USSBS Report 19, Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company

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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Kawasaki AircraftIndustries Company, Inc.

(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)

CORPORATION REPORV NO. IV(Air Frames aod Eagines)

Aircraft DivisionMay 1947


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THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Kawasaki AircraftIndustries Company, Inc.

(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)

CORPORATION REPORT NO. IV(Air Frames and Engines)

Aircraft DivisionDates of Survey:

10 October-29 November 1945Date of Publication:

May 1947


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it. a. SUPERfNTENDtM Of OOCUMENTS

This report was written primarily for the use of the United States StrategicBombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensivenature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be con-sidered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to furtherintei'pretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.


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FOREWORDUiiili'il Stiitos St.i-alcgic IJoinliinsj,- Sui-voy

estnl)lislK'(l by the Secretiirv of War on :!1044, pursuant to a directive from tlie

Roosevelt. Its mission was to eon-an impartial and expert study of the effects

aerial attack on Germany, to he used inwith air attacks on Japan and to

a basis fur evahiating the importance])otentialities of air power as an instrument

strategy, for planning the future de-of the United States armed forces, and

future economic policies with re-to the national defense. A summary reportsome 200 supporting I'eports containing the

o( the Survey in Germany have been15 August 194.5, President Truman re-that the Survey conduct a similar study

eflects of all types of air attack in the warJapa)i, submitting reports in dupHcate to

of War and to the Secretary of theThe officers of the Surve}' during the Jap-

phase were:Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Ale.vander, Vice

Chairmen.Harry L. Bowman,J. Kenneth Galbraith,Uensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,Fred Searls, Jr.,Monroe F.. Spaght,Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,Theodore P. Wright, Directors.Walter Wilds, Secretary.Survey's complement jH-ovided for 300350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The

miiitaiy segment of the organiziition was drawnfrom the Army to the extent of 60 percent, andfiom the Navy to the e tent of 40 percent. Boththe Army aiul the Navy gave the Survey allpossii)le assistance in furnishing men, supplies,transport, and information. The Survey operatedfrom head(iuartei-s established hi Tokyo early inSeptember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with mobileteams operating in other parts of Japan, theislands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartimeJapanese military planning and execution, engage-ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign,and to secure reasonably accurate statistics onJapan's economy and war-production, plant by])lant, a id industry by influstry. In addition,studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-tegic plans and the background of her entry intothe war, the internal discussions and negotiationsleading to her acceptance of uiiconditional sur-render, the coiu-se of health and morale amongthe civilian population, the effectiveness of theJapanese civilian defense organization, and theeffects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports\\ ill be issued covering each phase of the study.The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa-

nese military, government, and industrial officials.It also HH'overed and translated many documentswhich not only have been useful to the Survey, butalso will fui-nish data valuable for other stucUes.Arrangements have been made to turn over theSurvey's files to the Central Intelligence Group,through which they will be available for furtherexamination and distribution.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

KAWASAKI CORPORATION(Corporation Report No. IV) p^ ^The corporation and its importance in the aircraft industry. _ , .1Tlie air attacks 4Production statistics 5Intelhgence evahiation 9Reference item 9Appendix AAir-frame and engine production 1 930-39 14Appendix B Organization chart .. 14Appendix CFaciUty locations ' 15Appendix DEmployment statistics IGAppendix EAir-frame production statistics facing page 16

KAWASAKI KAGAMIGAHARA(Plant Report No. IV-1)

The plant and its function in the aircraft industry 17Effects of bombing 21Intelligence check 23Vulnerability 23General impressions of plant inspection and interrogation 23Reference item 25Appendix APlant expansions ^_ _, 34Appendix BOrganization chart 35Appendix CProduction flow chart facing page 36Appendix DCritical shortages in accessories 37Appendix EBomb plot facing page 38

KAWASAKI AKASHI(Plant Report No. IV-2)

The plant and its function in the aircraft industry 39Effects of bombing '. 46Intelligence check 53Vulnerability ._ 53General impressions of plant inspection and interrogation 53Reference item 53Appendix APlant lay-out before raid of 19 January 1945 facing page 56Appendix BOrganization chart 57Appendix CEngine production No. 1 facing page 58Appendix DAir-frame production . No. 2 facing page 58Appendix E 1-2-3-4Bomb plots . Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 facing page 58

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CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

KAWASAKI CORPORATION(Corporation Report No. IV)

ooiHiJUiiy occiii)i(Ml the Tuunbor thi'eo placeaircraft iiiclustvy. In over-all produc-

accounted for 17 percent of the combatand 12 percent of cotnbat engines

in 1944, the industry's peak year,3,217,814 squaie feet of productive

floor area and 2,155,680 square feet offloor aiea before the air raids. By the endwar, aii' frame floor area in pi'oduction was

to 100,000 square feet and enguie floor1,202,300 square feet,

production went to the Aimy. Kawasaki'sairplanes were Tony (Ki-61 antl Ki-100),

fighter in liquid-cooled and radial-engineresembling the Me-109; Lily (Ki-48), a

bomber with two radial engines; and Nick,twin-engine fighter (Ki-45) in conven-

and night-fighter vei'sions. Randy (Ki-102)

,

toward the end of the war, was aimproved Nick.company's own engine in various models

liquid-cooled Daimler-Benz design, manu-under German license (Ha-60, Model 22

Model 33). At Army request late inthe company manufactured Ha-35,

21, a Mitsubishi radial developing 1970at take-off. Both radials were shipped

I\oizum.i plants for use in Oscarfighters, respectively. The Ha-115

destined foi Ki-115, the Nakajunaattack plane.corporation was a completely owned

of Kawasaki Heavy Industries Com-Ltd. The aircraft division of the parent

was organized in 1918, and for the firstof its existence conducted its manufactiu'-

in the facilities of Kawasaki HeavyCo., I^td., at Kobe,

1937 au- fra.me manufacturing activities werefi-om the parent corijoration and a plant

at Kagamigahara, north of Nagoya. In

early 1939, engines mainifacluring also was se])a-rated from the Kawasaki H(>avy Luhistry facilitiesand a plant was started at Akashi just west ofKobe on the Inland Sea. A subsidiary unit of theair frame division, operated under th


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in southeast Kvuslui iind ;it Icliiiioiniy!) hotweenNagoya aiul Ciifu.

In addition to Aivasbi, other ])hmts producing-ronii)lete engines were at Takatsiiki, halfway be-tween Osaka and Kyoto, and at Futami about 2f)niiU^s west of Kobe. The Kobe casting andforging and the Sakai casting and forging sub-sidiaries also operated under the engine division.Through the late 20's and early ,'50's the com-pany received sizeable Army orders, ]iromi)ted bythe impending Chinese war, which built up to a1,000-unit order for type 98 light bombers in 1935.Kawasaki was apparently strong in Army favor,even in those days (Appendix A), However,there was a tendency, almost a well-defined policyon the part of the company, to keep the govern-ment's influence as small as po.ssible. In factKawasaki at first was in a position to refuse cer-tain types of work from the government, as in1943 when the company turned down an Armyinvitation to undertake experiments on jet androcket planes. Toward the end of the war, how-ever, because of failure of its own liquid-cooledengine, Kawasaki was being forced by the Armyto manufacture successful Nakajima and Mitsu-bishi designs,ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONManaging director of the company was Masa-

yuki Nemoto, a forceful executive who, in additionto his management duties, directly supervisetl thecompany's engine-manufacturing activities. Hisimmediate subordinate was Hisashi Tojo, brotherof Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime i)remier. Tojowas manager of the company's air frame manu-facturing plants.Tokyo representative of the company and

government liaison man was Sei Yamasaki.This man spent 5 years in Germany during whichtime he negotiated a licensed agreement forKawasaki on the Daimler-Benz engine. Thesethree men were the dominating factors in thecompany's operations (Appendix B), All werecooperative in furnishing requested information.

Examination of the heavily damaged plantsrevealed very little of mass-production techniquein either engine or air-frame mamifactuie. Kawa-saki methods in air-frame manufacture appearedto be those of the prewar, small order, aircraftindustry of the I'nited States.As previously indicated, Kawasaki's picxhiction

was largely concentrated in large, self-suflicunits, rather than being a series of "feeder" shiAkashi, Futami and Takatsuki all prodvlcomplete engines. Their only feeder units \|the Hokuben gear plant antl the Kobe and S;casting and forging plants.Complete air frames were produced at Kag;

gahara, Akashi, Ichinomiya, and MiyakorOnly Miyakonojo depended on other plantsparts (Appendix C).The comjjany hoped to go on a mass-prodiK

basis with Ki-61 Tony, but about the timewere tooling up toward 500 per month produithe "bugs" in their liquid-cooled engine fdsuspension of the contract. In the en(division orders were not of a quantity to diemass production on their liquid-cooled enToward the end of the war, when the comwas switching to Nakajima and Mitsubishi ia(they might have developed semimass produtechniques.The Kawasaki aircraft industries reachc' ui

employment peak of 87,121 persons in July ^j|(Fig. 1). Of these, 64,494 were employed iiair frame plants and 22,627 in the engine facii c-^At this time apjjroximately 19 percent o) illemployees in the air-frame plant and 7 pein the engine plant were students. Twenty]percent of the labor force in air frames and Tcent in engines were women. Just as the com preached this employment peak a heavy t(Army inductions caused a dro]) in employ eihat resulted in a serious ])roduction probler Ij

:i

dDuring the latter half of 194^ and during

1945, 50 percent of the air-frame emjjlovcisnonproductive. Throughout the middle nmyears of the war 50 percent of the labor luilioth engine and air-frame facilities wcic >scripted from other occupations under the ( lcould fill the draft quotas \\ith its least s Iiworkers, the draft seriously drained botl tliengine and air-frame plants of skilled ])('is( i!''Turn-over in both divisions of the com]):iii'about 1 percent per month. Absenteeism d'iialate 1944 and 1945 ran as high as S to 10 pc iillustrating the basic weakness of the cons( iprogram. Thus a combination of factors iiing the Army ilraft, unskilled conscripted w i> 'absenteeism and a serious typhoid fever cimin early 1944, dropped the company's prsjui


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tivity far below what its total employmentfigures should mdicatc (appeudLx D).

Until May 1943 the company was on a single,8-hour shift basis. In the second half of 1943 thecompany put on a determined drive to get alldepartments on two 10-hour shifts. By themiddle of 1944 they had succeeded m doing this forabout 66 percent of the engme facilities and 45percent of the total air-frame plants.BRIEF DISCUSSION OF APPENDED PLANTREPORTS

Detailed plant reports have been written onKagamigahara (USSBS Aircraft Division KeportIV-1) au--frame works and the Akashi (USSBSAircraft Division Keport IV-2) engine and air-frame works. These reports are appended. (Fornotes on the Miyakonojo works see referenceitem No. 1.)Kagamigahara and Akashi were inspected by

Field Team No. 3 of the Aircraft Division,United States Strategic Bombing Survey, andcomprehensive mterrogations of plant executivesdown through the level of department heads wereheld.

Supplemental to the information m this report,the plant reports contain plant lay-outs, bombplots, dispersal charts, plant flow sheets, andphotographs of air raid damage.THE DISPERSAL PROGRAMThe company had recognized by the middle of1944, to some extent the need for dispersal, andtooling had been increased at large parts plantsso that they might produce complete air framesand engmes. This was their first dispersalprogram. The engine division's plants at Fu-tami and Takatsuki, both converted spinningmills, were in this category and the air-framedivision's facilities at Miyakonojo and Ichino-niiya were of this type. Early in 1945 these fourplants were able to produce complete unitsin limited quantity. These plants, except Miya-konojo, were self-sufficient. Another dispersalunit consisted of a series of workshops in the Gifuarea feeding components to Kagamigahara. Thisfirst dispersal program was carried out almostwithout production loss as it really consisted ofincreased emphasis on existing facilities.As a result of the November and December

B-29 bombings as well as those that followed, thegovernment, on 4 April 1945, promulgated its

1

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dispersion order which specified a general m|ment underground if possible.As a result, the divisions of the comjl

planned a second dispersal program. The enldivision's liquid-cooled facilities in the TakallspiimLng mill were to move back into a ne;series of mountain tunnels partially complete

'

the war's end. The Futami radial engine faciwere to disperse to a group of 25 small spimjmills and reverted buildings m the forest itiIshiliara (Fig. 5, USSBS Aircraft Division Ror!IV-2). The Akashi au'-frame facilities wemove mto a like installation at Miki.Kagamigaliai'a air-frame facilities were to bup in a series of three assembly lines stretijthrough the mountains and forests withunderground installations at Mhio, Watchi, jJMisunami (Fig. 3, USSBS Aircraft Division RIV-1). The production loss to dispersal h:second program would have occurred m th(summer and early fall of 1945 when moveiinto forest and underground locations wouldbeen at their peak.

Transportation was, of course, a terrific hcap to dispersion. Railroads were overtaxedloads which normally woidd have been carrisea, and unprovised transportation such as thad to be used over narrow and bad roaremote sites. As dispersion got under way tounderground installations, an effort wasmade to miprove the roads with hard surfacmove which might have revealed such sitaerial reconnaissance.Food was scarce at dispersal sites and n

of the workers, who were installed in baiwithout their families, was bad.

THE AIR ATTACKSAIR ATTACKS ON PLANTS

Air attacks against the company's twosites at Akashi and Kagamigahara were amodels of success considering their effeoproduction. The first strilces crippled boibadly that they never played an important piwar production agahi. Due to economic parand a deteriorating materials situation, it ahave been a long uphill struggle for themso, evea if the war had continued.On 19 January 1945, the Akashi engiacair-frame works of the company were bombedWw


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liigh-fxplosive bombs and cvory impor-building was blanketed vvitb explosives

Aircraft Division Report iy-2, Apj)endixProduction was cut to a driblet in bolli

and engine; branches. Machines, liow-were only slightly damaged and if theirsal i)rogram had been successful they would

been "in the war." This plant was hiton 22 and 26 June with 4,000-pound bombs,i(s machines had been dispersed, but some

damage was inflicted.Kagamigahara air-frame facilities also wereon 22 and 26 June. Hits were scored on

buildings (USSBS Aircraft Divisiont IV-1, Appendix F) including several whose

such as the heat-treating facilities, thehydraulic press, and the acetylene gas

could not be replaced. About 17 percentmachine tools were seriously damaged.all of the buildings were burned out, butserious structural damage.

Miyakonojo plant of Kawasaki in Kyushuit three times by planes raiding the threeairfields. Task Force 58 fighters did a smallof damage on 18 July 1945. On 6 August

Army fighters devoted more effort to build-burned 95 percent of them. Majorwas destroyed by this raid. On 12Army fighters burned out the coastal

components branch 50 miles to the east.ON URBAN AREAS

attacks came too late in the Akaslii areaany effect on that plant. The plant had

completely smashed as a productive unitthe heaviest Kobe area raids of July wereout. Also, the company had carried out itsdispersion program for the engine section of

plant prior to these raids. The areamay have retarded the secondary dispersion

for engines and the primary dispersion ofair-frame branch to Miki.

prior to the 22 and 26 June raids wliichthe Kagamigahara air-frame plant of thethe Ichinomiya factory had been con-

to construction of complete airplanes andhad built a series of Gifu workshops

measure. These were expandedthe raids. The area raids on the cities of

and Gifu burned out these facilities,nullifying the division's dispersion pro-

gram. The division started! the second dispersionjirogram ])reviously mentione^d, but transj)ortatiotiand food difficulties made it an ahnost inevitablefailure. Previously the 16 March area raid againstthe city of Kobe burned out 80 percent of the K{)f)eand Sakai casting and forging companies, whichsupplied both engine and air-frame branches.

PRODUCTION STATISTICSFrom January 1941 through August 1945,

Kawasaki produced a grand total of 8,269 airframes under plans calling for 11,662. Over thesame period the corporation j)roduced a total of10,274 engines compared with a planned produc-tion of 15,402.The company's high month in engine production

was November 1944, with a total of 496 engines(Appendix E). By this time the company hadshifted the major part of its engine productionfrom liquid-cooled to air-cooled and 257 of thistotal were Nakajima-designed Ha-115 (Fig. 2).The 19 January 1945 raid smashed the Akashiengine plant when it was in high gear (USSBS,Aircraft Division Report IV-2, Fig. 3). TheFutami facilities, producing air-cooled engines,were well into production by 19 January 1945,and by May were producing 285 unitsthe enginedivision's entire production for the month.The peak month of air-frame production wasJuly 1944, in which 407 air frames were produced,

330 of which were Tonys, liquid-cooled enginefighters (AppendLx E).

After July, air frame production began to slumpand continued downward throughout the remain-der of 1944 and 1945 (Figs. 3a and 3b). Thiswas caused chiefly by a shortage of liquid-cooledengines from Akashi, and design modificationsdictated by combat failures in Tony. A secondaryfactor was the sharp inroads into the skilled laborsupply by the Armj' draft. Damages caused bythe 19 January 1945 attack on the Akashi facilitiesaccentuated this air frame production slump.Growth of tlu? company's production capacity

in both air fI'ames and engines was a steady develop-ment fed by military orders since 1927 whenthe company designed the type 87 heavy bomber.Even before the war the company was executing1,000-plane orders and in 1941 had a monthly pro-duction rate of about 80 airplanes and enguies.In 1942 this had been upjjed to approximately


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frames per month and 125 engines. Dur-production averaged 225 nir friiiiics per

and 325 engines,orders ran about 10 percent belowmachine tool capacity of the plant.

with a severe shortage of skilled hihorshortages of both engine components

frame accessories tliis maxinnnn productionis a very theoretical figure. This isout by the fact that the percentage ofon Government aii* frame contracts

percent in 1939, 45 percent in 1943, 66in 1944, and about 25 percent in 1945.company's record was no better on engines.the first half of 1944 the company com-production schedules for liquid-cooledbut during the latter half of the year they

met 50 percent of schedules. By Januarythere were 364 Tonys complete except for

engines. The Tonys eventuallyconverted to air-cooled radial installations.

the spring of 1945 the Futami facilitiesable to meet 75 percent of the Government

for air-cooled engines.direct attacks against the Kawasaki air-

facilities and area raids knocked out 66 per-of the engine production, or an estimatedengines lost to combat use, and 53 percentair frame production, or an estimated 2,040air frames lost, during the first 7 monthsThe effects of the 22 and 26 June air

on the large Kagamigahara air frame plantcame close at the end of the war would have

this loss had the war continued.INTELLIGENCE EVALUATIONDepartment Military Intelligence Service

estimates for fighters at the Kawa-facilities were very accmate (Fig. 4). Esti-of production trends lagged only about abehind the actual trends. Estimates on(Lily) production were not, however, asIntelligence estimates were 46 percent lowproduction, a miscalcidation of 200 planes.bombei- estimates wei'c very good (Fig. 5).

In November 1944 Lily was taken out of pro-(hiction but intelHgence estimatt^s slioweil con-tinuation of production on phines at the rate of00 per month until the end of the war.

Estimates on engine production were excellent(Figs. 6a and (jh).No intelligence seems to be available thatPeggys (Ivi-67) were being assembled at theKagamigahara plant beginning in December1944 or that the existence here of the radio-controlled Baka "I-GO-B" was known. Pro-duction averaged about 15 to 20 per month.Another intelligence oversight was in evaluatingthe Miyakomojo factory of the company as anengine parts plant. This was entirely devoted toTony manufactiu-e, the fu'st one coming off theassembly line in May 1945.The evaluation of a plant's productive capacity

was made only on a basis of roof damage sus-tained. For tliis reason, the Akashi plant wasbombed, although almost all of its machinery hadbeen removed to dispersal sites.Kawasaki's experimental planes were of inci-

dental intelhgence interest. Bob (Ki-64), thetandem-in-line engine fighter, was test-flown inearly 1944. It did not go into production becausethe type of engines around which it was built werefound to be unsatisfactory. The mockup hadbeen built for a four-engine bomber (Ki-91)which had a 5,000-mile range with a 4-ton load.The Ki-108 was a single-place fighter with pres-surized cabin unit. High performance was claimedfor this plane. About to go into jDroduction wasthe Baka I-GO-B, which carried a 660-poiuidwar head. Frances was to be the mother planefor this projectile. All experimental air-framework was done at Kagamigahara.

REFERENCE ITEMReference Item 1. Miyakomojo plant report,

Kawasaki Corporation.Reference item is filed with the USSES records,

Aircraft Division, Adjutant General's Office, WarDepartment, Washington, D. C.


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APPENDIX A1930-39 Air-Frame and Engine Production

Type 88 Recco (BMW engines)Type 92 fighter (BMW engines)Type 93 light bomber (BMW engines).Type 95 fighter (HA-9 engines)Type 98 Ught bomber (HA-9 engines).

1928-1929

300

1930-1931

300

1932, 1933-1934

250

1935-1936 1937,1!

800

APPENDIX BORGANIZATION CHART

Kawasaki Aikcraft Industries Company, Ltd.(Masayoki Nemoto, Afanaging Director)

Head officeChiof, Masayoki Nemoto.Engine divisionMasayoki Nemoto.

Akashi plant (Masayoki Nemoto, Stipt. Hokuban plant.Takatsuki plart^(T. Tominaga, ChieJ) Kobe, casting and forging plant.Futami plant.Sakai casting and lead-bronze plant.

Air-frame dvmsio7iHisashi Tojo.Akashi airplane plantToshikiiiii Tateyama, Manager.Gifii plant (Kagamigahara)Hisaslii Tojo, Manager.Miyakonojo plantTosliikuni Tateyama, Manager.

Mr. Isliii, Axst. Manager.Ichinomiya plantKinzo Tanaka, Manager.Tokyo agencySei Yamasake, Chief.

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APPENDIX DEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

AIRCRAFT DIVISION-Employment Manufacturer, Kawasaki; Plant, Corporation

Year


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APPENDIX EKAWASAKI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES CO., LTD.TOTAL AIR FRAME PRODUCTION

.

.

.

.

.

. . .Ki-tSS:

....

-.

.

.

.KMDIB,

S 10 11 13 ToUl 10 11 12 Total 10 11 13 ToUl 10 It 13 Total 10 U 12 Total 10 11 13 Total 10 11 12 Total

1 40 1 00 130 UK)

40 70

366' iao

flO .

CofponUon e&flM production,m Alronlt DlvUlop Report IV-3


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KAWASAKI KAGAMIGAHARA(Plant Report No. IV-1)

THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Kagamigahara works (Kagamigahara Seis-sometimes referred to as the Gifu works,Aircraft Industries Co., Ltd., was

to and slightly north of the Kagamiga-militaiy akport and about five miles east of

of Gifu. This area is 18 mUcs north ofThe works consisted of 24 large,

buUdings and hangars with numer-office and service-function structures,

floor area was 2,152,09 square feet (Appen-Kagamigahara works was the largest plant

for the air-frame division. Thewas also the center for a dispersal network

and workshops scattered throughout thefOifu) area. A few elements of

were located over 100 miles distantnortheast coast of Honshu. As head-for the air-frame division, Kagamigaharaunits at Akashi, Miyakonojo on Kyushu,

which produced complete au'craft.Kagamigahara management, in turn, re-to the general manager or managingfor all the corporation's aviation activitiesheadquartered at Akashi. This man was

sible to topside management of KawasakiIndustries Co., Ltd., holding company for

aviation and shipbuilding interests, located1937 the aviation activities of Kawasaki

housed with its shipbuilding activities atAt this time the airframes organizationto Kagamigahara and started constructionwas to be augmented many times over the

eight years.works was entu'ely financed with corpora-money derived from private capital,

its history Kagamigahara was ancontractor. Relationships between manage-and government agencies were harmonious,

Tojo, superintendent of the air-frameand head of the Kagamigahara plant, was

a brother of Hideki Tojo, prime minister in the"Pearl Harbor cabinet".The Army Ki-61 Tony single-engine fighter was

the organization's chief product. Through 194.3and 1944 this plane was powered with a liquid-cooled engine. In 194.5 it was converted to a radialinstallation and its designation changed to Ki-100.In its liquid-cooled version this plane was analmost exact duplicate of the German Me 109.Its engine was of a Daimler-Benz design.

Six months before the end of the war theworks' production was shifted to Mitsubishi'stwin-engine bomber Peggy, Ki-67. By the endof the war, however, the company had completedonly a few of these planes.During the middle war years Kagamigahara

produced the twin-engine bomber LUy Ki-48, andthe twin-engine fighter Nick Ki-45.

Prior to the war and during early 1942 the or-ganization had been producing trainers andtransports including Ki-56 Thalia, a version ofthe Lockheed IS; the Ro transport, also a twin-engine transport; the Ki-36 Ida; the Ki-55 recon-naissance plane; and Ki-32 Mary, light bomber.The lattei two were shigle-engine aircraft.PLANT ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAs previously mentioned, managing director of

this works and of the air-frame division wasHisashi Tojo. H^s assistant was Masayoshi Yakoand the factory manager was Kanabei Tanaka.To this top level of authority nine major depart-ment heads reported. Managers at 13 branchplants and workshops, which formed the ex-panded and dispersed Kagamigahara organization,also reported to these tliree men. During plantvisits and inten-ogations they furnished the majorpart of the information on the organization.The departmental organization of the works

was extremely detailed with many fine shadingsof authority which at times may have producedsome friction. However, a well-integrated topmanagement may have been able to keep the

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of Mut.luirily from snarling'. 'IMic sjx'cializu-of (lc])iir(incnis as illuslralcd 1)V tlic works

chart (Ai)j) Gi'rman success in adapting Tony's coun-ti'r])!ut, the Me 109, to a plywood tail assembly.

Plywood storage battery racks and ammunitionboxes also passed Government tests. However, amodel of the company's pilot seat failed. Plantinspection showed that a large part of Kagamiga-hara's sizeable research facilities were devoted toplywood experimentation. (Appendix D.)PRODUCTION STATISTICSPeak production month at Ivagamigahara was

July 1944 when 29G planes, mostly Tony fighters,19


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(Fig;. 2). Pioduction had avci-230 planes per montli throughout 1944

the \nii (h'op in Nov('in})er stalled the down-curve. This was caused by Ariuy-dictated

iu Tony. (Photos 3 and 4.).5,SS ])lanes in 19.19, and 320 in 1940,

prcnhiction huilL up to 718 ])hxnes757 in 1942, 1,518 in 1943, 2,68S in 1944durini>: the last eight inonths of the war,

of 7,232 aircraft. Amount of completioncontracts was 84 percent in 1939,

in 1940, 77 percent in 1941, 52 percent74 percent in 1943, (SO i)ercent in 1944,25 ])ercent during tlie months of 1945E).the latter part of 1944 (h'liveries of

engines from Akashi fell ln'iow sclied-of mechanical troubles, and m Janu-

there were 364 Tony air frames awaitingat Kagamigahara. Of these 265 wereto radial-engin(> installation. Liquid-

engines finally ariived for the remainder.AND REPAIR OF AIRPLANES

rebuilding or repair was done in the Kaga-works proper; however, skilled work-dispatched next door to the Kagamiga-

air depot where extensive work wasMost of this work was done by Army

although company technicians werein for extensive and specialized jobs.

TO EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFTwas a well-developed experimental de-at Kagamigahara and 12 percent of the

facilities were devoted to this work. Into one new and very large building used

experimental shop, there was a moderndevoted to flutter research.

research division reporting directly to thedirector, included the wind timnel de-the flutter research and the material

departments. The design and experi-division, which also reported to thedirector, included the customary group

departments and in addition aand construction department (staticand the experimental mainifacturingthe important projects was Rob (Ki-64),

fighter with two liquid-cooled, Ha-60,

Model 22 engines, i-ated at 1,020 liorsej)ower fortnke-olF. The engines were in tandem, onemounted foi'e and one aft of the pilot. Tiie planewas test down in early 1944 but troubles with I lieli(|uid cooled engines caused a delay in putting the])lane into i)ro(luction.The Ki 91, a four-engine bondxT about the size

of the B-29 but of much less load-carrying abilitywas in th(> mockup stage of development.Kagamigahara hail developetl anil put into

quantity production a radio-controlled "Baka"carrying a 060-lb. war head. This was known as"l-(i()-B". Frances or Peggy was intended asthe mother plane.The Ki-108 was an experimental twin-engine

fighter with pressurized cabin, a development ofRandyproduction twin-engine fighter in theAkashi works. They were also experimenting onRandy with an exhaust turbine.A large amount of German and American equip-ment in their shops for study indicated thatKagamigahara received good cooperation fromAnny research agencies (Photo 5).

EFFECTS OF BOMBINGDIRECT ATTACKSThe Kagamigahara works were fii-st hit on

22 Jime 1945 in a daylight precision raid from0926 to 0945. Visibility was good and a mLxedload of 4,000-lb and 2,000-lb l)ombs wei-e used withinstantaneous fusmg. The Peggy final assemblyshop, subassembly building, parts-assembly shops,anil the administration liuilding were hit.The raid of 26 Jmie 1945, from 0910 to 1049,

using 500-pound high-explosive bombs hit theTony final-assembly shop, the experimental build-ing, the engineering offices, subassembly shops,workers' dormitories, the school building, and thepress shops. This later group of buililmgs suf-fered by far the most irreparable ilamage. Thissecond raid was by far th(> more damaging(Photos 6 and 7).

All public utUitdes were knocked out by theraiils and company officials reported repair partieswere greatly disorganized.The two raids knocked out every important

building in the works. Manufacturing activitieswere permanently halted (Appendix F).Most of the buildings were blasted and burnt

out, but structural damage was small.21


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Stocks of raw materials were lost, but manyhalf-finished planes could have been completedthrouoh cannibalization.By the time of the raids, a hi

the city of Ichinomiya completi-ly destroyet470,000-square-foot Ichuiomiya Branch facwhich was prodiicmg Tonys at the rate of 2^month on a rising production cm-ve. The1945 incendiary raid on the city of Gifu ilestrthe workshops in that city which had been acqias k(\v uii,its in the Kagamigahara dispeplans. These were the last remaining functicunits of the once large Kagamigahara networ

Prior to the actual bui'uing out of Ichinoand Ciifu in July 1945 the population of thishad suft'ered very little inconvenience fronraids. Because the Kagamigahara worksbeen bombed out by the ti.me these raids occitlieir eft'ects on production were not measuiINTERRUPTIONS DUE TO SUPPLIES

Air attacks had not as yet affected receimaterials and supplies. Fi-o.m 1942 on, jtypes of electrical and hydraulic equipmentbehind delivery schedule because the- manturers of this intricate and specialized e(|uipcould not expand at the same rate as the air-i nplants. The Tokaido district earthquake inalso retarded deliveries of these parts iuxd Iponents (Appendi.x D). The effects weieabout to be felt when the war ended.

IDISPERSALFear of air raids had started dispersion oil

Kagamigahara works in Novcunber and Dece'J1944 to the Ichinonuya plant. On 4 April ((the Government ordered the company to begJiofficial dispersion jjiogram. This piogram Pschetluled for completion in August 1945JIKagamigahara officials estimated it would )(have been ready for production before Dece ui1945. ,The first phase of this plan was the acquis jo

of a group of schools and small mills in the itof Ciifu for conversion to workshops and hoiuunits for 500 to 1,000 employees each. Shi'i!neighborhood yards, and parks in the fori*


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llic KiitiamijjaliiU'ii wdiks were niiidclo store |)iirts and asscinhlics.second pluiso of this first disfx'rsid pl.-in \\,-is

of tiie forests and rou^li teri-.iin offor lar^io assombiy sliops and iindci'tiioiind

Uiidprground facilities in tiiis net-were located at Mizunami, Nakatsugawa,and Waclii. P"'orest installations were atKatabira, and Akutanii. All these loca-ith the exception of the small shops on the

coast of Honshu previously mentioned,ithin a 2o-mile ratlius of the main Kaga-

works.lie first disj)ei'sion program 1,900,000 squarefacilities had been ordered b_v the Govern-At the end of the war 1,200,000 squarebeen completed and machinery had been

or was in transit.1,200,000 square feet of completed dis-

aren appro.ximately 2.^ percent was in under-instidlations which represented half the

area. The largest undergroundwas at Mizunami with 2.50,000 squnre

but largely without lighting orinstallations. Tunnels were from 12

in width and from 1.5 to 21 feet high.area raids on the cities of Ichinomiya and

burned out the company's buildingsnecessitated a second dispersion program.

an expansion of the first plant throughof many more forest workshops whichinto three production lines anchored

Kagamigahara and Mizunami (Fig. 3).difficulties were a tremendous

des])ite relatively short hauls, in Kaga-dispersion program. The nearby rail-

could not be used and roads were narrow

a six months' period from Alarch through194.5, company officials estimated tJiatactivities were directly responsible for a

loss of 54 Tony aircraft. Consideringpoint to which production had fallen duecauses, this represented a large part of

total possible production during this(Photos 8-10.)

INTELLIGENCE CHECKa whole, intelligence information on thismostly complied by Military Intelligence

Service (G-2) was very good. I'idduclion esti-m;ites were about right. The only omission intills regard was failure to assess any Peggy (jro-duction at this plant. Proximity of the targetto the Kagamigahnra military air depot at whichall tyi)es of planes were serviced and tested mayhave served to confuse photographic interpreta-tion on this point.

A])|)arently movement by night of a majorproportion of the works' machine tools to dispersedlocations nlso went undetected by photogi'.-ipliirintelligence.The war did not last long enough to j)i'ove or

disprove the diagnosis that Kagamigahara 's pi'o-(lucti\ity had l)een destroyed l\y the raids of 22and 26 June. There is some evidence that after atwo- or three-month period of recujiei-ation theworks could have resumetl about 2.5 percent of itsformer ;issenil)]y functions.

VULNERABILITYKagamigahara 's most vulnerable facilities as

listed by company officials in ortler of prioritywere: (1) heat-treating facilities, (2) the 2,000-ton and 1,000-ton hydraulic presses, and (3) itsacetylene gas supply. All three were hit in the 22and 26 June raids.Most vulnerable factor in the dispei'sed and

branch factory facilities proved to be their in-flammability in the area raids on the cities ofGifu and Ichinomiya.

Apparently, fro.m the comnients of Kagamiga-hara officials, the thi-eat of air raids had a dis-astrous eft'ect on workers' morale. This was adecisive factor in the extensiveness of the dis-persal plans.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF PLANT IN.SPECTION AND INTERROGATIONThis was a well-organized plant IjuI the pro-

duction was disappointing. This was due to thepersistence in using the inferior Ha-60, Model 22,liquid-cooled engine supplied by their sisterKawasaki organization at Akashi. This cranky]iroduct was never available in sufficient quanti-ties. Even the engines supplied were high infailures. The resultmg design changes orderedby the Ar.my because of this, caused innumerableproduction stoppages. The sense of frustration

23


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us STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYKAWASAKI AIRCRAFT IN

KAWASAKI (GIFU)FIGURE

24

I


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resent JiKMit (owiird tlieir Kau'nsaki sisterwliicl) this ciiiised nnionjj the KngJiniijiJihiini

odieials was apparent. They wei-eto secure early redress, however, be-

tlieii- ii)aiia

.

a con)j)lete production stoppage in licpiid-engines finally fcced the Army to dictate

a switch to radial installation in Tony, it was toolate in tlie war to have any effect.

REFERENCE ITEMl{eferonce iteju foi- this icport. is filed with the

fecortls of the United States Strategic BombingSurvey, War Department, Washmgton, D. C,earc of the Adjutant General.Reference Item 1. Machine tool damagecharts.

25


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s^//5-

y III i : .. '^V

";


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No. 3.Tony, in new radial engine version sliown in final assembly building at Kagamigahara.hangar-type buildings constituted about one-half of the plant's structures.

Large arclied-roof

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I'liciiii X


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.'i. ('u'riiiaii ciifi.iiic from Focke-Wolff 190 tif^htci' found hi cxperiiiH-iital building ai Ivii-ui! ii, i::;ii:was studied as model in adaptation of Tony from liquid-cooled to radial-engine installation.

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Photo No. 6.Saw-tooth roof-type buildings at Kagamigahara showing light structural damage. The 500-i)oinidexplosives of second raid (2(i June 1945) did majority of damage on works, including these buildings.

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No. 7.Raiidy (Ki-102) fighter in experimental building at Kagamigahara. This plane was manufactured atAkashi and was brought to the experimental center at Kagamigahara. This picture shows in detail typical buildingdamage.

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Photo No. 8.Tuny figlUer assemblies hidcieii iiiidor the trees about one halt" mile from Kagaiuis^ahaia works. 1was part of dispersion i)laii whicli intended to use main works onl_v as assembly sliop for part of output after Jraids.

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1'hoto No. 9.Assemblies in yard of shrine one-lialf mile fnmi Kagamiftahara plaiil.

No. 10.As.somblies have crowded objects of worship out from under the roof of this shrine at Kagamigahara.33


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KAWASAKI (GIFU), APPENDIX APLANT EXPANSIONS KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, KAGAMIGAHARA WORKS

June 1937-March 1945Name of componentplant

Main factory atKaganiigahara.Do

Date of expansion

Do.Do_Do.Do.Do.Do.Do.

Total.

June 1937.SeptemberApril 1938-April 1939-April 1940-April 194NApril 1942-April 1943-April 1944-

1937-March 1938...March 1939..March 1940.Marcli 1941.March 1942.March 1943.-March 1944.March 1945.

Building or shop Building arc(square feel

Construction of first building.Office building, final assembly shop, boiler room,

forging shop, heat-treatment shop, etc.Drafting room, fuselage wing components sho]), foundryand press work shop, etc.Xorthern press work shop, etc .First ground engineering shop, higli pressure oil unitswork shop, etc.Covering shoji, second ground engineering shopThird ground engineering shop, cover units work shop,second final assemlily shop, etc.Fourth and fifth ground engineering shops, etc..Third final assembly sho]), experimental workshop,

etc.

45, 8e101.8;140,0;154. 6)172.182, 4!'264, 1!419,9"670, 2'

2, 152, 0"

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DiviVidii, Ilisnshi Tciji), Stipn inlendc?!!.'iirjihiiK pUiiil Tci^liiUiiiii 'l';il('v;uii;i, Siipi riiiliiiil-|i.ir'(iueiit of general alfiiirs, |)ei'soiiiiel clejiartiiienl,

deiiartnient, factoi'v iiiaiiatjer, tcclmi-Department.

ijahara (Gifii) plant Hisaslii 'I'cijci, Sii pcrinUiidi til;\ iislii Yakci, Aifnisldiil; Kanhi'i 'I'a'naka, I'ocluni

I'linrd (lirisi(i)i:Mcral affairs, estate, docvuuent, finance, vigilanee,

hcaltli and sanitation, medical treat-

ce laljor, faetdry lalxir, stiuient laliur, durniituries,health insurance.

division:preiJaration, parts preparaticm. materials

paynient in.spection, transportation.division:machinery, construction, utilization.

/I'c.s'ca/c/i divisiiiiiWind-t iinnil, IIiiIIit research, njaterial research.

Designing and cxpi rinii-ntdl division:PlanniuK anfl design, fuselage, wing unit, poucr plajjt,

arnuiiuent, drawing, strength and construction,experimental manufacturing.

I'lnniiing division:Planning, industrial alTairs, factory power, technical

assembling, parts engineering, process management.Production division:

Construction, Misato plant, Sakahogi plant, Xakat-siigawa plant, Kiyosu plant.

Inspection division:Materials insjiection, function inspection, production

inspection, experimental ins|)ection, flight adjust-ments, and jjreparations.

City of Gifu workshops, Kisogawa Ijranch factory, Saka-hogi branch factory, Nakatsugawa branch factory,Sabaye branch factory (XW Honshu), Fukui branchfactory (NW Honshu), Kawasaki hospital. Youngmen's .school, Ichinomiya factory.

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DORMITORIES

en.


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KAWASAKI (GIFU), APPENDIX DCRITICAL SHORTAGES IN ACCESSORIES

(Actual statistics lost in bombing, information supplied from memory of plant officials)


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DORMITORIES

LXXXV_ ;

BOMB PLOTKAGAMIGAHARA WORKSLEGEND

JUN22 JUN26RAID RAIDO D INDICATES BOMB HIT

U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEYKAWASAKI AIRCRAFTINDUSTRIES CO. LTD.

K A WASAK I (Gl FU )APPENDIX E

COMPLETELY BURNT DOWN ORCOMPLETELY DAMAGEDI I HALF BURNT DOWN OR HALFI I DAMAGED


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KAWASAKI AKASHI(Plant Report No. lV-2)

THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRYAkaslii works (Akaslii Scisukusliu) of

Aiicral't Iiulustries Co. Ltd., was locatedtwo miles northwest of the town of Akashi.on the shores of Akashi Strait of the Inland

and 12 miles to the west of Kobe.facilities, which combined an air-frame andengine works, contained a floor area ofover 3,300,000 square feet. This in-

S assemhly buiidings, 4 machine shops amiildings tlevoted to fabrication. Ten addi-buildings were used for inspection andand the remaining structures were usetl

welfare and service buildings,buildings were of modern light-steel frame

glass construction (Appendix A).I'ugine facilities of Akashi constitutedsquare feet of productive floor area and

air-fiame organization occupied 1,047.700feet of productive floor area.Akashi works, general headquarters for all

Kawasaki aviation activities, constituted onetwo large units of Kawasaki Aircraft Indus-

Co. Ltd. The other was located at Kaga-(USSBS Aircraft Division Airframes

Report IV-1). Akashi was the corpora-largest works and headquarters for thedivision.

air-frame works had i)een added to the largefacilities at Akashi early in 1941 to produce

aircraft. This works was under thestructure of the Kagamigahara air-

management. However, in such mattersair-raid defense, etc. it operated

the over-all Akashi organization.plants at Futami and Takatsuki, conceivedplants for Akashi, but later converted into

units producing complete engines bydispersal program, operated under the Akashi

management.ofl'shoots of the Akashi engine divisionthe .Sakai casting and forging plant, the Kobe

casting and forging plant, and the Uokuban |)lantw liich produced gears.The Akashi facilities were a wholly-owned unit

of Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Co. Ltd., whichin turn was a subsidiary of Kawasaki Heavy In-dustries Co. Ltd. The aviation branch had I)eeuorganized in 1918 and the company had been ableto retain complete financial control of all its facili-ties. Construction of the Akashi works wasstarted in 1937 when the aircraft activities leftKobe. Akashi was entirely an Army contractor.The history of Kawasaki's production was one

of steady growth, fed by military orders from theend of World War I into World War II.The company began building the French Salm-

son airplane and engine under license in 1919.In 1926 it purchased the license to manufacturethe Bavarian motor works (Bayerische Motern-werkc) engine, and in 1927 designed the Type 87heavy bomber which was powered with twoBMWs. In 1928 the company received an orderfor 300 Type 88 reconnaissance planes, alsopowered with Kawasaki manufactured BMWs.An order for 300 Type 92 fighters was given thecompany in 1930. The power plant was an im-proved BMW. During 1933 the company exe-cuted an order for 250 Type 93 light bomberspowered by the BMW, IVIodel 9. In 1935 itstarted manufacturing the Type 95 fighter of theChina campaigns on an order for 800. Thisfighter was powered by the Ha-9, a hquid-cooledengine manufactured by the company. In 1938an order for 1,000 Type 98 fight bombers powered-with Ha-9 model was received.Most important products of Akashi's engine

facilities were its line of liquid-cooled engines.These were Ha-60 Model 22, rated at 1,150horsepower for takeoff, and Ha-60 Model 33,rated at 1,350 horsepower for take-ofl", both out-growths of the Daimler-Benz design purchasedfrom Germany in 1937. They were used inTony fighters.

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The Akashi facilities also produced the na-35Model 22, and the Ha-35 Model 32^Nakajima-dcsigned radials, rated at 1,100 horsepower and1,150 horsepower for take-off, respectively. Theywere used iii Oscar fighters and Ki-115, theNakajima suicide plane. A late product was theHa-4.5 Model 21, Nakajima 1,970 horsepowerradial, used primarily in Frank fighters.Primary products of the air-frame facilities were

Nick, Ki-4.5, a twin-engine fighter in conventionaland night-fighter versions and Randy, Ki-102,also a twin-engine fighter but of single-placedesign and higher performance.ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION .A key figure in the Akashi works was Masayoki

Nemoto who was (1) managing director of allKawasaki aviation activities, (2) managiiig direc-tor of the Kawasaki engine division and (3)managing director of the Akashi works itself.Toshikuni Tateyama was superintendent of theair-frames division reporting to the au'-framemanagement of Ivagamigahara and, throughthem, to Nemoto (Appendix B).

All department heads of both engine and air-frame facilities attended interrogations at theAkashi works. The Sakai and Kobe casting andforging plants were also represented at thesemeetings. Nemoto's presence also assured com-plete cooperation in securing information for thisreport.The plant was organized on fairly well-estab-

hshed flow-line principles (Appendix A): but, withdestruction of the buildings almost complete, andall machinery icmoved, it was impossible toreconstruct the details of fabrication and assem-bly. Frequent design changes and productionstoppages, however, probably discouraged anyattempt at real mass ])rod about 7percent of the labor force in November 1944.Conscripted labor never was more than , 10percent of the workers.

40

Only after pi-oduetion had halted in Ifwere soldiers brought into the plant. Tlitotal was 717 at the high point.The engine-plant employment increased stead

through many difficulties, such as the Andraft, uutU bombing knocked out the plantJanuary 1945 (Fig. 1). Average monthly wiat Akashi was 150 yen.

In June 1943 the engine pl;int went on twohoin- shifts. Through 1944 and 1945 aboutpercent of the plant's departments were ondouble shift. A shortage of skilled workprevented the entire persomiel from going on tbasis. Labor timi-over svas from 1 to 2 perc^per month.

Air-frame employment at Akashi reachedpeak in August 1944 with 23,798 workers (Fig.Students constituted 25 percent of this grcand women about 5 percent. It succeededputting only about 30 percent of the organizaton tliis basis bj' mid- 1944. There were no soldiin the air-frame departments.The engine and air-frame branches functioi

under a common personnel department andis possible, because of the labor shortage, tmost skilled workers were of necessity channeinto the engine organization. This left theframe organization extremely short.MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS.

Allocation of materials for engine nianulturers was made by the Army section ofministry of munitions on the customary annbasis with readjustments made quarterly. Cimaterial sources were as follows:

Materials Sapptitrs LocntiovAl and Mg Kobe Kiiizokii phiiit of Ivobc.

castings. Kawasaki.Tojo Koku Kinzuokn K K NishinoniijSumitomo Kinzoku K K- Nagoy.a.

.M forgings Sumitomo Kinzoku K K_ Kat.ada.Koljc plant of Kawasaki,, Kolio.

Special stecL . Daitlo Seiko K K Nagoya.Nippon Tokusliuko K K_ Tokyo.

Steel forgings. Kobe Kinzoku K K Kobe.Sumitomo Kinzoku K K. Osaka.Kobe Seiko K K_ . Kobe.Kawasaki Seihan plant,. Nishinomiy

The material department for air framesAkashi was in reality a branch of the cenimaterial de[)artrnent for the entire air-frame


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42


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wliicli \\;is ;i( KtifiJiiiiijinliiiin (I'SSBSDivision AiriVnincs I'lanl licporl

Ak'iislii's iiiiitorisil sources iiiul slioitiiiicsitienticiil to those ciiunierated in the iva^ii-

|)lant report.

STATISTICSengine division ijrodiiced .i IoImI of

units against 15,772 ordered and i;i,S4()during tlie period April ]9IJ9-Angnst 1945

(').])roductioii lor tiie air-1'ranie division

2,714 units from Sej)tendHM' 1941 tliiough1945, while actual production, which

in August 1945, was 1,945 completed air(Appendix D).

monthly engine production foi- Akasliiimits during November 1944. Averageproduction during 1944 was 350 units

(Fig. '.]). This was about ecpiallybetween liquid-cooled and radial engines.

the first half of 1944 the coni]3any wasmeet government protluction schedules

Howevei', due to the Army draftfi'oubles they met only 57 percent

(piota during the latter half of the year,of licjuid-cooled engines was ham-

by main bearing, supercharger, oil andfailures.

of materials and mechanical failuresthe war thus prevented the type of

production scheduling which means massanil an efficient shop. Splitting the

between the manufacture of licpiid-cooledengines was probably another factormass production.

of Nick fighters in the Akashi aii-division reached its ])eak in August 1944

119 units ])roduced (Fig. 4). At this .timewas begun to the Randy fighter andslum])ed. The shortage of electric-dpet cocks and plungers resulting from

district earthquake was anotherin the slump which occurred during this

It was primarily a disruption of thesystem resulting from the earth-

rather than damage to the equipment plantsproduced the shortages. During 1944 themet 80 percent of its government schedules.

During the spring of Kill the pl.-inl iiad beendelayed in I'eaching its production |)eak


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Attack data

Intelligence data


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Xo. 1.Engine plant niachine shops damaged by ligiu i.MKI-il..,) HEs of 19 January 1945 raid. Li.uitodstructural

damage was caused by 22 and 26 June 1945 raids.

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Photo No. 2. Detail of engine machjsliops damaged by 500-lb. HEs in-January 1945 attack. Only 7 percentmachinery was damaged. Machinery wremoved lo disposal sites following tlattack.

Photo Xo. 3. Lookingsouth toward engine-parts assembly shops..Most damage occurredin 19,January 1945 attackby 500-lb. HEs.

k

ft

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spcontl i^roiip- aiiicliiiH' sliop, Irinl shop,s-assombly oflicc, shipping shoj), iii>spit;ii,

I'ooni; third groii]) production oliicc nnd

the air-fi'anii' inancii the first priority wasthe Hight-cnginci'iing sliop. Jlcrc phuiescaunihalizcd and about a dozen were


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^/^

^ "., '^ . .^l ^^s O'.' ^i:.Photos 4-9.--\"it\\s of Akashi jjlant Imililin^,- dau]at;ud and destroyed by June 1945 attacks in which 4,000-lb.

fused instantaneous!V were used.

~^.^"

:UJI*^7-|.

Photo No. 5.


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\wm^tW^ftMimmmm


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of small spiiininjj: mills mid forest liutsJshihara, far back in the hills iioilli ofThe Takatsuki hraiifh was scheduled

production of 200 entwines jier month and tin;i)i'anch for 250. Both were scheduled to

full i)iotluclion under their second dispersionlate in 1945 (Fip. 5).

air-frame division was scheduled to movea dispersed location at Miki hut never wasto carry out the program.

of th(> workers, who were living inat the dispersed sites without theirwas low. Transportation for material

machinery was very difficult. P^ood wasat dispersed locations and communications

plants were frequently cut.INTELLIGENCE CHECK

Department Military Intelligence Servicemonthly production estimates were phenom-close throughout 1944; however, estimates

production during 1944 were 80low. Kawasaki had been in production

throughout 1943 without any estimateduring this period.

estimates on Nick twin-engine fightersexcellent and were within a few percent ofproduction.

intelligence was faiily accurate,the movement of almost all machine

from the works after the 19 January 1945escaped notice. The result was an over-

of the amount of productivity stillin the works, and the raids of 22 and

with 4,000-pound high-explosives werewasted.

VULNERABILITYvulnerable feature of the engine plantwas its precision machinery hi the

buildings. Failure to damage seri-any appreciable percentage of this niachui-

ery might eventually have negated the effect ofthe 19 January raid which put Akashi out ofbusiness. Th


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Photo No. 10.Tunnel months at Takat.suki vuidergronnd engiue-di.spersal plant. Xote netting over entrancescrude hoists for handling machinerj-. Only rough .'^teep trails led to this remote location.

'^"Wm

Photo No. 11.('lo.se-u]) showing crude ci instruct ion of Takatsuki tunnels. Most of tunnels were not faced and had bconstructed early in war by Korean slave labor as an ammunition dump.

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Photo 12.Trellis at Takatsuki for liauling machinen- to tunnels.

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usSTRATEGICBOMBINGSURVEY

KAWASAKIAIRCRAFTIND.

AKASHIPLANT

IGURE5

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TlflMl O 17 (Pice p. SB)


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AKASHI PL/ANT Ilcad office engine division:AkasliiPlanning, equipment, production, technical,

Masavoki Nemoto Manager inspection, Takatsuki plant, Futann' plant, Hokubanplant, Kobe casting and furging i)lant,Saka casting

head office Maaayoki Nemoto Chief. ancl lead-bronze plant.Deputy of general atfairs, finance, headquarters of Note: For organization chart of Akashi division seetechnical director. Kagamigahara plant report.

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APPENDIX CENGINE PRODUCTIONPLANNED, CAPACITY, AND ACTUALAPRIL ie40-AUGUST 1945

PlinnKl...Adull

rUnnHArtUKl

AnuJI'lknnrl .Anutl ..

Ju. Pb. Mv. A|>t. Mfty I Jura- July Aut. api. On. | Nor. t>-. [Total ;

::l::::;:l;:::::l;:::::l IeOl Wl IID I JO I ID I 30

I wl IS I Ml sol &9I 50

Mayjlunt JulrUiif. 9tpi. Oct. I Nov, { Dc Total Jan. { Feb. Mar. j Apr. May June I July Aug. Bepl. Oct. Nov. Dec, Total

:i !SI SI S|--d-,,i::::::l;;::;:::l SSI::100 1 110 I 110 I I 120 I 130 IMOU I HO I !4 I los I los I seo I 110 I 11;

Ian. Feb. Mar. Apr. May JuiM July Auk. ^I>t. Ool. Nav. Dee. Total . May Juiu July Aug. Spl. OH. Nov. Dm. Total , Mtr. Ape. May June July

I120

II lU I 01 50 1 40 1 10 1 30 1 I MO 1 1..I SB I 73 I 70 I IB I 17Il.lia ! I..

] 2.7BI) a.ivnI 3.107

..6.07a .

.. fl.3ia .

. . 4.lU .1 s.STa

K) 131 1,373

4,3431.800S,1742.T3SJl21

1^77313.840laua;iaMI No J Fadui Pap-


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APPENDIX DKAWASAKI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES CO.. LTD.AKASHI AIRPLANE PLANTAIRFRAME PRODUCTIONPLANNED AND ACTUAI^SEPTEMBER 1941-SEPTEMBER 1945


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i^mTRMWM 9CM00L

aOAfe PLOT 19 JAN. 1945 ATTACK500 LB. BOMBS

245 HE30 UXB

AK4SHI PLANT OPKAWASAKI AIRCRAFINDUSTRIESAPPENDIX

TISMI O ' 47 |ru p. SB) No. 1


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DDl_l

DD

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52Abrasives Branch

The German Abrasive IndustryMaver and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main ficinuinyAnti-Friction Branch

*53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings IndustryMachine Tools Branch

*.5-t Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equi])nicnt*55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany58 Xaxos Union, Frankfort on !Main, Germany

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION59 The Defeat of the Geiman Air Force60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) CamjjaignGl Air Force Rate of Operation62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera-

tions in the European Theatre63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heav\ and MediumBombers in the ETO64 Description of RAF Bombing64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo-

gistics MORALE DIVISION*64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale

(Vol. I and II)Medical Branch

*65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Carein Germany

MUNITIONS DIVISIONHeavy Industry Branch

*66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany67 Coking Plant Report Xo. 1, Sections A,'B, C, & D68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany09 Friediich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany70 Ncunkirchen EiseuNverke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-many71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf,Germany72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany73 Friedrich Krup]) A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Gei-

niany74 Dortnuuid Hoerder Huettenverein A G, Dortmund,Germany75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany76 Bochumer \'erein fuer Gusstahlfabrikalion A (!,Bochum, Germany

Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch*77 German Motor Vehicles Indiistrv Report*78 Tank Industry Report79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris81 Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany82 Daimler Benz-(iaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Xuriiberg, Xurnberg,German\-84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Z\yickau, (iermaiiy85 Henschi'l & Sohn, Kassel, Geimany86 Maybach Motor ^\orks, Friedrichshafeii, Germany87 Voigtianfier, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany88 Volkswagenxyerke, Fallersleben, Germany89 Bussing XAG, Brunswick, Germany90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Biunswick, Ger-many91 I'liedrich Knijip (jrusonwcrke, Magdeburg, Germany

9293949596979899100

*101102103104105106

107lOS

*109*110*111

112113111

115116117IISI 19

120121

122123124125

126127128129

Submarine BranchGerman Submarine Industry ReportMaschinenfabrik Augsburg-X'^urnberg A G, Auburg. GermanyBlohm and Voss Shipyards, Hanrburg, GermanyDeutschewerke A G, Kiel, GermanyDeutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, GmanyFriedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, GermanyHo\yaldts\verke A G, Hamburg, GermanySubmarine Assembly Shelter, Farge. GermanyBremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany

Ordnance BranchOrdnance Industry ReportF>iedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G, MagdebGermanyBochumer Verein fvier Gusstahlfabrikation ABochiun, GermanyHenschel & Sohn, Kassel, GermanyRheimnetall-Borsig, Dusscldorf, GermanyHermann Goering Werke, Braim.schweig, HallencGermanyHaunoyerische IVIaschinenbavi, Hanover, GermaiiGusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, German

OIL DIVISIONOil Division, F'inal ReportOil Division, F'inal Report, Appendi.xPowder. Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet

pellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (MinistRei)ort #1)Underground and Dispersal Plants in GreatermanyThe German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report 178

Ministerial Report on ChemicalsOil Branch

Anuiioniakwerke Mcrseburg G m b H, Lcuna,many2 AppendicesBraunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Genr

Wintershall A G. Luelzkendorf, GermanyLudwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G FarbenindtA G, Ludwigsliafen. GermanyRuhroel Hydrogenation Plant. Bottrop-Boymany. \'ol. I, Vol. IIRhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Hai

Refinery, Hamburg, GermanyHhcnania O.ssag Mineraloelwerke A G, GrasI: )l

Refinery, Hamburg, GermanyRhenania Ossag ^lineraloelwerke \ G, Wilhelmi

Refinery, Hamburg, GermanyGewerkschaft, Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Gcrnuwv

I & Vol. IIF'uropaeische Tanklager und Transjjort A G. 1

burg. Germanyl';bano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, 1

burg, GermanyMeerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant-A Vol. II

Rubber BranchDeutsche Dnnliij) Gununi Co., Hanau on '.GermanyContinental Gummiwerke, Hanover, GermanyHuels Synthetic Rubber PlantMinisterial Report, on German Rubber Indu.str

60

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Propcllanls Hranchlok'kti-Dfheniisclu'W I'lkf, M uiiicli, ( IcriiuiiiyScliociiobock Ivxplosivp Plant, I,ignoso Sl)^(llf^^to(^Wcrke G in li H, Bad Salzoinon, Gcriiiaii\'Plants of TJynaniit A G, Vorinal, Alfred Noix-l & Co,Troisdorf, C'lansllial, Dnininiel anrl Dunoborf!;,GermanyDeutsche Sprengcheniie G ni b H, Krailiiiry, Ger-many

OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISIONOver-all Kcononiic Effects Division ReportGross National Product '|Si)ecial pa])ers

Kriegseilliericlite I which togetherHerman Goerinf? Works [ comprise theFood and Agriculture ) above reportIndustrial Sales Output and ProductivityPHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

Physical Damage Division lieport (ETO)Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, FranceRailroad Rejjair Yards, Malines, BelgiumRailroad Repair Yards, Lou vain, BelgiumRailroad liepair Yards, Hasselt, BelgiumRailroad Re])air Yards, Namur, BelgiumSubmarine Pens, Brest, FrancePowder "Plant, Angouleme, FrancePowder Plant, 4-iergerac, FranceCoking Plants, Montigny & Liege, BelgiumFort St. Blaise \'erdun Group. Metz. FranceGnome et l^hone, Limoges. FranceMichelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, FranceGnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,Franceivugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger-manyLouis i5rcguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, FranceS. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France.\. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, FranceV Weapons in LondonCity Area of KrefeldPublic Air Raid Shelters in GermanyGoldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap-sack, GermanyBrauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau-

weiler, CJermanyStorage Depot, XahboUenbach, GermanyRailway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, GermanyRailway Bridge. EUer, GermanyGustlofT-Werke Weimar, Weimar, GermanyHenschell & Sohn G m b H. Kassel, GermanyArea Survey at Pirmasens, GermanyHanomag. Hanover. CiernianyM .\ N Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, GermanyFriedrich Krupp A G, Essen, GermanyErla Maschinenwerke, G m b^H, Hcitcrblick, Cier-manyA T G Maschinenbau G m b H, Mockau, GermanyErla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Mockau, GermanyBayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, GermanyMittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha,GermanySubmarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Ger-manyMulti-Storied Structures, Hamburg, GermanyContinental Gummiwerke, Hanover, GermanyEassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, GermanyAmmoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, CJermanyBrown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, GermanyAdam Opel A G, Russelsheim, GermanyDaimler-Berjz \ G, I'nterturkheim, GermanyValentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, GermanyVolkswaggonwerke. Fallersleben, GermanyRailway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany

182 Shij) ^'ards Howaldtswerkc, Hamburg, Gcjrmany183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany1S4 Dainilcr-Bcnz A (i, Mannheim, GermanybS.') Syiilhrlic Oil Plant, Mecrbeek-Hamburg, GermanyIS(i (iewcrkscliaft Viclor, Caslrop-Rauxel, (Jerniany1S7 Klockner Humlxildl Deuiz, t'lm, Gerinany188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrojj-Hoy, (ier-manyIS!) Ncukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Germany190 Railway Viaduct at Allenbecken, Germany191 Railway V'iaduct at Arnsburg, Germany192 Deurag-Xerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany193 Fire Raids on Cierman Cities194 I G Farbenindustric, Ludwigshafen, Germanv, Vol I& Vol II19o Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany190 I G Farbendustrie, Leverkii.sen, Germany197 Cheniische- Werke, Huels, Germany198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany199 Locomotive Sho])s and Bridges at Hanim, Germany

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION*200 The pjflfectsof Strategic Bombing on German Trans-portation201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations inRegensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions.203 German Locomotive Industrv During the War204 German Military Railroad Traffic

UTILITIES DIVISION*205 German Electric Utilities Industrv Report206 1 to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Rejiorls"207 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports"208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G

Pacific WarOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

*1 Summary Report (Pacific War)*2 Japan's Struggle to I


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17

*18

*10

*20

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*2G

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*2'.t

*30

31

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62

ECONOMIC STUDIESAircraft Division

The Japaiiesp Aircraft Industry>Iifsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Corporatio>i Report No. I(Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK)(Airframes & Engines)Kakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd.

Corporation Report A'o. //(Nakajima Hikoki KK)(Airframes & Engines)Kawanishi Aircraft Company

Corporation Report A'o. ///(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabusliiki Kaisha)(Airframes')Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc.

Corporation Re/tort A'o. IV(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo KabusliikiKaisha)

(Airframes & Engines)Aiohi Aircraft Company

Corporation Report No. V(Aichi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division

Corporation Report No. VI(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, PuroperaSeizosho)

(Propellers)Hitachi Aircraft Company

Corporation Report No. VII(Hitachi Kokuki KK)(Airframes & Engines)Japan International Air Industries, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. VIII(Nipi5on Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK)(Airframes)Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company

Corporation Report No. IX(Nippon Gakki Seizo KK)(Propellers)Tachikawa Aircraft Company

Corporation Report A'o. A(Tachikawa Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

Fuji Airplane CompanyCorporation Report No. XI

(Fuji Hikoki KK)(Airframes)Showa Airplane Company

Corporation Report No. .\II(Showa hikoki Kogyo KK)(.\irframes)Ishikawajima Aircraft Indu.stries Company, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. XIII(Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo KabusliikiKaisha)(Engines)Nippon .\iri)lane Company

Corporation Report No. \IV(Nippon Hikoki KK)(Airframes)Kyushu Airplane Company

Corporation Report No. .XV(Kyushu Hikoki KK)(Airframes)

Slioda Engineering CompanyCorporation Report No. XVI(Shoda Seisakujo)

(Coni])oiien1s)Mitaka .\ircraft IndustriesCorporation Report No. XVII(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kal)usliiki Kaisha)(Components)

*33 Nissan Automobile CompanyCorporation Repott No. X\'III

(Nissan Jidosha KK)(Engines)

*34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air DepotsCorporation Report No. XIX

(Airframes and Engines)*35 Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft

Report No. XXBasic Materials Division

*36 Coal and Metals in Japan's War EconomyCapital Goods, Equipment, and Construction Divisio*37 The Japanese Construction Industry*38 Jajianese Electrical Et|ulpment*39 The Japanese INIachine Building Industry

Electric Power Division*40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan*41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant 1ports)

Manpower, Food, and Civilian Supplies Division*42 The Jai)anese Wartime Standard of Living and I't

zation of Manpower

*43 Japanese*44 Japanese4.5 Japanese*46 Japanese*47 Japanese*48 Jajjanesc

Military Supplies DivisionWar Production IndustriesNaval OrdnanceArmy OrdnanceNaval ShipbuildingMotor Vehicle IndustryMerchant Shipbuilding

49505152

^53

*54

*.55*.")()

*57*585!)

Oil and Chemical DivisionChemicals in Japan's WarChemicals in Japan's War .\i)peiidixOil in Jaiian's WarOil in Japan's WarAppendix

Over-all Economic Effects DivisionThe Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's \Economv (Including Appendix A: U. S. Econoi

Intelligence on JapanAnalysis and Comparls.\ppendlx B: Gro.ss National Product on Jaiand Its Components; Appendix C: StatistSources)

Transportation DivisionThe War Against Jajianesc Transportation, 19

1945Urban Areas Division

Effects of Air Attack on Jai)ane,se Urban Econo( Summarv Report)

Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex TokKawasaki-YokohamaEffects of Air Attack on the City of NagoyaEffects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kolje-KyotoEffects of Air Attack on the City of NagasakiICffects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima


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MILITARY STUDIESMilitary Analysis Division

Air Forces Allied willi Ihc I'liilrcl States in the WarAgainst Japan.Ia])auese Air PowerJapanese Air Weapons and TaeliesThe EfTeet of Air Act ion on Jai)iinese (.round Army

LogisticsKmi)loyniont of Forces Under tlie Southwest PacificCommandThe Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom-bardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth

Air Force)Air Operations in C'liina, Burma, IndiaWorld War

IIThe Air Transport Command in tlie War AgainstJa))anThe Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against JapanThe Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the WarAgainst JapanThe Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan

Naval Analysis DivisionThe Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and

II)Canniaigns of the Pacific W^arThe Reduction of Wake IslandThe Allied Campaign Against RabaulThe American Campaign Against W'otie, Maloelap,Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II, and III)The Reduction of TrukThe Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against JapanReport of Ships Bombardment Survey PartyFore-word, Introduction, Conclusions, and GeneralSummaryReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure A), Kamaishi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure B), Hamamatsu AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure C), Hitachi AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party- (En-closure D), Hakodate AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure E), !^Iuroran AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-closure F), Shimizu AreaReport of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Fln-elosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima-Saki Aieas

87 Rcjxirt of Ships Bonibardrneiit Survey Party (En-closure I), Comments and Data on Effectivene.ssof Ammvinition

88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party fEn-closurc J), Comments and Data on Accuracy ofFiring

8!) [{ejjorts of Ships Bombardment Survey Part}' (Imi-closurc K), Effects of Surface Bombardments onJapanese War Potential

Physical Damage Division90 EfTect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on .lapan (aReport on Eight Cities')ill The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb onJapanese Targets (a Report on Nine Licidents)92 Flfifects of the Atomic Bomli on Hiroshima, Japan93 Effects of the Atomic BomI) on Nagasaki, Japan94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa-

nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents;9.5 Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and FiveHundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (aReport on Eight Incidents)96 ~ A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary

Report)

G 2 Division97 Japanese Military and Xaval Intelligence98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part I. Comprehensive Report99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Jajja-

nese Homeland, Part II, Airfieldstoo Evaluation of Photograjihic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part IV, f rban Area Analysis102 i; valuation of Photograjjliic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part \"II, Electronics105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

nese Homeland, Part \'III, Beach Intelligence*106 EA-aluation of Photographic Intelligence in the .lapa-nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery*107 Evaluation of Photograjjhic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads

108 lOvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

USSBS Report 19, Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company

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Transcript of USSBS Report 19, Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company