USSBS Report 64, Military Analysis Division, Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics

8/7/2019 USSBS Report 64, Military Analysis Division, Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics

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UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

THE EFFECTON

JAP~ESE GROUNDARMY LOGISTICS


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. . aril for the use of the U. S. StrawgicThis report was wntten p~ y t further );e,ports of a. more eompre-:Bombing Survey in the preparatIon 0.. ressed in tIus report must. elusions or OpInlOns m . .- p - b thmpnve nature. A ny con ill. mawrial covered and as su lee!' 0k oonsidend as l~~ to t~!:;cfu~ther studies


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTAcknowledgment is made to the agencies enumerated in thfl bibliogro.phy

for much of the bas ic data upon which this report is bused.These s tudies were ini tia ted under the oveNIU direction of Maj.. Gen,OEVIL . A . . ANDERSON, with the executive a.ssistnllce of Col. RUBERTH. . TERRILL and Col. RAMSAY D. POTTS.This report, in both substance and. final form, was prepared by theGround Logist ics Brnnch of the Mi lit ary Andysis Division. The officerSof this branch, who served with the Pacific Survey, were as follows:Col.JER:MAIN F. RODENHAUSER, Ord. Dept. , Chief, Ground LogistjcsLt. Col. EARLE : M : . SHINE, Inf., Combat Zone Logistics OfficerL t . 0 : : 11 .DAVlD W . S WIFT , M I, Tntendance Officer & InterpreterL.. Comdr. WILLIAM J. McCLUSKEY, USNR, Ordnance OfliuerL.. Comdr. GENTRY C. WALDO, USNR, Transpo.rtation OfficerCa.pt . WALTER M. DROZD, MI, Medical Supply & Evaeua~ion OfficerCApt.PAUL W. AURELL, MI, Interpreterl.t. AMOS K. SMITH, US~"'R, Petroleum, Oils & Lubricants OffiCll.rLt. DEBET N. REITZ, USNR, Special Projects Officer

TABLEOF CONTENTSL Summaries :!rid Conclusions __I.Discussion - ---- -----------------------------

2. Summaries ~ - d - ~ ~ ~ ; l ~ - s i ; ; - : : _ - ~ ~ _ - ~ ~ _ - _ - ~ : _ - _ - _ - ~ ~ ~ : ~ : ~ ~ _ -Tra,n6portation _

1. Over-all aspects = = = = ~ = - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ ~ - ~ - - - - - - - - -2. Shipping = = - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .3. Railroad ~ - ---- -------------- --------.! : ~ ~ ~ a : ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ = ~ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = - - - - - - = = = = = = = = :7. , ~fe~~~~~-~~~;s~~-~--~-------------------------~-8. List of exhibi ts - ' ~ A ~ ' - t ~ ~ ~ h - ' ; X ; ~ - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - : - - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - ~ _ - ~ - _ - ~

PetNleum, Oils and Lubricants ----------------~---~ ~ r : ! ? ~ : ; ; ~ ; ~ : : : : : : ~ : : : : : : - : : : ~ : ~ : ~4. Comparison of requirements. with receipts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = = = =5. Dist.l"ihtttion--zone of communiCo.tiollS------------- -------------.6. Distribution of fuel ITom Rabaul ~--------------------------------7. Distribution of fuel in Philippines ----------.---------------------8. Effectiveness of !Ioil"ttack ----- - --- - -----------------------------9. Effectiveness OI bloclru.de-------------~----------------------------10. Reference no tes - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - -. - - - - -- - . - -- - - - - -- - - - -.11. Lis t of exhibi ts "A" through "V' --------------------------------.

V. Intendance -------------------~--------------- 1231. Introduction ~ ~ ~__ 1232. Provisions -- -------------------------- 128a. Organization -------------------------- 128b. Requirexosnts . -------------------------- 128

113

151 517MM38414243

5858585 960606565666767

10 110 110 11 0 3104 .10 6l O Bl O B1 0 91 0 9109110

, .


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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont inued)0. Distribution - y _d. Stocks -----------------------------------~-:----------------Dispersal _

8. Forage ! _4. Clotb~ _~ Organization !. _b. Supply _0. Stocks ------------------------------------------------------5. Efrect of air action _

6. Lis t of exhibits "An through "J" _7. Reference notes . .Ca:Arnaa VI. Medical Supply, Hospitalization, Evacuation ---- _1. Introduction _

2. Medical supply ~-------------------------a. Requirements _b. S~pp.ly ~. production ' _c. Distribution . _d. Medical supply depots ~ _8. Hospitalization ~4. Casualties _

5. Combat zone supplies ~ _L{reneral : _b. Philippine Islands _0. cnrlna _d. Burma ------ _e. Siam _f. Singapore, Malaya, Sumatril and Java ~ _g. Bismarcks and Solomon Islands _h. Celebes, Halmahera, and Northwest New Guinea _6. Combat zone evacuation _. . G ene ra l _

: . : a ~ ; e s ~ ~ ~ - = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =d.


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CHAPTER ISU:JMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

om;d 800110 Of the 1 epO?' t. -ThB objec-report is to present an annlysis andthe effect of the Allied !Lil' ef.l 'Olt.o f the J: tp imese log ist ics system

its f u L l {) ~ io11SI ,s o iu . 1 ' l I S they 'per-supply of the Japanese groundhospitalizati on and evacuation ofis based on investigation .into the

availability of major categories ofand supplies to the -various echelonsthroughout the war. Tlie' vast, widelyareas of the Pacific and '&si\). overwar WIlS fought, together with the

n I I m 1 < wlTili'.ivh, small frontSillld outpost areasiland warfare, have been CO u-determinuticn of th B extent to

W ! i i l ff i : ': i U i ; . . j't,D."1-~ i uterfered with (he dslivsry and-" ,, ,, .. .. .. . o f suppl ies . The same eons ider at lons

applied to the detarminntion of thosethe supply system most vulnerable toEvery eJl .' ort has been made to ascer-

shottages of important itemscombat troops in the more importantdeveloJ :i ls the prcgress i va deteri -Japanese supply system :hom theetfor~ could be brought to bear

outer fringes until the time when thedriven back to the pcint ",berethet ie employed with nmximumagainst every corner oft-he Japa

1I11~IK'j~ri~'ie~In~ihort, the report endea VOl'S toi; com p s tout evi c 1 en ce to parro j tof sound conclusions as to whatJ apanese logi st ic s system, forward~!p!': '&fj5i )j ,tel~dproduct ion, wer e i .d :fected most

nil' operations ,~n.d where theof this effor t prod\1cad the I ,, ,reutestof presentat io -n .-Invest .lgat ion has

: : " " 1 I " 1 [ i l i j i . U c ! ~ t e c l a long tha l ines of orgnni~a ll i. ol l o flog ist ic s' System. The !"{lport itself

is similarly constructed with minor vari ations insu~div isions for more e ft :ec ti "e s tudy and presen-tat ion . These subdi v isions a re :

(a) Transport .( 1 ) ) Ordnance : To include weapons, ammu-

n it -ion , motor veh ic le s, armored veh i-clas , communicat ions equipment , andspare parts,

( a ) Petrol eum, Oils and Lnbricaats.(d) Intendance , .To include clothing annrations.( c) Hospitalizat ion, Evacuati on and Medi-

cal Supp ly .(j) Combat Zone Logistics,Sources o] in. jm ." la tio-n .-Subsequent to sur-

r ende r and prior to occupat ion of t .hei r homelandby Allied forces the Japanese syst ematical lydes tro yed t 'hei r rema in ing documen ts, Hence , in-terrogatiou of competent Japanese personnel isthe primary source of dnta for tills report, Avery limited number of document s bearing on thesubjec t haV6 been uucove ted ; occasional d ia ri eshave been found; i .n some cases actual inventoriesof supplies preS6ntl.y on hand in par ti cu la r supp lymstallations have been obtained. Evel'y'eifort hasbeen m..de to exploit availi lh 1eJapal\ese ifor-mation to the maximum, In aclditlon someintelli-gence repor ts , Air Evah, .a~iou BO!LxdRapor ta, and1 '6p6r t-5 by other divisions of the Unitad StatesSt ra tegic Bombing Survey l . H 1 v e been utilized.TIle major portion of the stat.istical data hasbeen l"{lprodllCed 1'01[] memory by ,Tupane se per-sonnet who WeI'lI intimately connected wit h t.bevar ious agencies of the Government n,nd the(l.~mies. It is realized tlu-. t many inaccuracies maybe e~pec ted f rom such source ma te rial ; however,to theexteDt possible, cross-cheeks on the datasubmit ted have been mad". Also t o prevent pos-s ib le er ro rs ni l d isc repanc ie s tho consi stency ofdata obtained f rom related but d iffe rent s ec tionsof the J"prmeS1! army has been carefully ana-lyzed.A geuBl"! Il consistency has heen found through-out the d ll t . . obtained enabl ing the development

RESTR1CTED


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of trends, conditions and overall situation: Thedata are the best obtainuble under the circum-stances and jll1l confidently believed. to representfui rl y a ccu ra tely the p icture o f condi ti on s as theyactually existed throughout the war. The per-s onnel inter roeated were ,'ery eooperntive andwilling to fum ish any information within theiri nd iv idna] ( lu[ 'ob il il ie s. A ll i nt er rogat ions u sed' in the repo rt er e set for th in t ,J ,e l 'ef er enc~ no t. es .Copies of there interrogations are on file withthe United Sta te s Strategic Bombing Survey.Genera l aspec ts o f the s tudy .-The Japanese

logistics syst C , J I 1 was so complex and the reas onsfor shortages so numerous and varied that it isvery difficult 10 determine what shortages of spe-ci fi c i tems of supplies and equipment werecr eated at the many fr onts directly through airact ion. The existende in .1llpllllese.controlled Mnn-ehur ia o f a- si se ab le mdus tr ial l )o te nt ia l t oge therwith n complete distr ibut ion system to handle th emany troops staged through that area is wellknown. Howeve r , a cc ess to thi s very impor ta ntarea has been denied, und records pertinentt he reto are nen-ex is te nt i n . Ia pan proper . It isregretted that this ar ea could not. be exploitedto det ermine de fi ni tel y wha t pa rt it played inthe logistical functioning of the Jnpanese army.Never theless, the logistics study attempts a re-construction af the supply system during thewar insofar as available data permit. The suc-cess es and f ailures, cr itical phas es , and the pr o-gressive deterioration of the system will beshown together with deductions as to t he ul ti -mate failure )f the system based all the militaryevents tbat tr anspired in the course of the war.To evalua te Intelligently the effects of air

action on the logis tics sys tem we mus t firs t knowthe type of war the Japanese planned to wageand the logistic preparations that were made tosupport thosa plans. How broad and strong alogi st ic base the Japanese possessed to providesupport to tkeir widely scattered forces mus t beascertained, IS the effec tiveness and capabil it ieso f t ho se forces in the succ essive phases of t he wa rdepend almost entirely on the stability andstr ength of tae s upply structur e. That this struc-ture was inadequate to cope with the tremendousdemand thrown upon it is evident f rom the factsdeveloped in the report. The failure of the Jap-anese anny is in part attributable to tile short-a ge s o f t he r ec ea sa ry I m pl em e nt s o f modern war -fare which developed on nearly ever y combatf ront . The Effects of th e air offensive aga inst the

Japanese homeland were increased by the critical. s upply s ituation that already existed when thefull strength of that of fensive begun to be felt.Inadequate from the beginning to ful fi ll he t aSKSwith which it wns confronted, the Japanes e legis-t ic sys tem collapsed entirely under the e llec tsof the All ied efforts thrown against, it.Ba()kgl'ouwlof logi1!ticaJ,aitllation.-Ovlll what

period 0 1 ' t ime the Jupunese had been planning awar with tl,e nited States and her a ll ies is prob-lematical; however, it is certain that for yearsJapanese rnilitnry p1Ul1J10rSIl!I.c1been formuJatmgp lans to !Dee t pot en ti al enemies o f t l1 ei l' empi re ,These plans were studied and Improved upon con-tinuously n 1\ normal military responsibility ofthe general staff. Unquestionably Russia, theUnited Sta tes, and Great Britain were at t he topof Ihe l is t o f Japanese pot en ti al e nemies , pa rt ic u-larly from the moment of J apanese nggTes sion inhina,Evidence POUlts clearly to the filet tha.t theorigina l JaptlUese est imate'> (It the quantity andtype of equipment aud s upplies required to suc-cessfully wage a major war w r e based l arge lyon experiences in the Rus so-Jnpanese and Sino-Japanese wars, ome small influence WM ex-erted hy the experiences of the major powers in'World War 1 and the very early pad; o f Wor ldWar II.Having r egarded Rus sia O.S her number oneenemy unt il 194 .1 , when jt was thought that Ger-many had dafeated Rus sia, the Japanes e had eon-centrated their military strength both in troopsand S U P IJ lj es i n ManehUl 'h~ and Oh: i118 . Hence,when war with the nited States was undertaken,the .J apanese hlld these resources on which todraw immedintely. In faot) in 1941 nnd en!'l.!'1942 , p I 'a c ti c !~ l l y n i l troops 311c1 suppl ies t o sup-port the army in its sout.1nvnrd (tC1VMlCIl camefrom Mnnchur in nnd China. The e;.-tellt of theseresources is uot dalinitely kno,vn, but in tI ,e eyesof Jmperiul General Headquar ters in Tokyo theywere s uf ficient to provide the necess ar y supportIlgainst the type of opposition the JapMlese ex-pee red to encoll nter, . . . .' dHere i t should be saul tha t 11,11VIdence obt,alJ)Opoints to the fIlet; thnt. the supply services of thearmy were not optimistic in their views ? I; th.eadequacy ofresources, sverthe less, the 1l1iJltlll'Yoperations W()I'B imp lemen ted a s p lanned . imporeance o f this dec ision cannot be too greatlyemphasised as the attitude express ed therein 16representative of the thinking of the Jap:),nese

2

throughout the Will'. As Majorassistan t chief of staff tostated: "Ill ou r n r111 j' t he

to study logistiC-it does notwant to study only bow to

our mil it ary ac ademy i t i s d if li cu ltto study logistics."possessed the world's third

fleet and had the world s thirdwith which to gLIl1rnntee safe pas-seas. The J 'apanese armies had been

the years of combat in China ..been highly successful to date.be more prepared for Il.majorwas ill the early fall of 1041. On

her enemies were harder pres sed''':j~J,


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or JIUUlufact.urad) which was vit-a l to Japan 's in-dust ri ll .l and mi li tar y eOOl1omy. However, by ex-, tending her planned advances into the ~ewGuinea-Solomons area and into the Aleutrans,Japrul divided her snipping between imports:from tbe southern area and the supply of theadditional, barren eombat areas from which ~erships usually returned empty. This expall~10nwas beyond 1118CllpD.cityof her merchant. marme,As a CQumquence, after our counter!l .t t!LC~began , the Jlpnnesn had t o co:n~entl"... e t]lCll"

shipping in t:te supply of the POUlts currentlyunder attack: The following .figures show thehigh percentage of total o.vailnble ~rmy ship-p ing which was assigned to each lmLlor thellter:

D~t lnat iOD or!luppHe& "J! 'Q lmng i!" Totalf t: l i8 ll ;"11ed tcnnega_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 1 - - - - -

I _~!~----lo' .yo 710.00)(1 2,J. , ;Q,OOODetem~['-----~ uu'Zon..... ~__, Cl 50 ,OOOAPrH-::.::---- lh la:v !1r~hll lpp!ne . t ; .______ inO.Om) 1. ,S:!jO.(]OOApril-:ara.y __ ~ _ r jaemn .. 40ll,OOO~ tob e:r ~ iJu ada leo . lJa1-N ew C (3 ln co .. 5 00 ,0 00 ] . 1- i:i O, OO O~_~ Il'Ul(I.,cla1~N~w GUrnf:IL 710,000 .1,420.000

.t~tt.! iu.ttdIlJusna]rNeVi' Gulnea. :520.00[) 1.100,,,000M a , < I > ~ ~ : : l " I l a r l " " '" ' . 300.000 860, .000Ju l, .~pt\ ID!h(l'rl iPbJUpl>lne1J ~_ 410,000 675,000O~O=::ber btlIpp1ne!! ~__ 22 ti,O OO 4 :1 0. (.H )OlfLDqfl::-:h~lJ_~GUtb Cb l n . a . CoAAt _ ~_ __ SO,OO () Z 5_L)~ OOOt In tlW!Ie perlOOIi lh~ lapl!.ni;!8e .ab:u;udonianese began to realize

their inu.bj]ity to provide adeqnute logistic sup-port to thei I' exten ded forces,Allied nil' forces were quick to seize uponevery advnntage in their destruction of Japaneseshipping. After the endy days in the Sol(Tmonsand New GuiMn we were able to achieve local(lir superiority in every the(tter oT operations.From a tactica] viewpoint this enabled us toat tack each new objec ti VB huving no hope of ob-tnining fur ther supp lies .From the broader strategic point er vi~w ourintardietion of rear bases proved even moreimportnnt. As examples ]n the eltrly phases ofthe war, supply 'from Rabaul to the Solomonsand to New Guinea was cut 011 a fter .July 1943.It beeurue impossible for shipping to. movealong the uppel" west eonst o f UII l~LiJ_ layPenin-sula ,Itte" ,f,lI1UUI'Y 1944 und thi s, with eorrt inuednil ' attueks on Burmese raj I ines , was t lre princi -pal cause of t he enemy's :fni1ul"e in that, area,The same unsound log is ti cI11 s ituat ion continuedthroughout the war and as 'Our forces advancedacross the Paeific thB untimeliness and inade-'1uacy of In.pa11ese logis tic support eonsistentlyrevealed itself.Attacks on Truk from the [';1' ea rly' in In44reduced thnt bastion to nn outpost wh ich theJapanese finally found too costJ.y to maintain.Air attacks on mid Iater occupation of the Mari- I I. DUS prevented any further supply of the Caro-lines and, once the invnsion of the PMUppineswas well under way in 19


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IntbB oombae areas the u se o f avai la bl e motortranspor t was curtailed by the limited extent andpoor quality of the roads. Japan did not havethe equipment 01' technique for road building orrepair and diel not take this into account in herplanning, As a result, trucks of inferior con-struction quickly deteriorated and created aninsuperable maintenance problem, The s upplyof motor fuel in combat areas other than (Ihinawas usually adequate in total but was poorly dis-tributed and limited the range of vehicles to therelatively fe'\" depots or clumps in existence.Therefore troops were forced to _m arch greatdistances, carrying as much equipment as pos-sible. Recourse to hor se s, oxen , and coo li es neversufficed as a substitute for trucks even in themost advanced positions.Subma rines have obviou s inhe rent I tm it ar ionafor trans port purposes and such desper ate use ofthem by the Japanese proved too expensive fort he resul ts ac ai eved , At first, combat submarineswere employed for transportation of supplies tos trategic defensive positions cut off f rom theirown sur fa ce shipp ing by dominan t A ll ied force s.However, these craft had IL maximum cargocapacity of only 50 metric tons and the navylater bui lt Msubmarines espec inlly for t ransport .One of these had a capacity of 400 tons but forgasoline onlj, Not only did the other navytrans port susmarines have a maximum capacityof 80 tons hlt they were built too late to be area l, b ene fi t. The Jupanese a rmy al so under tookto build traasport s ubmar ines but these proyaddismnl disappointments in operation. Of thenine supply missions attempted by them sevenwere successful but only ran 90 miles fromYokosuka 00Hachljo Jima.The extellSive use of air transport whichproved 80 vUuable to us was not appreciated bythe Japanellil. That Japan had a maximum ofonly 80 trarsport planes specifically ass igned tothe Anny Air Transport Department is the bes tindica.tion of its inadequacy. These few planeswere devoted primarily to the transpor tation ofaviation BpII1'8 parts and were of virtually no useto the g round armies ,Orclflance,- The Japanes e ordnance supply

system left much to be desired in its organi-za tion, admini st ra tion and ope rat ion. P lanning,both befor e and during the war, WIS inadequate,ov~ly opt iu .ist ,ic! short range in charaetee , and in-lluible. Aimims tration was contained almostentirely in ordnance administration headquarters

in Tokyo and was thus too centralized to permite ff ic ient , opportune opera tion 011 the scale de-manded by a war of such magnitude and in-tensity.The system of records and accounts and cata-l og ing was admi tt ed ly inadequat e and inef fi ai ent ,Ordnance supplies could be ordered in IIvery fe wcases by code number. A catalogue col)tlLiningonly ~wo or three pages devoted to ordnaneslisted. certain items uud their code numbers, Thecode wns made up from 6gtU",,9, Kana, and Eng-lish combined. Obviously the great bulk of ord-nance items was never listed. This method,adopt ed i ll 193'7, c au sed innumerab le e rror s, c on -fusion and inef ficiency, yet 1)0thinO" was doneto install a more complete and effiaient cata-logue system.Homeland depots were very poorly plannedand equipped. The two-story warehouses weresma ll , T I! lr rOW, and poor ly l ight ed . The inte ri orwas broken up by platforms running on bothsides of a longitudinal center pass ageway. Thes eplatforms 01' mezzanines were about midway be-tween the floor nnd the ceiling, 12 feet above.Acce ss to the second f loo r W.9 by means of s tair-ways at both ends of the buildings. With a veryfew excepo ions no form of hoist or lift wa s inevidence. One or two short spur tracks consti-tuted the entire railway system of a depot leav-ing pr actically all the warehou as inacces sible tofreight cars. TIle depots were inadequate forl arge scal e, whol esal e handl ing and d is tr ibut ionof s upplies and are an excellent .indication of th~Jnpanese luck of appreciation of the seale of warin which they invo lved themse lve s.Ordnance stocks actually on haud at the start

of the war and capable of being pr oducer} (lurin""the war were inadequate to meet the toto,} de-mands of the military forces which spread them-selve s throughout t he vas t l '( !1 I. cheso f t Il e Pac tf icand Asia. Allowances fOI' wastage were ad-mittedly far too low; no provisions fo!' "pipe-line" supplies and losses ill t ransit , a ltho~ghrecognized as necessary, were made ; ef fc ct lV II ,efficient dis tribution of nvailable s upplies WitSgenerally lacking, particularly o:j'tel' the clLxlystages of the war. Production, never adequate,J agged behind actual cons umption aud dem.an~.At the end of 19\11, the Japanese had 108 l C n .1 S ~ -bun (unit of ammunition per division). Dnl'lllgt he fol lowing year t here we re 30 Kt1i sO )cnbu llcOll'. b duced For thesumed but only 25 Kaisen un pro ucen. dy...ur 1943 produec ion and consumption buJu) lCB

6

The consumption jumped to 411944 while producelon dr opped offand for 1945, to the end of thewas but 8 KaisGnbull while con-Kaisenbun. From Exhibit V itat the end of 1941 the Jl~panes e

for 10 3 d iv is ions and 81,000 motorat the termination o f t Il e War therefor 104 divisions and 6'7,000 motorthis period the Japenese had

of their army from 2,100,000at the end of 1941 to 5,500,000at the end of the war. ThusJapam'!se had 108 Kl1iscn-

ununmon, weapons to equip 103 divi-motor vehicles while ther e weremobilized. Whereas, at the end

they had but 74 Kaisenbun of ammu-for 104 divisions and 6'7,000while there were 169 divisionsConsequently many of tlle divisions

50 percent equipped. This over-allsupplies drastically limited bothand defensive capabilities of the

of spare parts and: the maladminis-UIlIi~'@~'l!IJ.llat~ program for the tmining of

made the supply situa ionthrough very poor maintenancep O O 1 I G e d a considerable quantity of~i!IIadlm.ed" In the words of Lieu-

t aDl ll lt ;! l jmeral Kan , c hi ef o f t he ordnance ad-headquarters, DESES Inrerrogu-231: "There was an over -al l hor ta ge

~ parts due to insufficient productionIIIl l .m~uate and pOOl ' d is ta ibu ti on. When -~ PlPlible complete items o r equipment wereahip~ Overseas f or cu,nnlbaliziltion in lieu of,~",, ,, ," ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, " The shortage of tra ined ori ln l) ,ncer . t I O J I i I I i i l U I . I J 1 & both commissioned and enlisted wasa.Pli~i1ltl:'V due to II. lack of appl"eciatioll by allIIJ!Il;IIlJmilal' ' ' of the importance of vast numbers1It'~~,ciams to service a modern army. Such

there was had been uppurently con-~"'!11~,'4~nl,v by the or Innnoe Mhninistrntion1 I G ! i ~ ~ A I : + . e r ~ in -Iapan, The 'School for priva tea4Il' I4i lJlatad about 600 s tudent s !I yen!' while the

courses f01" officers and noncoll lmjs.l ! l ' ! l l e ( l < o f i iC8 J 1 ' R did not exceed 400 officers and 600

officers graduated pel' year.a shortage of trained instructors,:t::,.~~t~:!~gac il it ies und much admjni st ra -

"I The courses were not staggered

as in American schools, thus failing to makethe most efficient. use of time. instructors andfaciJjties. ,- ,From the foregoing it can readily be seen

~hltt, as far as ordnance supplies are concerned,111 the cornmunicatiors, and combat zones therughly Success ful attacks of our submarines and~u: craf t on the ove r . .e xt ended , poor ly p ro tec tedlines of supply denied these inadequate butlllUC~ needed, m'itiea,1 supplies to the ground,wmles when and where they were IDOst urgentlyneed~d. In 1943 every the at er except Chinn, MaH-chnr ia and Korea suffersd loss es in transit. Thesituation went from bad to worse with over-illlos ses s kyroek ting f rom 4, percent in 1942 toulmo t 50 percent in 19.J.5 despit til fact thats upply Jines were shortened s aoh year.Lat 1" as the Jnpo.nes e were pushed back to he

very shores of their homeland, ail' power com-bined with blockade effec tive ly disrupted theproduction potential thl1t otherwise might havepr ovided a more sa~isf llctory s upply situationfor the shortened supply and defen e lines of thehomeland. In January 1945, for the defense ofthe homeland it 3 month' supply of nr nmunitionwa s planned but by the time of surrender forthe 57 divisions ass embled for this purpose ther ewere Kaisenblms of ammunition available foronly 30 and WC!l.POllS Tor only 40 di visions(ExJlib,t A1!J). Many of the newly mobilizedunits for tIle defense of the homeland were COD-seqnently hor as much lIS 50 percent of theirequipment.TIle effects of ail, action, both direc and in-

direct, contributed considerably to the inade-quacy o f Japanese o rdnance supp ly :First, through the destruction of Iarga

amounts O T shipping nnd the disruption of thetransportation of urgently needed snpplies and,Second, through the attninment of aerial

superiority and the resultant isolation of largeqnnntities of supplies in forward areas such asBabaul, II load so st~ggnring was thrown uponan already overburdened, inadequate supplysituation that Japanese military decisions anda ct ions we re adver sely a ff ect ed and thu s has te nedthe fmaJ col lapse,Third, while some ordnance stocks were

directly destroyed by ai r f ic ti on, t he high p rior i-ties assigned the production of .Tapanese air-Cl'aft weapons and ammunition, and antiaircraftweapons and ammunition to meet the threat ofour air action caused much greater shortages in

7


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: ground ordnance. Alltiaimraft weapons, airIforce weapons and air force ammunition weregiven C-I, 0-2 and 0-3 priorities respectivelyin 19U. By H42 they were raised to B-1, B-5,and B-6. For 1943 air force weapons and ammu-nition received A-I and A-2 priority and re-tained this ne1l ' position of preBminence for theremainder of the war. Antinircn~ft weaponswere raised W A-S for 1943, A-O for 1944 andA4 for 1945. A .s will be seen ft'OlR Exhlbit A: Jground ordnaI lce accounted for 86 .3 percent ofI the total e :s :pendi tu re f or ordnance .in 1941; a irforce weapons and ammunition accounted far 7.7per cent and nll ti au 'c raf t o, llotments were 6 .1 per -cent. As a resul t of the high prior it ies ass ignedthem, air f01CC weapons and ammuni tion in-creased until in 1945 they represented 30.2 per-een t of. the total o rdnance product ion while an ti -nircraft weapons and nmmunition represented7.8 percent. This (lecreused the production ofground ordnnnce from 86.3 percent in 1941 to57 pe rcen t in 1945. Of th.e total artillery pro-dneed antl!1.ireraft weapons represlillted 80 .4 per-cent in 1041 and st eadily i ncreased to 57.8 per-cent in 1945.Four th , t Il{ tbr


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, out ,J u pan p rO I} !! !' (Exhibits A und E), ,As iJlewar incn!ll!ll!d in magni tude and i nt ensity, audin order to expedite supply as well as effect dis,peI'!lIlJ ill antilij)ntion or air rald~" the numberof depots was inc reased unt il , in udditicn to thetwo main depots in Tokyo, there were 133bran..!] ,,1'[(1 ~llb,del)ots and ]lgellcies S

e Y . 8 l ' ; prodU(l~iOll was ne~6r able to catch up toow-!! ll requirements which increased at a veryr a p i l ! rate. For 1948 only 60 percent of total~Iillts could be manufactured ; in 1944~ 40 percent; and for that pnrt of th e 1 94 5JIsaallUPply year ending i n .A_ugust only lO per--h e . following cau ses w ere established us in-I ! I t n t m e : n t l l l ill disrupting' J apan 's medical supplyp r o g r a m . In 1942, 1943 and 1944 AlLied air~ s e a . . power took It. h5gh toll of Japanese ship-pm g the reby disrupting the desired impor tationsof raw materials so necessary for the IIIainte-~ of the medical supply indusrry, Some dif-~ 'Were experienced in rst aining ski ll edIechniCll\lJB who preferred toB .1 l t el ' o ther warw o r k with highei- pay. The year 1945 witnessed~ ~ction 'O f much of th e m edical supply~ 1 I I I I : l 1 : Inthe homeland , Al l,l ed [L~V!IJ ICes IHl~SSboa lIacific had finally permi tt ed . in tense nonalmbardment of th8 numerous industr ial urban

I \ " e a s l y in J~plLn, Many impo,(t~\nt medical sup-P . factol'les nncl plants were destroyed or::y d~~aged (Ref, 110te 4), Lie"t~llanten d I Shimisu statad thut if the war had not

ad whlll l it did the critical effects of the~ on arm?, mcdicnl~I~l?p1]' would haV6rL.,. appllr&nt III the depletion of reserves byVOIiO!Jet. 1945.8Q Throughout the war allocations of medicall! : ppHes to the army never e q lm l le d l 'e q ui l' em 6l l! : s..: ~ough some preierence was p; i veu to theP ly Y In an attempt to 1J1nitflin ,iliS lflcdieal sup-!b e pro~m, there wus nev er enougll (,0 su pplyo f gro"l~ demands. In 1043, the l 1 ! , m y ' s share P l' O dU ( lt iO D was 30 pel'cell t; iJl 1944,. tl1is Wnil~ to 85 pm'Cer;t; and in 19~5 the armydllcti: 40 per cl ln t o f lotlt1 I loUOC !L tl ons o f ptO-Till! distribution of medicfll supplies to Japa-

nese t I'?Ops in the wi dc. iT SC!l.tte;t'lldeo IIIb 't' area ~t,,]ns dls~t1pted by "'lIi .~d ail' and sea' "p'~,: ;Hough I~Sdevest ti --,-t a mg attncka On Jnpf111ese ship-pm", BllI,rirmin,, . '1 .. . '" as eltl) as 1942 the army wasunfl~le to make 100 percent distribution of tlieJ~~dlCfll snppl ies it (lid have, Deliver ies pi SUI1 -pues could 'lot be carded out according toschedu le bueausa available shipping was allo-cnted j o such .higher pri,?dty items as wea.pollSand arnmll)11tJOn., Approximat ely 20 percentor. the total medical supp 1is designated forshlp ,men~ never left the home islands, Inaddition Itwas estimated that '20 percent of ",lIntwas shipped was s tink enrcute, The result wasa general shortage of medical supplies through-out the Japanese-held territories. Te supple-me~ t tim eXIst1ng supplies in ove rs eas a reas thep01:cy of local self- suff iciency was inaugurated,This endeavor met 'with some success in Chino.J0.va, all d Malaya, but then the pro blems of dis~tribution prevented the front-line elementsfrom receiving their share of the supplies(Table : t - , T o . 47),The loss of medical supplies ill Jl lpan pl'Qper

through the direct bombing of medical supPlydepots was reportedly slight, being only about2 percen t. ,Thi s favorable aspecc was a tt ribu tedto the foresight of the medical a , f i 'airs bureanof the war ministry in directing the dispersalof medical supply depots in the early months of1944 (Ref, notes 1 and '1), However, in ecmbatareas ail' action took ,1 much higher toll 'O fstocks of critically needed medical supplies, InChinfl the interdiction or Japanese Iinss of COIll-munieation by the Fourteenth Ail' F'Orce madeslIpplyoi front-line combat troops generallydifficult and nt times almost iznpossible, Twohundred und ten tons of JT je


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qUAIltities of medical supplies. .Alll lo~t completetoss was experienced in the bombing of theCagayen depot, while at Tacloban on J:eyte' l i D percellt of ;he stock piles were de:mohshedlIS II. result of naval and air bombnrdmllnt(Rd. note 14).In Burma the RatuM quantity of medical'8Upplies tha t r ~acbed the front ;- line. t roops wassmail and resulted in inferior treatment of casu-alties. The lnek of atabrine, plasmochln, andquinine resulted in 90 percent of the combatt roops suffe ring rnalaria of which 6 .0E"rc imt be-came chronic cases, Ninety percent of t he troopSdisplayed symptoms of beriberi for lack of vita-min H' (Ref, rote 10),Stocks remamng in army depots in the home-land at the en d of the war were reported to 00

! approximately 455,.000 bOK~!! or 12,000 tons ofactull.l medicol supplies, This amount was1 l1o. ir ned to be suffi cien t to mee t the I l rmy's de-mand in the lomeland fa)' the next (; months;however, a compuriwD witl t the annual require-ments set forth in Tuble No. 46 indicates thatp robab ly les s than Il 4 months" reserve lI;risted,particuleely whan the large number of civil iansrooruited to msist in the defense of the home-land would bve to be supplied from armys tocks. Pre fe rence for the a rmy over the civi li anpopulat ion in allOClltillg the product ion of rnsd i-C 8 . \ supplies Iogether with the army's i nabilityto distribute ~ overseas troops undoubeedly ac-counts f or t ie a rmy 's compll I' at iv ll ly fn ,vorablemedical supply situation in Japan proper. How-eve r, the d is tcihu tion of these s lipp li es through-oUt the homeland was not s at isfnctory" Thedefense of tin home i slands cal led for a proper-tionate 6 months' stock pile of medical suppliesat ench of the eigbt military dist rict depots; thishad not ~l accomplished at the time of thesurrender, The Tokai and Cbngoku militarydistrict depot s had practically no medical sup-p li es by 15~"ugu!! t1945 (, rable 48 and Ref, notes5 a nd 6),Principal ly t hrough the inability of the Japa-nese to distribut e the medical supplies they hadto their widespread t roops a general shortage ofthese supplies developed in the overseas areasand resul t ed in a very high number of sick casu-al ties. 'For .be period of the war 7,925,787 sickpatients were treated in overseas hospitals; ofthese S percent or 223,520 died, P reva lentdiMueB were mala ria, tuberculosi s, p leuri sy ,t tM m t a l Inti nervous diselUl8ll, dysentery and

other stomaeh and intestinal diseases. Theshortllges, of such medicines us emetine, utabr ine,plllsmochin, and vitamins resultad in poortreatment and cllre.of patients. ~'.rhe killed find wounded casualties numbered778,55.0 for the enti1'0 war, Of this totn 156 per-cen t, o r 442 ,970 , W01'ek il led 111 action, Of the287,545 that , ,'el 'o wounded 86 pel 'Clmt survived,Itwould appear thlit tI,e CIl .I 'e(1n(1tre! l( ;ment ofLlle wounded was more satisfnctory than that ofthe sick, H.owever, it is vcry possible that manywounded became victims ef the prevalentdiseases, and their dell .ths may hnve been at-t ribu ted to the ir s iekIles s l111dJ10 t their wounds,Also, it is a known ne t tJlllt i ll u t l eas t S(lv( ;rn linstances the ,Tapanese wounded dest royedtnemselvBS or were des;t l'oyed by their comradesthr ough t .l ll~pract ice of find ing honor in death.In fo[wal' (l combat areas pBrsist ent Alli ed 'ail:

attacks on road, railand water lines of commu-nieatiou limited evncuation of casnalties to thehours of darkness, Even then only smallgroups could be moved f).taJlY one time. Withthis lack of tral1sport. facilities the sick andwounded piled up hI forwanl areu instllllationswhere ex.is ing reserves of medical supplies werelimi ted and quiekly emnusted, Recllpel' l1tiontime was prolonged; patients were expose(i to{ldd it io llUJ complie tion8; and the del l, th r ate in-creased.Ai; nvailnble shipping throughout tlle empirebegan to decrease tlle .J apnnese found it increaa-ingly more difficult to maintain e"a!)uations c h e d u I e s . The more 11rge n t need fOl' sh is tot ransport muni tions and r edep loy t roops l 'l \s. l1 lt edin the conversion of hospital ships into Ol'Wll]l.rytransporta. Finally in the enrly months of 1945,the .Jn:pllneS!! g ll V B up furth


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':3tates air and surface action denied nim the! freedom of movement so essential to logistical,support. Here in the very midst of plenty theIJu.panese went without. His every eifor to re-linforce his posi tions was fru t ra ted. The dec isiveIvictory of Umted States combined forces in thecaJ;lpllign was 1\ mlljol' clltllstrophe

Ju .p lln. se . TheY lost Wlll\~ was left oftheir navy, a s.bshmtial part of their remamlngair force, o,nd great ] lumbers of their f inest troopSu.nd equ:ipmen;. On 1 MlLrch 194.5 Gene.nJHoodqua.rters in Tokyo decided it was hopBlessto try to suprIy ILOY ground forces in the re-mllin ing outlying l tTelIS .Thus, in th~ East Indies, Malaya, Thnjland,Burma, Chin n , and ill the mnny other "outpostareas' the Japanese combat soldier was com-pl etely ut-ofl from his out ide sources of supply.In f nc t, the hQmBland i ts el f had now become . thecombat zone oE the WH. The air raids on .Tapanprope r had swe lled into such dest \' uc ti ve force in1945 that the Wlr potential of the COW try hadbeen. Ndnced to impotency. Even for It defenseof his homeland the Japanese cou ld not supp lyh is fo rces wi th more than the bar e neceSSi ti es f ora fanlLtical, stubborn, suicidal defense. Majo)"Genera l Ta .kaBhima , ch ie f of staff, Twel fth .AxeaArmy, states, "We only had enough ammu-n it ion for 1"> 'eekof heavy gl lt ing, our cannonwere few, I' im WIIS short but we expected to ob-tain rice from the 'ovember .harvest.' Sur-render was the only altemotive to ultimatenational su icide.The inroads 011 Jllpunese shipping mude byour submarine and nir trikes, becoming in-cr easing ly grouter a s the war progress ed , causednot only the loss of vitally needed supplies buta lso ef iec tivi ly preven ted the [DoTement of sup-. plies to area; where they were needed to $U~'1ully meet our counterattacks. The failure of

14

J.tpnnese tnLllsport, of which oil ' power destroyed01' , l!lm, lged approxi~n lt te ly 30 percen t, i s one ofthe g l' elLt s ingle causes of the de fe l1 t o f thenese, Aocol"cling to Lieutenant Genemlchief of st aff, Solomon operation, "Of000 men 011 GmLdalcann.l, over 10,000 wereout of action becl1use of lack of food. N oplies came 1n for ;I; months. O urtrength WII gone."In areas uch as Burma and hina airwa s not only largely respollsible for theof Japanese logis tics tllroug1~ the de13tructjOJsupplies , l 'a ih 'ou.ds und t rnnspOl 't but al sosingly responsible for keeping ourA.llied t roopS supplied ill C OU ll ry aCI~essib:lenil' alone. In fact, after the loss of theROlLd C h il ll L w as suppl ied by IlIT and thusIII the war lit 11 very cr it ica l t ime .The ail' att .'tcks on Jl1pan proper

destroyed the ",3,1 potel1til11 of the countrycaused mapel 'sal of rerouilling industry andplies. The additionn! bmcl611 thusI tlready overburdened trl lJ lsportatioIlcaused much confusion.lumcations l;tl'e tluLt interdiction ofmunlolltions system imluemateiy aft el' theof Okinawe would have impeded thement of large !Ilunbers of troops andof su pplies before theirpl lice for the planned defense of the "v;w~"_

Th e foroes assigned to th e homelandhad by 15 August 1945 prepared manydefensive positiollS but had equi pment andplies 1 ,c1eq llate only for an i l1 it iu .l st rong,bern defense. Major General Tnk(lshul1!L"As of August we had 40 percenc of ""'" . ...llnitplanned, 90 percent of fuel, amI 100food and' clothing (thls does no inc1 tl (l e thefoods of rice ~U1dwheat which Wll' a to betained from the November ha, rvest ). "


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1943JAN =a a MAR APR MAV

1945JAN


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CHAPTER11TRANSPORTATION

.SPORT FACTOR IN LOGISTICSOF JAPANESE GROUND ARMI~S

1 ' l : i ; i l i ilUbject is trea ted in the fo]lowing sub-divisioI$:Orit-..n Aspects of Tmnsportation1 : J ~ J ; l ' l ' i n g Transportation.B&ill:OadTransportationMOtDr and Horse TransportationS\'ibIIiarine 'I'ransportabion~e Transportation

There iI J additional discussion, b y major theaters,of th & i U f e c t s 011 combat operations of the 'Vari -ous me( ; hods of t.ransportation.O f.le r--a ll A sp ects 'It has become apparent thr it, a fte t their quick

IUId easy conquest of t he s ou th er nIndochina, Thnl1a.nd, MnJ ayu ,East Indies, Borneo,Halma-hera) with t ll e attendant bntIIlO:rlril l l ilulUl1t. capture of Burme and the, Philip-Japanese milit.'l>1'Ydecided that whUee x J I l l O i W i i l the r ich natural resources of tile sou th -eI'tl 'Uea;th.


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road building or repa ir and, in occ.upying terr i-tory where roads were nonexistent OJ ' had onlythe crudeat of t rail s, t. he l ise of even limited num-bers 0'1 trucks Wl}8 necessa.rilycurtailed. Furtherlimiting factors were maintenance und motorfuel. Even when the over-all supply of the Iat-tar was sufl lc ient :for all n,rea,. i t was usually sopoorly distributed tlmt the operating range ofthe trucks was confined to a. few fuel depots. Theuse of draft and pack horses supplemlll1ted motort ra .nsport where climatic condit ions allowed butin some instances, such as the Imphul campaignin Burma, elephnilts were the only means 01transportation employable. The final result inmany cases was tha t the troops walked and car-r ied as much equipment as possib le .Submarine tl' ansportation was obviously toolimited to do more than deluy the loss of be -sieged positions. At f irst the army prevniledupon the navy to' provide submarines for thispurpose but la~er , due to the losses of submarineson such missions and the need of them for thetraditional. "support of the fleet," the navy rEI-fused to furnish my more snbmarinesend thearmy undertook building trl1nspol"t submarinesof its own. These proved a dismal disappoint-ment in eve ry respect and were only used on twooccasions. Once, in attempting to reinforceLeyte, two army submarines were lost. On theother occasion seven successfu l runs wllre madefrom Yokosukn. to Hachijo Jima, all early ail'raid warning post some 90 miles to the south.-The AImy Air Tl"ll.Usport Command consistedof only about 8 Q planes which were used pri-rrul.l:ily in the transporto. tion of !].virrtiOllspareparts and some medical supplies on the Ilutwnrdjourney from Japau to areas from w'hich felT)'pilots were returned. The only major use ofthese planes for other supply ,,;as ill tr,l\.)1sporting some 300 tons of critica.l supplies to theground armies early in the Burma C!Iolllp!Ioign. Itwas rarely the practice to parachute supplie s inany volume and the only use of ail-borne troopSwa s in the capture of Palernbung by paratroopsearly in 19~.In brief, itwas Iaek of' distribution or luflldis,tribution rathec than an over-all sllottnge of SliP'plies which proved the worse impet1imel1t toground operations. Failure of their transportwas the greatest single factol' in the defe[l. tofthe Japanese, a bot which is borne out b~ ~lefollowing studies of the Gl'onn[l LogJstl il SBranch. .'

ore of the Imr ,'J '"I . - perra ~,"lmy Headq uarters to real-Iz e t 1e eJfeot of i.d - hi - .. - 1M equate ii' ppmO" 011 planned0jP.erll.tl.ons resulted ill deJnye.d re~uisj t ions ofs ups from othei I I, ..tio c asses ann, whan such requisi-to I~B were fu1~ly approved, belated changes had. made 111 other operational p lans . Thistar~llless u su al ly e nd ed ill desperate use of n,11available shippiug to supply combat areas andpre:'~ntedndeql\ate re~nfOl 'cement of supporcpos it ions , One offs et ting factor ill favor of theJapanese W.llS. that when the presence of ourforces prohi bited allY further ffill.l'itinle SUIJplyof the pOlnt.~ under' nt-tack, supplies eriginallydesl;Jl1~~for those points would be unloud eel a tn pos it ron current ly well ill the rear. For thisreason the enemy's supply situacion 01 1 targetstoward the end of the "-at" was better than in theern' ly phases. However, due to lack or carefulplanning, ~t was seldom possible to make themost e il 'cotnre use of troops 01 " snpplles and itwas nnrural that morale Buffeted as It result.Allof lm.e:n1; fIJ:ul operation. ofclas " A " s hi 7' 8, .-At the beginning of the wnr, the total sross ton-naee f"'" l' "., 'b ~ .t.' 811ps was U I" proxi IIIately 2,150,000of which 1,'160,000 (60 percent) was assigned tothe. transportation of combat units and to th.ereplenishment of their supplies; tIle other

690,000 tons were used in the trnuspcr tation andsupply of rcal" echelons and in preparations forth~ inv~sio11.of Java. Following are the oper-ations to winch the 1,460,000 tons were assigned:

Malaya-Burma nO ,OO ( )Luzon 650.000South SeilS 50,000Davao , Jo !O, and Taw t Tawl 5()"O O O

Table 1gives fur ther i temization of tonnaee . fig-ures in December 1$141. .,; rhe Burma campaign. proved the f irst di snp-pointment to Jupanese planning, This cnmpnignrequi red so much rci Jl iorcement that "A" shipshad to return 'ilumedintely to Japan for fur ther

h was possible for us always to a()~eve loe~lsuper iority bofl in quo.ntity and quality and Itas necessary . ..all before the actual landings forthe enemy to abandon all att empts to supply . t~etarget by large ships. Therefore, muterlll.ls origi-na11y des tined for the poin t under attack would00 unloaded at islands which were currently well.to the rear. A.sa result , the enemy's supply s itu-ation within orr targets ducing the latter phasesof tlie war WIl3 much better than in the begin-ing, There still remained, however, the prob-:Jems of briuging in fresh reserve troops and ofoverland dis tr ibution of suppl ies to combatt 1 ' O O p s .Rail roads were the most important method ofoverland transportation because of their ownsupe rior tonnage cnpacity and high degree ofdevelopment ill Japan, Korell, Manehuria, andNorth China. The limited amount of motort rlLll spor tation and the poor roads in Japan aswell 11S in the forwar(l a reus snhaneed the im-portnnce of tte railroads. Because of the highpr iority which was ahvays given to the movs-ment of military supplie s or troops in Japn.nand Korea i~Tas 110t thB army but mther indus-try which bore the burden of nl limitntions.In Chine, ths Japanese were faced with thene


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oads rather than waiting, as had been planned,to take aboard 1\ cargo of raw mate rials. Fur-ither, as the Burma campaign fell behind sched-ule, plans to capture the Fijis and Snmoa wereos tponed and were f inally abandoned because

~f the shipping (livened to ?fidway in June 1942and the tonnage required to support the Aleu-ians campaign and operations.In August our countera ttacks bsgan with thearicun landings on Guadaleanal and shortlythereafter in New Guinea. To resist these at-tacks the Jupanese Ilrmy needed II large amountof shipping . However , because of the pressingdemand for impor tation of raw mlLcerials thearmy had b e e n forced to release COllsiderablel tonnllge to the "C" class, The diversion of theseand some combat losses of ships resulted in thefollowing situation of "A" ships in October 1942:

GuadaJcanll-New Guinea 500,000Malaya-PtillpplDes 820,000Other area! 24,0,000Under repltr 90,000

'1'otlll 1,150,000Heavy ship leases , especially in the Solomons,made it necessary to acquire from new construc-tion or by rediversion from "0" to "A " ships upto 1,420,000 tons at the end of 1942, when one-half of the total was assigned to the Solomons-New Guinea theater_ Table 2 shows complete de -ployment of "A ." ships in 1942_By April 1m3 shipping losses, chiefly incom-bat, had redsced t.he total of "A" ships to1,100,000 gross tons and the a rmy t ried to meetthe situation in various ways, The extent towhich transports were overloaded is shown bychanges in tie average amount of gross tonsused to transport each soldie r with full equip-ment.

o;' ( lR I JPOJ1;. j______________________ 5_0________________ 3,0_ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 2 .0_________________ 1.5

December 1M 3 anil after 1_0

nat , .December alAugust 1M2December lK2June 1HS

!h e efforts to improve loading technique resultedin the following saving in time.

DAYSlIllQUlllED TO LOADOR UNLOAD A SHlJ>OF 3,500 GT

Until Al.orDecember D

Single vessels were speeded t ip in every way pos-sible te shorten the time of the round ~rrp butthe convoy system necessitated by submarine at-tacks held all ships dOW11 to the speed of theslowest. An additiOlml attempt to solve theshipping l)l'oblem was the revnmping of thearmy distributioll system to trnnsporf suppliesby the shortest possib le route.Being unable by now to levy any more " "ships, the army could not afford f"lll'chel' sub-stantial losses of "A" ships. The shipbuildingprogram included new SB or S ships (simil:l~to our LST's) and several weird new types de-signed to 58\'e time and materials in construe-tiOl1-\\-itJl consequent loss of qunlity (mel effi-ciency. However, the total of these was not suffi-cient for the army's needs and it resor ted to theuse of warships, principally destroyers, to runsupplies from the main depot at Rabaul toGuadalcanal and New Guinen. Presumably,these ships were better able to defend themselvesfrom our planes, PT boats' and submarines_However, losses of :32des troyers on sl lpply mis-sions in t-his theater alone prohibited theit' f ur-ther use and the enemy' s rsolated positions hadto depend on the trickle of supplies which camein at night by small WOOde J l s h ip s (usua,uy builtlocally}, by landing craft, or by submarine. Notonly were heavy losses sustained in these types. but the limited operating radius of the first twobrought the points of tr ! \J ls-shipmellt (:fromlarge vessels) within the range of OU I "land-basellaircra ft and resulted in continued losses of theprecious transports.When the Central Pacific became the l!Hl,intheater toward the end of 1943 0111' carrier taskforces had expanded to a point where theirplanes could not only augment the heavy tolltukeu by submarines .in shipping lanes but alsocould destroy ships in sheltered anchorages be-yond the range of our land-based planes. Theoriginal carrier attacks on 'I'ruk and Sn.ipan inFebruary 19H, on Palau in MfIJ' ch 1944, on thePhilippines in September 11)44and on Sa, igon in.Janua ry 1945 destroyed many cargo ships andseverely disrupted shipping plans and operations-Above all, our carriers were able to prevent l U I : ! ,fur ther suppl ies from reaching the combat zonesin appreciable quantity after our attacks hadbegun.These operations required the divel 'siou to ~lecentral Pacific of nearly all "A." ships which

18

,,0 "!~ s! g gI,:8 s ~ 1 1 1 , : t, 8 0 " ':~ 0 s 19: ,~ ~ ! g c :~I I~ A :~! ! I : "

8".. ."Q"_ ,

s..8oo. .. -

c i'"

00c""0oci\Ot-'"

ooo~-

0000000.0g~

000000000" .. .

19


17/112

b ad been supplying Ra.baul or plying between Japan and th e southern area. This, of course, cutof those impts which had been carried by "A "ships from th~ main source of natural resourcesand it wa s nal8S!l&ryto divert some 60,000 tonsfrom "A" to "C" ships to replace this importcapacity. ThI!S8ships continued to carry troopsand military supplies to the southe rn area butthe army's Slipping problem in the CentmlPacific WIS beyond solut ion . Again , navy war-ships and submarines were used for supple-mentary supply purposes. Table 3 presents re-deployment of "A" ships in 1943.The loss of Saipan in June 1944 made it im-possible to selld ships from Japan to the Caro-line Islands end ellSedthe shipping problem tothat extent, 3:owever, by now "A" ships oper-ational gross tonnage totaled only 675,000, andfaced with the necessity of reinforcing Okinawa,Formosa, and the Philippines, the Japanese Gov-ernment urgeJ. the mutual use of "A", "B", and"C" ships.When we t ttacked ! .eyte inOctober 1944, itWIS again necessary to diver t to the reinforce-

ment of the Phil ippines 80,000 tons of "0" Shipsfrom the southern area in sdditiou to all shipspreviously assigned til the supply of the Ryukyusand Fonnosa. Table 4 presents deployment of"A" ships in 1944.fter ou r reoccupatiol'l of Luzon it \VaS irn-possible to use ships between the southern a rea.and Japan, Itwas neeessery to Ienve in the former area ull ships which happened to be thereafter February 1945 and the only "A" ships inthe vicini ty of Japan to taled 225,000 gross tons ..As the mvnsion of the homeland became im.minent, the problem was to get supplies (foodin particular) from the Asiatic mainland toJu.pan. The limited number of all ships Jeft forthis purpose could not be employed to the ful lestextent because of the further losses from Alliedaircraft, submarines, and mines (laid by planes).Afte r May 1945 completely cnllect.ive use wasmade of "A", "B", and "0" ships. At that, timeonly 674 ,OO( } ' gross tons 0 ' 1 ' a11 classes remainedin operation. Table 5 presents deployment of"A" ships in1945.

Combat opera.tsonaTABLE 3.-DcpIOVmoot of : ' . ; 1 " ahips , 1949 (U"QSS10"8)

Routine supply

Totalancburlaan< ! Ko. ... . Ch ina f!urUes Japan"lG dill Undc('~

repetrSpoolal.Dlp.

'Ia 1._ .. ten amalI .h1p. of I... thaD 1.000 toBSwere uBed but total I . unknown. Of the IhIP11 ntnrDlDg from theMalaya a_ 90.000 gro.. ton>were ...:J tor Importlng raw materIal.IBedIl IhIps IndQde npo.Ir .h1P" re!rlgerawr ohIpB,b01lpltal .hlps, ete.

(Ref. note 1. )

20

ooo.Q 0~~~g '" 0000 " 88] 0 0000 " " "g~gg .; ~~ci~ ~ '" 00 0.." '" :e It) "..; 0'" I:":IM""II.. '" ~J I


18/112

og. .

,Ie t S i!I~ I ~! 1 < i l gI !

l ls'C>, i0" I ,"I! ,1 2 i,e; ' :1I~!8 10'f f !I! j ,I,""! : 8:~,0""i

!!I " ' = " 1 : 5 : ! 0 ! l:1 !,a Q It! 1 ! II ! ~,i I I !O~ , ~ ~ _ t - - - - . - t - ~ ~ - . - t - - - - i ! ~ : J i ~ + - J I L - 1. r ! I : I! !I II I i [ i~:;':,i , '

t ! i

8'0, . ..!! 1: ,i:! !

, : if I! I I! : J : ,1: I II I ,

" " I ,: " 8: I ,'I, 0: " I ' : .,Q III I I I:

II ! I !8 1 i 8i! : ~: I coI iiii: 1 II I I! i" I! i i !~ Ii!f l U22

. .~. .: . ,1I! i, :I II J I: I I! !~l,-I!i!U Htrn",C

i:,IIIIS~

1-10~Z 10~a

.-- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . .I au t " " " ' " .Dlll ~hl1lppJnn", nyukyu, l lnrl8WU1, 1I'0noola,


19/112

Bunna. Aleut!&RI. 801""'0'" Bo lo .Don . , Ilalmabora I'lIlIlplIl.n ...(Loytc) Homeland, ~

l>i1ulIl.ud KUPP Y (JOIUIUH MUpp1 IJtomRJId l:IlJoIa.._ :lilliI'll't i lIOPl)'

1 . ..,..". A. 'UGI An 'u o ' RfPed4I1J/ A..tocll .LetMol B,",ol


20/112

O I , , , .- . r , , . . " ', , , s ho T ta ge o n 8IUpply omJapa-6 shows in condensedof supplies scheduled to be

actual ly shipped and amountsby combat unitS in the majorThis same informntion isin Exhi.bits A through L.supp lies ol'igina.tedare7. The numbers of tTOOpSlost (in ship sinkings) are: givenTable 9 itemizes such losses b yand 1945.

QD!7 l

160.000 1---,-----

210 .0001-----~0U01. 30*Ammo. 2 1 1 *ou- e"

270 .000 1 _ _ , , _

ca te 1 uk.ratio,2,400.000 ~ll1y.

River, which is navigable byas far upstream a-s Hankow,. repre-artery of traffic in a country whereare vir tually nonexis tent and the railf requently disrupted. However , be-res tr ic tions of in land navigat iontli[jj;'~iibreat of attacks b y guerril la forces,and combat losses differedof deep water shipping.

1T8.000

31,000lfIjdr;iiI p4lI'Om.-L----l----j-------i----

890,000.

Exhibit M portrays graphically the amountof military and civilian supplies which movedboth up and down the Yangtze from 1938through August 1945. It will be noted that thetrend of the volume was downward with theexception of a r ise in civ ili an goods (priucipallyiron ore) transported downstream in 1 9 4 0 3 anda rlse in military supplies carried upstream in1944when preparations were being made for theJapanese drives on American airbuses at Kwei-l in and Liuchow,Bombing by the Uni ted Sto.tes Fourteenth Air

Force caused tIle greatest direct loss of shipping

Arm. . r

9010

19U 19~2 1943 19a 1945

J' ,O:IUUl 17M:nnebur1a 46Chln"_________ 110jseemeaa ~ '1

.8515

1Q O

Ref. note 1 .

152,,156

l it146,000

10,000 1 _ _ _ ~ 2 ,OOO

f~O,OOO 1946

83,293

-~-- - -~-~-1.~3549

122,000

27,71433,00610,178~,6121,51121,1951,7'421,4(i,~"

20,0000 ,0002 0 "10*10"1 1 0 "~~~~~----~--~~-----L--~----

2.080,000

5,811. .72115ua711625

on the Ya.ngtlle . and also contributed to otherlosses, from collisions and stmndings, by fors:mgJa.pal1ese ships to move only at night. JrIinesIaid by planes also caused numerous losses, par-t icular ly among large ships with steel hulls. A.summary of Ylmgf,ze shipping losses is given inTnble 10.The eft 'cets of (til' attacks all Yangtze shippingnre shown below:June 1943 (a) Daylight movement of largeships was prohibited above Nanking, result"ing in night operfLcions exclusively,(b) Dayl.ight. opemtiollS of sn_:~ll.vessels were

rendered huzardous aboveKiuklang,9.sn

23


21/112

December IH4. All movement of large shipsab o wg wa s discontinued and entiret r & ; ~d:pended on small c raft and l igh te rS .January 19&5 (a) Mining of ~ tr et eh b e tw ee nKiukiang and Hankow denied pnssage tosteel shipe, requiring noct.urrm] lise ofwooden hulls.(b) Small ~t ll tll sh ips st ill pl~ed between Han-kow and Yochow but at mght?nly. .March 1945. Further mining limited all shipmovements nbove Nanking' to wooden hulls.

TAHIr. 10.-Jnpane,e. . ' I I p . ,""k In YanlltS:6 IlI'ver8IlANOilM AREA

2! AUK,1944Ap" 19 46111 Nuv, 19.5

Namlt TonnftF . a.use 'Oato

Yo"lIlno J rlnru .)larukQ Maru _Tokll Mo'" - _,Unk""wn GUt ." rrUl n8_-8.008 )Un., ,

2]8 nU~rl'U1118__

CU1NKIANO AIIBrA

KOI an 1014" ' 1 ~ : ~ ~ I ~ ~ : ~ ~ = = : : : - I:::I:n~_~::,' _~,4111 Min ._=-=-T4)laJ. 3 , t I P I i . 4 tUKboRU,1 XUliho lt t (1 by mtne, t by

1 1 0 . .. . 1 1 1 ) ,NANK1NO ARB,\

Tcual, 1 t llg. 3 l Iah'f tll l ( I It)' lurllildlutt. 3 nr)crntlOlial1 .. .. . ) .

WI111I' AREATotal. n .... ~ r, U.hl(lr ... t2 by bOl i JbhlM'. 1 by Mtrnndln".

1 b}'rollhdoll. 0 fip.irnnonll)~

n Mur,194~Mo" 194DAp" l04~

ANKING A1mA10311-43

, " ."~Dee , 10431Je


22/112

. .;. ..

. . . . .,0. . . . . . . . .dr:5lo"'''''?~.,

,iiI~ lI- :i \

.. . '"0'"1 r i o ' : : " ' ' 3 P"'\~f1id.,~..q;!;

26

.,,"..'""' .. . '"...;o~ N 1-. . . . . . ."';M. . . .

1943 194'1

16,464 10,474 21.88415,486 11.40 28.67816,328 . 21,533 58.57615,363 21,232 7.28312,795 21,622 39152419,369 24190 38,16619,731 201543 45.20317,010 23,874 40.90114,676 26,016 50.28419,545 29.398 50.18218,264 25.11& 58,96220.095 ~8,149 1>4,153280,55T 495856

(561) (TOll) (1.338)

1945

47.81249.20354.06086.691101.29999.24888.441

. . ~,0-""' . .dof ~~

526,754(1.443)

01 p08Blmfler coaches in operatim>.19.4g_45

1943 19441.22\1 1,804 2,3841,528 1.101 3.2001,381 1.984 2,6391.912 1.911 2);911.110 1,117 2J880522 1,500 3.204l.410 lA51 3,9529;: )7 2,062 3,275840 2t271 4,0871,527 2,189 3,9931,991 2.162 3,3442.40 3.115.28001,728) (1.892) (8,535)

858,1601.5.01,700

(2.846)

Ion,):_______________________ 100.. .______________ 80__ . 720~ 680_____________________________ 480

" c a r Bomeland EXfu')rtEKI TotalDoze. Bo#'u .BtJ%e81941- _____ 1(4,000 450.000 594.000 (9.900 metric ton.)1942______ 144.000 3U1 ,OOO !l9r; ,OOO (!!,250 motrle ton.)IIH3______ 180,000 288.000 4 1 l l 1 , O O O (1.800 metric U>I l J!J1944 ______ 270,000 288,000 558,000 (9.300 metric tona)1945______ 484,000 12,000 496.000 (8.286 metric ton. )

(Ret note 4.)KORBA

3.I213.38~4,2.214,7005,29115.0144.8lI0

(Ref. note 5.)As in Japan, military rail movements enjoyed. the highest priority, thouzh the army never as-sumed direct control of the roads. Despite de-terioration of equipment, this priority assuredsmoothness of operations and tr affie flow. Inaddition to mili tary t raff ic there was the equallyvitful"Tenka' . traffic which consisted of that vol-ume of materials which had formerly beenshipped from Chinese ports to Japan but, be-cause of 0ur submn rille aeti "ity off til e Ohinacoast since 1942 had been eli eerted by rail toKorean ports from where it would have theshortest voyage to Japan. Both military and"Tenka" tt'IlOlc moved primn.l'ily. over the Keifu-Keigi l ine.That this would have been an excellent stra-tegic target is indicated by Table 16. However,

30,539(84) TABLE 16,-Tra.1/lC 'Vo,ume '''. K01'ea. . raib'oads

PASSENGERS (CAR KILOMETERS)

Yen:rUS.995.720167.844.040159.667,381134,576.31843,.377,~8

TroOl)e1941 _1942 -- -- -----1943 ---- ---1044 _194. CLot I:"'LO------

144,021..786l:60,28a..l~3150.781.33612


23/112

he only recorded damage by air attack was on~1 July 1945 when a. span of the Seisenko(Chungehunk&ng) Bridge north of Heijo wasiImookedout bS a. b om b . This only caused tempo-'r&ry stoppage of tra ffic, for within 2 days itad been diverted to a wooden t rest le which hadee n previous ly prepared for such an emergency.

CmNA(Ref. note 6.)To appreciate ful ly the problems confronted byhe Japanese D operating the ra. il ioads of China.lit is necessary to f ! l J back to the China incidentin 1937 . At t bM ; time th e war consisted prima.rily ,of skirmishes or local actions ,between the ChineseLandindividual area commanders, with no unifiedcampaign plaas among the latter. The Chinesetook advanta~ of all opportunities to damagethose rail lines which would impede Japanese'advances or hmder other operations. Exhibit Rindicated the amount of trackage which .the'Japanooe had to restore or build in order to sup-port their rudy occupancy of north and eas tOentr al Chinn and their later campaigns in Cen -: tra1 and Southern China,Attention is invited to tJle :facts tha t practi-ca lly no rehabilitation of railr oads was under-I taken be tweer. 194,0and 1944 and tha t thl! bulkof such rehabil ita tion after 1940 occurred in 1945when the mi .i tary si tuation became so criticalthat i t was necessary to give the highest priori tyto renovation of the rail system. During theyears 1940-44 her requirements in other theaters p revented Japan from improving the rail situation in Centra l and Southe rn China.This eventually became essential because of oursubmarine act ivi ties in tnt'! Yellow and EastI China S e a s and the vir tual paralysis of YangtzeI River traffic. The Tientsin-Pukou and Peip ing-Hankow railroads were forced to assume theburden of all traffic which had formerly comethrough Sho,_ ,ghai . Simultaneously ( in the au-~ of 1944) our Fourteenth Air Force, oper-~ting . fro,m K~e~in and Liuehow, began itsintensive interdiction campaign against these twotrunk lines and :forced the Japanese to initiatetheir drive 00 our two air bases.The aforement ioned drive involved the res to-ra tion of many miles of track between Yochowan d Liuchov to serve both as support of thecapt;un of Kweil in and Liuchow and 8 .s a belatedattelll.pt to establish an overland supply routefrom French Indo-China.

nasa in Southern Ohina by providing additionalbases from which OUI' land-based planes cou ldcover landings on the China coast. Thus, thereWIlS no further r l!ason for t lwenemy to maintainarmies for the purpose of holding the capturedairfields simply to deny their USI! to Alliedplanes. It was decided, therefore, to withdrawthe southern armies before the rail situacionshould deteriorate to a point where a retreatwould become a rout.A repor t prepared in November 1945 by theUnited States Fourteenth .Air Force covel'Sthoroughly the details and results of its aerialinterdiction of railrcnds in China, 'However , itis intended here in to confine the study exclu-sively to the effec ts on ground army logistics ofattacks by aircraft,The Japanese estimate that after October 1944a.pprorimately 90 percept of the damage doneto rail lines was caused by air attaok with theother 10 percent resulting from gnerrilla oper-ations, The cumulative et Iect of the total damagewas to reduce rail operations, to less than ~Opercent of normal and this, added to the loss ofYangtze Rjve r shipping, result.ed in a shortagso:f supplies that prohibited all but the mostlimited operations. In addition to the dir ectdamage done to eqlupment, bridges and main te -nance shops there was further disruption of miloperations caused by the necessity of movingtrains only at night, of dispersing egllipmentand installations and by the loss 0 .1 many man -hours of labor dur ing air-raid alerts. In fact, 50demoralizmg were the' air-raids that manyChinese civ ili an workers deser ted thei r jobs, 1 ' 1 \ >qu i r ing r eplacement by Japanese personnel ofwham there were too few,Though Chinese civilian bodies had nomin~1administra tion of the ra ilronds, final order s forrail operations came from .Japanese [ \ i 'myheadquarters in China which alw!l.Ys gf~V6 thehighest priority to the army's dl!)lIanc1s f ortransportation. However, a shor tage (if e(l 'dp 'ment prevailed througbout the ' war despite 1ilenumber of locomot ives and rol ling s teck acquiredfrom Japan, Manchuria, and Korea. Consequently, the army was never nble to tJM]Sp~rtby rail the full amount of troops or suppliesr equired. During t.he comparatively quie~ y e p r Sd - robof 19


24/112

30

i e a : D 4 l J l i I l b e d on 8 A.ugust 1 9 4 5 by Chinese guer-under the guidlLIlceof O. S. S. officers whoparacllUted behind the enemy lines.Fuel shortage prevented the Fourteenth .Airfrom making sustained attacks on thebut more inaccessible Tientsin-Pukou rail-intensification of our air attecks causedmoven:ents on the southern half of thereIDlIlI!'-.ntiLUH;Oll'ine to be made at night whichtraffic by more than 50 percent. Troop

nm'emten1tshad to be restricted in order to ac-bmmoda1te the shipment of crit ical supplies asin Table 20. Military supplies representedof total tonnage and cod for militarycomprised another 20 percent. Anion of military supplies (other than coal~nr..d,... ,.I


25/112

:required for reconstruction work. .. Rail operati:ms were planned on .the basl~ ofair operations causing the following declines[from normal eapacit~:

P.~mlt:NIght operallonB ~ SOCOal shottHIjeS 17Bridge repairs 20LocomQtlTe repairs 3,Reduced ruimlng speeds 7Total 77

However actual result s were only 10-80 percentIOfthe a~ounts planned on the ~bove bas is .I Personnel casualti es from all' attacks wereegl igible . However , the dest ruct ion of crit icali li tary supples, especially motor fuel, avera:gedbouc 30 tons per month and proved a serIOUShandicap.- The Kowloon-Canton line was an importantlrail artery to the Japanese in getting supplies.inland, Operations (under direct army eoil t:o l)priot to 1944 were limited to isolate? sectionsof the line due to sabotage by guerrillas, The.line was opened to t hTOUgh t,ra,ffic in 1944 butby then air attacks and fuel shortages had our-tailed traffic volume seriously.The number of troops transported andamounts of militaq supplies carried are shownbelow:

5u!,p!!",(mdrlc 10.,.)l.!JU _lD42, _~ _1943 _1944 _194.:1 _

882,540109.730llU,~1!I)12'1.33385,260

298.95028l,UOZl!U,480306,10021:1,780

Transpe rtaeion prioritie s were genera lly as-. signed in the following sequence: ammunit ion ,medical supples, food, vehicles, clothing.With the iatensificetion of air raids it wasnecessary frequently to alter train schedules andafter January 1945 all train movements had toIb e at night. Inadequate air raid precautions,:such as dispersal and concealment facil it ies, fur-Iher hindered ope rations. Few casualties weresu.stained from air attacks and only a smallamount of supplies were destroyed.

(Ref. note 7.)In this theater the Japanese found mil trans-port indispensable not only because of the pn.uc-ity oj' roads but also beC!Ul$ combined air andsubmarine activity off the west coast of theMalay Peninsula prevented sizeable ships fromapproaching Rangoon. An effort was muds touse small craft from the railhead at Ra.nong toRangoon but the preponderance ef supplies hadto be brought in by rail from Singapore, Bll.ng-

kok and Phnon Penh (French Indo-China). Inorder to accomplish this the Japanese built arai lroad from Bangkok to Tlmnhyuzayat, w h r u " - ei t connected with an exist ing l ine threugh HOllI-main to Rangoon.At first, damage to locomotives was the mostserious result of a"i ratt acks in BU1lUll. due tothe fact that few attacks were made on thebridges during the rainy season. Bridge repairscould be made r ather speedily in the dlY seasonand other means of transportation could beused to re lay supplies pa-st the peint of damage.One delayed result of bombing bridges duringthe dry season Wl;S that the ,Japansse frequentlyeff ected only emergency repairs which washed

out in the floods of the rainy season,A' S Allied air effort was stepped up and wascarried out more extensively in the rainy seasonthe Japanese were fac~d with lli lmnst insuperable. difficulties in repairing bl:idges on the Mitkyinaand Mandalay lines in July-September 1944.Exhib it X presents a graph of rail t a-afficvolume. in Burma after January 1943 when Allied airraids first became serious.No exact figures are available on the amountof military supplies destroyed by bombing therai ls but the following estimates were submittedon the major items (in percentages of the totalof each item transported) :

PCP'CfJnlA vIIItton and motor fuel _ _ ____ ______ 255mmuoltlon _Oloth log _Ordnance ~~- ~ ~ 2

(Ref. note 8.). d fterFrom January to September 1942 !1ll' :t.J d . nder th eovember 1944 the rat roll, s were u .

direct con~r~l of the army. InotI1e1.period.s ~~were administered by the Land TU1.llspoJ t' ,~hevmiuistrative Department but at all times .32

tr ansportaMon of supplies andon Luzon.is found the estimated yearly ton-the Luzon r!Lilroads. Laok of

of equipment-and inadequateshowed the ir effects on tr1Lf fic1948 and 1944.on the railroads had beenthan destructive prior to Octobe r .our landings on Leyts such at-so threatening a guise that the

to U$ tl16 most caut ious pro-at bridges and other v ital poin t".a trocks were made the more seri-based on aer ial observation

A .i r attacks on the Luzon mil lines resul t ed inthorough. interdjction of them.. An outstandinge1(!l.mple18 the bombing of the Calunpito Bridgeon 6 Janull. ty 1945. This caused the abandon-ment of the northern branch line nom San Joseto San Quintin.. St~afing of equipmsnt was perlincps moreeffec-tlve IllLuzon than any other theater. The bulkof ali supplies on that island were concentratsdin Manila in Janunc ry 1945 when the Japanesedecided to withdraw to make a. last stand atBagnio. B y that time the mil capacity hadshrunk to a mere 300 tons per day (approKimate)and only 6 ,000 ' tons of suppl ies could be evacu-ated from Manila before our landings on Luzonstopped all furthel' rail tra,ffio.

TAllLE22.-Volume Of miUt...", 3Up~!e1 tr""4p ",telt "" Lu:.IJI., railro ad$ ('netrlo tons]Nwnlior .f rnvJslo;n_sof '['QIal_ lLnd .AmmUni .l.A .A. .u:to~t...ns transported rQ~dec Ciotrung dOD mnunta Horses mubHesSoutb0 n9,2(lO 12.800 78,500 3 , ,6 00 lID g40 60 ,orthS! !OsoutiJ0 205MO 32,400 51.000 2.000 15 640 150North430

SOUll30 190.000 43,200 12,000 5.000 25 1,200 250North69f:jSouth0 a,MO 3.,000 1,250 300 2 20 10North30

GSO .200 l51,400 140t-750 11.4.00 62 2,500 no ,}510


26/112

1 4 . ~ o to r a v d llorseI (Ref. notes 9, to , and 11.)1 (NOT&-AII fi{1lrl!8 gl..en herein nre nppro1' 1 1 e 1 l 1 1 1 1 , , 8 , {.t!/41-l,5j

15,000~ ,OOOg,8003,80'0

tlwi.ie III Chinn were houg'bt I'rum

Sh'.e orarmy{thou-

. 80nd :P, l )

1\10tOl " I:]Y- MnJn te-0 1 , ; 1ee nn d n J : l n c ; : e

Trucks Ca.l'S sl(l~CA:r= ,S veh Ic tC ! : 8---I---------~- --~20,000 500 200 . .0020,000 lIoo 300 10020,OOn 200 200 15020,000 200 I ~O O 50l~,OOO \100 n o lOO

1941______ 2,1001942_ _____ 2,,.QO1043_,____ 3,100'l!lil4_ _ 4.100J . l H o _ ~ ~ _ _ n . a o o(19H)

resulting from illadequate' pro-aggravated b y total lossesfrom 1941 to IfJ45. Ofare the number (9,980) lost inthe number (38,670) lost byparts for repair or by lack of

proper maintenanos by skilled mechanics, Ofcourse, the need of maintenance was increased bythe severa_use of trucks of inferior construetecn?ver rough roads. The follo\ving table itern-izes the losses of motor "Bhides by years, zones,and causes,

Norn:.-Tr't.:u::k fl~ur'es:include 811sIzes, most of whteh wern;o( 2,..ton t::nl)lulty (rnted 1Jh~ton by the ttl!ll:J'JThese orders were filled to the followiugtent by domestic manufacturers:

'l ':ruck'l3 M o t or . C ,: r C le s M a : 1n t li ! "n J -I D ~

Yp.8r6;0001,5003500~,ooo900 so 500

GarB Sldee""';' V~lcles

500 200~OO 300200 200200 100200 ~O

6,0004,~OO5,5003~OO300

1941 _l042 ~ ~ _19~3 .,1944- _1945 ~

To meet more nearly its actua l motor r equire -ments the a rmy resorted, ea rly in the GreaterElts t Asia W~r (1931-45), to the pract ice 01pur-chasing by "requis it ion" t rucks and curs whichhad been orilt 'ina1Jy delivered to civil ian users in.Japan. These included a conside rable number(principally Fords and Chevrolets) which Japanhad imported, as shown in Table 25 be low , "WIlenhurried preparations were be ing made to resistthe invasion of the homeland, the army eom-mandeered H ,ODO ( 60 percent) of the total ope l"ational trucks in Jupan. These trucks are notshown in th B following tables because of theirshort usage ,

Sunk Total, : I t e sea lor year------I----~~----~16,00012,5001_1,5007,600

1,2.00- _ - -. - - _ _ -- 1 - - - - - - - - - - -

TAIlLE Z5.~Requi&i;Mon of motO' t1'1lOk8bv,J(JJ(JfJ!1I68e ( J f ( ' 1 ) " I J (1f/37-4!i, 10,100

To"'l

1937_ ____ 2,800 1,200 000 l,lOQ 6,000193IL____ 3~O 250 500 10 l,14Q1930__ __ 80 10 WO SO 3


27/112

1943 1945

field army depots,Combat=-area between the f ielddepots and the supply of combatand smalle r units ill the front

the following table.

11141

TULE 28.-Annual ,tatus 01Jrn>anel!earmv motor "ell.icle3

Sl,5007,6006009,800

this zone wasusually for shor t distances,between the fol1@winO"or arsenal-Tailroac1. - .

19i12lD9eDlory, ftr8t c' Il&ea.I ye.ar ~_~______ _ _ 291000Production (Ta.b!> 24) ~---------- 16,000Requlllltlo"" tn l' .....n Crable 2.;) _ 18.000A"'IalIIltlo.o .I'.~""'" (TAble 26) - - -- ---------------I-------~-------I-------l---------

02j5(X) 77,00012,500 ll,~OO2,000 -----l~ ,OOO 9,000

Looaoa ('l'lIhl. 21, - ---------- 83,000500

77,000 SQ,OOO1l1yontory. end of n a c n r YMr (31 March In fo l-lowing ~If!.ndar ;rear) -----~------------- 62.500

92,00015.0001)7,~0016,000

un.soo19,.500

This inventorj' was distributed as follows :NOTIl.-F.nli'l lIigur~ of 60:.800 for 194 6 I e a s of the end Qf the Wll' and, IIko a n other figures ill thl.Stable. IS!a rough

estimate.

Southet'u. I I'nclfl{'na te 1apan Manchuria CI>lna Philippi" .. MOO Durma If i lR. :nd~ Tom!Apr. l. 1942 _______ 1,000 25,000 2t,liOO ~O O 5,000


28/112

I dispersal of parked vehicles reduced losses fromsuch atta.cks.

ZONE OF CO]o[BA:l 'The greaust shortcoming of motor transportlay in the inadequate delivery of supplies to thiszone from th e depots of the field armies. Of the, total number of trucks about 20 percent wereallotted to the Combat Zone and it was ill thiszone, of COUIse, t l1at losses represented the high-est percentage of the total available-particularly

in the case of those captured or abandoned.Usually, trunks were burned before being aban-doned but, when this was not feasible , tlley wererendered unserviceable b y the removal of vitalparts.Operating condi tions were the most severe inthis zone with the repai r facil iti es most l imited..Also, fuel sWrage. was a difficu lt problem.The Japanese army had to use supply trucksas ambulances on their return from the front

the highest priority permitted by the supply de-mands of combat ope rations. Ho,veve r, in manycases such as their retreat to Hankow and intheir defea t on Luzon, all ambulatory cases hadto walk gl'eat distances, and the condition of themore seriously wounded was aggravated by. therough and inadequate transportation.HORSE T1tANSl'O:RTNTlON"

The lack of sufficient motor transport wasrealized in the higher planning levels and asaresul t, horses were subst ituted in tables o:fequip-ment as a rmy personnel inc reased. Horses weresubs ti tuted primari ly in infant ry div isions on thepromise that thei r combat operat ions would gen-erally he conducted -over terrain unsuited tomotor tr ansport. Table 30 shows the areas wherehorses wef'S used to any considerable ek-tent.As a last resort, use was also made of oxen,and, as in the Imphal campaign, even Burmeseelepbn.nt .s were pressed into service.

Year Japan M!" l___________ 111.500 lOS .nOO 92,000 (\,400 4.500 200

2~50010,2.008,0004.8QO2.400

Othor Total

NOTES1 . l" l alW' , Mancl ln rla . O JI dCblD a: 1 .0% _


29/112

and 2 were still under construction.The army sabmarines were severe disappoin t-ents in their lack of mechanical eff ic iency andof m aneu verab ility . Th e training. of th e crews'WBa also an. extremely difficult problem. Infact,lat the end 01 the wa r there were trained crewsI(by army stllJl.dards) for only 10 submarines.Th e only use made of army submarines was in

unknown causes before reaching theh destina -tion. In February nnd March 1945, ehree sub-marines made seven successfu l tr ips from Koko-suka to the air-raid warning center on HahijoJhna (90 miles to the south). On each of thes6-seven trips 15 tons of food, radar and radio-parts were carri.ed.

Cnll.Ei 'CofI ru ;R,~an dnumher "

3 p"uno _

IIIIIROII

P1: or ori gi nan. d...t1nB.t1ou(vitlI ronteo)

T'l'Rn6])OttMPC i : 'Bo l lD@. l(""my)ates:

Amount):..uPpU",.(to~l

'1labanl-GulidaloanoJ and eenren (mBulD), B abaUlBuu& and return (Tl" Lac)

. .Pa .. ra .moBhlro-Klsk&-AtttJ and retarnt Jlaba.u1-BougalnovUJe or- to Truli ;, and rerum

, KokooultaWake-M.trohaIl . and rettlrn (viaMen\YonjPalao-B.IIa,,~la aod retnm

I YokO!lukB.MartlUIl Rnd returnGnam~KureK.ore-.MjDamiDaJlO SblmQ. And return {vtnAmami 0 ShlmB)

r So.sOOOm~UDgBporeIud return

North Luz,on-To.luio

Late D..,em.bc.> 1942Late Jan 1')' 1943Late Dewnber 1942I4te Febroa l' )' :L943Mld.Aprrl 10~3Late Juno 1943

EaJoly February 1.948Ear ly A~r ll 1944La10 Ma , cb 11143Ell rl y Apr il 11144

Ea rly Febr uar y 19 44.M1dAugust 11145

)18)' 1944l\larcb 11)4'1_~ugu.119~~. r unn 19015.runc 104:' " !1ulle 1945

January 194111

800 ." .

1,000

_______ ~ _~ ,__~ __ T J nk no w [J5,000 . ~___________________ ' Unkn{l iWn900 . . _10 "__

__________________ 10250 . _

G o _ . _~ ~_____ Unknown

300 UnhucW'1 l400 (.~"801I1le)Unknown None:.mO { ;!f'6-0t'i1lf!) ~ ~ ~

: . I r l one .GO (a V'h;ttors) army never had nil' transport 3Sthat service. In bc t, there was 1Wof mil itary air tl a .nsportation untildepartment (Koku Yusobu)in ear ly 1943. This departmentconcerned with ferrying of planes>UUlrq ,C&Ut r e : t so th e combat uni t s and

U' lLDSlJo:r t planes at it s 1)ea1;:n Julyweu divided into 8 squadrons of 10In the same month there were 315to the department. Ail" crews500 and ground Crews consistedincluding women.the 80 planes in th e ail' trans-a few were usually attached to(Hikodan) or higher u n i t - s oexclusively for comn:nmicatiollsthe local theaters.

NOTESl~ The ebsvc amounts are est tmnres hut routes and c13tes are boUeved to be fairl1 accurate.2 . On out bound trips .B'Ubma.rlncs carmed -.B1IppUCSand olll:)" a Iew perscnnel ; on return trlDs pae ac nnel , e epc~ lnU1 H lc li i

aDd wounded were traJ>sported. TIle ollil' .""pll .. curiel! on .. .tu'D t rip. .. .. re 400 to... of avJatlon g".U,tG from Sln.~'PO'" to SBIIebo Inla1.J' 1945.

Suppl.l ..(to",,)

SO NOtl,i}Un 1 umwn None30 NoneNODe: ~O00 NO-D~GO NoneUnknown UnknowlJ60 UnknownUDk: ! : ! .OWD Unknown30 None40 N OD eU. t . : : nown UnkJ; iO 'WD~C UnknownUnknawt! N-one50 NOlle.30 Non e60 NotJe8(1 Unk110WD80 Onlrnown

lJlllttlOWl None10 No n e1.0 . N o n e ;eo NOlle20 Dllk:nO-WD20 UnknownUn,known

P lac e " Orroute 10whl.b loot

Both transport planes and those whioh werebeing fer t' ied to the forward 1IJ :'6!l . ,S were used to_carry supplies ".Thes_swe're usually aviation spareparbs and. occus!onaJly some medicines, The onlylIlst~lICe In which other types of supplies werecurried was the, air transport of 800 tons fromJa jJnfito the Singapore-Burma area in earl,Ui43. The hulk of this shipment was automobileand truck pnrts to replace those which the Brit ,ish had stripped from vehicles they had beenforced to abandon. The total amoU1lts trlUlS-ported were npproximately :

Yea rI U~2 - - --19 ta _104.. - - ---19~5 _

Pe.rson.ncl Sgpp)!.. (to:o.o)Silo163no:M~

Unknown~ ,OOOf j ,TeOl,76>t

About 30 t!an!fpOl"ts. were used to drop paratr-oops on Pnlernband, Sumatrn, i ll February 19424t

ut little attempt was made to drop supplies 8 Doell men t on Yangl;w R! ver tn'fic prepared January 1946 by COloUS SBS In tenog"Uon No. 263-

air trnnspurt t!opnrt"'"I!t of Jupn -nese Army "I I' rO l ' ~ .H. }lufl I. bs ll , OaroUne andJ. Bislllm'~1< aDd Solomon Ma~IHon l aIa nds ,Istands,


30/112

rom planes, t1tougn paTllChutes had been madefor that purpose,Gliders towed by Iarge bombers were used as'far as Manila but no figures are obtainable onhe volume of supplies 01' personnel thus carried.For evacuation of wounded 18Lockheed trans-!ports were corverterl into ambulance planes. InApril 1944 such planes carried about 300 patientsfrom Singapore to Japo,n and another 300 overthe same routs in March 1945. .At vm-ious othertimes dur ing the war some 400 sick or wounded'were evacuated from Saigon, Manila, und Kirun(Formosa).7. Referenu; NotesNote II~"',

1

(All reference l tems enumera tedh er ein h av e b een s ahm1 tte d to theolt lce or t il e halrlllan, USSBS.Each it .. ", rlescribed as It uoeu-men twas prepH 1'' ' 't!< >rate gene ral oflines of ""lillDlUIIClltion. ;JapaneseW'Ir :\!I"I,,tn. Tqkyo.The data In thls doL'l lment were

l'onllhoraled by tnter vtews duringNo~ember an ll December 1945 witht il e fol lowing off teers III ' l'ok~'o, Theplaces Indk .. Le,1 nfl'''' each nameare thl> stattcns (If the re!lPeerl~eo ll ker . dur l n il t he WH.r ,

Lie utena nt Colone l Ure shlnn ,I s) lk l, War Min is tr y, T okyQ .

Colvne l Shln oh IUR. ;\la80rl,arm)' shl pp lng heudquurt ers,UJI "n .MD . j '" MltBnoka, KenJlro, "rmyshipping headquarters, Ra-haul.Lleutenunr Colonel or", KIYQIIIlI,HI'my shipping hem)qunr(,erB,Singnpore.

Commander OJlro, 'r,ul"~hl,nnvy llIill18tl'y. Tokyu,

Commander Do !. Yasutul, navymlnilltrl', Tokyo.

Command er Sognma, Klyaahl,n avy m in is tr y, T okyo .

Table prepa red I n Nov embe r 11145by Lieu tenan t Coillnel I wakoBbl,Sblorolru, Inspectorate general ofUnes o t commu nicatio n, Japa neseWar Minis try, ' tokyo.

2

(I

7

8

(I

10

11

12

18

" -nel Ueuo, SIL lgcr ll . Japllnese AI'ill)'2d shIpping trnnsport command.Shanghai, Ch' lnn.Doell li le nt pTepI lr e< l De l: embel'

1045 nil ,Jllp>1lleSe 111\1itUL'l' tall trat-lie b)' Majo r Sh Ioya , 'I'a kes l! I , ran-I'(lln! tl'IU'SPO rt sect ion, Inspeeto cntegM,wni o f l in es o f c ommunic at io n,Jupnnese Wll' UlnlstLT. Tokyo.p1~1Imin nr~' report of sllip])i ug,and " nll t "nusport nt ion tUvl! ;l on at1JSSBS.Document on mllitnl'Y mil tmfltc

In C b I na pr epa Ted Janua 'Y1946 Ill 'L le l, l, en nn t Col on el Fujibayui;hi,Japflnese Mnern ll ln l, l!on ofl ice of the,China theater, Nnuklng, 'Ohina.Documen t on mi li tr .r y ! :a ll tl 'n !1 ie

In Burma prepnred by Majm 1111-suka, Mnklj:L, s ta ff ( li l1 ce r o f J aJ )~ "nese Rm'm" ALell A-rmylo Rangneu.Doeument was ""'itten In Feb"",nr~' 194!),Document w rt tt en if! Janm.]y

1046 on r nll lta " 2 0 ' rail tl'aJll~ In thePhlllppln.es 11Y Leute:u'!IlIt ColooelJshlknwa, KfkHO. ut the I .. ZQJ\P. O. W Camp No.1, Ishlkuwu wasIIs tnf f oWeel' of the :Japane se Fourteenth A rea lU'roy in the Philip-pines.Document ] I1 '' 'D al' e< l D ec et ub er1945 ou mill tury mot",' tru usport l>l'i \Injw' l ira I , T 'o shi ka tl l, motor t rans-por t s ectton, Ins peclo rnte g enc.'alof [lues of l'OUltUUllicotion~ JapJ):nes.eWnr Mnksn,I','l'ok)'o.Docuruent not mlllt'HY !Unto.

tr an spnr t 1 0 Ohl nr , p t' el)Ul 'e d Jnnu-an' m4 u bv LiclIt"",mt O


31/112

~ - - ~ = = ~ ~ . - - - ~ ~. . . . . 1 \".. Ii \ \,pM I I i \ \ \i ',pM :1 \, \\, Ii \ \I .".. ! i l. \ \\ .\.' " \ \/ 1 . \\. . . . .

I\~.. . . I \~\,.. . . . . \\

_ .SHPMENT OF M IU T AR Y S U P PU ESTOMANC l - l JR IA E ll KOREA. . . . ,----...---,--,--:-,-----,~....-~t-_\~4----t---t--__1I~, " ,, .~,IH.~--~4-~~~------+_----_r----_;- . I I i \ \ l\~! J ' . ~

i.." , ' 0 '; .\;, \I '~\100 I .\l i ~ ! ~~0_ f\\~~}..~

~ ' " ' ~ - - ~ , ~. . ~ - - ~ , ~ . a ~ - - - - , . ~ . - . - - - - - , ~ L - - - - - ~IDkCIII.Y, UHIIO ITOM .Y) , -- TotALI I II A I I D . .. . YUII MIA-ALWM ...,...... _I0Il ......--TOTAL A 9 ! ! 1 M . '. .. ., . . 'fWtFOllMIA_ t

KUR ILE E ll A LE UT IA N IS L AN O S

1 1 \i1 \ \ .], . ; \

USSBS Report 64, Military Analysis Division, Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics

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Transcript of USSBS Report 64, Military Analysis Division, Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics