Resolving Conflicts In The Caucasus And Moldova

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Scope NoteResolving Conflicts In The Caucasus And Moldova: Perspectives On Next Steps
Conference Report 6-7 May 2002
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) routinely sponsors unclassified conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the level of debate on critical issues. The views expressed in this conference summary are those of individuals and do not represent official US Government positions or views or those of the participants’ organizations.
CR 2002-03 September 2002
Resolving Conflicts In The Caucasus And Moldova: Perspectives On Next Steps Conference Report
Introduction On 6-7 May 2002, the National Intelligence Council and the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research sponsored a conference that examined the prospects for resolving regional conflicts involving four states of the former Soviet Union: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. The conference brought together outside scholars, regional experts and officials to discuss the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. The purpose was not to arrive at a consensus but to deepen understanding of the complex geopolitical dynamics at work in the region.
This conference report is intended to capture the salient points and original arguments of the proceedings. It consists of two major addresses, a précis of each speaker’s on-the-record presentation, and a summary of the ensuing not-for-attribution discussions. During the panel discussions no attempt was made to ascertain the general view of the panel or audience. Many of the points highlighted in these summaries of the panel discussions were noted because they were thought-provoking or outside the conventional wisdom. They illustrate the richness of the discussion, but they do not necessarily reflect accepted or prevailing views at the conference.
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Executive Summary Keynote speaker Ambassador Rudolf Perina reviewed similarities and differences among the conflicts, factors that might motivate change— such as new peace proposals or new leadership—and the role of mediators in encouraging compromise and providing interim conflict management. Luncheon speaker Ambassador Joseph Presel focused on lessons of the United States as mediator, the need to work with Russia, and the challenges of working with local leaders who have not prepared their populations for peace. Institutionalization of the Conflicts The major issues that led to the outbreak of violence during the collapse of the Soviet Union have largely faded into memory. New interests and identities have emerged that pose obstacles to resolving underlying social, economic, and political problems. As a result, successful settlement of the “frozen” conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria will require a shift in the current equilibrium. Each of these conflicts has produced isolated societies that engage in mutual recrimination and hold distorted views of developments across the conflict divide. Peace processes have been largely the domain of elites, who often seem to be out of touch with their societies and sometimes act as if they are more intent on consolidating their own positions than resolving the conflict and transforming their societies. Having contributed to the mobilization of their populations against one another, leaders on both sides have become trapped in an adversarial culture that reduces their receptivity to compromise. A variety of mediation strategies, both formal and informal, are required to overcome these obstacles. Abkhazia is the most intractable conflict and the most subject to renewed violence. It differs from the other conflicts in that the ethnic Abkhaz minority expelled the Georgian majority—with Russian and Chechen assistance. The Abhkaz fear retribution if displaced Georgians return. Russian policies characterized by inconsistencies and disincentives for peace further complicate the conflict. The fate of Abkhazia may be tied indirectly to that of South Ossetia in the sense that a successful resolution in one case is likely to affect the other. In both cases, economic issues are crucial. Illegal trade across cease-fire lines is considerable, creating incentives for the preservation of the status quo. Opportunities for enduring solutions will increase with economic development. Armenia and Azerbaijan are close to a settlement of their dispute over
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Nagorno-Karabakh. The near-term may offer the best opportunities for a balanced settlement because a prolongation of the dispute favors hard-liners on both sides. Over the longer-term disparate economic and demographic trends that favor Azerbaijan over Armenia also may preclude a settlement. Each year the Azerbaijani economy expands while Armenia’s economy stagnates and its population dwindles. Perceptions that the Armenian negotiating position is deteriorating may encourage an uncompromising and tough posture in Baku that is likely to generate an equally uncompromising response in Yerevan. Economic emigration from Armenia increases the influence of the relatively more hard-line Armenian diaspora and further diminishes opportunities for a compromise settlement. Displaced populations from the conflicts in Azerbaijan and South Ossetia do not present serious pressures for settlements. In Azerbaijan, only ten percent of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in camps. Others live primarily in urban and suburban areas, where many show signs of economic adaptation. This integration is due, in part, to programs sponsored by the Azerbaijani government and international organizations that target local economic development and job placement. The Azerbaijani government does not acknowledge its policy of integrating IDPs into mainstream Azerbaijani society, however, since this might be interpreted as acquiescence to the occupation of Azerbaijani territory. In the case of South Ossetia, many of the refugees—under 50,000—have settled into new roles in North Ossetia. The conflict in Transnistria is close to resolution and probably will not pose long-term problems. The original reasons for the conflict have grown less salient, and the dispute now is framed largely in terms of the private interests of elites. The conflict may prove tractable to settlement by traditional bargaining methods. External parties can play a helpful role by providing incentives to both sides; multiple mediators, however, have complicated the process in the past, and better coordination will be required. The recent election of a Russophone head of state in Moldova offers new opportunities for progress. The Role of Outside Players Iran is focusing internally on its national security, economic, and geopolitical interests. The Caucasus is looming larger on the Iranian horizon, however, because of the region’s energy reserves. Iran seeks to resist its marginalization in the region, which Tehran perceives as an US objective. Some in Iran argue that the US anti-terrorist campaign is a ruse and that increasing US interest in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan is an effort to encircle Iran as a prelude to hostilities.
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Nonetheless, Iran’s present economic difficulties are an impetus for greater cooperation with the United States. Iran is likely to pursue greater cooperation with Russia, including greater coordination of policies in the Caucasus. Turkey seeks to contain Russian influence in the region, manage difficult relations with Armenia and Iran, and maintain good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, especially to ensure the success of current pipeline projects. Turkey’s pursuit of closer ties to Georgia and Azerbaijan links its policies to the positions of these governments on the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaz, and Ossetian conflicts, fostering a greater sense of isolation and insecurity in Armenia. Turkey’s position prompts Yerevan to seek closer relations with Moscow and Teheran and encourages further cooperation in the Caucasus between Russia and Iran—at once an economic partner and the Islamic antithesis of Turkish secularism. Although Russia will have a key role in resolving each conflict, it is neither completely capable nor willing to play the part. Russia has considerable regional leverage that it has not used effectively, in part because it lacks confidence. As a result, the Russian approach toward these conflicts has been both ambivalent and inconsistent and is likely to remain so, barring incentives for change. From a security standpoint, the Caucasus is among Moscow’s top priorities, but under the current administration the economic dimension is becoming more salient and distinct from regional political goals. An increasingly pragmatic and flexible Russian posture may lead to more opportunities for cooperation and constructive engagement in regional peace processes. The current geopolitical climate presents an opportunity for constructive engagement with Russia. Russians are concerned about US activities in the region, and many expect the United States to act unilaterally. There would be psychological leverage in public statements from US officials declaring commitment to a multilateral approach to regional development in which Russia has a key role. If offered a choice between constructive engagement and exclusion, Moscow would be likely to choose the former. Because the Caucasus, in particular, is crucial to Russia’s security and economic interests, the fear of marginalization and the opportunity to preserve or expand Moscow’s influence there might help overcome domestic political resistance. The current geopolitical situation is opportune since most countries of the region want to work on the US side. They might be prepared to cooperate with one another for the sake of cooperation with the United States in its struggle against terrorism. In the present geopolitical climate, the metaphor of a “Great Game” is anachronistic.
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Compatibility and cooperation among US, Russian, British and French interests offer significant opportunities. Cooperation, particularly between Russia and Western governments, may provide a new basis for encouraging cooperation within the South Caucasus region. Prospects for Peace The South Caucasus retains infrastructure that once made it a crossroads for trade. The potential exists to look beyond past disputes and current dilemmas toward a regional strategy of shared advantage. History can be used in the interest of peace because it shows how much these populations hold in common and teaches that no political entity can achieve security and prosperity in isolation from its neighbors. These societies should be encouraged to shift the discussion from a rehearsal of hatred, grievance, and fear toward a recognition of shared futures, joint security, and mutual prosperity in a climate of democracy and economic development.
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Ambassador Rudolf Perina, Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts, Department of State
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Panel I: Abkhazia Paula Garb, University of California at Irvine Jonathan Cohen, Conciliation Resources Highlights of the Discussion
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Panel II: South Ossetia Arthur Martirosyan, Conflict Management Group Highlights of the Discussion
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Panel III: Nagorno-Karabakh Marc Spurling, UNHCR Highlights of the Discussion
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Panel V: Roundtable on the Role of Outside Players: Iran, Turkey, and Russia
Iran: Tom King, Department of State Turkey: Bulent Aliriza, Center for Strategic and International Studies Russia: Anne Herr, Department of State Highlights of the Discussion
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Resolving Conflicts In The Caucasus And Moldova: Perspectives On Next Steps Conference Report Keynote Address
Ambassador Rudolf Perina Special Negotiator for Nagorno- Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts, Department of State
This conference focuses upon the next steps in the resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova. At first glance these conflicts share a number of similarities, but as they have developed over several years they also have diverged from one another. While we will consider them together, we may ultimately conclude that the differences among these conflicts are greater than their similarities and that a comparative approach is consequently limited. Among their similarities are their occurrence in the territories of the former Soviet Union, following upon the Cold War, and feeding upon complex histories that go back decades or even centuries. In each of these conflicts, Russia has played a role that is complex and sometimes contradictory, due to the many strong voices that influence her policy. Yet if Russian policy is sometimes difficult to understand it is certain to remain important in all of these cases. And if each of these conflicts is currently frozen, they each have potential for stabilization and for escalation, and they all involve publics that are unprepared for the compromises that are necessary if their escalation is to be averted. While there are similarities in their origins, these conflicts have been sustained by factors that differ significantly from one another. In Transnistria, corruption plays a major role. In Abkhazia, the perpetuation of the conflict ensures the self-preservation of political elites and of those who were originally responsible for the conflict. In Nagorno-Karabakh, there are more traditional causes, including nationalism and the role of the diaspora. There are also substantial differences in degrees of progress that have been made toward the resolution of these conflicts. Abkhazia is one of the most difficult situations and perhaps the one that is furthest from constructive dialogue. Transnistria is somewhere in the middle. It has seen some interesting new developments in the last few years, including the Istanbul commitments, which have had a major impact on the conflict and the election of a new president. Nagorno-Karabakh is the major one, the one that gets the most international attention and the one that has come closest to resolution at various times through the years. Many proposals have been put
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forward, but in the end one side or the other always seems to pull back. The United States certainly has not given up. After the Key West meeting there was disappointment with the follow-up, and some have concluded that these negotiations are dead. Yet the two sides are incredibly close. The issues of principle have been decided, and what is left are technical differences. Both countries will hold elections in 2003, and this opens a window of opportunity. There has been some success in setting up a third tier of negotiations in Prague to look at confidence-building measures. That has been a step forward, but clearly there has not been a resolution of this conflict, nor for any of the others. When a conflict remains unresolved after ten years of negotiation one must ask what is needed to move forward. The most obvious answer is political will. Yet while the political will of key parties plays a critical role in each of these conflicts, it is also more complicated than that. We must not overlook the possibility of new factors that might play a pivotal role. Cyprus, for example, had long been a frozen conflict until new movement occurred in recent months in response to an opportunity to join the European Union. There are a number of factors that can change the dynamics of a conflict, and, as in this case, they are often external. New ideas and new proposals may be among these motivational factors. Yet in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the anticipation of new approaches has also led to disappointment and frustration. During ten years of negotiation, most ideas have already been placed on the table. People are looking for a magical solution that will spare them the burdens of compromise. Of course no one can offer that. One can juggle and readjust the old proposals, but the basic concepts for resolution are already out there. A second possible factor is new leadership. Leaders individually can have an enormous impact upon the fate of nations, especially in terms of conflicts, where the attitudes of leaders are vitally important. Consider the case of South Africa, where no one envisioned the emergence of F. W. deKlerk and Nelson Mandela as peacemakers. The Balkans saw the opposite result when leaders undermined the peace. Emerging outside influences are another factor. Some people thought progress would result from the development of the pipeline and exploitation of the region’s energy reserves. Perhaps one day they will. It is also possible that progress will result from the geopolitical shift that occurred after 11 September and especially from changing relations between the United States and Russia.
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External influences are often associated with unrealistic expectations for outside intervention. We hear people asking when the world will step in and write the terms of peace to resolve these conflicts. Most sides say such things with the silent hope that outside mediators will shove their proposals down the throats of the other side. The disputants may call for a Dayton-style conference, but it was a long and dusty road that led to Dayton. The situation in the former Yugoslavia differed from this part of the world in terms of a heated conflict that included military action, massive troop deployments, and bombing. More realistically, outside intervention means convincing both sides in a conflict that they will ultimately not get their way and that they will have to compromise. We have not achieved that recognition in the present cases. In all of these conflicts, there are players who think they can achieve their ideal solutions. When we try to persuade secessionist leaders that the world will never recognize them as an independent sovereignty, they remain unconvinced that the historical window has closed. They draw encouragement from events in Kosovo and cling to the belief that there is still an opportunity for the break-up of states. These conflicts will be solved, but their costs will increase as long as their solutions are delayed. Azerbaijan alone has a promising economic future and might weather the impact of these conflicts. For the other countries involved, these disputes have devastating consequences that should be of great concern to us. If any of these countries fail, the consequences would be extremely serious. The negotiator’s task can be frustrating, but it also brings achievements. Proactive mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh has probably prevented another war. Ultimately, we have to be realistic about the nature of a settlement and the interim management of these conflicts.
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Panel I: Abkhazia This panel examined the current state of play in Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region, including prospects for bringing an end to the conflict there. Paula Garb Associate Director, Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California at Irvine Professor Garb presented her paper, “The Impact of Abkhaz-Georgian Citizen Peacebuilding Initiatives.” She made the following major points. • Conventional peace processes are
sometimes hindered by popular perceptions of deep social wounds. Grassroots peace initiatives are needed before people can accept agreements made at official levels.
• The University of California at Irvine
project on peacebuilding provides a forum for constructive analysis of and presents valuable insights into the perspectives of both Georgian and Abkhazian sides. At first, the discussion topics were not political. As trust grew, it became increasingly easier to discuss the history and roots of the conflict and solutions for the future.
• A key achievement has been that the
participants own the process; they set the agenda and move at their own speed and in ways that are familiar to them. After the first dialogues, the participants took over the tasks of facilitation, alternating between Georgian and Abkhaz facilitators in consecutive sessions during each conference.
• Reflecting upon some of the
breakthroughs that we have achieved, we believe it was crucial that the Georgian side responded with understanding to demands that were made by the Abkhazian side. When the Abkhazians found that they were met with understanding, compromise was possible.
• After last October’s military crisis in the
Kodori Gorge, it has been more difficult for the Abhkaz to participate in this process. They expose themselves to local criticism and risk their reputations but because they have built up trusting relationships with the Georgians, they continue to meet, albeit cautiously. If there is a resumption of military action, the Abkhaz may feel the need to withdraw, at least temporarily.
• Discussions of policy options have been
successful in generating various alternatives where once there was little flexibility. The Georgian participants recognize the de facto independence of Abkhazia, and the Abkhaz side was prepared to consider confederal relations with Georgia before the October 2001 attacks in Abkhazia.
• Participants share several key concerns:
the desire to protect human rights, promote democratic processes and institutions, and ensure regional stability and security. These concerns suggest that both communities face similar challenges and are searching for ways to promote national identity and protect the security of minorities within their territories. Increased numbers recognize that they will…