Anatomy of a Revolution: the 2011 Egyptian Uprising ...

Anatomy of a Revolution: the 2011 Egyptian Uprising

Mustafa Bal

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under the Executive Committee of

the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2014

ABSTRACT

Anatomy of a Revolution: the 2011 Egyptian Uprising

Mustafa Bal

This dissertation offers a diachronic analysis of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

This study holds that, regardless of its sui generis nature, the January 2011 Egyptian

Revolution became possible as a combined result of a sociopolitical transformation in the

Egyptian society in roughly the last decade of Mubarak’s rule and several contingent

events that took place right before and during the January 25 events. Sociopolitical

transformations in Egyptian society were conceptualized along two dimensions: 1)

Gradual changes in Egyptian sociopolitical life that occurred particularly on the last

decade of Mubarak regime, and 2) Paradigmatic changes that took place during the 18

days of protests. This ethnographic account of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution –with

involved political processes and mechanisms; and human agency that transformed and

was transformed by those mechanisms and processes– aspires to contribute to our

understanding of 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and possibly revolutions in general, and the

ensuing political crises that arise in transition periods after major political

transformations.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST of MAPS, TABLES, and FIGURES ........................................................................ iv

List of Maps ................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ................................................................................................................. iv List of Figures ................................................................................................................ iv Map of Egypt .................................................................................................................. v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................. vi Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 2. Statement of the Problem ......................................................................................... 2

Chapter 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY .......................... 8 1. Study of Political Change ........................................................................................ 8 2. Political Transformation in Egypt and the Concept of Social Dramas .................. 14

a. Mobilization of Political Capital ........................................................................... 15 b. The Encounter or Showdown ................................................................................ 15

3. Revolution .............................................................................................................. 18 4. The Concept of Contentious Politics ..................................................................... 21 5. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 24 6. Limitations and Role of the Researcher ................................................................. 32

Chapter 3: BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT ..................................................... 35 1. Foundation of Modern Egypt ................................................................................. 35 2. The Nasser Years, 1952–70 ................................................................................... 36 3. Sadat’s Years: ........................................................................................................ 44

Part I: MOBILIZATION OF POLITICAL CAPITAL ..................................................... 51 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 51

Chapter 4. MUBARAK'S RULE ...................................................................................... 53 1. Mubarak’s Accession to Power and His Early Days ............................................. 53 2. The Political System in Egypt under Mubarak Rule ............................................. 55

a. The Presidency ................................................................................................... 56 b. The Legislative Branch ....................................................................................... 57 c. The Judiciary ...................................................................................................... 58

3. Authoritarianism and Characteristics of Mubarak's Rule ...................................... 62 4. Key institutions of the Mubarak regime ................................................................ 65

a. Ministry of the Interior and the Egyptian Police Force ...................................... 65 b. The Intelligence Apparatus ................................................................................. 72 c. National Democratic Party ................................................................................. 77 d. The Egyptian Military ........................................................................................ 79

5. State and Society Relations .................................................................................... 82 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 87

ii

Chapter 5: PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION ...................................................................... 88 1. Kefaya Movement .................................................................................................. 88 2. Succession Question .............................................................................................. 92 3. Muslim Brotherhood .............................................................................................. 99 4. Salafism in Egypt ................................................................................................. 107 5. Youth Movements ................................................................................................ 113

a. Phase One (2000-2003) .................................................................................... 114 b. Phase Two (2004-2006) ................................................................................... 115 c. Phase Three: (2006-2009) ................................................................................ 115 d. Phase Four: (2010-2011) .................................................................................. 118

6. Return of Mohamed ElBaradei ............................................................................ 119 7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 123

Part II: THE ENCOUNTER OR SHOWDOWN: 2011 TAHRIR REVOLUTION ....... 124 Chapter 6: 2011 TAHRIR REVOLUTION AS A SOCIAL DRAMA ........................... 125

Introduction ................................................................................................................. 125 1. Breach of Peace ................................................................................................... 128

a. Death of Khaled Said ........................................................................................ 128 b. 2010 Parliamentary Elections ........................................................................... 131

2. Crisis: January 25, The First Day of Protests ...................................................... 136 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 136

Timeline of the January 25, 2011 Uprisings ............................................................... 138 Crisis: January 25, The First Day of Protests ......................................................... 143 a. Innovative Collective Action ............................................................................ 145 b. Contingent Events ............................................................................................ 149 c. Certification ...................................................................................................... 164 Revolutionary Trajectories: January 28, The Day of Rage ..................................... 166 d. Constitution of New Political Actors and Identities ......................................... 170 e. Scale Shift ......................................................................................................... 172 f. Regime Defection ............................................................................................. 175 g. Decertification .................................................................................................. 186 h. Polarization ....................................................................................................... 189 Ritualized Protests as Rites of Passages ................................................................. 193 It Surprised us All ................................................................................................... 200 The Coptic Christians During the 2011 Revolution ............................................... 204

3. Adjustive or Redressive Mechanisms: ................................................................. 208 a. Threat and Intimidation ..................................................................................... 209 b. Attempts to Decertify the Protestors ................................................................. 213 c. Disinformation .................................................................................................. 215 d. Negotiations and Attempts of Reconciliation ................................................... 217

4. Restoration of Peace: February 11, Mubarak Steps Down .................................. 219 A Brief Overview of Post Mubarak Period and Morsi’s Short-Lived Presidency . 222 Revolutionary Romanticism ................................................................................... 239 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 241

Chapter 7: CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 245

iii

Post-Revolutionary Syndrome ................................................................................ 249 Muslim Brotherhood’s Failed Appeal as a “Party Open to All Egyptians” ........... 251 Contested “Legitimacies” ....................................................................................... 256 How Peaceful Was It? ............................................................................................. 260 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 262

References Cited: ............................................................................................................ 265

APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................... 287 Appendix: Informants ................................................................................................. 287

iv

LIST of MAPS, TABLES, and FIGURES

List of Maps

Map of Egypt…………………………………………………………………………….V

List of Tables

Table 1: Forms of Structural Change ……………………………………………………12

List of Figures

Figure 1: We came to kiss the feet of the revolution’s youth…...……..……….………166

Figure 2: Egypt belongs to all Egyptians; Muslims and Christians……..……………..173

Figure 3: The army and the people are one hand……………………………...………..185

Figure 4: Protestors welcome the Armed Forces on January 28……………….………185

Figure 5: Egypt Reborn…………………………………………………………………196

Figure 6: I am a revolutionary and therefore I am…...…………………………………206

Figure 7: I used to be Afraid I became Egyptian…………………………………….....197

Figure 8: Forgive me Lord; I was afraid and silent…………………………………….197

Figure 9: My Country, I am sorry it took me so long…………………………………..197

Figure 10: This is my shroud, for Egypt………………………………………………..198

Figure 11: More lentils, more chili, Where's the Kentucky, You son of a liar? ……….215

v

Map of Egypt

Political Map of Egypt Source, Nations Online Project.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would never have been able to finish my dissertation without the guidance of my

committee members, help from friends, and support from my family and wife.

First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Professor Lambros

Comitas, for his excellent guidance, caring, and patience. He continually and

persuasively conveyed a spirit of adventure in regard to research and scholarship.

Without his supervision and constant help this dissertation would not have been possible.

In addition, I would like to thank to Professor George Bond, Professor Charles

Harrington, and Hérve Varenne who introduced me to the field of cultural anthropology.

My special gratitude goes to my friends and informants in Egypt who opened

their hearts to me with great sincerity during my stay in Cairo. I would like to thank also

my friends Ismail Onat, Dr. Sevki Eldivan, Dr. Omer Demir, Dr. Rustu Deryol, Dr. Fatih

Vursavas, Erkan Cicek, Dr. Ahmet Can, Derin Akdeniz, Dr. Kamil Yilmaz, Dr. Sinan

Celiksu, Isa Karasioglu, Dr. Hudaverdi Balci, and many others for their generous support

and advice during my research and being there for me all the time.

Finally, I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my dear wife Zehra

and my parents, sister, and brothers for their love, patience and constant support in life.

vii

For the Miners Who Lost Their Lives in Soma, Manisa in May 2014

1

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

On December 17, 2010, 26-year-old Mohammad Bouazizi, a street vendor in the

city of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia self-immolated himself to protest the humiliating treatment

he was subjected to after a female police officer slapped him on the face in public and

confiscated his cart and goods. The incident caused public outrage and nationwide

protests that began on December 18. The demonstrations transformed into a civil uprising

that resulted in the ousting of the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. His 23-

year-long rule ended in 28 days on January 14, 2010. Following the events in Tunisia

similar wave of protests, which have been popularly termed the "Arab Spring", took

place in different countries in the Middle East and North Africa.1 The waves of protests

were of historical importance and marked a new beginning for many Arab countries.

Many of them shared similar tactics of civil disobedience that were organized extensively

through social media. These involved persistent campaigns consisting of demonstrations,

rallies, and strikes. Although not all were successful in achieving their goals, through

these protests people strongly expressed their demands for democracy against their

autocratic rulers.

Egyptians were the first to follow Tunisia. In the aftermath of a popular uprising

that lasted 18 days they overthrew their almost three-decade-long ruler Hosni Mubarak

on February 11, 2011. Egypt has been experiencing a historical transformation both on

1 After the Tunisian protests, similar uprising occurred in varying forms, intensity and outcomes in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Oman, and Djibouti.

2

societal and political levels. Egyptians have new expectations, interests, concerns, and

new political rules.

2. Statement of the Problem

The 2011 Tahrir events, popularly termed the 2011 “Egyptian Revolution”, was

probably the most popularized and best-documented mass movement in human history.

The events were broadcasted live through major communication channels over satellite

TVs and the Internet. The events were widely discussed in academic, political, and

popular circles around the world. Nevertheless, very often, the salient theme that

dominated these discussions, and some of the published articles and books, remained

limited to the role of youth activism and social media in the process of ousting decade-

long autocratic rulers, not only in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in countries such as Libya

and Yemen. In some popular accounts the role of the social media was almost sanctified.

In most cases, youth had played a leading role in forming these changes and they were

not intimidated by the repressive and brutal measures of the state security apparatus and

they extensively benefitted from the use of social media both as regards the organization

phases involved and during the protests. Yet, the events, with their background political

and societal dynamics and involved processes and mechanisms, were much more

complex and could not be adequately understood in the context of tangential reviews and

required more comprehensive analyses.

The removal of Mubarak was a new beginning, but it was only the first step. As

the anomalies of the post-Mubarak period became more evident, the initial euphoria

quickly dwindled. Although Mubarak and several key figures in the high echelons of the

regime were removed and the National Democratic Party (NDP) of President Mubarak

3

was banned, the entrenched power infrastructure of the old regime remained intact to a

large extent. Traditionally institutionalized political forces quickly sidelined

revolutionary forces, the bulk of which consisted of youth activist groups. The military

council who assumed the responsibility of overseeing the transition period was a

significant power center of the old regime and was unlikely to consent easily to complete

civilian supervision, as envisaged in full-fledged democracies.

Furthermore, the new political equation after the parliamentary elections led to a

new source of tension. The Islamist parties, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the

Salafist Parties, took two thirds of the votes in the parliamentary elections. When the

candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Morsi was elected as the president in

June 2012, there was already an increasing tension between the Islamist and liberal-

secular political forces in the society. Two years after Mubarak was deposed,

improvements in the average Egyptians’ life were not at the expected levels, if there were

any improvements at all. Besides, some Egyptians, specifically the more politically

liberal and secular individuals, became increasingly concerned that the country was being

diverted from its revolutionary ideals.

It was on this political background that I set off for Cairo, Egypt in May 2012 for

my field study that constituted the focus of this dissertation. The initial project was about

Coptic Egyptians; their position in the post Mubarak Egypt that was likely to be ruled by

Islamists dominated governments in the near future. Preliminary research before arriving

to Egypt suggested there was an increasing concern among the Coptic Egyptians, who

were Christians, about the direction of the country, possibly with some unfavorable

repercussions for them.

4

Initial interviews and observations among Muslim Egyptians suggested that

similar concerns to those of Coptic Egyptians’ were also prevalent among many Muslim

Egyptians and that the state was on the verge of gaining a religious character under the

influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist groups. After roughly two years

following the ousting of Mubarak, Egyptians were highly politicized and the society was

becoming increasingly polarized along the pro-Morsi versus the anti-Morsi factions. The

Islamists were accused of “having hijacked the revolution” and the political groups were

being assessed on the bases of their contribution to the “revolution”. Based on these

initial assessments, I came to believe that understanding the 2011 Tahrir Uprisings,

without necessarily confining the focus to the Coptic community would be more relevant

than having a narrow focus.

A certain level of “overconfidence” among some Egyptian youth was particularly

noticeable during the initial interviews. The swift and relatively cost free success of the

2011 Tahrir Uprising probably cultivated this sense of overconfidence. After President

Morsi took office at the end of June 2012, the political polarization in the Egyptian

society gained a new momentum. As early as in his second month in the office, there was

already a discourse that focused on a “second revolution” circulating among some young

Egyptians: a “second revolution against the Ihkwan (Brotherhood) to reroute the country

back to the revolutionary track.” For some young Egyptians, who participated in the

protests in Tahrir or elsewhere in 2011, “revolution” was a readily available and

relatively costless political choice that could be used to change or amend a political

system or a ruler at will. However, given the fact that revolutions are quite complex

political processes and only a small percentage of revolutionary situations end up with

5

successful revolutionary outcomes (McAdam et al. 2001), this assumption was erroneous

and potentially destructive. This pervasive belief among the youth held that when a

certain segment of the population could be mobilized against the ruler, even if he/she was

democratically elected, revolution was inevitable. This clear lack of understanding of

“regime change” or “revolution” failed to acknowledge the fact that in cases when a

considerable segment of a society supports the ruler, civil uprisings and attempts of

forced removal of a ruler could possibly lead to violent conflicts and prolonged societal

fractures.

The tactics and strategies that the young activists employed in Tunisia, Egypt, and

elsewhere during the wave of protests in 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa were

to a great extent an application of Gene Sharp’s (1973) works of “non-violent resistance”.

The concept of non-violent resistance attracted the attention of the World once again. Its

successful application in Tunisia and Egypt inspired other disgruntled groups in different

parts of the World. As in the Gezi Park Events in Turkey2 in May 2013, there were many

parallels and references to Tahrir Revolution.

Based on all these considerations, this study intended to offer a diachronic

analysis of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. This study was based on the assumption that,

regardless of its sui generis nature, the January 2011 Egyptian Revolution became

possible as a combined result of a sociopolitical transformation in the Egyptian society in

roughly the last decade of Mubarak’s rule and several contingent events that took place

2 Gezi Park Protests started in Istanbul, Turkey on May 28, 2013 as a reaction to a government based urban development plan that would destroy part of Gezi Park in Taksim, Istanbul. The protests that started with environmentalist concerns quickly gained an anti-government character and spread to almost every city in the country. Thousands of students and young people joined the protests and demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister Erdogan.

6

right before and during the January 25 events. Sociopolitical transformations in Egyptian

society were conceptualized along two dimensions: 1) Gradual changes in Egyptian

sociopolitical life which occurred particularly on the last decade of Mubarak regime, and

2) Paradigmatic changes that took place during the 18 days of protests

It was believed that a diachronic analysis of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, with

involved political processes and mechanisms; and human agency that transformed and

was transformed by those mechanisms and processes would contribute to our

understanding of 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and possibly revolutions in general, and the

ensuing political crises that arise in the transition period.

The research questions that informed this study were as follows:

1) Under what conditions and through what processes did the Egyptian people emerge as

a possible contender with a revolutionary claim against the Mubarak regime?

2) Under what conditions and through what processes did the Egyptian people succeed in

replacing Mubarak in 18 days, arguably in a very short time frame and in a peaceful

manner?

The design of this research was mainly based on the concept of Social Drama, a

theory that was originally conceptualized in his Schism and Continuity in an African

Society by Victor Turner (1957) and later slightly modified by Swartz, Tuden, and

Turner himself in 1969. Following a discussion of the theoretical framework (Chapter 1)

and brief history of Modern Egypt (Chapter 2) an analysis of the situation in question was

conducted and presented, as suggested by the concept of Social Drama, in two parts: 1)

The Mobilization of Political Capital; and 2) The Encounter or Showdown.

In Chapter 4, under Part I, Mubarak's Rule; namely the regime's general character,

7

its key institutions and mechanisms, state-society relations are discussed. In Chapter 5,

the Prelude to the Revolution, the development of rival political sentiments and groups

against the regime are presented.

Under Part II, the Encounter or Showdown section, Chapter 6 explores the

actualization of the Egyptian Revolution and provides an overview of the involved

processes and mechanisms that occurred in the context of the phases of the Social Drama

framework. Critical events that served as turning points in depleting the regime's

legitimacy and contributed to the further politicization of Egyptians against the Mubarak

regime are presented under the Breach of the Peace phase. Later, the Crisis phase, that

started on January 28, 2011, explores the processes involved and the mechanisms that

occurred during the 18 day long protests. The regime's response to the crisis attempts of

threat and intimidation, and the decertification process that followed constitutes the

subject of the third phase of the Social Drama, the phase of Adjustive or Redressive

Mechanisms. Under the fourth and last phase of the Social Drama, the Restoration of

Peace, the resignation of Mubarak and the nature of post-revolution period with a brief

overview of Morsi's Presidency and the ensuing military intervention is discussed.

8

Chapter 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The general theoretical framework that informs this research is based on the

processual paradigm used in the field of political anthropology. The processual paradigm

benefited extensively from political science and grew largely as a reaction to the

structural functional approach in anthropological thought, particularly in the context of

political anthropology. Practitioners who follow the processual paradigm have argued

that an appropriate focus of analysis in this field should involve agent-driven politics and

political processes; not the sociopolitical structures, and social unity and maintenance of

order as the structural functionalists believed (Kurtz 2001). The main concern of the

processual paradigm has been to show that the political process is fraught with conflicts

and political processes and conflict can lead to changes in the political system (Kurtz

2001). In the processual paradigm, the government or any other type of structure did not

present an issue of special importance for purposes of the political analysis (Swartz

1969). Processualism studies how relevant institutions or groups engage in the political

processes without necessarily examining such groups or institutions such as, villages,

lineages, or government.

1. Study of Political Change

The 2011 Egyptian Revolution arguably created and made evident two forms of

sociopolitical transformation. The first was the political change through years of

mobilization that paved the way for the initiation of the January 25 protests and the

ensuing revolution. This change occurred in a gradual and incremental manner and

among limited circles in Egypt. The second was the political transformation that actually

occurred and culminated in the performance of the revolutionary movement during the 18

9

days of protests, en masse and in a sudden manner through ritualized protests that can be

conceptualized as ‘rites of passages’. These two types or levels of changes are

interrelated and interactive processes.

Smith (1974) suggested that the concept of change should be analyzed with care:

“analytically change and continuity are complementary and mutually exclusive concepts

that serve to define one another" (p.170). In addition, for Smith, claims of total novelty or

complete stasis are unfounded because very often, social processes accommodate change

and continuity concurrently.

Another fact is that in a political unit, regular transactions that denote

redistribution of some elements are described quite often as acts of change. Sometimes

the same event can be interpreted as an indication of continuity and change by different

observers (Smith 1974). For instance, members of one community may perceive the

replacement of an official in the political unit as change, while – if no other modifications

occur in the system at that site– others may also describe this replacement as an

indication of continuity. We obviously need additional data about the political unit and

the political processes involved.

Without clear measures and concepts, recognizing change accurately is a difficult

task. Smith defined political change as "either some alteration in the state of a system of

social relations, or the processes by which those alterations occur" (1974:170). Yet, with

this proposition, another difficulty arises; that is, is any alteration in the state of social

system evidence of change? In other words, does any modification in the quantity of the

members or material resources or any modification in the arrangement of members and/or

competences of a social unit represent change? For Smith, given the fact that the social

10

systems have 'temporal duration' that expand and contract with the numbers of their

members and with circulation of their roles, this is a significant question that has to be

taken into consideration.

To overcome this difficulty, Smith (1974) suggested, we differentiate the

economic, demographic, or technological aspects of a society as an analytical system

from the social system as 'a system of social relations'. Statistical changes in the

economic, demographic, or technological variables of a society do not necessarily require

alterations in the structure of a social system. Depending on the context, changes in these

dimensions of society may considerably transform, or even destabilize the social system.

These alterations could provide evidence of continuity and regular development, but this

is difficult to determine without further analyses. Specifically it is difficult for the

members of a society to recognize when these alterations are latent and extends to a large

time span.

In sum, in accordance with Smith's (1974) formulation, by change, I refer to

"those alterations in the structure of the system, which involve changes in its

characteristic processes and operational conditions,” (p.171). Modifications, be it large

scale, in the state of the system or in the processual context in which these modifications

take place, may not lead to changes in the structure of the system. Smith emphasized that

although these two processes concur very often, it is necessary to differentiate structural

change from those states or processes that only comprise evidence of changes in scale.

Smith conceptualizes structure as "the set of units and their interrelations, which gives a

system its characteristic enduring form, boundaries, and operational modalities"

(1974:171). Two main constituents of structure are distinct units and relations and he

11

classifies these two components under the broad headings of entities (sets of units) and

processes (sets of relations). The particular nature of units and their relations differs with

the unit or system under question. Smith described the system roughly as sustainable

units that consist of interacting parts with their own structures, membership and

boundaries. His example of family as a system is helpful; a family has a structure with

certain attributes of status and roles, but at the same time, families are parts of larger

aggregates that constitute the key structures of the social system. He emphasized that

these concepts of system and structure, with their constituent element of units and

relations, are complementary generalizations and they can be utilized for analysis aptly at

any level of societal organization. In Smith's conceptualization, changes in system

structure arise and are manifested through changes in the conditions and processes of the

constituent units and these interact in the larger social system. For Smith, the social

system is "a set of interconnected social processes and the structures they engage and

sustain or modify" (1974:172).

These concepts are particularly useful in differentiating the routine circulation of

personnel that does not necessarily involve structural transformations –in token

continuity– from similar changes in circulation that create alterations in the norms and

procedures of allocation. In cases in which the circulation of personnel involves

alterations of procedures, norms, and status relations, this process indicates that some

structural change has occurred. Nevertheless, Smith stated that change (continuous or

episodic) in one respect may or may not lead to modifications in the wider system and

structure.

12

Table 1: Forms of Structural Change

According to Smith (1974) structural changes can be analytically classified as

pendular, cyclical, and as linear or vectorial transformations. In any kind of change,

structural changes contain substantial reorientations of the structure in which the original

structural arrangements face alterations that are advanced by various processes or series

of events. Smith argued that transformations may advance in piecemeal through lengthy

processes or; may emerge "abruptly, episodically, or radically with or without violence"

(1974:172). If the structure changes between two distinct ends, as between gumlao and

gumsa in Kachin as illustrated by Leach in Political Systems of Highland Burma (1973),

this is an example of pendular transformation. Smith described cyclical transformations

as changes in which the system repeatedly acquires 'a series of three or more different

forms of structures. If structural alternatives follow one another in a fixed sequence this

may be defined as a stable cycle and if the succession occurs on an irregular basis, Smith

described these as unstable cycles. The extent of structural change in both pendular and

13

cyclical transformations is limited and consistent with the capacities and form of the

initial system.

Linear or Vectorial transformations are those structural changes that are neither

pendular nor cyclic. They generally follow an irregular direction and degree and may

manifest as a series of alterations or as episodic and discontinuous. Either through

structural series or episodic and discontinuous forms, structural changes may have

extensive effects on the boundaries, internal cohesion and the distinctiveness of social

units. Structural changes may occur as a result of changes in internal dynamics or may

be arbitrated to historic events such as wars, conquests or natural disasters.

Socio-ecological context, population size, composition and distribution of

economic resources, technology and historic experiences are among the primary external

dynamics that effect political action and provide the incentive for change or to preserve

the political system (Smith 1974). Beside these external factors, Smith emphasized the

reciprocal relationship between the political system and the political culture that can

potentially lead to change.

As the phenomenon of change emerges and advances as a process, and sequences

of events arise, some events or conditions may not manifest their significance without

careful observation and analysis. In some instances, while initiating structural

transformations by piecemeal manifestations, change itself may appear to be latent. Thus,

as Smith suggested, in studying change we should also trace these latent dynamics.

Moreover, if the term 'political modernization' refers to the mean adaptive administrative

and multiparty political qualities typical of modern industrial states, Smith emphasized,

“structural change is neither synonymous nor coterminous with political modernization or

14

development” (1974:174). There is a rich body of ethnographic and historical accounts

where structural changes did not bring about political development or modernization.

Smith (1962) argued “the proper field of anthropologic inquiry is a unit over time,

not merely a unit at a particular point in time" (p.81). Swartz et al. (1966) adopted

Smith’s proposition; yet they suggested that, for methodological convenience, we must

choose a particular point in time for an acceptable exploration of a political continuum.

This study traced the sociopolitical transformation in Egypt through roughly the last

decade, particularly from 2004 to 2011, during the tenure of the Mubarak regime.

2. Political Transformation in Egypt and the Concept of Social Dramas

Having borrowed the central framework of Victor Turner’s (1958) concept of

‘Social Drama’, Swartz et al. (1966) offered a diachronic model of analysis as a tool for

studying political change. In their book, Political Anthropology, Swartz et al. (1966)

argued that their model, which was developed through an in-depth examination of

anthropological and sociological ethnographic data, allows for the understanding of both

instances of persistence and change in political field that is comprised of political

processes that flow in a spatial-temporal continuum. They hold that although various

kinds of political fields produce various kinds of patterns, a set of patterned processual

phases is likely to develop and follow one another in power struggles both at the inter

societal and intra societal levels.

They explained the model under two titles; (1) ‘Mobilization of Political Capital’,

a preparatory phase in which the groups and persons mobilize their political capital to

challenge the adversary/dominant structure. (2) ‘The Encounter or Showdown’, where the

phases of the social drama unfold. The phases of the drama include: a) breach of the

15

peace; b) crisis; c) countervailing tendencies; d) deployment of adjustive or redressive

mechanisms; and e) the restoration of peace. The social span and duration of these phase

developments varies depending on the peculiarities of the social setting and in some

instances, any of the phases can result in the restoration of the status quo. They consider

that this model can be applied successfully to the study of any changing system from

factional conflicts in tribal societies to international crises, such as the Cuban missile

crisis.

a) Mobilization of Political Capital

In this preparatory phase in which groups and individuals mobilize their political

capital to challenge the adversary/dominant structure, this study analyzes general

characteristics of the Mubarak regime, and some political developments in Mubarak’s

last years, with particular attention to his rule from 2004 to 2011, during his presence in

public office. From the viewpoint of the general theoretical framework of processual

paradigm, the study of politics is the study of political processes. These processes may

include issues such as ensuring compliance and using force to this end, achieving

support, weakening or eliminating rivals, fulfilling public goals and are of primary

interest in this analysis. These processes are important for the survival of a political

system and by analyzing them we can understand how the course of a revolution

progressed.

b) The Encounter or Showdown

In Turner’s (1958) conceptualization, social drama progresses in five phases: a)

breach of the peace; b) crisis; c) countervailing tendencies; d) the deployment of

adjustive or redressive mechanisms; e) the restoration of peace. However, Swartz et al.

16

(1966) explained that the full pattern as suggested above is an ideal abstraction and may

be interrupted at any point and in some cases the process may never be completed.

In explaining the phase of ‘Countervailing Tendencies’ Swartz et al. (1966)

referred to the potential role of customs and religion to contain crises. They cited a

passage from Gluckman that stated:

Men quarrel in terms of certain of their customary allegiances, but are restrained from violence through other conflicting allegiances, which are also enjoined on them by custom... Conflicts are a part of social life and custom appears to exacerbate these conflicts; but in doing so custom also restrains the conflicts from destroying the wider social order. (Gluckman 1956:1-4 cited in Swartz et al. (1966:34).

Nevertheless, Swartz et al. (1966) reminded the reader that Gluckman's

proposition might not be applicable to larger industrial societies, which are characterized

by high levels of socioeconomic stratification and the existence of various interest

groups. In such societies, under the influence of competing factions subgroups have

various political allegiances, and as Coser (1956) suggested, the role of customs is quite

limited: "Internal conflicts in which the contending parties no longer share the basic

values upon which the legitimacy of the social system rests threaten to disrupt the

structure” (Coser 1956:151).

In the first of the 18 days of demonstrations, prominent religious leaders both

from Muslim and Christian communities discouraged people from joining any protests

against the state. Yet, their influence was limited and their request did not prevent

increasing numbers of Egyptians from attending the demonstrations. Moreover, in times

of crisis, particularly during and after historical events such as revolutions, a state of

uncertainty and insecurity prevails. In such times of uncertainty, shared values of society

may not be observed by its members. There are numerous examples of previously

17

unthinkable and unacceptable practices in Egyptian ethical and moral norms that

occurred during and after the revolution. For instance, on various occasions, informants

explained and were also observed by the researcher where people began fighting in

mosques, and that was something unimaginable before the revolution. In sum, I believe

that in the face of unprecedented level of dynamism, determination, and rage that

surfaced as January 25 onward, the role of religious or any other customary institutions

were limited. Thus, the phase of ‘Countervailing Tendencies’ was excluded in the present

analysis.

As suggested earlier, the social span and duration of phase developments varies

depending on the peculiarities of the social setting and in some instances, any of the

phases can result in the restoration of status quo. Swartz et al. (1966) explained that this

model can be applied successfully to the study of any changing system from factional

conflicts in tribal societies to international crises, such as Cuban missile crisis.

Turner (1958) presented their model of social dramas as processes that occur

between two major parties, namely two adversaries while one is relatively dominant in

terms of power and the other is the antagonist who challenges the first. In line with the

theory, I consider ‘the state of the Mubarak regime’ and the ‘Egyptian people’ as the two

rivals of power struggle.

The January 25 events are termed differently in the media, public parlance, and

academic publications. The 2011 Tahrir Revolution, 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Tahrir

events, or Tahrir Uprisings all refer to the same 18 days of protests. In this study these

terms were used interchangeably. I also analyzed the entire protests using the different

phases embedded in the concept of ‘Social Dramas’. Each phase corresponds to a critical

18

threshold with specific, and sometimes recurring, mechanisms at work:

(a) Breach of the Peace: Death of Khaled Said on June 6 and Parliamentary Elections in November – December 2010 (b) Crisis: January 25, Protests on National Police Day (c) Deployment of Adjustive and Redressive Mechanisms (d) Restoration of Peace: February 11, Mubarak Resigns

3. Revolution

The literature offers a variety of definitions of revolution (Goldstone & Useem

1999; Halliday 1999; Stinchcombe 1999; Schock 2005; Tilly 2006). This study adopts

Charles Tilly’s description (2006:159) of revolution:

Forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the state’s jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc.

Tilly (2006) suggested that a successful revolution involves both a revolutionary

situation and a revolutionary outcome:

Revolutionary situations include; 1. Contenders or coalitions of contenders advancing exclusive competing claims to control of the state or some segment of it.

2. Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the citizenry. 3. Incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and / or commitment to its claims.

Revolutionary outcomes include; 1. Defections of regime members. 2. Acquisition of armed force by revolutionary coalitions. 3. Neutralization or defection of the regime’s armed force.

4. Acquisition of control over the state apparatus by members of the revolutionary coalition (Tilly 2006:159)

Moreover, Tilly (2006) suggested underlining the difference between a

revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome offers a convenient methodological

approach because it prompts the researcher to utilize the most relevant processes to

analyze a revolution. In the context of a revolutionary situation, the researcher is required

19

to explain the rise of contending blocs, the securitization of support for allocating

important sections of the public to each pertinent bloc, and the incapacity or reluctance of

the rulers to subdue the contending bloc. Using the same reasoning, Tilly argued that to

explain revolutionary outcomes, the researcher must explain the defection of the regime’s

elites, most importantly the armed forces, and/or the control of the armed forces by the

revolutionary bloc, and the seizing of control of the key state institutions.

According to Jack Goldstone (1980), who extensively researched the phenomenon

of revolution, studies of the revolution in the social sciences developed through several

different kinds of approaches or traditions. The descriptive studies in the first approach

(circa between 1900 and 1940) were directed either to determine the major phases of the

revolutionary processes or to identify the accompanying demographic and social changes.

In a contrary fashion, having ruled out the involved processes entirely, the second

approach (circa between 1940 and 1975) sought to explain revolutions on the basis of the

degree of underlying social strain. From about 1975 onwards, a third tradition began to

dominate the field with an emphasis on holistic and comparative analysis that was

intended to explain the causes as well as the diverse results of revolutions.

Skocpol (1979) has been the leading scholar in articulating this line of third

generation theories of revolution. According Skocpol, despite the significant role of

marginal elites, the major determinants that make revolutions possible are the structural

variables of states and the international system (Goldstone 2001). This paradigm

considers regime stability as the normal state and thus treats conflict in a political system

as a breach of normalcy. Hence, the theory seeks to identify the factors and conditions

that undermine the stability of a regime and as a result, factors that lead to popular

20

mobilization.

Nevertheless, Goldstone argued, after 20 years and with the occurrences of some

later revolutions, that the central arguments of Skocpol’s approach fell short in explaining

the phenomenon adequately. As argued in McAdam et al. (2001) despite its significant

contributions, the general structural framework of the third generation approach, in which

structural weaknesses of regimes were considered as the basic triggers of revolutions, did

not give due weight to actors; their roles, strategies, and interactions with each other. A

significant number of scholarly work of revolutions began to point to this theoretical

deficiency. Goldstone underlined the need for a fourth generation theory of revolution

that would rule out the preconception of stability as a departure point and would

recognize the role of group identification, leadership, networks, coalitions, ideologies,

foreign powers, and elite interactions in producing different processes en route to

revolutions. In a similar vein to Goldstone, and around the same time, McAdam et al.

(2001) recognized the nascent development of a fourth generation of revolution theory.

Yet, McAdam et al. (2001) stated that despite the corrective contribution this new

approach with a more cultural orientation, which "grants more attention to the role of

human agency and cultural construction in the emergence of revolution" (p.194), this

theory could not avoid some of the same setbacks of the third generations of theories of

revolution. As in the third generation of scholarly work, the researchers who adopted the

new approach paid extensive attention solely to social revolutions and omitted the

analysis of the "transformative mechanisms that produce revolutionary outcomes out of

revolutionary situations" (McAdam et al. 2001:194). Thus they overlooked the shared

features, as argued by Goldstone (1998), between successful social revolutions and failed

21

revolutions, social movements, rebellions, and series of protests.

McAdam et al. (2001) cited the tendency of mixing revolutionary origins with

revolutionary trajectories (course of contention after a revolutionary situation emerges) as

a persistent weakness in the fourth generation of revolution theory. This group, they

contended that despite its increased attention to agency, the fourth generation of

revolution theory still failed to duly analyze these critical interactions.

In an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of the revolution theory, McAdam et

al. (2001) formulated a more refined approach termed the 'contentious politics'. They

asserted that the concept of contentious politics is applicable to a wide variety of

collective movements of contentious nature such as any social movements, revolutions,

rebellions, movements of nationalism, and so on. It is an exploratory model that seeks to

identify mechanisms and processes in different episodes of contentious politics.

4. The Concept of Contentious Politics

Through their comparative analysis of a large and mixed sample of successful and

failed revolutions, nationalism movements, and rebellions, McAdams et al. (2001)

showed that certain processes and mechanisms consistently emerge as significant in

different types of contentions politics. In their seminal book, Dynamics of Contentious

Politics, they defined contentious politics as “episodic, public, collective interaction

among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant,

an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect

the interests of at least one of the claimants” (McAdams et al. 2001:5). The authors

emphasized that their concept was not a general model of contention, but it was an

exploratory model that sought to identify mechanisms and processes to account for

22

different episodes of contentious politics.

By the term ‘episodic’, the authors leave out events such as elections, periodic

congresses, and associational meetings that are held regularly. Furthermore, the term

‘public’ excludes political struggles or claims making initiatives that take place within

organizations such as companies, factories, or religious organizations. Although it is hard

to identify the boundaries between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics,

McAdam et al. (2001) argued that their conceptual framework was applicable to both

institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics; that is "official, prescribed politics and

politics by other means" (p. 6). Yet, their analysis showed that almost all social

movements and revolutions developed as a result of some instance of institutional

contention. The authors also acknowledged the role of cultural processes and human

agency embedded in revolutionary processes. However, they emphasized, “history,

culture, and interpretive processes operate not like external shrouds but through the

interactions of the major players in each drama” (McAdam et al. 2001:225).

McAdam et al. (2001) differentiated between contained and transgressive

contention. Contained contentions are episodes of contention that takes place among

formerly established actors who employ well established means of politics. On the other

hand, transgressive contention refers to contentious politics where (a) "at least some

parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or", (b) "at least some

parties employ innovative collective action" (p. 8).

This distinction is significant for two reasons. First, there is a close relation

between the two so that in many cases transgressive contentions emerge from instances

of contained contention. Second, very often, outcomes of contained contentions are more

23

or less reproductions of the existing system. In this respect, the 2011 Tahrir Uprising can

be described as a transgressive contention. The results of these events changed the

political system significantly and involved episodic, public, and collective claims making

against the Mubarak regime by newly emerged and self-identified political actors who

employed innovative collective actions.

McAdam et al. (2001) suggested that the researcher should not consider

recurrently observed processes in different episodes of contentious politics, such as

mobilization, actor constitution, and trajectories – that is, the course of the contention

after the revolutionary situation emerges– as different phenomena. Rather, they argued, it

is necessary to examine the constant interplay among mobilization, actor constitution,

and trajectories, through which new actors are introduced, alliances are formed and

dissolved, and identities are created and recreated. It is possible to trace these processes

and mechanisms in the 18 days of protests of the January 25 Egyptian Revolution.

According to McAdams et al. (2001) mechanisms and processes are constituents

of a continuum. They define these mechanisms and processes as follows:

Mechanisms are a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations. Processes are regular sequences of such mechanisms that produce similar (generally more complex and contingent) transformations of those elements. (p. 24) They are not very strict descriptions. Revolutions, democratization, and

nationalism can be considered as macro-processes, while identity shifts would constitute

a mechanism. This study holds that the concept of contentious politics can be aptly used

for the analysis of the processes and mechanisms involved in the 2011 Egyptian

Revolution.

24

5. Methodology

This study was based on ethnographic research that was conducted in Egypt

between May 2012 and August 2013. It draws on two major sources of data: 1) field

notes that were recorded through participant observation techniques including, semi-

structured interviews, unstructured interviews, and direct observation; 2) archival

research. During the research, photography and video-recordings were made to capture

relevant information for different events and environments. In most cases the interviews

were audio recorded. However, some interviewees did not want the conversation to be

recorded.

Revolutions, like all social and political transformations, do have antecedents and

a diachronic analysis was necessary in order to clearly understand those piecemeal

gradual sociopolitical changes, significant psychological, societal, and political events

and turning points that preluded what might be termed as ‘final encounter’ between

Egyptians and the Mubarak regime in January 2011. To this end, the interviews sought to

understand –from the perspective of the interviewees– the objective and subjective

conditions that prepared people on psychological and cognitive levels for the January 25

Uprisings in 2011. In light of the concept of Social Dramas that guided this study, social

and political transformations that roughly occurred in the last decade of the Mubarak

regime that culminated in the actualization of the 2011 Tahrir Uprising were analyzed

under two parts.

Part I is the Mobilization of Political Capital; the preparatory phase in which a

gradual mobilization of political capital and certain ‘contingent events’ prepared

Egyptians to challenge the Mubarak regime in January 2011. Part II includes the

25

Encounter or Showdown phase, as termed by Swartz et al. (1969) that mainly analyzes

the actual 18 days of protests and some preceding events. From the perspective of the

processual paradigm, this study adhered to the idea that the study of politics is the study

of political processes. Accordingly, those processes –such as ensuring compliance and

using force to maintain compliance, achieving support, weakening or eliminating rivals–

which the Mubarak regime depended on so profoundly for its survival; and the

development of contending sentiments, processes, and political forces in the society that

eventually challenged Mubarak were the topics of primary interest of inquiry in this

study. Those issues are analyzed mostly through an archival-literature review and partly

on the basis of informant accounts in the first part of this study.

For the second part, the Encounter or Showdown (mainly the eighteen days of

protests), and the phases of the framework of Social Drama, namely a) Breach of the

Peace, b) Crisis, c) Adjustive or Redressive Mechanisms, and d) Restoration of Peace,

were subjectively designated to certain key events and turning points by the researcher.

These key events and turning points that were attributed to the different phases of social

dramas were determined, to a large extent, in accordance with key informants’

descriptions of the socio political developments in Egypt and with reference to the

archival-literature review. For instance, many informants referred to two events as critical

on the eve of the January 2011 Uprising: 1) the death of Khaled Said in June 2010; and 2)

the parliamentary elections in November - December 2010. Specifically, the beating

death of the 23-year-old Khaled Said in public by two plain-clothes police officers in

Alexandria created a traumatic effect in the larger society. Given the deep resentment it

caused, Egyptians, particularly young people, were becoming increasingly politicized in

26

online platforms, such as Facebook, twitter, and personal blogs. Hence, these two

incidents were determined subjectively to designate the phase of “Breach of Peace” in the

analysis of 2011 Egyptian “Revolution” as a social drama.

The exploratory model of ‘contentious politics’ by McAdam et al. (2001) proved

to be very useful in identifying significant mechanisms and processes that were at play in

the 2011 Tahrir Revolution. From the accounts of the informants, and by asking them

questions such why and how it happened in January 2011 after almost three decades in

January 2011 and why and when they decided to join the protests –if they ever joined–, it

was possible to determine those relevant mechanisms and processes that brought the

successful revolutionary outcome in just 18 days. Varying and sometimes conflicting

depictions of interviewees of the antecedent events before the revolution and during the

protests offered information about the sources of contentions in the post-Mubarak period.

For instance, ‘who joined and when to the protests’ served as a source of legitimacy and

perceived by many Egyptians as a sort of a touchstone to determine one group’s right to

claim the leadership in the post revolutionary period. In this respect, in collecting the data

it was essential to meet with people of different ages, political, and religious orientations.

Politics inherently involves various groups with competing interests, claims, and

concerns. Despite the occasional, ad hoc based coalitions that existed against the

Mubarak regime before and during the Tahrir Events, Egyptian oppositional politics had

been marred by fragmentation, specifically along secular versus Islamists lines

(Hirschkind 2012). Conducted interviews showed that individuals from various groups

had different accounts and constructed differing narratives of different events in their

27

assessments of socio political developments in Egypt. Likewise, differences of opinion

were also evident along different social classes and generations.

Some of the differences of opinions and accounts stem from the way that people

from various social groups and categories prioritize their needs, interests, and concerns

differently. For instance, for a bawwab (janitor), who earns around 500 Egyptian Pound a

month (roughly $70) and depends highly on small tips, the price of bread was likely to be

more important than reforms regarding political freedom. It was the middle class youth,

not the poor classes, who spearheaded the Tahrir Uprising. For them, political freedom

and accountability of government officials in economic and political affairs mattered

more for providing them with a dignified life. For Coptic elites, who were financially

more secure, arguably the “security” that Mubarak offered the Coptic Church and Coptic

Community against the “religious extremists” in the larger society were more significant

than, for instance, a “transparent presidential elections” in which candidates –other than

those determined by the regime through some legislative manipulations– could run freely

and equally.

Politics in modern societies usually involve complex mechanisms and processes

that might not be easily discernable to everyone. Particularly in undemocratic settings,

like Egypt under Mubarak, in which accountability of officials and the lack of

transparency and backstage deals and manipulations prevailed, deciphering the involved

political mechanisms and processes might require more engaged (professionally,

intellectually, or academically) inquiry. For instance, conducted interviews showed that

the average Egyptian had a relatively benign –yet equally significant and relevant– view

28

concerning the role of the Egyptian military in the Tahrir Uprising than those of most

intellectuals who have been conventionally more critical and informed observers.

In sum, given all these considerations, in order to reflect these possible varieties

of opinion, this study selected informants, to the extent possible, from different socio

political backgrounds. Yet, entry to the field was not without difficulties and would have

been very difficult without the help of my research assistant and several other Egyptian

friends who became my primary informants. Especially in the first few months in the

field, because of the ‘xenophobia’ that the temporary military administration tried to

instill in the society, the snow balling technique did not serve well. During the initial

weeks in Cairo, the interviews were generally conducted with average Egyptians through

a snowballing technique. Later, a journalist, who I met first time in Cairo, helped the

researcher enrich the diversity of the interviewees. As he was a long-time and reputable

resident reporter of an international media organ in Cairo, he had a large circle of

possible informants. Upon my request from him to introduce me to Egyptians from

variety of socio political backgrounds, we created a list of people, having written the

(subjective) category that they were believed to belong to beside their names. My list

included renowned Egyptians from the media, political world, bureaucracy, and

academia. With the help of my Egyptian research assistant I began to contact them one by

one.

Until the November 2012 Constitutional Decree Crisis (during President Morsi’s

term), which later proved to be a turning point in the post-Mubarak period, I was able to

arrange meetings without much difficulty in most cases. Yet, after the constitutional

decree, the sociopolitical tension in the society began to rise gradually and because of

29

their increased daily schedule, my potential informants became largely unreachable.

Nonetheless, I was able to meet senior oppositional political figures, activists, retired

generals, and bureaucrats of the Mubarak period, intellectuals, religious scholars, and

journalists. They provided me with first-hand information and insights – yet sometimes

conflicting– both from the perspective Mubarak regime and oppositional groups. Because

of their professional or intellectual engagements, some of the key informants had been at

the center of political transformation in the last decade. Some of them were very close to

the Mubarak family. For example, one of the interviewees stated that he had met three

times with Mubarak in his last month of his presidency. Some of the informants were

imprisoned on various charges and tortured under the Mubarak regime.

Among the numerous semi-structured interviews conducted during this study, 47

were considered highly significant from key informants. Not all of the informants are

referred to in the present text. For various reasons, some of the informants are referenced

with pseudonyms and they are specified as such in the informant list in the appendix. In

the text, for the sake of clarity for readers, an abbreviation that represents the category of

the informant was written in brackets immediately after their names.

These categories included:

Members of various Salafist Groups (S): Four informants

Members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB): Six informants

Bureaucrats, intellectuals, and former politicians who were affiliated with the

Mubarak regime (FR): Seven informants

Coptic Egyptians (C): Six informants

30

Islamists politicians other than those from the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist

parties (from the Wasat Party) (WP): One informant

Young Activists (Liberal/Secular) (A): Seven informants

Liberal intellectuals (LI): Seven informants

Relatively religious intellectuals who are not affiliated with any Islamist political

organization (NA): Three informants

Average Egyptians (AE): Six informants

As the political and social tension rose after the issuance of the November 2011

constitutional decree, the number of protests and demonstrations increased and the

country became increasingly polarized along pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi lines. I

participated in some of these demonstrations and made direct observations, took notes,

photographs, videos, and conducted occasional unstructured interviews. Although my

primary focus was the 2011 Revolution, observing the post Mubarak period was very

significant mainly because the reorganization of the Egyptian politics in the post

Mubarak period was marred with controversies of the revolutionary processes. For

instance, the young activists who were the initiators of the revolutionary process were out

of the political equation in the new period. In a more ‘controversial way’ for most liberal

oppositional groups, the Islamists, who were not “revolutionaries” and not present in the

first days of the demonstrations, reaped the benefits of the “sacrifices” that were made

against the Mubarak regime. The post-Mubarak politics in Egypt, to a great extent,

mainly focused on these controversies. Thus, observing the present situation in Egypt

helped considerably in understanding the revolutionary process as a whole, which was,

arguably, “not finished” and was “still in progress”. I also participated in private and

31

public meetings of different activist, political groups, and research centers, such as the

Ibn Khaldun Center under the direction of the renowned sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim.

I had difficulty especially in getting in touch with the Coptic Egyptians. Thus, my

interviews with the Copts remained limited to only six individuals. In my interviews with

the Coptic Egyptians, I sought to understand their relations with the Muslim Egyptians,

the state, and their role in the 2011 Tahrir Revolution. Thus, questions about dating,

marriage, and schooling patterns were posed and information about issues such as the

occupational patterns of Coptic Egyptians, employment opportunities in the public sector,

whether there was any differential treatment in legal issues, their representation in the

political arena, the role of the Coptic Pope and the Church in their relations with the state

were gathered. I also inquired as to whether Copts joined the protests during the 18 days

of uprising and about their expectations and concerns regarding the post-Mubarak period.

In presenting the findings, in most cases, a few informants who might be

considered representative of their attributed category are quoted. When relevant,

conflicting narratives of an event or process are presented from different perspectives.

Contingent events, which had unexpected affects on the course of the revolution –and

without being perceived as such by most of the informants– are also traced.

The interviews were conducted in Arabic, English, and Turkish languages and

lasted between 20 minutes to 3 hours. I met with some of the interviewees more than

once. My research assistant was a young Egyptian male who recently graduated from

Cairo University. He introduced me to university professors and to many young male and

female university students, and new graduates, most of whom actually participated in the

protests during the 2011 Revolution. My research assistant usually accompanied me in

32

my meetings with informants that took place in different places, such as cafes, restaurant,

offices, and university campuses. During most of my field work I stayed in a rental

apartment in Nasr City, a middle-class and one of the largest neighborhoods located on

the east of Cairo.

6. Limitations and Role of the Researcher

Field research for this study started in May 2012, at a time that might aptly be

described as ‘period of transition’; a period that is likely to continue for some time in the

near future. Transition periods are inherently times of uncertainty in which insecurities

prevail and high expectations for a brighter future accompany societal and political

tensions. Accordingly, the political environment was highly charged at the time of this

research. One corollary of this politically tense environment was that there was a certain

level of xenophobia that prevailed in the society particularly during my first few months

in the field. Thus, at the beginning of my stay in Egypt, as a researcher from an American

university, I had difficulty in establishing a channel of connection that I could proceed

through for my research. At various times, my requests for an informal meeting or

interview were denied or simply ignored by different potential interlocutors. In one

instance, I was questioned by a group of young activists as a suspected “Israeli agent”.

Nevertheless, I could get over this initial hardship through references of some prominent

informants who I was able to get in touch with after several months of pursuit. Once I

met with several well-known and trustworthy interlocutors, the snowballing technique

worked well to reach a larger number of people in different social and political

environments.

33

Particularly, getting in touch with Coptic Egyptians was difficult. This was partly

because the Coptic Community in general has a distrust of foreigners. Probably, my own

identity as a Muslim researcher exacerbated this ‘distrust’ in my attempts to arrange an

interview. Against my request to introduce me some of other Coptic Egyptians, a female

Catholic Coptic Egyptian3 –with her own expression “a minority among minority”–

clearly explained that she would try but it was very difficult to persuade Copts to meet

with a foreigner and ask them questions that are political in nature. A second challenge

was the fact that the Coptic Community has been a relatively closed community that has

maintained limited relations with the larger Muslim society. For instance, when I asked

my research assistant Hussein (A), a young middle class liberal Egyptian who recently

graduated from University, about the relations between the Coptic and Muslim

Egyptians, he explained that (as most of Muslim informants stated) he had Coptic friends

and Copts and Muslims did not have any problems and they lived and worked together as

equal citizens of Egypt. Yet, when he was asked whether he could introduce me to one of

his Coptic friends he hesitated for a moment and said that he would try. Unfortunately, he

could not introduce me to any of his Coptic friends. This was a very common experience

that I had with most Muslim informants. In several similar cases, it became more evident

that Muslims do not have too many Coptic friends and their relations with those they

know are only limited. More interestingly, Muslims are not aware that their social

relations with their Coptic compatriots are usually limited.

Roughly from August 2012 until the end of November 2012, I was able to meet

with people from various sociopolitical leanings without much difficulty. Nevertheless,

3 Majority of the Copts in Egypt are Orthodox Christians.

34

after the ‘constitutional decree crisis’ of President Morsi on November 22, 2012, societal

tensions increased considerably and meeting with people, specifically with politicians

and intellectuals, became more difficult. After December 2012, increasing protests and

demonstrations polarized the society and the security situation deteriorated which

restricted my mobility after certain hours at night.

Another important limitation was the language barrier. The majority of the semi-

structured interviews were conducted in in modern standard Arabic that I could

understand well. Most educated Egyptians speak and understand modern standard Arabic

without any problem and in my interviews they switched to modern standard Arabic.

However, the daily language on the streets is an Egyptian dialect of Arabic of which I

have only limited knowledge. Thus, in my interviews with the average Egyptian I needed

the help of my research assistant.

35

Chapter 3: BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT

1. Foundation of Modern Egypt

Mohammad Ali is considered as the founder of the modern Egypt. He was an

Ottoman pasha of Albanian origin and was appointed as the governor to Egypt by the

Ottoman Sultan in 1805. His appointment as a governor coincided with the period of the

Ottoman Empire’s decaying power. Before his appointment in 1805, Muhammad Ali had

already gained the trust of Egyptians and had built a power base for himself militarily

(Vatikiotis 1980). He began acting independently far from the Ottoman capital. Despite

his intention and efforts he never succeeded in gaining formal independence for Egypt

from the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, during Muhammad Ali’s rule from 1805 until

1848 Egypt was a de facto independent state and had a precarious relation with the

Ottomans where Ali was sometimes fully loyal and sometimes warred against them

(Dodwell 2011).

After years of British occupation from 1882 onward, Egypt became a

constitutional monarchy in 1922. Nevertheless, the British continued to have privilege

and authority in the context of four issues; the defense of Egypt against external

aggression, the Sudan, the security of Suez Canal, and the security of minorities and

foreign investments (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). Mustafa Nahhas, who became the Prime

Minister after the 1950 elections, unilaterally annulled the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty

and announced Farouk as the king of Egypt and the Sudan. The Wafd were always

against British imperialism and supported the idea of a Nile unity in which the Sudan was

projected as a part of Egypt (Deeb 2007). However, Sayyid-Marsot stated that this move

was partly intended to divert public attention from internal ills and incompetence of the

36

government. The British continued to control the Sudan until 1956. In the following days,

Egyptian nationalists attacked the British Forces in the Canal area. The intention of these

guerilla attacks was to force the British to leave. The British reacted harshly to these

attacks. Having believed their role in these clashes, the British forces besieged a police

station in Ismailia, a town along the west bank of the Suez Canal. As a consequence, 40

policemen were killed and many more wounded by the British artillery and tanks

(Sayyid-Marsot 2007).

This incident led to mob attacks against foreign enterprises. Particularly British-

owned stores, clubs, and businesses were raided and looted by angry mobs. Parts of Cairo

were in virtually flames and the day this took place, January 26, 1952 was named 'Black

Saturday' (Deeb 2007). In the ensuing months, the monarch and the government were

unsuccessful in restoring order. Eventually, on July 23, 1952, a clandestine group of

young army officers known as the Free Officers Movement organized a coup d’état and

took over the rule of modern Egypt.

2. The Nasser Years, 1952–70

The Free Officers Movement took over the power and sent King Farouk into

exile. They ruled through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under the

leadership of General Mohammed Naguib. For many Egyptians, the 1952 revolution

meant the end of British influence in Egypt and the new cadre represented the first native

Egyptian rule in over two thousand years (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). From their early years,

the Free Officers Movement had deliberately infiltrated various political groups in Egypt

to in order to learn about their strategies and tactics. Interestingly, at various times both

Nasser and Sadat were members of clandestine cells of the Muslim Brotherhood (Deeb

37

2007).

Although the monarchy had lost its reputation and legitimacy, many Egyptians

valued constitutional rule and representative government (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). The

RCC banned all political parties and confiscated their assets. The 1923 constitution was

suspended and the RCC announced that for a three-year period an interim government

would be in charge. An interim constitution inured for the interim period bestowed

power to the RCC.

In 1953, Egyptians elected Naguib as the first president of the Egyptian Republic

and the reign of the monarchy ended officially. The Free Officers Movement did not

know exactly what the next step would be and there were in fact conflicting trends among

them. While one group favored pursuing the liberal experiment with a civilian

parliament, the other group, under the influence of Nasser had a different vision that

involved their direct hold on power. Soon it was revealed that Nasser was the real leader

of the Free Officers Movement. In February 1954, after a disagreement with several

members of the RCC, President Naguib resigned from his post; however, the problems

were resolved soon and the RCC reappointed him again as the President. On April 17,

1954 the RCC appointed Nasser as the Prime Minister while Naguib remained on as the

President.

In October 26, 1954 an assassination attempt took place that targeted Nasser

while he was giving a speech in Alexandria. The claim was that the Muslim Brotherhood

organized the attack. The attacker shot eight rounds from a relatively close range but

missed Nasser. Nasser showed no trace of panic, preserved his stature and remained calm

and his speech in the scene thrilled the crowd and he became the nation's hero (Rogan,

38

2011). Apparently, the Muslim Brotherhood was disgruntled by the indifference of

Nasser and his fellow officers, who had been helped by them to accomplish the coup

d’état. They had hoped to play a role in the rule of Egypt. In other words, the Muslim

Brotherhood felt betrayed by Nasser (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). This incident instigated a

large political oppression campaign that resulted in the arrests of more than 20,000

Egyptians, mostly from the Muslim Brotherhood, but also included some citizens from

the banned Wafd Party and the Communists (Aburish 2004). Nasser was convinced about

the role of the Muslim Brotherhood. A military tribunal sentenced eight members

including Sayyid Qutb, one of the major ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, to death.

Later, Sayyid Qutb's sentence was reduced and he was released from prison, only to be

executed in 1966 on similar charges. As a result of this act, the Muslim Brotherhood was

discredited in society and banned by the state.

Nasser believed that Naguib was been involved in the attack indirectly. Upon this

development, the RCC discharged Naguib from the presidency on November 14, 1954

and placed him under house arrest. He was never brought to court on any charges.

Initially, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, an esteemed intellectual and politician, was proposed as

president by the RCC, but he refused this and Nasser assumed the position and later in

June 1956 he was elected the second president of Egypt after a poll through which he

gained support of the majority of Egyptians (Sayyid-Marsot 2007).

Meanwhile, in October 1954, official talks with the British government over the

evacuation of British forces of the Suez Canal Zone resulted in an agreement. The British

government agreed to leave completely by June 1956. The British government had earlier

agreed to allow the Sudan to hold elections in 1953, which would be followed by a three-

39

year transition period. After the transition period ended in 1956, and a referendum, the

Sudanese decided to become independent from Egypt.

Egyptian leaders had always considered Egypt as the leader of the Muslim world

(Sayyid-Marsot 2007). Nasser wanted to increase the military capability of Egypt and to

that end he negotiated with the Russians. The arms deal was handled through the Czechs,

not Russians. The US administration was disturbed by the arms deal and they retaliated in

an indirect way by obstructing a credit agreement and loan that Nasser was expecting to

receive from the World Bank and the USA. The loan would be used to finance the High

Dam project that the Egyptian government deemed vital for their development project.

As a response, apparently in order to find alternative financial sources for the High Dam

project, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. This move enraged particularly the British

and the French governments. Together with Israel they attacked Egypt in October 1956.

The British and the French believed that a military strike would delegitimize the

leadership of Nasser in the eyes of Egyptian people (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). But, the

participation of Israel in the war proved their assumption to be ungrounded and Egyptians

united with Nasser. Within a few days, the Egyptian air force was destroyed; the city of

Port Said and Sinai Peninsula were occupied. The Soviet Union and the United States

intervened to end the war. Egyptian losses were high and the United Nations mediated

ceasefire negotiations. Nasser presented himself as a leader who honorably defended his

country against the atrocities of three foreign countries.

One of the declared aims of the 1952 Revolution was to realize economic and

social justice in society. According to one account, in 1945, approximately 36.9 percent

of the land was owned by 0.5 percent of the population and more than 75 percent of the

40

total population was comprised of poor peasants, most of whom did not have any piece of

land (Deeb 2007). Thus, land and agrarian reform was an important priority of the new

regime. To this end, after several regulations, the state restricted the maximum ownership

of land by 50 feddans (51.9 acres) and confiscated the excess of 50 feddans from the

landowners with compensation. Some of these lands were redistributed to the landless.

Nasser tried to establish a welfare state. He expanded the medical services, electricity and

drinking water, which were mainly a priority of urban centers, to rural areas (Deeb 2007).

There had been several ambitious projects such as establishing a steel and iron

industry complex near Cairo. However, most of these projects had rarely materialized as

initially projected. Inadequate planning, mismanagement, and corruption, which had

become widespread in the bureaucracy, severely limited the expected returns of these

projects. By the end of 1950s, the government had begun to adopt a socialist economic

stance and in 1961, with several new regulations, the state nationalized all major industry,

business, and financial institutions (Deeb 2007). The government appropriated almost all

foreign companies. The economic system had evolved into a mixed system "with a large

public sector (including all foreign trade) and with the remaining private economic

activities subject to various kinds of direct control" (Deeb 2007:411). The government

imposed strict control on production, allocation of resources, and prices.

In the political field, the government increasingly assumed the characteristics of a

one-party system. Old politicians of the pre-revolution period and potential opposition

figures were forbidden from entering politics. The government strictly screened the

prospective candidates for public offices. The national assembly was far from being a

true representative of public (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). As Sayyid-Marsot asserted, the

41

government successfully manipulated people and did not allow any political mobilization

that could eventually target the regime to be formed.

The military, particularly under the management of Abd al-Hakim Amir

consolidated its place as the major power foci. Amir had a privileged coterie in the army

that he protected and valued exclusively. Sayyid-Marsot (2007) stated that when Nasser

recognized Amir's increasing popularity within the army he began to regard him as a

potential rival. As a precaution, to counterbalance the military and to undermine any

potential political rival, Nasser founded the Mukhabarat, or state intelligence service.

The Mukhabarat soon became a very notorious state apparatus that targeted

dissidents, potential rivals of Nasser's government and specifically the communists and

members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many people were detained and tortured on

suspicion without any evidence or trial. Sayyid-Marsot’s (2007) analysis on the

repercussions of Mukhabarat’s extrajudicial activities is arguably very relevant for post-

Mubarak Egypt.

The mass of the Egyptian population was solidly behind Nasser and his regime, and the Muslim Brethren or the communists could do little damage in face of the man’s overwhelming popularity. The arrests simply served to polarize the country and set one group against the other, their function being to act as a means of keeping the country off-balance, the better to dominate it. Nasser spied on his own associates and even had their houses bugged so he could be kept informed of everything they said and thought. Such paranoia created a fragmented society with several political foci of power…an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust on the part of all the people, whether in government or out of it. (Sayyid-Marsot 2007:146).

Nasser’s successors, namely Sadat and Mubarak, maintained the same use of

intelligence apparatus – by further expanding their capabilities and reach– and made this

the most significant pillar of their rule.

Nasser created a defensive military pact with Syria in 1966. This rapprochement

42

led to tension and security concerns in Israel. The Syrians provoked Nasser by blaming

him of being dependent on the United Nations Emergency Forces (Sayyid-Marsot 2007).

Around the same time, the Russians shared an intelligence report that there was unusual

mobility of the Israeli troops on the Syrian border and possibly that they intending to

attack Syria and Egypt. According to Sayyid-Marsot, this was a false intelligence report

that was possibly fed by Israelis to lure Nasser into a provocative confrontation that

would be justified as a casus belli. The Israelis intention was to wage a war at a time that

they were militarily superior to the Arabs. Nasser could not decipher the background

intention of the Israelis and his reaction to mobilize the armed forces was interpreted as

casus belli by the Israeli government. Consequently, the Israeli Armed Forces carried out

a preemptive military attack against Egyptian air bases on June 5, 1967. Almost entire

Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground. Thus, without the cover of air forces,

Egypt became extremely vulnerable against the Israeli attacks. According to Cooper

(2012), Nasser was tempted into a war that was presented to him as 'unavoidable'.

The Israeli Army occupied the Sinai up to shores of the Suez Canal and the West

Bank in Jordan and the Golan Heights in Syria (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). Causalities were

high in the Egyptian army and the result shocked the entire nation. Nasser resigned

shortly afterwards. Nevertheless, immediately after his resignation, large numbers of

people demonstrated4 in Cairo asking him to stay in power (Cooper 2012). Consequently,

Nasser returned to office; however his leadership and charisma were severely damaged

4 Sayyid-Marsot claimed that some of the demonstrators were paid to participate (2007:148). These kind of allegations of paid thugs as paid participants of demonstrations are widely common in modern history of Egypt.

43

(Ansari 1986). He immediately turned his attention to the army and sent high generals

into trial. The army believed that they were being used as a scapegoat.

The war's economic consequences were grave and that hindered the country's

economic development and destroyed the relative gains of Nasser's earlier years (Sayyid-

Marsot 2007; Cooper 2012). There was a visible reorientation to religious sentiment both

among the Muslim and Christian Egyptians (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). The defeat was

traumatic for Egyptian society. Accounts of the apparition of the Virgin Mary over a

church in a Cairo suburb spread rapidly throughout the country.

Nasser died of a heart attack in September 1970. Nasser's death led to a great

sorrow in the country. He had partially improved the conditions of the poor and there was

relative structural improvement in the economy. Nevertheless, he ruled the country with a

one party system and his regime was oppressive. Many people were detained, tortured,

and imprisoned on false charges or even without proper trials. He widely depended on the

notorious Mukhabarat, the intelligence organization. He used media for the promotion his

own rule without allowing any press freedom in any true sense. Corruption and

clientelism became widespread.

The rise of Nasser marked the advent of a new elite into Egyptian politics. He was

an ordinary Egyptian from an underprivileged background that had reached the power

center through his recruitment into the military academy. After Nasser, the military

became a potential venue of social mobility for lower or middle class Egyptians. Sayyid-

Marsot (2007) stated that with Nasser three different centers of power became prominent

in Egyptian politics; military, intelligence network, and the chef de cabinet of the

president. The heads of these three institutions constituted the indispensable tools of

44

Nasser's one-man rule and by virtue of this, they personally acquired considerable

amounts of power.

3. Sadat’s Years:

Anwar el Sadat succeeded Nasser as the third president of Egypt. Sadat was vice

president of Nasser and was the only active remaining member of Free Officers

Movement who managed to stay close to Nasser for 18 years. Because of his ostensibly

low and submissive profile under Nasser, many people believed that his presidency

would be short (Meital 1997).

As soon as Sadat assumed power as president after a popular referendum in

October 1970, he eliminated his potential rivals by arresting many people who were close

to Nasser. After he became president, a new constitution was approved by the nation in a

nation wide referendum held in September 1971. Although the constitution extended the

authority of the National Assembly, it gave the president a dominant role. Presidential

decrees were defined as law in the constitution. As the head of state, the president had the

right to declare a state of emergency and had the authority to appoint heads of almost

every important institution including his vice presidents, prime minister, governors,

judges, presidents of universities, and representatives of religious organizations (Deeb

2007).

In his early days Sadat wanted to distance himself from certain aspects of Nasser's

legacy in economic and political fields (Wagner 2007). He declared he would tolerate

criticism of his government and the intelligence service would be controlled tightly. He

released members of the Muslim Brotherhood from prison and used them as a bulwark

against Nasserist ideology (Sayyid-Marsot 2007).

45

Sadat sought to develop his ties with the West, particularly with the US. He

believed that he could convince the US to push Israel to desert the occupied Sinai

(Sayyid-Marsot 2007). However, when he realized that this was not likely to happen, he

decided to wage a limited war to force the Israelis to negotiate. In 1971, Sadat agreed

with the Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad to act together against Israel.

In October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian military forces launched a surprise attack

on Israeli military positions. It was Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement and the

Israelis caught completely by surprise by ignoring early signals of a war that Sadat was

preparing for. Despite the initial success of joint Arab forces and Israeli forces, the

Israelis mobilized rapidly and managed to stop the Egyptian offensive and to push back

the Syrians as well to pre-war lines. The United Nations mediated a cease-fire agreement

between the parties on October 22, 1973. The United States was initially hesitant as to

any involvement or degree of involvement in the war, but eventually after the Soviets

decided to resupply the Arab armies, the US administration authorized a massive airlift of

military weapons and supplies including tanks. This airlift changed the fate of the war to

the advantage of Israel (Boyne 2002). Israel did not observe the armistice for two days

and when they finally stopped the fight, the Israelis were 60 miles from Cairo and 25

miles from Damascus (Wagner 1999). An early Arab triumph ended with what might be

called at best a stalemate. Nonetheless, the 1973 War had significant repercussions

particularly in the Arab world. Psychologically, after the damages of the Six-Day War of

1967, for Arabs it restored the broken honor. Sadat's intention was multidimensional. He

wanted to relieve Sinai from occupation. Besides, with a diplomatic solution he sought to

ensure "American support for his objectives to reorient Egypt's priorities (Wagner

46

1999:X)

With Sadat's presidency, the Egyptian economy made some structural shifts from

the state capitalism of Nasser's era towards an open door economic policy that basically

meant opening the economy to domestic and foreign capital and investment (Cooper

1982). Cooper argued that this shift was, to a large extent, due to the augmented internal

economic and political tensions at the time in Egypt. Sadat attempted to reduce the share

of the public sector in the economy.

Baker (1980) argued that Sadat's management was notably different from Nasser's

in two respects: the welfare aspect, and Nasser's skill at weakening the opposition by

dividing them. The economy had deteriorated particular after the 1967 War and this trend

had severely affected the welfare dimension of the state, which was one of the most

significant sources behind Nasser's popular support. Sadat had not provided the poor

masses with adequate public services in the face of the rising inflation, housing problems,

and unemployment rates. Sadat's precarious foreign policy standing, particularly the

failed peace initiative that meant, for many Egyptians, continuation of the Israeli

occupation in Sinai, that served as base to unite the opposition. Besides, the internal

problems, a growing class gap that crystallized with the advent of open-door policy

emerged that added to the building resentment among the opposition. Rampant

consumerism made the growing class gap more visible when luxurious cars and huge and

ostentations houses emerged in Cairo and other big cities. In 1977 there was a certain

amount of capital flowing into the Egyptian economy. The US yearly aid alone was $2

billion. Foreign monetary aid in 1977 was $2.9 billion in total (Zetter & Hamza 1998). In

addition to supplying its own oil needs, Egypt was exporting oil worth $2 billion.

47

Tourism and the Suez Canal revenues were about $2 billion. Nevertheless, these were not

enough to balance the budget deficit. High inflation had become a chronic problem with

the open door policy (Sayyid-Marsot 2007).

Under the burden of increasing foreign debt, the state could not afford to pay

interest payments alone any longer. To provide further funds the International Monetary

Fund required some structural changes in the economic management and removal of the

food subsidies. After the government declared the cutting of food subsidies in January

1977, mass demonstrations started in Cairo and several other major cities. These two

days of protests were registered in Egyptian history books as the Bread Riots of 1977.

Before the Bread Riots of 1977, Sadat had not allowed the establishment of

independent political parties (Deeb 2007). After the Bread Riots, political parties were

founded; yet their participation in the political process was limited. Freedom of the press

was a short-lived luxury under Sadat's rule. The New Wafd Party was founded in 1978

but was banned only a few months later when Fuad Siraq al-Din criticized Sadat and the

membership of the party reached about one million in several months (Deeb 2007).

Sadat, like Nasser before him, wanted to create a political organization but was unable to

tolerate the loss of the political control that would occur if these "parties" were to become

genuine vehicles for mass participation (Deeb 2007:415).

Given these circumstances, Sadat decided to take a more courageous initiative. He

announced his intention to visit Israel. This was fairly surprising both domestically and

internationally. Sadat explained to the Egyptian the necessity of such for the peace to be

achieved. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 was an important step that "broke

psychological barriers" (Wagner 1999:XI). Finally, through mediation of the US

48

government, Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin signed the Egyptian Israeli Peace

Treaty in March 1979. Sadat had surprised everyone including his allies and as well as

his enemies (Wagner 1999). Israel evacuated the Sinai after more than a decade of

occupation. However, having been frustrated by Sadat's move, the Arab League decided

to suspend Egypt's membership until readmitting her in 1989. There was widespread

discontent inside Egypt as well, particularly with articles regarding the Palestinian issue.

Sayyid-Marsot (2007) argued that with the passage of time, especially when his

international credibility grew, Sadat became increasingly detached from the general

population and their problems. He mostly depended on his own decisions and rarely

sought advice from his cabinet. Israel’s attitudes toward Arabs undeniably contributed to

the growing discontent against Sadat. Israel had blown up Iraq's nuclear reactor and had

carried out several raids in Lebanon and most significantly, many Egyptians considered

the Palestinian issue as a ramification of Sadat's Camp David negotiations that provided

Israel the relative freedom of movement in the region.

When the numbers of critics of his policies increased, a new law entitled the "Law

of Shame" was invoked in April 1980. According to this law, a Court of Ethics would be

formed to prosecute behaviors such as "inciting opposition to the state's economic,

political, and social system, and disseminating false or extremist statements that damage

national unity or social peace" (Sullivan & Abed-Kotob 1999:93).

As stated earlier there was already an awakening of religious sentiment after the

1967 war. There was even a visible change in dress code of the general public among

Muslims, men and women. Women, for example adopted increasingly more covered

dressing styles with long sleeves and veils. New Islamic organizations appeared

49

throughout the country and they were becoming an opposition in the sense that they were

projecting an alternative worldview; an Islamic society “with a return to their traditions

and religious values” that would cure the many social and economic ills of the modern

day (Sayyid-Marsot 2007:165). These religiously inspired groups were different in their

orientation and methods. Sayyid-Marsot identified two separate orientations in these

groups. In the first group were those who believed that the current corrupt system could

be healed through reviving society's own values and through using available channels of

political participation. The other group was comprised of people who did not accept the

value system of the society and believed the necessity of a totally new system. Those in

the second group justified the use of violence. These groups were from some Salafist

currents and their interpretation of Islam was quiet different from that of the mainstream

Egyptian understanding and they were in fact somewhat alien to the moderate nature of

Egyptian people.

Sadat was detached from the realities of society. This was also a characteristics of

Nasser's rule; both men ruled through a small coterie of people whose first and foremost

objective was to perpetuate the rule of their leader, thus perpetuating their own

prosperity. He misinterpreted this religious activism as groups of people who were

longing for an Iranian style revolution (Sayyid-Marsot 2007). Thus, Sadat failed to notice

that the growing resentment was, to a great extent, the consequence of internal economic

and political problems. Following several days of violent street clashes between mobs of

Copts and Muslims in the North of Cairo in June 1981, Sadat ordered – under the pretext

of Law of Shame– a massive clampdown in which 1536 people were arrested. Although

most of the detainees were Islamists activists, there were also individuals from different

50

political orientations and religions, including leftists and Christians. Sadat accused them

later in a speech to be instigating religious strife, directly or indirectly (Murphy 2002).

Worst of all was the hearsay that Sadat had another a list of 15000 people to detain

(Sayyid-Marsot 2007). Besides, rumors became widespread inside Egypt that some

family members of Sadat and some of his friends were acquiring personal benefits by

using their connection to Sadat (Goldschmidt 2000). He became increasingly unpopular

in Egypt. Widespread corruption in most governmental institutions completely eroded

peoples’ trust in the regime. According to Goldschmidt his luxurious lifestyle especially

in his last years, his perceived aversion to Islam, which was arguably most striking in the

eyes of the Islamist opposition with his mass prosecution of Islamists, and with his peace

agreement with Israel were important elements that resulted in his assassination by an

Islamist militant.

He was shot dead during a military parade on 6 October 1981 in Cairo. The

assassin was Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, an army officer who was affiliated with the

Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement (Ansari 1986). To the contrary of the grief that was

displayed internationally, particularly in the US media, Egyptians accepted the death of

their leader with a certain attitude of indifference; they "shed not a tear for the departure

of their leader" (Sayyid-Marsot 2007:166). Although he had declared otherwise at the

beginning of his rule, Sadat's regime was autocratic and repressive and did not allow

opposition or any normal channel of communication through which criticism and

resentment could be expressed to develop.

51

Part I: MOBILIZATION OF POLITICAL CAPITAL

Introduction

The brief review of the history of modern Egypt with particular interest on Nasser

and Sadat eras serves two purposes: First, in line with the processual framework, this

study handles viewed politics as a diachronic and historical process. Thus, a historical

review helps us situate the political phenomena in its social and political historical

context. Second, although three successive leaders, namely Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak,

had different personal characteristics, their modus operandi in essence showed

similarities. In a sense, there is continuity –to a significant extent– in terms of the

methods of their rule. In this respect, it is plausible to claim that some repressive

practices have been institutionalized and each successive president excelled the inherited

method to undermine new “socio-political challenges” most effectively. In short, a

historical review helps us identify these continuities, similarities, and the direction of

change in the methods of rule of three presidents. Following discussions in this chapter

hopefully will make the relevance of these points more intelligible.

In what follows, the general characteristics of Mubarak’s rule, with involved

strategies and institutions, will be analyzed. In a broad sense, as Swartz et al (1969)

suggested, politics include parties of differential power, and thus a power struggle

between them for the attainment of certain goals that have some sort of public nature is

common. In this regard, this study considered Egyptian politics, of which the Egyptian

revolution was fragment of a political continuum, as a power struggle between the two

contenders, namely the Mubarak regime and the Egyptians. In this power contest,

processes such as acquiring support, undermining or eliminating opponents, and

52

achieving goals were conceptualized as important elements of political activity. The

analysis sought to answer particular questions, namely: What were the resources and

strategies he used to maintain his regime? What constituted the sources of Mubarak’s

power? Was this force, absolute force or coercion? Did his regime have any type of

legitimacy? What were the sources of his regime’s legitimacy, if any?

Understanding the approaches of Mubarak’s rule, which is applicable for most

authoritarian settings, is important in several ways: First of all, some of the problems of

the post-revolution or transitional period stem from the problems of the past. For

instance, the political polarization that characterizes the post-revolution period is partially

a consequence of some of Mubarak’s strategies. Thus, conceivably, an analysis along

these lines might help us to better understand the transition period.

Secondly, the strategies and methods that Mubarak used to maintain his regime

developed antithetical or contrary processes in the long run. For instance, his use of the

intelligence apparatus as an instrument of oppression developed into a deep-seated

aversion against the security forces among the public that in turn, mobilized people

against the state. In this respect, it is possible to trace the sources and courses of rival

processes; explicitly, the processes that the Egyptian people were a part of in their

struggle against the Mubarak regime.

53

Chapter 4. MUBARAK'S RULE

1. Mubarak’s Accession to Power and His Early Days

When President Sadat was killed during a military parade on October 6, 1981,

Vice President Hosni Mubarak was in the front row and himself was slightly wounded.

The incident left nine people dead, including several foreign dignitaries and guests, and

38 people were wounded. The attackers, Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, the mastermind of

the plot, and the three other army officers recruited by him, were members of the

Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement (Ansari 1986). The assassination occurred after a

massive government clamp down of political activists, most of whom were Islamists.

After the assassination, in Asyut, a city in Upper Egypt harsh clashes took place between

the members of Islamic Jihadists organizations and the police in which more than 50

police officers and many insurgents were killed. The city remained under the control of

the insurgents for several days until the army intervened and reinstated security (Darraj

2007). In the following days more than 2500 people were arrested and were accused of

involvement in religious extremism or terrorist activities.

On October 13, 1981 Mubarak gained 98.4 percent of the votes in a referendum

and replaced Sadat as the new president of the Republic of Egypt by (Roussillon 1998).

Mubarak was born in a village in the Nile Delta Province of Menoufia in 1928. After his

graduation from the military academy in 1948, Mubarak completed his pilot training

program and was assigned to Air Force Academy as an instructor in 1950 (Cook 2011).

In 1962, he took part as the commander of the Egyptian squadrons to help the Republican

side in the 1962- Yemen Civil War. In 1964, Mubarak attended at the Frunze Military

Academy for post-graduate studies in the Soviet Union. Nasser promoted Mubarak to

54

Brigadier General in 1969. Later, in 1972 Sadat appointed him as the Air Force

Commander at the age of 44. He proved his merit to Sadat with his successful role in the

early days of the October 1973 war. After the war, he was awarded with three highest

military honors by Sadat and was promoted to the rank of air Marshal (Cook 2011). Later

in 1975, Sadat appointed Mubarak as Vice President. When Sadat was shot, Mubarak was

himself was slightly wounded.

In the first days of his presidency, Mubarak exhibited a modest profile and

assured Egyptians he would employ the Emergency Laws to a limited extent and only

when necessary (Cook 2011). He announced he would allow opposition groups from

every political spectrum, with the exception of religious extremists, to express their views

(Ansari 1986). He released the people who were arrested in September 1981 by Sadat. On

the day of their release, in an attempt to show his goodwill for reconciliation, Mubarak

invited many prominent figures of the religious and secular opposition to his palace.

However, he did not take any concrete steps to revoke any of the regulations that

remained against personal freedoms (Ansari 1986).

Mubarak assured everyone Egypt would continue to abide by all international

treaties and agreements that were signed by Egypt (Ansari 1986). Mubarak had inherited

a country that at peace with Israel and this was applauded in the US and Europe, yet

condemned by her Arabic neighbors for the same reason, and had serious economic

problems internally (Goldschmidt 2000).

Even though he was the Vice President –for the last five years– and the secretary

general of the NDP, he did not have the political expertise that would match his bright

military career. He had kept his professional integrity and had avoided, with utmost care,

55

not to be affiliated with any faction in the NDP (Ansari 1986). Probably this was the

reason that made Sadat keep Mubarak close to himself. One informant from the

organization of the Muslim Brotherhood had once stated; "Mubarak was not a very smart

man, but he was a survivalist". As the coming years in presidency proved he was capable

enough to design his own game.

Ansari (1986) noted that Mubarak gradually detached himself from important

members of the NDP. Some members of the ruling party had become quite notorious

with allegations of corruption and nepotism. Some members and their relatives had

acquired significant wealth through illegitimate means. From his early days onwards,

Kienle (2001) argued, Mubarak was adamant not to allow any one around him, whether

from the NDP or the military, to build a power center that could pose a threat to him in

the future. He had closely observed and learnt his lesson as to how Marshal Abd al-

Hakim Amr’s reputation in the army had reached the point where could undermine

Nasser’s power, particularly after the June 1967 War. Having recognized Abd al-Hakim

Amr’s potential, Nasser had astutely sidelined him (Cook 2007). Accordingly, Mubarak

frequently rotated senior officials to different posts and assignments. Everyone in the

hierarchical structure knew that their positions were never secure and they were subject

to dismissal in case of any small doubt of loyalty. By the same token, Mubarak did not

have a Vice President until he appointed Omar Suleiman on 29 January 2011, 12 days

before his forced departure from the presidency.

2. The Political System in Egypt under Mubarak Rule

In what follows, a brief review of the Egyptian political system with its three

branches, the executive, the judicial, and the legislative under Mubarak rule is provided.

56

According to the 1971 Constitution5, the executive branch was composed of the President

and the Cabinet of Ministers.

a. The Presidency

According to the 1971 Constitution that was in effect during the entire rule of

Mubarak, as the Head of the State, the President had exceptional powers that undermined

a healthy separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches.

According to article (a) number137, the President was the head of the executive body.

The constitution granted the President the right to issue laws or revoke them under

normal or exceptional situations (a112 &147). The President had the right to declare a

State of Emergency (a148) and had the right to veto proposed laws by the National

Assembly. The President was the head of the Supreme Council of Judiciary

Organizations (a173), the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (a 150 &182) and

Supreme Chief of the Police (a184). Moreover, the President had the right to appoint the

Prime Minister and Ministers and their deputies (a141). As these articles of the 1971

Constitution demonstrated, President Mubarak had accumulated significant aspects of the

power structure of the legislative and judiciary branches under his authority. Thus, the

legislative and judiciary had only limited independence (El Borai et al. 2001). Such an

arrangement was a clear repudiation of the idea of separation of powers. The President

was also the head of the dominant NDP party and he had he right to appoint the speaker

of the People’s Assembly. Hence, as Fahmy (2002) argued, the legitimacy of the

5 The 1971 Constitution stayed in effect until it was suspended on February 13, 2011 by the SCAF. There were several amendments in 1980, 2005, and 2007. On March 30, 2011 the SCAF drafted a provisional constitution that stayed in effect until the new constitution was accepted with a referendum in December 2012.

57

parliament in its role to control the executive branch was undermined. Moreover, the

constitution granted the President enormous powers without any reference to President’s

accountability.

b. The Legislative Branch

The Egyptian Parliament had been a bicameral one that consisted of the People's

Assembly (Maglis El-Shaab) and the Shura Council (Maglis El-Shura). The Shura

Council was established with a constitutional amendment in 1980. It is the upper house of

the Parliament and it is a consultative council that does not have any legislative power.

According to Article 86 of 1971 Constitution, the People’s Assembly was the

primary legislative authority. As discussed earlier, the constitution granted the President

the right to promulgate laws or the authority to object to laws. Besides, the President had

the authority to issue presidential decrees (El Borai et al. 2001). The constitution

specified the number of the members as a total of 454; 444 elected members and 10

members appointed directly by the president. The People's Assembly was vested in the

task of approving the general budget, the social and economic development plans, and

public policies of the state (Fahmy 2002). Yet, given the Presidents overwhelming power

and role as the head of the dominant party, even a supervisory role of the People's

assembly was dubious (El Borai et al. 2001). Fahmy showed in an analysis of seven years

of Parliamentary performance (from 1990 to 1996) that there was not even a single

attempt to pass a vote of no confidence by the Cabinet or its members. This conclusion

suggests that the People’s Assembly did not have the intention or the structure to serve as

a control mechanism over the executive branch of the state. Considering the absence of

any disagreement between the Prime Minister and the President since time of Sadat,

58

Fahmy (2002) argued that during the Mubarak’s rule, the Cabinet served as “a part of the

expanding Egyptian bureaucracy which executes the decisions taken at the apex of

authority pyramid” (p.46).

c. The Judiciary

In Articles 165 and 166 of the 1971 Constitution asserted the independence of the

Judiciary. However, Article 173 identified the President as the head of the Supreme

Judicial Council and this contradicted the principle of Judicial Independency. Article 44

of the Judiciary Law granted the President the authority to appoint judges. As El Borai et

al. (2001) argued the President's interference was most evident in the creation of Special

Courts. In some cases, half of the members of Special Courts were appointed outside the

Judicial System and were not professional judges.

The President selected the president and the members of the Supreme

Constitutional Court. El Borai et al. (2001) asserted that in more that several cases, the

Supreme Constitutional Court played a political role in favor of the ruling NDP and the

President by adopting double standards and making contradictory decisions. According to

El Borai et al. President Mubarak used the Judiciary very often to gain legitimacy for his

disputable political actions.

Nevertheless, overall, the judiciary's stance during Mubarak’s rule was somewhat

ambivalent in terms of judicial independence. Given other accounts and examples in

which the judiciary exhibited a firm stand with its decisions against the NDP's and

president Mubarak's unconstitutional acts and legal arrangements, it is plausible to claim

that had been a stream of judges and attorneys who stayed out of the influence of the

executive branch. For instance, in the Parliamentary elections of 2000, after the Supreme

59

Constitutional Court (SSC) decided that every polling station had to be monitored by a

member of the judiciary during the voting process, the judiciary executed its supervisory

function (Brownlee 2002). Yet, this did not change the result very much:

…it simply moved electoral manipulation outside of the polling station, sometimes by just a few feet. With judges only able to supervise the balloting itself, other aspects of the election process fell completely outside of their control. Opposition candidates and movements complained of official harassment (such as disconnected telephone lines), intimidation by security forces. (Brown et al. 2007:3) In non-democracies, the judiciary institutions scarcely perform as an independent

state organ (Ginsburg & Moustafa 2008). According to Moustafa (2007), authoritarian

regimes manipulate the judicial institutions for several purposes such as for purposes of

asserting social control, discouraging and eliminating opposition, claiming legitimacy

through legality, and fostering compliance to maintain internal order within the state

bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Ginsburg and Moustafa argued that in rare cases under non-

democratic settings, judicial institutions can serve as important political avenues by

challenging the regime. In his analysis, Moustafa (2007) cited the Egyptian judiciary as

one of these rare cases of “judicialization of politics” (p.132) in which the judicial body

could maintain a certain degree of independence. For example, against the will of the

regime, the SCC annulled several laws that would harm press freedom and the

nongovernmental sector (Cook 2007; Moustafa 2008). Nevertheless, it would be naïve to

depict Mubarak’s rule as a hassle free environment for the judiciary. For example, at

times, “respected judges have been publicly beaten for being openly critical of the

President and the preparations for the succession of his son” (Abaza 2013:93). Given the

relative strength of the judiciary, Moustafa argued, the opposition parties and human right

organizations adopted legal mobilization as an important strategy against the Mubarak

60

regime. Yet, Moustafa recounted that, despite the SCC’s bold decisions against some acts

and decisions of the Mubarak regime, the SCC did approve that Emergency State

Security Courts (ESSC), which the Mubarak regime used extensively and without much

limitation and safeguards, which were constitutional. Thus, Mubarak could sideline the

civil courts through the ESSC and later –when some inconveniences became salient– the

Military Courts that served as “parallel legal system” (Moustafa 2008:151). In spite of

strong expectations from the public, the SCC avoided challenging the regime by

defending the right of appeal to regular civilian judicial institutions.

According to Moustafa (2008) the transfer of civilians to military courts was

another disappointment that arose during Mubarak’s rule. The military courts were used

initially for terrorism trials; yet, a few years after their formation the regime began to

send civilians to this, particularly Islamists, based on their mere affiliation with Islamist

organizations. The judges of the Military courts were military officers who were

appointed by the Minister of Defense and the President. Under the provisions of the

emergency law, which took effect from 1967, with an exception of six months until

Mubarak left, prosecutors could detain anyone for up to 30 days without any charge.

Many Egyptians were imprisoned for years on false grounds or without a proper trial.

Their trials were not held publicly and the defendants did not have the right of appeal

(Moustafa 2008).

All in all, Moustafa (2008:155) portrayed the ambivalent stance of the judiciary as

follows:

The Supreme Constitutional Court and the administrative courts were able to push a liberal agenda in less significant areas of political life and to maintain their autonomy from the executive largely because the regime was confident that it ultimately retained full control over its political opponents. Supreme

61

Constitutional Court activism may therefore be characterized as “insulated liberalism.” Court rulings had an impact upon state policy, but judicial institutions were ultimately bounded by a profoundly illiberal political system.

The ambivalent position of the judiciary was reflected accordingly in interviews

with interlocutors from different political leanings. For example, Dr. Said, (FR) who was

very close the Mubarak regime said:

Nobody is perfect, however the Egyptian Judiciary proved to be very solid and powerful. They were actually making checks and balances on Mubarak. Like when you have a so-called tyrant, between 1980-2002, High Constitutional Court (HCC) annulled, I stopped counting, more than two hundred laws that Mubarak made and signed. They also dissolved the People’s Assembly of 1984, 1987, and 1995. The HCC was really a blow to Mubarak and also to Morsi.

According to Aly’s (2012) assessment in a report, the Judiciary’s struggle for

judicial independence and an independent budget intensified particularly in the last few

years of Mubarak’s rule and took the form of a “semi-rebellion” (p.50). On the grounds

of the lack of necessary judicial supervision, the SCC ruled that the 1984, 1987, 1990,

1995, and 2000 elections to the People's Assembly were illegal (Cook 2007; Moustafa

2008; Aly 2013). As argued by Cook (2007), to override this relative independence of the

judiciary, which the regime considered as a threat to his power, Mubarak increasingly

used State Security Courts and Military courts as alternative venues for carrying out the

states’ repression.

Contrary to the assessment made by Dr. Said (FR), Dr. Shevki (NA) from Cairo

University, (a religious Muslim not affiliated with any political Islamic organization)

expressed the view that “given their stance against President Morsi and the FJ Party in

the post-revolution period, there has been a significant pro-Mubarak element current

present in the judiciary.”

62

3. Authoritarianism and Characteristics of Mubarak's Rule

The vast literature on authoritarianism (Cardoa 1979; Diamon 2002; Geddes

1999; Karl 1995; Levitsky & Way 2002; O'Donnell 1973, 1994; Schedler 2009) offers a

variety of typologies and definitions. A common emphasis in the literature is that

differences in types are important because each type somewhat follows different courses

and strategies of survival, transition, or transformation (Anderson 2011; Hadenius &

Teorell 2007). For example, Geddes (2003) differentiated between military, personalist,

and single-party regimes, each of which had different implications for the stability and

the course of the regime with a possible end towards democratization.

The studies on this field also focus on types of ‘hybrid’ or ‘mixed’ authoritarian

regimes that show some democratic characteristics with the presence of some nominal or

limited democratic institutions such as the presence of parliament and elections. As

Levitsky and Way (2002) argued, some authors differentiate the names of these types of

regimes using terms such as 'electoral authoritarianism', 'illiberal democracy', 'pseudo-

democracy', 'semi-democracy' and so on. Levitsky and Way observed two significant

flaws common to many of these studies. The first was a 'democratizing bias' that was

implicit in much of this literature. These mixed or hybrid regimes were presented as

limited forms of democracy, an early phase of democratic transition or cases of extended

transition. The underlying implication of this was that they were eventually expected to

evolve into democracies. However, as some studies convincingly showed this was not

necessarily the case (Herbst 2001; Carothers 2002; Hadenius & Teorell 2006). Very often

such regimes ended up with new types of authoritarianism.

63

For Levitsky and Way (2002), the second weakness in the literature was that some

researchers failed to recognize significant differences among the types of

authoritarianism. Thus, they tended to lump them together using terms such as 'soft

authoritarianism', 'semi-authoritarian', or semi-democratic'. Levitsky and Way examined

'competitive authoritarianism' that they defined as a specific type of mixed regime. In line

with Linz (2000) they considered these mixed types of authoritarianism – contrary to the

approach that treated them as "diminished forms of democracy"– as "diminished form of

authoritarianism" (p.52).

In his masterpiece Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes Linz (2000:51) argued

that:

One of the easiest ways to define a concept is to say what it is not. To do this obviously assumes that we know what something else is, so that we can say that our concept is not the same. Here we shall start from the assumption that we know what democracy is and center our attention on all the political systems that do not fit our definition of democracy...we shall deal here with nondemocratic systems. For Levitsky and Way (2002:53) a modern democratic regime must necessarily

have, at a minimum, all of the following four criteria:

1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote; 3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and 4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.

In addition to above cited four criteria, Guillermo O'Donnell (1993), a prominent

scholar who published extensively on the transition from authoritarianism and democratic

consolidation, argued that for a regime to be considered a political democracy; its term,

once elected, should not be subject to any arbitrary risk of termination before its

mandated term. This abstraction of democracy is in parallel with Robert Dahl's (1971)

64

notion of "polyarchy" by which he refers to examples of existing ‘political democracies’

as “imperfect approximation of an ideal” (Coppedgeand & Reinicke 1990:51)–is similar

to the ‘ideal type’ of Weber– where democracy is considered as “a host of ideals that no

actual political system has ever approached” (p.51). In other words, polyarchies, where

certain existing modern democratic regimes perform democratically to varying degrees,

display only some but not all of the essential attributes of institutions of democracy in

their perfect form. Dahl also emphasized "the right to run for office" (1991:221) as an

essential attribute of polyarchy.

Following Linz's lead, it would be appropriate to describe the Mubarak regime by

describing what it was not. Based on the above description, the Mubarak regime was

neither a polyarchy, as termed by Dahl (1971), or a democracy. At the same time, the

Mubarak regime also conveniently fitted Linz’ (1964:225) description of

authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in the development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.

Linz (1964) himself also offered a variety of different typologies such as

‘bureaucratic-military authoritarianism’, ‘organic statism’, ‘postdemocratic’,

‘postindependence mobilizational authoritarianism’, and ‘post-totalitarian

authoritarianism’. Given the variety of available definitions of authoritarianism in the

literature, often with nuanced differences among them, it is no easy task to classify the

Mubarak regime and I believe such a task is not necessary in the context of this present

65

study. I will argue it will suffice to indicate that the Mubarak regime was nondemocratic

and authoritarian.

In his publication entitled the Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral

Societies, Clive Y. Thomas (1984) suggested examining the material basis of the state in

order to study the methods of rule by which authoritarian regimes operate. Thomas

suggested that those particular methods were "the most common ways in which both the

rulers and the ruled perceive the state" (1984:89). This idea provides valuable insight for

the Egyptian political context. In his ethnographic study conducted in Cairo, Salwa Ismail

(2006) made a similar observation and argued: "the quotidian encounters between people

and agents and agencies of the state that tell us about the effects of practices of rule in the

everyday life of residents of lower-income urban neighborhoods" (p.130). The police

officers' harassment of citizens based on the state's legal concept of mahdar ishtibah wa

tahari (suspicion and investigation) on arbitrary grounds created an aversion against the

Egyptian police and the state. Worse were the experiences of mistreatment in police

stations. These encounters left people humiliated and injured. Ismail claimed: "the

encounters with the state destabilize their masculine constructs and necessitated a

renegotiation of their masculinity" (2006:127). In sum, a brief overview of Mubarak

regime’s ruling strategies and key institutions and mechanisms that it depended on might

help one better understand the societal dynamics that led to the 2011 Tahrir Revolution.

4. Key institutions of the Mubarak regime

a. Ministry of the Interior and the Egyptian Police Force

During the Mubarak regime, the police force was under the administrative control

of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). In each of the 27 provinces of Egypt, there was a

66

security directorship that was responsible for operating against the MoI. There had been a

tremendous increase in the number of police personnel over the years since Nasser. The

number in the police force in 2009 were 850,000; 450.000 paramilitary Central Security

Forces (CFS) personnel and 400,000 members of the State Security Investigations

Services (SSIS) (mabahes amn al-dawla) (Brumberg & Sallam 2012).

Torture cases, the arbitrary detention of citizens, and cases of mistreatment under

police custody were widely documented by various international organizations such as

the UN Committee Against Torture (UN/CAT 2002) and Human Rights Watch (HRW

2007). On many occasions, interviewees from various political spectra explained that

police brutality and corruption that resulted in humiliation and injury for many ordinary

citizens were among the major reasons for the mass participation in the protests. The

Mubarak regime used the police forces extensively for the surveillance of the opposition

figures, particularly the Islamists and oppositional parties and civil society organizations.

Dr. Ahmad (MB) who is a medical doctor and an active member of the Muslim

Brotherhood claimed that the security forces were particularly cruel to the Islamists:

The seculars and liberals were treated differently (than Islamists). NGOs were allowed to work with freedom except for the Islamist. For example, I witnessed in many different instances; ten guys were demonstrating in front of a government building. They were shouting and saying things that we could not imagine. The police surrounded them, chatted with them and they left for home safely. Even if they were taken to police station they were not tortured. Some other accounts in interviews and the literature contradicted Dr. Ahmad’s

point. Tareq (LI) who had been working as a journalist in Cairo for almost a decade,

asserted that he had witnessed many instances of brutal police intervention to peaceful

protests of liberal or leftist groups. The security services’ hostility was not restricted to

Islamists or political opponents from a specific branch of the political spectrum. The

67

oppression had extended to include almost every citizen, particularly prominent figures in

all domains of social life (Arafat 2009; Kandil 2012). Even high ranked military officers

were vulnerable in that an intelligence report about them could easily lead to early

retirement at best (Kandil 2012). Renowned sociologist Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (LI), a

liberal activist explained that he was imprisoned and was subjected to police violence

after he criticized the President Mubarak.

Three members of his (Mubarak) family were my students. When one of them graduated or when they had a party and they invited the professors to their graduation party. So, in such occasions I was in and out of their house many times. Furthermore, I have known Mubarak since he was a vice president. But, when I criticized Mubarak one night I was taken from home and imprisoned on ungrounded charges and stayed in prison for about 3 years until I was officially acquitted.

It was no coincidence that the young activist groups chose 25th of January as a

day for nation-wide protests. It was the National Police Day and the activist groups knew

the deep resentment of the Egyptians against the police. The protestors had planned to

gather in front of the MoI and they initially demanded the removal of the Minister of

Interior, Habib el-Adly. All of these initial arrangements around the MoI and the police

indicated the importance of the central locus of police and MoI in the Egyptians’

perception of the state.

On many occasions, the informants reported instances of police repression, such

as being taken into custody just on "suspicion"; instances of police officers demanding

money impudently; or getting merchandise without paying from shop owners or street

vendors. Salih, (A) 23 year-old Egyptian who recently graduated from Cairo University,

explained:

The excesses of the state, with all its cruelty and recklessness against its own citizens, were sort of embodied in police forces. A police officer was like a king.

68

I remember once seeing an officer on a motorbike; he was blocking a whole busy street in downtown Cairo just because he came across someone he knew in a car and he kept talking without showing any hint of shame or concern regarding people waiting behind him. Well, in fact, it was not much different in any government office. Even in the hospitals…The system was corrupted from top to the bottom. Anyone who had somehow some level of governmental authority abused it. We were like objects, like captives of Mubarak. We were just powerless and helpless…worse than that; I think we were not even able to face that reality…

Thomas' (1984) argued that terror and repression in well-organized and systemic

manner, is the most distinctive characteristics of authoritarian regimes. Given the

widespread electoral riggings, it is difficult to estimate the real rate and extent of public

support for the regime during Mubarak’s tenure. Since authoritarian regimes lack an

adequate base of legitimacy and public support, which is usually granted to rulers by the

society through traditional, religious, or democratic institutions, they extensively depend

on coercive power (Diamond et al. 1989; Bermeo 1990). To this end, in order to control

the society, Thomas suggested that authoritarian regimes allocate disproportionally large

budgets for the security apparatus. Even in desperate economic conditions, authoritarian

regimes continue employ a large military. In the same vein, Kassem (2004) argued that

authoritarian regimes use their coercive apparatus extensively in the political realm. This

is a valid assessment for Egypt. The regime kept a large army and huge security

apparatus, with separate police and intelligence organizations. The Egyptian Army’s

manpower consisted of roughly 310.000 conscripts and 375.000 reservists and its annual

budget was $4.56 billion in 2010 (Sharp 2011). The exact number of officials who were

employed by the security agencies during the Mubarak regime was not publicly known,

but it is estimated to have reached approximately two million individuals (among a total

population of 83 million people) during Mubarak’s last decade in power (Kandil 2012).

Based on the fact that the three preceding presidents, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak,

69

were all from the military, popular analyses tend to describe Egypt as a military regime.

Beginning with Sadat, the political role of the military in the state’s affairs gradually

declined. When Sadat became president he initially deposed some influential military

figures who belonged to Nasser’s close entourage. Mubarak followed the same path and

eventually the power structure of the state became police centered (Kandil 2012).

Mubarak always approached prominent military leaders with suspicion and made

military personnel rotate to different posts frequently. Thus, he increasingly depended on

the police and the intelligence service Mukhabarat that proved to be dependable and loyal

over the passing years. Nevertheless, at the same time Mubarak benefitted from the

strong public image of the Egyptian military and their well-trained and disciplined cadre

of officers for sensitive posts. Yet, through different strategies Mubarak contained their

influence among the military and public so it would not reach a level that would

challenge Mubarak’s position. The share that the officers had been receiving from the

economic activities of the military was an important incentive for them. Mubarak

successfully sidelined the military and used the police and the intelligence apparatus to

forge the backbone of the regime’s coercive power.

Given the fact that Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak were all from the military and

they were all authoritarian leaders, this present researcher expected to hear at least some

level of resentment about the Egyptian military. Moreover, the Armed Forces have long

benefitted from extra state subsidies and proceeds that they were obtaining through the

military’s allegedly substantial economic investments. Yet, in early days of this study in

Cairo, it was surprising to notice the high level of respect and admiration that most of the

informants expressed about the Egyptian Army. This was partly a consequence of the

70

army’s vital and constructive role in ousting Mubarak, which, as my analysis revealed,

was taken for granted popularly as the “Egyptian Army’s loyalty” to its own people. Yet,

the Egyptian’s high level of admiration against the Egyptian Armed Forces’ was not a

new phenomenon. Over the years, in somewhat a controversial fashion, the military

managed to keep its organizational status respectable and remained untouched by the

ailments and defects of the regime. Mubarak ran his regime through the police and

particularly through the notorious main intelligence unit, Amn ad Dawla, the State

Security. Most average informants referred to the police brutality and the excesses of the

State Security, particularly the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups, as

one of the reasons for the public anger against the regime that paved the way to the 2011

Revolution. The reputation of the military to a great extent remained undamaged. Thus,

in comparison to the “cruel” police that most Egyptians disliked, the army remained a

widely respected institution.

Emergency law in Egypt, law number 162 of 1958 was imposed during the entire

rule of Mubarak with renewals every three years since 1981. The Emergency Law

granted the security apparatus the right to take anyone into custody without any

reasonable cause or evidence and imprison individuals without trial (Sharp 2011). The

emergency Law provided the police and the intelligence apparatus with a sort of a “carte

blanche” (Kassem 2004:40) to detain and arrest anyone at will. During Mubarak’s rule,

the military courts served as venues of suppression of political opponents. Kassem

(2004:42) reported that from 1992 to 2000 1,033 civilians were tried in military courts

and 92 of them received death sentences while 644 received varying years of sentences.

The Emergency Law was lifted by the SCAF in May 31, 2012 after the 2011 Revolution.

71

Thomas (1984) argued that as a response to growing unpopularity, authoritarian

regimes hinder "opposition's legal or constitutional access to power" (p.88) and these

counter precautions by the ruling regime "at a certain point…lead to a "constitutional"

restructuring of the state" (p.89). Arafat (2009) argued that “by blocking all legal and

peaceful avenues of change”, Mubarak’s manipulation exposed the Egyptian state to

either a revolution or a coup d’état. Against the threat of a mass uprising, authoritarian

rulers might occasionally choose democratic reforms, however limited, (Boix 2003;

Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006). Around the time of the

presidential elections in 2005, Mubarak initiated some nominal political reforms (Sharp

2011). According to Kassem (2004), Mubarak’s occasional ostensible political reforms

were not signs of his true dedication to democratization, but were mostly a part of a

survival strategy. They soothed the increasing domestic tension and with its “controlled

and contained” nature extended the life of the regime (Kassem 2004:3). Nonetheless,

these minimal changes toward liberalization served to incrementally influence opposition

against the regime in the long run. Over the years, particularly after 2004, opposition

groups began to be more vocal against Mubarak.

According to Thomas (1984), another strategy that authoritarian rulers employ

through intelligence and use of the media apparatus is to instill suspicion and distrust

within and between opposing groups. Arafat (2009) referred to some examples of this

type involvement of state security that occurred in the Labor Party in 2000, in the Al-

Ghad Party in 2005, and the Wafd Party in 2006 (p.140). As Kassem (2004) asserted, the

Mubarak regime employed methods of exclusion of the opposition movements through

the legal arrangements and the coercive capabilities of the state. The regime did not allow

72

political Islamists to take part in political competition as an organized group. They were

denied the legality to form a political party. The Muslim Brotherhood was a banned

organization during the Mubarak regime and it was only recently granted legal status

after the 2011 revolution.

b. The Intelligence Apparatus

The Egyptian intelligence community is composed of three distinct organizations.

The General Intelligence Service (Gihaz al-Mukhabarat al-Amma) was established in

1957 by Nasser and was responsible for providing intelligence domestically and

internationally in the context of Egypts national interest. The GIS was also termed the

Mukhabarat. The Mukhabarat represented a “symbol of state power and was widely

reputed to be the oldest, largest and most effective in the Arab world" (Sirrs 2010:13-14).

Sirrs indicated that principally, Coptic Egyptians –numbered between 6 to 10 percent of

general population– were not employed in the Mukhabarat. The Military Intelligence

Services and Reconnaissance, Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Harbyya wa al-Istitla was

another intelligence agency that worked under the Ministry of Defense. The third and the

most notorious organization was the State Security Investigations Service (Gihaz

Mabahith Amn ad-Dawla). The SSIS, often called the Amn Ad Dawla in daily use among

Egyptians was. “a formidable instrument of state repression” (Sirrs 2010:164). In an

attempt to evade any link from its notorious past, its name was changed to the Egyptian

Homeland Security organization after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Kandil 2012). State

Security has a nationwide presence and has directorates in provinces that report directly

to the Headquarter in Cairo. Its budget is not publicized. Besides, that, it employs a large

number of official cadres, it employs thousands of people unofficially and in some

73

accounts this number has exceeded a million (Kandil 2012). The primary focus of the

intelligence apparatus during the Mubarak regime was Islamist groups (Sirrs 2010).

Intelligence organizations are known to employ individuals as agents –recorded or

unrecorded–from outside their organizational body. The Mukhabarat is known to follow

this practice extensively employing paid thugs for different purposes (Sirrs 2010;

Brumberg & Sallam 2012; Kandil 2012).

They include doormen at hotels and apartment complexes and sweepers…taxi drivers. Additionally, the SSIS recruits informants from the legions of unemployed young men who lounge at cafes or on the streets near major hotels, tourist sites and foreign diplomatic facilities. Sometimes the informants are ordered to maintain an overt presence to deter and intimidate their targets (Sirrs 2010:164).

Use of these informants and agents off the record provided the State Security with

a sort of ‘juridical immunity’. There had been a widespread belief among Egyptians that

many of those unrecorded paid thugs were used by the regime during the 18 days of the

2011 Tahrir protests. After the first few days of the protests in late January 2011 the

police lost control over the demonstrations and withdrew from the streets. When the

police virtually disappeared from the streets, groups of looters raided stores and some

governmental offices particularly in the relatively wealthy quarters of Cairo. Many

people believed that this was a deliberate strategy of the State Security to instill anxiety

and fear among the general population and to discourage them from supporting the

protestors. From the first days, the state attempted to marginalize the protestors by

propagating through its media organs the idea that the protestors were criminal thugs and

irresponsible youngsters who were harming the public order. Many believed that the

State Security and the police encouraged the thugs deliberately to raid stores and steal

everything they could get hold of. Supposedly, the regime expected that Egyptians would

74

blame the protestors for the insecurity and instability that occurred after the police

withdrew from the streets.

The Emergency Law and Anti-terrorism Law of 1992 enabled the security

apparatus to override the legal framework that regulated the work of intelligence services

(Sullivan & Jones 2008). Thus, during the Mubarak regime the State Security worked

with unrestricted authority. A slight suspicion was adequate for the State Security to

arrest someone. The detainees were exposed to long terms of interrogation and torture

before they were brought into court and the period before the court appearance went

unrecorded (Sullivan & Jones 2008; Sirrs 2010). The organization was also good at

electronic and cyber surveillance. Tapping lines without court orders and raiding private

properties of citizens without a search warrant were common practices.

The notoriety of the State Security has left a deep injury in the minds and hearts

of the Egyptians, particularly among the Islamists. Several times in my interviews with

Dr. Ahmad (MB) he asked me to pause the recording when he talked about “sensitive”

issues. He believed that the Amn Ad Dawla (State Security) was active and as

“dangerous” as ever. His uneasiness was apparent at these moments. He expressed his

concern: “they knew every heart beating in the country”. When he referred to

“differential treatment” of the Islamists by the Mubarak regime Dr. Ahmad (MB)

asserted that the regime tortured thousands of people and a lot of them were disappeared.

In his account, some people were left to die with untreated injuries in detention centers. It

is also noteworthy that in our audio recorded interview with Dr. Ahmad (MB) (about

three and half hours long) –although we were not specifically talking about the State

Security or the issue of torture– he used the word “torture” nine times. His use of the

75

word “torture” in an example in an unrelated context is interesting:

…Also the issue of heritage (the expected transfer of rule from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal Mubarak) was annoying. It caused fear among people. He was not qualified for anything. Besides, Mubarak was an experienced dictator, but his son would be an “inexperienced” dictator. Someone can torture you but you can go home safe after a month. A young boy in the police force; when he tortured, you maybe he will cut a finger. Mubarak or his son Gamal; were bad and the worst. Gamal and his brother Ala, had some popularity at the end of the 2009 Egypt – Algeria match. It was a trial for popularity. But people forgot. Mubarak’s popularity was almost nothing. He was retiring in September 2011. We were captured under the regime and Mubarak family. We were not even citizens. We would face either with Gamal or Omar Suleiman. Sirrs (2010) suggested that an analysis of human rights reports about torture cases

by the State Security revealed a systematic pattern in the application of their cruel

methods of interrogation and punishment that caused terror throughout the Egyptian

society (Human Rights Watch 2004, 2007). Torture was also common in police stations.

According to a report by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) (cited in

Sullivan & Jones 2008) in 2007, there were 567 cases of torture and 167 death cases that

were suspected as being the results of police torture in police stations. According to a

2009 Amnesty International Report, as of 2009 about 10000 people were kept under

detention in various detention facilities without any charge or trial in Egypt, some of

them, for years (AI Report 2009).

Robert Bowker (2010) who was Australia’s former Ambassador to Egypt and

spent many years in different states in the Middle East, stated that for a comprehensive

analysis of the ‘state’ in Egypt –and in the Middle East in general– it is necessary to take

the informal structures, namely the ‘shadow state’ into consideration:

An important distinction needs to be made between the public apparatus of Arab states –ministries, armed forces, political parties and so on– and the less visible ‘shadow state’ which is subject to different dynamics…It is within the shadow state, an array of informal networks providing access to the state largely beyond

76

public view, that the concerns of key stakeholders are more likely to be managed, through mixtures of accommodation, interest sharing and when necessary, coercion. (Bowker 2010:65)

In interviews with different interlocutors, Egyptians referred to the ‘shadow state’

or ‘deep state’. Interestingly, in almost all cases in which the interlocutors talked about

the deep state they referred to the Ergenekon Criminal Case in Turkey6. The Ergenekon

Case began in June 2007 and legal hearings were ongoing as of 2013. The indictment

that was accepted by the court refers to the Ergenekon Organization as a ‘terrorist

organization’ that is claimed to be the upper organization of the Turkish ‘deep state’,

similar to Gladio in Italy. In fact, given the nature of interactions of Egyptians with the

state during Mubarak regime, one can appropriately claim that in given the terms of the

state’s policies and actions of its agents the line between the legal and illegal was hardly

discernible. Pervasive corruption, police brutality, and rigged elections, and worse than

those, the impudence that representatives of state adopted hardly required the “dirty

business” to be outsourced to a clandestine deep state. For instance, based on the

accounts of some interlocutors, in case of a sudden disappearance of a relative or a friend,

if one can blame the intelligence apparatus of the state without much hesitation then there

is no reason to look for an invisible wrongdoer to name it a deep or shadow state. If the

deep state is an organization that acts beyond the legal framework of the state, for many

Egyptians the state during Mubarak regime was hardly bounded by any legal framework

anyway.

6 Ergenekon is an alleged clandestine ultranationalist group that aims to govern the Turkish state and society through extra legal processes. It is said to consist of elements of the military and police, terrorist or paramilitary groups, nongovernmental organizations, organized crime, journalists, politicians, judges, and government officials.

77

c. National Democratic Party

As Swartz et al. (1966) suggested, using force as the main tool for controlling a

society is costly and unsustainable. For authoritarian regimes, the political party and

elections can serve as alternative institutions to provide support and cooperation, however

limited, from the public. Gandi and Lust-Okar (2009) argued that elections serve as a

convenient mechanism to distribute the spoils and make policy concessions. In a similar

vein, Friedrich and Brzezinski argued "It is the role of the party to provide a following for

the dictator" (1961:29).

Kassem (1999) argued that in Egypt’s ‘multi-party’ electoral system (from Sadat

to Mubarak, however nominal or restricted) election campaigns were predominantly

personally oriented. In other words, every electoral candidate sought the support of the

constituency through personal assurances in terms of communal services or private

benevolence. One repercussion of this method of voter recruitment, Kassem concluded,

was that it prevented the emergence of a party in any real democratic sense in which

party officials were supposed to gain the support of a constituency at the grass-root level

through party programs and projects. Arafat (2009) asserted that the NDP was “truly the

president’s party” (p.41) and that made his reelection possible over the years and would

facilitate Gamal Mubarak’s take over of the presidency. The NDP lacked a concrete

ideology, program or symbols that might otherwise have endeared it to the public. Arafat

argued that the nature of the relationship between the Mubarak regime and the NDP were

of prime importance in promoting their mutual interests, rather than that of the society.

The NDP was an instrument for gaining the support of the constituency in exchange for

providing communal and private services.

78

Based on his ethnographic research7 on an Egyptian parliamentary campaign

Shehata (2008) concluded that for most Egyptians, the electoral program, ideology, or

party affiliation does not play a significant role in determining how an electorate will vote

in the elections. She argued that many Egyptians vote on the basis of their anticipation of

services to the residents of an electoral district. Besides public services, such as better

roads, sewage systems, an improved local clinic or school, an electorate expects to obtain

individual services, such as finding employment and securing housing, as a return for his

vote. In the socioeconomic context during the Mubarak regime, having influential

political connections meant everything. As one key informant suggested, “the system

during Mubarak did not value your qualifications, it was not about who you were, it was

about who you knew in the government.”

Shehata (2008) also observed that there was inverse relationship between the level

of education and income and the participation in elections and vote. She suggested that

the wealthy and better-educated Egyptians, who can roughly be categorized as middle

and upper-middle class Egyptians, are less willing to go the polls. Because, he suggested,

unlike the poorer Egyptians, the wealthy and better-educated people are less likely to

demand a parliamentarian to provide better services for their district or provide mediation

in the bureaucracy for himself or herself. According to Shehata, this general voter

tendency reflected the disbelief in the Egyptian political system that a parliamentarian is

able to make significant policy decisions on behalf of the general population.

The candidates of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (at times when they were

allowed to run in elections) followed generally a different path by working through grass-

7 Shehata conducted his research in 2005 during the Mubarak regime. Thus, his remarks may not reflect the voting behavior that took place in the post-Mubarak period.

79

root forms of support. Although the Islamists candidates as well lacked a thorough party

program and a detailed project goal, they exhibited one major difference in that they

communicated through what could be called an ideology, namely an ideal of an Islamic

order (Kassem 1999). In the final analysis, Kassem suggested that the multi-party system

could not develop sufficiently to challenge the existing power structure with the Mubarak

at its top.

Mubarak skillfully tried to balance his regime’s unpopularity internally with

Egypt’s international posture by presenting himself as an indispensible ally, particularly

after September 11, and in the context of containing the “threat of political Islam” and the

“war against terrorism”. In this vein, Kassem (2004) argued that the United States’

controversial attitude towards authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, while promoting

democracy rhetorically on one hand, and supporting the autocrats on the other hand

contributed to the resilience of Mubarak regime.

d. The Egyptian Military

The Egyptian Army’s manpower included roughly 310.000 conscripts and

375.000 reservists and its annual budget was $4.56 billion in 2010 (Sharp 2011). Military

service is mandatory for every Egyptian male except for some exceptions such as medical

or familial exemptions and in cases when the male is the only sibling in the family able to

look after his parents (Geddes 1999).

Although the three presidents of the Egyptian Republic, until President Morsi in

2012, were from the military, the Armed Forces’ role in Egyptian politics was indirect

and limited (Brumberg & Sallam 2012). After the defeat of the Egyptian Armed Forces

against Israel in 1967, Nasser dismissed some high-ranking officers and took some

80

initiatives to reconstruct the army. When Sadat became president he discharged some

influential military generals who were close to Nasser and after Sadat, the army’s

influence in Egyptian politics declined significantly (Cook 2007). There was a decreasing

proportional representation of legislators who had military background from Nasser to

Mubarak period (Kassem 2004). Empowered by the 1971 Constitution, Mubarak

followed Sadat in that the presidency became the real power center in Egyptian politics.

Nevertheless, like his predecessors, as sort of a payoff against the military’s low

profile in politics, besides the huge economic investments that they benefited from,

Mubarak continued to provide the military with certain incentives. After retirement,

many military officers were employed in some of these economic enterprises with high

salaries (Kassem 2004). Mubarak also appointed retired army generals and police chiefs

as governors of provinces.

El-Borai et al. (2001) explained that the establishment of the Civil Service

Authority (CSA) after the implementation of law number 32 of 1979 expanded the reach

of the military into the domain of the civil service. Under the provision of this law the

military assumed a new role in implementing large projects in the areas of infrastructure

and development, which were formerly performed by civilians only. The Egyptian

military controlled a large and diversified economic enterprise that included highly

lucrative and state subsidized areas with high revenue returns (Brumberg & Sallam

2012). The military’s economic investments encompassed investments in tourism,

construction, security sector, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, food, and transportation

(Cook 2007). Cook suggested that this diverse portfolio “ rendered the military perhaps

Egypt’s single most important economic entity” (2007:19). Moreover, the military

81

benefitted from significant tax exemptions and occasional privileged deals such as buying

or renting large lands owned by the state under their real market values (Brumberg &

Sallam 2012). More importantly, Brumberg and Sallam argued, there has not been

enough transparency regarding the military budget and how the economic revenues are

used. Because of this lack of transparency, the exact size of the military’s economic

investment is not publicly known. Despite the official sources’ claim that holds the

military’s share in the economy to be less than 10 percent of the gross domestic product

of Egypt, some experts offer varying estimates from 5 to 40 percent (Brumberg & Sallam

2012).

The military has been reluctant to accede to the economic reforms which were

initially suggested by Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif in 2004 and included significant

privatization plans that would affect the major investments of the military (Cook 2007).

Since the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptian Armed Forces receive $1.3 billion

in military aid and $450 million in economic support from the US Government annually

(Cook 2007). According to Cook, the official nationalist narrative of the Egyptian army

provided considerable legitimacy for the Armed Forces:

In 1952, the military toppled an alien and corrupt dynasty. Four years later the armed forces heroically defended Egypt’s independence when it repelled the Israeli, British, and French invasion of 1956. The loss of Sinai in 1967 was the result of Israeli aggression and came at a time when one-third of the armed forces was fulfilling its Pan-Arab duty in Yemen. The heroism of the officers and soldiers of Egypt’s military made the Crossing of the Suez Canal possible in October 1973 successfully restoring Egypt’s collective national honor and ultimately its land. The Egyptian military is the guarantor of domestic stability and a source of regional stability (Cook 2007:28).

82

5. State and Society Relations

Fahmy (2002) identified three characteristics as significant regarding the nature of

the Egyptian state and society under the Mubarak rule: First, the Egyptian state had

similar features to a bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) state, as described by O’Donnell

(1979), due to the fact that “it is based on an alliance between the state, the military, and

selected segments of bourgeoisie who have established direct links with foreign business

interests”. (Fahmy 2002:242). In O’Donnell’s description, a BA state lacks legitimacy.

Thus, coercion and repression become the state’s indispensible tools for achieving

compliance over the masses. A BA state’s exclusionary practices in both the political and

economic domains fosters a society that is “depoliticized and apathetic” (Fahmy 2002:27)

in which individuals are forced into a constant preoccupation with their quotidian

struggle of subsistence. On many occasions, various informants stated during the

interviews and informal conversations, that Egyptians, particularly the youth were known

to be ‘apolitical’ prior to the 2011 Tahrir Revolution. Nevertheless, in the last decade of

the Mubarak regime, Egyptian youth became increasingly more politicized. Youth

movements and online platforms provided alternative venues for engaging in oppositional

movements. In the post-revolutionary period, many of the informants explained that

Egyptians had become increasingly more interested in politics everywhere, in cities as

well as in villages, and almost across every age.

According to O’Donnell (1979), the BA state is constituted by an unreliable

alliance among parties (state, military, and the bourgeoisie) with differing interests and

orientations that come together on the basis of a fragile and provisional deal. For

instance, the state depends heavily on the coercive power of the military, but can hardly

83

guarantee its unconditional support. Besides, as in the case of Egypt, the selected

segments of the bourgeoisie might have incompatible economic prospects. While the

bourgeoisie prioritize a transnational orientation and benefits from the states’

privatization policies, the military establishment does not want to lose its privileged

status in the economy (Fahmy 2002). Thus, O’Donnell (1979) concluded, the BA state is

troubled by an inherent tension that is exacerbated due to its lack of popular legitimacy.

Moreover, the BA state does not allow venues of mediation between the state and the

society.

In view of all these characteristics, O’Donnell suggested, the BA state is a weak

state, “which fears the silence of the excluded masses, who may be suddenly activated to

revolt…to destroy bureaucratic authoritarian state” (Fahmy 2002:28). O’Donnell also

argued that, in search for a source of legitimacy, the BA state adopts a form of democracy

with well-defined and controlled limits and schemes that would not endanger the

regime’s domination over the masses. In a nutshell, the Egyptian state under Mubarak

rule resembled O’Donnell’s BA state in many ways, and thus, as Fahmy argued as a

second characteristic, Egypt was a weak state that had a fragile and untenable connection

with its citizens.

Based on his own study of Arab states Ayubi (1995) argued that the "the Arab

state is...often violent because it is weak" (p.450). As Arabs states in general have not

enjoyed popular public support, they don't rule by popular consent through the will of the

people for the people. Because of this inherited weakness, Arab states in general, rule by

force against the will of the people. Ayubi concurs with Khalil (1984:169) who

emphasized the difference between “quwwat al-dawla and dawlat al-quwwa” that is;

84

‘force (strength) of the state’ and ‘state of force’. Since the incumbents of power in Arab

states usually lack the means or basis for providing legitimacy, which might be

considered as consensual power in Swartz et al.’ terms (1966), they rule by using

coercive power. Egypt under Mubarak’s rule seems to be consistent with Ayubi’s

description of Arab states.

Beginning with Sadat, the representation of the armed forces in the cabinet and

high-level administrative and political posts decreased. Mubarak followed the same

policy of Sadat in a consistent fashion to contain the armed forces influence in politics

(Fahmy 2002). The Egyptian military maintained a certain level of professionalism and

stayed submissive to the president. For example, without any visible opposition from

within the army, Mubarak was able to make unexpected appointments that affected the

regular chain of hierarchy in the armed forces. Removal of Field-Marshal Abu Ghazala

by Mubarak in 1989, at a time when he was very influential and popular, did not cause

any trouble within the armed forces. The military’s apparently apolitical stance was also

related to its vast economic activities that provided it with a significant source of extra

income. In the same fashion, the prominence of businessmen in the political arena and

thus in business deals was dependent on the discretion of Mubarak. All in all, Fahmy

concluded that the Egyptian state under Mubarak operated in relatively autonomous way

in respect to the military and the privileged segment of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Fahmy

argued that the Egyptian state under Mubarak’s rule was relatively autonomous.

The 1971 Constitution that was in effect during the entire rule of Mubarak granted

the president immense powers. Mubarak frequently used his authority to issue

presidential decrees granted to his office by the constitution. The legislative body was

85

subordinate to the executive branch, which was under strict control of Mubarak. Mubarak

was the head of the NDP that dominated the parliament and appointed its own member as

the Speaker of the Parliament (Fahmy 2002). In the same vein, through different laws, the

regime employed a process that involved the centralization of power under the office of

appointed governors and the influence of elected local councils was severely undermined.

Fahmy (2002) argued that state’s repression of opposition movements, including

civil society and the political parties through its security apparatus and legal and

administrative measures prevented these intermediary institutions and processes between

the state and society from bringing about a significant change in the regime. The labor

unions and professional syndicates had limited influence against the regime. The regime

managed to co-opt their leadership in most cases. They were usually plagued by internal

corruption. Given all these conditions, Fahmy concluded that the state shaped the society

in Egypt under the Mubarak rule. The state provided certain channels of opposition and

political freedom. However, these channels of political opposition were limited, often

interrupted and manipulated by the regime through arbitrary legal regulations, judicial

interference (particularly through military courts), by intimidation; and this might have

served to on of the increasing societal tension. There were elections held regularly for

both the parliament and the presidential office. However, as is widely known and

expressed by many informants the elections were rigged. The regime used every possible

method to guarantee its own success in the election results. Yet, the availability of

political channels (although they were virtually defunct) kept most political forces on

track with the hope that reforming the system through existing institutionalized channels

was possible. But, in fact, the regime was not ready for any reform and did not allow any

86

political force to reach a point that would directly challenge Mubarak. Thus, for instance,

the state did not allow the Muslim Brotherhood to be recognized as a formal political

party. As the largest and most organized oppositional movement of Mubarak period, the

Muslim Brotherhood kept its commitment to making a change largely through existing

political institutions. Thus, one interlocutor, Dr. Nadia Moustafa (NA), a political

scientist at Cairo University, suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood was not a

revolutionary movement. In her assessment the organization of Muslim Brotherhood

could be depicted (in relation to organization’s involvement in Tahrir Revolution), at

best, as a “reformist” group. The Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success, however

limited and unguaranteed, allowed the organization and its large base of supporters keep

their belief in the system8.

Having followed his predecessors Nasser and Sadat, another strategy that

Mubarak depended on was state subsidies for basic food and energy, namely natural gas

for domestic consumption and subsidies on gas. The state subsidies were a sort of a bribe

from the regime to its citizens, but they enabled a minimum livelihood for millions of

Egyptians. Besides, there was certainly a small group of the population who benefited

from the regime’s institutionalized distribution of privileges directly or indirectly through

the patronage system (Fahmy 2002). Because of their political and/or economic status,

they were either immune to the state’s coercive power, or they were part of the coercive

apparatus. Various informants’ different appraisal of Mubarak regime and the 2011

8 In the 2005 parliamentary elections, through independent candidates the Muslim Brotherhood gained 88 seats. Nevertheless, the organization could only secure one seat in the 2010 elections. For many Egyptians, this result alone showed the dimensions of the electoral fraud and the 2010 parliamentary elections were consequently the ‘worst’ elections in Egyptian history.

87

Revolution supports this proposition. For informants, informants who were part of the

state apparatus through their bureaucratic or political positions and some relatively

wealthy liberal Egyptians did not express much discontent regarding the past regime. On

the contrary, most of them seemed disturbed by the uncertainty that dominated the

political and social domains in the transition period.

Conclusion

In sum, Mubarak regime’s main pillar of governing was its coercive power. In

addition to that, the regime made use of democratic venues, however limited and

restricted, as a mechanism of relief for increasing societal and political tension and as a

means of providing legitimacy at the international level for its ostensibly “democratic

rule”. Moreover, the state subsidies enabled the regime, for a relatively long time, to

control a possible societal uprising.

88

Chapter 5: PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION

This chapter will review some of the significant developments and key events

–roughly in the last decade of Mubarak– which led to the socio political setting that

precipitated the January 25 Uprisings. The analysis of the data (mainly interviews)

revealed several developments and some key events some of which served as turning

points enabled Egyptians to challenge the Mubarak regime in January – February 2011.

1. Kefaya Movement

Almost unequivocally, most informants, regardless of their political orientation,

described the Kefaya Movement as an important step en route to Tahrir. The Kefaya

Movement was founded in an informal gathering in the house of Ebu Al Maadi, the

leader of the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, in 2004. It was the month of Ramadan and

after the iftar, the dinner that Muslims break their fast in Ramadan, a group of Egyptian

intellectuals from various political leanings, who were gravely concerned with the

conditions in the Middle East region (the ongoing second Palestinian Intifada and the

Occupation of Iraq) and in Egypt, decided to form a new political initiative (Shorbagy

2007). The central agenda of the movement was aimed to create public awareness against

the possible succession scenario of Gamal Mubarak to replace his father Hosni Mubarak

as the future president of Egypt. Kefaya’s message was effectively expressed in one

word, Kefaya, which means 'enough' in colloquial Arabic, was well received among

Egyptians (Shahin 2005).

George Ishak, (C) a Coptic Christian and a senior activist, was among the

founders of the Kefaye Movement. In our interview he explained his impressions about

the initial meeting and demonstration.

89

For the first time we had rights to criticize the president. The slogan was very interesting; kefaye, (enough). It was a very common word. Before Kefaye, no body could talk anything about the President. The instruction for the newspaper was that “you can talk about everything except Mubarak, his wife, and his sons”. The people could protest, to be pro-Palestinian, pro-Iraq and the government let the people express themselves, but were not allowed to criticize the government or the regime… In the first demonstration, we chose six people to declare our demands. The six persons were; one communist Ahmad Bahaa, one from the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the Nasserists and one from Kavmiyye Arabiyya, a liberal, and myself. The demands of the declaration were the same demands of the 25th of January. The same; cancel the emergency law, new constitution.. It was silent demonstration. No shouting.. People were surprised: “How dare you?” Hayman, one of the founders said; “If 100 people come to our first demonstration, we can consider ourselves successful.” I was a little bit frightened. There were thousands of police officers. When we got there we found around 1000 people. All the young generation who took a central role in the January 25 Revolution were from the cadre of Kefaya. Amr Farouk (WP), the spokesperson of the Wasat Party, emphasized the

important contribution of the Kefaya Movement to Egyptian politics:

It was Ramadan and I had the honor to be in this first meeting. The first name was Egyptian Movement for Change and the word Kefaya came after that. The spokesman was Christian activist George Ishak. Hamdeen Sabahi9 some other important political figures were there. By this first step, we started to make a hole in this big wall of fear. There was a very big wall of fear between the people and the regime. The Kefaya movement broke a taboo in politics.

Shehata (2011) argued that Kefaya represented a novelty in the opposition

movements in that they realized the futility of demanding the regime to realize reforms

within the system. The existing channels of opposition politics through elections, party

politics, activities of non-governmental organization proved to be ineffective within

Mubarak’s authoritarian system. The established opposition parties typically suffered

from restrictive governmental scrutiny, lack of funds, and internal fragmentation; yet,

9 Hamdeen Sabahi is a Nasserist politician and was a presidential candidate in 2012 Presidential Elections.

90

more importantly, they had long stricken with a public distrust and they were lacking

broad-based grass root reach (Shorbagy 2007; Ottaway & Hamzawy 2011). The Muslim

Brotherhood, which was an illegal organization, represented an important political force

with broad grass root support, but was not in a position to unite the nation against the

regime. As Shorbagy (2007) argued, its religious ideology and its secrecy –with a

hierarchal and strict organizational structure that had been closed to non-members–

nourished the reservations and concerns of many Egyptians about the Muslim

Brotherhood. During the Mubarak period, the Islamist versus secularist divide prevented

oppositional political forces from both camps to build a lasting consensus against the

regime (Shorbagy 2007). The occasional ad hoc based coalitions did not survive long.

The Kefaya Movement offered a new hope for Egyptian politics. Its cross-ideological

body of members was an important contribution for the opposition politics that had long

been fragmented.

The Kefaya Movement did not seek official permission from the regime required

for demonstrations or press releases. The Kefaya Movement believed in the power of

protests and demonstrations in public spaces. Through small protests, in which Mubarak,

his family explicitly, and the security apparatus challenged and denounced, the Kefaya

Movement broke an impeding taboo for opposition politics (Shaaban 2006; Shehata

2011). The peaceful protests that Kefaya Movement organized attracted wide attention

both on a national and international level (Shehata 2011). In a short while, Kefaya could

manage to organize itself in 24 of 26 of Egyptian provinces and held many protests with

the participation of thousands of protesters.

The Kefaya Movement’s three significant contributions to Egyptian oppositional

91

politics can be conceptualized as follows: Firstly, the Kefaya broke the taboo of targeting

Mubarak and his family and helped people gradually overcome the fear barrier against

the regime. Secondly, Kefaya modeled a new framework of oppositional movement with

its cross ideological and loose organizational structure. The Kefaya managed to bring

people of diverse ideological leaning together and by its loose organizational structure; it

was not restricted to any institutional framework that was subject to strict governmental

scrutiny. The founding members of the Kefaya Movement did not appoint a single leader

and adopted a consensus based decision-making process. The movement organized

protests and demonstrations and in a sense laid the seeds of future broader grass root

protest movements that would harbor Egyptians across cross ideological lines (Shorbagy

2007).

Thirdly, Kefaya achieved the ability to reach out to the young generation of

Egyptians and it gave birth to new movements such as Youth for Change. Thr Kefaya

successfully engaged many young Egyptian in politics through demonstrations (Sharib

2005). As a part of the Kefaya, Youth for Change participated in protests in 2005 and

they also organized independent activities with specific youth related demands.

Nevertheless, in 2006 political activism began dwindling due to government repression

and a general political crackdown on opposition movements and parties after the 2005

elections (Shehata 2011). Consequently, Shehata argued, youth activists turned their

attention to online platforms, namely blogging, as the new venues of opposition politics.

Blogging provided a freer environment for expressing ideas and resentments. Youth

blogs used a bold language against the Mubarak and his family and other public figures

who were closely associated with the regime. The use of pictures, cartoons, and videos

92

strengthened their message. Through personal blogs human rights violations, abuses of

security forces were disseminated to larger audience. Youth blogs contributed to an

increasing awareness against the atrocities of the state. Besides, the opposition

movements and parties benefitted from blogs in announcing their activities and events.

After the 2005 presidential elections in which Mubarak took 88.6 percent of the

votes, the Kefaya Movement began to lose its momentum (Shorbagy 2007). Nevertheless,

by challenging the regime in a very bold and explicit manner, which was unprecedented

at the time, the Kefaya Movement marked a new threshold in the recent history of

Egyptian politics.

2. Succession Question

Succession from father to son in the modern Arab Middle East is an old

phenomenon (Sobelman 2001). In Syria for example, Bashar Al-Asad assumed the

presidency after his father Hafiz Al-Asad's death in 2000 and in a similar fashion Qaddafi

was preparing his son Sayf al-Islam to succeed himself (Sobelman 2001). As Arafat

(2009) stated, before the popular Arab uprisings started in 2011, beside Egypt there were

expectations of hereditary successions of rule in Yemen and Libya as well.

It was around 1999 that rumors emerged about Gamal Mubarak's aspiration to

succeed his father (Arafat 2009). There was a widespread belief among Egyptians that

Mubarak was preparing to his place his son Gamal in the presidency. Many of

interlocutors expressed their deep resentment against the possibility that they considered

Gamal’s presidency inescapable unless something extraordinary would divert the course.

However, the regime systematically denied that possibility (Brownlee 2002; Arafat

2009). Mubarak even reprimanded a journalist once: "We are not a monarchy. We are the

93

Republic of Egypt, so refrain from comparing us to other countries in this region" (Arafat

2009:185). Some opposition leaders argued that the leading National Democratic Party’s

new section Policies Secretariat was established to bring Gamal Mubarak into politics

(El-din 2006; Zahid 2010).

The systemic denial did not persuade many Egyptians who believed that the

regime was preparing Gamal Mubarak for the presidency (Zahid 2010). Apparently,

Mubarak had believed that it had to be a smooth transition without causing any crisis

domestically and internationally. After all, for the incumbent ruler in an authoritarian

regime, providing conditions of a controlled succession is of vital importance, whether to

a family member or to someone else from outside family. Mubarak probably knew that if

a democratic government came to power, himself, his family, and his entire close coterie

would be held accountable for the violations that they committed. Obviously, this last

point is questionable on the grounds that we do not know for sure whether Mubarak ever

thought of his regime as "non-democratic" to be replaced with a democratic one, let alone

if he ever believed that he violated any legal framework.

In his On the state of Egypt Alaa Al-Aswany10 (2011) argued that Mubarak was

most likely captive of a psychosocial state what called a "dictator's solitude”:

History teaches us that all autocratic rulers consider themselves great heroes and live in such a state of perpetual self-delusion that they are able to justify all their misconduct and even the crimes they perpetrate. This constant dissociation between the autocratic ruler and what happens in reality is a phenomenon that has

10 Alaa Al-Aswany is a liberal Egyptian intellectual and a prominent author who was among the founders of the Kefaya (Enough) Movement. He is a dentist by training. His novel the Yacoubian Building (2002), in which he boldly described the frustration of Egyptians under Mubarak regime in the microcosm of a historical apartment building that represents the modern day Egypt, was the best selling Arabic novel in 2002 and 2003 (El Halim 2011).

94

been carefully described in international literature and is known as ‘dictator’s solitude.’ The dictator lives in complete isolation from the lives of his compatriots and does not know what is really happening in his country. After he has been in power for years, a group of friends and rich relatives formed around him and their extravagant lifestyle keeps them apart from the way of life of ordinary people, and so the dictator loses any awareness of the poor and has absolutely no contact with real life (Al-Aswany 2011:55-56).

Even a superficial review of Mubarak’s last speeches suggest the relevance of Al-

Aswany’s (2011) proposition of a "dictator's solitude”. Below there are a few excerpts

from his nation-wide speeches during the 18 days of protests in 2011. From a speech on

February 01, 2011:

…I have never, ever been seeking power and the people know the difficult circumstances that I shouldered my responsibility...Hosni Mubarak who speaks to you today is proud of the long years he spent in the service of Egypt and its people. This dear nation is my country, it is the country of all Egyptians, here I have lived and fought for its sake and I defended its land, its sovereignty and interests and on this land I will die and history will judge me an d others for our merits and faults. (Guardian 2011)

From another speech on February 10, 2011;

I am addressing the youth of Egypt today in Tahrir Square and across the country. I am addressing you all from the heart, a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters…I am telling you that as a president I find no shame in listening to my country's youth and interacting with them… (BBC 2011) Mubarak presented himself as ‘the guardian and “father” of Egyptian people who

did everything for the sake of his “sons and daughters”. It is not possible to know exactly

whether he had really believed this or they were mere strategic acts of speech to persuade

the protesting Egyptians. In the same article about a "dictator's solitude” that Al-Aswany

(2011) wrote in 2010, several months before the revolution started, he reminds us about

Queen Marie Antoinette of France. On the brink of the 1789 French Revolution, having

been surprised by the anger of the mobs, the Queen asks someone in the palace the reason

for the people’s rage. “When one of her aides told her they were angry because they

95

could not find bread, the queen is said to have replied in surprise: “Let them eat cake”

(Al-Aswany 2011:56). Mubarak seemed to have lived a similar delusion, disconnected

from the realties of the lives of ordinary Egyptians. In his last speeches Mubarak

expressed how surprised he was about the protests and how he deeply resented being

judged unfairly by his people after all his “sacrifices and commitment” for his land.

In 2002, Gamal Mubarak had become the secretary general of the Policy

Secretariat under the NDP umbrella and his group, what Arafat (2009) called the 'Big

Eight' became the new elite in the party and they soon began to dominate the party. In

Arafat's assessment, their ostensible commitment to liberalism and democracy were

questionable. Gamal Mubarak said in a lecture "it is not possible to follow the wishes of

the man on the street on everything and make them a reason for effecting foundational

change" (Arafat 2009:189). From the similar comments that his group made one can

conclude that in their opinion, ‘Egyptians were not yet ready’ for a full fledged

democracy. However, the regime seemed to follow a detailed plan to prepare Gamal as a

‘reformist, liberal, and competent’ leader for Egypt. To this end, Arafat argued, the

regime's strategy was based on three distinct pillars. Using the abundant state funds and

state media, an aggressive image making campaign that targeted both the domestic as

well as international audience had already began as early as 2002. Gamal Mubarak began

to appear frequently in the media and was acclaimed by "the man of the people" (Arafat

2009:191). In this aggressive image making campaign, the regime had not left out any

group –businessmen, religious establishments, the Copts, average Egyptians, young

students– as potential audiences to be influenced (Brownlee 2002). On the international

96

level, for the same reason, although he was not a government official, Gamal Mubarak

attended at high-level meetings in the US in 2003 (Zahid 2010).

The second pillar of Gamal's preparation was providing him with political

experience. His role as the secretary general of the Policy Secretariat in the NDP served

this end. As a third pillar of Gamal's preparation, Arafat (2009) explained that a gang, a

shilla, a word with meaning of gang or group in Egyptian dialect of Arabic, was set up

for Gamal that was organized under the Policy Secretariat as an ostensible group of

liberal reformists. Beside, with the influence of Gamal Mubarak, the Shura Council

replaced ten senior journalists with new editors in various positions in the state-run

media. Furthermore, the regime forged some legal regulations to facilitate Gamal's future

candidacy. According to the amendment in article 76 of the Egyptian constitution, in

order to be nominated for the presidential elections, one was required to be in the central

committee of his party's for at least one year. On the pretext of the NDP's relative failure

in the 2005 parliamentary elections, in which the opposition parties gained a significant

number of seats, many senior members of the NDP lost their positions in the party's

power structure. Consequently, Gamal Mubarak's group became the dominant power

center in the NDP. With the amendment of article 76, there was only one person from the

old guard who could run against Gamal Mubarak (Arafat 2009).

In my interviews with intellectuals from various political leanings, many people

raised the issue of inheritance as one of the significant elements that made Egyptians

mobilize against the regime. The Kefaye movement was established on these grounds to

create a public awareness against the Mubarak’s plan to implement his son Gamal to

presidency. Interestingly, along the line of official denial about the succession issue Dr.

97

Dr. Said (FR) argued that Mubarak did not have an intention of handing the presidency

over to his son Gamal:

Everybody was talking about –the main opposition figures, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the liberals, nationalists– reforming the system, clean elections and somehow there was the issue of inheritance, which I think was not solid. It was not true, however “perception is the reality” they say in politics. They wanted to prevent that.

Dr. Said (FR) was the chairman of the Board of Al Ahram Foundation, the state’s

main media organ, and he was also the director of the Ahram Center for Political and

Strategic Studies at the time of the Tahrir Revolution. Dr. Said (FR) was close to the

Mubarak family and to the inner circles of the regime. Referring to his personal

conversations with the General Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s Head of General Intelligence,

Fathi Sorour, the Speaker of the Parliament (before the revolution), and Husam Badrawy,

the last Secretary General of the NDP, Dr. Aly stated that Mubarak did not have any

intention to leave his place to his son Gamal. Nevertheless, whether real or perceived

there was a strong public sentiment against a possible succession scenario that Gamal

Mubarak was main actor.

Arafat (2009) and Zahid (2010) argued that the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB)

reaction against the succession question was ambiguous. Two distinct groups in the MB

had diverging opinions on different grounds. Mahdi Akef, who was the supreme guide of

the MB from 2004 to 2010, explicitly opposed to the idea of supporting Gamal (Arafat

2009). He asserted that the organization would lose its credibility in the eyes of Egyptians

by supporting the Mubaraks. A second group promoted the idea that the organization

could negotiate a deal with the regime for constitutional and political reforms as an

exchange for their support to Gamal’s possible presidency.

98

Arafat (2009) estimated that a group of liberals, some people from the media,

particularly the new editors that were appointed with Gamal’s influence, an important

group of business elite was likely to support Gamal. These bureaucratic and capitalist

elites were the main beneficiaries of the Mubarak regime and they wanted their

privileged status to continue. Nevertheless, Arafat asserted that their ostensive support to

Gamal was conditional and circumstantial due to his father’s position of power.

Arafat (2009) argued that Egyptians completely opposed the possibility of

Gamal’s succession and this was being expressed forcefully by important public figures,

Hassanein Heikal and Assam Alislambouli in the media. Beside the Kefaya movement,

the Nasserist Party was the most vocal group that consistently stated its opposition to

Gamal. Yet, interestingly, during interviews with average Egyptians (people who were

not from academia or those who were not politically active) the issue of succession was

rarely mentioned.

Before the revolution the true opinion of the security apparatus and their reaction

to Gamal Mubarak’s intention of replacing his father was unknown. Nasser, Sadat, and

Mubarak had military origins. At the time of the revolution Field Marshal Hussein

Tantawi was the defense minister and he was around 76 years old. His poor health

condition and lack of support from within the military or the public made him an unlikely

candidate for the presidency. In any case, many people including Mubarak considered

him loyal to the regime (Alterman 2000). Furthermore, there was no popular figure in the

high ranks of the military that could be considered as a potential candidate for the

presidency. This was, to a large extent, a consequence of Mubarak’s long time strategy to

sideline the military as an organization and furthermore, Mubarak did not allow anyone

99

to build up an independent power base whether in institutionally or publicly. The primary

example of this was Field Marshal Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala who was

appointed to a civilian post by Mubarak when he seemed too ambitious and became

increasingly popular (Alterman 2000). Another more recent example was the former

Chief of Staff Magdi Hatata. Upon his increasing popularity and potential, Mubarak

appointed Hatata as the head of Arab Institutionalization Establishment (Arafat 2009).

There was no prominent military officer who would provide a significant base of

institutional and public support for presidential candidacy. According to the leaked US

cables (Guardian 2011b), some analysts suggested that the Egyptian military was not

contented with the idea of Gamal’s possible succession. There was resentment among the

military leadership against Gamal and his coterie of businessmen’s rising influence at the

expense of the Armed Forces’ economic and political interests. Yet, other sources

indicated that the regime was striving to persuade the military through business deals to

accept Gamal’s succession plan. Similar arguments were raised by some of my

interlocutors. Omar Soliman, the head of the General Intelligence, was another possible

candidate for the presidency. But he was a loyal Mubarak supporter and was unlikely to

act independently without Mubarak’s approval.

3. Muslim Brotherhood

The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 in Egypt by

Hassan al-Banna. In his early years in Cairo, al-Banna observed a decaying society in

terms of religious sensitivity and resented gravely the widespread atheism (Soage &

Franganillo 2010). Hasan al-Banna envisaged an Islamic renaissance as the remedy to

ills of Egyptian society (El-Ghobashy 2005). To this end, he and several of his friends

100

began preaching at mosques and public places and recruited members through one-o-one

and door-to-door interaction (El-Ghobashy 2005). For al-Banna, Islam was a

comprehensive system (related to both the world and after life) that needs to be embraced

by the believers (Soage & Franganillo 2010). The movement became increasingly

popular among Egyptians especially through its social-welfare activities.

In the late 1930s the organization earned a more political character. They began to

hold occasionally mass demonstrations and called for the implementation of Sharia, the

Islamic Law. When their activities became more assertive and confrontational, al-Banna

and several other leading members were sent out of Cairo temporarily (Soage &

Franganillo 2010). After strained relations with the authorities, al-Banna set up a

clandestine paramilitary group, ‘Special Apparatus’.

After the Second World War, Egyptians lost their trust in their politicians and the

Muslim Brotherhood's support for the Palestinians and their standpoint against the

occupying Britain appealed to the larger number of people. Besides, charity activities and

educational services that they provided in their own facilities attracted working class

Egyptians were drastically affected by the deteriorating economic situation after the war

(Soage & Franganillo 2010). By this time, the numbers of its members were estimated to

have reached around half a million (Mitchell 1993).

In the postwar period when Egypt suffered a period of instability, the Muslim

Brotherhood’s Special Apparatus was involved in some violent incidents and

assassinations against British figures and some Egyptians politicians and Egyptian Jews

(Soage & Franganillo 2010). In November 1949, at the backdrop of increasing violent

activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, the police found a secret arms cache, which was

101

claimed to belong to the organization. Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi came to

believe that the Muslim Brotherhood was in preparation of a coup and as a response, al-

Nuqrashi banned the organization. As a response, the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated

Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi after a short while. Al-Banna, who later denounced the use of

violence, was shot dead later in February 1949.

After the 1952 coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser banned all political parties. But he

allowed the MB to continue as an "organization" to undertake its nonpolitical activities.

Nasser had hoped to cultivate a grassroots support for himself through the Muslim

Brotherhood. He offered Sayyid Qutb, the new ideologue of the organization, a key post

in the Liberation Rally Part, but he declined the offer (Soage & Franganillo 2010). After

a failed assassination attempt of Nasser by the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1954,

Nasser immediately took repressive measures against the organization. Thousands of

members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested, tortured and jailed with lengthy

sentences (Zollner 2009). Hasan al-Hudaybi, the leader and six others were sentences to

death; yet, al-Hudaybi's sentence was later changed to life imprisonment. Sayyid Qutb

was also arrested and he wrote most of his important works in prison. In his Ma’alim fi’l-

Tariq (Signposts on the Road) he argued that since the Muslim societies are not ruled

according to the tenets of Islam, they could not be considered Muslim. More

significantly, he suggested that jihad might be necessary to topple the corrupt rulers in

Muslim states (Qutb 1964). Nasser ordered a new wave of repression against the Muslim

Brotherhood in 1965. Qutb was arrested again and executed after a show trial (Soage &

Franganillo 2010). After a general amnesty in 1975, the remaining imprisoned members

102

of the Muslim Brotherhood were finally released. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood

remained an illegal organization (Kepel 1985).

In the 1970s having been influenced by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, a group of

young members of the Muslim Brotherhood began criticizing the leadership of their

"passivity" against the government repression (Soage & Franganillo 2010). Eventually

they left the Muslim Brotherhood and established a militant group, al-Gama'a al-

Islamiyya (Kepel 1985). Al-Gama'a al-Islamiye (the Islamic group) was a radical

religiously motivated movement that was considered as terrorist organization.

Conspicuously, for a certain period during his rule President Sadat considered al-Gama'a

al-Islamiye as a counterweight against the Arab leftist and Marxist opposition (Kepel

1985). Al-Gama'a al-Islamiye was involved in a violent insurgency in Egypt between

1992-1998 in which hundreds of police officers, soldiers, and civilians were killed

(Ashour 2007). After heavy government clampdowns, particularly beginning from May

1992, al-Gama'a al-Islamiye had to review its tactics. In 1997 the organization declared

that it abandoned violent methods (Ashour 2007). After the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,

the al-Gama'a al-Islamiye established Building and Development Party and gained 13

seats in 2011-2012 parliamentary elections.

Under the leadership of al-Tilmisani, the Muslim Brotherhood ruled out violence

as a means of struggle. Al-Tilmisani convinced the leadership that the organization could

be more effective as a through peaceful means with a bottom up approach (Soage &

Franganillo 2010). Naguib (2009) stated that after the Jihadist al-Gama'a al-Islamiye

were marginalized and completely and renounced violence the Muslim Brotherhood

became “the only significant trend of political Islamism” (p.112).

103

In the 1980s the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood saw the opportunity in that

the student unions, teachers' clubs and other professional unions could serve as ready

platforms of social and political activism without a direct confrontation with the regime

(Soage & Franganillo 2010). To this end, the Muslim Brotherhood began to focus on

professional unions, student clubs and assumed the control of most of these in 1980s.

In the 1984 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood allied with Wafd Party and they

ran on Wafd's list for the People's Assembly. The Muslim Brotherhood gained 8 seats.

Later in 1987 elections, the Brotherhood gained 36 seats from an alliance with Labor and

Liberal parties. While the regime refused to grant legal status to the Muslim Brotherhood,

it did not prevent the organization from widening its presence and influence at the grass

root level through social welfare and charity activities. From the regime's perspective,

this served two distinct reasons; on one hand, these apolitical activities were keeping

them busy and out of direct confrontation with the regime. On the other hand, the

organization was compensating state's deficiencies by providing essential healthcare and

charity services particularly in small towns (Soage & Franganillo 2010).

In the 1990s the regime's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood became more

instable. Mubarak blamed the organization in that they were not moderate as they

presented themselves. The organization’s campaign for legalization continued

throughout Mubarak years. In January 1995, the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected a

massive wave of arrests. Eighty-two members were arrested in the pretext that the

Muslim Brotherhood was plotting to overthrow the government. After a failed

assassination attempt to Mubarak in May 1995 in Addis Ababa by Sudanese National

Front, Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiye (the Islamic Group), and the Egyptian Islamic

104

Jihad. Following the incident, Egyptian security forces detained thousands of

Brohterhood members. They were accused of having links with the aforementioned

terrorist organization and 54 of its members were given 3-5 years of imprisonment by

military courts.

Generational tension continued between the successive leaders from the old guard

and the younger members both on the decision making process, which were allotted to a

small group of senior members, and also on ideological grounds. In 1996, Abou Elela

Mady from the new generation filed an application for a new party under the name of

Hizb al-Wasat (the Middle-way Party) (Stacher 2002). The State Commission for Parties

rejected their application and some of the applicants were sent to military court for their

membership to the outlawed Muslim Brohterhood. Later in 2000, just before the

parliamentary elections, the Egyptian security forces detained many prominent members

of the Brohterhood. Nevertheless, in spite of the adverse conditions, 17 members of the

MB were elected in the parliamentary elections. Given the fact that all other opposition

groups together gained only 16 seats, the election of 17 parliamentarians (although not

formally affiliated with the organization) was a significant success for the Muslim

Brohterhood.

The appointment of Mahdi Akef as the new general guide in March 2004 may be

considered as a new phase in the history of the organization. Although he was one of the

old guard he attempted to the bridge the gap between the different currents; sort of a

balanced stance between the old guard who has prioritized proselytizing, and the younger

members who has advocated more direct engagement in politics (Soage & Franganillo

2010). In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brohterhood obtained 88 seats,

105

while the other opposition parties gained only ten seats. The NDP secured 145 seats but

when the independent candidates joined their representation rose to 311 out of a total of

444 seats.

El-Ghobashy (2005) argued that over the years, the Muslim Brotherhood were

subject to change, both on an organizational level and ideological domain, as is "endemic

to any party or social movement: splits occur along generational lines, intense internal

debates arise about strategy, and a shift in their ideological plank from politics as a sacred

mission to politics as the public contest between rival interests" arises (p. 374).

According to El-Ghobashy the Brohterhood 's political engagement through electoral

competition, among other factors, had a considerable effect on this transformation from a

religious mass movement to what looked very much like a modern political party" (p.

374). Over the years, there had been a trend towards relative moderation in the official

discourse of the organization. This shift was most evident in the organization's

renunciation of Sayyid Qutb's ideas and reinterpretation of the philosophy of Hasan al

Banna (El Ghobashy 2005). Especially on sensitive issues such as the Sharia law, the role

of women in society and politics, and the status of the Coptic Egyptians, which had been

at the forefront of discussions between the secular and the Islamist Egyptians, the

organization seemed to have adopted a more encompassing stance. A similar “relative

change” in discourse was observed in the Salafist Islamist parties after the 2011

Revolution. El Ghobashy (2005) argued that an important ideological revision occurred

in 1994 when the Muslim Brohterhood issued a statement on women's political rights,

which emphasized that women have the right to be nominated as candidates for public

offices, except for the highest office.

106

The Muslim Brohterhood had a wavering relationship with the regime. During the

reign of the three authoritarian leaders, namely Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, these leaders

repressed the organization heavily whenever they considered the organization a potential

or a readily serious threat to the stability of the regime. Many of its prominent members,

such as, Khayrat al-Shater, Al-Monem Abu Al-Futouh, Essam al-Eryan, Mohammed

Mursi, and some who later left the organization, were subject to imprisonment because of

accusations related to their allegiance to the Muslim Brohterhood. For example, just

before the parliamentary elections in 1995, the security officials detained 82 prominent

middle-aged members of the organization (El Ghobashy 2005). In 2000, again before the

parliamentary elections the government arrested 20 candidates who were later sentenced

to one-year imprisonment by a military court. Nevertheless, despite the regime's arbitrary

waves of repressions, El Ghobashy stated, the Muslim Brohterhood did not refrain from

cooperating with the government. Interestingly, El Ghobashy (2005) stated that the

Muslim Brohterhood was accused of being "sham democrats, and avid theocrats intent on

overturning the secular state" (p.381). It might be said that many people in Egypt were

not convinced about the MB's commitment to democracy. Yet, before these views can be

treated as facts, these claims have to be substantiated with tangible evidences.

The organizational structure in the Muslim Brohterhood consists of three important

pillars. The Shura Council (Majlis al Shura), is the legislative body and has 100

members. They choose 13 members for the Guidance Bureau (Maktab al Irsahd), which

is the politburo of the organization. The General Guide is at the top of the hierarchy as

the chief executive and official spokes person. The Muslim Brohterhood is the largest and

one of the most influential Islamic movements (Soage & Franganillo 2010). It has sister

107

organizations with same or different names around the World, particularly in the Middle

East.

4. Salafism in Egypt

Salaf means predecessor, forerunner and refers to the Prophet Muhammad and his

Companions. According to the Salafi belief system, Salafism represents adherence to the

Islamic thought and practice as it was preached and implemented in approximately the

first century of Islam. Salafism developed with a consistent idealism around the 1300s as

reaction to the perceived degeneration in Islamic thought and practice (Brown 2011). It

mostly spread in the Islamic world in the 18th century. Salafi beliefs hold that Salaf, the

predecessors, generally include the first three successive generations, and they had the

purest understanding of Islam since they learned it directly from the Prophet or from his

Companions (Wiktorowicz 2001).

According to Salafi thought, there is only one correct interpretation of Islam, and

that was epitomized by the Salaf, the predecessors (Meijer 2009). Thus, Salafi thought

denies the Islamic pluralism that was institutionalized in the mainstream Islamic tradition,

specifically through the four main Sunni madhab, school of thought and religious

jurisprudence (Wiktorowicz 2005). In the same vein, they believe that four distinct

madhab are unnecessary distortions and must be avoided. Salafis claim that in subsequent

years, the pure understanding and the ways of practice of Islam became subject to

contamination and were distorted with bidat, innovations. Salafis attribute this 'deviation'

to the natural corrosive effect of the time and Islam's spread among different cultures.

Based on these convictions, Salafis claim to be adhering strictly to the purest form of

Islamic thought and practice, as they believed it to have been lived in the Prophet's time.

108

In other words, Salafism is a quest for the pristine understanding of Islam as in the

‘golden age’ of the Prophet and his companions (Haykel 2009). Salafism holds that

learning and practicing the pure form of Islam will eventually bring society into an ideal

Islamic order (Brown 2011).

Although Salafi thought is considered to reside in the Sunni branch of Islam, their

perception of different madhab as ‘unnecessary distortions’ renders Salafism a distinct

tradition that is considered somewhat “radical” by most Sunni Muslims. The strict

interpretation of religious doctrine leads to a firm boundary between Salafis and others;

Muslims and non-Muslims. For them, some practices that are widely observed by

Muslims under different madhabs and cultures, such as visiting tombs, celebrating the

Prophet’s birthday, constitute a heresy and thus must be renounced (Wiktorowicz 2001).

Their “uncompromising stance has led others in the Muslim community to label Salafis

as stubborn radicals” (Wiktorowicz 2001:21).

Salafism is also called Wahhabism, with a reference to Ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-

1792). Although Wahhabism is a Salafi trend and might be considered a revivalist

movement in the classic Salafi tradition, it does not represent a wide spectrum of Salafi

thought (Meijer 2009). Wahhabism is followed widely in Saudi Arabia. Salafism includes

diverse traditions that hold different and even conflicting viewpoints on issues such as,

politics, state, and violence (Wiktorowicz 2005). For example, although most Salafis do

not approve of violence as a method, there are militant Salafis, such as those who

constitute the bulk of the terrorist networks, such as Al Qaida, who employ violent

methods as a means of political struggle. Esposito (2011) argued that “Salafi religious

exclusivism can lead to intolerance of other believers, both other Muslims—in particular

109

Shii Muslims, whom Salafis despise—and non-Muslims” (p. 56). Nevertheless, Esposito

emphasized “a religiously exclusivist theology is not necessarily violent” (p. 56).

The introduction of Salafi thought into the Egyptian religious domain began with

Sheikh Hamid al-Fiqi, who intended to purify the Islamic thought from "deviations and

heretical innovations" (El Houdaiby 2012). To this end, he founded Gam'iyyat Ansar al-

Sunna in 1926. El Houdaiby argued that Salafism became an established Islamic

movement after the 1970s. According to El Houdaiby, several factors played a significant

role in the spread of Salafism in Egypt in the 1970s. First, it was a corollary of

disempowerment of al-Azhar –the highest religious (Sunni) authority and Islam's oldest

scholarly association. Al-Azhar scholars had traditionally had a great influence in the

Egyptian society and played a significant role in anti-colonial campaigns (Bayat 2007).

From Muhammad Ali onward, including the British, Egyptian rulers perceived al-Azhar's

independence as a threat to their rule. With Nasser's deliberate policies, already weakened

al-Azhar lost its independence and influence and assumed a political role of legitimizing

rulers (al Awwa 2005). Consequently, El Houdaiby argued, al-Azhar became

increasingly confronted with Islamist groups, which gradually leaned towards the other

schools of thought, such as Salafism and Qutbism for scholarship.

Secondly, the 1967 defeat against Israel shook Egyptian's believes in Nasserism

and pan-Arabism and the ensuing identity crisis turned many towards Egyptians to

religion and Islamism (El Houdaiby 2012). Moreover, after Sadat assumed power, he

considered 'apolitical' Salafism as a bulwark against the Muslim Brotherhood and

Nasserism.

As a third reason, some liberal interlocutors suggested that return migrants from

110

the Gulf countries, specifically from Saudi Arabia, came back indoctrinated with Salafi

related thoughts. Besides this, El Houdaiby (2012) claimed that the Egyptian Salafi

network was being financially assisted by oil-rich Gulf countries, particularly by Saudi

Arabia, to export their Salafi ideology.

According to Salafi thought, a valid state system for Muslims must be based on

Sharia Law. Salafis do not approve the modern secular state and democratic institutions,

nevertheless; as long as a ruler is Muslim, Muslims must obey his rule and must not rebel

(Brown 2011). Nevertheless, if the ruler "ceases to be a Muslim, he can be opposed

violently" (Brown 2011:3). As Brown argued, most Salafi shcolars are opposed even to

voting in democratic elections. Salafis in Egypt were not involved in politics directly

before the 2011 Revolution. Thus, their entry into politics was a big surprise for most

Egyptians and a significant departure from their basic tenets (Brown 2013). Most Salafi

scholars adopted political quietism and avoided controversial political issues during the

Mubarak regime and preached for individual salvation through the practice of Islam free

of 'heretical innovations' (El Houdaiby 2012). Several days before the January 25

demonstrations the spokesperson of Al-Dawa al-Salafiyya in Alexandria stated that they

would not support the protests against the regime.

Egyptians differentiate between the militant Salafi groups, who are claimed to be

active in the Sinai region and others who do not approve use of violence. During my stay

in Egypt, I met with many Egyptians who adhere to Salafi thought. Some of my

informants emphasized the fact that although they had adopted the Salafi beliefs, which

they roughly referred as “a quest for the pristine form of Islam”, they were not affiliated

with any specific Salafi group or leader. Salafi men usually have long beard. Salafi

111

women wear niqab, a cover the face. Although al-Azhar University, as the highest Sunni

authority in the country does not recognize Salafism as a legitimate Islamic tradition, the

university has many Salafi students and some professors (Brown 2011).

Unlike the Sunni tradition, the Salafi movements in Egypt do not have a central

authority or a shared leader (Brown 2011). Salafism in Egypt lacks a central and

hierarchical structure and has multiple leaders who have different interpretations about

politics. Thus, the various movements rarely take shared positions regarding political

developments in Egypt. The movement is concentrated around multiple influential

preachers, most of whom are loosely connected to Wahhabi scholars in Saudi Arabia.

After the 2011 Revolution, some Salafi groups reorganized themselves. In 2013, there

were six main active Salafi groups and five political parties in Egypt (Brown 2013).

According to El Houdaiby (2012), two of these groups are relatively more influential and

have a larger base of public support. One is Ansar al-Sunna Organization, which has a

presence in all areas of Egypt. The second is the Al-Dawa al-Salafiyya in Alexandria. Al

Nour Party11, which is the largest Salafi political party, is associated with Al-Dawa al-

Salafiyya.

Brown (2011) stated that in the post Mubarak period, many violent incidents,

particularly by those committed against Coptic Egyptians were attributed to Salafis in the

media. However, Brown explained that “in many cases, that events did not unfold as

reported by the generally hostile press” (p. 7)12. Media reports usually lack specific

11 In the 2011–12 Egypt parliamentary elections, the Islamist Bloc led by Al‑Nour party received 7,534,266 votes out of a total 27,065,135 correct votes (27.8%) with 83 out of 96 seats (BBC 2012). 12 “Salafis suffered not only because of their own misguided and at times criminal steps, but also because of unfavorable and often inaccurate media reporting…tales of Salafi

112

details as to whether the violent acts were perpetrated by a specific Salafi movement in a

coordinated and planned fashion for a specific political or social aim and probably more

importantly, without specifying whether a religious motivation was involved. Kenan

(MB) is a Muslim Egyptian in his mid thirties and he is a member of the Muslim

Brotherhood. He explained that he finds suspicious the way that some violent attacks

against Coptic Egyptians took place in the past ant the fact that the Egyptian security

forces could not unravel the plot in a persuasive manner:

On January 1, 2011 20 or more people got killed and many people were wounded in a car bomb attack on a Coptic Church in Alexandria. It was inhumane and unacceptable of course and it was a shame for us, for Egyptians. In the ensuing events, angry Copts attacked a nearby mosque and they clashed with Muslim Egyptians. The Ministry of Interior blamed a terrorist organization from Gaza. But, I don’t remember that the police documented any hard proof for that. They said that “a sophisticated remote controlled device” was used in the attack. Yes, that might be true, but why didn’t the police bring them to justice? Where are those people? Occasionally such attacks take place in Egypt and in different countries and the “Salafis” or “Islamist radical terrorists” are there to blame and most of the time without enough evidence. And the media is always ready to make it even bigger. More interestingly, in a more recent incident in Sinai, it was last year in 2012 in Ramadan, a group of armed attackers ambushed the Egyptian soldiers who were eating dinner and killed 17 of them. Then, they stole one of the armored vehicles and drove it towards Israeli border. Of course, the Israeli soldiers killed all of them at the scene. Isn’t it strange? No body claimed responsibility, but again, the military blamed a “Jihadist” terrorist network. It is really strange. They must be really stupid to flee to Israel just to die. I believe that the Mubarak regime was complicit in some of the past attacks against Coptic Christians. The regime used the so-called “radical Islamist” threat to create an air of fear inside Egypt. Such a fear helped Mubarak justify his hard-handed rule against the international audience. I don’t say that we don’t have any extremist in Egypt13.

In spite of occasional radical statements by individual Salafi leaders, their barbarism became a salient theme in the Egyptian press, especially in liberal-leaning papers” (Brown 2011:8).

13 For more information: (Fahim 2011; Fahim 2012). Khalil (2012) stated that Church-bombing case in Alexandria remained unsolved and “it’s unclear whether there was ever any hard evidence to connect the city’s Salafists to the church bombing” (p.184).

113

engagement in politics through several Salafi parties will likely lead to a certain level of

moderation in their views or discourse (Brown 2011). As El Ghobashy (2005) suggested

for the Muslim Brotherhood’s engagement in electoral politics, "it is the institutional

rules of participation rather than the commandments of ideology that motivate political

parties (p. 390). El-Ghobashy suggested, "the Islamist parties are subject to the same

institutional rules of the political game." (p. 375). Thus, in order to survive in politics, the

Salafi leaders will have to revise some of their ideas.

For example the al-Nour Party’s official website, which Brown (2011) considers

is a token of political pragmatism of the party, states that “Sharia law must protect the

personal religious rights of Copts, whose personal status and family law are handled by

their own religious systems” (Brown 2011:10). Along with other Salafi parties, al-Nour

stated that they recognize the women’s significant role in politics and they would

nominate at least one female candidate.

5. Youth Movements

Because of the significant role of the youth movements in organizing the protests

and their ensuing contribution during the 18 days of protests as the main bulk of the

protestors, many observers like to describe the January 25 Revolution as a youth

revolution (Shehata 2012). Shehata argued that youth movements, such as the April 6

Movement, We Are All Khaled Said, Youth for Change, the ElBaradie Campaign, and

Tadamon, had very important contributions to make in the successful outcome of the

Tahrir Revolution. First, they used innovative methods and strategies of organization,

mobilization, and actual resistance and struggle tactics against the security forces.

Secondly, their cross-ideological discourse helped overcome the pervasive divisions

114

among the established opposition groups. Thus, they unified the opposition against the

Mubarak regime. As a third contribution, Shehata argued that the youth movements

created a link between social and political activism.

Shehata (2012) suggested that beginning with the start of second Palestinian

Intifada in 2000, which marks an important turning point for youth mobilization in the

Middle East, until the January 25 Revolution, youth activism in Egypt can be

conveniently analyzed under four phases.

a. Phase One (2000-2003)

After the instigation of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 youth mobilization

gained significant momentum (Azimi 2005). Through the newly founded Egyptian

Popular Committee for the Support of the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) thousands of

young Egyptians got acquainted with political activism. Thousands of students

participated, for first time in their lives in demonstrations for the Palestinian cause

between 2000 and 2001. Shehata (2012) explained that the EPCSPI offered, quite

remarkably, a cross-ideological platform that embraced students from all political

orientations. The organization’s decentralized and horizontal structure, largely

autonomous from the Central Committee in Cairo, enabled the creation of various

committees in different locations. Thus, the organization hosted thousands of students to

express their resentment about the Israeli and U.S. governments through different protest

activities.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 added a further momentum to youth activism in

Egypt. Several new youth initiatives, such as the Cairo Campaign and the 20 March

Movement were established to mobilize support against the invasion. These movements

115

successfully coordinated with transnational anti-war movements and they organized

several joint panels and conferences. These initiatives on a national and international

level contributed to a working culture between young activists who belonged to different

political ideologies.

b. Phase Two (2004-2006)

After 2004, the focus of the youth activism changed from external and

transnational issues to domestic political problems. The emergence of the Kefaya

Movement in 2004 as a reaction to possible hereditary succession of Gamal Mubarak

enabled many youth activists to raise their concerns for their country (Oweidat 2008).

Scores of Egyptian youth joined Kefaya and its subgroup Youth for Change. Particularly

Youth for Change included many new members some of whom were active in the

EPCSPI. Freedom Now was also another organization, which provided a venue for youth

activists who demanded substantial constitutional and political reforms. These

organizations organized numerous protests between 2004 and 2006. Youth’s demands

were political democracy within the university and within the larger society, better

education, employment, housing, and healthcare.

c. Phase Three: (2006-2009)

Shehata (2012) stated that after the 2005 elections the youth activism turned its

attention from political reforms and democratization to economic and social issues. The

2006 workers strikes in Mahalla, a city located in the middle of Nile Delta with the

largest public sector textile company of Egypt, marked the start of a new wave of labor

protests that had wider repercussions in Egypt. The protests started with demands for

116

better wages and working conditions and intensified in numbers from 222 in 2006 to

more than 700 in 2010 (El-Mahdi 2010a).

The unprecedented increase in the numbers of the labor protests that was about

600 in 2006 and 2007 led some young activists to reconsider their model for change

through engagement with the established party or non-governmental oppositional groups

(Shehata, 2012). In their assessment, these movements, such as the Kefaya, were elitists

who often had abstract demands that did not necessarily reflect the priorities of the

masses (De Semet 2012; Shehata 2012). Thus, the established oppositional movements

failed to link with the critical masses whose main concerns were more concrete matters

such as low wages, increasing food prices, bad working conditions. To this end, in order

to bridge this gap between the democratization and labor movements, a group of young

activists from the Youth for Change Movement founded the Tadamon (solidarity)

Movement in 2007 (De Semet 2012). The Tadamon Movement aimed to unify various

grassroots forms of activism to create a popular movement in which economic and

political demands would be emphasized equally. Tadamon included activists from youth

from leftists, liberals, and Islamists groups (Shehata 2012).

Tadamon supported several labor movements in different parts of Egypt by

providing them legal support and by publicizing their activities and concerns through

print and online media (Shehata 2012). Nevertheless, in 2008, differences of opinion

emerged inside the movement. Some activist from the Labor Party and liberal al-Ghad

Party abandoned the Movement with the belief that the ‘gradual change’ from increasing

bottom up societal pressure, as the Tadamon believed, was not the best way of struggle

against the Mubarak regime. Those who left believed that Egyptian society needed a

117

more radical change and the society was ready for that. To this end, in March 2008, these

young activists from the Labor Party and al-Ghad proposed a general strike in support of

the strike of textile workers in Mahalla (Ottoway & Hamzawy 2011). The proposed strike

was planned to take place on April 6, 2008 and it was announced through a Facebook

page dedicated for the purpose. The call reverberated throughout the country. The Kefaya

Movement and al-Ghad Party declared their support. Thousands of individual subscribed

to the Facebook Page in a short while. Nevertheless, some of the opposition groups such

as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Wafd Party did not support the initiative.

The success of these protests movements might be related their independence

from the established opposition groups and parties (Abaza 2013). Abaza suggested that

the absence –or their minor role at best– of the established political organizations in these

movements implied a despair of “the end of politics” (p. 88); “in the sense that political

parties seem to have been absent, or rather less influential, in the street compared to the

expanding self-organization of citizens, workers or meetings organized by e-mail, or

Facebook groups” (Abaza 2013:88).

Through the tremendous increase in the use of digital and social media tools such

as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and individual blogging. Political activism was carried

to the alternative cyberspace (Lim 2012). Pictures and videos of security agencies’

brutality and torture against detained individuals and prisoners, the misery of people such

as those waiting in the long lines for hours for bread were spread all over the internet.

Abaza (2013) argued that this phenomenon concurred with growing number of

demonstrations and strikes in the face of increasing food prices and with demands for

higher salaries and better working conditions. These events included people from a large

118

segment of society including workers, bus drivers, university professors, and tax

collectors.

Security forces responded harshly to the general strike in the city of El-Mahalla

El-Kubra on April 6, 2008. Many people were injured and security forces arrested many

activists and workers. Event though the strike attempt ended apparently without success,

it further distanced thousands of people from the regime and more importantly it led to

the creation of the April 6 Movement, which would spearhead, along with several other

youth groups, the January 25 Protests in 2011. In their founding declaration the leaders of

the April 6 Movement pointed to an inherent problem that the most opposition politicians

and intellectuals were disconnected from the general public and were unaware of their

real demands and concerns. Thus, the April 6 Movement claimed that the change would

be realized through the struggle of ordinary people (Shehata 2012).

Abaza (2013) identifies a significant distinction in these protest movements that

intensified after 2000; their demands were more basic and concrete, namely economic

and material ones rather than demands of democratic reforms or removal of the

emergency laws as promoted by the established political parties and organizations such as

the Nasserists, the Leftists, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Abaza suggested that it would

be more appropriate to define the wave of these protests movements as “non-state

centric” and “non-competitive” (p.87) forms of contestation. Thus, she argued they

gained increasingly more popular support.

d. Phase Four: (2010-2011)

A significant turning point before the January 25 Revolution was the return of

Mohamed ElBaradei to Egypt (Bilgin 2012). ElBaradei is a Nobel Peace Laureate and the

119

former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). After he

retired from his position in November 2009 in the IAEA, ElBaradei affirmed his intention

to run for the presidency in 2011 (Guardian 2009). He was already critical of human

rights violations in Egypt, but after he retired he became more vocal against the regime

and Mubarak. He demanded constitutional reforms. His return to Egypt in February 2010

brought a new wave of youth activism to the country.

6. Return of Mohamed ElBaradei

Mohamed ElBaradei was the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) from 1997 to 2009. He was a respectable diplomat and was awarded the Nobel

Peace Prize, jointly with the IAEA in 2005. After he finishing his third term in the IAEA

in November 2009, before returning to Egypt, he became a vocal critic of the regime in

Egypt and Mubarak himself. Apparently, many Egyptians believed that because of his

international reputation, Mubarak would hardly eliminate him politically by threat and

intimidation or by discrediting unfairly. Suddenly, on the eve of the 2010 parliamentary

elections and 2011 presidential elections, ElBaradei became the new hope for many

Egyptians (Khalil 2012).

In an interview held in December 2010, ElBaradei stated that the system was no

longer sustainable and it had to change. He articulated that the established elite in the

country was corrupt; however, they seemed dissatisfied with the existing political system.

Thus, he expected the change to stem from those in the younger generations, not from the

old politicians, most of whom were some how ‘coopting’ with the regime (Daily News

2010). He demanded constitutional amendments that would allow independent

candidates, without being obligated to be a member of an existing party, to run in the

120

2011 Egyptian presidential elections.

Suddenly ElBaradei became the center of attention for those who opposed the

idea of Gamal Mubarak’s potential presidency.

People seemed to look to him as their salvation, the hero on a white horse who would single-handedly save the country from a Gamal Mubarak succession scenario. ElBaradei had managed to become a rallying point for the vast ABG (Anybody-But-Gamal) voter bloc (Khalil 2012:106).

When he arrived in Cairo in February 2010, around one thousand people

welcomed him with great joy. As soon as he arrived he was hosted on several TV shows.

Enthusiasm around him grew gradually for a several months. His meetings and panels

were publicized by the independent media and followed with great attention. He was

presented as a savior (Aslan 2010). Nevertheless, the state-owned media either denied

acknowledging the public excitement he caused or portrayed him as an outsider and

questioned his loyalty on the grounds that he had spent the last several decades outside

Egypt. Osama Saraya, editor of the state-owned Al-Ahram daily, stated:

El-Baradei's remarks were tantamount to a constitutional coup and opened a door for George W Bush's policy of constructive chaos into Egypt…A presidential candidate must be fully Egyptian and not, like El-Baradei, hold a Swedish passport. El-Baradei's remarks open the door for Islamist fundamentalists to have access to power and this in turn opens the gates of hell on Egypt. (El-Din 2009)

In February 2010, together with several political activists from different political

orientations, ElBaredei established the National Association for Change, a loosely

bounded civil society and youth group that intended to campaign for some urgent

constitutional amendments regarding the elections (BBC 2010). Many young Egyptian

activists volunteered for a nationwide petition campaign to gather signatures of citizens in

support of a seven article list of demands that included annulling the emergency law and

121

constitutional amendments that would enable individuals outside the national assembly to

run for presidency.

Despite the smear campaign by the regime, the youth around ElBaradei were

hopeful and the petition campaign seemed on track for several months (Khalil 2012).

ElBaradei was apparently using his strong international image as a long time successful

diplomat and a Nobel Laurette. He said once “I had a sort of immunity so I could speak a

little louder” (Khalil 2012:110). He also rightly recognized the growing societal tension

and pointed out that change was imminent and this would come from the youth. In a

speech made in September 2010, ElBaredei suggested: “the three-decade rule of president

Hosni Mubarak was a decaying, nearly collapsing temple", and …regime change was

possible in the coming year” (Shenker 2010).

ElBaradei called for a boycott of the November 2010 parliamentary elections. He

warned that the elections would be fraudulent as usual and claimed that "anyone who

participates in the vote either as a candidate or a voter goes against the national will"

(Shenker 2010). But he could not mobilize enough support from the established

opposition movements. Particularly, without the support of the Muslim Brotherhood,

which had endorsed ElBaradei’s petition campaign, a boycott call would not yield any

result (Khalil 2012).

Despite the initial enthusiasm and hope that ElBaradei had caused, the ElBaradei

for President campaign soon lost its momentum (Aly 2012; Khalil 2012). Interestingly,

ElBaradei kept a very busy travel schedule. He was out of Egypt very often. Furthermore,

rather than trying to develop affinity with the people on the streets he preferred

broadcasting his message through panels, media conferences, and YouTube messages. He

122

refrained from public meetings that he apparently felt uncomfortable with. He lacked the

proper local knowledge of Egyptian politics and proved he was not a charismatic

politician that would appeal to masses thus his influence among the public remained

limited (Khalil 2012). According to the political scientist Abdel Monem Said Aly (2012),

who was close to Mubarak regime, the marginalization of the ElBaradei campaign in a

very short time before the presidential elections might have caused a further false sense

of “regime resilience” that would later proved detrimental for the regime.

Many secular interlocutors who participated in this research suggested that

ElBaradei’s return made significant contributions in Egyptian’s struggle against

Mubarak. He became the focal point of counter inheritance campaign against the possible

candidacy of Gamal Mubarak. As quoted earlier, owing to his status of “immunity”,

ElBaradei contributed to the process of delegitimation of the Mubarak regime on national

and international levels. George Ishak (C), one the founders of the Kefaya Movement,

said in our interview that ElBaradei’s role was particularly significant in that he stated;

“No reform from within the system, Mubarak has to leave.”

His lack of energy and commitment for the real politics on the streets proved to be

true in that he was not in Egypt on January 25, 2011 and he appeared only once in Tahrir

during the 18 days of protests. Informants who were either members of the Muslim

Brotherhood or a Salafist group or people who were sympathetic to these religious groups

interpreted the role of ElBaredei very differently. For most of them, he was a “part of a

foreign, an American project” who would divert Egypt from following an Islamic

direction.

Abdulkadir (AE), who was a devout Muslim and a sympathizer of the Muslim

123

Brotherhood stated:

ElBaradei is not even an Egyptian. He lived outside Egypt for years. He does not know Egypt and Egyptians. Furthermore, when you ask people about him outside Cairo no one recognizes him. Why did he not become a candidate in the presidential elections after Mubarak? Because he knew that he would not get any votes. This divergence of opinion between the seculars and the Islamist about ElBaradei

stems from the fact became one of the three main political figures in unified opposition

against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in the post revolution period. Thus,

informants who had affinity with the Islamist movements did not acknowledge his

contribution to the Egyptian opposition against Mubarak regime in the pre revolution

period.

7. Conclusion

In the analysis of pre-revolution period, we see that a gradual structural change

was in progress that refers to the transformed relations between the state and the society.

The oppositional groups had gained relative political freedom roughly in the last decade

of Mubarak’s rule. The emergence of the Kefaya Movement in 2004 signified a turning

point. Kefaya challenged President Mubarak and his family directly against the

possibility of hereditary succession of Gamal Mubarak. In a gradual manner, Egyptians

became more vocal and confrontational in expressing their resentments against the

Egyptian state through demonstrations, protests, strikes, and youth activism. Furthermore,

over the years, young Egyptians became more politicized and experienced in using the

marvels of the Internet and social media to reveal the excesses of the security forces and

to get organized around a common agenda.

124

Part II: THE ENCOUNTER OR SHOWDOWN: 2011 TAHRIR REVOLUTION

This chapter will examine the first phase, ‘Breach of the Peace’ in my analysis of

the 2011 Egyptian revolution, which was conceptualized as a social drama. Swartz et al.

(1966) presented their model of social dramas as processes that occur between two major

parties, namely two adversaries while one is relatively dominant in terms of power and

the other is the antagonist who challenges the first. In line with the theory, this study

considers the Mubarak regime and the Egyptian people as the two contestants in the

power struggle. Yet, it is necessary to admit that this is a subjective classification and

does fall short in reflecting the political picture exactly since there were more than these

two blocs that were involved (directly or indirectly) in this struggle. It would be a mistake

to assume that every Egyptian in the country supported the demonstrations. On the

contrary, there were Egyptians who opposed the demonstrations and supported Mubarak.

Alternatively, instead of naming one of the major parties of the contest as Egyptian

people, or just as people, one may consider using the word ‘protestors or revolutionaries’.

Yet, then another problem emerges; there were many people who were intensely against

the Mubarak regime, but they did not or could not participate in the protests for various

reasons. They were not among the protestors and thus cannot be named as revolutionaries

in any literal sense. However, most of them had one or more of their family members in

the protests and by having lived in almost three decades of repressive regime of Mubarak,

the silent masses were certainly part of the power equation against the state. Thus, despite

these reservations and given the great numbers of protestors that exceeded several

million, this study identifies the two major parties of the 2011 Egyptian revolution as

people versus the state or the regime.

125

Chapter 6: 2011 TAHRIR REVOLUTION AS A SOCIAL DRAMA

Introduction

The reasons behind the January 25 Tahrir Revolution was of a socioeconomic and political nature. Besides, there was the state repression and intimidation against its own citizens. Wide segments of the population had turned against the regime in recent years of Mubarak, particularly from 2008 to 2010, the numbers of protests increased dramatically. There was already a high tension in the society. Mubarak ruled with cycles of relaxation and repression. The 2010 parliamentary elections signaled the beginning of a new cycle of repression. The Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition were pushed out. In addition, there was the issue of heredity succession from the Mubarak to his son Gamal. (From interview with Amr Hamzawy (LI), a liberal, parliamentarian and political scientist).

In a similar vein, Dr. Said (FR) explained the reasons for the 2011 Egyptian

Revolution as follows:

Retrospectively, I believe, structural contradictions that were caused by socioeconomic problems and accompanied by political repression by the state led to Tahrir Revolution. There was a tremendous demographic change at work to which the state failed to respond appropriately. The population more than doubled in the last 30 years, from 40 million in 1980 to 88 million in 2010. In 2010 the Egyptian per capita income was about $6300 and about 20 percent of the population were living under the poverty threshold. Life expectancy in 2010 was 72 years (rose from 57 years in 1980). Moreover, the literacy rate increased from 40 percent in 1980 to 72 percent in 2010. Mubarak regime's successfully reduced infant mortality and this played a significant role in this rapid demographic change. The young generations were highly educated, yet there were serious hindrances for them to start their own life. Because of the high rates of unemployment 14and high rates of poverty they are stuck with their parents until they get married in their early 30s. The middle class, though not significantly wealthy, expanded in the last two decades. Moreover, about 30.000 civil society organizations, a growing independent media and increasing use of social media all contributed to the greater awareness of state repression and political activism among the youth. The regime was neither aware nor ready to respond constructively to these social and demographic challenges. Beside these structural factors, there were those dramatic developments, what I call circumstantial factors, in the political environment. The public disappointment and rage about

14 In 2010 the unemployment rate in Egypt was 8.97 (Index Mundi 2010) and 83 percent of the unemployed belonged to the age group of 15-29 (Aly 2012). The college graduates were ten times more likely to be unemployed that those who had only an elementary school education (Goldstone 2011)

126

the rigged 2010 parliamentary elections; ElBaradei's challenge to the regime, the Tunisian Revolution, and the mismanagement of the crisis, that is the 18 days of protests, all contributed to the removal of Mubarak.

In his analysis of the ‘Arab Spring’, Goldstone (2011) argued that what drives

revolutions is not simply the increasing food prices or lack or absence of economic

growth; but “it is the persistence of widespread and unrelieved poverty amid increasingly

extravagant wealth” Goldstone (2011:12). Although there were clear signs of

socioeconomic and political deficiencies and high levels of societal tension, hardly

anyone saw the coming of the revolution in Tunisia, Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle

East. Moreover, these were not new phenomena and Egyptians had been suffering

because of these malaises for years. The above mentioned socioeconomic and political

factors do not necessarily lead to revolutionary movements. The literature on revolutions

suggests that even if revolutionary movements emerge they hardly end with a

revolutionary outcome (McAdam et al. 2001). Thence, a more relevant approach here is

to ask why and how the protests that started on January 25 gained a revolutionary claim

and how they succeeded to bring about a revolutionary outcome in just 18 days and in a

relatively peaceful manner.

The impact of the Tunisian Revolution on the psyche of average Egyptians was

beyond the influence of any group of activist or elite whose reach, in most cases, were

limited to certain classes of Egyptians, whether in terms of economic class or

generational groups (El-Ghobashy 2011). After all, the Kefaya movement, which

undeniably marked a turning point en route to 2011 Egyptian Revolution, failed to build

on the initial enthusiasm that it generated by bringing many diverse groups of individuals

together when it first appeared in 2004. The Kefaya movement did not evolve into a

127

massive political opposition movement and dissolved after several years of activism. In a

similar vein, the initial enthusiasm that emerged with the return of ElBaradei (Khalil

2012) did not turn into a lasting unified opposition movement. Contrary to expectations,

the coalition that organized around ElBaradei dissolved before the elections. The

opposition was deeply divided and preferred to participate separately in the elections (Aly

2012). Thus, ElBaradei's National Society for Change was marginalized in a sense and

was left out of the equation without securing a considerable public support.

The Tunisian Revolution that resulted in the ousting of the Ben Ali regime on

January 14, 2011 with its relatively quick pace (in 27 days) and peaceful nature, led

Egyptians to contemplate the “impossible”; ‘why not the same in Egypt?’ Nevertheless,

although the air was highly charged particularly after the brutal murder of young

Egyptian Khaled Said in June 2010 and the rigged parliamentary elections of December

2010, which was probably the worst and most impudent of its kind in Egyptian history,

this wishful thinking was not enough to mobilize the apolitical masses. In what follows,

the 18 days of protests will be analyzed under four separate four separate phases, each of

which signifies a turning point for the protests, of social drama.

128

1. Breach of Peace

For Swartz et al. (1966), the phase of ‘breach of the peace’ is the decisive verge

where one of the major parties of contention considers itself to have gained “enough”

amount of political support to initiate an encounter against the adversary. This calculation

may be realistic or illusionary. It is a strategic threshold on the way to the initial

encounter or crisis. It marks the culmination of an already developing societal tension.

Swartz et al. argued that in many instances, without the lead of any particular event, the

group's acquisition of considerable support can lead to further tension in relationships.

The group may instigate the crisis itself or provoke the adversary for an action. In other

instances, increased tension may cause the adversary to react preemptively and in a

violent manner.

As will be discussed in the following section, the brutal killing of young Egyptian

Khaled Said on June 6, 2010 by the Egyptian police and the parliamentary elections in

November – December 2010 –arguably the “most fraudulent” elections of Egyptian

history– could be considered as the advent of the phase of ‘breach of the peace’ for the

2011 Egyptian Revolution that is conceptualized as a social drama.

a. Death of Khaled Said

Khaled Said was a young Egyptian of 28 years of age when he was killed by

Egyptian police officers in Alexandria. Khaled Said became a national symbol and

created a focal point of public anger against the regime. Most of the interviewed

informants, regardless of their political orientation, referred to death of Khaled Said as an

important threshold. Many Egyptians became convinced that the state was running

against its own citizens.

129

On June 6, 2010, two plain-clothes Egyptian police officers entered an Internet

cafe in Alexandria. The officers headed directly to Khaled Said and began dragging him

from the second floor. According to the eyewitness accounts, the young man could not

resist physically when the officers began hitting him (Khalil 2012). They did not let him

speak and without any explanation they dragged him to the entrance of a nearby

apartment. The officers kept beating him and hitting his head to the floor. The incident

happened in a small and busy street that was full with cafes and shops where a curious

and bewildered crowd gathered immediately. The two officers threatened the people

around them not to interfere. In a short while the young Said was lying motionless on the

floor. A doctor, owner a nearby café, checked the young man’s body and told that they

were hitting a dead man. The officers insisted that he was faking and they would wake

him up and continued to hit him. When the officers became sure that he was not faking,

they handled the case with the same kind of recklessness. They made several calls and

soon many officers in uniform and plain clothes arrived at the scene. They took the dead

body of the young man and brought him back after several hours and carefully placed

him to the entrance of the same building. An ambulance arrived soon and they refused to

take a death body and the police threatened and forced the ambulance personnel to take

the body to hospital (Khalil 2012).

The incident shook the residents. After a family member managed to get a picture

of Khaled Said in the morgue, the incident made the headlines in national private media

and on Internet and subsequently it led to a public outcry. The picture showed a

disfigured face with broken jaw and nose, fractures on his skulls, bruises all over his face.

Wael Ghonim, 30 year-old Egyptian who was working as a marketing executive

130

for Google in Dubai, read about what happened to Khaled Said in Alexandria and

prepared a Facebook page with the name “We are all Khaled Said”. The Facebook page

attracted the attention of online community among the Egyptian youth and attained

thousands of followers in a very short time15. The police report in the following days

indicated that Khaled Said was a drug dealer and the he suffocated to death because of a

small pack of drug that he tried to swallow to hide it from the police officers. The police

report was confirmed later by a similarly dubious autopsy report.

Selim, (A) a liberal activists and politician in his forties narrated the role of

Khaled Said’s death on the way to the revolution:

Khaled Said’s death was not the first case of police brutality that Egyptians came to know on national level. The youth movements such as Six April and many individual blogs were circulating images and videos of torture in police stations. But, several specific features of the incident separated it from many others and caused a deep resentment and anger across the country. Khaled Said was an average young Egyptian; someone whom everybody can easily identify with around himself as a friend, brother, nephew, or son etc. Thus, people easily sympathized with him. Secondly, it happened in public and apparently without any hesitation or fear of possible repercussions. The police was well known for their cruelty but this was too much.. People, especially the youth, could not take it. I think the Facebook page, We are all Khaled Said, made a important contribution and in the following days after incident several youth organization coordinated many demonstrations around the country.

In a similar vein, Khalil (2012) explained that, given the average profile of

Khaled Said the incident led many Egyptians to contemplate that submitting to the

regime’s excesses would not protect them anymore from possibly being harmed by the

state. Khalil stated that mothers and fathers began to think about what happened to

Khaled Said could happen to their sons.

Dr. Ahmad’s (MB) portrayal of the media’s “differential treatment of the 15 By mid-June followers of We are all Khaled Said Facebook page reached to 130,000 (Preston et al. 2011).

131

Islamists by the regime and the media” explains why Egyptians adopted Khaled Said as a

symbol.

People were feeling that there was a problem in our lives…They were eating dirty food, streets were crummy, salaries were very low, and financial scandals occurred every now and then without any consequences for the responsible ones. There was no justice. The election, especially in 2010 was a scandal. People felt that the regime was responsible for everything. People were waiting for the opportunity. These were feelings not usually voiced out. In addition, the issue of heritage of presidency from Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal Mubarak was annoying. But the boiling point was the torture cases by the police; either Khaled Said, the famous guy, or Sayed Bilal the infamous guy. Khaled Said died in the street and the police said that he was a drug dealer. Sayed Bilal was another guy that got killed under police custody a few months after Khaled Said. After the explosion in the church in December 2010 (I don’t know who did it) he was taken from home for questioning; a few days later he was dead. He was a Salafist and had a big beard16. The public and the media did not care much about him. He received little attention. Media always was talking about crimes against non-Islamists. Khaled Said’s Facebook page received 4 thousand fans in one hour. After 10 days, the number of the subscriber reached to 184 thousand. When I was writing my book, it had 1,700, 000 followers.

b. 2010 Parliamentary Elections

Although elections under authoritarian regimes are somewhat paradoxical, they

are not infrequent (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009). However, controversial, Magaloni (2006)

showed that elections and hegemonic party regimes are mechanisms that are commonly

used by authoritarian regimes in all parts of the world. Conventional wisdom would

rightfully question the function of elections under authoritarian settings when the ruling

regime successfully and without much difficulty rigs it and engineers its preferred

outcome. The academic literature on elections under authoritarianism offers varying

16 Sayed Bilal, a 31-year-old Salafi, was arrested on January 5, 2011 as a suspect for a bombing attack in a Coptic Two Saints Church in the New Year's Eve in Alexandria. He was killed under police custody. The forensic autopsy report determined the cause of death as cerebral hemorrhage related to head injuries. Later, Alexandria Criminal Court decided that Sayed Bilal was subjected to police torture under custody (MENA 2011).

132

arguments about the subject. Gandi and Przeworski (2007) argued that in order to

countervail threats from larger groups in the society, autocrats very often employ

democratic mechanisms and institutions such as elections and 'elected' legislatures.

In Gandi and Przeworski’s (2007) assessment, it cannot be taken for granted that

"elections necessarily undermine authoritarian regimes; in fact, the opposite generally

appears to be true" (p.417). Depending on the particular socio political setting, elections

serve different aims and produce different effects and short and long term affects. Gandi

and Przeworski suggested: “Specifically, partisan legislatures incorporate potential

opposition forces, investing them with a stake in the ruler’s survival. By broadening the

basis of support for the ruler, these institutions lengthen his tenure” (p.1280).

Through elections, authoritarian regimes provide support, however limited, and

constitute an essential coalition. Any coalition, regardless of its strength, provides the

regime with a certain amount of public support from within the society. In the same vein,

Blaydes (2011) argued that through elections, the Mubarak regime made everyone,

supporters and rivals alike, know that it had a certain base of support within the society.

She asserted that during the rule of Mubarak, elections were a nominal democratic

institutional practice designed to claim the legal tenure (both for the domestic and

international audience) of the government.

The Egyptian Ministry of Interior regularly deployed police officers to supervise

the elections and presidential referendums (Kassem 2004). Police forces in coordination

with the intelligence organizations ensured regime’s desired outcome. To this end, the

Ministry of Interior systematically used various methods including detaining popular

opposition candidate before elections and hindering voters to enter the poling stations.

133

One interlocutor who had an Islamic political orientation explained that on one occasion,

at the day of election security forces, who had list of names, prevented him repeatedly

from entering the polling station. He recounted:

When I approached the polling station, police officers checked my id and sent me to another place. Each time I tried, I was redirected to some other entrance or polling station and eventually I could not vote.

The 2010 Parliamentary elections were held to form the Ninth Assembly in two

rounds in November and December 2010. All major political parties, other than El-Ghad

Party that endorsed ElBaradei’s call for boycott, participated in the elections. The

elections were held without judicial supervision and independent international

monitoring. The results of the elections justified the concerns of ElBaradei. It turned out

to be one of the most fraudulent elections of the Egyptian history. Mubarak's National

Democratic Party won 420 of 444 contested seats in the parliament. The New Wafd

became the second party and won only six seats. Because of its illegal status, the Muslim

Brotherhood participated in the elections though independent candidates obtained only

one seat. This was a frustrating result for the Muslim Brotherhood that had gained 83

seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections. For many people, this outcome proved the level

of manipulation in the elections.

Kasim, (LI) a liberal Egyptian in his early 40s explained;

Before the elections in 2010, there was a certain level of hope in people. ElBaredei’s return and his brave petition campaign raised expectations specifically among the youth and intellectuals. Yet, the 2010 election results were disastrous and shook the beliefs of people in the system. I think it was the worst elections in the Egyptian history. The Muslim Brotherhood had gained only one seat; from 88 seats to one seat? How was that possible? The brutal killing of Khalid Said by the state security and the fraud in 2010 elections alienated people against the regime completely.

The regime had employed different strategies to control the outcome of the

134

elections. In our interview, Dr. Nagib (FR), a political scientist who was among

important members of the Mubarak’s NDP stated:

In Egypt, whoever runs the election, determines the results.

Several days before the elections in November 2010, the state stopped the

broadcast of several media outlet on different grounds. Besides several important figures

from the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested on trivial excuses. Haroun, (MB) a MB

supporter in his late thirties, explained his experience on polling day in November 2010:

During Mubarak’s rule, the regime had a wide variety of strategies for rigging elections that were employed before and on the day of the elections. The state security and police were experts in that. Cancelling opposition votes, denying access to polling stations for people, intimidating, arresting influential oppositional figures, vote buying, reproducing votes for the NDP, damaging ballot box in places that are known to be mainly against the regime, deleting people’s name on registration lists are well known to Egyptians. People who were known to be supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood or other oppositional parties were too intimidated to go to poll stations. Sometimes police arranged groups of baltagiyya (thugs) to violently confront members of the Ihkwan (the Brotherhood) around the polling stations. According to official state records, the ratio of participation in elections was 23

percent in 2005 and 25 percent in 2010 (Masoud 2011). As these low levels of turn

out in the elections suggested, Egyptians had already lost confidence that the elections

would bring any improvement in their lives. Under complete police management, the

elections in November-December 2010 were flagrantly rigged to return 97 percent of the

seats to Mubarak’s vehicle, the National Democratic Party. The elections outraged

political elites and ordinary people alike, spurring a unified opposition protest on

December 12 and left behind fresh memories of street battles in dozens of districts across

the land (El-Ghobashy 2011).

135

Contrary to many intellectuals who were close to Mubarak regime, Aly (2012)

identified the increasing social opposition and tension before the events of January 25.

Nevertheless, President Mubarak did not seem to be interested in Aly’s calls for urgent

and comprehensive reforms:

Al-Ahram (state’s main media foundation) prints about 85 percent of press publications in Egypt and distributes 90 percent of all print publications— so I had access to information not only about our products but also those of our competitors. Utilizing this information, I…devised a way of measuring the degrees of resentment on the part of Egyptian citizens against their government. Since al-Ahram publications were circulated at approximately 3,000 points throughout Egypt, I tracked the distribution levels of three pro-state national newspapers—al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, and al-Gomhuria—and three opposition newspapers: al-Masry al-Yum, al-Dostur, and al- Shrouk. Utilizing this information, locations where more opposition papers than pro-state papers were disseminated were marked in red, and locations where the national press had a higher circulation in green…Until September 2010 the majority of the map was always green. In the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, however, the red spots on the map started to gradually increase. By January 2011, the map had become almost entirely red: The country was raging with anger. Still, I did not predict, or expect, imminent revolution (Aly 2012:3).

Aly (2012) interpreted this sudden increase in tension and resentment against the

state as people’s reaction to the rigged parliamentary elections that was held in

November-December 2010: “While I knew that the elections, with their rigging, fraud,

violence, and intimidation, were a national catastrophe, I was also aware of the fact that it

was not the first time that Egyptian elections had been fabricated” (Aly 2012:3).

However, this time the public’s anger did not fade away as he expected.

The killing of Khaled Said and the rigged parliamentary elections in 2010

depleted most Egyptians’ hopes against the regime and as the sudden increase in protests

and online activity in webpages such as “We are all Khaled Said” showed, Egyptians

politicized at unprecedented levels. These two events completely delegitimized the

Mubarak regime in the eyes of the Egyptians.

136

2. Crisis: January 25, The First Day of Protests

Introduction

The phase of crisis in social dramas can be conceptualized as instigation of the

final encounter that is usually preceded by an event or events considered by all members

of the political field as a severe violation of a common norm. As Swartz et al. (1966)

argued, this is not necessarily to be a political or legal norm and in many instances it

could be an ethical norm that is of highly political value. Very often this critical incident,

which is interpreted as a severe violation of a common norm, is related, in the minds of

people to 'legitimacy' of the power holders. Violation of such a norm may result in a

crisis, a "momentous juncture or turning point in the relations between components of a

political field" (Swartz et al. 1966:34). By the advent of crisis, hidden animosity turns

into overt conflict. At this point, by application of various mechanisms and strategies –

particularly from the side of antagonist– such as intimidation, terrorizing, conspiracy,

unlawful detentions, the whole society is most likely to position itself in two adversarial

camps. Swartz et al. argued that at this stage, rivalries that prevailed before the crisis

among different groups of society are suspended temporarily until the end of the crisis.

In light of above discussion, January 25, the first day of 18 days of protests can be

considered as the start of ‘crisis’ phase. The Tunisian Revolution that resulted in the

ouster of Ben Ali regime on January 14, 2011 with its relatively quick pace (in 27 days)

led Egyptians to contemplate the “impossible”; ‘why not the same in Egypt?’. The impact

of the Tunisian Revolution on the psyche of ordinary Egyptians was beyond the influence

of any group of activist or elite whose reach, in most cases, was limited to certain classes

of Egyptians, whether in terms of economic class or generational groups (El-Ghobashy

137

2011). On January 25, 2011 several youth movements organized nation wide

demonstrations on the National Police Day to protest the widespread police brutality and

the activities of Ministry of Interior.

Particularly, by January 28, “the day of Rage” the crisis reached the threshold

considered as the final encounter. The organizers had aptly used a cultural and religious

occasion, namely the Friday praying that many Muslim Egyptians traditionally attend, to

mobilize greater numbers of people. On January 27, the Muslim Brotherhood declared

their intention to join the protests after the Friday praying. Egyptians who were

encouraged by the unprecedented numbers of protesters during the first three days and

their relative success against the “untouchable” security forces decided to join in ever

larger numbers. Until that day, neither the regime nor the protestors had recognized the

true magnitude of the protest.

138

Timeline of the January 25, 2011 Uprisings

January 25:

“Day of Rage”: Thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in Cairo, Alexandria, Nile

Delta cities of Mansura, Tanta, and in the cities of Assiut and Aswan.

Clashes between the police and demonstrators; police use tear gas and water cannons.

The Ministry of Interior claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood provoked the events. The

Muslim Brotherhood vehemently denied the accusation.

The government blocked access to Twitter (yet it was still accessible through third-party

mobile applications).

January 26:

Protests grew across Egypt; violence continued. Police used live bullets. There were

reports of deaths and wounded people. The Twitter block was lifted.

January 27:

Relatively calm compared to the previous two days. Egyptians were getting prepared for

the "Day of Rage" on Friday, 28th. The Government blocked access to Facebook, but

many people could bypass the block through proxy servers and third-party applications.

January 28:

Egyptians were preparing themselves for a new wave of protests after Friday prayers.

Reports of major disruptions in Internet and cell phone and text message services

occurred.

The Interior Ministry warned of decisive measures.

20 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested overnight.

139

Police and demonstrators clashed throughout Egypt. There are reports of deaths and

wounded protestors.

Troops stepped into Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, but they do not interfere.

Police withdrew from the streets. There were reports of occasional looting in some areas.

January 29:

Shortly after midnight Mubarak announced that he dismissed the cabinet but he rejected

calls to step down. Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman, former head of intelligence, as

the vice-president (for the first time during his near three decades of rule).

Military presence increased in Cairo and a curfew was declared, but protests continued

throughout the night. The military secured Cairo's antiquities museum from looters.

Thousands of protesters camped in Tahrir Square although soldiers fired into the air in an

attempt to disperse them. Suez had a tense night.

Volunteer groups secured their districts against looters.

January 30:

Thousands of Egyptians remained in Cairo's Tahrir Square. F-16s of the Egyptian Air

Force flew over Tahrir Square.

January 31:

Mubarak still ignored growing calls for his resignation. Despite the military-imposed

curfew, protesters continue to gather in Tahrir Square and different cities. Protesters

remain camped out in Tahrir Square.

The new vice-president assured dialogue with the opposition.

The White House announced that the government must establish sincere dialogue with its

people to resolve the unrest.

140

The military repeated that it would not attempt to clash with the protesters.

The EU urged free and fair elections. National and international investors continued

withdrawing significant amounts of capital from Egypt.

Mubarak declared his new cabinet and Mahmoud Wagdi, assumed the role as the new

Minister of Interior.

Al Jazeera reported an unusual scale of interference in its broadcast signal.

February 1:

The planned "March of the Millions" took place in Tahrir Square. There were differing

accounts about the numbers of the protestors. Al Jazeera estimates that there were around

two million protestors present in Tahrir Square in surrounding streets.

In a televised speech Mubarak declared that he would not run for presidential elections in

September 2011 but he refused to step down. Mubarak promised reforms to the

constitution especially for article 76, which virtually prevented any independent

candidate from running for office. He promised that government would concentrate on

improving the economy and creating jobs.

Occasional violent clashes began at night between pro-Mubarak groups and protestors

February 2:

Battle of Camel: Groups of Mubarak supporters, some on camels and some on horses,

charged into crowds of protesters in Tahrir Square. There are reports of deaths and

hundreds of injured people. Some protesters claim that the military allowed thousands of

pro-Mubarak armed thugs, to enter the square.

February 3:

Bursts of gunfire at early hours aimed at protestors in Tahrir Square. Several people died

and some were wounded.

141

February 4:

Day of Departure: Hundreds of thousands of protesters continued to remain in Tahrir

Square.

February 5:

Rumors circulated that the military was planning to evacuate protestors from Tahrir

Square.

The leadership of the ruling National Democratic Party, including Gamal Mubarak,

resigned.

February 6:

The Muslim Brotherhood announced its intention to participate in dialogue with

government officials. Vice President Omar Suleiman met with representatives of the

opposition. Omar Suleiman promised reforms.

Egyptian Christians held Sunday Mass in Tahrir Square, secured by a ring of Muslim

Egyptians.

February 7:

Mubarak set up two committees to make changes to the constitution. Thousands

remained in Tahrir Square. Banks reopened, but schools and the stock exchange market

remained closed. To pacify the protesters the government approved a 15 per cent increase

in salaries and pensions.

Google executive and political activist Wael Ghonim, who was in placed detention

during the previous week, was released.

February 8:

According to some sources Egyptians witnessed the biggest crowd of protesters of their

142

history.

The vice-president Omar Suleiman announced some constitutional and legislative

reforms to be prepared by representative committees.

February 9:

Labor unions joined the demonstrations. Large-scale strikes started throughout Egypt.

Some political prisoners were released. Human Rights Watch reported that 302 people

were killed since the beginning of the protests.

February 10:

Mubarak gave a televised speech; he reiterated that he would not run in the next

presidential elections and he would stay in power to supervise a peaceful transition in

September. Protesters reacted with rage that Mubarak rejected to step down. The

protestors called the army to join actively in the uprising.

February 11:

At 6:00 pm local time, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak's resignation;

the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces would assume power.

(Sources: Aljazeera 2011; Reuters 2011c)

143

Crisis: January 25, The First Day of Protests

Having been inspired by the events in Tunisia that resulted in the ousting of the

23-year-long Ben Ali regime on 14 January 2011, young activists from the April 6 Youth

Movement, the liberal Democratic Front Party, the leftist Youth Movement for Justice

and Freedom, the Popular Campaign for the Support of ElBaradei, and some young

activist from the Muslim Brotherhood met and decided to call for mass demonstrations

on 25 January which was the National Police Day that was inaugurated for the

commemoration of the police forces’ struggle in the city of Ismailia against the

occupying British in 1952 (Shehata 2012). From her first-hand interviews with several of

the organizers, Shehata reported that the young activists particularly selected January 25

to protest the police brutality and the repressive activities of the Ministry of Interior. A

similar attempt by the April 6 Movement one year before on January 25, 2010 had been

violently suppressed by the police (Khalil 2012). The organizers decided to use the “We

Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page for the announcement and organization of the

protests. The announcements and plans for the demonstration were spread on Twitter and

personal blogs. Their slogan was: “Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity”. The core of

protestors mainly consisted of educated youth who were widely using the social media.

Although it is difficult to judge exactly, it is plausible to argue that the majority of the

protestors that responded to calls were initially youth of middle class backgrounds.

Based on responses to the calls for protests on the We are all Khaled Said

Facebook page, the organizers predicted that it would be a different day with more

participation than a regular protest. The Ministry of Interior warned Egyptians through

the national media about the possible consequences of arrest for unlawful demonstrations.

144

According to the demonstration laws of 1914, any public meeting exceeding more than

five persons required a permit. Apparently, the police were prepared with numbers of

Riot Police that were deployed and check points were established at important and major

access points leading to Tahrir Square. The Ministry of the Interior had arranged similar

security measures for the Greater Cairo area and other major cities. The police blocked

the main roads that led to inner Cairo from the surrounding provinces of Menoufia,

Daqhaliyya, and Kafr al-Shaykh (El-Ghobashy 2011).

From the early hours of January 25, the numbers of protesters surprised both the

organizers and the police; these were far beyond estimations. One of the organizers from

the Popular Campaign for ElBaradei, Ziad al-‘Ulaymi said: "we went out to protest that

day and expected to be arrested in the first ten minutes, just like usual” (El-Ghobashy

2011:7).

Amr Farouk, (WP) spokesperson of the Wasat Party, talked about how they made

a decision to join the protests as the Wasat Party and his impressions on the January 25:

We met to make a decision whether we would, as the party, attend or not. At that time, we were waiting for the verdict of authorities about our last application for permission to establish our party. We had submitted our last application in 2009 and we had been refused again. So, the party’s committee appealed the verdict and the last session of the committee in the court would be held on February 19, 2011. So, that was why we had to make the decision, a compromising decision, not to clash with the government at that time. But, nevertheless, we decided to join…On the 25th , we went to Supreme Court. It seemed that it would be a regular day till maybe 2-3 o’clock in the afternoon, there were groups coming…Then I started receiving phone calls informing that increasing numbers of people started to gather and people started to march from more than one place…I reached Tahrir Square around 6 o’clock. For the first time in my life I saw such a big crowd of protesters; around 50 or 60 thousand of very very young gentlemen, very very well educated gentlemen had gathered. They were not the people that one normally would expect to see in a revolutionary movement. We had thought that a revolutionary movement would originate from the hungry, starving people, not from this well educated, not from the middle class. We had thought that it would be from the lower class. It was what happened in 2008,

145

when the food prices skyrocketed people, generally from lower classes, joined mass uprisings and labor strikes that occurred in the city of El-Mahalla El-Kubra. And on that day (January 25), I did not see the Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) on the streets. We used to see them in big demonstrations. It should be supported with Ikhwan because they have this big organization and they can mobilize lots of people. When we organized a big demonstration, we had to be supported by Ikhwan, but those people were not from Ikhwan. Anyway, I moved on. I was searching for the people who I knew in the demonstrations. We have a history with demonstrations and we knew most of the people joining in; I knew them, all. Those who attended that day were not the people I knew. We had new different people on the streets…

In what follows, the phase of crisis will be analyzed in light of the concept of

contentious politics. McAdams et al. (2001) showed that certain mechanisms and

processes recurrently occur in various episodes of contentious politics such as successful

and failed revolutions, nationalism movements, and rebellions. In the analysis of 2011

Egyptian Revolution as a social drama, this study arbitrarily determined Innovative

Collective Action, Contingent Events, Certification, Scale Shift, Constitution of New

Political Actors, Regime Defection, Decertification, Polarization; and various redressive

mechanisms such as Threat and Intimidation and Disinformation as relevant mechanisms

and processes that contributed to the revolutionary outcome; that is the ouster of

Mubarak.

a. Innovative Collective Action

McAdam et al. (2001) argued that Innovative Collective Action is a recurring

process that plays a significant role in successful revolutions. In most cases of

revolutionary situations, the security apparatus of the ruling regime provide an

approximate estimation of the means, tactics, and capacity of the contending bloc. These

assessments usually involve the known tactics and established modus operandi of the

opposition groups. Therefore, the security forces are prepared for an encounter based on

146

these calculations. Then, it is the innovative tactics that enhance the capability of

contenders to challenge the institutional power of the security forces in real terms.

The use of digital media and the Internet as a medium for both increasing public

awareness and getting organized should not be considered a completely new

phenomenon. Internet and satellite channels, specifically the Al Jazeera played a

significant role both in the pre revolution period and during the 18 days of protests

(Ghareeb 2000; Ghannam 2011; Lotan et al. 2011). Al Jazeera helped resurrect a pan

Arab identity (El-Nawawy & Iskandar 2003; Zayani 2005) through which Arabs

elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa quickly espoused the revolutionary fervor

observed after the events in Tunisia. Social media and individual blogging provided an

alternative public space and means of organization around shared causes against the

regime. The Facebook pages, such as “We Are All Khaled Said” exposed the brutalities

of the Mubarak regime and contributed significantly to the delegitimization of the

Mubarak regime.

For the past several years the youth movements were actively using the Internet

through social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to communicate

their political views and agenda and to get organized and publicize regime’s atrocities

(Howard et al. 2011). However, neither the users, the leading figures of the opposition on

digital platform nor the security forces had an exact estimation of the reach of their

message in the society. Thus, everyone was surprised to see so many young people on the

streets on January 25.

The novelty was not limited to the unprecedented numbers of protestors; the

organizers employed new strategies that were aimed to distract the security apparatus.

147

The organizers had announced the start of the protests as 2 pm to be held in front of the

Ministry of Interior and it would ostensibly last until 5 pm. Accordingly, the security

forces closed off all main streets that were leading to the Ministry of Interior and the

police permitted pedestrian access only after ID checks. Yet, El-Ghobashy (2011)

reported, it was a ploy and the organizers had deliberately misinformed the ministry

about the exact time of the protests and the location of these. The real timing was noon

and the organizers disseminated this information through mobile phones and landlines on

the morning of January 25. As El-Ghobashy recounted from al-‘Ulaymi, one of the

organizers, the real plan was to start off marching from several small streets and to gather

all groups later at one central meeting point. These kinds of tactics proved to be very

effective for overwhelming the security forces. As the following days of the protests

revealed, particularly after the demonstrations took a revolutionary stance, the youth

increasingly benefited from the experiences of their counterparts in Tunisia and

elsewhere. In our interview, the renowned sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (LI) recounted

an interesting note about the use of new tactics by the protestors. According to Dr.

Ibrahim’s account, a defected Egyptian police officer, who lived in the United States at

the time, was in regular contact with the several of the organizers during the protests in

Cairo. Based on his experience within the Egyptian police force, the former officer

advised the protestors to meet in small numbers at more than one place and then begin

marching towards to central meeting point. He anticipated that as the demonstrations

increased in length, the security officers would get exhausted with little sleep and food

and they would be more susceptible to sympathize with the protestors. He also suggested

to the protestors to befriend the police, especially the Riot Police most of whom come

148

from a poor socio-political background.

…I found them (protestors) starting dialogues between them and between small and young policemen like lieutenants and first lieutenants at same ages. They (protesters) started to ask them: “why are you doing this, we are coming here for you and us, for al karama (dignity), for social justice and for..” and others were answering; “we are here to protect the regime this is what we swore about.” (During protests in downtown Cairo on January 25: From interview with Amr Farouk (WP) ).

Although some of the groups could not reach the downtown area of Cairo

initially, the tactic worked to a great extent. Each group grew while marching toward

Tahrir by participation of bystanders, most of whom were emboldened by the events in

Tunisia (Lynch 2013). Apparently, the relatively big number of the groups trying to reach

to Tahrir had encouraged other Egyptians. The number of participants began to grow

slowly along the way. A snowballing effect, certainly with some interrelated dynamics,

was in place. People who did not know that a protest was taking place, or initially not

intending to join the protests were encouraged by the unusual numbers and enthusiasm of

the marching protestors. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (LI) explained how his American citizen

wife joined the protests on January 25.

My wife was chairing a conference about potential role of youth in the Arab World at one of the luxury hotels overlooking the Nile. She saw a big group marching from Qasr al-Nile Bridge towards the Tahrir Square and she realized that the number of protestors were quite bigger than usual. Then, she suggested to the participants that they should go down and join the protestors to talk with them directly about subject matter of their meeting. The participants agreed and they reached Tahrir Square before that group and stayed there in Tahrir. I (Saad Eddin Ibrahim) was in the US at the time and she called me on the phone and told me that something big was developing.

A close analysis of the protests reveals that the organizers followed a pattern that

was outlined by Gene Sharp in his works The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973) and

From Dictatorship to Democracy (1993). Some of the organizers, like Ahmad Maher and

149

a few others from the Six April Youth Movement were specifically influenced from the

experience of Otpor (Resistance)17 movement in Serbia and had training there on how to

realize a successful revolution against a dictatorship (Kirkpatrick & Sanger 2011).

According to Gene Sharp’s doctrine nonviolence was the most effective strategy

when there is no balance of power between the rivals. Thus, protests had to be

nonviolent. Although there happened occasional violent actions that went beyond limits,

the tactics that were used by the protestors were in general defensive and aimed to render

the security forces dysfunctional (physically and psychologically), and in terms of

equipment. To this end, from the first day on the protesters chanted frequently "salmeya,

salmeya " (peaceful, peaceful). The protesters had to restrain themselves against any

excessive acts of violence, even though the security forces provoked them. Furthermore,

there was the Tunisian experience. The organizers were in contact with their counterparts

in Tunisia and they shared their “best practices” against the police tactics (Kirkpatrick &

Sanger 2011).

b. Contingent Events

Contingent events denote unexpected incidents that affect the course of

contentious episode in unpredicted ways and scale. McAdam et al. (2001) provided

examples of contingencies in various contentious episodes. One striking example is the

devastating earthquake that happened in Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, on

17 Otpor is a youth organization that played a leading role in ouster of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. It was founded by a group of students in 1998 (Kurtz 2010). After the Serbian Revolution Otpor institutionalized itself providing training for nonviolent struggle against undemocratic rulers. Otpor's main source of reference has been Gene Sharp’s doctrine of nonviolent action. Otpor is believed to get financial assistance from the US government (Beissinger 2006)

150

December 23, 1972. After the earthquake, Nicaraguan President Somoza, who depicted

the earthquake as a "revolution of possibilities", allotted huge contracts of rebuilding of

the capital to no one but a few from his coterie of businessmen (McAdam et al.

2001:200). Thus, the Somoza 'clan' enjoyed unrestricted control over the demolition and

construction business and later selling of commercial and residential buildings with

speculative and very lucrative prices. Consequently, right after the earthquake, serious

discontent emerged among the ruling alliances. Eventually, by 1974 the significant

segment of the Nicaragua's business elite defected from the alliance with the regime and

began to call for reforms. The earthquake was a very important turning point in the

course of eventual ouster of Somoza regime. In a nutshell, unpredictable events might

effectively change the course of contentious episode, whether a nationalist movement,

revolutionary movement, or democratization process exists.

In regard to the collected data concerning the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, three

incidents were considered as “contingent events” that had unexpected impacts on the

revolutionary process and outcome: i) The Tunisian Revolution, ii) The Muslim

Brotherhood’s Late Entry into the Protests, iii) The Miscalculation of the Regime.

Studying the effects of contingent events on the revolutionary trajectory enriches one’s

understanding of the existing fault lines in the Egyptian society in pro-revolution period.

i) Tunisian Revolution

In our interview with Tarek El-Kholi (A), one of the leading members of the

influential April 6 Youth Movement18, he explained:

18 Several months after the 2011 Tahrir Revolution, the April Six movement split into two different groups. One group under the leadership of Ahmad Maher and the second

151

After the Tunisian Revolution, we began saying: if Tunisians did it, we can do it too. We are Egyptians...Tunisian affect was spreading. There were already cases of self-immolations in different cities of Egypt, though none triggered a Tunisian-like mass movement. We decided with several other activists groups to organize a day of demonstration on the Police Day, January 25 to protest the Ministry of Interior. We were excited by what happened in Tunisia, but we did not initially think that so many people would join and it would turn into revolution. The Tunisian Revolution can plausibly be considered as a contingent event that

stimulated similar aspirations and actions in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. The

Tunisian Revolution had profoundly influenced the Egyptians, particularly the young

activists. As Khalil (2012) put it “there was an immediate post-Tunisia adrenaline rush in

the Egyptian activist community—not to mention the uncounted ranks of the

depoliticized, who suddenly allowed themselves to think the unthinkable” (pp. 85-86).

ii) Miscalculation of the Regime

Mubarak regime’s failure to understand the increasing tension and the true

dimensions of the planned protests, and even the Tunisian example, can be considered as

another contingent event with unforeseen consequences that affected the course of the

protests.

As Mona El-Ghobashy (2011) argued, although there was a significant increase in

numbers of protests and strikes, particularly after 2008, opposition movements were

fragmented and weak in general during Mubarak rule. Thus, they failed to develop into

an organized force against the regime. The regime framed these increased incidents as

labor strikes, demonstrations of different occupational groups, rural strikes, and protests,

as “economic, not political; local, not national; and defensive, not proactive” (El-

group, April 6 Democratic Front, is under the leadership of Tarek El Kholy (El-Gundy 2011)

152

Ghobashy 2011:3). Despite the fact that this assessment was correct to a great extent, this

kind of approach by the regime operated on two somewhat contrasting dimensions. First,

it led to a complete disregard or blindness among the ruling elites, beginning from

Mubarak himself, against the needs and demands of Egyptians. Consequently, having

failed to appraise the true dimensions of the resentment and societal tension, the regime

did not attempt to address people’s demands with appropriate and concrete political and

economic reforms. Secondly, this misapprehension of resentment led to regime’s

mismanagement of the crisis, that is the 18 days of protests, from the first day on. As Aly

(2012) also argued, this mismanagement eventually enabled the protests to gain a

revolutionary status and then to bring about a revolutionary outcome. In a similar vein, in

our interview with Dr. Ali El Din Hilal (FR), another political scientist from the inner

circle of Mubarak’s NDP, he suggested that the regime did not collapse because of the

numbers of the protesters, but because of the inner decay of the ruling elite. He argued

that the decision making process could not address the crisis in a timely and in an

adequate way.

The intelligence apparatus was monitoring the online activity and the preparations

and they were aware that something was different this time. They expected about 30,000

protestors in the greater Cairo area and 10,000 in Alexandria (Aly 2012). Nevertheless,

they underestimated the numbers of potential participants in the protests. More critically,

the security forces ignored the silent masses that appeared to be uninterested in politics.

In our conversation with Mr. Soliman (FR), a high-level bureaucrat who was part of the

intelligence apparatus at the time of the revolution, he explained:

After the uprising in Tunisia and increasing activity in the Facebook page of We Are All Khaled Said, we anticipated an unusually harsh confrontation with

153

protestors on January 25. However, our concerns and warnings were not taken into consideration with due attention by Mubarak. In fact, eventually the number of protestors and the intensity of the clashes turned out to be beyond our estimations. Dr. Said (FR) argued that until the fourth day of the protests the regime depended

on this miscalculation. And after the January 28, “Friday of Anger” the state faced the

cold reality that controlling millions of protestors was out of its capacity. The Secretary

General of the NDP, Husam Badrawy, who met with President Mubarak several times

during the second week of the demonstrations, realized that Mubarak was misinformed

about the extent of the demonstrations (Aly 2012). Thus, Mubarak failed to make timely

critical decisions to alleviate and contain the increasing tension during the first days of

the protests.

In the last ten days before the uprising Dr. Said (FR) met three times President

Mubarak. He explained that in spite of the Tunisian Revolution, Mubarak seemed quite

relaxed and unconcerned. This lack of concern and relaxed attitude of Mubarak was

somewhat consistent with the ruling elite’s perception of Egyptian society and politics. In

the same vein, the quotes that are presented from people who were close to Mubarak

regime, in which some of them do not refer to any root causes of the uprisings, reflect the

same elite perception about the Egyptian society in the Mubarak era. Ali al-Din Hilal’s

communication with a US diplomat in 2009 is illuminating: “Widespread, politically

motivated unrest was unlikely because it was not part of the ‘Egyptian mentality’” (El-

Ghobashy 2011:3). In our interview with Ali el-Din Hilal (FR), a trained political

scientist who served as the Media Secretary of the NDP at last years of Mubarak, said

that their assessment for the January 25 period was that “it would be like one of the many

demonstration”; it would be more crowded but, they did not expect anything

154

extraordinary. Ali el-Din Hilal (FR) was right in a sense that Egyptian people hade been

calm by nature, yet the regime failed to notice the increasing tension that would

eventually mobilize the masses in the coming days.

Based on the preceding accounts, this study considers the initial ‘incorrect’

estimation of the security apparatus and their reaction during the first day on January 25

as a situation of ‘contingency’ that led to unexpected and significant cumulative effects

on the evolution of a ‘regular’ day of protest into a revolutionary movement. From

accounts of the informants and from the analysis of the actual responses of the security

apparatus, it is plausible to claim that the assessment of the security apparatus of the

planned demonstration was far from apprehending the true magnitude of the developing

crisis and the potential numbers of the protestors. Thus, Mubarak could not make timely

critical decisions and did not respond preemptively to the initial ‘humble’ demands of the

protesters in the first two days. We can only speculate about what these possible ‘timely

critical decisions’ could be and how the protesters would react or how the course of

protests onward would proceed. Nevertheless, as some of the interlocutors who were

among the organizer suggested, if Mubarak had responded positively on the first few

days and had sacked the Ministry of Interior, Habib el-Adly; and if Mubarak had

promised that neither himself nor his son Gamal would run for presidency in the coming

elections, it was likely that the protests would not have continued. These were some

initial demands by the protestors and given the actual or perceived imbalance of power

between the protesters and the regime, they would probably happily have acquiesced with

what they could get. Yet, the regime did not make any concessions in the first few days

and tried to disperse the protesters violently. As the first two days past, the protesters

155

became more confident gradually and after the fourth day, January 28, the course of the

protests gained an irreversible direction and gained a revolutionary stance. As some of

the interlocutors explained they were not expecting to stay more than several hours. It

was the unprecedented numbers of protestors and their relative and occasional advantage

against the police that encouraged others, who did not intend to join or did not know

about the protests, to go out and join the protestors in the first and following days.

The miscalculation of the upcoming “threat” or the misapprehension of the true

magnitude of the tension in times of potential crisis was not a fault unique to Mubarak or

his security apparatus, but it is a common phenomenon in authoritarian regimes

(McAdams et al. 2001). It is as such probably because of the “dictator’s solitude”, as Al

Aswani (2011:36) argued for another context in Mubarak regime. Mubarak himself and

the ruling elite were so detached from the public that they were not aware of people’s

sufferings and demands. It was probably because of this problem, some of interlocutors

who were close to the Mubarak regime, were surprised greatly by the revolution that, in

their estimation, “suddenly disrupted the increasing momentum of prospering Egypt”.

Furthermore, it was the plague of the “arrogance of power”, as Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal

(FR) stated in our conversation, referring to Fulbright’s (1966) term used in a different

context. The ruling elite was so arrogant and confident that they just did not take the

increasing resentment and rage, even after having witnessed the Tunisian Revolution,

seriously.

iii) Muslim Brotherhood’s Late Entry to the Protests

One of the controversies that prevailed even in the post-revolutionary period was

about claiming ownership for the revolution. It was certainly a popular mass movement,

156

and not a specific group claims the sole ownership of it. Nevertheless, the contest was

about who organized and initiated the protests in the first place and thus deserved a

justified acclaim and acknowledgment for its success. Discussions around this issue have

been to a great extent related to determining the owner of the “revolutionary privilege’,

that is to identify the group who was supposed to have a fair say and role in Egyptian

politics –as per their contribution to the revolution– in the post-Mubarak period. In this

vein, the timing of the participation became a point of contention, mainly around the role

of the Islamist political organizations, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis.

This debate was framed with the popular term of ‘hijacking the revolution’ and it has

been widely used in Egypt in political debates since the ousting of Mubarak. Hijacking

the revolution denotes the “disproportional” gain of the Islamists, particularly the Muslim

Brotherhood, from the revolutionary outcome19. The Salafi parties and the Muslim

Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won around the 2/3 of the votes in

parliamentary elections that were held at the end of 2011. Some people argued that the

Muslim Brotherhood was a latecomer in the protests. The Islamist organizations joined

the protests only after they believed that the balance of power changed for the favor of

the protestors. This point is significant in terms of understanding the revolutionary

processes and the debates of legitimacy in the post-revolution period.

The leading figures of the revolution and public in general considered one’s

participation and role in the revolution, whether as an individual or institutional, as the

19 There is also another aspect of the expression of ‘hijacking the revolution’ by which secular opposition groups argue that the Muslim Brotherhood diverted the political course of the country away from the revolutionary ideals by the policies of the FJP government and President Morsy.

157

major source of legitimacy in doing politics in the post-Mubarak period. In this respect,

many of the members of the Mubarak’s NDP were banned practicing politics and even if

they were not legally banned their candidacy for any political position sparked public

anger and criticism. However, before the presidential elections in 2012, former Minister

of Aviation and Mubarak’s last Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, declared his candidacy for

the presidency. Although this led to an initial public outcry, the judiciary approved his

candidacy and he ran for the office in the second phase of the presidential elections

against the MB’s candidate Mohamed Morsi.

The MB had a controversial and volatile relationship with the state during the

Mubarak regime. The MB was legally banned as a political party; yet the state allowed its

non-political activities. The MB has had a considerable numbers of members and

organizational presence throughout the entire Egypt. There had been a generational

difference between the old guard of the organization at the top and some elements of

younger members who had not been subjected to the most repressive tactics of the state.

The state, from Nasser and Sadat to Mubarak, intermittently repressed the MB on varying

forms and intensity. The organization was banned and its financial assets were

confiscated and economic activities had been stopped. Many of the leaders had been

subjected to imprisonment and torture. Yet, despite its banned status and the intermittent

state repression, the MB had somewhat of an ambivalent relationship with Mubarak. In

spite of their criticism of the regime, Mubarak allowed the organization to continue their

social welfare activities, by which state’s inadequate public services, particularly in rural

areas, were, to some extent ‘compensated’. Thus, the MB continued to exist as a political

158

opposition force –however limited and restricted– against the Mubarak’s National

Democratic Party

Having paid a costly price against the state repression, it was not surprising that

the MB was reluctant to respond to the calls for the protests on the January 25. After the

organizers announced their intention to protest on the Police Day, the MB made it clear

that they would not participate in the demonstrations. The Maktab al-Irshad, 'the

guidance office', with the Murshid, ‘the supreme leader’ were familiar with the tactics of

the Ministry of Interior to handle protests and probably they did not want to lose their

institutional position, though this was far from ideal and a true political alternative

against the regime. After all, the MB had a lot to lose in case of a possible counter attack

by the state if the events get out of limits that the regime would tolerate. The MB could

not risk that. Like almost everyone, the MB did not expect the protest to have a

detrimental effect on the regime. Thus, probably because of these concerns, the

organization opted to abstain. Nevertheless, El-Ghobashy (2011) and several

interlocutors from various political leanings conveyed the fact that young activist from

the Muslim Brotherhood were present at the first meeting where the representatives from

various youth movements decided to organize the protests. Their decision to join the

demonstrations was an individual initiative that was not encouraged nor supported by the

organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the same vein, in our interview with Amr

Farouk (WP), the spokesperson of the Wasat Party, he stated that from the first day

onward, young activists from the MB were present in the protests individually, not as a

group.

159

The controversy endured even after the revolution ended. In our interview with

Jihad Haddad (MB), a young prominent member of the MB and the spokesman for

President Morsi, he argued that, although it was not acknowledged by the organization

directly, the MB participated in the demonstration from the first day, the January 25. He

argued that he was there in the demonstrations and he had certain tasks that were

assigned by the organization for the first day, January 25. Yet, the widespread belief

among the Egyptians and the evaluation of the security apparatus was that the MB did not

respond positively to the calls for the protests and were not present in the streets officially

and in large numbers until the fourth day, January 28, ‘the day of anger’.

As at he backdrop to these contradictory accounts about the timing of MB’

participation to the demonstrations, lies the quest of legitimacy for the post-revolutionary

period. Yet, more importantly, what this study considers more relevant is that the initial

position of the MB had a determining effect (in an unpredicted way and scale), on the

outcome of the revolution in several ways. Based on the interviews and review of the

available information in the media, this study holds that the MB did not want to risk its

institutional gains vis-à-vis the regime by participating in the protests that were organized

by ‘politically motivated novices’ or young activists. Thus, the organization decided not

to join the protests. This was an arguably a rational preference and the same reasoning

may well be applicable to explain the initial reaction of the Coptic Church under the

leadership of the deceased Pope Shenouda III. Initially, the Coptic Church did not

support the protests and in fact encouraged the Coptic Egyptians to stay away from the

demonstrations (Champion 2011). Inter alia, one of the main reasons behind the decision

of the Coptic Church was to maintain the benevolent relationship that was developed

160

over the years, particularly between Pope Shenouda III, who was the Pope since 1971,

and President Mubarak. Furthermore, the Coptic Community in general saw Mubarak as

a protector against the “radical Islamist forces”.

If the MB had agreed to join the protests on January 25, the composition of the

participants and further reaction of the regime and people would have been considerably

different. Most probably, given the organizational efficiency and large numbers of its

members, the MB would have dominated the demonstrations both in terms of numbers of

the participants and leadership. Yet, in that case, the protests would very likely to be

perceived as a ‘Muslim Brotherhood show’, which would alienate some political groups

and many individual Egyptians who have been aloof to the MB and their ideas.

Furthermore, if the leaders of the security apparatus had believed that the MB

would participate, their preparation and reaction would be harsher to the extent that their

control of the demonstrations from the early hours, when the number of the protestors

were relatively small, would probably have changed the course of the events. Many

ordinary Egyptians, who were unaware of the planned protests or who were undecided

whether to join, were encouraged by the unexpectedly large and continuously growing

numbers of the protesters and their relative success in overwhelming the police in the

early hours of the events. The police was apparently unprepared as to that number of

demonstrators which was unprecedented. The tactic of moving from various locations

instead of gathering in one center proved to be useful. There was sort of a snowballing

affect; as the people saw crowds walking towards the downtown and as they were called

to join the numbers of protesters began to increase. As McAdams et al. (2001) argued,

garnering the support of the wider society for the cause against the regime is of vital

161

importance for contenders in social revolutions. It is not necessarily the numbers of the

protestors that play a decisive role in a revolutionary event that brings about the

revolutionary outcome. But a revolutionary outcome, that is a successful revolution, is a

cumulative result of several other factors, such as elite defection, certification, actor and

identity constitution, contingencies, and so on. Given the diverse political inclinations of

the organizers and the composition of the participants, Egyptians realized that it was a

truly united and heterogonous movement. Egyptians from all political and social

backgrounds had unified against the regime and this fact encouraged many people to join

the demonstrations. Ashraf Khalil (2012) made a similar argument in the sense that the

MB’s participation would probably have hindered the protests from gaining a

revolutionary claim with people from different political and religious background. The

processes of scale shift, certification, actor and identity constitution, would unlikely not

have developed in a setting dominated by the MB leadership.

The explanations of the MB on this issue were controversial. According to a

newspaper article, the former Muslim Brotherhood MP al-Beltagy claimed that MB's

decision not to join the protests was a strategy to circumvent the regime's possible

manipulation to portray the events as a protest of "bearded Islamist hordes" (Khalil

2012:94). However, Essem Erian, one the leading members of the MB made a conflicting

statement: “Police Day was supposed to honor the fight against British colonialism, on

that day we should all be celebrating together” (Kirkpatrick & Sanger 2011).

Khalil’s (2012) evaluation of the MB’s initial position is worth noting:

In retrospect, whether or not you believe al-Beltagy’s explanation of the famously opaque Brotherhood decision-making process, the group’s choice to “sit out” January 25 proved to be one of the best legacies of that day. Egypt’s non-Islamist forces needed to prove (perhaps to themselves as well) that they could marshal

162

massive numbers into the streets without the help of the Brotherhood’s legendary grassroots machinery. And ordinary apolitical Egyptians who feared the Brotherhood’s power needed to see that this wasn’t coming from the Islamist camp. The way things eventually played out, with the Brotherhood formally joining several days into an already robust popular uprising, turned out to be a tremendous boost to the credibility, perception, and confidence of the revolutionaries (Khalil 2012:95).

There is another significant corollary of the absence of the MB in the first day of

the protests. During his entire rule Mubarak successfully used the existence of Islamist

trend in the society as a sort of bargaining instrument both nationally and internationally.

Particularly after the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, Egypt became a close ally of the

US. The US supported Egypt and Mubarak (Cook 2011). He presented himself to the

West, specifically to the US, as the best alternative against the potential threat of

religiously motivated extremists and political Islamists, particularly the MB, of whom

Mubarak had successfully saved the nation and the state. His close cooperation with the

US in her “war on terrorism” and after the 2006 Parliamentary Elections in Palestine that

resulted in Hamas’s victory with 44.45% of total votes, Mubarak proved to be a

important personality, though an undemocratic one, for the US.

All in all, if the MB had participated in the protests on the first three days, the

regime would most probably have taken the events more seriously and manipulated their

involvement to be seen as a potential extremist threat to Egypt’s stability. Thus, the

reaction of the international community would have been different in that they would

most likely have continued to support Mubarak. In fact, the initial reaction of the

international community was somewhat controversial. Some countries, including the US,

declared their support for Mubarak. However, after the magnitude of the events proved

that it was a popular uprising with an unprecedented level of participation and

163

determination, the international community’s support changed direction towards the

Egyptian people.

Consequently, despite the limited number of individual participation, the MB was

not present officially and in large numbers on the first three days of the protests. The MB

joined the protest on January 28, the "Friday of Anger”. The revolutionary fervor had

already gained a momentum and hundreds of thousands of people gathered after the

Friday praying in different locations throughout Egypt. Many liberal interlocutors

interpreted the MB’s decision to participate as a pragmatic move describing the

organization sort of a ‘free rider’ to join the protests at a moment when the protesters had

gained the upper hand against the security forces. Whether it was a pragmatic move or

not, as McAdams et al. (2001) suggested, what is more relevant in a revolutionary

trajectory is to garner the support of the wider society. By the involvement of each new

group and by defection of regime allies, the regime continued to weaken. Moreover,

some activists and politicians who were among the protestors from the first day argued

that the MB’s participation was at a very critical point and probably enabled the protests

to continue.

Arguably, a similar ‘pragmatic pronouncement’ to support the revolutionary

crowds could be attributed equally to the late-comers supporters such as, some

intellectuals, the Coptic Church, the Al Azhar (the highest Islamic authority in Egypt),

and some international powers. Nonetheless, it was not necessarily the changing balance

of power that made the support of new individuals, actors, or groups possible for the

revolutionary cause, but it was as well, inter alia, the gradual elimination of initial

confusion about the intent, cause, and composition of the contenders. Particularly after

164

January 28, the growing numbers and determination of the protesters from all sections of

society showed that this was a popular uprising. Some people, organizations, or

international actors realized that it was the genuine demand of Egyptians and they had to

respect that demand. Yet, this proposition does not rule out the possibility that some were

pragmatists who saw the coming of a new political reality and wanted to be a part of it.

Some intellectuals and journalists who staunchly supported the regime in the first days of

the revolution, changed sides on the latter days of the protests and presented themselves

as ‘revolutionaries’ in the post-Mubarak period.

McAdam et al. (2001) argued that contingent events produced “sudden and

unpredictable decisions, high levels of uncertainty, and new combinations of threat and

opportunity options” (p. 223). Besides, the contingent events generated not only

mobilization but also other mechanisms that potentially determine the course of the

revolutionary process. The Tunisian Revolution and Mubarak regime’s miscalculation of

the emerging crisis boosted an already developing mobilization. As the unprecedented

numbers of protesters achieved a broad reach in Tahrir Square, more Egyptians were

encouraged and joined them. Finally, the organization of MB’s initial absence and later

participation on the Day of Anger, arguably at a very critical moment, had various

significant repercussions.

c. Certification

Certification denotes the process of “validation of actors, their performances, and

claims by external actors (McAdam et al. 2001:158). The analysis of the events shows

that as the protests progressed the general population began to acknowledge the young

people’s determination and courage and in the course of several days, the young

165

organizers and participants became legitimate representatives of the general population

against a corrupt regime.

The youth movements and other political groups that initially took part in

organization of the protests were on the Egyptian political scene for a while and had been

involved in various demonstrations and similar political activities. None of them assumed

a leadership position in either in the planning or later phases of the January 25 protests. It

was a truly collective movement that was not particularly affiliated with any of the

established political movements. Therefore, one of the distinctive characteristics of this

initiative has been the fact that it was an audacious challenge against the state repression

from the educated Egyptian youth from all sects of the society. They were smart,

educated, young people who dared to speak up boldly against the Ministry of the Interior.

The common denominator of the protestors was their courage and love for Egypt. They

had offered a frame and identity that was appropriable for every Egyptian. Therefore,

Egyptians had quickly conferred on them the due respect and acclaim that became

evident by increasing number of participants. Interviews revealed that Egyptians feel a

deep respect for the young activists who took part in the protests, and call them

“revolutionaries”. This ‘validation’ of the activists as revolutionaries and as true

representatives of the Egyptian people occurred against the backdrop of delegitimation

and decertification attempts by the regime.

166

Figure 1: We came to kiss the feet of the revolution’s youth (Khalil 2011:75).

Revolutionary Trajectories: January 28, The Day of Rage

Having benefitted extensively from Charles Tilly's (1993) seminal work of 709

revolutionary outcomes in European history, McAdam et al. (2001) pointed out that only

a very small number of revolutionary situations result in successful revolutions.

Goldstone argued that (2011) a revolution succeeds when a broad segment of the society

–involving people from all or most ethnic and religious groups and social classes–

mobilize on the fact or perception that their government became irrecoverably

incompetent and unfair and thus endangers the future of the country; and when

significant allies of the regime, particularly the military, withdraw their support from the

government or the ruler. Nevertheless, Goldstone, emphasized, “revolutions rarely

triumph because these conditions rarely coincide” (2011:8). Accordingly, in their analysis

of revolutions, McAdam et al. (2001) focused their attention on processes, namely

167

revolutionary trajectories, which were at play after the revolutionary situation emerged.

They suggested; “something must be happening – not in the origins or structural

conditions but in the trajectories of contention – to produce so few successes out of so

many revolutionary situations" (McAdam et al. 2001:195). They argued that for a better

understanding of a revolutionary trajectory, it is necessary to analyze the interactions

within contentious politics. Focusing on a revolutionary trajectory help us identify these

interactions such as emergence of new identities and new alignments among contenders

and supporters of regime and defection of significant allies from the regime that together

with other factors have a determining role in revolutionary outcome.

As an analytical convenience, McAdam et al. (2001) suggested first to identify the

start of a revolutionary situation. Following Tilly (1993:10):

In a revolutionary situation three proximate causes converge:

1. The appearance of contenders, or coalitions of contenders, advancing exclusive competing claims to control of the state, or some segment of it;

2. Commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the citizenry;

3. Incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the alternative coalition and/or commitment to its claims

A careful analysis of the 18 days of Tahrir protests reveals that a revolutionary

situation only emerged on January 28, three days after the protest started. In other words,

the three elements that are suggested by Tilly were absent at the first day, the 25th of

January. Although most popular accounts of 2011 Tahrir revolution claim otherwise,

interviews with some of the organizers and people who participated in the demonstration

from the first day onward, the organizers and the participants did not have or did not

express a revolutionary intention or agenda on the start of the protests. For example,

according to al-Behari (Aly 2012), one the key figures of the Revolutionary Youth

168

Coalition, their plan was just to organize a demonstration on Police Day to challenge the

police brutality and they expected 10,000 with a maximum 20,000 thousand people.

This is not unusual in the sense that in many instances in history revolutions did not stem

from intentional revolutionary protests but only turned out to be as such only after certain

conditions and contingencies progressed in tandem in the course of events as outlined by

McAdam et al. (2001).

It was not until Friday, January 28 that the crisis reached a threshold that could be

considered as a final encounter. The organizers had aptly used a cultural and religious

occasion to mobilize greater number of people and they began campaigning for greater

protests on Friday, January 28. On January 27, the Muslim Brotherhood declared their

intention to join the protests after Friday prayers. Egyptians, who were encouraged by

the unprecedented numbers of protesters and their relative success against the

“untouchable” security forces during the first three days, decided to join in ever-larger

numbers. Until that day, neither the regime nor the protestors had recognized the true

magnitude of the protests. As McAdam et al. (2001) suggested culture and social

construction play their role at every phase of contentious politics as embedded features.

The protesters took the opportunity that the social and cultural environment provided for

them. They strategically chose Friday to engage ordinary citizens in the contention.

Friday is the first day of the weekend on which most of Egyptians do not work and more

importantly, there is the weekly Friday prayer that the majority of Muslims –even if they

do not observe the regular five times daily praying– attend. Thus, after the praying ends

at around 1 pm there would be already great number of people to join if they could be

persuaded. Even after the 2011 Tahrir Revolution Egyptians, particularly the ‘Islamist’

169

groups organized the major demonstrations on Fridays.

Al-Azhar, the highest religious Muslim authority in the country that represents the

dominant Sunni branch of Islam, and some prominent religious figures among the Salafis

had publicly denounced (Al-Nour Party 2011; Baetz 2011) the protests, claiming that

rising against a Muslim ruler was not permissible in Islam. However, their influence

proved to be limited. Furthermore, on January 27, the MB publicly declared their support

for the protests and demanded their members to join the demonstrations after the Friday

praying (Mekhennet & Kulish 2011). Up to that point, it was obvious that the protests

were against the economic difficulties, police brutality and for greater political freedom

(Mekhennet & Kulish 2011). There was no religious dimension and claim. Thus, it

appealed to every Egyptian; religious, secular, liberal, and Coptic Egyptians who were

Christians. The support of the MB would clearly boost the numbers of the protesters. The

MB has had a very loyal group of followers who would not hesitate to take the streets

after a call from their leaders.

Dr. Nadia Mustafa (NA) from Cairo University suggested that the MB had the

potential to mobilize large number of people from their own members:

In 2005 for example the Muslim Brotherhood asked for demonstrations all over Egypt. Then we found suddenly more than millions in the streets. This was a message to the system that “we are very strong and you have to take us seriously.” But the Muslim Brotherhood has never taken or could take a decision to go revolution by themselves. Because, in that case, it would be considered as an Ihkvan (Brotherhood) revolution by the army and by everyone. Egyptian people would not support it. But after the revolution up to now, revolutionary forces accused the Brotherhood as “latecomers”.

The security forces had taken extra precautions by the early hours before the

Friday praying. Some mosques that were close to focal meeting points were closed off

and Riot Police were deployed around them.

170

We were told to gather in front of mosques, any mosque after the Friday prayer. As our Wasat Group, we would pray in Sayyida Zeynap Mosque. Because our first headquarters were there. A second location was Omar Makram Mosque in Tahrir. I was supposed to be in Omar Makram, but I found it closed. There was big police truck, blocking the gate of the mosque. We passed behind the truck and I asked the policeman, a ranked policeman. He said, with very “nice” words, “no praying here today”. Then we went to Sayyida Zeynep Mosque. The Imam said, “We don’t have to go out the streets”. He was one of the regime supporters. He would almost get killed. People said “stop talking otherwise, we will pull you down and will pray without you”. After the praying, we began walking toward the Tahrir Square (From interview with Amr Farouk (WP)).

Right after the praying ended Egyptians poured into the streets in every major city,

Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Port Said and so on, to meet in focal meeting points like Tahrir

Square in Cairo. For many people it was the first time and they were encouraged by an

already growing movement that was unprecedented with great numbers of participants

and its composition from all sects of the Egyptian society, Muslims and Christians alike.

In this phase of the crisis, which also coincides with the emergence of the

revolutionary situation, several processes seem significant in the progression of the

revolutionary trajectory: constitution of new political actors and identities, scale shift,

decertification, polarization, and regime defection. The following pages will examine

how each of these processes contributed to the outcome of contention while developing

and interacting with other mechanisms and processes.

d. Constitution of New Political Actors and Identities

McAdam et al. (2001) identified the prevailing ‘Constitution of New Political

Actors and Identities’ as another recurrent process in variety of contentious episodes.

Following Holland et al. (2003), I understand identities as the products of a continual

heuristic process. Individuals and groups improvise their identities using “the cultural

171

resources available in response to the subject positions afforded one in the present”

(Holland et al. (2003:18). Identities are positional and negotiable.

The process of identity constitution might involve different mechanisms. For

instance, it could be in the form of a constitution of new political identities or

transformation of existing identities. Equally relevant is that, as happened in the 2011

Tahrir Revolution, the transformative effects of the revolutionary processes might have

impacted individuals by means of ‘restoration of self respect’ or the recreation of ‘true

Egyptianes’. The ordinary Egyptians were known to be apolitical; however the Tahrir

uprising changed people’s political culture. It appears that with the courage and

determination that they showed against the regime, Egyptians restored their self-respect

and redefined themselves.

The organizers and the initial participants realized on January 25 and in the next

few days that there was a bigger force at play at the scene, bigger than they had planned

for and anticipated. As the crowds became larger in number and as they gained the upper

hand against the security they came to believe that they could hold on in Tahrir and could

continue their demonstration the next day. Furthermore, they gradually gained more

confidence and began to reconstruct their claims and their identity. They started as

activists and they were becoming revolutionaries. This transformation in identities was

not restricted to the organizers; the participants as well quickly adopted the idea of

revolution and revolutionary after the first few days.

McAdam et al. (2001) emphasized the role of social interaction and social

construction that potentially determines the course of the contention as it develops. They

suggested that contention changes the involved parties and their relationships:

172

“participants in contentious politics constantly manipulate, strategize, modify, and

reinterpret the identities of parties to their contention, including themselves” (p. 56).

Identities are not fixed characteristics, but they are socially constructed and subject to

change as the contention proceeds as a result of constant interaction with the environment

and other involved parties. In a gradual way, in the first few days of the protests, the

interrelated processes of contingent events, certification, identity construction and actor

constitution began to contribute the events to evolve into a revolutionary situation.

e. Scale Shift

McAdam et al. (2001) identified scale shift as one the robust processes that appear

in most episodes of contentions. Scale shift refers to a “change in the number and level of

coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a wider range of

actors and bridging their claims and identities” (McAdam et al. 2001:331). In this sense,

the participation of new groups and individuals into the demonstrations on January 28

denotes a process of scale shift in the protests. There were new actors on the scene.

Scale shift also expresses the process of carrying the contention to the attention of

the international community. McAdam et al. (2001) argued that scale shift from local to

international arenas may result in changes in the actors and the interactions within the

actors. By January 28, many states and major international organization were closely

monitoring the developments. The US’s reaction was very important for both the

Egyptian people and Mubarak. The US had had a long time close relation with the

Mubarak regime and had been granting Egypt with regular annual military aid. The US’s

reaction on the first day, January 25 was pro Mubarak and they were not ready to forsake

Mubarak (Richter 2011). Nevertheless, as the course of the day proved, the uprising had

173

taken an irreversible track and international community’s reaction to the events began to

change.

The growing momentum was so strong and the framing of contention so inclusive

that almost anyone, no matter from which class, social, or political background he or she

was, could easily and perfectly have identified himself/herself with the cause of the

protests, which was the police brutality and repressive policies of the Ministry of Interior.

No particular ideology or political orientation or group was allowed to dominate the

movement. This was not without problems of course. For example some young activists

were initially disturbed with the appearance of the MB in large numbers with a concern

that it would turn into an Ihkwan (Brotherhood) movement. Nevertheless, the prevalent

fragmentation among Egyptian opposition groups, who had failed to challenge the regime

as united bloc for years, had disregarded their differences and had united against the

common opponent.

Figure 2: Egypt belongs to all Egyptians; Muslims and Christians (Khalil 2011:74).

The security forces’ reaction was very harsh from the early hours after the Friday

prayers ended on January 28. The police used water cannons, gas, rubber and real bullets,

174

and pellet guns. There was reports of deaths and many wounded protestors.

Before, the police used to wait until we finished with our speeches and they used to attack us to disperse. But this time as soon as we started to gather they started to attack us brutally. There were also baltageya20 among them… Normally people of Sayyida Zeynap District are between middle class and low class but they are not involved in politics and they are very brave people. People who were involved in politics were the ones who were related to the Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. Then we saw the brave young men of Sayyida Zeynap attacking the policemen. The security forces wanted to finish it that day, because they knew that if they did not finish it in 3-4 hours it would get out of their hands, out of control and that was what happened (From interview with Mahmoud (A), a young activist in his mid thirties). The protesters were well prepared as well. As one of the organizers from Ahmed

Maher explained in a newspaper interview they were in touch with youth groups from

Tunisia, Serbia, and the Academy of Change in Qatar (Kirkpatrick & Sanger 2011). They

provided the Egyptian protesters with tactics to use against the security forces. The

protesters improvised strategies for their own security and tried to weaken the security

forces’ attacks. Despite the occasional supremacy of the police, the demonstrators

managed to hold onto their positions and stayed in Tahrir Square, which was of strategic

and symbolic importance. Many of the important governmental offices and the NDP

party were in close proximity.

After about five hours of violent clashes, the demonstrators had driven the riot

police back and had taken control of the Tahrir Square. The police, the Central Security

Forces, the riot police, were completely exhausted. There were causalities among both

sides. The main building of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and many police

stations across the country were burnt down.

The situation was not different in other cities. Particularly Suez witnessed violent

20 Baltageya means thugs in Egyptian Arabic.

175

clashes between the police and the protestors. Many people were injured and there

numbers of death from protesters and the security forces. On Friday, after the protesters

overwhelmed the police, the military were deployed around important government

institutions in Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria. The Egyptian Armed Forces has traditionally

enjoyed a very strong public reputation and the protestors believed that the army would

not shoot their own compatriots. The military did not intervene and welcomed by

protestors with cheers.

Despite many casualties, jubilation dominated the atmosphere in Tahrir Square

and other big cities throughout Egypt. Egyptians had left aside their political or religious

differences and had united, Christians, Muslims, leftist, Islamist and so on against a

common rival; that is the Mubarak regime. The slogan that was adopted from Tunisa was,

Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam, “People want to topple the regime” and this was being

chanted in Tahrir Square. The police virtually collapsed and with drew from the streets.

By the evening of January 28, a new political aspiration; that is a revolutionary claim

emerged and it become the dominant drive of the protestors after that day. The young

activists had become revolutionaries.

f. Regime Defection

McAdam et al. (2001) described regime defection as “a sustained process by

which significant elements of a previously stable ruling coalition align with the action

programs of revolutionary or other opposition groups" (p. 196). In their analysis of

contentious episodes with successful revolutionary outcome, McAdam et al. specifically

identified three significant mechanisms involved in the process of regime defection:

infringement of elite interests, suddenly imposed grievances, and decertification.

176

As discussed earlier, the 1971 Egyptian constitution provided the president with a

disproportional level of authority without virtually any accountability. Despite the

relative independence of the judiciary, there was no real check and balance mechanism

between the state’s branches of the judiciary, legislation, and the executive. The

executive branch enjoyed virtually unrestricted authority and Mubarak was the head of

the executive branch. Thus, in this anomaly of the political setting, when the ruler uses its

power arbitrarily without virtually any restriction the regime turns into an authoritarian

regime. Although there were regular parliamentary and presidential elections they were

not free and fair. Mubarak was an authoritarian leader and the foundation of his power

was based on coercion not consensus. Therefore the strength of the police and

intelligence apparatus were of vital importance for the maintenance of the Mubarak

regime. In his Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt, Hazem Kandil

(2012) argued that by the time Mubarak assumed power in 1981, Egypt had transformed

itself from a military state in 1950s to a police state. Starting from his early days in the

presidency Mubarak consolidated this character of the state depending increasingly on

the coercive power of security forces, namely the police and the intelligence apparatus.

Yet, on the evening of January 28, after four days of intense violent clashes, the Egyptian

security forces virtually collapsed and lost control of the streets. Many police vehicles

and police stations were burnt down and some centers of the intelligence department

were stormed. As a result, the Egyptian Army was deployed on January 28 to provide

security of the vital governmental buildings and historical and cultural assets such as the

Museum of Antiquities. After the police collapsed, the only significant regime ally that

Mubarak could depend on to further maintain his rule was the military. Mubarak

177

expected the army to provide order in the streets. Therefore, one of the most critical

turning points in the 2011 Tahrir Revolution was the response of the Egyptian Armed

Forces when they stepped in the streets on January 28. The army did not interfere and

avoided confrontation with the demonstrators. The leaders of the military stated the army

would stay neutral and they were there to protect people (Hammond 2011). The position

of the other regime allies, such as business elite, intellectuals, or media was not of much

of relevance because this was a rapidly progressing mass uprising and was already out of

the state’s control. This stance of the Egyptian Armed Forces can be considered as

“regime defection”.

Kandil (2012) argued that Mubarak sidelined the army in an attempt to prevent

the emergence of any strong figure who would potentially challenge his leadership. He

allowed the Armed Forces to establish and develop their own economic investments

through preferential governmental incentives and contracts. Besides, the retired army

generals were regularly employed in civilian enterprises owned by the state or they were

appointed as governors to country’s twenty-seven governorates. There were also retired

military officials among them members of the ruling NDP. During the Mubarak tenure,

the Egyptian Armed Forces seemed complacent with the role that was allotted to them by

Mubarak. They were probably the most respected entity in the country and were

responsible for the defense of the country against the external threats. Meanwhile they

were not allowed to play a direct political role and apparently they had not showed any

interest in politics. Nevertheless, they preserved their institutional reputation and strength

as the major physical force in the country (Albrecht & Bishara 2011).

178

Infringement of Elite Interests: Why Did the Armed Forces Abandon Mubarak?

Gross class disparities and economic exploitation may help to trigger revolutionary situations, but are clearly not sufficient for producing revolutionary outcomes. For that to happen, the political interests of segments of the dominant regime coalition must be seriously compromised (McAdam et al. 2001:199-200).

On January 28, after the collapse of the security forces, Mubarak himself ordered

the military to deploy its troops. The Egyptian Military played an important role in

quelling several major public demonstrations and mutinies in 1968, 1977, and in 1986.

Kassem (2004) suggested that the military's existence in cases of large-scale protests

provided Mubarak with a certain degree of confidence. However, on January 28, the

military stated that they would stay neutral, which was a paradoxical statement per se in

that; by not interfering they were actually supporting the protesters.

Based on the statements made and actions taken by the military leadership after

January 28 and up until Mubarak left, Albrecht and Bishara (2011) suggested that the

military leadership as well were caught by surprise and their intention was not clear and

they opted to observe the unfolding events and determine their position accordingly. The

fact that the army did not initially attempt to prevent the blood bath on February 2, the

infamous Camel Battle, when pro-Mubarak thugs on camels back with blades, sticks and

weapons attacked the demonstrators on Tahrir Square enhances the relevance of Albrecht

and Bishara’s assessment. By January 31, the Armed Forces’ statement had become

somewhat clearer; they announced that the military would not use force against the

demonstrators (Albrecht & Bishara 2011). When the Supreme Council of the Armed

Forces (SCAF) convened on February 10 without Mubarak it was clear that the military

had ruled out the option to continue with Mubarak.

Steven Cook (2007) argued that the military in Egypt historically (beginning from

179

the Nasser's Free Officers Movement onward) considered itself as the vanguard of the

society, with an assertion that they were capable modernizers qualified with the necessary

technical and organizational capacity (p. 15). Cook suggested that the Egyptian military

traditionally sustained a hierarchy of interests: a "lesser-order interests; core parochial

and institutional interests; and existential interests, which represent the regime" (p. 16).

He argued that when the military considered the future of the regime in danger, its

intervention was highly likely. In several interviews with high-level bureaucrats and

retired army generals, various interlocutors suggested that the events that resulted in the

ousting of Mubarak did not solely emerge and progress as an outcome of internal

socioeconomic and political causes, but there was also foreign intervention and

manipulation. Apparently, this was a widespread conviction among the high ranks of the

army. Shortly after the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed leadership of the

country after February 11, 2011, there were TV ads circulated in the state owned and

private TV channels in which citizens were warned against foreign spies.

It is noteworthy that in interviews there was a noticeable disparity of

interpretation of the Tahrir uprisings –with its background dynamics and the political

developments in the post-Mubarak period– between the intellectuals, activists and some

experienced politicians on one side, and the average Egyptian citizens and young people

on the other side. This divergence of explanation also manifested itself with respect to the

interpretation of the role the Armed Forces. In the interviews, these two loosely defined

180

categories21 (Intellectuals, politicians, and activists versus average Egyptians, particularly

the young generation) explained the role of the Egyptian Armed Forces differently.

Intellectuals, activists and some politicians offered a more critical stance against

the army. Several of the interlocutors shared the view that the military leadership hated

the idea that Gamal Mubarak was very likely to replace his father. Gamal Mubarak did

not have a military background and after his schemed ascension in the NDP, he was

increasingly intervening in state affairs. Gamal had a small coterie of privileged

businessmen around him and their increasing influence in the economy and politics

annoyed the higher echelons in the military. Furthermore, some argued that the

neoliberal economic policies of Mubarak over the last decade had led to privatization of

some state enterprises and that the military who had a share in this, alienated the Army

from Mubarak.

In an interview with senior liberal activist and Coptic Egyptian, George Ishak (C),

he explained that:

When I met with high officials from the military they said that, “because we did not like Gamal, we were preparing to get rid of Mubarak, but you made it possible through a mass movement.” But after the revolution, when we (George Ishak) looked at what they did, it turned out that they are still the men of Mubarak. Tantawi (the latest Chief of Staff of Mubarak) was surprised when Mubarak was arrested. Morsi dismissed Tantawi in a very bad way. The army was not in a position to confront the people in Tahrir. Tahrir was very strong. If they could have done so, they would have done it. They refused to interfere and use violent repressive measures and we really appreciated that. Dr. Ali el-Din Hilal (FR), who was an MP and the Media Secretary of Mubarak’s

NDP stated:

21 These two categories can be discerned from each other with a loosely defined in-group common denominator; that is, the application of an informed perspective (either gained from academic training or professional experience as politicians or activist) or the lack thereof in the latter category.

181

The army had grievances about the expected succession of Gamal Mubarak. Gamal had started to intervene in the internal affairs, such as promotions and appointments, of the army. Furthermore, the army was against the economic liberalization, which they considered as a factor weakening the state. The army observed the weakness in the decision making process during the first ten days of the protests and since there is no place for vacuum in politics the army decided not to support Mubarak.

More importantly, Dr. Nadia Mustafa (NA) suggested, even if the top

commanders had decided to use force against their own people, they could not be sure of

possible defections particularly from the middle and lower rank officers. Aly (2012)

made a similar comment that the army feared a violent confrontation with the

demonstrators that would possibly endanger the unity of its forces causing defections or

could lead to a similar fate like the police. In a similar vein, Maher (LI), a columnist and

reporter who closely observed the Tahrir events explained:

Beside other reasons, the Army’s decision not to support Mubarak reflected a rational calculation in terms of balance of power vis-à-vis the huge numbers of the protesters and their determination. The police and the intelligence apparatus, whose numbers were probably over a million, could not hold out for more than a few days against the protestors. The number of Army’s personnel was about 450.000 officers and they would not be able to control the streets by force without causing heavy casualties, which would be very unwise and risky in the face of possible defections from the army’s own ranks and under live coverage to the world. Barbara Geddes (1999a) argued that most military officers deem the unity,

survival, and effectiveness of the corps more important than ruling the country. They are

more concerned with the internal cohesiveness and hierarchy and providing adequate

budget in order to be up to date materially and for personal economic prosperity.

Secondly, Geddes argued, with their actual capabilities of use of force, the military

regimes can negotiate an advantageous exit plan from power and they always have their

barracks to return to safely without risking their reputation. In Egyptian case, the high

182

echelons of the military corps tended to avoid resorting to violence against their own

citizens particularly as this was likely to cause divisions inside the military. The Armed

Forces in fact attempted to clear Tahrir Square several times –for example on February 2

and 5– by persuasion, but the crowds were not impressed by their call and the Egyptians

did not leave Tahrir. Consequently, the military did not attempt to use force against the

people’s response and would not leave until Mubarak stepped down (Awad 2011).

An analysis of the collected data revealed that average Egyptians 22 had a more

benign approach towards the military. Although the SCAF’s rule in the transition period

(after Mubarak stepped down until President Morsi assumed power) might have slightly

eroded it (Goldstone 2011), traditionally the Egyptian Armed Forces have had a high

level of institutional repute and prestige in Egypt (Albrecht & Bishara 2011). On many

occasions various informants (mainly those who were in the loosely defined category of

‘average Egyptians’) offered great complimentary comments about the Egyptian military;

their professionalism, courage, strength, and their constructive role during the Tahrir

protests. It is quite normal that citizens respect and love their army. Yet, it was still

surprising to hear that level of respect for the Armed Forces. To the disadvantage of the

general public, the Armed Forces had oddly controlled significant amounts of economic

investments with special governmental deals and subsidies that had provided them a

relatively better life style. Besides, like two of his predecessors Nasser and Sadat,

Mubarak, who in the own words of one of one informant, “virtually devastated the social

fabric of the Egyptian society”, and ruled the country with repression for almost three

22 The average Egyptian is an arbitrary and loosely defined category. In this context, the term is used to describe Egyptians who are not involved in politics intellectually (as academicians and/or journalists) or practically (as professional politicians and/or activists).

183

decades was from the military. Despite all these facts, the Egyptian army maintained a

high level of respect in the society.

Nonetheless, this respect was more pronounced by interlocutors from the general

public. Youssef’s (AE) comment, a teacher of Arabic language, resonated the true

feelings of many Egyptians about their army;

The Egyptian Army is great; they do not fear anything, ever!

Inter alia, two reasons behind this high level of admiration are noteworthy.

Firstly, from Nasser and Sadat to Mubarak all successive leaders in the recent history of

Egypt were from the military and all ruled with some level of authoritarianism. Yet,

Mubarak ran his regime through the police and intelligence apparatus. As Kandil (2012)

argued, Mubarak had sidelined the army and empowered the intelligence and police

apparatus. This was a deliberate strategy of Mubarak’s since he did not want anyone from

the army to emerge as a potential rival to replace him. Kandil claimed that the increased

influence of the police during the Mubarak regime led to a resentment and conflict in the

army against the police. Consequently, while the intelligence and the police were all

carrying out ‘dirty business’ on behalf the state, the Armed Forces managed to keep its

reputation unharmed.

Secondly, as Kandil argued (2012) the state official narrative of the Egyptian state

successfully promoted the idea in the society that the Armed Forces hade been the sole

protector of the Egyptian nation. In a way, the Armed Forces were sacrificed. Egyptians

are very patriotic people (Bradley 2012). They are proud of their ancient history and

civilization. As raised by several interlocutors, as a token of their land’s and nation’s

invaluable place in history of civilizations they also refer to some verses in the Holy

184

Qur’an, in which their land is mentioned with the Arabic word Misr, meaning Egypt,

explicitly or implied positively. In one verse23, it reads that Egypt is a “safe land”. For

Egyptians these direct and indirect references to Egypt and its explicit commendation as a

“safe land” further contributes to the deep affection of their country and their army,

which many Egyptians consider as the guardian of their independence. This widespread

positive perception of the Armed Forces, particularly among the general public, seemed

to affect people’s interpretation of the Army during Tahrir uprisings and post-Mubarak

period.

When asked about reasons that made the Armed Forces leave Mubarak, many

interlocutors from the general public said, almost without any exception, that it was

because the Armed Forces love their country and compatriots and that it has been a

professional army who would never shoot its own countrymen24. Few would argue on the

contrary that Egyptian Armed Forces has been respectful to general population and has

maintained well-disciplined corps of high level of integrity. After the army stepped in the

streets on January 28, despite the deep respect of the military there was a moment of

uncertainty about their intentions, and whether they would side with Mubarak or not. Yet,

since the military did not interfere and deployed its troops around important

governmental institutions and the Antiquities Museum, the protestors were relieved and

this was interpreted as a lethal blow to Mubarak. “The army and the people are one

23 In Surah Yusuf (the Story of Prophet Joseph). 24 The Egyptian Armed Forces carried out a military intervention on July 03, 2013 to oust elected President Mohammad Morsi who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the following events, on July 8, 2013 many civilians were wounded and killed (Dziadosz & Nasralla 2013). As a repercussion of these developments, the military’s reputation was gravely tarnished among some Egyptians, particularly among supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

185

hand” became one of the slogans of the revolution. Dr. Nadia Mustafa (NA), Professor of

International Relations at Cairo University and Director of the Civilization Center for

Political Studies, explained:

The Military was the hero in the eyes of people. They did not interfere and they did not support Mubarak.

Figure 3: The army and the people are one hand (Khalil 2011: 20).

Figure 4: Protestors welcome the Armed Forces on January 28 (Khalil 2011:21)

In the light of these arguments it is plausible to claim that the high echelons of the

186

military initially waited to see the course of events and later decided not to intervene.

Thus, they decided to side with the people to save the country from further “harm”.

Besides, according to the analysis of the collected data, the most significant factor in the

army’s decision was the issue of inheritance of the presidency from Mubarak to his son

Gamal Mubarak, an “unpopular civilian” for the military corps. Lastly, the losses in

economic activities of the army that were caused by increasing liberalization initiatives in

the last decade of Mubarak regime constituted the basis of “infringement” of military

interest and led to the alienation of the leadership of the Armed Forces from Mubarak.

g. Decertification

Decertification denotes the situation when the key actors or elites who support the

regime withdraw their validation of the ruling regime, their claims and performances

(McAdams et al. 2001). As McAdams argues, this is a frequently observed mechanism in

contentious politics. By decertification, the elites’ relationship with the ruling regime

either loses its value to preserve the status quo or the associated risks to maintain their

relationship brings unsustainable costs.

January 28, 2011, the fourth day of the protests marked an important turning point

for the uprising. By the new participations of hundred of thousands of people, including

the Muslim Brotherhood en masse, a revolutionary situation emerged. The self-

confidence of the protestors grew and a new collective identity of “revolutionaries”

emerged. Associated with that, there was a significant transformation in the self-

identification of protesters on a scale that may be called a ‘paradigmatic change’. After

the collapse of the security forces the Military stepped in and declared that they would

respect the demands of the people. With this regime defection, the Mubarak was exposed,

187

increasingly and rapidly, to a process of decertification on a national level.

According to McAdam et al. (2001) a regimes’ relationships with significant

states or transnational organizations constitutes a secondary structure of validation. Thus,

the withdrawal of validation or support by significant international actors creates an

additional direct or indirect strain on the regime’s stability and its perpetuation. This is

especially important if there is direct financial or military support for the regime from

international actors. The international community’s initial reaction to the events in Egypt

was somewhat ambivalent, but it began to change accordingly when the revolutionaries

gained relative success against the security forces.

For the Mubarak regime the most ‘significant other’ was certainly the United

States. Since the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, Egypt has been the second largest U.S.

foreign assistant recipient. Although the total yearly amount fluctuated over the years, the

U.S. had provided Egypt with roughly $1.3 billion in military aid since 1987 (Sharp

2011). Thus, the U.S.’ reaction was very important for Mubarak and particularly for the

Egyptian Armed Forces. After the protest started on January 25, the US Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton said in a statement: "Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is

stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the

Egyptian people" (Reuters 2011a). After January 28, the tone of the US Officials began

to change slightly urging the parties (the protestors and the security forces) to refrain

from violence. On January 29, the US President Obama suggested Mubarak to implement

essential social, economic, and political reforms. The EU leaders displayed a similar

approach (EurActiv 2011). These mixed massages showed that most significant others in

international arena did not completely withdraw their support from the Mubarak regime

188

as of the first week of the protests. However, the events were already under transnational

public scrutiny and all major international entities, including the UN, who had reminded

the regime to allow citizens’ the freedom to take part in demonstrations and free speech.

There was constant live coverage of the protests through satellite TV Channels like Al

Jazeera International and the BBC. It was becoming increasingly difficult for Mubarak

however, to justify the violent tactics of the security forces while under such close

scrutiny.

After the second week of the protests, the US’s stance began to change

significantly. Earlier, the US officials had already increased the tone of their criticism and

advised Mubarak to take urgent reform initiatives. Particularly, after the infamous Camel

Battle on February 2, it became evident that Egyptians would not consent to anything less

than Mubarak’s resignation. And the US finally accepted the fact that the Mubarak

regime was coming to an end. President Obama had called Mubarak several times and

reminded him that it was time to leave (Khalil 2012). In a similar vein, the UN’s

Secretary General Ban Ki Moon escalated the level of criticism against the regime.

Turkey’s PM Erdogan clearly stated on February 2 that Mubarak should leave office

immediately (Seibert 2011). Given these facts, it is plausible to claim that after the

violent Camel Battle of February 2, the Mubarak regime was truly decertified on

international level.

McAdam et al. (2001) argued that decertification encourages claimants to

intensify their struggles against the regime and urges hesitant supporters to desert the

ruler at the face of the changing relative balance of power, in which regime is likely to

“become more a liability than an asset” (p. 221). Particularly after February 2, the

189

apparent triumph of the protesters against the security forces and the Armed Force’s

deployment –with their tacit support to the protestors– led to a highly tense political

environment for the supporters of the regime. The political atmosphere was becoming

strictly polarized. On the one side, there was hundreds of thousands of Egyptians

attending protests that were instigated by a small number of well educated Egyptian

youth, and on the other side, there was Mubarak’s dictatorship.

h. Polarization

McAdam et al. (2001) identified polarization as another significant mechanism

that is seen in most episodes of contentions. Polarization denotes “widening of political

and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the gravitation of

previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward one, the other, or both extremes”

(McAdam et al. 2001:322). When the process of polarization arises, the moderate center

loses its relevance and it compels everyone to take sides. People and groups reconsider

the value of existing coalitions and new ones are created.

By the night of January 28, 2011 the security forces were completely withdrawn

from the streets and the Egyptian Armed Forces were urging people to observe the

curfew. The Mubarak regime had taken a serious blow. A feeling of victory dominated

the protesters. A category of what may be called “free Egyptians” was in the making. A

new Egyptian profile, which was defined on the basis of mutiny against Mubarak regime,

was being constructed. People versus the regime became the dichotomy that people and

groups had to choose from. Egyptian politics was being rapidly polarized. With the

apparent supremacy of protesters in controlling the streets, while security forces were

absent and the military was not involved, supporting Mubarak became increasingly

190

difficult and potentially costly. Thus, it could be argued that the calls of Shaykh Ahmad

al-Tayyib, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, the highest Islamic authority in Egypt, who had

discouraged Muslim Egyptians from protests against the ruler (Zeghal 2011), and Pope

Shenouda III, head of the Coptic Church, who had expressed support for Mubarak

(Champion 2011), lost their relevance to a great extent. That was because the regime they

were supporting (implicitly or explicitly) was completely demonized. Thus, even

Muslim clerics from the Azhar and the Coptic Christians sects joined the protests in

increasing numbers.

The organizers and initial participants in the first three days were largely middle

class Egyptians youth. As of January 28, people from the slums and low wages

employees joined the protesters and began to join in the protests.

The protestors, until that time, were young people from middle class backgrounf. A new change occurred on the 28th. Poor people, very poor people from the low-income shantytowns began to join the protests in downtown. Most of them were criminals and dangerous. Of course they joined for different reasons. People who wanted to steal entered police departments to take the weapons or drugs. There were also others who wanted to support us. Everyone had his own intention, but their numbers were in thousands. Most of them hated the police, because some of them were tortured under police custody. So that was a very good way for them to take their revenge. Everything was in our side (From an interview with Mahmoud, a young activist in his mid thirties).

After the security forces vacated the streets the level of tension decreased

significantly and more women and children stepped into the streets. When the

interlocutors asked whether they participated in the protests, very often they responded

affirmatively with great pride. For many Egyptians it was a matter of honor to be able to

say, “I was in Tahrir Square”.

The various social classes’ different timing of entry to the protests required

further exploration in more detail. A tangential analysis suggested that it might be

191

because the organizers used mainly the Internet and social media to announce their plan

for the January 25 protests. The Internet and social media were available in general for

those people of a middle class background and for the upper classes. Although the use of

mobile phones is almost universal and relatively cheap in Egypt, having access to the

Internet directly or through mobile phones –and/or having a mobile phone with Internet

capability– was beyond the reach of many Egyptians, 25.2 percent of whom lived in

poverty in 2010-2011 (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2012) 25. The use of social media and the

Internet was not only limited to the organizational phase. The youth activist groups also

used the social media and the Internet for mobilization purposes. For example, the

Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” played a significant role in increasing the

awareness of Egyptian youth against the brutality of the security forces and the

corruption in the governmental institutions (Ghonim 2012). Thus, it would be plausible to

argue that the middle class Egyptian youth, who had regular access to the social media

and Internet, were more politicized than the socioeconomically lower classes.

Another possible explanation might be that; the youth from relatively well off

backgrounds were less intimidated by the security forces and could risk more because

they were not regularly subject to the same level of repression as most Egyptians from

relatively poor socioeconomic backgrounds. It was the people from the shantytowns of

Cairo or elsewhere in Egypt who were mostly exposed to police brutality in their daily

lives. They were sometimes picked up from the streets and were beaten by the police in

their stations just because they dared to look into the eyes of a police officer directly

25 In this statistic the poverty line was accepted as LE256 per person per month, or LE8.5 per day. In US dollars this equals approximately $43 per person per month or $1.5 per day (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2012).

192

(Ismail 2006). Therefore, despite their deep resentment, they were more hesitant because

of their past experience with the security forces. Besides, from the accounts of various

informants, this researcher had the impression that the police were treating people

according to their social and political backgrounds. Ismail (2006) made a similar

argument that police officers’ speak with care and respect with someone who is driving

an expensive car. That degree of ‘care and respect’ was rarely shown to any ordinary

Egyptian from a shantytown of Cairo or to someone one with a Salafi style beard.

Several points of observation and commentaries recounted by some informants

reinforce the above proposition. For instance, Amr Farouk (WP), the spokesperson of the

moderate Wasat Party explained that on the night of the first day of protests on January

25 (to the surprise of Amr Farouk) after the intense clashes earlier in the day, some of the

young activists wanted to leave the Square. Amr Farouk interpreted this as their lack of

experience with the state26. He explained that if they had left that night or if they could

not have finished what they started, the regime would have punished them severely by all

means for their “insolence” against the state. We can interpret the Muslim Brotherhood’s

decision not to participate in the protests on the first three days using the same reasoning.

The MB had learned to respect the power of the state the hard way. Since its

establishment in 1928, the organization had been subject to severe persecutions of the

state on many occasions (Hafez 2003). Its leaders were arrested and some of them spent

many years in prisons. Thus the MB did not want to risk their institutional status against

the Mubarak regime for an apparently ‘highly improbable’ outcome, such as

26 He does not suggest a complete unawareness of the state’s repressive measures. For example some of the organizers as well, like Ahmad Maher from April Six Movements, were arrested before because of their political activities (Kirkpatrick & Sanger 2011).

193

overthrowing Mubarak. Yet, at a critical juncture, as the balance of power seemed to

change after the first three days of protests, and the MB decided pragmatically to join

these.

On the first day of the protests, the probability that the protesters would

eventually overpower the police was hardly imaginable; yet when the relative supremacy

in the streets developed to the advantage of the protestors, people from the

socioeconomically disadvantaged classes –probably full of a sense of revenge against

their oppressors– did not hesitate to join in. To the benefit of the initial core group of

organizers, these late coming youth and specifically members of the Ultras Ahlawi, the

hardcore fans of Cairo’s Ahly Football Club, played a significant role in violent clashes

with the police. Very often in interviews, Egyptians commended the Ultras for their

courageous confrontations and sacrifices during the most critical times of the clashes with

the security forces.

Ritualized Protests as Rites of Passages

Victor Turner (1973:1100) defined a ritual as “a stereotyped sequence of activities

involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in a sequestered place, and designed to

influence preternatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interests.”

Earlier anthropological studies of rituals (such as Turner’s (1969) study among the

Ndembu of Zambia) focused on its role in tribal societies. Yet, rituals may serve various

functions and as Lewellen (2003) suggested rituals are equally relevant subjects of

inquiry in modern societies: “it is through ritual, and through the individual’s

participation in it, that the ordinary citizen makes the crucial emotional bond with the

otherwise unthinkably huge and often impersonal state” (Lewellen 2003:69).

194

In an illuminating study, Julie Peteet’s (1994) showed a quite contrary role of

rituals through which ritualized physical violence is interpreted “as a transformative

experience that galvanizes one set of participants to unsettle power arrangements" (p. 31).

Peteet argued that Palestinians framed the Israeli practice of beating and imprisoning

young Palestinian males during the intifada (uprising) as a rite of passage into manhood

that enhanced political consciousness and agency among Palestinian youth.

In a similar vein, in ritualized protests of the 18 days of the Tahrir Uprisings,

confrontation with the security forces, served as a rite of passage for Egyptians through

which they redefined themselves with an idealized understanding of self as “free and

dignified people as Egyptians. Participating in the protests during the 18 days–when

Mubarak was still in power– without necessarily clashing with the security forces might

be considered an initiation of a rite of passage. As conceptualized by Arnold van Gennep

(1960) the rite of passage represents a ritual event that facilitates and orders an

individuals transition from one status in life to another.

Although protests were on rise over the last few years, particularly after the 2008

labor demonstrations in the Mahalla district of Cairo, the regime had never been

challenged on this scale and in such a direct manner as on January 25, 2011. For most

Egyptians, it was the first time that they were joining a protest. According to their

statements, some informants had joined the protests after the January 28 or after February

2, after the security forces withdrew from streets and major violent clashes with the

police or paid thugs were over. Given the fear against the security apparatus that captured

the imagination of most Egyptians until January 25 uprising, being among the protesters

during the 18 days –even without necessarily clashing with the security forces– was

195

perceived as a challenge against the state. Not all of the interviewed informants had

actively clashed with the security forces, even if some of them were present in Tahrir or

other places of demonstrations in the heyday of the street clashes. Nevertheless, the

organizers had managed to frame the contention in such an inclusive way that anyone

who somehow contributed to the protestors could easily identify himself or herself as a

part of the whole who rose up against the regime. A strict polarization in the course of

events and “people versus regime” categorization that was formed as a consequence

helped people to feel attached to the movement on the streets. Thus, for example, Dr.

Shevki (NA) from Cairo University who prepared posters and took his colleagues to

Tahrir Square proudly stated that he considered himself a revolutionary. Along the same

lines, Salma (AE), a middle age female Egyptian who works in a nearby post office to

Tahrir Square, explained with great pride that she cooked and prepared meals for the

protestors during the demonstrations. In short, regardless of the level of contribution

participation in the protests served as a transformative mechanism as a ‘rite of passage’

through which people reclaimed their self esteem and dignity against the state.

The transformation of the people’ self identity and political culture was reflected

as well in the slogans, bills, and posters that were used during the 18 days of protests. In

her edited book Messages from Tahrir, Revolutionary Photography Karima Khalil (2011)

presented a rich collection of photographs that reflected the psychology of the Egyptians

during the 18 days of protests. In a newspaper article about the content of her collection

Khalil stated; “the language indicates a loss of fear that had dominated the Egyptian

psyche for decades” (Hussein 2011). Several of these pictures were quite illustrative:

196

Figure 5: Egypt Reborn Name: Citizen Religion: Egyptian Place of Birth: Tahrir Square Date of Birth: 25 January 2011 Occupation: Revolutionary (Khalil 2011:72).

Figure 6: I am a revolutionary and therefore I am (Khalil 2011:73)

197

Figure 7: I used to be Afraid I became Egyptian (Khalil 2011:51)

Figure 8: Forgive me Lord; I was afraid and silent (Khalil 2011:71)

Figure 9: My Country, I am sorry it took me so long (Khalil 2011:127)

198

Figure 10: This is my shroud, for Egypt (Khalil 2011:24) This creation or transformation of identities, or reconstruction of self are not

necessarily deliberately initiated processes and in some cases changes may not be

observable by the subjects. Thereby, it is not always evident as some of the posters in

quoted pictures suggest:

I used to be afraid I became Egyptian Forgive me Lord; I was afraid and silent. My Country, I am sorry it took me so long.

A young Egyptian wrote: Place of Birth: Tahrir Square. Date of Birth 25 January 2011 (Khalil 2011).

What was being created or reconstructed as 'true Egyptianness', as dignified and

fearless citizens, should not be considered as an individual acquisition. As a form of

social construction, the rediscovered identity of true Egyptianness was rather a product of

collective participation in the performance, which was the protests with contributions of

all involved parties; the protestors, the security forces, and the audience. This statement

199

does not suggest that every Egyptian who was in Tahrir Square during the 18 days of

protests experienced same level of transformation of political culture at the same level of

intensity. As Schieffelin (1985) persuasively argued, ritual performance (protests in 2011

Egyptian Revolution) may involve various meaning for different individuals:

Because ritual in performance is a reality apart from its participants, the participants may not all experience the same significance or efficacy…The performance is objectively (and socially) validated by the participants when they share its action and intensity no matter what each person may individually think about it (Schieffelin 1985:722).

McAdam et al. (2001) argued that political identity formation involves both

cognitive and relational mechanisms. In ritualized protests of the Tahrir Revolution

individuals’ identity changes or restorations were approved negatively (by the security

apparatus of the regime who could not disperse the protesters) or positively (by the fellow

protestors and remote audiences who witnessed the courage and determination of the

rebelling individuals) and this was how the transformation of identities was reinforced;

yet not sealed.

In the post-Mubarak period, in which protests and demonstrations across various

social, cultural, and political lines became the dominant tool of expressing public

sentiment, it is plausible to claim that the 18 days of protests changed the political culture

and people’s understanding of themselves as more “free and self-confident” citizens. In

our interview, former diplomat Fathy El Shazly (FR) stated that the change in the psyche

of Egyptians has been ‘paradigmatic’. He suggested that the political culture in Egypt

was changed in a paramount way. Although he did not refer to Thomas Kuhn (1970), it is

equally convenient to describe this change as paradigmatic in the exact Khunian sense.

As Kuhn suggested, when a reigning scientific paradigm keeps falling short of addressing

new scientific inquiries, tension begins to mount and a state of crisis takes the stage until

200

a new dominant paradigm is introduced in a revolutionary (not in a cumulative) way.

Along the same lines, the dominant political culture during Mubarak regime, which

fostered the submissiveness of powerless citizens –coercively and fraudulently–to a ruler

who had no accountability, had long ago lost its sustainability. Finally, with the

convergence of accumulated societal/political tensions and affects of contingent events, a

crisis broke out. Consequently, this crisis (the revolutionary situation that was manifested

itself on January 28 after the collapse of Mubarak’s security apparatus) made it evident to

both parties, people and the regime alike, that a new political culture had replaced thus

far prevalent political culture of submissiveness and indifference.

This transformation seemed most evident when even some young Egyptians of

high school age, university students or average citizens of any age group or social class

began pronouncing their intention to realize a second revolution just about three months

after the first democratically elected president took office. A simple reasoning, such as

“Egyptian who endured Mubarak’s almost three decade repressive rule could not stand

their first fairly elected president more than a few months” would be a misapprehension

of the Egyptian psyche in the post revolution period. It seems that Egyptians were not the

same people (as they were before the 2011 Revolution). After the revolution, they were

politically more interested, more self-confident, and more demanding. Moreover, young

activists had become sort of “experienced revolutionaries”, some of whom were over-

confident and were overwhelmed by a ‘revolutionary romanticism’.

It Surprised us All

Dr. Said (FR). a trained political scientist was close to the Mubarak regime. His

account of the events, both in our interview and in his own published report, provided

201

useful details that could be considered, to some extent, as "an insiders view" from the

regime’s side. At the time of the Tahrir uprising Dr. Said was the chairman of the board,

of the state-owned Al Ahram Newspaper and Publishing House and also a member of the

Gamal Mubarak's Policy Committee under the NDP. As stated by almost every

interlocutor, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution also surprised Dr. Said. Except for several

meticulous observers of Egypt (like Shehata 2008; Wright 2008; Aswanny 2011) who

believed that some sort of societal outburst with possible consequences of revolution was

imminent , many academicians were caught by surprise when the Mubarak regime ended

after a popular uprising (Agathangelou & Soguk 2011; Korani & El-Mahdi 2012). Yet, in

interviews, two different types of surprise or ‘astonishment’ were observed. Under the

first category, almost all interlocutors expressed their astonishment regarding the sudden

advent and relatively peaceful success of events that resulted in Mubarak's ousting. In

addition to this sentiment of surprise, some interlocutors had a slightly different type of

surprise or ‘shock’ that was explicitly stated or implied. Some Egyptians seemed to be

shocked with the “ungrounded” mass uprising against Mubarak regime and they could

hardly make any sense of it. It seemed that the deep public resentment against the

Mubarak family and the regime were unintelligible for them. From their accounts and the

way they described the events, the researcher had the impression that, apparently, from

their point of view, there was no basis for such an uprising. All of these interlocutors who

shared this latter kind of ‘shock’, were either high-level bureaucrats during the Mubarak

regime, including military personnel, or politicians who were members of the then ruling

NDP party. Their descriptions of the events were different in the way that they did not

show any sentimental ownership or claim for Egyptians' courageous and historical

202

initiative to reclaim their political rule of their country. Nor was there, contrary to the

descriptions of many other Egyptians, any trace of pride in their accounts of the events.

In many of the interviews and conversations, Egyptians from different social and

political backgrounds proudly narrated their side of the story about the revolution. Their

joy, with an accompanying sense of anxiety that was mostly related to uncertainty of the

transition period, was obvious. Even if they were not able to participate in the 18 days of

protests for some reason, they shared the joy of victory and pride with their sons and

daughters and countrymen. Dr. Shevki (NA) from Cairo University is a Muslim Egyptian

and he was not officially affiliated with any political movement. His excitement was

obvious when he talked about the young generation of Egyptians:

We could not imagine that this revolution would be possible. This is an evaluation of myself with all my age and experience as an Egyptian in this country. But, the young people, they believed that they could change the regime. For example, my son, Yousuf, they believed that they could change this country. My wife and me were astonished with their courage and determination and in fact, we did not how and where they have gotten (with his sisters) this confidence…I consider myself a revolutionary, because I took the professors from the University to Tahrir and joined the demonstrations and wrote slogans on the papers and prepared billboards. On the other hand, Dr. Kamil’s (FR) account of the revolution carried somewhat a

different tone. Dr. Kamil is a professor of Political Science and he was among the

important figures of Gamal Mubarak’s “reformist” Policy Committee in the NDP.

…Of course it was a surprise. Those who gathered on the 25th did not imagine that number of participants. It was beyond the imagination of the security, the media, and those showed up. They did not call the overthrow of the regime. They wanted reforms, especially in the Ministry of Interior; reforms related to human rights, things of that sort that were related to police activities. And than big thing happened on the 28th. That is when many people joined in. There were attacks on government institutions, police stations and so on. As a result, the police collapsed. After that there were negotiations between the government and the demonstrators. President Mubarak and his new vice president Omar Suleiman announced some reform initiatives, but it seemed that they were not enough for

203

many parties who were involved in these protests. So Mubarak decided to quit. No body expected it. It developed so quickly. It was bad management (of the crisis, the protests) those who managed it at the top, president and the people with him. And the president felt that he had to leave and the military took over…. Was it a revolution or not? It depends how you look at it. Of course, in pure academic definition, like the French or Iranian revolution, it may not be easy to call it a revolution from academic point of view. But definitely it led to revolutionary changes…. On the other hand, some people are saying that we got rid of an authoritarian regime... I think people are more politicized (after the revolution), more interested in politics; especially young people, university students. Politics become more entertaining. Become more interesting after the so-called fear barrier has been broken… Dr. Nagib (FR) is also a political scientist and like Dr. Kamil he was member of

the Policy Committee of the NDP. He explained that he expected a revolution, yet; his

assessment of the Tahrir Uprising was quite different than most Egyptians’:

You need to understand first, what type of revolution it is. I am a liberal and head of the Department of Political Science at our University. I consider this revolution as a civic revolution not a political or a social revolution. It was being triggered as a result of widening political participation. Revolution does not occur as a result of social injustice, because there was no social injustice at that sense at the time. There was social injustice being seen as deepening because of the growing political participation. Growing political participation was the reason of Egyptian civic revolution. In the last five years of Mubarak regime, there was a widening political participation in different forms and ways and it harbored a lot of groups…When you widen the political participation, according to my reasoning, then you have what you call it civic conflict. I have a book on civic conflict in Egypt, describing that we would see such a revolution… The groups that participated in the political process during the last five years were basically middle class, and upper middle class. Later on, lower classes came in as a spillover of the process of liberalization or political participation… Given the differences in political orientations, social and economic statuses, and

peoples’ relation with the Mubarak regime, all these different approaches and attitudes

–explicitly expressed or implied– about Egyptian Revolution are understandable.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, most of the interlocutors who were close to the

Mubarak regime, did not refer to state’s systematic repression against political freedoms,

police brutality, corruption, high level of unemployment, or economic hardships, as many

204

other Egyptians indicated. They tended to explain the massive uprising by “foreign

intervention” or by describing the events as a “civic revolution” disagreeing with the

existence of the pervasive social injustice in the society. In some cases, as some of the

quotes above imply, the revolution was a phenomenon that was incomprehensible for

them. For some informants in this category, the revolution occurred because of

Mubarak’s and his close circle’s “bad management” of the crisis (the demonstrations) and

eventually “the so-called fear barrier has been broken” in the society. What is more

intriguing was to see how some people come to deny wholeheartedly the misery and

oppression that millions of Egyptians had to endure for decades under Mubarak.

The Coptic Christians During the 2011 Revolution

Although it is not possible to give an exact number, Coptic Christians comprise

approximately 6 to 10 percent of the total population (Pennington 1982; Kort 2007).

According to Coptic accounts, they began to convert to Christianity in about 60 CE by

the introduction of evangelist St Mark in Alexandria (Reid 2002). During the Islamic

period (starting from 641 A.D) under different dynasties, the Copts were subject to

various forms of differential treatment in public life. After the independence of modern

Egypt, Coptic Egyptians lived usually in relative cohesion with the political authorities.

There have been sporadic acts of violence against the Copts that were usually sparked by

the claims of forced conversions, abductions, or the issue of building churches. Nasser’s

rise to power following a coup d’état by the Free Officers movement in 1952 negatively

affected the Copts on several accounts. Nasser’s mainstream policy was socialism and

pan-Arab nationalism. His nationalization policies severely affected the Copts who held

significant economic investments in the private economic sphere. Besides, his pan-Arab

205

policies undermined the national sentiments and attachments of the Coptic community

who equally valued their pre-Arab identity and their claimed pharaonic heritage

(Meinardus 1999).

Under the patriarch of Pope Shenouda III Coptic-Muslim relations notably

improved with his efforts towards emphasizing the unity of the Egyptian people. He

maintained good relations with the Muslim religious leaders and government officials. In

a press release at a UN-sponsored conference in Cyprus, Pope Shenouda III rejected the

notion of minority for Copts in Egypt and emphasized that Copts are Egyptians and part

of Egypt, of the same nation (Sedra 1999). It is also important to note that although the

Copts are de jure equal citizens of Egypt, there is widespread resentment among the

Copts about their differential treatment by the state in the public sphere (Henderson

2005). For example, while conversion from Christianity to Islam is encouraged and

welcomed, conversion from Islam to Christianity is encountered usually with public

disdain. Another point of resentment relates to the building of churches that is strictly

dependent on official permit by governorate. It is also claimed that the Copts are

discriminated in being appointed to public offices. They believe they are

underrepresented in government posts.

Sedra (1999) argued that there are two opposing strands of thought within the

Coptic community. First, the ‘national unity’ discourse according to which the Copts are

fully and harmoniously integrated into Egyptian society. Second is the ‘persecution’

discourse that accepts the Copts as entirely distinct people from Muslims in religion,

culture, history, and race. For the adherents of the latter strand of thought, the Coptic

experience with the majority Muslims has traditionally been marked by persecution and

206

misery and they tend to describe themselves as members of a minority group. Sedra

argued that these two contrasting strands of thoughts have developed under different

political conditions within different sections of Coptic community.

According to Sedra’s (1999) analysis of class dynamics within the Coptic

community during the past century, there has been a complete reversal of roles. He

argues that while elite Copts pioneered the struggle for reform of church at the turn of the

century, and defended their rights of citizenship within Egyptian society, currently, it is

the middle-class Copts that struggle to defend such rights.

Elite Copts have come to reject the language of the persecution discourse—language that resonates for the Coptic middle class. Further, elite Copts have come to endorse a millet partnership between Pope Shenouda and President Mubarak characterized by conservatism and quiescence—a partnership that serves as a barrier to the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Coptic middle class (Sedra 1999:227).

The analysis of the Coptic community’s initial stance and role in 2011 Revolution

supports the relevance of Sedra’s (1999) assessment to a great extent. During the first

days of the revolution, in January 2011, the Coptic Church under the leadership of Pope

Shenouda III initially supported President Mubarak and asked Coptic Egyptians not to be

involved in the demonstrations (Ahram Online 2011b). According to the accounts of

various informants (Christians and Muslims), a certain segment of the Coptic community

honored the calls of the Pope Shenouda III and refrained from participating in the

demonstrations during the 18 days. In the lights of the informants’ accounts of the events

and their experience, the analysis of the collected data indicated that the majority of the

Coptic Egyptians who were relatively more religious or those who belonged arguably to

the upper class in the Egyptian socio economic structure did not join the protests. The

relatively more religious Copts consider the Coptic Church and the Pope as their

207

legitimate representative vis-à-vis the state. Nonetheless, various informants who were

present in Tahrir Square during the revolution explained that many young Coptic

Egyptians joined the demonstrations and equally shouldered the responsibility of

defending Tahrir in the most critical times, such as the infamous Battle of Camel on

February 2. According to the statement of one of the Coptic informants Joseph (C), who

spoke as a representative of the Coptic Maspero Youth Union, the majority of the Copts

who joined the revolutionary forces from the first days were mainly Coptic youth of

middle class backgrounds. In his assessment, the Egyptian Revolution started as a middle

class youth initiative and the representation of the Coptic community was in accordance

with the general structure of the initial participants. The analysis of the data revealed that,

as of January 28 –the fourth day of the demonstrations– a scale shift occurred and new

actors, groups, and classes joined the demonstrations. With this scale shift in the larger

society, we see that Egyptians from underprivileged classes, Christians or Muslims,

joined mostly as of January 28.

Dr. Fahmy (C) is a Coptic Egyptian in his late sixties. He is a professor of

chemistry at one of the large universities in Alexandria. Dr. Fahmy stated that because of

his older age, he did not join the protests during the 18 days in 2011. He emphasized that

the support of the Coptic community for Mubarak regime should not be understood to

imply that the Copts were happy under the Mubarak regime or that the Copts just ignored

the excesses of the regime; human rights abuses, police brutality, the level of corruption,

widespread social injustice, or the lack of political freedom. Dr. Fahmy suggested that it

was a reciprocal relationship; while the state protected the non-Muslim citizens against

potential threats from the larger society, Pope Shenouda III and the Coptic Church and

208

community provided support and loyalty to the regime. Egypt under Mubarak was a

secular state and Mubarak respected Pope Shenouda III and had good relations with him.

In her evaluation of the recent developments in the Coptic community aftermath of the

Egyptian Revolution, Karima Kamal, a Coptic intellectual, argues that with the renewed

sectarian tensions after Mubarak, some Coptic groups, led specifically by youth, began to

fiercely adopt a revolutionary and confrontational discourse on Coptic rights and

concerns (El-Hennawy 2012). She holds that this mounting idea resonates with the strong

disapproval of the Church’s long-time tradition of avoiding confrontation with the state

authorities among the youth and Middle class Copts.

3. Adjustive or Redressive Mechanisms:

In this phase of social drama, adversaries (regime versus revolutionaries) resort to

various adjustive or redressive mechanisms to resolve the breach. Turner (1957)

suggested that these mechanisms could take place in different forms: "personal and

informal arbitration", "use of formal and legal machinery" and, under some

circumstances "performance of public ritual" (p. 98). Turner noted that if the legal

machinery is not an applicable mechanism because the common norms are in conflict,

parties could resort to "a common frame of values, which organizes a society’s norms in

a hierarchy" (1957:126). It is also important to remember that the application of a

redressive mechanism does not necessarily resolve or end the crisis. According to Swartz

et al. (1966) the intervention of third parties can serve in some instances as a redressive

mechanism. Swartz et al. argued, sometimes, particularly when the extent and scope of

change is massive, possible redressive mechanisms, ritual, arbitrational, legal strategies,

etc. may not resolve the crisis and society may remain in an extended state of crisis, or

209

what may be called ", "pervasive factionalism" in Siegel and Beals’ terms (1966:109).

In the course of the 18 days of demonstrations, Mubarak addressed the nation

three times with a varying tone (threatening, challenging, admonishing, warning, and

with a tone of sympathy) that reflected the regime’s perception of the crisis. Mubarak

made some piecemeal concessions and furthermore, after January 28, 2011, high-level

state officials began meeting with representatives of activist groups and some important

political figures from opposition groups. Nevertheless, none of these attempts proved to

be effective in mitigating the popular anger. In addition to Mubarak’s speeches to nation,

the regime’s attempts of ‘threat and intimidation’, ‘decertification of revolutionaries’,

‘disinformation’, direct ‘negotiations’ with the revolutionary forces can be considered as

adjustive or redressive mechanisms that were deployed by the state.

a) Threat and Intimidation

The intelligence apparatus was monitoring the Internet activities and was aware of

the planned protests on January 25, 2011 (Aly 2012). Under the Mubarak regime any

demonstration was required to have prior permission from the police. Therefore, since the

protesters did not have permission for the planned demonstrations the state could arrest

anyone at will. An official statement from the Cairo Security Directorate before January

25 stated that the police would respond decisively to any unlawful attempt against public

order (Khalil, 2012). Yet, the intimidation of officials did not deter the Egyptian youth

from joining the protests.

After the protests gained momentum on January 25, 26, and 27 the organizers

were more encouraged and decided to carry the protests to a next level. To this end, they

chose the coming Friday, January 28. They believed that they could provide larger

210

participation after the Friday prayers and if people joined it would mean an all-out

uprising throughout the entire Egypt. The decision of the Muslim Brotherhood to join the

protests on January 28 was an important development. The security forces then began to

realize the seriousness of the developments and they arrested several prominent leaders of

the MB, including the future president Morsi on January 27 (Reuters 2011b). They were

held in Wadi el-Natroun prison near Cairo until they managed to break out on January 29.

Wael Ghonim, a young activist and employee of Google in Katar, was also arrested on

the morning of January 28 (Ghonim 2012). He was the administrator of the famous

Facebook page "We Are All Khaled Said", which played a significant role in the

mobilization process leading up to the uprising. Ghonim was held in detention

blindfolded and was interrogated for 11 days.

On January 28, after the security forces collapsed and many police stations were

raided and burned down by the protesters there occurred breakouts in some prisons (Aly

2012). There have been controversial explanations about how this happened. According

to some claims, the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas

arranged the outbreak of the leaders of the MB (AP 2013). In some accounts, 23000

prisoners escaped from the prisons during the 18 days of protests (AP 2013). Particularly

after the police withdrew from the streets and the ensuing prison outbreaks, serious

security problems emerged in the cities. On January 28 and afterwards, there was

occasional looting of stores by thugs and robberies and thefts were increased

significantly. In response, Egyptians formed voluntary watch teams to secure their

neighborhoods. On many occasions in interviews, Egyptians raised their doubts about the

prison outbreak. There was a widespread belief that the prison outbreaks were

211

orchestrated by the regime on purpose to instill a sense of insecurity among the public.

The aim was to delegitimize or decertify the protestors holding them responsible for the

“reigning insecurity”. Nevertheless, it apparently did not prove to be a very effective

strategy. Hamid (AE) explained:

There was a security issue, but young people in the neighborhood quickly organized security teams and working shifts among them and they set up sort of checkpoints at the entrance of certain districts. People took responsibility and this contributed to the sense of unity among citizens and further increased anger against the regime.

Battle of Camel: February 2

After the violent clashes on January 28, the next several days were relatively quite

and peaceful. Some people went to their homes to sleep and shower, thus the number of

the revolutionaries in Tahrir decreased. According to Aly (2012), supporters of the NDP

planned a pro-Mubarak demonstration in Mustafa Mahmoud Square in Cairo on February

2. At the same time, with the intention of dispersing the protesters and vacating the

Square, some leaders of the NDP organized a mob attack of Tahrir Square. At about

midday on February 2, a large group of pro Mubarak supporters (around several

thousands) began to walk towards the Tahrir Square. They were chanting pro Mubarak

slogans. At first, people in Tahrir Square were surprised; they did not simply expect it.

Then, came the people on horse and camel backs with sticks and bladed weapons. They

were charging through the pro democracy protestors. After a moment of confusion, the

revolutionaries began to engage in a violent confrontation with them. Because of those

who were riding camels the day is remembered as the day of the Battle of Camel.

Suddenly there was a struggle and people began to shout. We found people coming to the square, thousands. It was not the camels first. On that day, government employees were taking their salaries from the ministries. They said to the employees: “you have to get into busses and go to Tahrir Square and say that

212

you want Mubarak.” I also spoke with some of them they were regular, average Egyptians. And later it turned out to be very violent. It was the first day of the hard revolution. Before that day all was peaceful. Of course, on the 28th there were deaths but after the 28th there was no clash at all. But this was like a civil war. They wanted to start a civil clash, not with the police or army. They wanted a civil clash and some of them were paid thugs. There were snipers and may be there were people from the army and maybe from the intelligence. All were there, trying force us to leave Tahrir. But we stayed (from interview with Amr Farouk from the Wasat Party). According to the informant accounts, Khalil (2012) reported that the military’s

stance on February 2 was somewhat suspicious. They claimed to be neutral but in fact

they watched and allowed thugs with firearms, bladed weapons, sticks, and Molotov

bombs, and with other improvised weapons to attack the unarmed and peaceful

protestors.

It wasn’t just that they weren’t doing anything. They were complicit. They let these guys through, El Dahshan said. At one point, El Dahshan asked an army colonel on the scene, “Why aren’t you doing anything?” The officer replied, “Aren’t you expressing your opinion? They’re here expressing their opinion as well.” (Khalil 2012:147). In the later hours of the day, the pro Mubarak demonstrators began to use firearms

and began target shooting. Some protestors believed that some of pro Mubarak forces

were police and intelligence officers (Khalil 2012). According to some eyewitness

accounts members of the MB played a significant role in defending Tahrir Square during

the violent clashes on February 2 (Kirkpatrick 2011; Khahil 2012). Besides the MB

hardcore soccer fans took the lead in confronting the thugs that day (Kirkpatrick 2011).

The clashes lasted until about 3 am in the morning at which point the protestors began to

drive the pro-Mubarak demonstrators back and the military intervened (Khalil 2012). At

the end of the clashes there were 11 people who were killed and 600 who were wounded.

213

The Battle of the Camel was one of the turning points that “turned public opinion

irreversibly against the Mubarak regime” (Fathi 2012:1). After February 2, it became

clear that Egyptians would not consent to anything less than Mubarak’s resignation. The

US’s stance had changed after the second week of the protests. Earlier the US officials

had increased its tone of criticism and advised Mubarak to undertake urgent reform

initiatives (Nicholas et al. 2011). International community’s stance against Mubarak

changed considerably after February 2 and the Mubarak regime was truly decertified on

an international level.

b) Attempts to Decertify the Protestors

The regime was trying hard to decertify, and disgrace the protestors. To this end,

they used several different tactics. In an attempt to discourage people to join the

demonstrations the state spread a rumor that it was the Muslim Brotherhood who

organized the protests and caused the public “disorder” (Mekhennet & Kulish 2011).

From his early years onward Mubarak had successfully created a bogeyman out of the

MB and he was using –domestically and internationally– this “potential threat” of

“radicals” as a mechanism to provide legitimacy for his repressive rule. Therefore, there

was already some level of concern and fear as regards the MB in the society. The regime

tried to frame the negative incidents as a MB attempt to destabilize Egypt for their own

cause.

Khalil (2012) quoted an important anecdote from Shahira Amin who was an

administrator and presenter on the state-owned Nile TV channel. She hosted a show at

nighttime on January 25 and as planned earlier, she was expected to host an opposition

politician. Yet, to her surprise just minutes before the program started, her boss informed

214

her that she had an NDP parliamentarian instead of the opposition politician and her

conversation had to be around three issues: “the foreign elements organizing the protests;

the shadowy hand of the Muslim Brotherhood in stoking the unrest; and the need for all

parties to engage in a national dialogue” (Khalil 2012:286).

The issue of “foreign interference” came up in interviews with some high-level

bureaucrats and retired army officials. In an interview, Mohamad Celebi (FR) a retired

general from the Egyptian Armed Forces indicated that there were “foreign powers”

behind the Egyptian uprising. This assessment seems to reflect a prevalent view among

the high echelons of the military. After the SCAF assumed power on February 11, 2011,

some state-owned TV channels broadcasted commercials in which Egyptians were

warned against foreign spies (El-Kouny 2012). In the same vein, Mr. Soliman (FR), a

high-level bureaucrat shared with me his belief that foreign powers were involved in the

Egyptian uprising. He expressed several times his astonishment and anger against the

revolutionaries that led to ousting of Mubarak and the ensuing “chaos”, in his terms. For

him, there was no basis for such a public uprising. There were claims that some of the

activists had been in contact with activists from Serbia. Dr. Ali Eddin Hilal Desouki

(FR), who was the Media Secretary of Mubarak’s NDP, stated that some of the

revolutionaries had been in Serbia for training on non-violent movements. In fact, Ahmed

Maher, the leader of the 6 April Youth Movement explained that he was Serbia with

members of OTPAR. Secondly, some of the NGOs were accused of receiving illegal

foreign funds (Ahram Online 2013).

215

Figure 11: More lentils, more chili, Where's the Kentucky, You son of a liar? In order to discredit the protestors, the state media organs spread the rumors that protestors were paid 50 euros a day and were given free Kentucky Fried Chicken meals (Khalil 2011:143). Rania Abouzeid (2011) reported that during the protests, the state-owned media

were actively trying to instill the idea that “the chaos” on the streets was the work of

foreign powers and thus was not for the good of Egypt. To enforce their claim, Abouzeid

stated, the regime offered the viewers some sort of evidence. One such piece of

“evidence” was a broadcast on the Nile TV channel of a blond woman and a young

Western looking man with a Palestinian style scarf and he was holding a poster that read

“In solidarity with the Egyptian people” The following comment of the presenter was that

“it was the evidence of foreigners who wanted to destabilize country through chaos”

(Abouzeid 2011). Apparently, the regime’s plan was not successful and ordinary

Egyptians continued to join the protests.

c) Disinformation

From the first day, January 25 onward, the state tried to manipulate the public’s

opinion through disinformation, decertification, or downgrading the scale of the events.

To this end, the regime used the state media institutions, namely the TV channels and the

216

daily newspapers (Khalil 2012).

Moreover, on January 25, the Nile TV channel aired a press statement from the

Ministry of Interior, which read that there had been no confrontation and conflict

anywhere in Egypt. For the first few days, the regime could manage to control, to a

certain extent, the media coverage of the uprisings. However, specifically after the

January 28, pressure on employees of state-owned media institutions led to internal

uprisings (Aly 2012; Khalil 2012).

Although they had underestimated its role, the state security was already

monitoring the activities of the opposition youth movements on the Internet. They knew

that people were getting mobilized through Facebook pages, twitter, and short messages

on mobile phones. Before January 28, a turning point whereby the protests would gain a

revolutionary claim, the state security ordered the Internet and mobile phone service

providers to cease their operations. The Internet and mobile phone service was cut off in

major cities on January 28 (CNN 2011). The Internet and mobile services were resumed

after a while. The state security later tried to block the access to Twitter and Facebook,

but some informants explained that they could override the block in various ways.

According to Khalil (2012) the regime’s strategy of communication shut down had

unexpected adverse effects. People who were not able to reach their sons and daughters

went out to see what was happening. Some people went out just out of curiosity and

found themselves inside the clashes.

The regime was aware of the “adverse” effects of live TV coverage, even

sometimes 24 hours non-stop, from the main Squares in the country. While the state-

owned media were downgrading the scale and the intensity of the uprising, Egyptians

217

were informed about the developments in Tahrir and elsewhere with more accurate

descriptions through international satellite channels like Al Jazeera, CNN, and BBC. This

alternative channel of information facilitated further mobilization. People were

encouraged when they saw unprecedented numbers of protestors repelling the

“untouchable” security forces in Tahrir. Furthermore, the media coverage had always a

limiting effect for any ruler, democratic or authoritarian, in resorting to repression against

the protestors. To this end, in order to contain the “harm” of independent international

media outlets, the Mubarak regime raided the office of Al Jazeera and detained some Al

Jazeera journalists in Cairo. The regime also publicly demonized the Al Jazeera

employees through its own channels. Thus, for employees of international media

covering the revolution became sometimes very hard (Khalil 2012) and pro Mubarak

demonstrators harassed them on occasion. Besides, as Al Jazeera reported they

experienced intermittent interference in their broadcast signals across the Middle East

(Khalil 2012).

d) Negotiations and Attempts of Reconciliation

After the violent clashes on January 28, the regime began to realize the gravity of

the crisis. Mubarak delivered three live televised speeches during the 18 days of the

protests. The first speech was on January 29, right after midnight. The police had

collapsed and the Army had assumed the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior to

secure the streets. He acknowledged the resentments of the protestors and he explained

that he had dissolved the government. He promised further reforms (Korani 2012). These

statements did not satisfy the demonstrators who expected him, at least, to declare that he

218

or his son Gamal would not run for the office in the coming presidential elections in

September 2011 (Aly 2012).

Mubarak made another speech on February 1. It was a touching speech and

fostered some sympathy for him among some protesters (Aly 2012).

On the 1st of February, it was the first million march, the very big and at that day, there was the speech of the Mubarak and made some people cry. It was a very good speech actually. It was very very professional, but he did not make any concessions. He said “I will die in this place, I will never leave. I am the fighter and I fought for my country... I will leave after six months.” (From interview with Amr Farouk (WP)) He announced that he would not run for the presidency for a sixth term. He

appointed Ahmad Shafik to set up a new cabinet. Besides, for the first time in his almost

three decade rule, he appointed Omar Suleiman, who was the Minister of Interior and the

Chief of General Intelligence, as Vice President. Khalil (2012) argued that with his

second speech Mubarak aimed to gain the hearts and minds of Egyptians who were

outside Tahrir Square, people who had not yet decided which side to choose. He gained

some sympathy but the infamous Battle of Camel the next day on February 2 made him

lose his relative gains.

Omar Suleiman announced that new committees would be formed to make

constitutional and legislative amendments (Reuters 2011c). Mubarak ordered new Prime

Minister Ahmad Shafiq to maintain governmental subsidies (Aljazeera 2011). The new

government formed a fact-finding committee to investigate accusations about security

forces’ excessive use of force and killings of protestors for the last week’s events. The

leaders of the NDP and Gamal Mubarak resigned. Meanwhile Omar Suleiman and some

other representatives of the regime began directly contacting and negotiating with

important political figures among the revolutionaries.

219

However, as Goldstone (2001) argued, at the face of increasing tension when the

society asks for large-scale change, it is a difficult task for the ruling regime to employ a

balanced combination of repression and concession to assuage the opposition. “If a

regime that has already lost its perceived effectiveness and justice offers concessions,

these may be seen as “too little, too late,” and simply increase the popular demands for

large-scale change.” (Goldstone 2001:161). The revolutionary fervor was growing and

the repressive mechanism, the police and intelligence apparatus, of the regime was

seriously harmed. The revolutionaries began to believe that the end of Mubarak regime

was close. Amr Farouk (WP), who was in Tahrir from the first day onward explained:

Our headquarters was like meters away from Tahrir Square. They also served as headquarters of the revolution. We had all the well-known political figures in our headquarters. The Coalition of Youth, including Abdul Hamid Nasser and 17 other guys were in our headquarters. There was another consulting circle including Mohamed Selim al-Awa (who later would run for presidency), Essam Sultan, and Khazim Mustafa. We began receiving phone calls from the SCAF and we started negotiating with them through Dr. al-Awa. Of course there were other sites of negotiations and other personalities from the regime. There were negotiations with the SCAF, with Omar Suleiman, who was appointed as Vice President, and with negotiations Essam Sharaf from NDP, Ahmad Shafik (Prime Minister). So there were lots of negotiations. The important thing was that we all had one target. That is why Mubarak had to leave. We never made any concessions, we did not.

Mubarak did not give up easily. His made his final speech on February 10. He

handed over his powers to Omar Suleiman, his Vice President. Mubarak reiterated that he

would do his best to provide a seamless power transfer after the presidential elections in

September.

4. Restoration of Peace: February 11, Mubarak Steps Down

According to the concept of Social Dramas, if adjustive or redressive mechanisms

are deployed effectively there may be either restoration of normal relations between the

220

two parties or it may lead to "to a social recognition of irreparable schism" (Swartz et al.

1966:37). The deployment of a redressive mechanism does not necessarily mean that this

will be successful. Rather, it is the exhaustion of, factually or perceptually, available

redressive mechanisms. Restoration of normal relations is not a conflict free society or

political state, which rarely exists (Lewellen 2003); it denotes the establishment of a

socially, popularly accepted common ground of peaceful political engagement. In

Lewellen’s assessment, restoration of peace is a provisional and insecure equilibrium; “a

readjustment of forces that lends more strength to one side and depletes the strength of

the other” (2003:98).

Empowered by the increased participation of Egyptians, the collapse of the

Security Forces, and the ambivalent reaction of the Egyptian Armed Forces27, the

revolutionary forces decided not to acquiesce to anything but Mubarak’s resignation.

After Mubarak's last public speech on February 10, the revolutionaries decided to gather

in front of the Presidential Palace. Having considered the gravity of the developments and

possible bloodshed between the protestors and the Republican Guards, Minister of

Defense Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi advised Mubarak to depart for Sharm el-Sheikh

with his family (Aly 2012). Aly stated that details of Mubarak's last hours, such as how

he took the decision to resign, whether he was forced by the army commanders is not

known. Nevertheless, by 6: 00 pm on February 11, 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman

declared that Mubarak had resigned and the powers of the presidency were transferred to

the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Mubarak had stepped down and his main coercive apparatus, namely the

27 Except for several instances the Egyptian Armed Forces neither attempted to disperse the protesters nor to defend them against the attacks from the supporters of Mubarak.

221

intelligence and police had been withdrawn from the scene earlier. The revolution was

successful in ousting Mubarak and a new democratic process under military supervision

and the SCAF would soon start and was supposed to leave the rule to civilians as soon as

possible. In this respect, one can argue that the Egyptian Revolution as a social drama

ended with the “restoration of peace”; that is, in a restatement of Lewellen’s (2003)

approach, the revolutionary forces had apparently neutralized Mubarak’s coercive power

and had emerged as a new (yet not as the only one) power center. Ostensibly, with

Mubarak’s resignation, a popularly accepted common ground of political engagement

through the democratic processes was established. Nevertheless, as the developments in

the post-Mubarak period suggested, the new state was very fragile and prone to new

crises. The new political situation had many peculiarities. Despite the initial euphoria, as

later developments would prove, the ‘restoration of peace’ or ‘restoration of normal

relations’ was a tentative state. The extant power structure of the former regime remained

unchanged. The military, which was certainly not a revolutionary institution, assumed the

power –ostensibly temporarily– to oversee the transition period. The revolutionary youth

that had played a leading role in the uprising and made up the bulk of the protestors

would be soon excluded from the new political arrangements. Moreover, the Islamists

would gain the lion’s share after the elections. The new steady state, if we may name it

so, was fragile from the start.

In order to have a better assessment of the final state of social drama, namely the

new sociopolitical setting after Mubarak left, a brief review of the post revolutionary

period is useful.

222

A Brief Overview of Post Mubarak Period and Morsi’s Short-Lived

Presidency

The analysis of the collected data suggests that Egyptians in general conceptualized

the January 25 events as a revolution. Dr. Shevki (NA) from Cairo University explained:

It was a true revolution and more than anything, the events changed the political culture of Egyptians.

For Dr. Kamil, (FR) a political scientist from Cairo University and a former

National Democratic Party member, the January 25 events cannot be described as a

revolution in a strict sense:

…from a political point of view, with the changes the events brought, it can be considered as a revolution.”

Dr. Nadia Mustafa (NA) from the Center for Civilizations and Political Studies, the

January 25 events constitute “a model revolution” for the modern world. On the other

hand, Abdulkarim (AE), a language teacher in his early forties, defined the January 25

events and its aftermath as “half-revolution”. Abdulkarim (AE), a devout Muslim and not

affiliated with any of the Islamist parties, sympathized with the MB and President Morsi.

In his assessment;

…given the fact that supporters of the old regime in bureaucracy and business community, and more importantly, the police and the Amn ad Dawla (the State Security) are at their places, the removal of Mubarak from power can best be considered as a half-revolution. The threat of the old regime is valid and most apparent in organizing the opposition and the current chaos in the country. A half-revolution is worse than no-revolution.

Bayat (2013) argues that with the speed of its execution and its relatively civil and

peaceful nature, the Egyptian 'Revolution', like the Yemeni and the Tunisian ones, is sui

generis. Furthermore, despite the high level of social respect and support from the public,

the revolutionaries did not attempt to rule or realize significant reforms in the context of

223

state institutions or functions. Instead, Bayat asserted, they wanted the Egyptian military

to administer and/or create a new constitution, hold elections, provide a free and plural

political environment. In other words, despite the revolutionary legitimacy, the

revolutionaries had to consent to the expected change to be realized within the

institutional limits of the very regime that they revolted against. Thus, Bayat suggests,

given the fact that the Egyptian Army has been a firmly entrenched institution that had a

symbiotic relationship with the old regime, what was achieved after the 18 days of

protests had more of the characteristics of a reform movement. Thus, this constitutes the

anomaly of the Egyptian 'revolution'. In this respect, Bayat suggests that these revolutions

may be called as “refolutions” (2013:53), of which one might hope at best for some

momentum towards reforms through the institutions of the Mubarak regime.

The unexpected speed and momentum did not leave an opportunity for the

revolutionaries and oppositional groups to claim a more assertive role in the post-

Mubarak period (Bayat 2013). This fact became a source of tension in the later days

when the secular (liberal or leftists) revolutionaries and opposition figures realized that it

was –from the viewpoint of most secular activists and politicians– the “free-riders”

(Bayat 2013:51), namely the Islamists MB and Salafists, who reaped the benefit of the

revolution by achieving unexpected levels of success in the parliamentary and later in the

presidential elections due to their long-time grassroots activities in the Egyptian society.

Soon after Mubarak left, the anomalies of the new situation began to surface.

Mubarak left power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that was

constituted of the senior military officers. After the initial euphoria dwindled, the

revolutionary forces faced a new and not necessarily ideal political reality. On one side, it

224

was the SCAF who was supposed to oversee the transition period and on the other side, it

was the Islamist groups, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, who were the

only organized groups with a wide grass root reach. The revolutionary youth

organizations and liberal opposition groups distrusted both camps, the SCAF and the

Islamist, as to their true commitment to the revolutionary ideals. Moreover, internal

divisions within the revolutionary coalition started to emerge (Bayat 2013). Coalitions

were dispersed and new alliances were established. Some youth movements aspired to

continue as a political party while some others opted to continue as activist groups.

The first contention between the secular and Islamist currents on a national level

emerged regarding the timing and sequence of creating a new constitution and the

parliamentary elections. The Islamist wanted the new constitution to be prepared after the

parliamentary elections. Conversely, in an attempt to avoid the preparation of the new

constitution by a potentially Islamist-dominated parliament, liberal opposition groups

supported the idea of forging the new constitution before the parliamentary elections. A

constitutional referendum that was held on March 19, 2011 determined the direction of

the process. The new constitution was scheduled to be written after the parliamentary

elections that would be held in six months. The referendum included several amendments

concerning the terms of the presidency, such as limiting the term of the presidency to a

maximum of two six-year-terms. Approximately 77.2 percent of Egyptians voted 'yes' in

the referendum (Ahram Online 2011a). This was an early sign of disagreement between

the Islamist and the liberal opposition movements, which itself consisted of highly

diverse political groupings.

SCAF became quickly unpopular and was involved in many controversial and

225

undemocratic practices (Goldstone 2011)28. During SCAF’s term, Egypt went to the polls

on December 2011 and January 2012 for the two-phased parliamentary elections. The

Islamist parties won two thirds of the votes. In June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional

Court (SCC) ruled that the law that regulated the first parliamentary elections after

Mubarak's ouster was invalid. A direct consequence of the ruling required the parliament

had to be dissolved. Upon the ruling, the military council assumed the legislative

authority. It was not only the Muslim Brotherhood who was disappointed by the court's

ruling, but also many liberal politicians and activists became concerned that transfer of

power from the military council to civilians would be further delayed. The MB

considered the Court's ruling as "political"(Fahmy & Levs 2012). The SCC also decided

that Ahmed Shafik, the last Prime Minister of Mubarak era, could run in the presidential

elections.

Later in 2012, SCAF oversaw the presidential elections. On June 17, 2012, shortly

before the announcement of the results of the presidential elections, SCAF announced an

extra addendum to the February 13 Constitutional Declaration. The annex restricted the

president’s power on determining the national security policy and supervising the

military. SCAF assumed the legislative powers of the dissolved parliament (Shukri

2012). 28 During the SCAF’s rule, on several occasions the security forces cracked down protesters brutally and used deadly force. On October 9, 2011, in Maspero, Cairo, twenty-seven people, most of whom Coptic Egyptians, died and hundreds were wounded. On November 19, 2011 in Cairo –during nationwide protests against the military rule– forty citizens were killed and around two thousands were injured. On December 16, 2011 in Tahrir Square in Cairo, sixteen people were killed and around one thousand people were injured (Brumberg et al. 2012).

226

The result of the presidential elections was illustrative of the fragile political

ground that Egyptians inherited after Mubarak. At the run-off elections, Mohamed Morsi

was elected president by winning 51.7 percent of the votes, versus 48.3 percent for

Ahmed Shafik. Despite both sides’ reciprocal allegations of fraud, the elections were

considered fair and free in general. The result was controversial in the sense that Ahmed

Shafik, was the last Prime Minister of Mubarak. For many Egyptians, Ahmed Shafik was

'one of the old regime', or one of the feloul (remnants of the old regime), as Egyptians

like to call this. Yet, Shafik managed to secure nearly half of the votes. This result alone

was illustrative of a deep distrust against the Muslim Brotherhood and candidate Morsi.

In many instances informants stated that the result of presidential elections did not reflect

the true choice of Egyptians. Some secular interviewees stated that although they did not

like Shafik they voted for him because they were not sure of the intentions of the Muslim

Brotherhood. And some other informants stated, with a contrary rational, that despite

their concerns and reservations about the MB, they voted for Morsi just because Shafik

was a feloul, a remnant of the old regime. Some informants explained that since neither

of the candidates appealed to them, they did not go to the polls in the runoff elections. All

in all, the reactions against the two candidates, and the results showed that the support

base of the two camps was quite tentative. Furthermore, the margin between the

candidates was so close that the supporters of defeated candidate, Shafik portrayed Morsi

as someone who was not approved by 48.3 percent of the citizens. Thus, the new term

with President Morsi proved to be very tenuous from the beginning.

The salient emphasis on ‘change’, whether expressed or implied, in the accounts of

many informants was an aspiration for an imagined future where Egyptians live with

227

honor and dignity. The 2011 Tahrir Revolution certainly increased people’s expectations;

villagers, students, politicians, and statesmen alike. In a similar vein, Bayat (2013) argued

that end of Mubarak's nearly three decades long repression led to release of great level of

political energy with an accompanying sense of renewal. As various interviewees

explained on many occasions, people became more vocal in their demands at all levels of

society. Students in universities demanded better conditions at colleges and youth in

slums formed their own organizations. Many new political parties were established.

Political discussions began to dominate the TV broadcasts. Politics became an ever-

ending subject of daily conversations among people from every social status and age.

Political activism became a prestigious and self-satisfying occupation for young people.

It was remarkable to see that young Egyptians were generously giving up their time and

energy for their political beliefs.

Bayat (2013) makes an important observation:

But the extraordinary sense of liberation, the urge for self-realization, the dream of a just social order, in short, the desire for ‘all that is new’, this was what defined the very spirit of these revolutions. Yet as these mass social layers moved far ahead of their elites, the major anomaly of these revolutions was exposed: the discrepancy between a revolutionary desire for the ‘new’ and a reformist trajectory that could lead to harbouring the ‘old'. (p. 52)

It was only a few months after the election of President Morsi to office that my

research assistant and I had a chance to attend at a private meeting with a group of young

Egyptian activists. The group was trying to form a new volunteer political initiative

against the Muslim Brotherhood, its political branch the Freedom and Justice Party, and

president Morsi. Under the leadership of a young lawyer, about ten young people from

different cities and occupations had met for the first time and they discussed the

increasing awareness about the MB's and FJ Party's 'excesses'. To this end, each was to

228

undertake the responsibility of monitoring the activities of a ministry and would gather

data to expose any wrongdoings to the public. For Mina (A), the female liberal activist in

her twenties who took us to the meeting, the revolution was hijacked by the MB and she

seemed dedicated to struggle against the MB and President Morsi. The leader of the

group explained that people in the group had different political leanings; some were

liberal, some were leftists, and some claimed to be devout Muslims. Apparently they met

on a common denominator of a “dislike” against the MB; yet the real aspiration, as they

expressed, was to keep Egypt on the revolutionary track. Despite the optimism of people

who were members or sympathizers of the Islamist groups, many others (liberals and

even some religious Muslims who were not affiliated with the Islamist organizations)

stated on many different occasions that after two years after the ousting of Mubarak

people had not experienced a significant change and improvement in their lives. This fact

aggravated the tension that already prevailed in the transition period. At best, expected

improvements, if there were any, were not moving forward at an acceptable pace. Even,

some of the informants argued that, in terms of public security and safety their lives were

better under Mubarak.

In the aftermath of an attack of a border checkpoint in the northern Sinai on

August 5, 2012, in which 16 soldiers were killed, President Morsi forced the retirement

of Field Marshal Tantawi, the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian

Army, and some other senior commanders. President Morsi also annulled the June 17

Constitutional Declaration that restricted his presidential powers and appointed General

Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who ironically would later lead the military intervention against

him, as the Defense Minister. President Morsi’s rather bold move was an important step

229

in curtailing the direct influence of the military in Egyptian politics in the post-

revolutionary period.

On November 22, 2012 Morsi announced a seven article constitutional decree

through which he appointed a new prosecutor general and stipulated that no authority can

dissolve the People’s Assembly29 and the Shura Council, the upper house of the

parliament, which was rumored at the time would be dissolved soon as well by the

Prosecutor General. The second article of the decree was particularly controversial in a

democratic sense:

Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled (Ahram Online 2012).

This article in particular led to great concern and reaction among the public,

especially among the liberals. It was a turning point for anti-Morsi and anti-Muslim

Brotherhood sentiment and soon evolved into a full-fledged campaign that united the

liberal/secular opposition groups30. The opposition groups claimed that Morsi was

becoming the new dictator, the new Pharaoh of Egypt. As the results of 2011-2012

parliamentary elections suggested, the established political parties had been historically

fragmented and weak in Egypt and they lacked grass root support31. Furthermore, there

29 The Prosecutor General had dissolved the lower house of the parliament earlier. 30 It is important to note that although anti-Morsi / Muslim Brotherhood campaign was predominantly liberal/secular opposition groups; there were also religious Muslims among them who did not approve the policies of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi. 31 2011-2012 People’s Assembly Elections Results: Freedom and Justice Party - 235 seats (47.2%); Nour Party - 121 seats (24.3%); New Wafd Party - 38 seats (7.6%); Egyptian Bloc - 34 seats (6.8%); Al-Wasat Party - 10 seats (2.0%); Reform and Development Party

230

had been a binary degree of opposition between the seculars and Islamist, “a split that

both the Sadat and Mubarak regimes exploited to weaken political opposition”

(Hirschkind 2012). The Constitutional Decree crisis was an opportunity for the major

oppositional politicians to mobilize Egyptians and unite against the common rival,

namely the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi. Under the leadership of ElBaradei,

more than 35 opposition movements decided to act jointly under the name of the National

Salvation Front (NSF).

Right after the announcement of the constitutional decree several of the special

advisers to President Morsi resigned on the basis that they were not aware of the

constitutional decree’s preparation phase and were not consulted. As several liberal

informants stated, the resignations showed that Morsi had another circle of consultation,

namely the Guidance Office of the Muslim Brotherhood. This claim was repeatedly

raised by several informants, secular as well as among some devout Muslims who were

not sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and to President Morsi. Given the fact that

President Morsi was a long time senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood the claim

that President Morsi was highly dependent on the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance

Office was not without some credible grounds. President Morsi came from such a

tradition in which himself, like other members of the organization, was likely to develop

a loyalty to the organization and its cause over the years by living through in a

hierarchical organizational structure in which, as El Ghobashy (2005) argued, “a strict

master-disciple” relationship had been the norm (p. 374).

- 9 seats (1.8%); Revolution Continues - 7 seats (1.4%); Other parties - 18 seats (3.6%); Independents - 26 seats (5.2%) (BBC 2012).

231

As argued earlier, Egyptians became politically more engaged and more vocal

after the 2011 Revolution. Street politics, namely demonstrations, protests, and sit-ins

became daily occurrences. People had high expectations and competing visions of Egypt

that more or less formalized along the secular or religious binary. Egyptians, especially

the youth who took the leading role in the Tahrir Uprisings were increasingly feeling that

the country had to be rerouted to the revolutionary track. The societal and political

tension became more visible particularly after the protests that were organized by the

opposition groups in front of the Presidential Palace in Cairo against President Morsi’s

declaration of the November 22 Constitutional Decrees. Several protesters were killed

and some others injured in these protests. The opposition leaders, now organized under

the umbrella organization The National Salvation Front, held the supporters of the MB

and President Morsi responsible for the killings of the protesters.

It was remarkable that most of informants began using same rhetoric (in

accordance with their political views) almost with the same words that the political

leaders and prominent intellectual figures were using in the media or elsewhere.

Everywhere, it seemed the same sentences, the same reciprocal (unsubstantiated)

accusations, and defamations were circulating. About two months before the long-

planned big demonstrations on the first anniversary of Morsi’s Presidency on June 30,

2013, I met with professor Sheyma (LI), who was teaching at the American University in

Cairo, for an interview. At some point, against my question regarding a coup d’état risk,

she argued that, (although, ostensibly, she did not want that) in order for the military to

intervene, there must be large-scale violence with at least “70-80 deaths”. Surprisingly,

different people such as taxi drivers and average people referred the same range of “70-

232

80 deaths”. One corollary of this proposition was that “in order to have the military to

intervene, we must somehow have at least 70-80 people killed on June 30, 2013”.

Eventually, as expected people were killed, offices, building were torched and the

Egyptian Armed Forces intervened deposing President Morsi on July 3, 2013.

As Bailey (1969) argued, real bureaucracies (in contrast to ideal types) are

unavoidably political arenas. Brumberg et al. (2012) argued that in the post Mubarak

period, before and after the election of President Morsi, the military and established state

bureaucracy were resistant to any large-scale institutional reforms. The bureaucracy had

an entrenched interest with the old regime that had developed over the years. For

example, a large-scale privatization attempt would significantly decrease the economic

interests of the military. As it became clear in the 2012 constitution drafting process

under Morsi’s Presidency, the military budget and the military courts were wo sensitive

areas that the military leadership did not want civilian interference and oversight. In

particular, the military courts provided an important level of protection or the military

officers (Brumberg et al. 2012). Moreover, the bureaucracy had a persistent ideological

aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood.

As discussed earlier, major institutions of state power that the old regime

depended on –particularly the security and intelligence apparatus in Egyptian case– had

been more or less intact after the revolution. Besides, there were disgruntled groups

whose interests were undermined with the removal of the old rule and who lurked

patiently and manipulated every opportunity to sabotage and prompt black propaganda to

undermine the stability of the new already fragile political order. There was a widespread

belief, particularly among Egyptians who either had affiliations with the political Islamist

233

organizations or simply sympathized with them, that the remnants of the old regime had

been active and had been trying every possible method to damage the reputation of the

organization of the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi to make them fail in

government. Dr. Shevki (NA) explained:

The old regime had a lot of stolen money and dirty businesses. I don't think that they have surrendered or given up their claims on Egypt. Most of them are well established in the bureaucracy and business world. The new government did not seem to wage war against the established business elites who were active and popular in Mubarak times. There was a resistance in the bureaucracy against the MB and President Morsi; yet it was not necessarily because they sympathized with Mubarak and his time. Some of them simply did not approve of the policies of the MB.

The process of drafting a new constitution also became a point of contention

between the secular and Islamist parties. From the very beginning, the non-Islamist block

accused the MB of dominating the constitutional committee with members with Islamist

leanings at disproportional levels. Despite the heated debates, the constitutional draft was

accepted with a 63.83 percent “yes” vote in a public referendum on December 2012.

Transition periods are characterized by uncertainties and associated states of

insecurities. People and groups have high expectations for a more democratic state and

better economic conditions. Yet, at the same time, they have concerns. For instance,

many secular Egyptians, Coptic Christians, and even some Muslims who considered

themselves religious but nevertheless not affiliated with any Islamic organization, feared

that under the rule of President Morsi and the Islamist Parties, the Egyptian state and

society would gain a more religious character. Moreover, many Egyptians believed that

President Morsi was acting in a partisanship manner. On the other hand, others,

particularly people who were related to the Islamist organizations or people who were

234

sympathetic to them, believed that the remnants of the old regime were still active and

trying to reinstate the “old corrupt system”. The members of the Muslim Brotherhood,

including their leadership tended to see the increasing opposition –particularly after the

November Constitutional Decree– as part of a conspiracy against the organization and

President Morsi and they framed it in terms of “Muslims versus seculars; seculars who

were “antagonist” against the Islamic belief and values”. This was politically and socially

a precarious and fallacious representation.

There was also widespread media reports that violent attacks against Coptic

citizens and churches had increased in the post-revolution period (Ezzat 2011)32. Some of

my Christian and Muslim informants expressed the same concerns. Yet, these news

pieces or articles do not provide a detailed report with exact numbers and names of the

individual perpetrators or groups. Some Muslim informants who were either members of

the Islamist groups or sympathetic to their cause suggested that the stated increase might

be related to the deteriorated security situation after the revolution. On January 28 –the

Day of Rage, the fourth day of the 18 days– Egyptian security forces virtually collapsed,

many police stations in big cities were torched. Even for some time after the revolution,

because of the public rage against the police forces the police were afraid of working in

uniforms. The security situation worsened in cities and rural areas. This trend was

reported in the media, as well as by many informants, and continued even after President

Morsi assumed power.

Moreover, after President Morsi was elected, some police stations went on strike

around the country. According to the accounts of many informants there was an obvious

32 The stated increase in the numbers of attacks against Coptic Christians is more evident in the aftermath of the overthrow of President Morsi after July 3, 2013.

235

lower police presence and lack of security compared to the pre-revolution period33. The

Mubarak regime depended heavily on the security apparatus. In this respect, they might

be considered as natural allies of the former regime. Thus the security apparatus were not

satisfied with the new ruling elite, namely the Islamists, most of whom they knew as the

Islamists who were under close scrutiny of the former regime34. For the security

apparatus, they were “radicals” or “extremist”, or with the most optimistic evaluation the

new political elite were “potential threats” from the past. Furthermore, the members of

the security forces were afraid that they might be held accountable for their past “work”

during the Mubarak regime. In an interview with a high-level police chief he stated that

some of his friends were sacked and he considered himself lucky to keep his position.

Some informants who were sympathetic to President Morsi suggested that the police, as

in other bureaucratic institutions, were trying to undermine the new President by

deliberately neglecting to fulfill their jobs. In sum, based on the aforementioned factors,

the security situation was relatively worse than the pre-revolutionary period. Following

this argument, some Muslim informants suggested that relative increase in the number of

attacks against Christians could be a natural result –rather than an “increased hostility

against Christian Egyptians, as implied by some media reports and Coptic informants”–

of the general deteriorated security situation in the country.

Nevertheless, as was also raised by various informants (Muslim and Christian),

there had been several fault lines that had sparked violent confrontations in many cases

33 After the military’s take over on July 3, 2013, the increase in the police presence in the streets of Cairo were obvious. 34 The security apparatus detained many important members of Islamist organizations such al Gamaa al Islamiyya and the Muslim Brotherhood, including President Morsi. Some of them were imprisoned on more than one occasion during the Mubarak regime.

236

between the Muslim and Coptic Egyptians. For instance, conversions from Christianity to

Islam or vice versa, love affairs between a Muslim and Christian, and the issue of

building Churches had been the initial cause of violent confrontations that residents of a

certain place aligned along religious lines (Lane 2011; Ibrahim 2012). Both Muslims and

Coptic families in general do not tolerate conversions. It is also noteworthy that regarding

the Coptic question, secular and liberal Muslim Egyptians had a different view from

those of the Muslim Egyptians who were either members of the Islamist parties or

organizations or those who were sympathetic to them. Secular and liberal Muslim

Egyptians offered a more objective account of tensions between the Copts and the larger

society. Nevertheless, informants who were members of the Islamist organizations or

who were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi organizations or sympathetic

to them tended to play down the tension and problems that existed in the society. They

usually explained that Coptic Christians are a part of the Egyptian society and violent

confrontations have been exceptional cases.

It was not only secular Egyptians or Coptic Christians, but also some religiously

devout Muslims that had certain concerns about the President Morsi’s rule and direction

of the country. Even among religious Muslims, some Egyptians had a strong dislike and

distrust against the Muslim Brotherhood and consequently against the President Morsi.

Several informants explained (I also witnessed this personally on several occasions) that

people had heated arguments and even fist fights because a preacher during Friday

prayers in a mosque made some supporting comments about President Morsi. In an

interview with a female professor from the American University in Cairo, she suggested

237

that some of her female students stopped wearing headscarf as a reaction to the Muslim

Brotherhood35.

Nevertheless, the supporters of the MB and the leadership of the organization

failed to see the legitimate concerns and anxieties –whether real or perceived, constructed

or exaggerated– of Egyptians. Thus, they failed to assuage the increasing criticism and

opposition against the organization and President Morsi with due consideration. In an

interview with a professor from Cairo University, who was also a high-level member of

the Muslim Brotherhood, the researcher was scolded harshly when asked about this as

follows; “some Egyptians have fears against the Muslim Brotherhood.” The Professor

stated:

As a graduate student, you are supposed to not to credit those claims, which is not based on any scientific research. What is the percentage of those who fear and on what reliable research are you depending on? And how do those people represent the general Egyptian population? Basically, he did not seem to believe that some people outside the organization

had some doubts about the “real intentions or agenda” of the Muslim Brotherhood and

President Morsi. In a similar vein, in our interview with Mahdi Akef (MB), the former

Supreme Guides of the Muslim Brotherhood, he stated that the media has been hostile to

the organization and to President Morsi. One can hardly deny that main the stream media

has been unsympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi; nonetheless,

conducted interviews with members or sympathizers of the organization indicated that in

general they tended to disregard any criticism against the organization.

35 The professor herself had a headscarf and I personally found her claim “hard to believe”.

238

Besides, there was a widespread belief among sympathizers and the members of

the Muslim Brotherhood that the remnants of the old regime and the “deep state” were

trying hard to undermine the rule of President Morsi. Those claims were not completely

unsubstantiated. At least, the established bureaucracy was not supporting the President.

One who lived in Egypt, particularly in Cairo must have witnessed some ‘strange’

incidents particularly in the period before the June 30, 2013 demonstrations. For instance,

suddenly around three weeks before the demonstrations on June 30, 2013, the private

international and national oil companies stopped selling gas. Except for the gas stations

that were owned and run by the military, finding gas was impossible. Consequently, since

everyone had to go the same military owned gas stations, there occurred long lines,

extending for several hundred meters. The already bad traffic of Cairo suddenly became a

nightmare. One informant, who was a sympathizer of the Muslim Brotherhood, claimed

that several weeks before the June 30th, police officers were sometimes getting keys of

several cars in the middle of the highway and then caused the traffic to be blocked

completely. Beginning approximately from the first week of June (three-four weeks

before the planned anti-Morsi demonstrations) several hours of power cuts became the

city’s daily routine in Cairo. The researcher had naively attributed this to the air

condition-related rising electric demands because of the warm weather. However, after

the military ousted Morsi, on July 3, 2013, gas stations began selling gas and power

outages ended36. Approximately one week after the military intervention, workers placed

garbage containers in the neighborhood where the researcher lived. Interestingly, for the

36 For more detail: Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi (Hubbard & Kirkpatrick 2013).

239

past one year, garbage was left on the streets because there were neither garbage

containers at all or they were not enough. Moreover, right after Morsi’s overthrow, the

police presence in streets increased visibly. Many Egyptians did not seem to question the

oddness of these events. On one occasion, a wealthy and well-educated Egyptian female,

who lived in one of the best locations in Cairo, explained that Morsi and the Muslim

Brotherhood were deliberately cutting the power. Given the headscarf that she was

wearing the researcher assumed that she was a religiously devout Muslim, but she had a

strong dislike against the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi. One might expect her and her

husband, who was a pilot, to be more critical in their judgment. Holding Morsi and the

MB responsible for the power cuts was like suggesting that the mayor of a city, who

expects to be re-elected for a second term, was deliberately cutting the power or water of

the city which he was ruling. One cannot help but speculating that, probably because of

the highly polarized political atmosphere, people were very receptive to political

propaganda or their dislike against a group was distorting their judgment.

Revolutionary Romanticism

Bayat (2013) argued that the Egyptian revolution was also self-limiting in the

sense that because of the rapid ousting of Mubarak, the revolutionary forces had the false

impression –accompanied by the revolutionary euphoria– that the revolutionary ideals

were achieved, without in fact there being any substantial change in the key institutional

power structure and its components. This swift success was probably the major source of

the revolutionary romanticism that I observed among some of the young Egyptians.

Although revolutionary romanticism is a benign feeling per se, for some young people it

possibly masked the involved commitments, sacrifices, and processes of revolution that

240

took years to develop. Thus, having missed these processes and sacrifices, some people

were keen to demand a second revolution without taking into consideration that Morsi

was an elected official and most of the people voted for him would not easily acquiesce

to have him leave by force.

The opposition groups long prepared for a “decisive” nation wide demonstration

on June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of President Morsi in the office. The newly

established youth movement Tammorrod (Rebel) assumed the leadership in the

organization of the demonstration and a petition campaign against President Morsi.

People were expecting a serious confrontation with possible violence and prepared

themselves against it. Some families left Cairo or sent their children and elderly people

outside the city. In some neighborhoods, cars were taken from their usual parking areas

just as a precaution against possible violence. Meanwhile, the supporters of the MB and

President Morsi had planned alternative demonstrations in different locations as a token

of their support for President Morsi. As discussed earlier, from the early days of President

Morsi, people, especially the youth were talking about a second revolution against the

MB. Now, they were practically preparing for a second revolution. The youth who

comprised of the most significant bulk of the Tamarrod, Rebel movement, believed that

‘revolution was imminent when they mobilize certain number of the population37.

Nevertheless, differently from the 2011 Tahrir Revolution, in which the supporters of the

MB had arguably played a critical role with their participation en masse at a critical point,

37 The leaders of the Tamarrod Movement claimed to have collected 22 million signatures in their petition campaign against President Morsi.

241

the ruler, namely President Morsi had mass public support behind him38. Therefore, any

forced attempt to remove him from the Presidential Office was to encounter resistance

from his supporters, which could possibly evolve into large-scale, nation wide violent

civil clashes, nothing less than a civil war. Hence, a civil war, more than a “second

revolution” was more likely. Fortunately, that did not happen but the armed forces

intervened. Defense Secretary General Abdel Fattah Al Sisi declared President Morsi's

ousting on July 3, 2013. The military took Morsi into custody and announced Adly

Mansour, the head of the Constitutional Court, would serve as the interim president.

Although a considerable number of Egyptians did not consider the army’s intervention on

July 3, 2013 as a “coup d’état” and preferred calling it the second revolution, the army

interrupted the democratic process by forcibly removing an elected president. The

outcome was continuing political chaos, frequent bloodshed with killings of unarmed

civilians, the curtailment of political freedoms, and more importantly, deep fractures

between different segments of Egyptian society that might take years to heal.

Conclusion

The concept of social dramas holds that whether in case of restoration of normal

relations or social recognition of irreparable schism, the new political field after the

power struggle exhibits many changes possibly in terms of its range and scope, and

number and size of its parts. The sources of support and legitimacy, as well as

mechanisms to acquire them, are likely to be altered. But, despite all these changes,

38 It is not possible to know the exact number or percentage of his supporters among the general population. Nevertheless, in a quite speculative fashion, looking at the results of the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections and 2012 presidential elections, in which the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi gained 47.2% and 51.73% of the votes respectively, after just one year in the office it would be difficult to justify any estimate of approval rate, despite of all his mistakes, less than 25%.

242

particular relationships and norms endure. Moreover, Swartz et al. (1966) emphasized, it

is likely that relations of the parts (agents) and structure of the field will be different.

There might be new alliances even between formerly rival sub-groups. Possibly there will

be changes in status of actors towards opposite directions39. New norms may emerge to

redress the problems of bygone regime and old norms and including some institutions

may become void. Some informal relations may be institutionalized in the new political

field. The foundation of Freedom and Justice Party's (FJP), the political party of the

Muslim Brotherhood, which was a politically banned organization during Mubarak

regime, can be seen as an example of this process.

The ousting of Mubarak was the revolutionary outcome and marked a new

beginning for Egypt. The regime’s main repressive security apparatus, namely the

intelligence and police forces had disappeared and the armed forces, as the other main

pillar of the regime, had defected. Nevertheless, except for several names in top

positions, such as the Ministry of Interior, the security apparatus protected its position,

yet without much public visibility and interference. Furthermore, since the revolutionary

forces did not directly assume any role in the new ruling mechanism or setting right after

Mubarak left, the Armed Forces’ defection did not exactly mean that they aligned with

the revolutionary forces. In other words, although the loser was clearly Mubarak, it was

hard to determine the winner.

In this respect, there was a new power equation in the post revolutionary period.

The Armed Forces retained its strength, and in fact even increased its influence as many

39 An early 2013 panel workshop in American University in Cairo titled "Islamists rise from prison to Palace". The opposite is true as well that some of the key figures of the former regime that they were sent to prison, including former President Mubarak himself.

243

average Egyptians applauded its stance against Mubarak. Tahrir, predominantly

composed of young Egyptians, emerged as a new power center40. Although, the unity that

Egyptians from all sects of society displayed in Tahrir Square against the common

antagonist, the Mubarak regime, was clear, it vanished soon as differences of opinion and

competing visions of the new Egypt began vocalized41. Besides, Egyptians in general

were empowered through the ‘rites of passages’ of Tahrir protests. The Islamist

organizations, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist groups emerged as a third

power center. As later events showed, there was only a tentative state what might be

termed a restoration of peace. To recall Lewellen, who described restoration of peace in

social drama as “a readjustment of forces that lends more strength to one side and

depletes the strength of the other” (2003:98), depletion of the power of the antagonist

Mubarak regime (from the Egyptians’ perspective) did not result solely in the advantage

of the revolutionary forces, but it also empowered new power centers who soon disagreed

about the legitimacy of the new actors and a common ground of political engagement;

that is the democratic process through elections. Thus, they began competing against each

other through the street politics of organized demonstrations42.

In sum, after Mubarak left, the military, which was certainly not a revolutionary

institution, assumed power, ostensibly temporarily, to oversee the transition period. The

40 Protests and demonstrations took place in almost entire Egypt during 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Tahrir here refers to 2011 Uprising in general. 41 Ad hoc alliances that were established in Tahrir were broken only to be reformed again along the Islamists versus others against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood soon after the Constitutional Decree Crisis in November 2012. 42 Depletion of the power of the antagonist Mubarak regime is also a questionable issue. Many Egyptians believed that remnants of the old regime stayed active in bureaucracy and specifically in police and intelligence apparatus.

244

revolutionary youth that had a leading role in the uprising and had carried out the bulk of

the protests were excluded from the new political arrangements. Hence, the new political

state was insecure from the start. Later after the elections, when the Islamists gained 2/3

of the votes, some Egyptians felt that Islamists “hijacked the revolution”. Moreover, the

Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi, against whom a significant portion of

Egyptian society has had a deep distrust, failed to quell anxieties in the larger society. On

the contrary, with some wrong policies, President Morsi increased the concerns of many

Egyptians regarding the direction of the country. Given all these peculiarities, ‘restoration

of peace’ or ‘restoration of normal relations’ was a tentative state.

245

Chapter 7: CONCLUSION

All revolutions are incomplete; no revolution is total. The ground is not cleared; there are always continuities; a total revolution is something imagined, whether wished-for or feared, but never achieved. (Bailey 2001:195-196)

The 2011 Tahrir Uprising constitutes a historical turning point in modern

Egyptian history. Inspired by the events in Tunisia, members of several young activist

groups decided to organize nation-wide protests on January 25, 2011, the National Police

Day. Contrary to the most popular accounts, even the organizers did not expect –despite

the wishful thinking– the protests to develop into a revolutionary situation that eventually

succeeded in overthrowing their almost three decade long ruler Hosni Mubarak in just 18

days.

This study intended to explain how the 2011 Egyptian Revolution succeeded in

ousting Mubarak. Questions such as, why did it happen in January-February 2011? What

was novel about it? Was it planned? If so, to what extent?, constituted the focus of

public and academic inquiry about the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The two research

questions that guided this study; namely 1) Under what conditions and through what

processes did the Egyptian people emerge as a possible contender with a revolutionary

claim against the Mubarak regime?; and 2) Under what conditions and through what

processes did the Egyptian people succeed in replacing Mubarak in 18 days, arguably in

very short time and peaceful manner?, were analyzed with a diachronic analysis that

benefitted mainly from the concept of Social Drama of Victor Turner. In Part I, the

Mobilization of Political Capital, the power sources of the two contending parties,

namely the Mubarak regime versus Egyptians, were analyzed. A principal instrument of

246

the Mubarak regime was the maintenance of a coercive apparatus that tried to control the

society. Besides this, the regime manipulated and exacerbated communal strife on

ideological domains along Islamist versus secular lines. The ostensibly democratic

institutions and processes, such as the multi-party political system, and elections mainly

functioned, inter alia, as a means of providing a limited legitimacy for Mubarak on

domestic and international levels. Nevertheless, Mubarak’s heavy-handed, authoritarian

rule functioned counter productively in deepening anti-regime sentiments. The failing

economic conditions and specifically the likely succession scenario of Gamal Mubarak to

replace his father Hosni Mubarak, which was considered imminent by many Egyptians,

intensified the oppositional momentum against the regime. Several significant

developments and events, such as the emergence of the Kefaya Movement, the evolution

of Islamist organizations and youth movements and the return of ElBaradei were

analyzed in context of development of oppositional power centers and a gradual change

in the political culture of the society. In short, a gradual structural change –in MG

Smith’s (1974) formulation–, which denotes the transformed relations between the state

and society, was at play during the last years of Mubarak in power. Egyptians became

more vocal and confrontational in expressing their resentments against the Mubarak

regime through demonstrations, protests, strikes, and youth activism. Furthermore, over

the years, young Egyptians became more politicized and experienced in using the

marvels of Internet and social media to reveal the excesses of the security forces and to

get organized around a common agenda.

Part II, the Encounter or Showdown was organized in accordance with the phases

of the Social Drama concept and it analyzes mainly the 18 days of protest in January-

247

February 2011 along with several closely preceding events. Two events were interpreted

as most significant as the harbinger of the crisis en route to 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

The death of Khaled Said in June 2010 and the fraudulent parliamentary elections in

November-December 2010 depleted the already-dubious legitimacy of the regime and

increased the politicization of many, particularly the young Egyptians who benefitted

extensively from social media. Social media, mobile cell phone technology, and satellite

channels contributed significantly to the mobilization and organization of people before

and during the regime; yet their significance should be evaluated as a whole with other

involved processes and mechanisms that were at play. Although social media provided an

alternative public space and a convenient medium of organization and politicization of,

particularly, young middle class Egyptians, it would be misleading to describe the 2011

Egyptian Revolution as a “Facebook Revolution”.

Analysis of the involved processes and mechanisms proved to be important to

better understand the post-revolutionary period. To this end, this study benefitted

extensively from the concept of the Contentious Politics as formulized by McAdams et

al. (2001). Analysis of the data determined relevant processes such as certification, scale

shift, constitution of new political actors, regime defection, decertification, and

polarization. Following the progress of those processes, the evolution of planned protests

on January 25, 2011, on the National Police Day, to gain a revolutionary claim on

January 28, the Day of Rage is discussed.

The Egyptian revolution was not a discrete event that occurred with the

emergence of sudden conditions and opportunities. As McAdam et al. (2001) suggested a

comprehensive analysis of revolutions requires a diachronic approach that pays

248

simultaneous attention to history, to long-term structural changes, to the effects of culture

in interpretation of opportunities and risks, and to the strategic calculations around

contingent events. The Egyptian revolution was not a fully planned event and contingent

events –unexpected occurrences that affect the course of contentious episode in

unpredicted ways and scale– significantly contributed to its success. This study identified

three contingent events that changed the course of contention between the regime and

people: the Tunisian Revolution, the Mubarak regime’s underestimation of the people’s

growing resentments, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s late participation in the protests on

the fourth day, January 28, 2011. Although the protests on January 25 did not start with a

revolutionary claim, the Tunisian Revolution had a profound affect among young

activists to dream the “impossible”, namely to overthrow Mubarak from power. As

explained earlier, the security apparatus underestimated the numbers of participants and

their sophisticated strategies before the protests started on January 25, 2011.

Consequently, as protesters gained a relative supremacy against the security forces, their

confidence and further participation from different segments of the society increased.

More significantly, as the third contingent event, the absence of the organization of

Muslim Brotherhood in protests on the first three days contributed to the success of the

revolution in two different ways.

Firstly, if the Muslim Brotherhood had declared their support, many liberal

Egyptians would have hesitated to join the demonstrations. The Muslim Brotherhood was

the best-organized and most populous organization in the country; hence, they would

likely dominate any demonstration they would join. It would be a Muslim Brotherhood

show and thus participation of Egyptian from the larger society would be limited.

249

Secondly, if the Muslim Brotherhood declared that they would join the protests on

January 25, the response of the security forces would be harsher and arguably the protests

would never gain a revolutionary claim. In other words, it would end without starting.

The events on the first anniversary of Morsi’s presidency and ensuing military

intervention arguably support the relevance of these two inferences.

As people shaped its course and direction, the revolutionary processes

transformed people in a paradigmatic fashion. The protests served as sort of rites of

passages and helped many Egyptians redefine themselves as free individuals. Hence,

besides a gradual change in political culture roughly in the last ten years of Mubarak,

there was a sudden shift in the way people understand political freedoms and state-

society relations. After the revolution, Egyptians became politically more vocal and

demanding against the state.

Post-Revolutionary Syndrome

F. G. Bailey (2001) argued that every successful revolution unavoidably retains

continuities from the old regime. Individuals and the entire society “need time to unlearn

the old and learn the new—to be reprogrammed—even when they are ready and willing

to accept the changes” (p.190). In a similar vein, in her analysis of the post-transition

period in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, Sheri

Berman (2013) emphasizes that stable democracies “requires more than just a shift in

political forms; it also involves eliminating the antidemocratic social, cultural, and

economic legacies of the old regime” (p.67). Berman argues that the transition democracy

is a cumbersome process that involves usually, as many historical examples show, long

and very often violent struggles. False starts and detours are not infrequent occurrences in

250

transition to democracy. Berman explained that first democratization tries in France,

Germany, and Italy failed. Violence, incompetence, and confusion in post-transition

period should not be interpreted as “unique” failures of a specific culture. Rather, the

crises of transition period are “normal and predictable” (p.73). She suggests that some of

the problems of the post-revolutionary period are inherited from the past regime.

In an interview with Tamer (A), a young liberal Egyptian in his mid thirties, who

participated in the in the Revolution as an activist and now among the founding member

of a new political party, said:

We don’t know how to do politics; we do not know how to talk to each other and how to take the next step.

Tamer (A): Mubarak used the Muslim Brotherhood, for domestic and international politics. He implied that “if I leave, you will have Ihkwan (Brotherhood)”. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood used Mubarak as well…They (the Brotherhood) used every tool to survive, this is understandable; it is politics. But after the revolution, we have a new system. Yet they (the Brotherhood) have nothing other than the old ways. We thought that as normal people who participated in the revolution we need another way to rule this country. When I sat with someone from the Ihkwan and talked to them, I see that they have the same old systems, same tools. We have a new power now after the revolution; we have us, civil powers, liberals…

Researcher: There seems to be a lack of communication and understanding between the Islamist organizations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, and the opposition groups. The perception that “oppositional groups are against Islam” is not uncommon among Islamist political groups.

Tamer (A): It is not their fault and it is not our fault. The Mubarak regime depended on this. The regime systematically isolated people in Egypt; in politics, in public areas, parties, religious people, rich people, villagers etc. After the revolution, our party prepared a political awareness caravan to publicize our new party. We went to the poor areas in and around Cairo. It was my first time, actually our first time for my entire group. We went to poor places around Cairo, very poor places. There, people thought that we were Americans, not Egyptians. They started talking in Arabic in front of us as though they did not know that we could understand them. Of course they were isolated from other social segments around them. This was, I think, Mubarak’s strategy. He depended on

251

this…Actually, I discovered Egypt after the revolution. I am discovering Egypt in streets now. I can see different people now from many places. I didn’t see those people before. And many people like me would say; “where did those people come from? We did not see them before”. So, I think, this was the old regime’s way of the controlling the country. So, lack of communication is not their fault. Of course, now they discover us, we discover them. Still discover the other side. The battles, and negotiations are still going on. Maybe after 5, 6, or 10 years we will understand each other. They will discover that we are Muslims and they will discover that they have another idea that we can understand. If I sit with someone from the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi groups, I see that they are normal people. They have the same ideas as we have, they dream about new Egypt, about modern Egypt like me. We have just perpetuated rumors against each other. So, we just need to sit and negotiate.

Muslim Brotherhood’s Failed Appeal as a “Party Open to All Egyptians”

The Muslim Brotherhood has an efficient and organized hierarchical structure and

has a meticulous recruitment process. There is not a certain age group that the MB targets

exclusively for recruitment. Members of the organization continuously look for potential

members and they usually approach those who are pious. Ahmed (MB), in his early

thirties, has been a long time member of the Muslim Brotherhood and he has local

responsibilities in his town in Menoufiya Governorate. In our interview with Ahmed

(MB), he explained the long recruitment process that was developed in the organization

over the years.

After a member identifies a possible candidate, the first step is to develop a

personal relation on non-political grounds. For the preliminary contacts, specifically in

recruiting children, the Muslim Brotherhood organizes social and cultural or sportive

occasions. After the initial trust is developed reciprocally, the recruits proceed through

several stages and are introduced with political and religious indoctrination gradually in

local branches of the organization. In the first stage, when an individual shows a candid

interest in maintaining the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood he is called a

252

muhib, (lower) and he is expected to attend the regular meetings that are held at least

once a week with the usra, (family), the smallest unit of the Muslim Brotherhood. If the

person shows commitment and follows the requirements of the level of muhib, he is

promoted to be a muayyad (supporter) and later becomes muntasib (incorporated), and

muntasib becomes later muntazim, (organizer). In each level adherent is observed closely

by his superior in that level and he is also trusted with responsibilities and tasks in

accordance with his level, such as teaching Quran and identifying and recruiting new

members. Needless to say that each member is expected to observe the five-times daily

prayers and fasts in the month of Ramadan. This way, the new adherents are exposed to

gradual indoctrination, tasks and responsibilities and they gain a new identity or supra-

identity in what we may call a ‘communities of practice’ (Lave & Wenger 1991)43. By

going through aforementioned stages that last five or more years an adherent becomes a

full member with voting privileges in internal matters and elections. Besides, the MB has

a wide variety of community events and associations on very different occasions

throughout the year in which members contribute on different levels with either their

service or financial aid. In these communities of practice, each member adopts the

religious and political ideology of the organization and at the same time, by taking on

responsibilities and performing their tasks they internalize the values and identity of the

organization. Furthermore, this intricate recruitment process also serves to prevent

43 According to Lave and Wenger (1991) communities of practice, with formal or informal organizational structures, are participation frameworks that learning takes place through shared practices among co-participants. According to Lave and Wenger through 'legitimate peripheral participation', "learners inevitably participate in communities of practitioners and that the mastery of knowledge and skill requires newcomers to move toward full participation” (1991:29).

253

undesired infiltrations from the state's intelligence apparatus (Trager 2011). By going

through all the stages, before reaching the larger or national level offices, where Maktab

al-Irshad, the Guidance Office, constitutes the highest unit in the hierarchy, a member

proves his or her loyalty and commitment. Given all these recruitment processes and

organizational structures it is plausible to argue that the MB has had a very efficient

organizational structure and highly loyal members. In fact, the adherents of the

organization proved to be very loyal when they kept their position in the Rabaa al

Adaviye Square for more than a moth, day and night, after the ousting of President Morsi

by the military on July 3, 2013. Even two deadly attacks, in which hundreds of people,

including children and women were killed, did not deter them from supporting Morsi

(Memmott 2013). I was living approximately two miles away from the Rabaa al Adaviye

Square and used to see them almost every day in my last month in Cairo. They used to

say repeatedly that “we will die here in this Square but we will not leave”. And they did

so. The security forces could only dispersed the crowd and controlled the al Adaviye

Square after the third –and the deadliest– attempt in which hundreds of protesters were

killed by the security forces (Kirkpatrick 2013).

A corollary of this meticulous recruitment process is a constructed, probably an

unintentional ‘circle of trust’, which inherently generates its sort of antithesis; i.e. a

‘circle of distrust’ that comprises the members of the society outside the Muslim

Brotherhood. Based on this argument, it is not surprising that President Morsi maintained

his strong and intimate relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and appointed members of

the Brotherhood or sympathizers of the organization to different governmental positions.

President Morsi, specifically in a highly tense and historically hostile environment

254

against the organization, which was subjected to numerous cases of state crack downs,

imprisonment of its members, and confiscation of organization’s property in its history,

might have had difficulty in trusting people outside the Muslim Brotherhood. There is no

reliable source that can provide exact statistical percentages of the Muslim Brotherhood

members among President Morsi’s appointees to different governmental posts. But this

was a common perception particularly among liberal Egyptians. President Morsi and the

Muslim Brotherhood were accused of attempting the “Brotherhoodization” of the state.

There were early signs of a sort of a “preemptive” interference against President Morsi.

In a conversation with a high level bureaucrat; against his concerns about the

“Brotherhoodization” of the Egyptian state, I suggested that the democratic process

would likely moderate the Muslim Brotherhood. As El Ghobashy (2005) argued, the

Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral engagement over the years brought ideological revisions

to the organization and, "it is the institutional rules of participation rather than the

commandments of ideology that motivate political parties” (p. 390). Nevertheless, the

interlocutor was not convinced with my remarks and he said:

It might be too late after a certain level, if the Brotherhood and Morsi stay in power. Another repercussion of the Muslim Brotherhood’s systematic recruitment

process was that it essentially restrained people from becoming a member at their will.

Since everyone, provided that they are introduced to the organization at first hand by a

member, has to go through the same recruitment process beginning from the first level, it

is not possible for someone to decide at his or her will to become a member overnight. In

other words, one cannot say, for instance by reviewing the party program of the Muslim

Brotherhood that “I liked their party program, it reflects my worldview and I will become

255

a member of the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood.” Thus, from the

very inception, with its existing institutional structure, the Muslim Brotherhood had

inherent difficulties in presenting its organization and the Freedom and Justice Party as

an inclusive political organization.

In the post-Mubarak period, the Coptic Egyptians became increasingly concerned

about the prominence of political Islam. Dr. Sedat (C) is a Coptic Christian in his early

fifties. He is a medical doctor and wealthy man. It was the first months of Morsi’s

Presidency and in a conversation Dr Sedat (C) stated that the Coptic Egyptians had some

concerns regarding the new Islamist political elite.

Their ultimate aim is to turn Egypt into a state that is ruled by Sharia law. According to the Sharia law, Christians’ and Jews’ statuses are considered as dhimnis or as the non-Muslim members of the society. In a sense, they are considered to be second-class citizens. We won’t accept that. I guess we can make it with the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Salafis are very difficult, they are very intransigent. In order to understand the real and perceptual insecurities that the Coptic

Community suffers, it is necessary to understand, from a Coptic point of view, the

material and symbolic interests and real or perceptual threats to those interests. Muslims

and Coptic Egyptians have limited relations and there has been a certain level of distrust

among the two communities. More importantly, Muslim Egyptians seem to be unaware

of the anxieties and insecurities that members of the Coptic Community have.

Insecurities may arise out of not only real and factual threats but also perceptual or

imagined ones. The analysis of the collected data suggested that sporadic instances44 of

injustices against the Coptic community throughout hundreds of years after the Muslim

44 Violent attacks against Coptic Egyptians and Churches had increased after the military intervention on July 2013.

256

conquest of Egypt nurtured a sense of anxiety and a state of uncertainty, and probably a

state of insecurity, among the Coptic Egyptians. A tangential analysis shows that every

year several violent attacks and incidents against Copts take place. Fortunately, local

incidents have never transformed into confrontations on a national level. Yet, every

incident, however intermittent, reinvigorates a sense of insecurity and uncertainty among

the Coptic Egyptians. Such a feeling is possibly cultivated with the possibility that any

small incident might easily escalate into all-out lynching campaign against the Coptic

community.

The Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi seemed sensitive about the

concerns of the Coptic community. Nevertheless, their assurances did not persuade the

Coptic community. Especially, after Morsi issued a constitutional decree on November

22, 2012 and after the ensuing demonstrations in which several people were killed and

some people wounded, the relations between the Copts in general and the Muslim

Brotherhood worsened gravely.

Contested “Legitimacies”

In his Toward Anthropology of Government William Schumann (2009) suggests

analyzing legitimacy in plural as “legitimacies”. For Schumann, as a socially constructed

political practice, without ascribing a priori meaning, legitimacies should be studied in

their sociopolitical contexts. He differentiated between institutional and representative

legitimacies. Institutional legitimacies denote the conformity of political practices with

democratic principles; whereas representative legitimacies are about whether government

officials represent common public interest. Schumann concludes that rulers in a

democratic system must necessarily observe both institutional and representational

257

legitimacies. From an early period in his presidency, many Egyptians claimed that Morsi

was the President of the Muslim Brotherhood and not the entire nation. President Morsi

and the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood did in fact nourish this anxiety with some

of their actions. On the first day of the announcement of his presidency, Morsi made a

speech in front of several thousands of people who consisted solely of, or mainly, the

members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was skillfully used by the opposition figures

to advance their claims as stated above. From Schumann’s perspective, one can

expediently argue that President Morsi failed to secure a “representative legitimacy” in

the larger society. As to the “institutional legitimacy”, given the fact that President Morsi

could gain with only a very little margin in the presidential elections (with 51.73%

against his rival Shafik’s 48.27%), many Egyptians in the anti-Morsi/MB campaign

argued that Morsi’s electoral success was dubious.

After the November 2012 Constitutional Decree Crisis and ensuing

demonstrations several demonstrators were killed and many were wounded. As a reaction

to those killings, leaders of the opposition political groups stimulated a new discussion

that the President had ordered the security forces and MB members to use deadly force

against the protesters and thus he lost his “legitimacy”. Against this claim, the supporters

of the President adopted a defiant position holding that the source of legitimacy in

democracies is elections and one gains or loses his/her legitimacy through elections. In

interviews with people from different political currents, these conflicting accounts of

legitimacy were raised repeatedly.

As discussed earlier, the repressive, heavy-handed rule of Mubarak tried to

control every political movement in the country. Mubarak, like his predecessor Sadat,

258

used Islamist versus secular binary strategies to control the opposition politics and

society. Moreover, there was an already developed deep distrust among certain segments

of the society against the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis.45 The oppositional

political parties had been weak during the entire reign of Mubarak. Except for the

Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned as a political organization,

yet; “condoned” to continue to its activities in the form of religious and welfare activities

in the larger society, was the only organized group in the country with an influential grass

roots reach. 46 Thus, the post-revolution period started with the relative supremacy of the

Islamist organizations (against the liberal/secular political parties), at the grassroots level.

The Islamist parties’ electoral victory in parliamentary elections showed that the

secular/liberal parties had a long way to go against their rivals. One of the implications of

the results of the 2012 presidential elections, in which the candidate of the Muslim

Brotherhood Morsi who could hardly have won the second tour with 51.73% against his

rival Shafik (48.27%), was that the secular/liberal forces could in fact build a viable

coalition in the long run against the Muslim Brotherhood. But they were fragmented and

failed to unite effectively.

Any electoral campaign would unlikely have changed the results dramatically in

the short term. When the November 2012 Constitutional Decrees of President Morsi

intensified skepticism about President Morsi in the society, these provided a base for the

grouping together of the coalition of the liberal/secular oppositional groups. The

45 The distrust against the Islamist political organizations partly stemmed from their past engagement in some terrorist activities and their use of violence means earlier on in Egypt. Moreover, in the past, they had a more radical discourse; nevertheless, as El-Ghobashy (2005) argued, their engagement in electoral politics relatively moderated their stance and discourses. 46 Until the ousting of Mubarak, Salafi groups stood aloof from politics.

259

sociopolitical tensions intensified gradually because of the reciprocal uncompromising

attitudes of President Morsi and the oppositional groups. Consequently, in a sort of

“preemptive” intervention against “the state’s imminent brotherhoodization under

President Morsi”, as many people among anti-Brotherhood groups claimed, an important

segment of Egyptian society set out for a “second revolution”, on the first anniversary of

Morsi’s presidency on June 30, 2013.

Tilly’s (2006) suggestion for analyzing a revolution consists of two distinct

phases, namely a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome, and this proved to

be rather relevant for understanding the “revolutionary romanticism” that many Egyptian

youth were infatuated with. As a benign yet potentially misleading feeling, revolutionary

romanticism led many young Egyptians in the anti-Morsi camp to believe that mobilizing

a certain number of people against the ruler –i.e., creating a revolutionary situation–

would make a revolutionary outcome imminent. Nevertheless, as in the Egyptian case

where the ruler had a substantial support base from the public, one group’s mobilization

with a revolutionary claim could potentially result in violent confrontations and possibly

in a civil war. The mobilization of the anti-Morsi camp under the leadership of the

National Salvation Front and the Tammarrod Movement eventually ended with the

ousting of President Morsi. The euphemistic depiction of the July 3, 2013 military

intervention as the “Armed Forces’ response to popular demand” does not invalidate the

fact that Morsi was overthrown by military force, not by the force of popular opposition.

Thus, this might hardly be considered as the “Second Revolution”, as many Egyptians in

the anti-Morsi camp claimed.

260

How Peaceful Was It?

As stated earlier, after President Morsi’s constitutional decree on November 2013,

Egyptians became increasingly polarized along pro-Morsi versus anti-Morsi lines. Both

sides maintained strong prejudices against each other. While the pro-Morsi campaign

pervasively held that the anti-Morsi campaign was predominantly composed of feloul,

(remmants of Mubarak regime) who were against Islam, the anti-Morsi camp held that

Ihkwan and President Morsi were in a campaign of brotherhoodization of the state and

the country was diverted from its revolutionary ideals. These reciprocal accusations

brought a haste of defamatory accusations that resulted in the dehumanization of the

other. Street politics had already become the main venue for the power show of each

camp. The numbers of participants, mostly exacerbated, were presented as signs of each

camp’s level of legitimacy. Meanwhile, the violence on the streets increased gradually.

Violent confrontations between the different groups became daily occurrences. Political

leaders, President Morsi and the leaders of the National Salvation Front –the oppositional

umbrella group– failed to provide a working channel of communication that would

potentially lead to consensus and possibly mitigate the societal tensions. As the

prominent political scientist and liberal politician Amr Hamzawy (LI) stated in our

interview, the National Salvation Front adopted a rejectionist attitude against President

Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party. This rejectionist attitude did not resolve but

escalated the tensions even further. In a similar vein, President Morsi had mainly an

uncompromising approach against the concerns and demand of the opposition.

Consequently, the society became more and more strained.

261

Although Egyptians are known to be good natured and calm people, increasing

violence, before and after the military intervention, marked a sharp deviation from this

common feature of Egyptian people. It is not an easy task, and not relevant for this study,

to determine who inflicted more violence. Yet, both sides accused each other. Traditional

values were hardly effective for providing arbitration and order.

A young liberal politician recounted a scene from a demonstration:

During the demonstration in front of the Ittihadiye, the Presidential Palace in Cairo, they (members of Muslim Brotherhood) caught one of our friends and started to beat him. So, the guy thought that he would die and began uttering shahada (the Muslim profession of faith). They said, “stop beating him, he is a Muslim, he just became a Muslim”. They thought that we were not Muslims. They were not from Cairo and they were told that they would fight against infidels in Cairo. We did not imagine that this would happen in Egypt. In his State of Exception, Giorgio Agamben (2005) differentiated between human

bios, political bodies and zoes, biological bodies. He argued that over time, the zoe

became politicized and the line between bios and zios became indistinguishable. Based

on his analysis of Hitler and Nazis, Agamben argued that by having suspended the certain

articles regarding civil liberties of the Weimar Constitution, the Nazis created a “state of

exception” –a term barrowed from Carl Schmitt (1985)– and this “justified” a “legal civil

war” against the Republic’s Jewish citizens.47 A state of exception, a space without law,

is a zone of exclusion. Thus, the Nazis did not consider killing Jews as a form of

“homicide”. For Agamben, the state of exception became the norm, not an exception in

modern political life.

Weeks before the planned anti-Morsi demonstrations on June 30, 2013, it was

widely stated among supporters of the anti-Morsi campaign that “at least seventy – eighty

47 Schmitt argued that a “sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception” (1985:11).

262

people had to be killed in order to push the armed forces to intervene”. The military’s

intervention can be aptly argued to represent a “state of exception”. Yet, more

significantly many Egyptians seemed to getting used to the daily occurrence of violence.

Particularly, after the military intervention, it became more evident that the “state of

exception” that the military intervention had created, “justified” the killings of unarmed

protesters by gunshots by the military. As Carr (2013) reported, some mainstream media

channels used a “derisory and mocking” language to describe the killings of protesters. In

unsubstantiated claims by the media, the protestors were referred as terrorists, and thus

the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.48 In Agamben’s (2005)

conceptualization, zoes were highly politicized in the post-revolution tension. In

comparison to some historical examples such as French Revolution, the 2011 Egyptian

Revolution49 could be considered relatively peaceful. Nevertheless, given the widespread

violence that different political groups were involved in, and the acceptance of violence

as inevitable, necessary, and routine as a quasi means of political negotiation in the

transition period, one may question the “non-violent” nature of the Egyptian Revolution.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis of the collected data suggests that regardless of its sui

generis nature, the January 2011 Egyptian Revolution became possible as a combined

result of a sociopolitical transformation in the Egyptian society and several contingent

events that took place right before and during the January 25 events. This study

48 Both parties were involved in violent acts before and after the military intervention. The military’s indiscriminate use of lethal force and the widespread societal reaction, which considered killings of several thousands of people as “justified”, constitutes a more vivid example of a general adoption of state of exception. 49 According to some sources, during the 18 days of protests, 840 individuals were killed and 6467 individuals were wounded in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution (Rashwan 2011).

263

determined two analytically distinct components of transformation: 1) There was a

gradual change in Egyptian sociopolitical life, which occurred roughly during the last

decade of the Mubarak regime, and 2) There was a paradigmatic change that took place

during the 18 days of protests.

We can conveniently argue that, with MG Smith's conceptualization, the 2011

Egyptian Revolution constituted a 'Linear or Vectorial Transformation' that denoted an

episodic structural change. It was a structural change in the sense that the revolution

altered the processes and operational conditions of the social structure of Egyptian

society, which was conceptualized as being composed of social entities (sets of units) and

social processes (sets of relations). Nevertheless, given the ensuing political crisis and

societal tension that existed before and after the military intervention on July 3, 2013, this

structural change, which was concurrently per se a motive and a consequence of the

Revolution, has not yet been institutionalized. The nature of the relations and involving

processes between the state and society have been altered; yet, as implied by Bailey

(2001) for post-revolutionary situations individuals and societies need time for the new

system to be institutionalized.

In the aftermath of the military intervention, the state marginalized the

organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has had an undeniably significantly large

number of followers. Almost all of its leading members, including Mohammed Morsi,

have been arrested and its activities have been banned. Yet, one can hardly expect the

political and societal tensions to end without the incorporation of the organization of

Muslim Brotherhood into the democratic system.

264

It is also significant to consider that revolutions hardly ever provide a clean slate

for societies and politics. The 2011 Egyptian Revolution provided a new beginning; the

beginning only which was built on old legacies; old sociopolitical attitudes and frictions,

which require time and patience to overcome. The resignation of Mubarak was neither a

complete restoration of normal relations nor a state of “recognition of irreparable

schism”. Despite an initial order or “insecure equilibrium” after Mubarak, due to

contending political orientations and references regarding the future direction of the

country the new power centers failed to agree on an idealized image of the Egyptian state

and society and on the means of achieving that idealized future. In this respect, it would

be more appropriate to depict the political state after the military intervention on July 3,

2013, as a “transition period” or “revolution in progress”.

265

References Cited:

Abdel-Rahman, Hussein

2011. “Messages from Tahrir, Revolutionary Photography.” Egypt Independent, June 8. Accessed September 23, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/messages-tahrir-revolutionary-photography

Abaza, Mona 2013 Cyberspace and the Changing Face of Protest and Public Culture in Egypt.

In Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Unmaking Power: Sadiki, Larbi Wimmen, Heiko, Al-Zubaidi, Layla eds. Pp. 86-108: Routledge.

Aburish, Said K 2004 Nasser: the last Arab: Macmillan. Abouzeid, Rania

2011. “Egyptian State TV: Let Us Tell You What's Really Happening.” Time, February 5. Accessed November 23, 2013. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046510,00.html

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson 2006 Persistence of power, elites and institutions. National Bureau of Economic

Research. Agamben, Giorgio 2005 State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: U of Chicago P,

2005):83-84. Agathangelou, Anna M, and Nevzat Soguk 2011 Rocking the Kasbah: Insurrectional Politics, the “Arab Streets”, and

Global Revolution in the 21st Century. Globalizations 8(5):551-558. Ahram Online

2011a. “Egypt Referendum Results: 77.2 per cent Say 'Yes' to the Amendments.” Ahram Online, March 20. Accessed July 29, 2013.

http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/8125.aspx —

2011b. “Pope Shenouda III Supports Mubarak, Egyptian State TV.” Ahram Online, February 6. Accessed May 23, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/5097/Egypt/Politics-/Pope-Shenouda-III-supports-Mubarak,-Egyptian-state.aspx

— 2012. “English Text of Morsi's Constitutional Declaration.” Ahram Online, November 22. Accessed November 22, 2013.

266

http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspx —

2013. “Egypt Sentences 43 NGO Staffers To 1-5 Years In Prison.” Ahram Online, June 4. Accessed September 3, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/73129.aspx

AI

2009. “Human Rights in Arab Republic of Egypt.” Amnesty International. Accessed July 29, 2013. http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/egypt/report-2009

Al-Awwa, M.S.

2005 The Militant Jamaah Islamiyya in Egypt: 1974-2004 (Al Jamaah al Islamiyya al Mosallaha fi Masr: 1974-2004), Cairo: Maktabet al-Shorouq el Dawliya

Al Aswany, Alaa 2002 Imarat Yaqubyan: Al Madboly Library. — 2011 On the state of Egypt: What made the Revolution inevitable: Random

House Digital, Inc. Albrecht, Holger, and Dina Bishara 2011 Back on horseback: the military and political transformation in Egypt.

Middle East Law and Governance 3(1-2):1-2. Aljazeera

2011. “Timeline: Egypt's Revolution: A Chronicle of the Revolution That Ended the Three-Decade-Long Presidency of Hosni Mubarak.”Aljazeera, February 14. Accessed December 2,2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html

Al-Masry Al-Youm

2012. “Govt: Poverty Rate Increased To 25.2 Percent of Population.” Al-Masry Al-Youm, January 31. Accessed July 3, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/govt-poverty-rate-increased-252-percent-population

Al-Nour Party

2011. Al-Nour Party Accessed November 12, 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3171/al-nour-party

Alterman, Jon B 2000 Egypt: Stable, but for How Long? Washington Quarterly 23(4):107-118.

267

Aly, Abdel Monem Said

2012 State and Revolution in Egypt. Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University

Anderson, Lisa 2011 Demystifying the Arab spring: parsing the differences between Tunisia,

Egypt, and Libya. Foreign Aff. 90:2. Ansari, Hamied 1986 Egypt: The stalled society: SUNY Press. Arabiya.net

2013. “Egypt Court: Muslim Brotherhood Members Planned Jailbreak.” Arabiya.net, June 23. Accessed August 2, 2013. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/06/23/Egypt-court-Muslim-Brotherhood-members-planned-jailbreak.html

Arafat, Alaa Al-Din 2009 Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy: Palgrave Macmillan. Ashour, Omar 2007 Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of armed

islamist movements: The case of the Egyptian Islamic Group. The middle east Journal:596-625.

Aslan, Reza

2010. “Plotting a Revolution in Egypt.” Accessed November 2, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/10/25/mohamed-elbaradei-plots-to-topple-mubarak-regime-in-egypt.html

Ayubi, Nazih N 1995 Over-stating the Arab state: Politics and society in the Middle East: IB

Tauris Publishers. Azimi, Negar 2005 Egypt’s youth have had enough. Open Democracy. Awad, Marwa

2011. “Egypt Army Seeks to Free Tahrir Square for Traffic.” Reuters, February 5. Accessed July 23, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/us-egypt-protests-idUSTRE7141S820110205

Baetz, Juergen 2011. “Top Egyptian Cleric: Mubarak Deserves Mercy.” CNS News, May, 21. Accessed July 14, 2013. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/top-egyptian-cleric-mubarak-deserves-mercy

268

Baker, Raymond William 1981 Sadat's open door: Opposition from within. Soc. Probs. 28:378. Bayat, Asef 2007 Making Islam democratic: Social movements and the post-Islamist turn:

Stanford University Press. — 2013 Revolution in Bad Times. New Left Review (80):47-60. BBC

2010. “ElBaradei to Form 'National Association for Change'.” BBC, February 24. Accessed December 4, 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8534365.stm

—

2011. “Egypt Unrest: Full Text of Hosni Mubarak’s Speech.” February 10, 2011. Accessed July 26, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12427091

— 2012. “Egypt’s Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament.” BBC, January 21. Accessed June 01, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16665748

Beals, Alan R, and Bernard Joseph Siegel 1966 Divisiveness and social conflict: An anthropological approach: Stanford,

Calif.: Stanford University Press. Beissinger, Mark R 2006 Promoting democracy: Is exporting revolution a constructive strategy?

Dissent 53(1):18-24. Bermeo, Nancy 1990 Rethinking regime change: JSTOR. Blaydes, Lisa 2011 Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt: New York:

Cambrdge University Press. Boix, Carles 2003 Democracy and redistribution: Cambridge University Press. Bowker, Robert 2010 Egypt and the politics of change in the Arab Middle East: Edward Elgar

Publishing. Boyne, Walter J 2002 The Two O'Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift

That Saved Israel: Thomas Dunne Books.

269

Bradley, John R 2012 After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts:

Palgrave Macmillan. Brown, Jonathan AC 2011 Salafis and Sufis in Egypt: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brown, Nathan J 2013 Islam and Politics in the New Egypt. MIDDLE EAST. Brown, Nathan J, Michele Durocher Dunne, and Amr Hamzawy 2007 Egypt's controversial constitutional amendments. Volume 23: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace Washington DC. Brownlee, Jason 2002 The decline of pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt. Journal of Democracy

13(4):6-14. Brumberg, Daniel, and Hesham Sallam 2012 The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt: US Institute of Peace. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 1979 The new authoritarianism in Latin America: Princeton University Press. Carothers, Thomas 2002 The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of democracy 13(1):5-21. Champion, Marc

2011. “Coptic Christians Worry About Future Without Mubarak.” Wall Street Journal, February 1. Accessed June 3, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703439504576116222399438428.html

CNN

2011. “Egyptians Brace for Friday Protests as Internet, Messaging Disrupted.” CNN, January 28. Accessed July 29, 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/27/egypt.protests/index.html

Cook, Steven A 2007 Ruling but not governing: The military and political development in

Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey: Johns Hopkins University Press. — 2011 The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square: Oxford University

Press.

270

Cooper, Mark N 1982 The demilitarization of the Egyptian cabinet. International Journal of

Middle East Studies 14(02):203-225. — 2012 The Transformation of Egypt (Rle Egypt): Routledge. Coppedge, Michael, and Wolfgang H Reinicke 1990 Measuring polyarchy. Studies in Comparative International Development

25(1):51-72. Coser, Lewis A 1956 Functions of social conflict. Volume 90681: Simon and Schuster. Dahl, Robert A 1971 Poliarchy: participation and opposition. Volume 54: Yale University

Press. DailyNews

2010. Political Change Will Come in Egypt, Says Elbaradei.” DailyNews, November 1. Accessed June 23, 2013. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2010/11/01/political-change-will-come-in-egypt-says-elbaradei/

Deeb, Marius 2007 Arab Republic of Egypt. The Government and Politics of the Middle East

and North Africa:403-431. Diamond, Larry Jay 2002 Thinking about hybrid regimes. Journal of democracy 13(2):21-35. Diamond Larry Jay, and Linz Juan.

1989. Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America. In: Diamond L and Linz J (Eds.) Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Diamond, Larry Jay, et al. 1989 Democracy in developing countries. Volume 4: Lynne Rienner Boulder,

CO. Dina, Ezzat

2011. “Back From the Cold.” Ahram Weekly, 29 December 2011 - 4 January 2012. Accessed June 01, 2013. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1078/eg81.htm

271

Dodwell, Henry 2011 The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ʻAli: Cambridge

University Press. Dziadosz, Alexander, and Shadia Nasralla

2013. “At Least 51 Killed in Egypt as Islamists Urge Defiance.” Reuters, July 8. Accessed July 23, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-egypt-protestsidUSBRE95Q0NO20130708

EI

2012 “Morsy Issues New Constitutional Declaration.” Egypt Independent, November 22. Accessed June 01, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issues-new-constitutional-declaration

El Halim, Tarek Abd 2011 A literary understanding of Egypt’s unrest. Canadian Medical Association

Journal 183(8):E500-E500. El-Din, Gamal Essam 2006 One More Episode. al Ahram Weekly 1. — 2006. “Re-introducing Gamal Mubarak.” Ahram Weekly, April 5. Accessed July

28, 2013. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/788/eg3.htm —

2009. “Politics of Conditionality.” Ahram Weekly, 10-16 December. Accessed September 23, 2013.

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/976/eg7.htm El-Ghobashy, Mona 2005 The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim brothers. International

Journal of Middle East Studies 37(3):373-395. — 2011 The praxis of the Egyptian revolution. El-Gundy, Zeinab,

2011. “Egypt's 6 April Splinters: Two Youth Movements Under One Name.” Ahram Online, August 11. Accessed July 23, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/18516/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts--April-splinters-two-youth-movements-under-.aspx

El-Hennawy, Noha 2012. “Shenouda Leaves Copts Divided on His Legacy and Church's Future”.

Egypt Independent, March 18. Accessed March 26, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/shenouda-leaves-copts-divided-his-

272

legacy-and-churchs-future El-Kouny, Nada.

2012. “Egypt’s Anti-Spy Tv ad Continues to Stir Controversy.” Ahram Online, June12. Accessed November 23, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/44653/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-antispy-TV-ad-continues-to-stir-controversy.aspx

El-Mahdi, Rabab 2009 Enough! Egypt's quest for democracy. Comparative Political Studies

42(8):1011-1039. El-Mahdi, Rabab, and Philip Marfleet 2009 Egypt: the moment of change: Zed Books. El-Nawawy, Mohammed, and Adel Iskander 2003 Al-Jazeera: The Story of the Network that is Rattling Governments and

Rede Fining Modern Journalism: Basic Books. Esposito, John L 2011 What everyone needs to know about Islam: Oxford University Press. EurActiv

2011. “EU Leaders Shy Away From Demanding Mubarak Resignation.” Accessed November 23, 2012. http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/eu-leaders-shy-away-demanding-mu-news-501940

Fahim, Kareem, and Mayy El Sheikh

2012. “Gunmen Kill 15 and Steal Vehicle in Attack on Egypt Base.” New York Times, August 5. Accessed September 27, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/world/middleeast/gunmen-storm-egyptian-base-killing-15-soldiers.html

Fahim, Kareem, and Liam Stack

2011. “Fatal Bomb Hits a Church in Egypt.” New York Times, January 1. Accessed April 2, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/world/middleeast/02egypt.html

Fahmy, Ninette S 2002 The politics of Egypt: state-society relationship: Routledge. Fahmy, Mohamed Fadel, and Josh Levs

2012. “Some Cry 'Coup' as Egypt's Highest Court Annuls Parliament, Military Extends Power.” CNN, June 14. Accessed November 23, 2013 http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/14/world/meast/egypt-ruling

273

Fahmy, Heba 2011. “Police Forces Fled During Imbaba Clashes.” Daily News, May 16. Accessed December 12, 2013. http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/05/16/police-forces-fled-during-imbaba-clashes-says-eipr/

Fathi, Yasmine 2012. “Egypt's 'Battle of the Camel': the Day the Tide Turned.” Ahram Online, February 2. Accessed August 4, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/33470.aspx

Fulbright, JW 1966 The arrogance of power. Random House Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar 2009 Elections under authoritarianism. Annual Review of Political Science

12:403-422. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski 2006 Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships. Economics &

Politics 18(1):1-26. — 2007 Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. Comparative

Political Studies 40(11):1279-1301. Geddes, Barbara 1999a Authoritarian breakdown: Empirical test of a game theoretic argument.

annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1999a. Vol. 2.

— 1999b What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual

Review of Political Science 2(1):115-144. — 2003 Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in

comparative politics: University of Michigan Press. Gennep, Arnold van 1960 The rites of passage: Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ghannam, Jeffrey 2011 Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings of 2011.

Center for International Media Assistance/National Endowment for Democracy 3. Ghareeb, Edmund 2000 New media and the information revolution in the Arab world: An

assessment. The Middle East Journal:395-418.

274

Ghonim, Wael 2012 Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater Than the People in

Power-A Memoir: Mariner Books. Ginsburg, Tom and Tamir, Moustafa, eds. 2008 Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes: New York:

Cambridge Univ. Press. Gluckman, Max 1956 Custom and conflict in Africa. Volume 4: Blackwell Oxford. Goldschmidt, Arthur 2000 Biographical dictionary of modern Egypt: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Goldstone, Jack 2001 Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annual Review of

Political Science 4:139-187. Goldstone, Jack A 1980 Theories of revolution: The third generation. World Politics 32(3):425-

453. — 2011 Understanding the revolutions of 2011: weakness and resilience in Middle

Eastern autocracies. Foreign Aff. 90:8. Goldstone, Jack A, and Bert Useem 1999 Prison Riots as Microrevolutions: An Extension of State-Centered

Theories of Revolution 1. American Journal of Sociology 104(4):985-1029. Guardian

2011. “Hosni Mubarak's Speech: Full Text.” The Guardian, February 2, 2011. Accessed July 27, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/02/president-hosni-mubarak-egypt-speech.

— 2011b. “Us Embassy Cables: Egyptian Military's Influence in Decline, Us Told.” Guardian, February 3. Accessed September 23, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/171176

— 2009. “Mohamed Elbaradei Lists Tough Terms for Run at Presidency.” The Guardian, December 6. Accessed June 1, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/06/elbaradei-egypt-presidential-election

Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell 2007 Pathways from authoritarianism. Journal of democracy 18(1):143-157.

275

Hafez, Mohammed M 2003 Why Muslims rebel: Repression and resistance in the Islamic world:

Lynne Rienner Publishers. Halliday, Fred 1999 Revolution and world politics: The rise and fall of the sixth great power:

Duke University Press. Hammond, Andrew

2011. “Egypt Minister Says Army Could Act to Protect Nation.” Reuters, February 9. Accessed November 2, 2013. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/09/us-egypt-minister-army-idUKTRE7185DM20110209

Haykel, Bernard 2009 On the nature of salafi thought and action. Global Salafism: Islam’s new

religious movement:33-51. Henderson, Randall P 2005 The Egyptian Coptic Christians: the conflict between identity and equality.

Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 16(2):155-166. Herbst, Jeffrey 2001 Political liberalization in Africa after ten years. Comparative Politics:357-

375. Hill, Evan

2010. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Flux.” AlJazeera, November 21. Accessed December 12, 2013.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2010/11/2010111681527837704.html Hirschkind, Charles 2012 Beyond secular and religious: An intellectual genealogy of Tahrir Square.

American Ethnologist 39(1):49-53. Holland, Dorothy C 2001 Identity and agency in cultural worlds: Harvard University Press. Howard, Philip N, et al. 2011 Opening closed regimes: what was the role of social media during the

Arab Spring? Human Rights Watch

2004. “Egypt’s torture epidemic.” Accessed July 15, 2013 http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/02/25/egypt-s-torture-epidemic

276

Ibrahim, Ekram 2012 “Coptic Church in Egyptian Village Threatened After Girl Disappears.” Ahram Online, February 15. Accessed April 20, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/34614/Egypt/Politics-/Coptic-church-in-Egyptian-village-threatened-after.aspx

Ibrahim, Vivian 2011 The Copts of Egypt: The Challenges of Modernisation and Identity

London: I.B.Tauris Index Mundi

2010 “Egypt Unemployment Rate (Source: International Monetary Fund)” Accessed June 23, 2013. http://www.indexmundi.com/egypt/unemployment_rate.html

Ismail, Salwa 2006 Political Life in Cairo's New Quarters. Encountering the Everyday State:

University of Minnesota Press. Jos, Linz Juan 2000 Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Kandil, Hazem 2012 Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt: Verso. —

2013 Deadlock in Cairo. London Review of Books, 35(6), 17-20. Karl, Terry Lynn 1995 The hybrid regimes of Central America. Journal of Democracy 6(3):72-86. Kassem, May 1999 In the guise of democracy: governance in contemporary Egypt: Garnet &

Ithaca Press. — 2004 Egyptian politics: the dynamics of authoritarian rule: Lynne Rienner

Publishers. Kepel, Gilles 1985 The prophet and pharaoh: Muslim extremism in Egypt: Al Saqi Books

London. Khalil, Ahmad

1984. Al-Arab wa al dimuqratiyya (The Arabs and Democracy) Beirut: Dar al-Hadatha

277

Khalil, Ashraf 2012 Liberation Square: inside the Egyptian revolution and the rebirth of a

nation: Macmillan. Khalil, Karima 2011 Messages from Tahrir: signs from Egypt's revolution: American

University in Cairo Press. Kienle, Eberhard 2001 A grand delusion: democracy and economic reform in Egypt. Volume 32:

IB Tauris Publishers. Kirkpatrick, David D, et al. 2011 A Tunisian-Egyptian link that shook Arab history. New York Times 13. Kirkpatrick, David D., and David E. Sanger

2011 “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History.” New York Times, February 13. Accessed July 27, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/world/middleeast/14egypt-tunisia-protests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Korany, Bahgat, and Rabab El-Mahdi 2012 Arab Spring in Egypt: revolution and beyond: American University in

Cairo Press. Kort, Michael 2007 The handbook of the Middle East: Twenty-First Century Books. Kuhn, Thomas S 1970 The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago/London. Kurtz, Donald V 2001 Political anthropology: power and paradigms: Westview Press Boulder^

eColo Colo. Kurtz, Lester R 2010 Otpor and the Struggle for Democracy in Serbia (1998-2000).

International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Lane, Gary

2011. “Muslim Mob Attacks Coptic Village, Church in Egypt.” CBNNews.com, March 07. Accessed August 12, 2013. http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/march/muslim-mob-attacks-coptic-village-church-in-egypt-/

278

Lave, Jean, and Etienne Wenger 1991 Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation: Cambridge

university press. Leach, Edmund Ronald 1973 Political systems of highland Burma: a study of Kachin social structure:

Berg. Leiken, Robert S, and Steven Brooke 2007 The moderate Muslim brotherhood. foreign affairs:107-121. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way 2002 The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of democracy 13(2):51-

65. Lewellen, Ted C 2003 Political anthropology: an introduction: ABC-CLIO. Lim, Merlyna 2012 Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: Social media and oppositional movements

in Egypt, 2004–2011. Journal of Communication 62(2):231-248. Linz, Juan J, and An Authoritarian Regime 1964 The case of Spain. Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems,

herausgegeben von Eric Allardt/Yrjö Littunen, Helsinki:291-342. Linz, Juan J, and Alfred Stepan 2011 Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe,

South America, and post-communist Europe: JHUP. Lotan, Gilad, et al. 2011 The revolutions were tweeted: Information flows during the 2011 Tunisian

and Egyptian revolutions. International Journal of Communication 5:1375-1405. Lynch, Marc 2013 Arab Uprising: PublicAffairs. Magaloni, Beatriz 2006 Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico:

Cambridge University Press New York. Mansour, Sherif

2010. Egypt’s "Facebook Revolution", Kefaya, and the Struggle for Democracy and Good Governance (2008-2011). Accessed July 02, 2013.

http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/images/stories/pdfs/mansour_egypt.pdf

279

Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya, and Andrew Coleman 2013. Changing The Guard—The Price OF Democracy: Lessons From The Arab Spring On Constitutionalism. In Carla, Panara and Wilson, Gary (Eds.). (2013). The Arab Spring: New Patterns for Democracy and International Law (Vol. 82) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Masoud, Tarek 2011 The road to (and from) Liberation Square. Journal of Democracy

22(3):20-34. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly 2001 Dynamics of Contention: Cambridge University Press. Meijer, Roel 2009 Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement: London: Hurst & Co. Meinardus, Otto FA 1999 Two thousand years of Coptic Christianity: American University in Cairo

Press (Cairo). Meital, Yoram 1997 Egypt's Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967-1977: University

Press of Florida. Mekay Emad 10 July 2013

2013. “Documents Reveal Us Money Trail to Egyptian Groups that Pressed for President's Removal. Exclusive: US Bankrolled Anti-Morsi Activists.” AlJazeera, July,10. Accessed November 23, 2013.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/2013710113522489801.html Mekhennet, Souad, and Nicholas Kulish

2011. “With Muslim Brotherhood Set to Join Egypt Protests, Religion’s Role May Grow.” New York Times, January 27. Accessed June 27, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28alexandria.html?_r=0

MENA 2011. “Five Police Officers Referred to Criminal Court for Killing Salafi Preacher.” Egypt Independent, October 27. Accessed December 23, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/five-police-officers-referred-criminal-6court-killing-salafi-preacher

Mitchell, Richard Paul 1993 The society of the Muslim Brothers. Volume 9: Oxford University Press. Mondal, Anshuman A 2003 Nationalism and post-colonial identity: culture and ideology in India and

Egypt: Routledge.

280

Murphy, Caryle 2002 Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: The Egyptian

Experience: Scribner. NPR

2011 “Mubarak Warns Of 'Chaos' If He Leaves Office Early.” NPR, February 3. Accessed December 14, 2012. http://www.npr.org/2011/02/04/133456631/egyptian-army-moves-between-rival-camps-in-cairo

O'Donnell, Guillermo 1979 Tensions in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state and the question of

democracy. The new authoritarianism in Latin America:285-318. — 1993 On the state, democratization and some conceptual problems: A Latin

American view with glances at some postcommunist countries. World Development 21(8):1355-1369.

O'donnell, Guillermo A 1973 Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism: Studies in South

American politics: Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley.

Osman, Ahmed Zaki

2011. “Alleged Convert Sparks Controversy, Not Clashes in Qena.” Egypt Independent, May 12. Accessed November 23, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/alleged-convert-sparks-controversy-not-clashes-qena

Ottaway, Marina, and Amr Hamzawy 2011 Protest movements and political change in the Arab world: CARNEGIE

endowment for International Peace. Oweidat, Nadia, et al. 2008 The Kefaya movement: a case study of a grassroots reform initiative:

Rand Corporation. Parkinson, Joe

2012. “Turkey: Mubarak Should Leave Now.” Europe News, February 2. Accessed July 13, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/sb10001424052748703960804576119811353451704.html

Partrick, Theodore Hall 1996 Traditional Egyptian Christianity: A History of the Coptic Orthodox

Church: Fisher Park Press.

281

Pennington, JD 1982 The Copts in Modern Egypt. Middle Eastern Studies 18(2):158-179. Peteet, Julie 1994 Male gender and rituals of resistance in the Palestinian Intifada: A cultural

politics of violence. American Ethnologist 21(1):31-49. Peter, Nicholas, and Paul Richter, and David S Cloud.

2011. “a Rebuffed U.S. Turns to Egypt's Army in the Crisis: Unrest in Egypt.” Los Angeles Times, February 03. Accessed November 23, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/03/world/la-fg-egypt-white-house-20110203

Preston, Jennifer, et al. 2011 Movement began with outrage and a Facebook page that gave it an outlet.

New York Times 6:10. Purcell, Mark 1998 A place for the Copts: imagined territory and spatial conflict in Egypt.

Cultural Geographies 5(4):432-451. Qutb, Sayyid 1964 Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones). For an English translation on-line, see:<

http://www. masmn. org/Books/Syed_Qu tb/Milestones/001. htm. Reid, Donald M 2002 Whose Pharaohs: Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity

from Napoleon to World War I: University of California Pr. Reuters

2011a. “US Urges Restraint in Egypt, Says Government Stable.” Reuters, January 25. Accessed November 23, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/ozatp-egypt-protest-clinton-idAFJOE70O0KF20110125

— 2011b. Egypt Arrests Two Muslim Brotherhood Leaders. Reuters, January 27. Accessed July 23, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/28/egypt-arrests-idUSLDE70R00720110128

—

2011c. “Timeline: 17 Days of Protests Against Hosni Mubarak.” Reuters, February 10. Accessed June 13, 2013. http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE7197R920110210?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

282

Richter, Paul 2011. “Hillary Clinton Says U.S. Not Pushing For Ouster Of Egyptian President Mubarak.” Los Angeles Times, February 13. Accessed June 24, 2013.

http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/30/nation/la-na-clinton-egypt-20110131 Rogan, Eugene 2011 The Arabs: A History: Basic Books. Roussillon, Alain 1998 Republican Egypt interpreted: revolution and beyond. The Cambridge

History of Egypt 2:334-392. Russell, Margaret M 1995 De Jure Revolution?: JSTOR. Sanger, David E.

2011. “As Mubarak Digs In, U.S. Policy in Egypt Is Complicated.” New York Times, February 5. Accessed July 21, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06policy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Sayyid-Marsot, Afaf Lutfi 2007 A history of Egypt: from the Arab conquest to the present: Cambridge

University Press. Schedler, Andreas 2009 The new institutionalism in the study of authoritarian regimes: Centro de

Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Estudios Políticos. Schieffelin, Edward L 1985 Performance and the cultural construction of reality. American Ethnologist

12(4):707-724. Schmitt, Carl 1985 Political theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty: University

of Chicago Press. Schock, Kurt 2005 Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies.

Volume 22: U of Minnesota Press. Schumann, William R 2009 Toward an Anthropology of Government: Democratic Transformations

and Nation Building in Wales: Palgrave Macmillan.

283

Sedra, Paul 1999 Class cleavages and ethnic conflict: Coptic Christian communities in

modern Egyptian politics. Islam and Christian�Muslim Relations 10(2):219-235. Seibert, Thomas

2011. “Turkey's Erdogan Says Mubarak Should Go Now.” The National, February 3. Accessed May 2, 2013. http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-mubarak-should-go-now

Shahin, Emad El-Din 2005 Egypt’s moment of reform. European Neighbourhood:117. Sharp, Gene 1973 The politics of nonviolent action, 3 vols. Boston: Porter Sargent. Sharp, Jeremy M 2011 Egypt: the January 25 revolution and implications for US foreign policy:

DIANE Publishing. Shehata, Dina 2011 Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End, The.

Foreign Aff. 90:26. — 2012 Youth Movements and the 25 January Revolution. Arab Spring in Egypt:

Revolution and Beyond. Shehata, Samer 2008 Inside an Egyptian parliamentary campaign. See Lust-Okar & Zerhouni

2008:95-120. Shenker, Jack 2010. “Egyptian Dissident Mohamed Elbaradei Urges Election Boycott.” The Guardian, September 7. Accessed November 12, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/07/egypt-mohamed-elbaradei Shorbagy, Manar 2007 Understanding Kefaya: The New Politics in Egypt. Arab studies quarterly

29(1):39-60. Sirrs, Owen L 2010 The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-

2009: Routledge. Skocpol, Theda 1979 States and social revolutions. Volume 29: Cambridge Univ Press.

284

Smith, Michael G 1962 History and social anthropology. The Journal of the Royal

Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 92(1):73-85. Smith, Michael Garfield 1974 Corporations and society: Duckworth London. Soage, Ana Belen, and Jorge Fuentelsaz Franganillo 2010 The Muslim Brothers in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood. The

Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement, New York: Palgrave Macmillan:40-41.

Sobelman, Daniel 2001 Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt? Middle East Quarterly. Stacher, Joshua A 2002 Post-Islamist rumblings in Egypt: The emergence of the Wasat party. The

Middle East Journal:415-432. Stack, Megan K.

2005. “Life Without Mubarak? Unimaginable.” Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2005. Accessed June 7, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/06/world/fg-egypt6

Stinchcombe, Arthur L 1999 Ending revolutions and building new governments. Annual Review of

Political Science 2(1):49-73. Sullivan, Denis Joseph, and Kimberly A Jones 2008 Global security watch--Egypt: a reference handbook: ABC-CLIO. Swartz, Marc J 1969 Processual and structural approaches in political anthropology: A

commentary. Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 3(1):53-59.

Swartz, Marc J, Victor Witter Turner, and Arthur Tuden 1966 Political Anthropology, Chicago: Aldine De Gruyter. Thomas, Clive Yolande 1984 The rise of the authoritarian state in peripheral societies: Monthly Review

Press New York.

285

Tilly, Charles 1993 European Revolutions, 1492-1992: Blackwell Oxford. — 2006 Regimes and Repertoires. TI

2010. “Corruption Perceptions Index.” Transparency International. Accessed February15, 2013. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results

Trager, Eric 2011 Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt,

The. Foreign Aff. 90:114. Turner, Victor 1969The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure: Chicago: Aldine. — 1957 Schism and Continuity: A Study of a Ndembu Village Life: Manchester:

Manchester University Press. —

1958 Schism and Continuity in an African Society: Manchester, Manchester University Press pour l’institut Rhodes-Livingstone.

UN/CAT

2002. “Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Egypt.” Accessed July 09, 2013. http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/CAT.C.CR.29.4.En?Opendocument

Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J 1980 The history of Egypt: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Wagner, Heather Lehr 2009 Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin: Negotiating Peace in the Middle East:

Chelsea House. Wiktorowicz, Quintan 2001 The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad. Middle East

Policy 8(4):18-38. — 2005 A genealogy of radical Islam. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(2):75-

97. World Policy Institute

2012. “Egypt's Police State is in Its DNA.” World Policy Institute, May 5. Accessed July 14, 2013. http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2012/12/10/egypts-

286

police-state-its-dna Page 1 of 4 Wright, Robin B 2008 Dreams and shadows: The future of the Middle East: Penguin. com. Zahid, Mohammed 2010 The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's succession crisis: the politics of

liberalisation and reform in the Middle East. Volume 81: IB Tauris. Zayani, Mohamed 2005 The Al Jazeera phenomenon: Critical perspectives on new Arab media:

Pluto Press London. Zeghal, Malika

2011. “What Were the Ulama Doing in Tahrir Square? Al-Azhar and the Narrative of Resistance to Oppression.” Accessed February 2013. http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/sightings/archive_2011/0217.shtml

Zetter, Roger, and Mohamed E Hamza 1998 Egypt: The state, foreign aid and community participation in urban shelter

projects. International planning studies 3(2):185-205. Zollner, Barbara 2008 The Muslim brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology: Routledge.

287

APPENDIX

Appendix: Informants

Informant Codes:

(S): Members of various Salafi Groups: Four informants

(MB): Members of Muslim Brotherhood: Six informants

(FR): Bureaucrats, intellectuals, and former politicians who were affiliated officially (not necessarily ideologically) with Mubarak regime: Seven informants

(C): Coptic Egyptians: Six informants

(WP): Islamists politicians (from the Wasat Party): One informant

(A): Young Activists (Liberal/Secular): Seven informants

(LI): Liberal intellectuals: Seven informants

(NA): Relatively religious intellectuals who were not affiliated with any Islamist political organization: Three informants

(AE): Average Egyptians: Six informants

Informant List: Abdulkarim (AE) (Pseudonym): Arabic language teacher in his early forties. A devout

Muslim, sympathetic to Islamist parties but he is not affiliated any of them.

Abdulkadir (AE) (Pseudonym): Arabic language teacher in his late twenties. A devout

Muslim and a sympathizer (not a member) of the Muslim Brotherhood:

Ahmed (MB) (Pseudonym): Long-time member of the Muslim Brotherhood and he has

local responsibilities in his town in Menoufiya Governorate

Amr Farouk (WP): Spokesperson of the Wasat Party, moderate Islamist party; an

offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Amr Hamzawy (LI): Liberal parliamentarian and political scientist at American

University at Cairo.

288

Dr. Ahmad (MB) (Pseudonym): A medical doctor and an active member of the Muslim

Brotherhood

Dr. Ali El Din Hilal (FR): Political Scientist. Served as Media Secretary of Mubarak’s

National Democratic Party.

Dr. Fahmy (C) (Pseudonym) Coptic Egyptian in his late sixties. Professor of chemistry

in a university in Alexandria.

Dr. Fahri (LI) (Pseudonym): is political scientist by training and director of a research

center in Cairo.

Dr. Nagib (FR) (Pseudonym): Professor of Political Science at Cairo University and

former member of Policy Secretariat (Committee) of Mubarak’s National

Democratic Party.

Dr. Kamil (FR) (Pseudonym): Professor of Political Science at Cairo University and

former member of Policy Secretariat (Committee) of Mubarak’s National

Democratic Party.

Dr. Masud (C) (Pseudonym): Coptic Egyptian. Dentist and he owns a private clinic in

Heliopolis, one of the upper-class districts of Cairo.

Dr. Nadia Mustafa (NA): Professor of Political Science at Cairo University and Director

of Program for Civilization Studies and Dialogue of Cultures.

Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (LI): Renowned sociologist, senior liberal activist. Dr. Said (FR) Abdel Monem Said Aly: Political Scientist and currently the director of

Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. Served as the

Chairman of the Board, of the state-owned Al Ahram Newspaper& Publishing

House during the last years of Mubarak. He was also a member of Gamal

Mubarak's Policy Committee under the NDP.

Dr. Sedat (C) (Pseudonym): Medical doctor, Coptic Christian in his early fifties. Dr. Shevki (NA) (Pseudonym): Professor of Islamic Studies at Cairo University Fathy El Shazly (FR): Egypt’s former Ambassador to Turkey

Director of the Executive Secretariat for Demining and the Development of the

North West

Hamid (AE) (Pseudonym): An unemployed young Egyptian in his early twenties who

289

recently graduated from Cairo University.

Haroun (MB) (Pseudonym): Member of the Organization of Muslim Brotherhood in his

late thirties.

Hussein (A) (Pseudonym): (research assistant) Young, middle class liberal male; recently

graduated from Cairo University.

Jihad Haddad (MB): Spokesman for President Morsi

Joseph (C) (Pseudonym): A young Coptic Christian in his mid twenties. He is a member

of Coptic Maspero Youth Union.

Kasim (LI) (Pseudonym): Liberal Egyptian in his early 40s explained; Kenan (MB) (Pseudonym): Muslim Egyptian in his mid thirties and he is a member of

the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mahdi Akef (MB): Former Supreme Guides of the Organization of Muslim Brotherhood Maher (LI) (Pseudonym): Columnist and reporter who closely observed the Tahrir

events.

Mahmoud (A) (Pseudonym): Young activist in his mid thirties.

Mina (A) (Pseudonym): Female liberal activist in her twenties. Mohamad Celebi (FR) (Pseudonym): Retired general from the Egyptian Armed Forces. Mr. Soliman (FR) (Pseudonym): High-level bureaucrat who was part of the intelligence

apparatus at the time of the revolution.

Salih (A): 23 year-old activist, recently graduated from Cairo University Salma (AE) (Pseudonym): Middle-aged female Egyptian who works in a post office. Selim (A) (Pseudonym): Liberal activists and politician in his forties.

Sheyma (LI) (Pseudonym): Female professor at American University in Cairo.

Tareq (LI) (Pseudonym): Liberal journalist in Cairo Tamer (A) (Pseudonym): Young liberal activist and novice politician.

Tarek El-Kholi (A): Young activist, spokesman of the Six April Movement, the

Democratic Front

290

Youssef (AE) (Pseudonym): Teacher in his late twenties. Zeki (AE) (Pseudonym): Devout Muslim, a teacher in his early forties.

Anatomy of a Revolution: the 2011 Egyptian Uprising ...

Documents

Transcript of Anatomy of a Revolution: the 2011 Egyptian Uprising ...