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    Why Do Contractors Contract? The Experience of Highly Skilled Technical Professionals in aContingent Labor MarketAuthor(s): Gideon Kunda, Stephen R. Barley and James Evans

    Source: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Jan., 2002), pp. 234-261Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696207 .

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT?THE EXPERIENCE OF HIGHLY SKILLED TECHNICALPROFESSIONALS IN A CONTINGENT LABOR MARKET

    GIDEON KUNDA, STEPHEN R. BARLEY, and JAMES EVANS*

    This studyexamines 52 highlyskilled technical contractors' explanations, in1998, of whytheyentered the contingent labor force and how their subsequentexperiences altered their viewpoint. The authors report three general implica-tions of their examination of the little-studied high-skill side of contingentlabor. First, urrentdepictions of contingentwork are inaccurate. For example,contraryto the pessimistic "employment relations" perspective, most of theseinterviewees found contractingbetter-paying hanpermanent employment;andcontrary to optimistic "free agent" views, many reported feeling anxiety andestrangement. Second, occupational networksarose to satisfyneeds (such astrainingand wage-setting) thatemploying organizations satisfy or non-contin-gent workers. Third, regarding theirplace in the labor market, high-skilledandwell-paid technical contractors cannot be called-as contingentworkersusuallyare-"secondary sector" workers;and theirmarket s not dyadic,with ndividu-als selling labor and firmsbuying it, but triadic, involving intermediaries suchas staffing irms.

    For most f the twentiethentury,nsti-tutions of bureaucratic employmentdominatedthesocial organization ofwork.Bureaucratic employmentwas built on asimple bargain: as long as firms emainedprofitable, heywould provide employeeswithsecure jobs in return foreffort ndloyalty. Although there were notable ex-ceptions on the economy's periphery(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Baron and

    *Gideon Kunda is Chair, Department of LaborStudies, Tel AvivUniversity;Stephen R. Barley isDirector,Center forWorkTechnologyand Organiza-tion,DepartmentofManagement,Science, and Engi-neering, Stanford University; nd James Evans is aDoctoral Student in the Department of Sociology,StanfordUniversity.

    Bielby1984; Piore 1979; Friedland 1975),until the 1980s most middle-classAmeri-cans believed thatworking or a reputablecompanywouldguarantee ife-long mploy-ment,as long as theyperformed onscien-tiously nd the economyremained strong.In recentyears, hreedevelopmentshaveshaken thisbelief. First, n the name ofefficiency,irmsn the economy's corehaverepeatedlylaid off arge numbers of em-ployees independent of economic cycles.For the first ime in history, ayoffshave

    The authors deeplyappreciate the comments andsuggestionsthat Diane Bailey,RosemaryBatt,YinonCohen, and Pamela Hinds made on earlier drafts fthispaper.

    Industrial nd Labor RelationsReview, ol. 55, No. 2 (January 002). ? by Cornell University.0019-7939/00/5502 $01.00

    234

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 235targeted ignificant umbers of managersand professionals (Heckscher 1994;Osterman 1996; Cappelli 1999). Second,despite inconclusive data (Diebold,Neumark, and Polsky 1997; Bureau of La-bor Statistics1997), many people believethat ob tenure has become shorter andlabor marketsmore volatile. Finally,per-haps the mostradical break with he systemof bureaucraticemploymenthas been theexpansion of the so-called "contingent a-borforce" Barkerand Christensen1998).The term contingentaborhas been ap-plied to a wide range of short-termmploy-ment arrangements, ncluding part-timework, emporary mployment, elf-employ-ment, ontracting, utsourcing, nd home-based work. Estimates of the size of thecontingentlabor force varywidely. Themost conservative ata come fromthe Bu-reau of Labor Statistics. Under the mostliberalof ts restricted efinitions, he BLSestimates that 13.3% of Americans werecontingently mployed in 1995 (Polivka1996a, 1996b; Cohany 1996; Cohany et al.1998).1 Estimates for 1997 were nearlyidentical.2 More liberal estimates suggestthat the number maybe as high as 30%

    'Under its mostliberal,restricteddefinition, heBLS defines the contingentworkforce as the sum of(a) all wage and salary workerswho "do not expecttheir employment to last," except for those whoplanned to leave their obs for personal reasons, (b)all "self employed (both the incorporated and theunincorporated) and independent contractorswhoexpect to be and had been in theirpresent assign-ment for less than 1 year," and (c) temporaryhelpand contractworkerswho "expected to work for thecustomers owhomtheywere assignedforone yearorless" (Cohany et al. 1998:43-44).2The BLS repeated its assessment of the contin-gentworkforce n theFebruary1997 supplementtotheCPS. The number of workers n the BLS's broad-est definitionof contingent labor declined by .5%,while the percentage ofAmericans n each of the fouralternative mployment elationsremained constant.Since two data points do not make a trend, it isdifficultodeterminewhether he decline representsrandomvariationor an actual shift wayfrom ontin-gent abor. The BLS's data also cannottellus whethercontingent labor increased prior to 1995, as mostcommentators ontend.

    (Dillon 1987; Belous 1989; Kalleberg et al.1997).Estimates of the spread of contingentwork rehampered by heabsence of ongi-tudinal data. However,data on the tempo-rary ervice ndustry uggest wo ignificanttrends (U.S. Department of Commerce1997). First, etween 1986 and 1996 therewas spectacular growth n the relative sizeof thetemporary ervice ndustry: n thoseyears, employment n temporary ervicesgrew 10.3% while total employment n theUnited States grewby only 1.7%. Second,there has been a change in the distributionofcontingentjobs. Between 1991 and 1996,the percentage of the temporary erviceindustry's payroll represented by office,clerical,and medical work declined, whilethe industrial, echnical, and professionalsegments (which include managers) be-came more important (Staffing ndustryReport 1997).Thus, three conclusions seem reason-able on the basisofavailable data: a signifi-cant proportionof Americans are contin-gently employed; this proportion has in-creased over the past decade; and techni-cians, professionals, nd managers repre-sent a larger portion of the contingentlabor forcethan in thepast.Although researchers have begun to at-tend to contingentwork, theyhave yettoexplore all of itsfacetsfully. The largestbody of research,conducted primarily ysocial scientists nd management scholars,addresses the issue of how firmsuse con-tractors o respond flexibly o increasinglycompetitiveenvironments (Handy 1989;Mangum, Mayall, and Nelson 1985;Abraham1988;Abraham and Taylor 1996;Pfeffernd Baron1988;Harrison ndKelley1993; Davis-Blakeand Uzzi 1993; Matusikand Hill 1998). Because this literaturetakesthefirm's erspective,tfocusesmoreor less exclusively n thedemand forcon-tractors nd ignoresboth the contractors'experience and the significanceof con-tractingas an employment relationship.Scholars who have studied contingent a-borfrom heworker'sperspectivehave usu-ally focused their attentionon relativelylow-skilledccupations ongassociated with

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    236 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWtemporaryabor. Although raditional em-porarywork remains an important spectof contemporary abor markets, nless re-searchers also take highly skilled contin-gent work nto account, theyriskdevelop-ing theories fcontingent mployment hatare of limitedscope.This paper takesa step towardbroaden-ing our image of contingent work by ex-ploring the experiences of highly skilledtechnical ontractors. ydocumentinghowtechnical contractors iewtheirworld, wehope to facilitatecomparisons with tradi-tional contingentwork and to illustratehow theories of contingent employmentcan be profitably eveloped. We begin byreviewing wo iteratures hat speak to thesignificanceand experience of contract-ing. Afterhighlighting heir limitations,weturn wayfrom eceived notions ofwhatcontingentworkmeans and ask: how dohighly killed, technical contractorsmakesense of their situation? We develop ouranswer by turningtowhatcontractors ayabout why theybecame contractors andhow their subsequent experiences alteredtheirperspective. We conclude by explor-ing the implications of our study or exist-ing theories of contingentwork.

    Perspectives on theImplications of ContingentLaborJournalists, onsultants, awyers,nd so-cial scientistshave interpreted ontingentworkfrom wopointsofview,whatwe shallcall the "employmentrelations" and the

    "freeagent" perspectives. Each offersdistinct ccount ofcontingentwork nd itsimplications.The EmploymentRelations Perspective

    Analystswhoadopt an employment ela-tions perspective situate contingent em-ploymentn its nstitutional ontext. Theyare concerned with the experience of em-ployment, he collectivewelfare femploy-ees, and, by extension,the welfareofsoci-ety s a whole (Osterman 1988; Cappelli etal. 1997; Parker1994; Smith1998; Cappelli1999). In thisview, bureaucratic employ-

    ment is not onlya prescriptionforstableemployment; it is the foundation forAmerica's unique system f social welfare,which hinges,to some degree, on employ-ers fulfillingegallyprescribed obligationsto a permanent workforce.Employmentrelations researchers viewthe expansion ofthe contingent abor forceas a threat othestabilityf thesystem ndhave historically ramed the threat fromtheperspective fdual-labormarket heory.This theory holds that industrial econo-mies are composed of two sectors: "pri-mary"and "secondary" (Piore and Sable1984; Osterman 1984; Baron and Bielby1984). Primaryabor markets rovide tableemployment, areer ladders, ob security,high wages, and attractivebenefit plans.Secondarylabor markets re, by compari-son,less stable and markedby owerwages.Participants re more likely o be membersofminority roupsand toworkfor mploy-erswhoprovidefew enefits.Because schol-ars have viewed secondary abor markets speripheral, theyhave treated them as asocial problem tobe controlled within heframework fexisting nstitutionsforex-ample,minimumwage aws),rather han asa threatto bureaucraticemployment.Scholars in thistradition,however,fearthatthegrowth f contingentworkrepre-sents the spread of secondary abor marketdynamics nto the economy's core. More-over, it appears thatpermanent obs arethemselves no longer secure (Osterman1996; Cappelli 1999). Manyfearthatthesedevelopments are underminingthe well-beingofworkers nd their amilies Hippleand Stewart 996a, 1996b; Osterman1988;Christensen 1998). Others have arguedthat ontingentwork's pread mayresult ngrowing emand forgovernment ssistance(Dillon 1987) and suggestthatcontingentemploymentfacilitates the oppression ofmarginal groups (Martella 1991; Polivka1996b; Spalter-Roth nd Hartmann 1998;Banegin 1998). Finally, ome critics hargethat the shift o contingent abor is partofanattempt oundermineunions Aronowitzand Defazio 1994; Rifkin1995). In short,the employment relations scholars viewcontingent abor as an unravelingof the

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 237system f employmentestablished by theNewDeal and a return o laissez-faire api-talism. Consequently, hey rguefor itherstrengtheningNew Deal institutionsorsearchingfornew nstitutions hatwillpro-videenhanced securityBenner 1997;CarreandJoshi 1997).The employmentrelations view of con-tingentworkas exploitative s most vividlyarticulatedbyethnographiesof temporarywork in clerical or industrial settings(McAlester 1998; Parker 1994; Henson1996; Rogers 1995; Smith 1996, 1998). In-formants in these studies report beingforced nto temporarymploymentbycir-cumstances that make it difficult o findfull-timeobs. They subsequentlyexperi-ence a continuingsense of insecuritynduncertainty.3 oor working onditionsareoftendescribed: lowwages and high work-relatedexpenses; disputesbetweenclients,agencies, and workersover paymentandhours; antagonism from permanent em-ployeesand a sense of isolation,exclusion,estrangement,nd dissatisfaction ithwork.In comparison to these disadvantages, n-formantseport ew dvantages.Some claimto enjoy the flexibilityf scheduling theirwork and the freedom of being able torejectjobs that re particularly npleasant.Otherssaythey refer o receivetheir om-pensationas "fast ash"rather hanwaitfora monthlypaycheck. Still others reportobtaining satisfactionfromknowingthattheir ervices re "really eeded" by ompa-nies in crisis. Overall,however, he disad-vantages of contingentwork clearly out-weighitsadvantages.Although the exploitation and socialproblems that concern employmentrela-tions researchersdeserve close attention,one can questionwhether heirviewvalidlydescribes all contingentwork. With fewexceptions (Barkerand Christensen1998;Jurik1998), theemployment elations m-

    3Jurik 1998) is a notable exception in thatonly20% of her self-employed, ome workersfeltforcedinto theirhome businesses. Nevertheless,Jurikixedon the perceptionsofthat20% inassessing howhomeworkersfelt about theirwork arrangements.

    age of contingentworkrelieson studiesoflow-skilled ccupations. Even labor econo-mists nd industrialrelations researchers,who acknowledge the changing composi-tion of the contingentworkforce,quicklylose sight of the highly skilled sector intheir analysis because they relyon aggre-gate data, which is weighted toward theresponsesof traditional emporarymploy-ees (Cappelli 1999; Kalleberg et al. 1997;Spalter-Roth t al. 1997). Yet,studentsofworkhave long understood that there aresubstantialdifferencesn social organiza-tion between low- and high-skilledwork.Permanent professional, technical, andmanagerial obs are usuallymore secure,moreremunerative,morevaried, ndmoreintrinsically nvolving than lower-skilledservice and industrial obs. It stands toreason that low- and high-skilledcontin-gentwork should vary n similarways. Byoverlookinghighlykilled ontingentwork,theemployment elationsperspective isksconfounding he effects fcontractingwiththe correlatesoflow-skill ccupations.Free AgentPerspective

    In sharp contrast,the free agent per-spectivefocusesalmost entirely n the ex-perienceofhighlykilledcontractors.Mostadvocates of freeagencyare futurists, u-man resource consultants,or staffingn-dustry xpertswho write ooksaimed at thegeneral public or publish articles n popu-larmagazines. Nevertheless, heirpointofview s consistentwithmore academic ver-sions of "agencytheory"n thatboth stresstheadvantagesoffree abor markets.Advocatesof freeagencyagree that bu-reaucraticemployment nd itssupportinginstitutionsreunraveling, ut,unlikethosewho adopt the employmentrelationsper-spective,theyendorse this development.They portrayorganizational employmentas constraining nd unjustand view jobs"and "careers" as outmoded inventionsofthe ndustrial evolution hatweredesignedto meet the needs of large organizations(Bridges 1994; Pink 1998; Beck 1992;Caulkin 1997; Darby1997). In theunravel-ingof bureaucratic employment hey ee a

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    238 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWreturn to craft-basedmodels of employ-ment centered on marketable skills thatrelease people fromthe confines of bu-reaucracy.

    Advocatesoffree gencypromote a post-industrial vision of economic individual-ism in which entrepreneurialworkersre-gain independence and recapture fromemployers deserved portionof their sur-plus value. The free agent literature sreplete withstoriesof contractorswho va-cation when and where they choose, wholive in exotic places because they cantelecommute, and who successfully nte-grate the demands of their work with theneeds of their family. Although profes-sional and technicalworkers ypically opu-late such stories,proponentscontend thatpeople in all socio-economic strata couldbenefit by adopting a similar attitude towork Bridges1994). In short, ree gency'semphasis on self-reliance nd individual-ism echoes the rhetoric of Social Darwin-ism popular at the turn of the twentiethcentury Bendix 1956).The free agent perspective paints anoptimistic ictureofcontingent abor thatcontrasts harplywiththe employment e-lations iterature oint bypoint. Advocatesof freeagency argue thatcontingent tatusis a choice rather than a necessity; hat itrepresents iberationratherthanisolationfrom heworkplace;thatuncertaintyboutemployment sactuallyminimized nd thatflexibilitynhances personal control; thatcontractors eceivemoremoneythanper-manent employees because theyare paidforeveryhour thattheyworkat rates thatreflect premiumforskills;and that fulluse of theirskillsresults n a sense of self-actualization rather than estrangement.Although it is plausible that some of freeagency'sclaimsare consistentwiththe ex-periencesofcontractorsnprofessional ndtechnical abormarkets, tpresentthere sno wayto know,because there have beenno studies ofhigh-endcontracting.Limitations of Existing Perspectives

    Althoughtheemployment elations andfree agent perspectives attempt to posit

    credible views of contingentlabor, theirdepictionsare too neat and narrowto cap-ture the full diversity f the phenomena.Three limitationsare particularly ignifi-cant. First, oth perspectives ack ground-ing n the experiencesof sufficientlyroadrange of contingentworkersto facilitatecomparisons. The freeagent literature slargelynon-empirical. Itsproponentsrelyexclusivelyon anecdotes purposefully e-lected to supporttheirviews (see Bridges1994; Davis and Meyer 1998). In contrast,proponents of the employmentrelationsperspectiverelyon careful research, buttheir oncernwith xploitationhas ed themto study low-skilled temporaryworkers.Thus, both literatures ack empiricalstud-ies ofhighly killed contractors.Second, both perspectivesoverlook di-versitynd contradictionseven withinoc-cupationalsectors.Advocates ffree gencygenerally gnorethe risks nd costsof con-tracting.Althoughemploymentrelationsresearchers acknowledge that contingentworkmayhavebenefits, hepositive spectsare typicallydownplayed. Nevertheless,there is evidence that even lower-skilledcontractorshave a widerrange of experi-ences thanmostcommentatorsmply ndthat hevariationmaydepend on situationaland organizationalfactors Lautsch 1998;Benson 1998; Pearce 1993; Cohen andHaberfeld 1993; Smith1998).Finally, oth perspectivesmply hat on-tractorsuse limitedconceptual frames tomake sense of themselves nd their work.Employment elations cholars ssumethatpeople construct the meaning of workagainst a backdrop of involvement n anorganization.Advocatesof the free gencyview uggestthatpeople definethemselvesbytheir kills nd bythe role they lay nanentrepreneurial labor market. This di-chotomyof hierarchiesand markets rtifi-ciallylimits and simplifies he social con-texts nwhichcontingentworkers perateand developa senseofself.Specifically, heliterature n contingentwork argely ver-looks occupation-long known o serve s asourceofworkerdentity VanMaanen andBarley1984) -as a locus for rganizing ndsense-making.

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 239Developing a more accurate image ofcontingent work will require collectinggrounded data on various forms f contin-gent workand on the contingentworkers'

    perspective.Thiswillenable researchers odevelop better typologies of contingentemployment nd explain distinctions hatcurrentlyppear to be contradictory. twasin order to develop a more grounded im-age of contingent employment n skilledlabor markets hatwe set out to studywhyengineers, software evelopers,and infor-mation technology professionalsbecomecontractors nd how theyultimately ometo interpret he advantages and disadvan-tages of contracting. As we shall show,ourdata indicate that neitheran employmentrelationsnor a free agent perspectivead-equately captures the themes that runthrough the contractors' discourse. In-stead, our analysis uggests hatthe experi-ence ofhigh-end ontractingsmorevarie-gated than currently magined and thatnotions of occupation are important forunderstandinghow contractorsmake senseof theirsituation.

    Data and MethodsBecause there s atpresentno represen-tative numerationof ndividualswho workas technical contractors, esearchers haveseveral equally troublesome options forchoosingrespondents nd informants. necould convincea staffingirmo make avail-able the names ofthepeople in theirdata-bases, sample fromone of severalresume

    databanks found on the Internet,or seeksubscriptionrecords frommagazines tar-geted at contractors.All of these sources,however, re biased in different ays.Ourapproach was to select informants romalist of nearly 500 contractorswho regis-teredfor seminaron contracting ifestylesbroadcast ive overtheWorld Wide Web inDecember 1997.The seminarwas sponsored bya staffingfirm hat pecializes inrecruiting nd plac-ing technicalprofessionals nd was widelyadvertised n contractingcircles through-out the nation via a number of channels,including magazines written ortechnical

    contractors. During the spring and sum-mer of 1998, we interviewed 2 contractorswho had registered or heWeb Seminar, swell as 10 otherswhom we encountered inthe course of the larger project of whichthis studywas a part or who were recom-mended tous bycontractorswhom we hadalready interviewed. We actively soughtcontractorsfromoutside Silicon Valley toensure that our conclusions were not re-gionally biased, and we rnade a particulareffort o interviewwomen. Althoughourinformants re not representative n a sta-tistical ense, they pan numerous regions,occupations, and age cohorts, as well asboth genders. For this reason, we are rea-sonably onfident hat ur data identify eyissues and dilemmas that re ofwidespreadconcern to technical contractors.4All informants orked nengineeringorinformation echnology-orientedoccupa-tions. Table 1 reportsthe distribution finformants cross occupations as well astheir ge, theirmarital tatus, nd the engthof time they had worked as contractors.Although the contractorsranged from26to 68 years old, most were over 40. Forty-fivepercent had been contractingforfiveyearsor less, 33% for six to tenyears, nd22% forover a decade. Sixty-nine ercentof the informantswere married. Thesedemographic patterns parallel those re-portedin Black and Andreini's (1997) sur-veyofIT contractors n the SiliconValley.Fifteen f the contractorsn our studywerewomen. Fifty-eightercentworked n theSilicon Valley,and the remainderworkedin Austin, Houston, Baltimore, Seattle,Toronto, LosAngeles, Atlanta,Billings, ndNorwalk Connecticut).Five of our informants itherwereinde-pendent contractors rwereincorporatedas a business.5 The restworkedas employ-

    4It s important o recognize that substantive ov-eragedoes not mply istributional overage. For thisreason we make no population inferences,and weurge readers to exercise the same restraint.5The distinctions between an independent con-tractor, contractorwho works as an employee of astaffing irm, nd a contractorwho is incorporatedas

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    240 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWees of staffingirms hat pecialized in find-ing contractors'obs and served s the con-tractors' employer of record while theyworkedat a client firm.6Most informantshad workedwith numerous staffing irmsover their career, and 37% had at sometime secured a contractthroughthe firmthat sponsored the Web seminar.Doctoral students trained in ethno-graphic interviewing onducted most ofthe interviews,which were structuredaround a commonset of open-ended ques-tions developed to ensure thateach inter-view covered the same topics. These in-cluded the contractors' easonsforbecom-inga contractor, heircareerhistory, heirperceptionsof contracting, heir businesspractices, and their personal and familylife.Twenty-fournterviews ereconductedover the telephone and 28were conductedface-to-face. The decision to use a tele-phone or face-to-facenterview ependedon the informants'preferencesand geo-graphical location. All interviewswere re-corded and transcribed.In thecourseofeach interview, e askedinformants o reconstruct he sequence ofevents that ed themto leave full-timem-

    a business concern the contractors' tax status,notwhether hey se staffingirms o findjobs. Indepen-dentcontractors re individualswhosatisfy numberof criteria etbytheIRS, who receivewages,butwhopay taxes and social securityon a quarterlybasis.Contractorswho are incorporated have registeredthemselves s a businessand bill fortheir ervicesviaan invoicefrom heir orporation. All othercontrac-tors are "W2's,"workingas employees of a staffingfirmthatwithholdstaxes and social security. LikeW2's, independent and incorporated contractorssometimes use staffing irms o find obs, but unlikeW2's they re not obligated to do so.6We use the term "client firm" to refer to theorganizationfor which a contractorperformswork.Manyfirmsrecruittheir own contractors,but thendemand thattheyregisterwith staffing irm orthedurationof the contract. The staffing irm ecomesthecontractor'semployerof recordand takeson thelegal responsibilitiesof an employer, ncluding thewithholdingof taxes and social securitypayments.The client firmpays the staffing irm fee that in-cludes the contractors'wages as well as the staffingfirm's mark-up."

    ployment or heirfirstontractingjob.Todeterminehow ubsequentexperienceshadaffectedtheir perception of contracting,we asked themto tellus later in the inter-viewwhatthey awas the costsand benefitsof contractingand what theywould tellsomeone who was thinking bout becom-ing a contractor.Our intentwas odiscoverif nd how thecontractor's nterpretationsof contractinghad changed. Although theinformants' econstruction f thepastmayhavebeen colored by their ituation t thetimeof the nterview, here s evidence thattheywere able to distinguishbetween thetwo time periods: informants ended toanswerthe first et of questions using thepasttenseand the second with hepresenttense. More important, heir nswersweresubstantivelyifferent.Weused answers othe first uestion to develop our analysisofinformants' reasonsfor becoming a con-tractor" nd the second set forour analysisof how they interpretedthe "realitiesofcontracting."7

    Reasons forBecoming a ContractorThe stories hat ur nformantsold bouthow and why they became contractorsevincedthreebroad themesthat,whenar-rayed sequentially, reveal an underlyingnarrative ftransformation. he narrativebegins with the lament of an expert forwhom the tension between the ideal oftechnicalrationalitynd thepolitical real-ity forganizationalifehas becomea sourceof simmering discontent. Then, an

    employer's ction oranunanticipated ventthat undermines ob securityeads the ex-pertto act on his orher discontent.Aidedby erendipitous ncounterswith heworld

    70ne limitationof our data is that we cannot sayhowpeople who had entered and then left ontract-ingwould haveresponded to our questions. There isno systematicwayto identifyndividualswho leavecontracting. Nevertheless,several informants aidthey ntended to returnto permanentemployment.Several others had moved back and forth betweencontractingand permanent employmentover thecourse of theircareers.

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 241of contracting,he expertfinally hooses toescape theworldof full-time mploymentinto the world of contingent work,whichpromisesa wayof ife more consistentwiththe expert'sworldview.Expertise and Discontent

    Informantswove their tales of discon-tent withpermanent employment roundthree motifs: politics, ncompetence,andinequity. Together, thesemotifsdepictedorganizationsas irrational nd capricious."Politics" was the term informantsmostfrequently sed to refer o the endless waysin whichthe machinations and manipula-tions of self-interestedthers underminedtechnical rationalitys a criterion ororga-nizational action. Oftensubsumed underthe label of politics were managers' per-sonal agendas and collective nterests.Theview that managers acted to further heirown nterestswas so widespreadthat nfor-mantsfrequently ortrayed echnicalpro-fessionals and projects as pawns inmanagement's political games. A boarddesignerrecounted: "Iused to havewrittenon my grease board, 'Politics Is Our MostImportantProject.' The boss came aroundand saw thatand it went awayreal quick.But t'strue:we'rejusttools n their roject"(Board designer,M, C50).8 A verificationengineer offered similar,albeit less hu-morousview:Iworked lotof onghours. t wasfor olitics.Itwasn't or ettingheproject one. Itwas ikeI wasdoingthisforsomebody lse's ego, orsomebodylse'spersonal r career oals.Theycouldcheck ff, hey ot his r that onebasedonmywork. wasgettingheproject one notfor hegoalsof theproject utfor hegoalsofthepeopleabove. Verificationngineer,,Cl9)

    Politicswas not confinedto hierarchicalrelationships nd interactions: peerswere

    8To assist eaders, eprovidenformationn theinformant'sccupationndgender swell s auniqueidentifieror ach excerpt ited n thetext.Weusetheformat(occupation, ender,dentifier),whichappears t theendofeachquotation.

    Table 1. Informant Characteristics:Occupation, Age, Marital Status,and Tenure as a Contractor.Dimension PercentageOccupationSoftwareDevelopers 40%Hardware Engineers 12Technical Writers 13QualityAssurance 12InformationTechnology 17Project Managers 4Marketing 2Age60s 4%50-59 1940-49 3830-39 2920-29 10MaritalStatusMarried 69%Single or Divorced 31Years s a Contractor1-5 45%6-10 3311-15 1216-20 421-25 4over25 2

    said to be as political as management. Or-ganizational life was, therefore, rife withconflicting agendas, which informants per-ceived as a waste of time and a source oftension.You have to listento a lot ofpeople's agendas,spend time in a lot of unnecessary meetings,trying o keep everybodyhappy, trying o playtheirgame. It's not strictlywork-related, t'sveryunproductive, nd it can be very ense....But I've seen people in meetings who don't talkto each other there'sso much tensiongoingon.(Mechanical design engineer,M, C44)

    Incompetence was the second source ofdiscontent that informants routinely men-tioned. Whereas they portrayed politics asan aspect of social life, they saw incompe-tence as an attribute of specific individuals.Organizational leaders were sometimes atarget of criticism. For example, a softwaredesigner with over 15 years' experience

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    242 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWoffered scathing ndictment f entrepre-neurial management in Silicon Valley,which he claimed was fullof "ego-maniacswhojust happened tostumble nto a bunchof money." He continued: "There's plentyof people out therewho've made money nspite of themselves. It's the BeverlyHill-billy tory. They were shootin' at a rabbit,struck oil, and now they think they're agenius" (Software eveloper, , C39). An-other software esigner said he had turnedto contracting fter ncounteringa seriesof senior managers whose incompetenceshaded intodishonesty:I was t thenaval hipyardor coupleofyears,and theyweregoingnowhere. theoreticallyreported o thechief inancial fficernd theybroughtn a couple, howdo we say, yo-yos."Wecaught ne of heCFO'sfunnelingtuffntohiscondo nFlorida. We had a series fCFO'sand achone had differentdeaofwhat eededtobe done and how odo it, nd 'm going, No,I'm notplaying nymore."You know?Therewas no realstrategyr anything. Softwaree-signer, , C12)

    However, itwas middle management-and project managers, in particular-forwhom contractors eserved theirmost sus-tained and detailed accusations of incom-petence. The comic strip Dilbert,"whichdepicts the travails f technical profession-als who workformanagerswho lack requi-siteskills,was a popular source of magery.A software upport technician made theconnection: "I don't know if you read'Dilbert,'but t's almostprophetic. I mean,theyhire people tobe managers thatyou'dsay, Why n the world is thisperson lead-ing?' They ust don't have the skills" Soft-ware upport, , C18). Often ccompanyingsuch complaints was the belief that nfor-mantswere more rationaland capable thanthemanagersforwhom theyhad worked.Adatabase administrator'scomments illus-tratethisperspective:I think am a littlebit smarter hana lot ofpeople out there. If therewerereallygoodprojectmanagers utthere, herewouldnotbeanycontractors.The reason contractorsrehired s because they organizations] re indeep shit.Andthereason heyre nso deep sbecause theyhave been poorlymanagedor

    poorly planned. Like when I was working at[Astrotech]. The project manager there wasbordering on schizophrenic; things changedeveryday: the project plan, the featuresof thesoftware product. They changed every day!When thathappens, people cannotget anyworkdone. And thenI-and the rest of the team-would be berated fornot getting nough workdone. They hire people as project managerswithout having worked up through the ranks.They have not done the work that the peoplethey remanagingare doing. They have no clueas to what s required toget thingsdone. Theydon't know what s reasonable and what s not.(Database administrator,, C34).Informants felt that managerial incom-

    petence bred trouble for individuals as wellas organizations. For individuals, livingwith incompetence produced a sense ofindignity and injustice. A quality assurancetechnician who had been laid off by a man-ager whom he perceived as incompetentexplained, "To have a person like that say,'You have been tagged and you don't havea job any more,' was just too much. Thisbozo is telling me I don't have a job anymore and he's still working?" (Quality assur-ance, F, C13). Incompetent management,usually combined with other associated fac-tors, also made experts feel they had littlevoice, a situation that informants viewed asdetrimental to organizational performance.An informant who specialized in projectmanagement underscored the costs of sup-pressing an expert's voice:In the corporateworldyou mayhave an opin-ion, but you are not allowed to say t. When Iworked on theproject in Missouri, said: "Weare going to lose our rearends on thisproject!"They recognize that now. But then they aid:"You are not a team player.You are giving upbefore the battle starts." No, this is reality!Fifteen million dollars later, theywill comeback and say: "Why idn'tyoutell us?" (Projectmanager,M, C14)

    The informants' third source of discon-tent was their perception that permanentemploymentwas inequitable. Many claimedthat employers exploited technical expertsby requiring long hours without commen-surate pay:There's no compensationforengineers. I had

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 243to take a lower salary, didn't get to take anyvacation, nd I worked lot ongerhours. WhenI worked at Motorola the last timeas a perma-nent employee, was required to work 12-hourshiftswithno extra pay. And itjust wenton likethatformonths nd months nd months. (Veri-fication ngineer, , C19)I don't workforfree anymore. As an employeeI did that lot, because I wasexempt and didn'tget paid forovertime. I have observedthat theguy who will workfor free-they will ust givehim more work orfree. AndI have noticedthatno good deed goes unpunished when it comesto workingforfree and volunteeringto do so.(Software eveloper, , C48)

    Inequity, however, was not simply a fi-nancial matter. Contractors claimed thatthe growing tendency for firmsto demandloyaltywithout offeringsecurity was funda-mentally unfair:As time went on I saw that companies wantloyalty, ut they will not-and in some sensecannot-give loyalty o theiremployees. Youknow, if the company is falling apart, if it'sgoing bankrupt-they're going to lay off em-ployees. They're going to try nd remain aviable entity. But, theywant oyalty romme asan employee. Now, why hould I do that? Whatdo I get out of this relationship? I have tosubject myself o reviews, o whatever he latestreviewing echnique is out there. Peer reviewsthisweek, somethingelse nextweek. I have tosubject myself o all of this tuff, ompany poli-tics, orwhat?What s t that 'm goingtogetoutofthat? (Software eveloper, , C48)

    Informants claimed that inequitableemployment relationships created an un-pleasant work environment. A program-mer spoke of the pettiness and competitive-ness she had observed among full-timeemployees who felt they were improperlycompensated:I was workinga contract at TRW just aroundChristmas.People werevery psetbecause thebonus was a thousand dollars and to get yourthousand dollar bonus you had to walkon wa-ter. Bonuses weregraded, and theywere argu-ing and complaining and yelling n the halls.And I'm thinking, What s the matterwithyoupeople. Why reyou doing thisfor thousand-dollar bonus? You're highlypaid people. Whyare you standinghere screamingabout a merethousand dollars? It's nothingn the grand

    scheme f things!" uteverybody'snvolvednall thepolitics f stuff-whohouldbe gettingwhat, nd why. Programmer,, C27)Ultimately, politics, incompetence, andinequity xacerbated insecurity nd under-mined a climate of trust.A technicalwriterdescribed the fear of layoffs he had ob-served among full-time mployees n firmsin the Silicon Valley: "You can smell thefear n the halls when you walk ntosome ofthose buildings. People are so tense, soafraidthat hey re goingtoscrewup. Theywonder about the next layoff" Technicalwriter, , C8).Panel A of Table 2, which displays thenumber (and percentage) of informantswho spontaneously mentioned politics(31 %), incompetence (33%), and inequity(21%) as sources of dissatisfactionwithpermanent employment, indicates howwidespread themes of expertise and dis-contentwereamongthetechnicalcontrac-tors we interviewed. Since other infor-mantsmayhave failed tovoice similardis-contentment, ne can only nterpret hesepercentagesas a lower bound. Neverthe-less it is instructive o note thatwithoutprompting,over half of the informantsmentioned at least one of these themeswhenexplaining why hey ecame contrac-tors.Triggers for Change

    Althoughdiscontentwith he exigenciesofpermanent mploymentwaswidespread,itwas insufficient o motivatemost ofourinterviewees o turnto contracting.Infor-mants did notgenerallydecide to becomecontractors ntilthey ncounteredlayoffs,acquisitions, financially roubled employ-ers, deteriorating work conditions, andothereventsthat made changing obs sud-denlyseem inevitableor desirable. Thesewere eventsthat nformants ould neitheranticipate nor control. For at least 50%(see panel B ofTable 2), such eventstrig-gered a choice between seeking anotherfull-time osition, becoming a contractor,or becoming unemployed.By far the most common triggersweredownsizingand other situations thatsug-

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    244 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWTable 2. Themes in Contractors' Accounts ofEntering Contracting.

    Theme Number PercentageA. Expertise and Discontent

    Organizational Politics 16 31Incompetent Management 17 33Inequity 11 21NumberfContractors hoMentioned t Least One Theme 28 54B. TriggersLaid Off 11 21Unable to Find Full-TimeWork 3 6Probable Loss ofJob 11 21DeterioratingWork Conditions 4 8Boring or Routine Work 3 6ProspectofUndesired Relocation or Travel 3 6NumberfContractors hoMentionedtLeast One Theme 26 50C. FactorsEncouraging Escape intoContractingEncounter with Contractors 11 21Encounter with Staffing irms 11 21Desire to Work for a Specific Company 6 12Encounter withFriends/PriorCustomers Who Said They CouldUse Someone with nformant'sSkills 2 4NumberfContractors hoMentioned t Least One Theme 27 52D. Anticipated RewardsMoney 23 44Autonomy tWork 7 14Development of MarketableNew Skills 8 15Control over Time 6 12Entrepreneurialism 3 6JobVariety 4 8Number fContractors hoMentioned t Least One Theme 32 61

    Notes:The themes are listedin the order inwhichthey ppear in the paper.The total number of nformantsn each panel is the sum ofall informantsmentioning t least one thematicitem mentioned in the panel and hence cannot be computed bysumming the number of informantswhomentioned each item.

    gestedjob loss was mminent.Eleven (21 %;see Table 2, panel B) of the contractorswere actually aid off rom heir ast perma-nentjob. Most went directly nto contract-ing:In March f 97Applehad a huge ayoff,0% ofmydepartment as cut, and I was one of thepeople laid off. This was a long, drawn-outprocess, nd therealreadywere rumors hatApplewas peculatingbout ayoffs,o many fus had begun hinkinghatwewould o inthatcase. I had beentoying ith he deaofbecom-ing contractorefore nd so I decidedthatfI were obe laidoff, wouldbecome contrac-tor. So that'show got nto t. I knew hatbecomingcontractorould equireome our-

    age and a leap of faith f sortsbecause contract-ing is, you know, unstable by ts nature, and Iknew would need to have somethingto live onwhile gettingmyself oing. And yet knew thatit was something that ultimatelywanted to doand it was ust a question of when I'd get up thecourage to take this tep. And the ayoff eemedlike the perfectopportunity ecause we all gotseverance packages that oftened he fall. (Tech-nical writer,, C24)Others (3 informants) initially looked forpermanent work after being laid off, butcould not find it.I didn't realize at the time, when I quit DEC,that t was changingmy ife forever. I went to

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 245Apollo; fourmonthslater I got caught in thefirstayoff ave atApollo, and itdecimated theentiretech writing epartment. Four monthsafter that,another 20 to 30 percentwere laidoff. Shortly fterthat,Apollo was bought byHewlett-Packard. Apollo went right down, itwas absolutelyamazing. When I got laid off tApollo, thatwas t. I could not find permanentjob anywhere n Massachusetts. So I startedtogo contract nstead. (Technicalwriter, , C9)

    A number of contractors (11, or 21%)did not wait for the pink slip. Observingthat their employer was having financialdifficulties, they decided to leave the firmbefore it collapsed around them:Hayes filed for Chapter 11 protection. Theysuccessfully eorganized,butin the midstofallthis, said, "Look, they'renot being very nno-vative echnology-wise. nd they'renotputtinganymoney nto new products like I thinktheyshould. Ijust don't see it beingviable." Peoplewere bailingout left nd right.Myformer oss,who had already quit, said, "Look, call up thiscompany,MRJ, nc. [a staffing irm]. Theyneed somebody like you and they're payingreallygood money." MRJmade me an offer. Isaid, "Man, this s ust too good to turn down."So I leftHayes." (Embeddedystemsngineer, ,C41)

    For another set of contractors (4, or8%), deteriorating workingconditions weresufficientto triggerthe shift o contracting,even though these events did not explicitlythreaten their ob security. For example, amultimedia developer had been demoted,feltunappreciated, and saw the acquisitionof his company as a sign that it was time tomove on:I was in computersupportfor seven years, ndat one point I was a managerbut I got demotedand I ended up beingin field ervice.There wasa period of about twoyearsthere,whereaboutevery ingleday hated myob and I wantedtogetout of t. When the company wasworkingwithgotsold to a biggercompany, said, "I amnot doing this gain," and I left. So that s whatI mean by push. If a companykeeps rejectingand does nottake advantageof theskills have,there s no sense offulfillment. hat is enoughof a push. It was sort of like, the universe isgivingme a hint, maybeyou should move on.(Multimedia eveloper, , C3)Others indicated that they turned to con-

    tracting ecause theywerebored (3 infor-mants)or because their mployerhad askedthemto relocate and theydid not wanttomove (3 informants).Escape into Contracting

    Triggering ventswere crucialfordecid-ingto movefrom ermanentto contingentemployment, ecause they ed informantsto consider theiroptions. However, eventhe experience of being laid off was, byitself,nsufficiento tipthebalance in favorof becoming a contractor. As 52% of ourinformantsspontaneously reported (seeTable 2, panel C), the decision to entercontracting often required exposure topeople or opportunities that made con-tracting eem moreviable than takingan-otherfull-timeob. Exposure to contract-ing could occur throughencounterswithcontractors, taffing irms, nd potentialclients.Most nformants adworkedbeside con-tractors n previous obs where theyhadopportunitiesto observe the practicalitiesof contingent employment. Informantswere particularly aken withthe idea thatcontractorsmade more moneyfordoingthe samework.Twenty-one ercentof ourinformantsnoted that when theyfinallymade their decision, other contractorsservedas role models:Therewere everal ontractorslso workingtGeneral lectricnd found utthat hey eremaking lotmoremoneyhan was ven houghthey idn'thavethe benefits did. So at onepoint hada disagreementithhepeople wasworkingor nd said, Theheckwith ou,"ndI quitGeneralElectric nd I went o the obshop thatwas employingheguysthatwereworkingtGE and I said,"Doyouguyshaveacallfor nybody?" nd theyaid,"Ohyeahwedo,and wewill vengiveyouyourjob ack."Sothey avememy ob [at GE] backat aboutathirdncreasensalary. Qualityssurance, ,CD

    Encounters with staffing irmswere asecond, common stimulusthat led infor-mants oconsidercontracting s an option.Technical professionals, speciallythose nmanagerialroles,routinely ncounterrep-

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    246 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWresentatives f staffing irms eeking newrecruits nd job openings. Eleven of ourinformants 21%; see Table 2, panel C)reportedbeinglured ntocontracting fterencountering gentsofstaffing irmst thevery imewhentheywerereadytoconsiderchange:How did I get into contracting?The companythat workedforhiredcontractors.And atonepointthey inishedup theportionof theprojectfor the contractors nd they et themgo. Thecompany that they worked for, the Registry,called up a fewweeks later and said, "Hey,doyou need anybody lse?" I said "No." Theysaid,"Howwould you like togo to work s a contrac-tor? And I said: "Sure!" (Databaseadministra-tor,M, C34)

    Another12% ofour nformantsaid theyentered contractingbecause theywantedto workfor a specificfirm, ut found thatthe firmwould onlyhire themon a contin-gentbasis. In fact, omefirms ppeared tohave an explicitpolicy ofhiringpeople ascontractors o assesswhether o offer full-time ob:I wasworkinghorrendous hours and I got fedupwith t after while. Myneighborsaid: "I seeyour light on at 3:30 everymorning. What'sgoingon?" AndI said, "Well 'mworking n thisRISC chip." She said her husband was at IBM,and suggested try here.So I talked to BM andtheygave me thissix-pagefolder and said theydidn't hireanybodywho had experience. Theyhired everybodyrightout of school. I said,"Howdo yougain experience? How do you hirepeople from utside?" And they aid, "Wellyouhave to come in as a contractor." So I did that.I got a one-yearcontract,and then I got a sixmonthextension. (Verificationngineer, , C19)

    A final typeof encounter that pulledinformantsocontractingwas a directofferof contingentemploymentfroma poten-tial client. In some cases,offers ame frompersonal friends nd acquaintances:A friendofmine, a divingbuddyactually,whowas theAssistantDean ofUCLA needed some-one withmy kill et to do a majorproject. Shesaid: "Gee itwould be great fyou were avail-able!" and I was like, "Well,yeah,maybe couldbe available." So I decided that twas timetogetout of the corporation,go offon myown andstartmakingsome moneyformyself nd being

    myownboss. All of a sudden I had a one-yearcontractfull-time ithUCLA to do thisproject.(Software eveloper, , C28)Opportunities also came fromcustomers offormer employers who believed that an in-formant had valuable skills for which theywere willing to pay high rates on a contin-gent basis. A softwaredeveloper explainedhow he was hired to develop and maintainsoftware sold by his former employer:The customerswerejust very asy to find. Theywantedcustomdevelopment. They were exist-ing customersof the softwarehouse that wasworking or. The companydid notoffer ustomdevelopmentservices. In the last two years, nfact, t became obviousthat hepresidentdidn'treallywantto take the companyanywhere ndwas actually ooking to sell it. More and morecustomersweregetting ntsy. They stillwantedmodifications. So that'swhen I went nto con-tracting.And itwasbyword ofmouth. I had toturndownwork, herewas so muchwork. (Soft-waredeveloper,, C11)Anticipated Rewards

    Encounters with contractors were cru-cial for informants because they modeled awayto escape discontent while gaining ben-efits thatseemed more attractivethan thoseassociated with full-time work. Of the vari-ous advantages of contracting, the mostfrequently and compellingly expressed wasthe belief that contractors made moremoney. Forty-fourpercent of our infor-mants volunteered that theywere drawn tocontracting primarilybecause theythoughtthey would make more money. A numeri-cal control programmer captured the gen-eral tenor of contracting's economic lure:A little essthan a year go, my amilynd I wereliving nSeattleand we weregetting little ightonmoney-getting behind,gettingndebt too-because Boeing did not pay enough for me tosupportmy amily ithoutmywifeworking.Shedoesn't work and I don't believe she shouldhave to. We have four children. I actuallyworked two or three jobs at one time forabout a year. I was even delivering newspa-pers and doing other odd jobs. At Boeing Iwas making about $40,000 to $44,000 a yearplus overtime which maybe averaged out tobe another $5,000 a year. Here, in eight

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 247months I've made about $115,000. (N.C.programmer, , C47)In fact, the lure of money was so persuasivethat contractors were willing to forgo whatthey saw as the benefits of a more tradi-tional career:It was a big move,frompermanentto contract.I gave up the chance to climb the corporateladder, the security, enefits. I mean, you loseeverything.As a permanent employeeyou canclimb up the ladder in the company and getmore responsibility,more opportunities. Butyou ose everythings a contractor. [Interviewer:So why id you move?] The money! They paid alot more! (Systemsdministrator, , C42)

    Enhanced income, however, was not theonly attractive feature of contracting. Anumber of informants (14%) anticipatedmore autonomy in their work.I really wanted to have a little more freedomand choice aboutwhat I was nvolvedwith. hadbeen doing software upport for network faxproducts and I ended up doing some supportfor omedevelopmentwork or companybuild-ing network nterface ards and I reallywantedto gravitatemore toward networking n a full-timebasis. (Systemsdministrator, , C6)Others (15%) anticipated developing newskills: "I thought, I've been doing thisfirmware stuff and systems bit for quite awhile. Maybe I need to branch out andlearn some of this IT stuff, ike client serverand networks and GUI's and all this" (Em-bedded ystems ngineer,M, C41). Still others(12%) sought more control over their time.A marketer described how she quit a per-manent position and came back as a con-tractor to gain the flexibility to pursuemultiple jobs:The companydid not allow part-time mploy-ees, so I had to be a temp. I was outsourcedthrough regular empplacementagency,work-ing for him half day versus being a full-timeemployee. Then I was free to work at thelectures and video companyfor half of theday.And it was flexiblehours. Ijust had to tell themthedaybeforewhattime would be expected.The flexible hoursreally helped, being able tojuggle these things. (Marketer,, C15)A few of our informants were drawn tocontracting notbecause theywanted money,

    flexibility,rcontrol, utbecause they ikedthe entrepreneurial excitementof string-ing together seriesof temporaryontracts(6%) or because theysought the varietythat contracting nevitably rought 8%).Our informants' tories of how theybe-came contractors uggest hat xplanationsfor the rise of high-endcontingent workthatconsider onlya one-sided set of causalfactors annot adequatelyexplain why ech-nical professionalsbecorne contractors.Asscholars of employmentrelations wouldanticipate, downsizing, outsourcing, andrelated practices triggeredmovement ntocontractingfor a significantminorityofinformants (Cappelli 1999; Barker andChristensen1998). But the individualisticand financial motives hatfigure o promi-nently n free agency's rhetoricof employ-abilitywere also integralto many contrac-tors' accounts. Moreover, serendipitousencounters withtheworld of contractingwerecritical ormakingcontracting eem arealistic option at a crucial point in time.The complexityof "pushes" and "pulls"that ed informants nto contractingmakeit difficult o distinguish ontingentwork-ers who entered temporaryabor marketsvoluntarily rom hose whodid so involun-tarily for example, Tilly 1991). At leastamong our nformants, ostofwhomcouldhave easily found a permanentjob, thedecision to enter contracting usuallyevinced attributes fboth.In short,thedecision to become a con-tractor eems to reflect mix of structuraland economic factors as well as a set ofmotivesrooted in a professional deologyof work. Most informantsviewed them-selves as expertsand subscribedto theno-tion that decisions about workshould begoverned primarily y n ethic oftechnicalrationality ased on logic,reason,and prac-ticality.But theyhad discovered,to theirchagrin,not only thatorganizational lifedeviated from heway hey elievedorgani-zations should operate, but also that, asexperts, theywere not always given therespect they hought hey eserved. In thissense, the contractor'sdiscontent s remi-niscent of the difficulties ociologists ofwork have repeatedly discovered among

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    248 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWprofessionals in bureaucratic settings(Marcson 1960; Ritti1971; Raelin 1985).Although some contractors ound theirdiscontenta sufficientmotiveforenteringcontracting,most required a push fromtheir nvironment eforethey ookaction.Atthispoint, an encounterwith contrac-tor, taffingirm, r potentialclient madecontingent employment eem like an op-tion that would allow informants o aligntheirwork ifewith heirprofessional deol-ogy. Contractorsnot onlyhoped to makemore money,theywantedto be treatedasknowledgeable and enjoy the autonomy,flexibility,nd influencethey elieved theydeserved. Our informants,herefore,ni-tially aw contracting s a wayto escape theburdensof organizational ife,whilesecur-ing the benefits and respect befittingprofessional.The practicalrealitiesofcon-tracting, owever, oon provedto be morecomplicated and ambiguous than mostnewlyminted contractors nticipated.

    Realities of ContractingWhenasked toevaluatetheir xperienceas contractors and offer dvice for thosewho mightfollow n theirfootsteps,nfor-mantsarticulateda more complex and dif-ferentiated iew of contracting han whenthey spoke about whythey had becomecontractors. Experience as a contractorcast new lighton their original concernsand posed a new set of problems. A fewcontractors ven expressedbelated recog-nitionthattheyhad lost some of theadvan-

    tages of full-time mployment. Most hadcome toperceivetwo ides tocontracting,matched set of pros and cons that sug-gested underlying tensions. The infor-mants' discourse on the realities of con-tractingcentered on four themes, eachmarkedbyan opposition: independenceversus being an outsider, securityversusuncertainty,nhanced income versushid-den costs, and skills as expertise versusskills s a commodity.Table 3 documentsthenumber of nfor-mants who spontaneously voiced eachtheme during their interviews. As withTable 2, thesepercentagesmustbe read as

    clues about the relative mportanceofthethemesamong technicalcontractors:theyare, at best, ower bounds ofa sample esti-mate,because informants erenotrespond-ing to structured uestions.Independence versusBeing an Outsider

    As previouslydiscussed, informantsni-tially erceivedcontracting s a way fgain-ing independence and distance fromtheirrationalitiesof organizational life. Aspanel A of Table 3 indicates, even afteryears of experience, at least 69% of ourinformantscontinued to view indepen-dence as one of contracting's dvantages.Like manycontractors 37%), a quality s-surance specialistfelt hatcontractinghaddeliveredthepromisedescape fromorga-nizational politics:As contractor, anyimes ou an beremovedfromcorporatepolitics-not removedcom-pletely,ut t enoughof a distance o thatyoudon't haveto take a position-youcan be asinvolved s you wantto be. Whereas s anemployee,found hat ou re nvolved hetheryouwant obe ornot. Contractorsan step ackabit, ecausepeople et hem o that.They ay,"Ohthis ersonsn'there oreverike he est fus." (Qualityssuranceechnician,, C13)

    Contracting lso granted nformantshefreedomto express professionalopinionsand offered at least the illusion of morecontrol over their own time, in part be-cause theywere ess invested n theorgani-zationand less enmeshedin social relation-shipsatwork 31 %). Because contractorswereexposed tomanywork nvironments,21% also mentionedthat hey xperiencedmore challenge and varietyn theirwork:The thing like with onsultings I getto dodifferenthings.And know here's n end toitand can do another roject. wasofferedfull-timejob;didconsidert, utwhenthoughtabout t, realized would stillbe doingthesamething. o I optednottotake t. (Multime-diadeveloper,, C26)

    In otherwords,contractors pparentlyfound that moving from ob to job re-lieved them of the burdens theyassoci-ated with full membership in an organi-

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 249Table 3. Themes in Informants'Accounts of Their Experience as Contractors.

    Number f PercentagefTheme Informants InformantsA. Independence Versus Being an OutsiderIndependenceEscape fromOrganizational Politics 19 37Freedom to Express Opinions 16 31Job Variety 11 21Total Mentioningt Least One ndependenceheme 36 69Being n OutsiderUnable to Speak for Client Company 3 6Clients Bar Access to Information/Technology 7 13Treated as an Outsider 10 19Repeating Cycles-Adapt to New Firms 6 12Total Mentioningt Least One Outsider heme 18 35B. Job SecurityVersus UncertaintyGreaterecuritya 10 19UncertaintyUncertainty/Lack fSecurity 17 33Must RepeatedlyLook for Work 6 12Must Endure PeriodswithoutMoneyto PayBills 4 8Total MentioningtLeastOneUncertaintyheme 21 42C. Enhanced Income Versus Hidden CostsEnhanced ncomea 26 50Hidden CostsNo Benefits 15 29SkillsTrainingCosts 13 21Responsibility orTaxes and Fear of IRS 4 8Downtime Costs 11 21Lack of Stock Options 2 4Total MentioningtLeastOneHidden Cost 29 56D. Skill as Professional ExpertiseVersus CommodityProfessionalxpertiseDeveloping Marketable New Skills/Learning 15 29Gaining Influence and Respect 10 19TotalMentioningtLeastOneExpertise heme 21 40CommodityHaving to Keep Skills Current 9 17Finding Specialized Niche 3 6Total Mentioningt Least One Commodityheme 11 21

    Notes:The themes are listedin the order inwhichthey ppear in thepaper.The total is the sum of all informantsmentioningat least one theme in thiscategoryand so cannot becomputed by adding the number of informantsmentioningeach theme.Because this themehad no significant ariants, tem and theme total are equivalent.

    zation. But, once they experienced therealities of contracting, they also discov-ered that ndependence had a price: theywere now outsiders who developed onlyshort-term elationships with employers.

    Their status as outsiders manifested it-self in a varietyofways. For example, adesign engineer lamented thathe wasnolonger granted the rightto speak forthecompany:

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    250 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWWhen itcomes to representing he company,can make recommendations and all that. Butwhen itcomes down to it, can't speak for thecompany. I don't have the authorityto dothings n theirname even though I have a jobdescription that says, "OK, this contract em-ployee is the one who willrecommend go-no-goon thiskindofthing."So it'sjust ... it'sa minorlittlepoint,but t's a point nevertheless. Designengineer, , C5)More crucially, and less symbolically, some(13%) discovered that being an outsidercould limit their access to more interestingwork, thereby undercutting one ofcontracting's perceived advantages:There's one big difference. I can't do somethings could do as a permanentemployee. I'mworkingon a joint venture project on non-volatilememory.But there're some aspectsof tI can't get involvedin because I'm a contractperson, not a permanent employee. I'm notpermanent,so I mightwalk awayfrom t andleave a hole in theirgroup. Also, theydon'twant to giveout thatsortoftechnical informa-tion to just anybody. It's sort of like thecompany'sjewels: process nformation nd stufflike that. (Verificationngineer, , C19)

    Contractors also found that they werenot always treated well by permanent em-ployees, precisely because they were per-ceived as outsiders. A programmer ex-pressed the perception well: "Some com-panies don't treat contractors as good astheir employees. In a lot ofplaces, employ-ees are a little unfriendly because they'rereally cautious about what information toshare with you" (Programmer,M, C22). In-formants were conscious of the day-to-dayconsequences of lacking full membershipin an organization, such as being excludedfrom company parties or being given anundesirable workspace. Most consideredthese consequences to be an acceptableprice for contracting's advantages, but asignificant minority (19%) found themtroublesome and spoke openly of their dis-satisfaction with being a person without acommunity:The one thing 've actually never reallytalkedabout is thelack ofbelonging. As a contractor,you oftengo fromgroup to group. You don'treally eel tiedto thegoals and vision of anyone

    community f writers. n contrast o the expe-rience I had at Apple where was part of a largewell-respected documentation group that wasdoing a lot of nteresting hings nd had some-what of a vision for the future. There wereopportunities for individuals to feel part ofsomething greaterand more important. As acontractor, 'm temporarily ied to the goals ofall these different roups. I have myownper-sonal goals, but less of a sense of, you know,belonging and community. Technicalwriter,,C24)Others (12%) mentioned the frustrationof becoming acclimated to a new settingonly to leave and start over somewhereelse. A mechanical engineer describedthe experience of being a professionalstranger:You go to a new company, they ook on you asoutsider. They don't tellyou much, and you'rea strangern thebeginning, nd it takes a whiletogetto know them. You have toprove yourselfall over again. It takes a while to establishyourself. By the time you establish yourself,you're out of the company. Your work s doneand you're gone. So that's thedownside. (Me-chanicaldesign ngineer, , C44)When informants began contracting, be-ing a perpetual newcomer was not entirelynegative. It offered diversityand opportu-nities to learn. Over time, however, thepositive aspects of being an outsider couldfade and the negative aspects predominate.As a programmer, who had been a contrac-tor nearly all his career, put it: "You'rehaving to figure out a new culture everytime you change jobs. It's tough. At thebeginning that was one of the benefits, butnow it's getting to be one of the drags"(Programmer,M, C21).In short, the majority of informants feltthat contracting had liberated them fromthe costs of membership in an organiza-tional community. Many had entered con-tracting, at least in part, to escape suchcosts, and most remained disdainful of or-ganizations' social demands. After work-ing a number of contracts, however, infor-mants discovered thatfreeing oneself fromorganizational life entailed accepting a newburden: the existential status of a per-petual stranger.

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 251To manage isolation, some contractorsdeveloped affiliations long occupationaland professional ines. For instance, someparticipated n-and one even founded-a

    users' group where softwaredevelopersgathered to exchange information bouttechnicaland career ssues. Othersworkedthrough taffingirms hosebusinessmodelapproached thatofan occupational collec-tive, nd one technicalwriter ctually ffili-ated with n occupational union. Still oth-ers turnedto virtualcommunitieson theWorldWideWeb fortechnicaland profes-sional support as well as forfindingwork.Almostall informants ecognized the im-portance of cultivatingnformalnetworkscomposed of professional peers and, infact,the majorityhad such networks.Forveteran contractors, n particular, thesenetworks rovideda substitute or he com-munity heyhad renounced, but the infor-mal networks hat most contractorsmain-tainedhad notdeveloped into an extendedprofessionalcommunity.These networks,nevertheless,helped contractorsaddressanotherkeydifficulty: heproblemof obsecurity.Job Security versus Uncertainty

    Perhaps the keybenefit of permanentemployment s the sense of social and eco-nomicsecurityt affords.On the face of t,contractors raded thissecurity or the un-certainty f the market, calculated riskthat seemed worthwhile r unavoidable atthe time contractorsmade their decision.Withthe benefitof hindsight, nformantsnow viewed security rom two conflictingperspectives. Nearlya fifth19%) of ourinformantslaimed without rompting hatcontracting adactually nhancedheir enseof security see Table 3, panel B). Thosewho articulatedthisviewportrayed he se-curity fpermanentemployment s an illu-sion. Securitywasnot about keepingajob,they claimed, but about how easily onecould findanotherjob whenone's currentjob ended. These contractors elieved theyhad developed networks nd skillsthaten-abled them to manage ob loss as a matterofcourse. The resultwasan optimism hat

    belied popular perceptions of contingentemployment'suncertainty:Job security s the abilityto get a job. Staffpeople don't have ob security; oucan be firedwheneverthe company likes. And they don'thavethe networks.They can't call someone andget a job tomorrowmorning. They thinktheyhavejob security ut t'son paper. People don'trealize thatreal ob securitys when youhave anetwork f managersand recruiterswhere yousimply all them and say,"OK mycontractfin-ished," and theysay, "Great, I can place yousomewhere tomorrowmorning." The socialrealitys, the staff ersonhas no connectionstoa nextjob. Theydon't havesocial relationships.They're isolated. A contractorhas these rela-tionships. That's real ob security. That's therealgame. (Technical riter,,C32)People always aid, "Oh, contracting, ou makea lot ofmoneybutyourfuture snot secure. Nojob security." have neverever been firedfromajob. There've been a numberof times was atplaces wheretheyhad layoffs.Big tearful ceneout in the parking lot afterthe big company-widemeeting. "Oh I'm goingto missyou." "OhI don't know what I am going to do." I'mwatching hesepeople-you know,hip flasks fvodka, tearfulgoodbye scenes. I'm a contrac-tor. I've got ajob. I've gotajob as long as I wantone. That's happened a lot, and I don't knowwhy. It maybe thatemployees end up costingthecompanya lot more. Itseemslike wheneverthere's a downturn,wheneverthere's a layoff,management has an opportunity o get rid ofthe corporate deadwood with plausibledeniability. Whereas, it's not an issue withacontractor ecause they an makethemgo awayanytime heywant. hat's always ow t'spannedout forme. Stay s long asyouwant. You gottoquit because theywon't kickyouout. (Softwaredeveloper, , C36)

    Our informants' depiction of contract-ing as secure had experiential confirma-tion: most had yet to experience signifi-cant "downtime," their term for periodsbetween contacts. Nevertheless, at least 17(Table 3, panel B) were still concernedwithlong-term securityand believed that atsome point they would face a prolongedperiod of downtime and its accompanyingfinancial difficulties. Although mostthought they could survive, and proved soby repeatedly choosing to remain in con-

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    252 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWtracting,uncertainty urked in the back-ground. Contractors countered theirdoubts with heargument, gain groundedin their own experience, that risk dimin-ished with xperience: "There is more risk.A contract an be over today. But the moreyou stay in contractingthe less scary itbecomes. Those in it for20 yearswouldnever be an employee" (Quality assurance,F, C13). Nevertheless, thirdof the infor-mants onsidered latentuncertaintyo be adownside of contracting, nd half ofthesefound itstressful:Well, initially twas very tressful.Right now,I'm kind of relaxedbecause I'm inthe middle ofa contract that's rather ong and theywant torenew. But, many times during the year youhaveto think bout findingwork. You're alwayslooking for work. They say it gets easier withtime.Once you'vedeveloped, ifyour lients rehappy with you, they'll come back and referwork. But there's that constant tress. (Techni-calwriter,, C24)

    Moreover, contractorsdiscovered thattheactivitiesnecessaryforminimizingun-certaintywere themselves disadvantage.As 12% of our informants mentioned,searchingforobs, maintaining network,and keepingrecords took time nd energy:You are ookingfor job every ouple ofmonths.That is probablyno different han a salesmanwhoisoutofajob everymorning-he hasgottogo create businesseverymorning.But, till,youhave to devote some ofyourtimeand some ofyourenergy ofindingwork, nsteadofworkingyourwork. So that s a disadvantage. (Program-mer, , C48)A surprisinglymall number (8%) of ourinformants, owever, eared thatfailing ofindajob would drain theirsavings,mak-ing it difficult o paybills and make endsmeet.Commentary n the nature and mean-ing of security nd uncertaintywas nearlyubiquitous in our informants' valuationsofcontracting.Allwere awareofthe risksassociatedwith ontracting,nd thosewhoworried boutuncertainty eremorepreva-lent than those who did not (40% versus19%). For themostpart,however, ontrac-tors had discoveredwaysof redefiningor

    minimizing he lack ofsecurity.The mostcommon view was that the economic re-wardsof contracting, t least for themo-ment, outweighedthe risk.Enhanced Income versus Hidden Costs

    Contractorsreadily agreed that moneywascontracting's rimary dvantage.With-out prompting, 50% of the informantsmentioned thatcontractinghad enhancedtheir ncome (see Table 3, panel C). Mostestimated that they made 30-300% morethan they had as permanent employees.Even those who were initiallyconcernedabout making ndsmeetbelieved thatcon-tractinghad made them wealthier. Fewenvisionedreturningopermanent mploy-ment,and manyhad alreadyturneddownone or more offers. A storytold by anembedded systems ngineer was typical:[Mymanager] said tome, "Everybodyoves yourwork,we likeworkingwithyou. So,we're goingto offer ou $80,000 a yearand a $5,000 signingbonus and we mighttalk about stockoptions."And I go, "Well,Mark,gee that'sgreat."Afterweekend I come back and he says,"Have youthought bout it?"AndI say, Yeah, Mark, hat'sa greatofferbut, you know, bythe timeI takecare of all mybenefits, acation and everythingelse,there's still twentyhousand dollar differ-ence between whatI can make as a contractorand whatyou're offeringme. I'd love to take tif I could, but it ust doesn't make economicsense." (Embeddedystemsngineer, , C41)

    Even contractorswhofactored owntimeinto their calculations concurred that theeconomics ofemployment avored ontract-ing. In fact,no informants aid theywereeconomicallyworseoff hantheyhad beenas full-timemployees. One reason for hiswas thattheyhad experienced less down-time than theyoriginally expected. An-otherwas thatunlike permanent employ-ees, contractorswere paid foreveryhourtheyworked, usuallyat a ratehigherthanpermanentemployees performing ompa-rable work. An outspoken programmerput itbluntly:They're askingme to work eventy ours aweek.And, youknowwhat? They're going topaymefor eventyhours a week. When they sk a full-

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 253timepersonto work eventy ours a week they'regoing to pay themwhatever heir alary s. Thefull-time erson is sitting here going, "Ugh."I'm going, "Ching,ching, ching,ching." (Pro-grammer,, C27)Yet, despite their insistence that theywere economically better off as contrac-tors, informants had come to realize thatcontracting entailed hidden costs. Onecost, widely recognized in the literatureand mentioned by 29% of our informants,was the burden of providing one's ownbenefits, especially pension funds andhealth insurance. Less widely appreciatedoutside contracting circles was the burdenof maintaining one's expertise (mentionedby 21% of our informants). The directcosts of remaining up-to-date included feesfor courses as well as the price of equip-ment, books, and software:You make a lot ofmistakes, nd you have to go,"You ust blew five housand dollars on a pieceof software hatyou're throwing way. Whoa!"Especiallywhen you're starting ut, that's hardto do. God! (Softwareeveloper, , C12)Other costs were indirect, as when contrac-tors lowered their rates to secure contractsfromwhich theyhoped to learn new skills:When I moved fromthe old-not that ld, butlegacy-skills tothenewer,more popular skills,I had to lowermyrate because obviously wascoming as a neophyteas opposed to someonewho has several years of project experience.Mostly, customers want references for realprojectsas opposed to somethingthat did athome. So the earningof new skills s a contrac-tor s a challenge. (Softwareeveloper,, Cll)Some contractors (8%) said that highertaxes and different tax schedules were an-other hidden cost that reduced the mon-etary advantage of contracting: "I earn alittle bit more than an employee. But let'sget it straight: It may appear that I earntwice as much because I take home thesehuge checks, but half of it goes to thegovernment. I have to pay myown taxes"(Technical writer,M, Cl 7). Especially thosecontractors who worked as independents(or 1099er's, as theyare known in contract-ing circles) feared a tax audit and its subse-quent penalties, since the IRS was thought

    to scrutinize independent contractorsclosely.Another hidden cost was the price ofuncertainty tself (21%). The potentialirregularityfa contractor's ncome in theface of fixedexpenses meant that contrac-torshad to think xplicitly bout financialstrategiesfor ameliorating uncertainty'simpact:Say somethingurns ad, and my ontract tCisco is terminated.NowI havemy$860-a-monthmortgage,my$300-a-monthar pay-ment. $300-a-monthoodbill, don'tknow,whateverlse,youknow, tilities,lectric, as,water.... You learn to thinkdifferentlys acontractor. Technical riter,,C9)At eastone informantmanaged the cost ofuncertaintyymaintaining buffer ccountin the bank, and severalothers mplied thattheyhad done the same. As thisengineer(M, C19) put it, "The differencebetweenbeing contract nd being permanent s theamount of money I have in my savingsaccount." Other contractors poke of de-layingmajorpurchases untiltheyhad savedenough topayfor he tem ncash. Marriedcontractorsusuallysaid theycould get byon their spouses' income, at least for ashortperiod oftime.Finally, echnical contractorsperceivedthe lack of stock options as a hidden cost.Although contractors ypicallymade moremoney than permanent employees, espe-cially n theentrepreneurial limate oftheSiliconValley,permanent mployeescouldbecomewealthy vernightf heir irmwentpublic and didwellon the stockmarket.Atleast two of our informants were stilltroubledbymemoriesof ost opportunitiesto become wealthy:I turneddown a job at Netscapebecause Iwanted o contract. mean turned own joboffer romNetscapethe monthbeforetheywentpublic! I decided not to applywhenGraysonmoved o Mountain iew ven houghIwasdoingWebdevelopmenttthe ime. hat'sthe one thathurts.Of course hadno idea atthetime hatNetscapewasgoing o do that. Ikeep remindingmyself f thatwhen I startfeelingreally tupid. (Softwareeveloper,,C21)Economic considerations were central

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    254 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEWto the informants' nitialdecisions to con-tract, nd most felt that theyhad reapedthe economicbenefits hey ought,buttheyalso understood that contracting'smon-etary dvantage was reduced by costs theyhad not anticipated. As a result, infor-mantsgradually began to realize the fullimplicationsof having directly ntered alabor market. Like actors in any othermarket, they confrontedthe necessityofestimating, ricing,and managinguncer-tainty. To this reality theybrought onecrucial resource: theirprofessional xper-tise. The meaning of expertise n a marketwas thefinaltheme thatmarkedour infor-mants'discourse on contracting.Professional Expertiseas Skill versus CommodityInformants riginally oped contractingwould allowthemto focusmore ntentlyntechnicalwork ndondevelopingnew kills,and 29% (see panel D ofTable 3) volun-teered thattheyhad achieved their objec-tive:I am really lad became contractor,ecauseithasgivenme a chancetogo all aroundtheValleyand workforall kinds of companies.Whenyoustayn thesamefield,you only eethatworld;youdon'tgetto see otherkinds fthings. did a contractestingncryptionoft-ware or bank. Iwouldhavenever one that.Imean wouldnothavegoneto bank nd said,"Can test our ncryptionoftware?" didn'tevenknow t xisted. o I got ots fopportuni-tiesbydoingthat. (Qualityssurance,, C13)Furthermore, early fifthfthe contrac-tors (19%) claimed that their skills hadbroughtthem considerable influenceandrespect n theclient companieswhere theyworked.The realities of developing and main-taining xpertise,however,were sometimessobering. Contractingdid not guaranteeinteresting r challenging work. Once in-formantsbegan contracting, hey quicklydiscovered that exercising skill was nolongersimply matter fbeingknowledge-able; skilland reputationfor killwerethecoinage bywhich others measured theirvalue in themarketplace. Failing to keepcurrent nd demonstrate kills hatwere n

    demand undercut a contractor's market-ability:It is possible, as a contractor, o wind up doingsmall things. You know,the same pigeon-hol-ing can happen toyou as a contractor. fyou failto educate yourself, ou not only have all of theentrepreneurialrisks,but you have the samedrawbacks as an employee and none of thebenefits. Softwareeveloper,, C39)

    Once contractors recognized that re-mainingon the "cutting-edge"was crucialfor maintaining employability, earningbecame an issue ofsurvival nd not simplya means ofgetting job done or a route topersonal satisfaction nd growth.At least17% ofour informants ortrayed he con-tinualneed to retool as a cost of contract-ing. Furthermore, ontractorsdiscoveredthat it was ultimately ustomers who de-finedwhat theyneeded to learn. The needto stay breast oftechnology ould becometedious and might ven lead contractors oconsider returning to full-timeemploy-ment:The competition is getting a little stiffer e-cause the application packages that a writerneeds to knoware getting more complicated,more complex, more work ntensive. And so,you have to keep up with t. At45, I'm gettinga little iredofplaying hatratrace,which swhyI'm atCisco,because Cisco wants obringme onboard direct. I would ust as soon focuson thenetwork ngineeringside oftechnology nd onworking my way into a management positionthan continue this. (Technicalwriter, , C9)

    In time, contractors realized that themeaning of expertise had been trans-formed. To be an expertwas no longersimplyto possess sophisticatedskills andknowledge. One had to possess skillsthatwere marketable. A few contractors 6%)even lamented that one result of sellingexpertisewas doing highly killedbut mo-notonous workwithin specialized niche.In short, xperienced contractors ame tounderstand xpertise s a commoditywhosemaintenance could be costly. Ironically,many had become contractorspreciselybecause theywantedto distance theirpro-fessional selves fromthe irrationalities forganizational ife,yetmosteventually is-

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    WHY DO CONTRACTORS CONTRACT? 255covered that heirprofessionalismwas nowsubject to market orces,whichcould be noless corrosive.

    Discussion and ImplicationsAs ethnographers, ur objectivehas beento document technical contractors' ac-counts of theirexperienceswith contract-ing and touse theseas a lensfor valuatingconceptions of contingentwork and forbuildingmore valid theoriesofcontingentlabormarkets.Our data are informative nthree counts. First, they help us under-standwhy urrent magesof theexperienceofcontingentworkreoversimplified. ec-ond, they ointtothepreviously verlookedrole that occupational communities andcommunitiesof practice may play in con-tingent abor markets. Finally, theyraisequestionsabout our notions of how contin-gent labor markets are structured. Con-sider each implication n turn.Adequacy of CurrentImages of Contingent Work

    Most research on contingent workbe-gins bypositing contrast etweenemploy-ment nbureaucracies and employment nmarkets nd then, t least mplicitly,ham-pions one system vertheother. Employ-ment relations scholars highlightthe ad-vantagesofbureaucraticemployment ndthedisadvantagesofcontract abor. Theywarn thatcontingentemployment xacer-bates economic insecurity by loweringwages, abetting discrimination,eliminat-ing access to benefits, ndermining ppor-tunities for collective action, and, ulti-mately, xposing people more directly othewhimsofemployers nd theravagesofeconomic cycles.Advocatesof free gency,on the other hand, enumerate the con-straints and injustices of organizationalemployment nd extolthevirtues fsellingone's skills n theopen market.Freeagents,they laim,have more autonomy, ccumu-latemore wealth, nd enjoya more holisticlifestylehanemployeeswho are trapped nthewebs of bureaucracy. Our data, how-ever, suggestthatboth interpretationsreinadequate.

    For those who live it, a life of technicalcontracting ppears neither as grimas theproponents of the employmentrelations'perspective earnor as rosy s theadvocatesof free agency promise. Viewingthe tech-nical contractors'world throu