd,

C" ' l I or" t~Qn l?op'or! No. JlllJ, ,.' .

118111awallin" K 0I", I, ogyo h"b""lu k,

Kalsha)Engines)

2g. N ippou Ai rp lo . : n e Co n i p n n yCorpor!';!ian E , , ;pp r !No . XII'

(1 '111'1'0", Hil lok RK)(AirrrlUll0tl)

30 l \: y" .\ 1" Ai"pl ll .no Comp'll1SCO"~o,"tio" 1I01'0rt 11 ' o~Xr

(Ky".hu Hikok KJ()(AirfraDl<lll)

.1\ rllooda Etiglroeerinp; Compo,,),Curp.ro!im' l i a l ' " F r No. X 1'1

(SI><,da Sc,"aklljoj(Compo,,""t;,)

: 12 ' ). oI l~ B . k . u . AitCi.r!).n II I d Ufl~l''iC~COI '1Jr J( "aNm~R t lU ) rt N ( J, Xl~!l

PJl ' . . . .k . a I <oku T{og),o l{nbu.bik; J{nistn)

(O,}ll1 I'one" \ - " l

TRANSPORTATION DlV1SlON

200 The Effe"!" or SLrategic Bombing o:n Gnrmnn T'81l '-pcrtation

R l ii I Op "" ,UO IlB OOQT tho Branner POSl IEJJcots of Bomhmg on 1l:ailiQa.d I ns ta ll a t io ns inRegensburg, N~rDb"rl! and. Mun!oh Di-vision.

Ge rman Lcoomo tt va I ndus tr y Dur in g t he WarGerman M. l1 l tru"y R a il ro lK l T rn - ff i e

33 Ni.... n Auto~obil" Comp_,.nyCo r pu r a ! . o" I I 6'M,j No. X ' " II j

IN;.sa,, Jldosun KK)Engln . . j

34 A, ,, ,y .A 1r A rs en al & . Navl Air ,Depot"C. ' fT o ' a li l ; n R epQF I ' } ;o . X I X

(Ai rf ,ames und Engin es)35 .lapau Airo,af\, Underground

a G Con i a nd Me! .a IB i n J ap "" 'o War "Economy

Capil alGoods , E qu ip tn en l. nd Co~. !r ue li . .n ·D lv is ic n

37 The Jnpnnese Const ruct ion Industry3S Japanese Elect ri ca l E 'l ui pmerot39 Th".J n pn n e se Mac hip e Buildln s In dustry

Elect ri c Power Oiv i-", on

40 '_r ll~ 'Rle c < ri c Pow. r 1"dustry of Jail'" nH The E1e"~rio Pow", 10dustry of .r "1'0.0 (Pinn t M-

ports)

4 2 The J8P~nc" " War ti cr n" S ta nd a,d o f L iv in g and U tiU-z a : t : i o u o f ! 'V 1 .a npc we r

Mililary Supplies Dlvlaien

43 .J"panes" W" r Prnd uet ion Industr ies44 Japan ese N""al Ordnanc e. : 1 5 J ap an es e Army O rdna " ..46 Jnpnnese N a,val Sbipbu Ud'o.g47 Japanese :Vlowr 'vehicle Industry48 JBpan ese Marehnn t Sb ipbuhdin g

a ll an d Cb e mleal D i"'lsi On

40 Chemicals in Jupau's \ , V n ;S O Cl,emio.als in J'M'uJ)'. War-Appendix51 Oil in J ap an 's \1 a e52 Oi l ln J ap "" '. War -Append i"

Over . .all Eeenumic Effects Divislon

5 3 Tho Elf ec;'" of Strategic Bombing all J"Il;"n'. ,I '"arEconomy ( In el ud ln g Append ix A: U . 1 : > . EconomicI nf ell lg eu ce on JnpoD-Annly si • a nd Comparison:,IPl"'lldh: B: Gross National Prcduet on Japanand J]s Cornponents: Appendix C, St .. tistical

SO" rces),

Tru .ns p 01;la ti 0 n D iv is lo n

M The 11'" r i , gnin.t J"I"ll.\OSC Trnllspoctatio,.\, t94J-1945

Urbn:n Areas Divis io!l

55 Eli", ,!" or Air Atlack On Japo"""" Urb<m ECODOID.!

(SUlnma r}' R,oport)55 BiTnet!! of AIr A~tnck On Urea" Coo 'p l"" Tokyo.

Knw ......ki- Yokuhama57 Ef fe cts o f . t\ _irAt """ " on Ibe 01" ', o f NBgDl '' '58 Bff oots of Air Ac""e" 0!1 O""ka-Kobc-Kyoto. 5 \ 1 Etfcol1<of i , - " Att ack on th. e Ct~ l' o [ Nagasak i~O ElJe"w or Air Attn.k On tlon Clt~·Q I Eire.hi",,,

25

201202

20320·)

205206207

20 8

UTlLITlES .DIVISION

C",man EI. "t ,i o UtlUl losl ndustry Repor ."I t o 10 i ll Vol I "Ut il it iC ll<Divl si cn PI8nt Repor ts"U to 20 in Vo l n ''U Lil lt les Division Plant RepOlts"2 1 Rhe ln i • • h c-Wc .t r" li sc he E l. kt, hil .. .e tswe rk A G

Pacific Wl l r

OFFICE OF 'THE C llAIRI IUN

I Summa,y Mport (Pa.ific War)2· Japun '". Struggle to End The Wa r3 Tho Effeots of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshim .. and

NnS)lMld

CIVIL.IAN STUDIES

Clvilia_1lDefense Division

Fie ld ~"p(l rt Cover ing Air Raid " ro tocHOl l und Allkd. S u b J e e t s, To kyo, Japao

5 Fwl d Repo rt CO' ·. ri ng A ir R ai d P ro te cuon and A ll ie dSubia" . .. , Nagasaki , . rapatl

6 Field l_l .cl'ort Covering Air ROlidP.,o!""tioTI and All i!il l. subl ec ts , ~o, to ,. Japan

7 F ,e l d ~~ "poF tCover in g A ir R ai d P ro lectlon and AlUed_s "-0Jcc\s, Kobe, Jnpan

8 l /, el d. l_ l. cpor t Cover ing Alr Raid Pro tect iou and All ied

SubJeot., Os . . k o . , J pauo Field l_l.cpo,' qov".ing A'ir RaId Protectien aud All ied

SubJccts. n " " . W m a , Jl>pnll-No. 1 -10 S"~ry Rcport .Covering Air Raid p·"'~".tioll and

.All ied Sublcots III .1 npmnFmal Ml"'" Covering Air Raid Protootio" undIIIIied 8\1bjM.ts ItoJapan

II

!If.d i ea l D lvMo n

12 T~e Elfe, ot s of Boml) il !g "1 0 RoalOh lind Mildiom!S", ,' _13 '""" tn J.ap(ln . v

The Effccu.. of }~tomk. Bombs 00 BoalLh and MedioolSa,vlo08 U1 R,roshhna and N"I!(l68~i .

Mo.ale Dlvlaion

14 The Elf"" . . o fS l r" ,t eg ic Bombing QnJ" IIU"""" MQml"



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10 '4&' TRUK ISLAND GROUP

1I.t. ull.iittlC 'O.... I'NI SUnl'

USSBS Report 77, Reduction of Truk

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Transcript of USSBS Report 77, Reduction of Truk