35 By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another. John 13.
Ye Men
Transcript of Ye Men
Table of Contents
Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 4
Geography ____________________________________________________________ 5
Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 5
Area ______________________________________________________________________ 5
Geographic Regions and Topographic Features __________________________________ 6 Coastal Plains ____________________________________________________________________ 6 The Yemen Highlands _____________________________________________________________ 7 Eastern Plateau and Desert __________________________________________________________ 8 Islands _________________________________________________________________________ 9
Climate __________________________________________________________________ 10
Drainage _________________________________________________________________ 11
Bodies of Water ___________________________________________________________ 12
Major Cities ______________________________________________________________ 13 Sanaa _________________________________________________________________________ 13 Aden __________________________________________________________________________ 14 Ta‘izz _________________________________________________________________________ 14 Al Hudaydah (Hodeida) ___________________________________________________________ 15 Al Mukalla _____________________________________________________________________ 16
Environmental Issues _______________________________________________________ 16 Water Scarcity __________________________________________________________________ 16 Other Issues ____________________________________________________________________ 19
Natural Hazards ___________________________________________________________ 19
History ______________________________________________________________ 21
Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 21
Ancient Kingdoms _________________________________________________________ 22
The Advent of Islam ________________________________________________________ 24
Competing States __________________________________________________________ 26 North Yemen ___________________________________________________________________ 26 South Yemen ___________________________________________________________________ 27
Road to Reconciliation ______________________________________________________ 28
Unified Yemen ____________________________________________________________ 28
Recent Developments _______________________________________________________ 31
Economy _____________________________________________________________ 34
Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 34
Hydrocarbons _____________________________________________________________ 35 Oil ___________________________________________________________________________ 35 Natural Gas ____________________________________________________________________ 36
Agriculture _______________________________________________________________ 37
Manufacturing ____________________________________________________________ 38
Taxation _________________________________________________________________ 39
Banking __________________________________________________________________ 39
Foreign Investment ________________________________________________________ 40
Tourism __________________________________________________________________ 41
Society _______________________________________________________________ 42
Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 42
Ethnic Groups and Languages _______________________________________________ 43
Religion __________________________________________________________________ 43
Gender Issues _____________________________________________________________ 44
Qat Chews ________________________________________________________________ 47
Food _____________________________________________________________________ 48
Clothing __________________________________________________________________ 49
Arts _____________________________________________________________________ 50 Poetry _________________________________________________________________________ 50 Dance _________________________________________________________________________ 51 Architecture ____________________________________________________________________ 51
Sports ___________________________________________________________________ 52
Security ______________________________________________________________ 54
Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 54
Yemen: “Tribal Republic” __________________________________________________ 55
U.S.–Yemen Relations ______________________________________________________ 56
Relations with Regional Countries ____________________________________________ 57 Saudi Arabia ___________________________________________________________________ 57 Oman _________________________________________________________________________ 59 Iran ___________________________________________________________________________ 60 Somalia _______________________________________________________________________ 61
Terrorist and Insurgent Groups ______________________________________________ 61 Al Qaeda ______________________________________________________________________ 61 Houthi Rebellion ________________________________________________________________ 62 Southern Mobility Movement ______________________________________________________ 64
Water Security ____________________________________________________________ 65
Threats to Internal Security _________________________________________________ 66 Corruption _____________________________________________________________________ 66 Refugees and Economic Migrants ___________________________________________________ 67 Poverty ________________________________________________________________________ 68
Armed Forces _____________________________________________________________ 68
Looking Ahead ____________________________________________________________ 69
Introduction
The Republic of Yemen was established in 1990, when
the states of North and South Yemen merged. The
division was born of differing historical and cultural
influences. North Yemen comprised the Red Sea coastal
plains and much of the adjacent, isolated highland region
to the west. The Zaydi imamate, a Shi‘ite theocracy,
emerged in the highlands in the late ninth century.1 It
exercised some type of political control over shifting
portions of the region until 1962. From the 16th through early 20th centuries, the Zaydis
competed with the Ottoman Turks for power in the north. In 1962, the imamate was
overthrown and replaced by the government of the Yemen Arab Republic (1962–1990),
though Zaydism remains the dominant faith. South Yemen comprised not only the south,
but also what is now central and eastern Yemen. In contrast to the Zaydi-dominated
north, this region had for many centuries been populated by Sunni Muslims of the Shafi‘i
school. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the south was occupied by the British, who exerted
control over the port of Aden—an important commercial refueling, provisioning, and
trans-shipment port between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. After the
British withdrew from the south in 1967, a Marxist government was established which
became dependent on support from the Soviet Union. During this time, South Yemen
adopted the name People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970–1990).
The two governments had engaged in unity talks since the 1970s with limited progress.
The merger was ultimately facilitated by economic necessity when South Yemen was on
the verge of losing its primary patron after it became clear the Soviet Union would be
disbanded. The new state, the Republic of Yemen (RY), promised to bring democracy to
the Arabian Peninsula. But a smooth transition to universal suffrage seemed unlikely
given that Yemen lacked good physical infrastructure and the impoverished population
was largely illiterate. Despite civil war, insurgency in the north, and a resurgent
secessionist movement in the south, successive elections have been deemed competitive
by outside observers and kept President Ali Abdallah Saleh in power. Saleh has been able
to create an extensive patronage network, with resources often funneled through tribal
shaykhs, who operate as local power brokers in regions that the central government does
not control. Thus, much decision-making takes place outside the formal institutions of
governance.2 This arrangement makes it difficult to diminish corruption and introduce
1 Zaidism is a branch of Shi‘a Islam, constituting the form of Shi‘a Islam that is closest to Sunnism. The
former rulers of Yemen, the Imams of Sanaa, were leaders of the Zaydi sect. The sect developed as a purely
political expression of support for the rule of the Prophet Muhammad‘s cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi
Talib, and his descendants. In Zaidism there is no veneration of Ali or any of his descendants as infallible
supernatural leaders of the Muslim community, unlike that found in some other Shi‘ite sects. 2 Norwegian Peace Building Centre. Saif, Ahmed Abdelkareem. ―Complex Power Relations in Yemen
Provide Opportunities for al-Qaeda.‖ February 2010.
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/Noref_ComplexPowerRelationsInYemenProvideOppor
tunitiesForAlQaeda.pdf
transparency, which governments that provide the republic with foreign aid require. Saleh
has described governing Yemen as akin to ―dancing on the heads of snakes.‖3 His ability
to sustain this delicate balance is threatened by declining national revenue that is
generated from the country‘s oil reserves, which are expected to be exhausted by 2017.
Geography
Introduction
Yemen, in the Middle East (or Near East), occupies the
southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, across
from the Horn of Africa. It is a geographically distinct
region of the peninsula, which is better known for its
vast, inhospitable deserts than for mountainous terrain.
Yet western Yemen is marked by rugged highlands and
mountains, including several peaks that reach more than
3,000 m (10,000 ft)—the highest points on the peninsula.
For this reason, Yemen has been called the ―Roof of Arabia.‖4 The temperate climate and
relatively abundant rainfall enjoyed by the Yemeni highlands led the ancient Romans to
call it ―Arabia Felix,‖ meaning ―happy‖ or ―fortunate‖ Arabia.5 Yemen‘s coastal
lowlands, eastern plateau, and deserts display the hot and dry conditions that characterize
greater Arabia. Today, water is a precious and limited resource that is increasingly
strained by the needs of Yemen‘s fast-growing population.
The Republic of Yemen has existed only since 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic
(North Yemen) and the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) were
unified. The Yemen Arab Republic (1962–1990) comprised most of the western region of
the current country. Its territory bordered the Red Sea and encompassed most of the
adjacent mountain highlands, but was blocked from the southern coast by the People‘s
Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970–1990). South Yemen comprised what is now the
central and eastern portion of the country, extending west to the Bab el Mandeb strait.
The country‘s current borders reflect the unification of the two countries, including
boundary agreements with Oman and Saudi Arabia.6
Area
Yemen occupies a strategically important position on the
southern Arabian Peninsula, near vital shipping lanes. It
3 Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Glosemeyer, Iris. ―Dancing on Heads of Snakes in
Yemen.‖ May 2009. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Dancing%20on%20Snake%20Heads%20in%20Yemen.pdf 4 Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―Introduction [p. 7].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner
Publishing Group. 5 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia Felix.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9008151
6 Yemen‘s boundaries with Oman and Saudi Arabia were settled in 1992 and 2000, respectively. Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf
shares land borders with two countries: Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the
northeast. To the east and south, Yemen borders the Arabian Sea and its arm, the Gulf of
Aden, which separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa. Across the Gulf of
Aden lies the African country of Somalia and its autonomous region Somaliland. Off the
southwestern tip of Yemen lies the Bab el Mandeb, a strait that connects the Gulf of
Aden to the Red Sea. The small African country of Djibouti lies directly across the strait
from Yemen. Yemen‘s western border runs along the Red Sea; across the sea lies the
African country of Eritrea. Yemen‘s total coastline measures 1,906 km (1,184 mi).7
Yemen also possesses more than one hundred islands scattered throughout nearby
waters.8 These include the Kamaran and Hanish Islands (two island groups in the Red
Sea), and the island of Perim (Barim) in the Bab el Mandeb strait. Socotra (Suqutra),
Yemen‘s largest island, lies in the Arabian Sea off the tip of the Horn of Africa.9
Yemen‘s total land area, including the islands of Perim and Socotra, is 527,968 sq km
(203,850 sq mi), slightly larger than the combined area of Colorado and Wyoming.10
Geographic Regions and Topographic Features
Yemen‘s topography exhibits considerable variation. A rugged and fertile highland
region occupies the west. The east is dominated by a high, arid plateau dissected by
wadis, or valleys that seasonally flow with water. Desert covers areas of the north.
Coastal Plains
The extensive coastline is lined with plains that range
from 8 to 65 km (5 to 40 mi) in width.11
The western
coastal plain on the Red Sea is known as the Tihamah (or
Tihama). Hot and humid, this plain extends from Saudi
Arabia south to the Bab el Mandeb strait. Along the
water, the Tihamah features beaches and mudflats, while
inland are sand or stone plains and occasional salt flats
(sabkhas). Although the plain receives little rainfall,
wadis carry seasonal run off to the plain from the adjacent mountains. These wadis
support limited agriculture on irrigated plots that are interspersed throughout the large
7 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Yemen.‖ 28 December 2009.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html 8 Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―The Land [p. 8].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing
Group. 9 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45252
10 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Yemen.‖ 28 December 2009.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html 11
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Relief and Drainage.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45252
network of sand dunes.12
On the plain‘s eastern edge, the terrain rises sharply into cliffs
and foothills that form the western escarpment of the mountainous interior.
The plains lining the southern and eastern coasts (on the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian
Sea) are narrower than those on the west coast. Like the Tihamah, they are bounded by
rugged escarpments, some of which reach to the sea. Unlike the Tihamah, the southern
and eastern coasts can be blanketed by dense fog as a result of the southwest monsoon.
This climate encourages thick woodland vegetation on the nearby foothills.13
Aquaculture
(primarily shrimp farming) and fishing-related industries are based on Yemen‘s coasts.
The major ports are Aden (on the southwestern coast), Al Hudaydah (on the Tihamah),
and Al Mukalla (on the southeastern coast).
The Yemen Highlands
Inland from the Tihamah, the terrain rises sharply to
highlands that extend north-south parallel to the Red Sea
coast and eastward parallel to the southern coast. The L-
shaped range is known as the Sarat Mountains.14,
15
This
region is the southern part of an upland rift along the
western coast of the Arabian Peninsula. The rift, which is
part of the Great Rift Valley system, is the product of the
separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the African
continent that occurred millions of years ago.16
The highland region consists of a large,
dissected plateau marked with rugged mountains and volcanoes. The western escarpment,
which forms a transitional zone between the Tihamah and the upland plateau, is steep and
rugged. Thousands of small villages are situated on rocky outcroppings of this slope,
which supports crop cultivation via an elaborate terracing system.17
Such features mark
the Haraz Mountains, for example, which have the city of Manakhah on their western
slope.18
The highlands culminate in intermittent mountain chains that contain the country‘s
highest points. The tallest peak, west of the Yemeni capital Sanaa, is known as Jabal an-
Nabi Shu‘ayb and reaches 3,760 m (12,336 ft). East of the western escarpment, the
12 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Tihamat al-Yaman.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9072460
13 World Wildlife Fund. ―Terrestrial Ecoregions: Arabian Peninsula Coastal Fog Desert.‖ 2001.
http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/terrestrial/at/at1302_full.html 14
Yemen: The Bradt Travel Guide. McLaughlin, Daniel. ―Chapter 1: Background Information [p. 3].‖
2007. Buckinghamshire,U K: Bradt Travel Guides. 15
Yemen Tourism Promotion Board, Ministry of Tourism, Republic of Yemen. ―Yemen Profile.‖ No date.
http://www.yementourism.com/information/detail.php?ID=2712 16
Yemen: The Jewel of Arabia. Aithie, Charles and Patricia Aithie. ―The Highlands [p. 21].‖ 2001. London:
Stacy International. 17
The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Wenner, Manfred W. ―Chapter
1: The Land [p. 8].‖ 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 18
Yemen General Tourism Development Authority. Yemen: Haraz Mountains: Nature, Culture, Trekking.
Kasparek, Max. ―Nature [p. 7].‖ 2007. Heidelberg, Germany: Kasparek Verlag.
upland plateau contains rolling plains and basins among hills and mountains.19
Settlements and agriculture here benefit from fertile soils, a temperate climate, and
moderate rainfall. Throughout the highlands, agricultural plots have replaced much of the
original woodlands and forests.20
Wadis cut throughout the region, carrying seasonal
runoff to lower elevations. The advantageous geographic and climatic conditions make
the highlands home to the majority of the Yemeni population and several of the country‘s
major cities. These include Ta‘izz, which is in the southern highlands, and Sanaa, which
is in the central highlands. The highlands gradually descend into the arid plateau of the
east, where the change in climate is pronounced.21
Eastern Plateau and Desert
From the highlands, the terrain slopes down to an arid,
upland plateau and desert. The Ramlat as Sab‘atayn, a
large desert of undulating sand dunes, occupies west-
central Yemen, just east of the highlands. The Jawl (Jol),
an expansive limestone plateau, covers much of central
and eastern Yemen.22
It is crossed by numerous wadis,
the largest and most well known of which is Wadi
Hadramawt.23
This extensive valley runs through the Jawl
from central Yemen, east of the Ramlat as Sab‘atayn, to the Gulf of Aden on the
southeastern coast. The greater region is also known as Hadramawt (Hadhramaut). The
seasonal runoff and fertile soils of the upper valley, which is intersected by additional
wadis, have long supported settlement and agriculture, including fruit plantations. The
valley‘s lower reaches, toward the sea, are sterile and mostly desolate.24
This lower
course is known as Wadi Masilah.25
19 ―Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen [pp. 6–7].‖ Gochenour, D. Thomas. In
Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background. B.R. Pridham, Ed. 1984. New York: St.
Martin‘s Press. 20
World Wildlife Fund. ―Terrestrial Ecoregions: Southwestern Arabian Montane Woodlands.‖ 2001.
http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/terrestrial/at/at1321_full.html 21
The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Wenner, Manfred W. ―Chapter
1: The Land [pp. 9–10].‖ 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 22
King Saud University. Quaternary Research, No. 50. Lézine, Anne-Marie, et al. ―Holocene Lakes from
Ramlat as-Sab‘atayn (Yemen) Illustrate the Impact of Monsoon Activity in Southern Arabia [pp. 290–
291].‖ 1998.
http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/archaeology/Publications/General/Holocene%20lakes%20from%20Ramat%20as-
Sab%E2%80%99atayan%20(Yemen).pdf 23
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia: The Land: Relief, Drainage, and Soils: Yemen.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45287 24
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 3: South Yemen: Geography and Population [p. 223].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 25
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Hadhramout.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-
9038736#261501.hook
South of Wadi Hadramawt, the Jawl reaches a highpoint of 2185 m (7,169 ft) in a series
of low mountains and hills that run parallel to the coast. The plateau‘s southern
escarpment descends sharply to the coastal plain. North of Wadi Hadramawt, the plateau
descends gradually to the southern reaches of the Rub al-Khali, or Empty Quarter, a
massive sand desert that covers some 650,000 sq km (250,000 sq mi) of the Arabian
Peninsula. Hot, dry, and extremely inhospitable, the Rub al-Khali is the largest sand
desert in the world.26
Except for Wadi Hadramawt and its related branches, the eastern
region is sparsely populated, with large expanses of unforgiving, uninhabited terrain.27
Islands
Yemen possesses more than 100 islands in the Red Sea,
the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. (While estimates
have varied, recent figures place the number at 183.)28
Topography and climate vary from island to island. Those
in the Red Sea generally share the hot and humid
conditions of the Tihamah. Many are rocky, barren, and
without fresh water. Most of them remain undeveloped,
although efforts have been made in recent years to
harness their potential as tourism locales.29
Fishing is the primary livelihood of most
island inhabitants. Strategically, the islands are important for their location amid the busy
shipping lanes of regional waters.
Among the most important islands in the Red Sea are the Kamaran Islands, an
archipelago just off the coast of the northern Tihamah. The main island has a small
population, primarily composed of pearl fishers.30
Further south in the Red Sea, the
uninhabited Hanish Islands were the subject of a territorial dispute between Yemen and
Eritrea. Following armed conflict and international mediation, most of the islands were
officially awarded to Yemen in 1998. Jabal Zuqar, the largest of the Hanish Islands, has
the highest elevation of any island in the Red Sea: 624 m (2,047 ft).31
Perim (Barim)
Island is in the strategic Bab el Mandeb strait. In 2009, Yemeni and French officials
announced plans to construct an artificial harbor on the island for combating regional
26 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia: The Land: Relief, Drainage, and Soils: The Rub‘ al-Khali.‖
2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45285 27
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAO Country Profiles and Mapping
Information System. ―Yemen: Population.‖ No date.
http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/Maps/YEM/10/pt/index.html 28
Business Intelligence—Middle East. ―NONAV—Yemen—Travel Leisure and Hospitality Report.‖ 21
December 2004. http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=158&t=1 29
Yemen Observer. Al-Qairy, Mohammed. ―Yemeni Islands: The Gate to Yemen‘s Future.‖ 4 December
2007. http://www.yobserver.com/environment/10013379.html 30
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Kamaran.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9044454 31
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Hanish Islands.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9039145
piracy.32
A proposal to build a bridge across the Bab el Mandeb strait would use the
island as a stopover point.33
Yemen‘s largest island, Socotra, is in the Arabian Sea, 340 km (210 mi) southeast of the
Yemeni coast. Measuring approximately 3,600 sq km (1,400 sq mi), Socotra has a
mountainous interior surrounded by coastal plains. It is known for its unique biodiversity,
including many species that are found nowhere else on earth. Local economic activity
includes fishing, animal husbandry, and small-scale agriculture.34
Travel to the island is
greatly hindered during the southwest monsoon.
Climate
Yemen‘s climate is determined by two major forces: dry
northerly winds dominate in winter, and moist monsoons
prevail in spring and summer.35
Although the alternating
strength of these forces makes for relatively distinct
seasons, climate conditions vary widely according to
region and elevation. In general, the highlands experience
a temperate climate with dry, mild winters, and warm
summers that see moderate to abundant rainfall. Sanaa, in
the central highlands, has an average temperature of 14ºC (57ºF) in January and 22ºC
(71ºF) in July.36
Occasional frosts and light snowfall may occur at upper elevations
during the winter. The spring and summer monsoons bring rain to the highlands in two
major cycles: March to May and July to September. The western escarpment and
mountains receive the most rainfall. Precipitation levels are lower on the upland plateau,
where rainfall is heavier in the south than in the north.37
Average annual rainfall in Sanaa,
for example, is about 51 cm (20 in),38
while to the south the highlands around Ibb and
32 Arab News. Agence France-Presse. ―Yemen Plans Port to Help Combat Piracy.‖ 22 February 2009.
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4§ion=0&article=119468&d=22&m=2&y=2009 33
The Herald (Scotland). ―Bin Laden‘s Brother Aims to Bridge the Red Sea.‖ 31 May 2008.
http://www.heraldscotland.com/bin-laden-s-brother-aims-to-bridge-the-red-sea-1.829714 34
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Socotra.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9068481 35
Sharecropping in the Yemen: A Study of Islamic Theory, Custom, and Pragmatism. Donaldson, William
J. 2000. ―Chapter 1: Introduction: 1.2: The Yemen: A Contextual Overview [p. 6].‖ Leiden, Netherlands:
Brill. 36
Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―The Land [p. 12].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner
Publishing Group. 37
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Geographic and Demographic Setting: The Physical Environment [p. 98].‖
Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 38
Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―The Land [p. 12].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner
Publishing Group.
Ta‘izz receive more than 75 cm (30 in) each year.39
Precipitation takes the form of
localized storms and can thus vary considerably, even across short distances.40
The coastal plains are less affected by the dominant air current patterns. They experience
a tropical climate, with low rainfall and high heat and humidity. Temperatures in this
region range between 27ºC (81ºF) and 42ºC (108ºF).41
Average yearly rainfall is less than
13 cm (5 in).42
The eastern plateau and deserts are similarly hot and dry year-round.
Average temperature highs in Wadi Hadramawt range from 30ºC (86ºF) in the winter to
40ºC (104ºF) in the summer. This region receives around 5 cm (2 in) of rainfall each
year—typically in short, periodic downpours that occasionally cause floods.43
In the
deserts, rain may fall only once every several years. Daytime temperatures in these
regions can reach 50ºC (122ºF), although nights are cooler.44
Nationwide, rainfall is
erratic, frequently resulting in drought.45
Precipitation has reportedly decreased in many
regions over the last several years. Sandstorms and dust storms, fueled by strong
northwesterly winds known as shamal, can sweep through the region in winter and early
summer.46
Drainage
Yemen has no permanent rivers. Instead, wadis, which
are valleys and dry riverbeds, provide seasonal drainage
for rain fall run-off. Wadis run from the highlands and the
upper elevations of the eastern plateau to the coastal
plains and interior deserts and lowlands. They allow for
settlement and crop cultivation in otherwise inhospitable
areas. Because the highlands receive the majority of the
country‘s rainfall, the surrounding lowland regions
depend largely upon runoff.47
The most well known wadi is Wadi Hadramawt, which is
the longest wadi in Arabia and the lifeblood of the eastern plateau.48
Other major wadis
39 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45253
40 Country Pasture/ Forest Resource Profiles, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Alabsi, Ali Abdulmalek. ―Yemen.‖ November 2001.
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Yemen/yemen.htm 41
Aquastat, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. ―Yemen.‖ 2009.
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/yemen/index.stm 42
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45253 43
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 3: South Yemen: Geography and Population [p. 223].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 44
Yemen: The Bradt Travel Guide. McLaughlin, Daniel. ―Chapter 1: Background Information [p. 3].‖
2007. Buckinghamshire, UK: Bradt Travel Guides. 45
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45253 46
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia: The Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-
45290 47
Sharecropping in the Yemen: A Study of Islamic Theory, Custom, and Pragmatism. Donaldson, William
J. 2000. ―Chapter 1: Introduction: 1.2: The Yemen: A Contextual Overview [p. 6].‖ Leiden, Netherlands:
Brill.
include Wadi Zabid and Wadi Mawr, which both run from the highlands down to the
Tihamah; and Wadi al Jawf, which flows down the eastern escarpment from the northern
highlands. From the southern highlands, Wadi Bana flows down to the southern coastal
plain, where it empties into the Gulf of Aden. On the eastern plateau, Wadi Doan
(Dawan) runs northward through the southern Jawl, where it connects to the Wadi
Hadramawt system. The lower course of the Wadi Hadramawt, which flows into the Gulf
of Aden, is known as Wadi Masilah.49
Many regions and towns carry the same name as
the local wadi that supports them.
While Yemen has no lakes, a dam at Marib, on the eastern escarpment, has a capacity of
some 400 million cubic meters. (Marib was the site of huge dam that allowed for the
development of the Sabaean culture in the 1st millennium B.C.E.) Hundreds of smaller
dams in the highlands store water for local use or channel it into depleted aquifers.50
Bodies of Water
Yemen‘s strategic importance is largely due its location
along vital shipping lanes. These bodies of water include
the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb
strait, and the Red Sea. Together, they form a network
that links the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean.
This network is vital for global trade. It is a major route
for shipping goods between Europe and Asia, as well as
for transporting oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and
the U.S.51, 52
This region has been increasingly affected by piracy in recent years. Many
of these pirates are based in nearby Somalia.53
Off the southeastern coast of Yemen, the Arabian Sea comprises the northwestern portion
of the Indian Ocean. Its inlet, the Gulf of Aden, begins near the point of the Horn of
Africa. The Bab el Mandab strait that links the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea is only 29 km
(18 mi) wide at its narrowest point. It is therefore a chokepoint for traffic in and out of
the Red Sea. The strait‘s name, which means ―gate of tears,‖ refers to the challenges that
48 Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Hadramawt [pp. 414–415].‖ 2004. Footscray,
Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications. 49
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Hadhramout.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-
9038736#261501.hook 50
Aquastat, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. ―Yemen.‖ 2009.
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/yemen/index.stm 51
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabian Sea: Economic Aspects: Transportation.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-22722 52
Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. ―World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Bab
el-Mandab.‖ January 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Bab_el-
Mandab.html 53
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Ploch, Lauren, et al. ―CRS Report
for Congress: Piracy off the Horn of Africa.‖ 28 December 2009.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf
it once posed to vessels navigating its passage.54
A company owned by Tarek bin Laden,
the brother of Osama bin Laden, has proposed building a bridge across the strait that
would link Yemen with Djibouti via Perim Island.55
It would be the world‘s longest
suspension bridge.56
North of the strait, the Red Sea ultimately links to the Mediterranean
Sea via the Suez Canal; it is one of the busiest transportation waterways in the world.
Ships from the Gulf and Asia that are bound for Northern Europe or the Western
hemisphere must pass through Bab el Mandab to reach the Suez Canal.57
Major Cities
Sanaa
Sanaa, the capital and largest city of Yemen, is situated in the central
highlands at an altitude of more than 2,200 m (7,200 ft). The city
sprawls across a fertile upland basin near the foot of a mountain
known as Jabal Nuqum. Yemeni legend attributes the founding of the
city to Shem, one of Noah‘s three sons. The city‘s name is thought to
mean ―fortified place.‖ Only in the early 1960s did an all-weather
road make the historically isolated city relatively accessible from the
Tihamah, via the rugged western escarpment. The city became the
capital of the Yemen Arab Republic, also known as North Yemen,
which existed from 1962 to 1990. The city has since expanded
rapidly, growing from approximately 35,000 in the early 1960s to 1.7
million, as of the 2004 census.58
More recent estimates place the city‘s population near 2
million. The influx of people has led to urban sprawl and a strain on infrastructure and
resources, most notably water. Amid a water crisis affecting the entire country, the city
could run out of water by 2025 if the depletion of local aquifers continues at the current
rate.59
The old quarter of the city is enclosed by a wall measuring 6–9 m high (20–30 ft). This
district retains multistoried tower houses that are over 1,000 years old. Historic mosques,
bath houses (hammam), and traditional marketplaces (souks) are also located in this
54 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Bab el-Mandeb Strait.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9050482
55 The Herald (Scotland). ―Bin Laden‘s Brother Aims to Bridge the Red Sea.‖ 31 May 2008.
http://www.heraldscotland.com/bin-laden-s-brother-aims-to-bridge-the-red-sea-1.829714 56
The total length would slightly exceed the 28 km (17.6 mi) Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel that connects
Virginia‘s eastern shore to the mainland. The Chesapeake waters, however, are only one-tenth as deep as
the Bab el Mandeb, which plunges to about 305 m (1,000 ft) at its deepest point. The Washington Post.
Whitlock, Craig. ―A Bin Laden Brother‘s Ambitious Bridge Project.‖ 28 May 2008.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/27/AR2008052702766.html 57
Geopolitics-Geoeconomics. Engdahl, William. ―Yemen: Behind Al-Qaeda Scenarios, a Geopolitical Oil
Chokepoint to Eurasia.‖ 4 January 2010.
http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics___Eurasia/Chokepoint_Yemen/chokepoint_yemen.html 58
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Sanaa.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9065400 59
Reuters. Lyon, Alistair. ―Water Crisis Threatens Yemen‘s Swelling Population.‖ 30 August 2009.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57T0HK20090830
sector. The city‘s most important mosque is the Great Mosque, or Al-Jami‘ al-Kabir.60
As
the nation‘s capital, the city is home to government offices and civil servants. Its airport
is a major hub for travel in and out of the country.
Aden
The former capital of South Yemen, Aden is a large port
city on a small, volcanic peninsula on the southern coast.
Its natural deep-water harbor has long made it an
important shipping and trade center. According to legend,
Noah‘s ark set sail from this area. The port had become a
vital transit point between the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean by the 14th century. Its importance for Yemen grew in the 18th century following
the decline of Al Mukha (Mocha), an ancient port located on the Tihamah.61
The Suez
Canal, opened in 1869, increased Red Sea traffic and greatly enhanced the port‘s
significance. Today, Aden remains the commercial capital of Yemen and one of its
strategic centers.
The city comprises several districts. Al-Tawahi is a business district on the northwestern
end of the peninsula. Just to the east, Ma‘alla comprises the natural harbor. Crater, the old
quarter, is on the eastern side of the peninsula, just below Aden‘s inactive volcano, which
is known as Jabal Shamsan. To the north, Khormaksar, the site of an international airport
(a former Royal Air Force base), is on the isthmus connecting the peninsula to the
mainland.62
Sheikh Othman, an industrial district, is located to the northwest, across the
Bay of Aden from the harbor district.63
Yemen‘s second most populous city, Aden has
approximately 589,000 residents (2004 census).64
Ta’izz
Ta‘izz is located in the fertile and rain-fed southern
highlands; it sits at an altitude of 1,400 m (4,500 ft). The
city served as Yemen‘s administrative seat from 1948 to
1962, when Imam Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid, the second-
to-last Zaydi imam, moved the imamate‘s capital south.65
Benefiting from a temperate climate, Ta‘izz lies within a
productive agricultural region where coffee and qat (a
60 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Sanaa.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9065400
61 The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudry, Karen Aziz. ―Chapter 3:
Taxation and Economic Fragmentation [p. 113].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 62
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Aden.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9003715 63
Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Aden [p. 401].‖ 2004. Footscray, Victoria,
Australia: Lonely Planet Publications. 64
City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.
http://www.citypopulation.de/Yemen.html 65
Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Ta‘izz [pp. 398–399].‖ 2004. Footscray,
Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.
mild stimulant) are the main crops. It also features light industry, as well as a madrassah,
or Muslim theological school. The city is a regional transportation hub. It is linked via
highway to Aden (to the southeast) and the port of Al Hudaydah (to the northwest on the
Tihamah). Another highway runs northward from Ta‘izz through the highlands to
Sanaa.66
With a population of 467,000, Ta‘izz is Yemen‘s third-largest city.67
Al Hudaydah (Hodeida)
Al Hudaydah is a major port city on the central Tihamah coast. It grew to prominence
during the period of the Ottoman Empire, when it was a point of entry for Ottoman
troops. Over time it became known for its export of coffee and pearls.68
In the 1960s, Al
Hudydah and the surrounding region underwent extensive reconstruction and
development with the aid of the Soviet Union, which built a new deepwater port just
north of the city. At about the same time, Chinese engineers built an all-weather road
linking the city with Sanaa in the highlands. Today, the port remains vital for Yemeni
export trade in coffee, cotton, and qat. Fishing is an important local industry; the city is
known for its bustling fish market. While much of the city was built over the last several
decades, a small (Ottoman) Turkish quarter remains. Al Hudaydah‘s population is
approximately 403,000 (2004 census).69
Ibb
Ibb is in the southern highlands, north of Ta‘izz, in the
Jabal Ba‘adan range.70
It lies at an elevation of 2,050 m
(6,725 ft). The city and the surrounding territory benefit
from abundant rainfall and rich volcanic soils, making the
region green and agriculturally productive. Crops such as
grains, coffee, qat, and various fruits and vegetables are
grown in terraces ascending the hillsides. Animal
husbandry is also important to the local economy. The
region‘s rich agricultural produce and animal products are sold in the local souk, or
marketplace. The old city is walled, and filled with tower houses and mosques. Some
houses in Ibb reportedly receive running water from an aqueduct and its distribution
66 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Ta‘izz.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9070994
67 City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.
http://www.citypopulation.de/Yemen.html 68
Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Al-Hudayday [p. 393].‖ 2004. Footscray,
Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications. 69
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Al-Hudaydah.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9041383 70
Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Ibb [p. 397].‖ 2004. Footscray, Victoria,
Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.
system—a rare service in Yemen.71
The city is home to approximately 213,000 residents
(2004 census).72
Al Mukalla
Al Mukalla is located on the Gulf of Aden, on the southern coast of the Hadramawt
region. Although it was made the capital of a sultanate (kingdom) in 1915, it did not
become a regional center of commerce until the late 1950s, when it grew in response to
rumors of oil in the Hadramawt region. The modern-day city has expanded along the
coast for 20 km (12 mi). A series of low hills surrounds and splits the city into three
distinct sections: an old city, and eastern and western suburbs.73
One part of the city‘s
waterfront boardwalk is reserved for women and the other for men.74
Al Mukalla is
known for its high-quality stone and marble, which support a mining and quarrying
industry. It is the primary port for southeastern Yemen, and is a center for the country‘s
fishing and fish processing industries. It is the region‘s administrative seat and largest
city, as well as its major commercial hub.75
Al Mukalla has a population of
approximately 182,000 (2004 census).76
Environmental Issues
Water Scarcity
Water scarcity is a pressing environmental concern in
Yemen. The country lacks permanent rivers and lakes, so
it is wholly dependent upon groundwater (aquifers) and
rainfall for its water supply. Yet water consumption has
rapidly outpaced the replenishment of Yemen‘s limited
renewable aquifers. The country‘s water deficit—the
difference between consumption and replenishment
levels—was around 900 million cubic meters in 2000. It
was estimated at 1.28 billion cubic meters in 2005, and is expected to grow in coming
years. This trend will be difficult to avert owing to rapid population growth, which has
already strained the country‘s limited resources. Estimates of Yemen‘s annual renewable
water resources per capita range from 125 to 200 cubic m (4,414 to 7,062 cubic ft); these
figures are substantially lower than the global average of around 6,750 cubic m (238,374
71 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Ibb.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9041882
72 City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.
http://www.citypopulation.de/Yemen.html 73
Cities Alliance. ―Mukalla: Gateway to the Hadramout.‖ 2008.
http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/mukalla.pdf 74
Foreign Policy Research Center. Kaplan, Robert. ―A Journey to the Future.‖ 31 July 2003.
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030731.americawar.kaplankuehner.journeyintothefuture.html 75
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Al-Mukalla.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9054191 76
City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.
http://www.citypopulation.de/Yemen.html
cubic ft), and the international water poverty line of 1,000 cubic meters (35,314 cubic
ft).77, 78
Agriculture is the primary beneficiary of Yemen‘s water; it accounts for roughly 90% of
the country‘s annual water withdrawal, leaving only 10% for domestic and industrial use.
Notably, approximately 40% of annual water use goes to the cultivation of qat, which is
widely consumed in Yemen.79
Cultivation of this irrigation-dependent crop has been
discouraged by the Yemeni government, but it remains widespread due to its high profit
margin. The proliferation of wells drilled illegally to procure irrigation water for qat has
contributed to the rapid decline of groundwater levels. Recent reports indicate that these
levels are dropping by 6 to 20 m (20 to 65 ft) per year—an extraordinary rate. Erratic
rainfall, drought, and higher temperatures have hindered the replenishment of aquifers.80
Moreover, an estimated 20–30% of the country‘s rainfall is thought to be wasted by
faulty collection and poor maintenance of water conservation infrastructure.81
As a result of water shortages, rationing is in place in urban areas. In some cities, such as
Ta‘izz, water may be provided as infrequently as once every 45 days. At the current rate
of use and growth in population, Sanaa, the capital, is expected to run out of water by
2025 or even earlier. Throughout the country, public water supplies are limited, and
people often buy water from private sellers or hike long distances to tap it. Such water
may or may not meet basic health standards for drinking.82
As the price of water has
rapidly increased, more wells have been drilled illegally to meet demand. Water scarcity
has increasingly resulted in social unrest and conflict owing to population growth coupled
with unsustainable usage practices.83
The Yemeni government has made efforts to
address the crisis by implementing regulatory policies and developing wastewater
treatment plants.84
Yet the government‘s authority is weak outside of Sanaa, and it lacks
the financial resources to develop desalination plants—facilities that are used by its richer
77 IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Unprecedented Water
Rationing in Cities.‖ 16 August 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85734 78
Intersecretariat Working Group on Environment Statistics, United Nations Statistics Division. Al-Asbahi,
Qahtan Yehya A.M. ―Water Resources Information in Yemen [p. 4].‖ June 2005.
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf/pap_wasess3a3yemen.pdf 79
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Unprecedented Water
Rationing in Cities.‖ 16 August 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85734 80
United Press International. ―Yemen‘s Water Crisis a Mideast Warning.‖ 29 October 2009.
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2009/10/29/Yemens-water-crisis-a-Mideast-
warning/UPI-52511256844951/ 81
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Thirsty Plant Dries Out Yemen.‖ 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 82
Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Yemen Water Crisis Builds.‖ 11 October 2009.
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/11/world/fg-yemen-water11 83
The Christian Science Monitor. Kasinof, Laura. ―At Heart of Yemen‘s Conflicts: Water Crisis.‖ 5
November 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1105/p06s13-wome.html 84
Aquastat, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. ―Yemen.‖ 2009.
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/yemen/index.stm
neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia.85
Moreover, it is hard to make water a top priority in a
country beset with so many other problems.86
85 The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Thirsty Plant Dries Out Yemen.‖ 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 86
National Public Radio. Kenyon, Peter. ―Obscured by War, Water Crisis Looms in Yemen.‖ 20 November
2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120619082
Other Issues
Yemen also confronts the related environmental issues of
overgrazing, deforestation, soil erosion and desertification.
Overgrazing of the country‘s limited rangelands has reduced natural
groundcover and placed pressure on remaining pastures.87
The
unsustainable exploitation of woodlands and forests has contributed
to deforestation in the highlands. Many Yemeni households in rural
areas remain reliant on firewood as a source of cooking fuel, making
it difficult to curtail tree loss and rejuvenate forests.88
Soil erosion is
also pronounced in the highlands where some terraces, formerly used
to cultivate food crops, have fallen into disrepair. As a result, they have ceased to serve
―the twin functions of anchoring soil to the mountain sides and storing diverted rainfall
runoff from adjacent non-arable surfaces.‖ 89
In turn, erosion and water scarcity have
contributed to desertification. In 2009, government officials stated that 97% of the
country‘s land suffered from varying degrees of desertification. While the government
has developed strategies to combat the problem, it has been unable to widely or
effectively implement them.90
Lack of funding has been identified as the major obstacle
to doing so. The ongoing degradation of agricultural land is a serious threat to Yemeni
farmers, who comprise more than half the country‘s population.91
In addition, desert
locust infestation has proved a threat to crops.92
Natural Hazards
Yemen is susceptible to a variety of natural hazards. In
recent years, drought has been a common occurrence as
rainfall has decreased and temperatures have risen.
Droughts affect the livelihoods of farmers in particular,
but also contribute to a lack of food security for the
greater population.93
In 2008, drought was so severe in
the northwestern highlands that thousands of residents
87 International Livestock Research Institute. Global Agenda for Livestock Research. E. F. Thomson, et al.
Eds. Ahmed, S.H. ―Yemen Country Paper.‖ 1997.
http://www.ilri.org/infoserv/webpub/fulldocs/wana/Yemen.htm#TopOfPage 88
Country Pasture/Forest Resource Profiles, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Alabsi, Ali Abdulmalek ―Yemen.‖ November 2001.
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Yemen/yemen.htm 89
International Development Research Centre. ―Projects in Yemen.‖ 1998-2000.
http://www.idrc.ca/awards/ev-83265-201_938604-1-IDRC_ADM_INFO.html 90
Yemen Times. Al-Ghabri, Ismail. ―97% of Yemeni Lands Suffer Desertification, Says Agriculture
Ministry.‖ 12 August 2009. http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=1165&p=local&a=2 91
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Land Degradation Threatening
Farmers, Says Senior Official.‖ 18 October 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74843 92
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Desert Locust Infestation Has
Yet to Be Controlled.‖ 21 August 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73830 93
ReliefWeb. Yemen Times. Ismail, Salma. ―Drought and Floods in Yemen Affect Food Security.‖ 26
August 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SHIG-7VBEQF?OpenDocument
abandoned their villages and migrated to urban areas.94
Floods periodically occur as a
result of torrential downpours. In 2008, more than 100 people were killed after heavy
rains caused severe flooding.95
Wadi Hadramawt was among the most affected regions,
with thousands of residents displaced by the disaster.96
Sandstorms and dust storms are
occasionally produced by shamal, or northwesterly winds that sweep into the region in
winter and early summer. These potentially dangerous storms can block out the sun, and
cause property damage and the destruction of crops. They also contribute to erosion.97
Yemen‘s location in a geologically active zone—the Great Rift Valley between the
Arabian and African tectonic plates—makes it susceptible to earthquakes and volcanic
activity. Indeed, Yemen and its nearby waters have experienced several major
earthquakes. One of the most well-known occurred in 1982, when a 6.0-magnitude
earthquake struck the Dhamar region of the southern highlands, causing landslides and
extensive ground ruptures.98
The quake killed approximately 3,000 people and devastated
many villages.
Evidence of volcanic activity is widespread in Yemen, including active hot springs and
volcanic vents.99
In 2007, a volcano erupted on the Red Sea island of Jabal al-Tair,
destroying a small Yemeni naval base and killing at least eight.100
Sparked by several
earthquakes, the eruption reportedly caused the western half of the island to collapse into
the sea and covered the eastern half in lava.101
94 IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Drought Displaces Thousands
in Mountainous Northwest.‖ 5 May 2008. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78048 95
CNN.com. ―Yemen Floods Kill ‗at Least 100.‘‖ 28 October 2008.
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/10/28/yemen.floods/index.html 96
The Boston Globe. Taylor, Alan. ―The Big Picture: Storm-Battered Yemen.‖ 29 October 2008.
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2008/10/stormbattered_yemen.html 97
Yemen (Cultures of the World). Hestler, Anna. ―Geography: Dust Storms [p. 13].‖ 2000. Tarrytown, NY:
Marshall Cavendish. 98
Earthquake Hazards Program, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior. ―Significant
Earthquakes of the World: 1982.‖ 5 January 2010.
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/significant/sig_1982.php 99
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Relief and Drainage.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45252 100
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Red Sea Volcano Still Active,
Say Specialists.‖ 3 October 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74613 101
Reuters. Ghobari, Mohammed. ―Eight Killed as Volcano Erupts off Yemen.‖ 1 Oct 2007.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3020171320071001
History
Introduction
Ancient Yemen was the site of several prosperous and well-
developed cultures that benefited from the region‘s wealth of
frankincense and myrrh.102
The advent of Islam in the seventh
century C.E. profoundly shaped social and political development in
the region. Founded in the late ninth century C.E., the Zaydi
imamate—a Shi‘ite Muslim power—ruled portions of the highlands
for more than 1,000 years.103
Although Yemeni tribes in the interior
have long been relatively autonomous, Yemen was periodically
occupied by foreign powers, most notably the Ottoman Turks and the
British. In the 20th century, two competing states within the region
emerged. North Yemen was ruled under the Zaydi imam from 1918–
1962, and governed as the Yemen Arab Republic from 1962–1990. South Yemen, a
former British protectorate, was administered under the socialist government of the
People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen from 1970–1990. Following intermittent
conflict, the two states merged into the Republic of Yemen in 1990.
Today, Yemen is the only republic on the Arabian Peninsula where monarchies are the
dominant form of government.104
Since unification, a dynastic democracy has emerged in
which relatives of President Ali Abdallah Saleh (who came to power in 1978 and has
won successive elections since the late 1990s) hold key posts. The president‘s son,
Ahmed, is being groomed to succeed him. Critical to Saleh‘s longevity in office has been
his ability to balance various actors--tribes, political parties, the armed forces, and
Islamists--to maintain a stable coalition upon which his authority rests.105
Yet in reality
the government‘s authority is limited, because many parts of the country are under tribal
rule.106
The limitations of the central government are reflected in increased Al Qaeda
attacks, an insurgency in the north, and a resurgent secessionist movement in the south.
102 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: The Pre-Islamic Period.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45271 103
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: Islam: The Zayids [pp. 27–28].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et al. 1986.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 104
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Prados, Alfred
B. and Jeremy M. Sharp. ―CRS Report for Congress: Yemen: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations [p.
4].‖ 4 January 2007. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21808.pdf 105
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, Jeremy M. ―CRS Report for
Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations.‖ 13 January 2010.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf 106
International Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology. Leahy, Elizabeth. ―Yemen: At the ‗Tipping Point.‘‖ No date.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Reports/Demography-and-Development/Case-Study-
Yemen/
These factors have led some experts to conclude that Yemen as a state may be on the
verge of collapse.107
Ancient Kingdoms
Ancient Yemen was home to several kingdoms and city-states,
including those of the Sabaeans (Saba), Qatabans, Hadramis
(Hadramawt), Minaeans (Ma‘in), and Himyarites (Himyar).108
These
cultures, which coexisted and often competed for power, all depended
on trade to generate wealth. Among the most important commodities
were the aromatic resins of myrrh and frankincense, which there was
a nearly insatiable demand for in the ancient world. The trees that
produced these two resins grew almost exclusively in the highlands of
southern Arabia. The resins were greatly prized for their curative
powers and widely used in religious and funerary rites, most notably
as incense.109
In fact, ―[t]here was not a temple or wealthy home in
Babylon, Egypt, Greece, Jerusalem, or Rome [that] did not require these precious resins
to please their gods.‖110
The resins were shipped via camel caravans that traversed the
Arabian Desert.
The largest and most well-known of the early Yemeni kingdoms was that of the
Sabaeans. Archaeologists have approximated the emergence of Sabaean civilization to
the 10th–12th century B.C.E., although the Sabaeans peaked in power several centuries
later. Their most famous ruler was Bilqis, the Queen of Sheba, who is mentioned in the
Bible and in the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Sabaean culture was distinguished by its
architectural achievements, including large temples and monuments.111
It is best known
for the massive Marib Dam, which sources believe was constructed around 750 B.C.E.
and expanded at about 500 B.C.E.112
The dam was not only designed to store water but
also to divert it into a network of irrigation canals. According to some estimates, the
impressively engineered dam helped to irrigate some 10,000 ha (25,000 acres) of
107 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Policy. Johnsen, Gregory. ―The Well Runs Dry.‖
February 2009. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23061 108
―Pre-Islamic History [pp. 29–32].‖ Daum, Werner. In Insight Guide: Yemen, 2nd Ed. Hans Höfer, Ed.
1992. Singapore: APA Publications. 109
Institute for Traditional Medicine. Dharmananda, Subhuti. ―Myrrh and Frankincense.‖ May 2003.
http://www.itmonline.org/arts/myrrh.htm 110
The Muslim Empire and the Land of Gold. Phillips, Rodney J. ―Chapter 6: Trade with the Nations [p.
45].‖ 2008. New York: AEG Publishing Group. 111
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Saba.‖ 2010.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514881/Saba 112
The Hydraulics of Open Channel Flow: An Introduction, 2nd Ed. Chanson, Hubert. ―A Study of the
Marib Dam and Its Sluice System (BC 115 to AD 575) [pp. 533–534].‖ 2004. Oxford, UK: Elsevier
Butterworth-Heinemann.
cropland, enough to support tens of thousands of people.113
Local farmers cultivated
cereal grains such as wheat, barley, and sorghum.
Although irrigated agriculture enabled the population to
expand, trade was the primary source of Sabaean wealth.
Marib, the Sabaean capital, lay on the trail that connected
ports on the Arabian Sea with the desert caravan routes
that reached Mediterranean markets.114
Chinese silk,
African gold and ivory, Persian pearls, and Indian spices
and fabrics were carried via these camel caravans. At the
height of their power near the end of the fifth century
B.C.E., the Sabaeans ruled a federation of regional entities that constituted much of
southern Arabia.115
The Himyarites, a tribe within the Sabaean kingdom, gradually
overtook the Sabaeans and became independent about 115 B.C.E., consolidating control
over much of southern Arabia in the 3rd century C.E.116
They perpetuated Sabaean
culture, and improved and maintained the Marib Dam. Originating from the coast, the
Himyarites were sea traders, and their rise reflected the declining importance of overland
trade. They eventually moved their base to the highlands, where they wielded power until
the sixth century C.E.117
But in the first century C.E., the Romans, who had conquered Egypt, disrupted the south
Arabian economy by encroaching on Red Sea trade routes. By using maritime routes,
they effectively undercut Yemen‘s role as a transit point between Asia and the
Mediterranean. The Romans called south Arabia ―Arabia Felix,‖ or ―happy‖ or
―fortunate‖ Arabia, due to its prosperity and fertile terrain in the highlands.118
Yet the
prosperity of the south Arabian kingdoms was further threatened after the Roman
Emperor Constantine made Christianity the new state religion in 323 C.E. The limited
use of frankincense in Christian churches and a corresponding ban on traditional funerary
rights throughout the empire dealt a major blow to the region‘s economy. Meanwhile,
maritime commerce on the Red Sea sailed past Yemen. Economic insecurity contributed
to the decline of the south Arabian kingdoms, which were then left exposed to foreign
invasion and occupation. The Christian Aksum kingdom (Ethiopia) invaded in the fourth
and early sixth centuries C.E. The latter invasion, which occurred around 525 C.E., was
prompted by the massacre of local Christians by the last Jewish king of the Himyarite
113 Ancient South Arabia: From the Queen of Sheba to the Advent of Islam. Schippmann, Klaus. ―Chapter 2:
The People [p. 10].‖ 2001. Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner Publishers. 114
Nabataean Travel and Trade. ―South Arabia.‖ 2002. http://nabataea.net/sarabia.html 115
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: South Arabia in Pre-Islamic Times [p. 10].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et al.
1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 116
―Pre-Islamic History [pp. 33–34].‖ Daum, Werner. In Insight Guide: Yemen, 2nd Ed. Hans Höfer, Ed.
1992. Singapore: APA Publications. 117
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Himyar.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9040502 118
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia Felix.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9008151
dynasty.119
The Sassanids of Persia took control of the region in the late sixth century,
after the declining Himyarite kingdom requested their assistance to expel the
Aksumites.120
The Advent of Islam
The Islamic era began in the seventh century. The potent
spread of the Muslim faith from Mecca and Medina in
neighboring Al Hijaz (the Hejaz), now part of Saudi
Arabia, resulted in a rapid assimilation of Yemenis.121
This wholesale conversion has been connected, in part, to
the rupture of the Marib Dam in the sixth century, which
marked the end of Yemen‘s ancient trading kingdoms.
The Quran states that the dam broke because people had
not given sufficient thanks to Allah. A Yemeni tale attributes the breach to burrowing
rodents. Regardless, it forced an exodus of farmers who lost the means to sustain
themselves, amid a period of great economic insecurity.122
Entire tribes migrated north to
Syria. More than 20,000 Yemenis joined the armies of Islam, which succeeded in
creating an empire from Spain to India.123
As Yemen was absorbed into the Islamic world, it fell under the control of various
Muslim caliphs in the Arabian Peninsula. The Damascus-based Umayyad dynasty, which
ruled from the latter part of the seventh century, was followed by the Baghdad-based
Abbasid caliphs in the early eighth century. Indigenous dynasties then emerged. In the
late ninth century, the Zaydi imamate was established in the far north of Yemen and
became deeply rooted in towns and villages in the northern highlands. The imamate was
a theocracy that followed a branch of Shi‘a Islam.124
A Sunni Muslim dynasty founded by the Rasulids repeatedly skirmished with the Zaydis
in order to counter their spreading influence. The Rasulids are thought by some to have
been professional soldiers who broke from the Egyptian Ayyubid dynasty in 1229 to
119 Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: South Arabia in Pre-Islamic Times [pp. 10–12].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et
al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 120
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: The Pre-Islamic Period.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45271 121
College of Arts and Sciences, New Mexico State University. ―Ancient Yemen.‖ No date.
http://www.cs.nmsu.edu/~fmohamed/ancient-ye.html 122
Saudi Arabia World. ―A Dam at Madrib.‖ March/April 1978.
http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/197802/a.dam.at.marib.htm 123
Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―Chapter 3: History and Government [pp. 23–24].‖ 2007
Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books. 124
Shi‘a Muslims believe imams are descendents of the Prophet Muhammad and are therefore privy to the
thinking of Allah. Suite101.com. Gamso, Jonas. ―The Divisions of Islam.‖ 13 September 2007.
http://islamic-history.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_divisions_of_islam
establish their own sultanate.125
They took control of the coastal regions and the southern
uplands, where they reinforced the influence of the Shafi‘i school of Islam. Initially based
in Aden, the Rasulids controlled international trade through the Red Sea. This gave them
prestige in the Muslim world and in all states that traded in the region.126
Their capital,
later located at Ta‘izz, became well-known for its diverse artistic and intellectual
achievements, which were modeled on the Ayyubid ideal of a cultivated and learned
ruler.
Because of the mix of dynasties, three legal traditions co-
existed in Yemen—each of which developed its own
administrative bureaucracy. The northern Shari‘a courts
dispensed justice based on Zaydi jurisprudence while, in
the south, a class of Sunni sayyids (descendants of the
Prophet Muhammad) adhered to the Shafi‘i school of
Shari‘a law. In the hinterland, customary law (urf)
provided the framework by which tribal shaykhs
governed.127
This meant there was no agreement on a uniform code of justice or use of
force.
By the 15th century, the Rasulid dynasty was in decline. In the early 16th century,
Portuguese naval ships attempted to blockade the Red Sea trade routes but failed to take
the city of Aden. The Ottomans, in control of Egypt at the northern end of the Red Sea,
found it necessary to defend Yemen at the southern end against the Portuguese. The
Ottomans established their Yemeni base in the coastal town of Mocha (Al Mukha), from
which a thriving trade in coffee was conducted. Mocha replaced Aden as the area‘s chief
port. Ottoman authority was limited to cities, leaving the Zaydi imamate’s authority over
tribal areas undisturbed.128
The highlands, where myrrh and frankincense had been
cultivated, remained economically isolated from the world from the mid 17th century to
almost the mid 19th century.
The British wrested control of Aden from a local sultan in 1842.129
In the mid 19th
century, the Ottomans regained control of parts of northern Yemen. The Ottomans had
relied primarily on land to accumulate wealth, whereas British imperial wealth was
125 Ibn 'Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam. Kynsh,
Alexander D. ―Chapter 9: Ibn ‗Arabi in Yemen [pp. 227, 229].‖ 1999. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 126
Islamic Dynasties of the Arab East: State and Civilization During the Later Medieval Times. ―Chapter 4:
The Rasulids of Yemen (1229–1454) [p. 83].‖ 1996. New Delhi, India: MD Publications Pvt. Ltd. 127
The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. ―Chapter 3:
Taxation and Economic Fragmentation [p. 106].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 128
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―Background Note: Yemen.‖ November
1995. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/nea/yemen9511.html 129
Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia. Carapico, Sheila.
―Chapter 2: Twentieth-Century States and Economies [p. 23].‖ 1998. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
contingent on the control of shipping lanes.130
To this end, the British rebuilt the entire
seafront around Aden. They successfully warded off the Ottomans. Beginning in 1886,
Treaties of Protection were negotiated. This included an agreement between the British
and a local leader that placed nine tribes under British protection in which he pledged not
to alienate any of the territory to a rival foreign power without the crown‘s permission.
Subsequently the two imperial powers reached agreement to recognize each other‘s
territorial claims.131
Competing States
North Yemen
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Imam Yahya,
leader of the Zaydi community, took power in the north and
established a Zaydi government. The prominent northern tribal
confederations, the Hashid and the Bakil, supported the new
government. But the imams were unable to break the power of the
tribal shaykhs, and resorted to playing the tribes against each other to
maintain their power. Opposition to the imamate was centered in the
Shafi‘i community, where merchants chafed against the tax burden
imposed upon them and collected by Zaydi soldiers.
By the mid 1940s, opposition to Yahya‘s rule had widened to other
major elements of the population. Among them were Zaydis who
objected to the remote nature of the imperial government, which was staffed by officials
who seemed oblivious to Zaydi concerns. In 1948, Yahya was assassinated in a palace
coup, and opposition forces immediately seized power. His son Ahmad eventually
succeeded him and remained in power until his death in 1962. Imam Ahmad‘s reign was
marked by growing repression and renewed friction with the British over their presence
in the south. During this time, the imamate also faced increasing pressure, from both
domestic and regional sources, to support the Arab nationalist objectives of Egyptian
President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser represented a post-colonial alternative type of
leadership in the Arab world, bound together by language and religion, which proved
unsettling to traditional monarchical regimes in the region.132
From 1958 to 1961, North Yemen joined with Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab
States.133
Imam Ahmad‘s son Badr assumed power but his reign lasted only 1 week. He
130 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 27, No. 2. Khoury, Dina Rizk and
Dane Kennedy. ―Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and the British Raj in the Long Nineteenth
Century.‖ 2007. http://cssaame.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/27/2/233.pdf 131
A History of Modern Yemen. Dresch, Paul. ―Chapter 1: Turkey, Britain and Imam Yahya: The Years
Around 1990 [p. 10].‖ 2000. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 132
The Wilson Quarterly. Ottaway, David. ―The Arab Tomorrow.‖ Winter 2010.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=603733 133
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf
was removed via a military coup whereupon he fled to Saudi Arabia, which did not want
another Arab nationalist regime, particularly one on its border. Yet this is exactly what
the group of young officers that overthrew the imamate had in mind: a senior military
leader to serve as figurehead, just as General Mohammad Neguib had done for President
Nasser in Egypt.134
Colonel (later Marshal) Abdullah al-Sallal was selected to lead the
newly named Yemen Arab Republic (YAR); he became both the president and prime
minister.
Civil war ensued between remnant supporters of the imamate, who received material
support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and republicans, who were bolstered by Egyptian
troops—as many as 85,000, according to some estimates.135
The conflict was later
referred to as ―Nasser‘s Vietnam.‖136
Neither side exercised effective control over much
of the country. Both attempted to court the support of tribes by providing guns and
money. Egyptian troops withdrew in 1967 and, by 1968, following a siege of Sanaa by
supporters of the imamate, Sallal was deposed and most of the opposing forces had been
reconciled. A negotiated settlement followed in 1970. Yet the prolonged war left the
tribal shaykhs more firmly in control of their domains, and enhanced their role in national
politics.137
South Yemen
Aden was governed as part of British India until 1937, when it
became a crown colony; the surrounding territory was designated a
protectorate. By 1965, Aden and most of the tribal states within the
protectorate had merged to form the British-sponsored Federation of
South Arabia. Anti-colonial resistance, active since the 1940s,
resulted in several failed coups.138
Each failure further radicalized
those opposed to colonial rule. After the establishment of the
federation, two rival communist groups—the Marxist National
Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied
South Yemen (FLOSY)—fought for power. By August 1967, the
NLF was in control of most areas. The federation had formally
collapsed by summer‘s end. The last British troops were withdrawn on 29 November,
134 The Independent. Bidwell, Robin. ―Obituary: Abdullah Sallal.‖ 18 March 1994.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-abdullah-sallal-1429912.html 135
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Pelletiere, Stephen C. ―Yemen and Stability in the
Persian Gulf: Confronting the Threat from Within [p. 12].‖ 22 May 1996.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub194.pdf 136
Cold War Studies Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science. Wieland, Alexander
R. ―At Odds in ‗Arabia Infelix‘: Anglo-American Relations and the Yemeni Revolution, September 1962–
February 1963.‖ 2009. http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/workingPapers/wieland.pdf 137
Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influences. Gause, F. Gregory. ―Chapter 2:
Social Structure and the State in the Yemen Arab Republic [p. 22].‖ 1990. New York: Columbia University
Press. 138
The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. ―Chapter 3:
Taxation and Economic Fragmentation [p. 123].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
after a Labour Party-led government decided that the commitment was too expensive to
maintain. The next day, 30 November 1967, the People‘s Republic of Yemen, comprising
Aden and South Arabia, was established. In June 1969, a radical wing of the NLF gained
power. The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) became the only legal party and the country‘s
name changed to the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) on 1 December
1970.
Road to Reconciliation
By 1972, the respective governments of North and South Yemen were in open conflict,
and each side had outside backers. The YAR received aid from Saudi Arabia, while the
PDRY, the lone Marxist state in the region, received arms from the Soviet Union. The
Arab League brokered a cease-fire and both sides agreed to forge a united Yemen within
18 months, yet the union did not materialize. In both countries, large contingents of the
national armies occasionally dissolved when soldiers went on leave with their
weapons.139
In both countries, tribal loyalties to the leadership often proved fleeting, and the ensuing
years were plagued by continued unrest and conflict, which culminated in the
assassination of the YAR president in June 1978. A month later, Lieutenant Colonel Ali
Abdallah Saleh, head of the General People‘s Congress (GPC), was elected to replace
him by the Constituent People‘s Assembly. Fighting renewed in early 1979, but in March
the two heads of state signed an agreement in Kuwait reiterating their commitment to
unification. In May 1988, the governments of the YAR and PDRY agreed to withdraw
troops from their mutual border and establish a demilitarized zone to ease border
crossings. In May 1990, they settled on a draft unity constitution, which was approved by
referendum the next year.
Unified Yemen
The Republic of Yemen (RY) was officially established
on 22 May 1990. Despite the milestone, it was not
universally viewed as a turning point. Prior to unification,
South Yemen‘s government was disintegrating and on the
verge of losing its primary patron, the Soviet Union—
which was itself in the process of dismantling. South
Yemen‘s socialist government had not permitted private
enterprise, which had compelled huge numbers of
citizens to seek work abroad.140
The remittances from workers who had been sent to
Eastern Bloc countries had been critical to the economy, but were drying up.141
As a
139 Asia Times. Zunes, Stephen. ―Yemen Left with Little Wiggle Room.‖ 13 January 2010.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LA13Ak05.html 140
Eternal Yemen. ―History of Yemen.‖ No date. http://www.eternal-yemen.com/history.htm 141
Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform. Enders, Klaus, et al. ―Chapter II: External
Environment: Politics, Oil, and Debt.‖ 2002. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
scholar observed several years later, ―[I]n contrast with Germany, [the two Yemens‘]
marriage was more merger than takeover‖ between two quasi-functioning
governments.142
Saleh moved into the presidency; Ali Salim al Baydh, secretary general
of the Central Committee of the YSP, was named vice president; and PDRY President al
Attas was named prime minister. Al Attas led a transitional coalition Council of Ministers
whose membership was divided between the GPC and the YSP.
From late 1991 through early 1992, the newly unified country experienced unrest as a
result of deteriorating economic conditions. The situation was exacerbated by the return
of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States who
were deported after the new government supported Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of
Kuwait. Nevertheless, previously planned legislative elections were held in early 1993. In
August, Vice President al Baydh embarked on a self-imposed exile to Aden, alleging that
the south had been marginalized by the elections, which gave the YSP only 69 out of 301
parliamentary seats.143
Moreover, southerners were unable to secure their share of
government jobs due to the relocation of government departments to the north. Power-
sharing broke down and, by May 1994, the country had fallen into civil war. International
efforts to broker a cease-fire proved unsuccessful.
On 21 May 1994, al Baydh and other leaders of the
former South Yemen declared secession and the
establishment of a new Democratic Republic of Yemen,
with its capital at Aden. But the new republic was not
recognized internationally. The ensuing combat took
place mostly in the south, despite air and missile attacks
against northern targets.144
The civil war ended on 7 July
1994, when President Saleh‘s troops captured Aden. In
August, Saleh unveiled a reorganization program to preclude another secession
movement. Party membership was prohibited from then on for members of the armed
forces. This was intended to undercut the strength of the southern military units that were
still loyal to the YSP. Universal suffrage was also introduced. Saleh was reelected to
another presidential term in October. He named GPC members to key cabinet posts and
gave several ministerial posts to members of the Yemeni Islah Party (YIP), which had
supported him during the civil war.145
142 Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford. Ismail, Sharif. ―Unification in Yemen: Dynamics of
Political Integration, 1978–2000 [p. 12].‖ 2008. http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Ismail%20Thesis.pdf 143
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Zimmerman,
Katherine. ―Yemen‘s Southern Challenge: Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism.‖ 5 November
2009. http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background-rising-threat-
secessionism 144
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―Background Note: Yemen.‖ January 2010.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm 145
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf
It was only after the war that the government turned to urgent economic reforms that had
been postponed since unification. A large debt that the south owed to the former Soviet
Union, along with high deficits, required the government to cut spending. The price of
fuel doubled and the government withdrew food subsidies. Access to water and
electricity diminished. This prompted public demonstrations that the government failed to
address with a coordinated response. The YIP could not find common ground with the
GPC over reforms that had been mandated by the World Bank. In parliamentary elections
in April 1997, the GPC won 187 seats and the YIP only 53 seats.146
A new Council of
Ministers, comprised primarily of GPC members, was named in May. In September
1999, the country‘s first direct presidential election was held. Saleh was reelected to
another 5-year term by an overwhelming margin. Constitutional amendments adopted in
2000 extended his term by 2 years. Yet the security situation continued to deteriorate, and
there were several well-publicized abductions of foreign tourists by Islamic
fundamentalists.
In 2004, the Houthis, a Zaydi-led rebel group in the Sa‘ada governorate of northwest
Yemen, launched an insurgency against the Yemeni National Army. The sustained
conflict has involved several periods of fighting and occasional cease-fires.147
Although
the Houthis have lacked a coherent agenda, they claim to be defending Zaydi Islam from
the central government, which they perceive as ―too dependent on its northern neighbor,
Saudi Arabia, and its partner in the war on terrorism, the United States.‖148
Some tribal
leaders who are disinterested parties to the conflict have nonetheless thrown their support
behind the Houthis, as a means of reducing central government influence in their areas.149
146 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf 147
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, Jeremy M. ―CRS Report for
Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [pp. 1–17].‖ 13 January 2010.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf 148
Foreign Affairs. Hiltermann, Joost R. ―Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia‘s War inside Yemen.‖ 16
December 2009. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border 149
The Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 12. Overton, Shaun. ―Understanding the
Second Houthi Rebellion in Yemen.‖ 17 June 2005.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=508
Recent Developments
Saleh was reelected in September 2006, in an election considered fair
by outside observers.150
Yet he has filled important positions with
family members. For example, three nephews (by his late older
brother) serve as the deputy director for national security, head of the
central security forces and the counterterrorism unit, and head of the
Presidential Guard.151
His half-brother is head of the air force. He is
positioning his son Ahmed, currently the head of the elite Republican
Guard (modeled on that created in Iraq by the late Saddam Hussein),
to succeed him as president.152
His style of governance relies on the
age-old system of informal bargaining to balance competing interests.
In short, the provision of services and patronage jobs is used to exact
compliance and loyalty from local actors.153
As a journalist observed,
―The aim of a ruler in Saleh‘s position is less to accomplish great things than to rule for a
long time and then die peacefully in bed.‖154
Knowing that the squeaky wheel gets the grease, tribal leaders resort to such actions as
kidnapping visitors to wrest concessions from the government. Yet ―these appear to be
integral and accepted parts of Yemen‘s political equation rather than threats to it.‖155
In
one incident, a Chinese engineer was kidnapped by a beekeeping tribe that had been
raided by the police. The foreign national was abducted to bring attention to the fact that
the hives‘ owners had not been compensated for damages
done by the police.156
There are signs that the system is breaking. Parliamentary
elections scheduled for April 2009 were postponed after
the Joint Meeting Party (JMP), an alliance of opposition
parties and the only competitor to the GPC, threatened to
150 National Democratic Institute. ―Yemen.‖ No date. http://www.ndi.org/yemen
151 The New York Times. Erlanger, Steven. ―In Yemen, U.S. Faces Leader Who Puts Family First.‖ 4
January 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/world/middleeast/05saleh.html?hp 152
Al Bab. School of Oriental and African Studies. Daair, Omar. ―Authoritarian Rule in a Plural Society:
The Republic of Yemen.‖ MSc dissertation. September 2001. http://www.al-
bab.com/yemen/pol/daair1.htm#SALEH 153
The Majalla. Heydemann, Steven. ―Saleh‘s Tipping Point.‖ 11 December 2009.
http://www.majalla.com/en/geopolitics/article11920.ece 154
The Atlantic. Kaplan, Robert D. ―A Tale of Two Colonies.‖ April 2003.
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/kaplan 155
International Crisis Group. Middle East Report, No. 86. ―Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb [p.
7].‖ 27 May 2009.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/86_yemen___def
using_the_saada_time_bomb.pdf 156
Independent. Cockburn, Patrick. ―Threats to Yemen Prove US Has Not Learned from History.‖ 31
December 2009. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/threats-to-yemen-prove-us-has-not-learned-
from-history-1994696.html
boycott them—casting doubt on their legitimacy.157
The JMP perceived the rollback of
elections until 2011 as a victory that provides time to implement electoral reforms for
leveling the playing field.158
Yet discontent has moved far beyond the point where
campaign promises are enough to placate the population. Moreover, the government‘s
ability to buy off opponents is increasingly in question as Yemen runs out of oil, which
provides 70% of the budget. Oil revenues of USD 4.2 billion for January through October
of 2008 plummeted to USD 1.5 billion for the same period in 2009.159
Over half of all
Yemenis are farmers, yet water scarcity and soil nutrient depletion—due largely to the
extensive cultivation of qat—threaten their livelihood.160
In the former South Yemen,
which claims most of the country‘s oil, a secessionist group known as the ―southern
mobility movement‖ (al-harakat al-janubiyya) formed in 2007 to support demands from
southern military officers who complained of discriminatory pension differentials.161
Western governments, particularly the U.S., have watched this breakdown in
governmental authority with mounting concern, given the ability of terrorist groups to
operate in failed states and the known presence of Al Qaeda in Yemen. Other observers,
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have focused on the government‘s use
of lethal force to silence its critics in the north and the south. The government has made
its intentions clear by naming a 2009 campaign in the Houthi conflict (also known as the
Sa‘ada War) as ―Operation Scorched Earth.‖162
The conflict in Sa‘ada has also been
referred to as ―Yemen‘s Darfur‖ due to alleged government efforts to prevent food and
medical aid from reaching civilians.163
The Saleh government does not allow foreign
reporters into the area to investigate allegations. Saleh‘s inability to put down this
rebellion in the north has emboldened southern secessionists.164
In early 2010, yet another
157 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Reform Bulletin. Johnsen, Gregory. ―Yemen:
Electoral Game of Chicken.‖ February 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=downloadArticlePDF&article=22699 158
The Middle East Institute. Middle East Institute Viewpoints, No. 11. Phillips, Sarah. ―Politics in a
Vacuum: The Yemeni Opposition‘s Dilemma.‖ June 2009.
https://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Yemen.pdf 159
Real Clear World. Associated Press. Keath, Lee. ―US Takes Risk on Yemen President to Fight al-
Qaida.‖ 4 January 2010.
http://www.realclearworld.com/news/ap/international/2010/Jan/04/us_takes_risk_on_yemen_president_to_
fight_al_qaida.html 160
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 6. Fakir, Intissar.
―Yemen: Economic and Regional Challenges.‖ July 2008.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fakir2.pdf 161
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Zimmerman,
Katherine. ―Yemen‘s Southern Challenge: Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism.‖ 5 November
2009. http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background-rising-threat-
secessionism 162
The National. Johnsen, Gregory D. ―The Sixth War.‖ 12 November 2009.
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091112/REVIEW/711129992/1008/ART 163
Wordpress. Jane Novak‘s Yemen Articles. Novak, Jane. ―Aid Won‘t Fix the Crisis in Yemen.‖ 27 July
2009. http://janenovak.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/aid-wont-fix-crisis-in-yemen/ 164
Christian Science Monitor. Kasinof, Laura. ―Yemen Used Lethal Force to Quell Southern Secession
Protests, Says Report.‖ 15 December 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2009/1215/Yemen-used-lethal-force-to-quell-southern-secession-protests-says-report
cease-fire in the northern conflict led Saleh to declare the war over, despite the fact that
several previous truces had failed. Observers postulated that the truce was unlikely to
persist, due to the failure to resolve the problems underlying the conflict.165
While the southern movement cannot yet be characterized as an insurgency, unrest on
two fronts may force the regime to focus on survival at all costs rather than the ―war on
terror.‖ Some argue that Western aid should focus on economic development, because a
higher standard of living would stabilize the country more effectively than military
assistance that Saleh could use against his enemies.166
The U.S. intends to provide USD
63 million in development aid to Yemen in 2010, up from USD 40.3 million in 2009 and
USD 8.4 million in 2008.167
Yet the government of Yemen has had little means to absorb
and account for past aid, which typically fueled patronage networks and corruption. As
Francis Fukuyama, a well-known political economist, observed, ―The international
community knows how to supply government services [e.g., medicine], what it knows
much less well is how to create self-sustaining indigenous institutions [e.g., healthcare
clinics].‖ 168
165 The New York Times. Reuters. ―Yemen Declares End to War with Shi‘ite Rebels.‖ 19 March 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/03/19/world/international-us-yemen.html 166
International Affairs Review. McGee, Ron. ―Yemen: The U.S. Partnership‘s Flawed Approach.‖ 15
February 2010. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/137 167
IPS News. Fromm, Charles. ―Yemen: US Poised to Increase Aid.‖ 6 January 2010.
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49896 168
State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Fukuyama, Francis. ―Chapter 1: The
Missing Dimensions of Stateness [p. 42].‖ 2004. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Economy
Introduction
Yemen is the poorest nation in the Arab world, with unemployment
estimated at 35%.169
The country‘s population growth rate of 2.9%
(average 2005–2010) is one of the highest in the world.170
Job
creation is therefore an urgent priority because the population of 23.6
million is expected to double over the next two decades.171
Yemen
was historically a source of labor for surrounding countries, as well
as for Eastern Europe before the Soviet Union was disbanded. The
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 eliminated the need for migrant
laborers in Eastern Europe where socialism had created an artificial
labor shortage.172
South Yemeni nationals were forced to return to a
country that had become dependent on their remitted wages. This
contributed to economic insecurity in the south, which played a role in the reunification
of North and South Yemen in 1990. Soon, the newly unified government backed Iraq‘s
invasion of Kuwait, an unpopular move with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which
retaliated by expelling Yemeni workers.173
It is estimated that within a few months some
880,000 people were repatriated to Yemen.174
In most cases they had no land to return to
or much chance of replicating the standard of living that they had achieved abroad.
Official channels that would allow Yemenis to again seek work in those neighboring
countries have never been re-opened.175
Nor is there any prospect for Yemenis to work in
Europe legally.
Yemen is the first country with a democratically elected government on the Arabian
Peninsula. The longstanding Yemeni social contract, in which citizens legitimize the
government in exchange for a modest social safety net, has eroded under the weight of
169 Counterterrorism Blog. Winer, Jonathan. ―Testing a Dangerous Yemen.‖ 1 January 2010.
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2010/01/testing_a_dangerous_yemen.php 170
United Nations Population Fund. State of the World Population 2009: Facing a Changing World:
Women, Population and Climate. ―Demographic, Social and Economic Indicators [p. 90].‖ 2009.
http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2009/en/pdf/EN_SOWP09.pdf 171
Counterterrorism Blog. Winer, Jonathan. ―Testing a Dangerous Yemen.‖ 1 January 2010.
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2010/01/testing_a_dangerous_yemen.php 172
Citizens of the former socialist bloc countries were assigned jobs and received generous social welfare
benefits. Since it was difficult to place anyone in an undesirable manual labor job, migrants from poorer
socialist countries were brought in to fill those positions. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, citizens had to
take any job they could in the transition to capitalism. Migrants represented competition and were sent
home. 173
The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudry, Kiren Aziz. ―Chapter 7:
Beyond the Paradox of Autonomy [p. 302].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 174
Yemen into the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change. Mahdi, Kamil et al. ―Chapter 3: Political
and Economic Realities of Labor Migration in Yemen [p. 69].‖ 2007. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. 175
Guardian. Black, Ian. ―Yemen: Discontent and Poverty Simmer in West‘s New Frontier Against Al-
Qaida.‖ 24 January 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/24/yemen-al-qaida-terror-threat
population growth and declining oil revenues.176
During the first 10 months of 2009, oil
revenues garnered USD 1.5 billion, down nearly two-thirds from the USD 4.2 billion
earned over the same period during 2008.177
The capital-intensive nature of the oil
industry does not translate into job creation commensurate with growth of per capita
GDP.178
In other words, although oil production brings wealth to the country, the
revenues are not equitably distributed as either government services or income from
industry-related jobs. Moreover, Yemen‘s oil is predicted to run out by 2017, and the
government has few sustainable post-oil options to create growth.179
Having operated as a
rentier state, in which the revenues that fill state coffers overwhelmingly originate
abroad, the government is now hard-pressed to create a domestic economy from which it
can generate tax revenues.180
Hydrocarbons
Oil
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in Yemen in
1984.181
The oil is situated in what was formerly South
Yemen, while the government that collects the revenues
has its capital in Sanaa, in what was North Yemen.182
In
contrast to much of the rest of the oil-producing Middle
East, petroleum extraction in Yemen is heavily reliant on
foreign firms.183
Oil reserves have been divided into 97
onshore and offshore exploration and production blocks,
176 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Nakhleh, Emile. ―Testimony on Yemen and Al-Qa‘ida:
Turmoil in Yemen: How Understanding the Challenges Can Help Us Undermine al-Qa‘ida and the Radical
Paradigm [p. 3].‖ 20 January 2010.
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/NakhlehTestimony100120a.pdf 177
Real Clear World. Associated Press. Keath, Lee. ―US Takes Risk on Yemen President to Fight al-
Qaida.‖ 4 January 2010.
http://www.realclearworld.com/news/ap/international/2010/Jan/04/us_takes_risk_on_yemen_president_to_
fight_al_qaida.html 178
Global Security. Pike, John. ―Oil.‖ 3 January 2010.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/oil.htm 179
Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Boucek, Christopher. ―Yemen:
Avoiding a Downward Spiral [p. 5].‖ September 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf 180
Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization, 2nd Ed.. Lane, Jan-Erik and Hamadi Redissi.
―Chapter 9: The Modernization of Arabia. [p. 139].‖ 2009. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing. 181
Adelphi Energy Limited. ―The Republic of Yemen and its Oil and Gas Industry [p. 4].‖ July 2005.
http://www.adelphienergy.com.au/projects/documents/Yemen%20Country%20Summary%20July%202005
.pdf 182
Global Research. Engdahl, F. William. ―The Yemen Hidden Agenda: Behind the Al-Qaeda Scenarios, A
Strategic Oil Transit Chokepoint.‖ January 2010.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=16786&context=va 183
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen [p. 10].‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf
only 12 of which actually produce oil.184
After security issues compelled several major
international oil companies to withdraw in the mid- to late-1990s, the government
identified smaller, independent oil companies as potential partners for Production Sharing
Agreements (PSA). A number of state-owned companies are also involved, but all
companies report to the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources (MOMR). It is
responsible for initiating contracts with foreign oil companies, although parliamentary
approval is still required.185
Oil production in Yemen dropped to 300,000 barrels per day
(bpd) in 2008 after peaking at 457,000 bpd in 2002. Analysts anticipate that Yemen will
become a net oil importer by 2011.186
This does not bode well for the future given the
country‘s heavy dependence on oil, which accounts for approximately 70–75% of
revenues and 90% of export earnings.187
Natural Gas
Yemen has approximately 479 billion cubic m (16.9
trillion cubic ft) of proven natural gas reserves.188
Yemen‘s late entry into the natural gas industry enabled
the country to bypass the earlier pipeline dependent stage,
in which gas could not be easily redirected outside of
established pathways to new markets. This was the case
in landlocked Central Asia, where the expensive and
time-intensive construction of new pipelines was required
to increase export options and volume. Now, newer technologies make it possible for
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to be shipped by truck or ship to any end market, making
pipelines less important. In July 2005, after significant delays, the Yemeni government
approved contracts to supply LNG in partnership with Total Oil (a French company),
Hunt Oil, and various South Korean firms. In November 2009, Yemen joined the ranks of
LNG exporters. Yet the global recession has reduced demand for energy, resulting in
declining prices.189
Moreover, there is a high opportunity cost to international sales.190
Yemen‘s natural gas
could alternately be used to augment domestic electrical generation and distribution
184 Middle East Program, Carnegie International Endowment of Peace. Boucek, Christopher. ―Yemen:
Avoiding a Downward Spiral [p. 4].‖ September 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf 185
Oil and Gas Directory Middle East. ―Republic of Yemen: Research Profile.‖ 2009.
http://www.oilandgasdirectory.com/2009/research/Yemen.pdf 186
Reuters. Fuchs, Martina. ―Analysis—Gas Probably Not Enough to Buoy Yemen.‖ 24 August 2009.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLL63161320090824 187
Energy Bulletin. ASPO-USA. Andrews, Steve. ―Yemen‘s Oil-Deadly Decline Rate.‖ 18 January 2010.
http://www.energybulletin.net/node/51227 188
U.S. Energy Information Administration. ―Country Analysis Briefs: Yemen: Natural Gas.‖ March 2010.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Yemen/NaturalGas.html 189
Stratfor Global Intelligence. ―The LNG Trade: A Surge of Supply with Few Buyers.‖ 30 March 2009.
http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/134594/analysis/20090328_lng_trade_surge_supply_few_buyers 190
When economists use the term ―opportunity cost,‖ they are referring to the value of the activity which a
resource is not spend on. If, for example, you decide to spend an afternoon and your remaining disposable
capacity, to better meet internal needs. Less than one third of Yemeni households have
access to electricity from the national grid. Desalinization of water, which has been
proposed as a means to increase the country‘s dwindling water supply, would require
substantial electricity. With the government selling 90% of the country‘s energy reserves
(under conditions that are not fully transparent), energy will have to be imported to meet
rising domestic demand. As an American blogger who writes on Yemeni affairs
observed, ―Twenty years of oil production in Yemen have done little to raise the standard
of living for the Yemeni people. The coming 20 years of gas production may do little
more.‖191
Agriculture
Yemen was historically self-sufficient in food production.
Terrace cultivation has been employed for 3,000 years,
enabling farmers to catch rainwater on slopes and to
control soil fertility.192
During the 1960s, cheap grain
began to flood the country, making food crop cultivation
unprofitable while, simultaneously, jobs in oil-rich
neighboring countries attracted labor migrants. Many
terraced slopes fell into disrepair and suffered soil
erosion. Despite this, today over half the population remains engaged in agriculture and
animal husbandry.193
The low profits and wages generated through farming, coupled with
population growth, contribute to underemployment and poverty. Much of the country‘s
limited fertile land has been planted with cash crops, which are more lucrative than
subsistence food crops. The major cash crop is qat (Catha edulis), a shrub whose leaves
are chewed as a mild stimulant. It requires much less labor than coffee, another important
cash crop, but it is water-intensive and thus heavily reliant on irrigation. Motorized
pumps were introduced in the 1970s, enabling farmers to extract water from underground
aquifers much faster than it could be naturally replenished. Although the pumps were
outlawed in 2002, they remain in use.194
Most Yemeni men and many women chew qat on a daily basis, often in the afternoon in a
communal setting. It is grown at elevations above 1,000 m (3,281 ft). Harvested leaves
have a shelf-life of only 24 to 48 hours and therefore must be marketed quickly, in a
country not otherwise known for efficient distribution. As an agronomist observed, ―the
income to go to the movies, you cannot spend that money to go to a restaurant for a meal or allocate the
time to read a book. The Concise History of Economics. Henderson, David. ―Opportunity Cost.‖ 2008.
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OpportunityCost.html 191
Wordpress.com. Jane Novak‘s Yemen Articles. Novak, Jane. ―Yemen‘s Natural Gas: Who Benefits?‖ 7
August 2006. http://janenovak.wordpress.com/2006/08/07/yemens-natural-gas-who-benefits/ 192
Soil and Water Conservation Society. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, Vol. 42, No. 1. Vogel,
Horst. ―Terrace Farming in Yemen.‖ 1987. http://www.jswconline.org/content/42/1/18.extract 193
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Republic of Yemen. ―Sector Background Info.‖ No
date. http://www.mpic-yemen.org/new1/strategies.asp?contantmain=6&key=17&stratigy=67 194
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Thirsty Plant Dries Out Yemen.‖ 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html
transportation and distribution of qat around Yemen…might well rival in efficacy the
ancient frankincense trade routes on which the Yemeni kingdoms thrived in past
times.‖195
Yemenis purchase their leaves at the local market around midday. The
afternoon qat chew ritual has the effect of ending the work day.
Qat consumption not only disrupts work and carries adverse health affects such as oral
cancer, qat production has serious environmental implications for the country. It accounts
for approximately 40% of the country‘s annual water use while water supplies are rapidly
diminishing.196
Yet cultivation and distribution of qat employ approximately 14% of the
population. Banning the use of qat would have serious economic implications in a
country where jobs are already scarce.197
In fact, the government indirectly subsidizes the
cultivation of qat through low-cost diesel fuel used to extract water and provide daily
marketing transportation.198
Finally, Yemenis, including government officials, generally
do not consider qat to be a harmful drug.199
It is illegal in the U.S., where it is a
controlled substance.200
The expanded cultivation of qat at the expense of food crops has contributed to severe
food insecurity in Yemen. Drought and conflict are also responsible for food shortages.
Although much of the Yemeni population works in agriculture, the majority of Yemen‘s
food supply is imported, due to insufficient domestic food production and the availability
of grain which has been subsidized through farm supports by industrialized countries on
the international market. In 2008, 95% of cereals and 85% of other food stuffs were
imported.201
Even most rural households are net food buyers rather than sellers. High
prices for food imports often prevent poor families from purchasing other necessary
supplies since they have little cash income.202
Manufacturing
Aside from oil refining, almost all manufacturing businesses in
Yemen are small-scale operations with one to four employees. They
195 College of Agriculture, University of Arizona. Development. Milich, Leonard and Mohammed Al-
Sabbry. ―The ‗Rational Peasant‘ vs. Sustainable Livelihoods: The Case of Qat in Yemen.‖ 1995.
http://ag.arizona.edu/~lmilich/yemen.html 196
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Unprecedented Water
Rationing in Cities.‖ 16 August 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85734 197
Financial Times. Fielding-Smith, Abigail. ―Yemen Economy Hooked on Qat.‖ 20 January 2010.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff20aeee-05e3-11df-8c97-00144feabdc0.html 198
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Thirsty Plant Dries Out Yemen.‖ 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html 199
Yemen Observer. Ghanem, Suzan, and Jowhara Zindani, Zinadine Zindani. ―Qat: The Plague of
Yemen.‖ 26 February 2008. http://www.yobserver.com/sports-health-and-lifestyle/10013815.html 200
National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice. ―Khat Fast Facts: Questions and
Answers.‖ No date. http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs5/5116/5116p.pdf 201
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Food Insecure Face Double
Whammy.‖ 2 February 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82687 202
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: ‗The Most Food-Insecure
Country in the Middle East.‘‖ 17 February 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82966
mostly produce goods for the domestic market.203
Construction materials, daily use
consumer goods, and processed food and beverages are among their primary products.
While Yemen has a tradition of entrepreneurship dating back millennia, there are
currently significant obstacles to expanding private business. Transportation
infrastructure is poor and many economic inputs are under monopoly control by
politically connected groups. These conditions make it difficult to turn a profit.
Moreover, banks typically do not extend loans to the politically unconnected.204
Yemen
lacks an informal money lending market, such as those in other Muslim countries despite
the Islamic prohibition on charging interest. In an effort to promote manufacturing, in
2004 the government announced the establishment of three industrial zones in Aden, Al
Hudaydah (Hodeida), and Al Mukalla, respectively. Since that time, little development
has transpired and many Yemeni businessmen remain wary of the perceived heavy hand
of the government. The zones still lack significant investment in the basic services
required, including power, to become functional sites for business.205
Taxation
There is no standardized system of personal income tax
collection in Yemen. Implementing such a system would
require not only detailed information about household
wealth, but the political will to determine who should pay
what portion of their income. Because most Yemenis
work in the informal, cash economy, it would be difficult
for tax collectors to know how much people are earning.
Instead, governments in Yemen have historically relied
on taxing trade and, more recently, hydrocarbon revenues and customs duties on
remittance-funded imports. These revenue sources have proved sufficient during boom
times, but do not fund public services—such as administration and law enforcement—
when revenues fall. The government is not able to plan on future income streams, given
price volatility in the international energy market and the fact that other governments can
expel Yemeni workers at a moment‘s notice. This has inevitably led to balance of
payment problems, because of the country‘s reliance on fluctuating oil revenues and
remittances for foreign exchange. Both are needed to cover the steadily escalating costs
of imported food for a growing population. These conditions have contributed to
Yemen‘s plight as a ―failed state‖ that is unable to provide basic public services and
security for its citizens.
Banking
203 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf 204
Yemen Post. ―Yemen Banks Unwilling to Credit Small and Medium Enterprises, IFC Study Finds.‖ 21
November 2009. http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1609 205
Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―2009 Investment Climate
Statement—Yemen.‖ February 2009. http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2009/117168.htm
Few Yemenis have access to formal banking services.
Cash is therefore the medium of commercial exchange.
The country has 15 commercial banks, the majority of
which are fully or partially government-owned. Some of
the others operate as Islamic banks, a separate
classification of banks that do not charge interest.
Privately owned banks overwhelmingly make loans on
the basis of the political connections of the borrower
rather than on a business plan.206
All banks are saddled
with large numbers of non-performing loans which impedes the flow of credit. Yemeni
banks are developing their own ATM networks that will not recognize each other‘s cards.
The ATM system is extremely limited in coverage. In addition to banks, there are more
than 300 licensed exchange houses in Yemen. They handle remittances from abroad as
well as domestic money transfers. Their services, which are well established throughout
the Muslim world, are cheaper and preferred by Yemenis needing to transfer money.
Foreign Investment
Until 1995, foreign investment in Yemen was minimal. It
was even negative in some years when more funds left
the country than entered it. The hydrocarbon sector
accounts for the majority of foreign investment, in the
form of PSA. Efforts have been made to expand
investment into other sectors (such as tourism), which
have elicited interest mainly from Gulf State investors. In
2002, Yemen‘s investment law was revised to accord
equal treatment to foreign and Yemeni firms. Yet because connections are more
important than legal rights for those seeking to do business, the revision means less in
practice than on paper. Corruption has been identified as a major impediment to
profitability.207
Yemen must address additional problems in order to attract investment outside the
hydrocarbon sector. Pressing issues include poor security, erratic energy supplies,
tolerated non-compliance of law enforcement, and an impoverished, low-skilled
citizenry. The last factor is particularly significant. Since Yemenis are poor, it is unlikely
that an investor would want to produce goods for the domestic market because few
people could afford them. At the same time, owing to the population‘s lack of skills,
206 CGAP. Lyman, Timothy R., Thierry Mahieux, and Xavier Reille. ―Report of CGAP Multi-Donor
Mission: Microfinance in Yemen [p. 4].‖ June 2005. http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.2831/diagnostic_Yemen.pdf 207
Economic Growth in the Republic of Yemen: Sources, Constraints, and Potentials. ―Chapter 3:
Developing the Private Sector and Improving Governance [p. 59].‖ 2002: Washington, DC: World Bank.
foreign investors are not likely to view Yemen as an attractive place to assemble goods
bound for markets in North America and Western Europe.208
Tourism
The Yemeni government has promoted tourism as an
industry that could reduce its reliance on oil revenues.
Yemen possesses numerous sites of historic, religious,
and cultural interest. The old city in Sanaa, for example,
is a UNESCO World Heritage site. Aden, a centuries-old
port city, could also attract visitors.209
Yet the
development of a thriving tourism industry is unlikely in
light of security issues, including recent high-profile
kidnappings and murders of foreign nationals by Al Qaeda.210
Tribal groups also
routinely kidnap visitors in order to draw government attention to their needs and
demands. The victims of these kidnappings are typically released unharmed after the
government has addressed the tribe‘s concerns, but this is not always the case. Safety
concerns stemming from the separatist activity in the south deter the use of the scenic
Sanaa-Aden road via the mountainous city of Ta‘izz. The northern city of Sa‘ada, also
famous for its old city, has been affected by sustained conflict between government
forces and Houthi rebels over the last several years. Hadramawt, in the southeast, is home
to the 16th-century towers of Shibam, the oldest high-rise structures in the world. (The
town is sometimes referred to as the ―Manhattan of the desert.‖) Yet Hadramawt is also
plagued by security issues. Other attractions include Sabaean ruins near Marib, on the
eastern escarpment. On a trip to the ruins with an armed escort of Yemeni soldiers, the
journalist Robert Kaplan noted that the site ―should be overrun by tourists,‖ yet ―even the
souvenir stand [t]here, built before a wave of kidnappings of Westerners, and before the
region‘s infiltration by al Qaeda, is just another ruin.‖211
Overall, the lack of security has
hurt private businesses looking to provide goods and services to foreign visitors.212
208 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, UN. ―Foreign Direct Investment Report.‖ August
2008. http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/edgd-08-tech1-e.pdf 209
Business Intelligence Middle East. ―NONAV-Yemen-Travel and Leisure Hospitality Report.‖ 21
December 2004. http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=158&t=1 210
AlertNet. Reuters. Laessing, Ulf. ―Tourism Slump Compounds Yemen‘s Economic Problems.‖ 4
February 2010. http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LAE434968.htm 211
The Atlantic. Kaplan, Robert D. ―A Tale of Two Colonies.‖ April 2003.
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/kaplan 212
The New York Times. Friedman, Thomas L. ―Postcard from Yemen.‖ 6 February 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/opinion/07friedman.html
Society
Introduction
Yemeni tribes have long regarded territory and lineage as
distinct markers of identity and solidarity. Today, tribal
affiliation remains strong in the northern highlands and
adjacent eastern mountain slopes. Tribal identity is
weaker in the south, where the British—and later, the
socialist government of the People‘s Democratic
Republic of Yemen—undermined tribal structures.213
Since unification in 1990, the administrative apparatus of
the central Yemeni government has remained limited in coverage and capacity. In many
areas of Yemen, tribes operate independently of the central government, whose
effectiveness is mostly confined to the Sanaa region.214
Tribal areas of Yemen are not
ungoverned or lawless places, however, because tribal governance and customary law
(urf) organize the society—often rigidly.215
For example, tribes have traditional
approaches to managing resources, and to preventing, mediating, and resolving
conflict.216
Some tribes acknowledge the central government, while others oppose its authority.
Many tribal leaders are recognized and supported by the government through formal and
informal channels. Their cooperation with the government is secured through a patronage
network, in which the government distributes resources (e.g., oil revenues, jobs, political
appointments).217
This network has been integral to the stability of the central
government, which is still led by Ali Abdallah Saleh, president of the Republic of Yemen
since unification. The patronage system has weakened local tribal leaders‘ roles in
maintaining order and equity. Shaykhul power is now directed at securing outside
resources for the tribe. Thus the incorporation of shaykhs into the central government has
changed the relationship between tribal leaders and ordinary villagers.218
213 The World Bank. ―Republic of Yemen: Country Social Analysis [p. 13].‖ 11 January 2006.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Yemen_CSA.pdf 214
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen [p. 19].‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf 215
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yemen on the Brink: A Carnegie Paper Series. Middle
East Program, No. 107. Phillips, Sarah. ―What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-
Building [p. 3].‖ March 2010. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes.pdf 216
Council on Foreign Relations. Patrick, Stewart M. ―Are ‗Ungoverned Spaces‘ a Threat?‖ 11 January
2010. http://www.cfr.org/publication/21165/are_ungoverned_spaces_a_threat.html 217
Center for Global Development. Egel, Daniel. ―Tribal Diversity, Political Patronage and the Yemeni
Decentralization Experiment [pp. 7–8].‖ 12 January 2010. http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/Post-
Doc%20Seminars/Daniel_Egel.pdf 218
The World Bank. ―Republic of Yemen: Country Social Analysis [p. 38].‖ 11 January 2006.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Yemen_CSA.pdf
Ethnic Groups and Languages
The Yemeni population is predominantly Arab. Many residents of
coastal communities, especially along the Tihamah (Red Sea coast),
are Afro-Arab, a heritage that reflects the region‘s proximity to
Africa. Yemen‘s legacy of foreign trade and foreign occupation is
reflected in the presence of small communities of Europeans and
Indians.219
They are concentrated in urban areas, especially Aden,
where the British colonial presence was strong. Yemen is also home
to a large population of Somali refugees, who commonly undertake
the dangerous journey across the Gulf of Aden to escape the conflict
in their country.220
Yemen‘s residents of African ancestry, called
Akhdam (poor, low-class ―servants‖ and sanitary workers)221
or abid
(the descendents of slaves), face discrimination and persecution.222
Arabic is the official language of Yemen and the first language of most Yemeni citizens.
There are several regional dialects, including Sanaani (northern and central highlands),
Hadrami (Hadramawt), and Ta‘izzi-Adeni (southern highlands and southeastern coast).223
Two small ethnic groups speak other languages. The Mahra live in the eastern
governorate of Al Mahrah, which borders Oman. They speak Mahri (Mehri), an ancient
South Arabian language. Socotrans, the residents of the island of Socotra, speak Socotri
(Soqotri), another South Arabian tongue. Members of both of these ethnic groups are said
to also speak Arabic,224
although some reports indicate that many Socotrans speak only
Socotri.225
Religion
Almost all Yemenis are Muslims belonging to either the Zaydi order of Shi‘a Islam or the
Shafi‘i school of Sunni Islam. Zaydis, who comprise an estimated 45% of the population,
are concentrated in the northern and central highlands. The Zaydi imamate, or theocratic
state led by an imam, ruled portions of the highlands from the late ninth century until
1962. Because of its rationalist and relatively orthodox nature (relative to other Shi‘ite
219 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf 220
Yemen Times. Jubran, Walid. ―The Crisis of Somali Fugitives to Yemen.‖ 12 August 2009.
http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=918&p=report&a=2 221
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Languishing at the Bottom of Yemen‘s Ladder.‖ 27 February
2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/world/middleeast/27yemen.html 222
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Social Class and Tribe [pp. 123–124].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 223
Ethnologue.com. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th Ed. M. Paul Lewis, Ed. ―Languages of
Yemen.‖ 2009. Dallas: SIL International. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=YE 224
The World Bank. ―Republic of Yemen: Country Social Analysis [p. 13].‖ 11 January 2006.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Yemen_CSA.pdf 225
Ethnologue.com. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th Ed. M. Paul Lewis, Ed. ―Soqotri.‖ 2009.
Dallas: SIL International. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=sqt
sects), the Zaydi order has been called the ―fifth school‖ of Sunni Islam.226
Shafi‘is, who
comprise 55% of the population, are predominant in the Tihamah, the southern highlands
(from Ta‘izz to the southern coast), and central and eastern Yemen.227
Unlike the Zaydis,
who reject any mystical or folk interpretation of Islam, Shafi‘is tolerate Sufism, a
mystical practice of Islam. Overall, the differences between Zaydi and Shafi‘i doctrine
are minor, particularly in comparison to the broader Shi‘a–Sunni relationship, which
causes conflict in many areas of the Muslim world.228
Islam shapes not only the daily lives of Yemenis but also
the country‘s social organization, politics, and
government. It is the state religion of Yemen, and
Shari‘a, or Islamic law, is the basis of the country‘s legal
system. Although these references to religion are decreed
by Yemen‘s constitution, it neither restricts nor protects
religious freedom. Citizens and foreign nationals are free
to practice a religion other than Islam, but it is illegal for
Muslims to convert to another religion and illegal for others to attempt to convert them.
Conversion of some from Zaydi to Shafi‘i Islam has created tension in the north, though
it is not illegal.229
Regardless of sect, Yemeni law requires all elected government
officials to be Muslim.
Gender Issues
Men are associated with public spaces, while women are associated
with private spaces in Yemen. Moreover, roles within the family
correspond with traditional views and practices that enforce the
distinct responsibilities and separation of the sexes. This has the
effect of marginalizing female participation in society, where males
claim decision-making authority inside and outside the home.230
As
the heads of household, men are expected to be strong-willed family
providers and protectors. They make the important decisions for the
family and represent its interests within the community. Men are
responsible for protecting their children and female relatives, who by
tradition are seen as weak and vulnerable. Men are the
226 Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: Islam: The Zaydis [p. 25].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et al. 1986.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 227
The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Wenner, Manfred W.
―Chapter 2: People and Culture [p. 29].‖ 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 228
Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen. Dresch, Paul. ―Chapter 1: Introductory: A Sketch of
Physical and Conceptual Geography [p. 11].‖ 1993. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 229
Middle East Report, No. 204. Weir, Shelagh. ―A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen.‖
July-September 1997. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer204/weir.htm 230
―Strategies and Approaches to Enhance the Role of Men and Boys in Working for Gender Equality: A
Case Study from Yemen.‖ Elsanousi, Magda Mohammed. In Gender Equality and Men: Learning from
Practice. Sandy Ruxton, Ed. 2004. London: Oxfam.
disciplinarians, ensuring family adherence to social codes, which focus on clear gender
roles and segregation of the sexes. Women are expected to be good Muslims, and good
mothers, preferably of sons. They are expected to be chaste and modest.231
The practice of purdah, or female seclusion, is one means by which women maintain
their modesty. When in public, most women wear abundant, concealing clothing,
including expansive cloaks, shawls, hoods, and/or veils.232
Women‘s participation in the
public workforce is limited, because strict adherence to purdah prevents many females
from receiving an education or pursuing a career outside the home. In 2009, Yemeni
women comprised only 23% of the official workforce, leaving most women to work in
unpaid jobs, either in the home or elsewhere in the informal sector.233
Girls are reared to
accept male authority, and gender stereotypes are reinforced outside the home. At the
most basic level, women who fail to comply with the social code—for example, by not
wearing the appropriate clothing in public—may face verbal harassment from men.
Domestic abuse is considered a private family affair, and thus mostly goes
undocumented. The stigma of shame cloaks this practice.234
Women may also view
domestic violence as acceptable due to social conditioning and lack of education.
Sons are highly valued because they carry on the family name, inherit
its assets, and accommodate their elderly parents. Daughters are
viewed as an economic burden so they are often married off to other
families early in life. This is a means for parents to reduce the
number of mouths they must feed.235
Over half of Yemeni brides are
under the age of 18.236
The presumption that conjugal relations will
wait until the bride has reached puberty—around age 15—is
routinely ignored.237
A bill that would have set a higher minimum age
for marriage was debated in parliament in February 2009. Passage
was blocked by those who cited social precedent and Islamic law,
which sanctions marriage for girls as young as 9. Marriage often
231 ―Islam, Custom and Revolution in Aden: Reconsidering the Background to the Changes of the Early
1990s [pp. 340–342].‖ Dahlgren, Susanne. In Yemen into the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and
Change. Mahdi, Kamil A., and Anna Würth, Helen Lackner, Eds. 2007. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. 232
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Gender Roles [pp. 125–127].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office. 233
Yemen Post. Al-Omari, Moneer. ―Most Yemeni Women Work in Unpaid Jobs; Women‘s
Unemployment on Rise.‖ 5 July 2009.
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=100&SubID=1006&MainCat=5 234
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. 2009 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices. ―2009 Human Rights Report: Yemen.‖ 11 March 2010.
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm 235
Child Rights Information Network. AlertNet. ―Yemen: Early Marriage a Challenge to Development.‖ 26
March 2006. http://www.crin.org/violence/search/closeup.asp?infoID=7834 236
The Washington Times. Murdock, Heather. ―Yemen Still Wedded to Child Marriages.‖ 24 December
2009. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/dec/24/yemen-still-wedded-to-child-marriages/ 237
BBC News. Sekkai, Rachid. ―Yemeni Child Bride Gets Annulment.‖ 16 April 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7351336.stm
renders girls ineligible to attend school since they must take on the duties of a wife, and
presumably possess sexual knowledge that could corrupt their female classmates.
Because a mother‘s education level is inversely proportional to family size, it is difficult
to reduce Yemen‘s birth rate of 6.5 children per woman—among the highest in the
world.238
The value of education for girls, whose lives will likely be relegated to the
home, is seen as minimal by many Yemenis.239
As a result, the literacy rate for Yemeni
females (39%) is significantly lower than that of men (76%).240
Women‘s prisons in Yemen are reportedly full of inmates who have violated social
conventions rather than committed crimes. For example, if an unmarried couple has had
pre-marital sex, the girl‘s parents will most likely not accept a marriage proposal. Instead,
they will press rape charges against the man despite the fact their daughter will face legal
consequences for being alone with him. Women can be charged with ―fornication‖ or
prostitution, even if they were raped.241
The family must take these actions to preclude
the implication that they condoned pre-marital sex. This implication would place a stigma
on the whole family, in keeping with the tradition of shared familial honor.242
An inmate
who has served her sentence can nonetheless only be released to a male family member
who has agreed to take her back into the family—in accordance with a law that, in theory,
was overturned in 2006.243
Alternately, she can be married off to a man who has bribed
prison administrators.244
Without a home, and lacking job skills, women who have served
prison time confront a bleak future. These circumstances may force them into
prostitution, making it likely that they will end up back in prison.
238 Yemen Observer. Almasmari, Hakim. ―Yemen‘s Fertility Rate Remains One of the Highest.‖ 26 June
2007. http://www.yobserver.com/reports/10012478.html 239
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Female Education Remains
Key Challenge.‖ 6 September 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74159 240
World Economic Forum. Global Gender Gap Report 2009. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ 27 October
2009. http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap2009/Yemen.pdf 241
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. 2009 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices. ―2009 Human Rights Report: Yemen.‖ 11 March 2010.
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm 242
The Women‘s International Perspective. Sohlman, Eva. ―Yemen‘s Women Behind Bars for Love or
Rape.‖ 15 November 2007.
http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2007/11/yemens_women_behind_bars_for_l.html 243
Oxfam Great Britain. ―Yemen: Advocacy on Violence Against Women.‖ June 2008.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/FP2P/FP2P_Yemen_%20adv_on_viol_ag_women_CS_EN
GLISH.pdf 244
RefWorld, UNHCR. ―Women‘s Rights in North Africa and the Middle East-Yemen.‖ 14 October 2005.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,FREEHOU,,YEM,47387b712f,0.html
Qat Chews
Yemeni social life includes communal qat chews. The
use of qat, a mild stimulant, was introduced in the 14th or
15th century by Sufi Muslims,245
who chewed the leaves
during prayer and meditation.246
Today the use is
widespread and habitual. Daily afternoon qat chews
provide an opportunity for friends, acquaintances, or even
strangers to socialize and discuss a wide range of issues,
including business and politics.247
Participants may settle
disputes, or exchange lore and poetry. Like most social events, qat chews are segregated
by sex. For men, these gatherings are known as maqil.248
For women, who consume the
drug less often, qat chewing may be a part of afternoon, female social gatherings known
as tafrita.249
Participants bring their own qat and congregate in private homes, which
usually have a mafraj, a special room for such gatherings. Seating is not random; it
corresponds to social status among the persons attending. The stimulant reportedly has
the effect of relaxing social inhibitions. The qat equalizes the participants, who are then
freer to express their opinions.250
The drug suppresses the appetite but provokes thirst.
Drinking water or soda is therefore common. Smoking also frequently accompanies qat
chewing. Beginning after lunch in the early afternoon, these gatherings typically last until
early evening.251
Although qat use has a long history in Yemen, widespread and heavy daily consumption
of the plant has been identified as a serious medical and social problem. Short-term side
effects include sleeplessness and loss of appetite; heavy long-term use has been tied to
kidney and liver disease. Yemenis, even government officials, do not consider the plant
to be a drug. The chewing of qat can be an everyday habit that absorbs much of a
Yemeni‘s time and income. In a country with high poverty and unemployment levels,
some observers have viewed qat chewing as a significant waste of potential productivity
245 The Republic of Yemen: Developmental Challenges in the 21st Century. Colburn, Marta. ―Glossary: Qat
[p. 78],‖ and ―Glossary: Sufi [p. 78].‖2002. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. 246
Poverty News Blog. Seattle Post Intelligencer. Associated Press. Garwood, Paul. ―Chewing Qat Blamed
for Yemen‘s Poverty.‖ 30 November 2005. http://povertynewsblog.blogspot.com/2005/11/yemen-chewing-
qat-blamed-for-yemens.html 247
The University of Chicago Chronicle. Harms, William. ―Lisa Wedeen, Professor in Political Science and
the College, Chair of Political Science.‖ 12 June 2008. http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/080612/wedeen.shtml 248
Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen. Dresch, Paul. ―Chapter 1: Introductory [p. 20].‖ 1993.
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 249
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed.. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Geographic and Demographic Setting: Qat [pp. 106–108].‖ Krieger, Laurie,
et al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 250
Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. Wedeen, Lisa. ―Chapter 3: The Politics
of Deliberation [p. 129].‖ 2008. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 251
Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,
Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Geographic and Demographic Setting: Qat [pp. 106–108].‖ Krieger, Laurie,
et al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
and precious income.252
Some poorer Yemenis may be spending as much as half their
income on the plant. But it is widely used among all levels of society.253
Food
Meat, vegetables, rice, and bread are the core components
of the Yemeni diet. Yemenis use distinctive spices that
reflect both Middle Eastern and Indian cuisine.254
Cardamom, caraway, saffron, and turmeric are used in
Yemeni cooking, as they are throughout the Middle East.
Culinary experts have also noted the similarities between
Yemeni and African cuisine.255
For example, Yemenis
commonly make a puffy, light bread akin to Ethiopian
injera. Hilbah, or fenugreek, is a particularly popular spice. Saltah, the country‘s
signature dish, is a hot and spicy stew of meat, potatoes, and various vegetables such as
tomato, eggplant, and onion. Flavored with hilbah, saltah is a characteristic Yemeni
lunchtime meal, and is regarded as the best dish to eat before the afternoon qat chew.256
For those who can afford it, meat is eaten daily. Commonly consumed meats are chicken,
goat, sheep, and lamb; the latter is the most prized. Pork is strictly avoided in accordance
with Islamic custom. Because meat is a luxury for many Yemenis, no part is wasted.
Flavorful broths and soups (shoubra) are made by boiling meat or bones with vegetables
and spices.257, 258
Dinner dishes, which are typically small, include fasouliya (beans) and ful, a bean paste
made with spices and vegetables.259
Asid (asit) is a sorghum porridge commonly eaten by
rural Yemenis. Yogurt and honey are popular condiments. Honey also drenches desserts
such as bint al-sahn, which is a layered pastry. Tea (shay) is usually served sweetened.
Yemen was famous for its Arabica coffee, known as mocha, but few Yeminis now can
252 Yemen Observer. Ghanem, Suzan, and Jowhara Zindani, Zinadine Zindani. ―Qat: The Plague of
Yemen.‖ 26 February 2008. http://www.yobserver.com/sports-health-and-lifestyle/10013815.html 253
Reuters UK. Noueihed, Lin. ―Qat Draws Water and Life from Impoverished Yemen.‖ 29 May 2007.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKNOA93814520070529?sp=true 254
Brooklyn Botanic Garden. ―A Taste of Herbs.‖ 2010.
http://www.bbg.org/gar2/topics/kitchen/handbooks/gourmetherbs/2a.html 255
New York Magazine. ―Yemen Cafe and Restaurant.‖ No date.
http://nymag.com/listings/restaurant/yemen-cafe-and-restaurant/ 256
In Mama‘s Kitchen. Serbe, Diana and Elinor Moore. ―Dining with the Queen of Sheba: Ethiopian
Cooking and Yemeni Cooking.‖ No date.
http://www.inmamaskitchen.com/FOOD_IS_ART/mideast/ethiopia_yemen.html 257
Things Asian. ―The Exotic Cuisine of Yemen-The Ancient Happy Arabia.‖
http://www.thingsasian.com/stories-
photos/3576/21395059/1/brt0_art;jsessionid=EE2EE202BBA243721EEA5202DB23DBE6 258
Things Asian. Salloum, Habeeb. ―Recipe: Shoubra—Meat Soup.‖ 29 March 2006.
http://www.thingsasian.com/stories-photos/3580 259
Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Yemen: Food [p. 371].‖ 2004. Footscray,
Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.
afford it. Instead, Yemenis today drink a beverage called qishr, which is made by
steeping ground coffee husks with ginger.260
Clothing
In contrast to mandates in other Muslim countries,
Yemeni women are not required by law to wear the veil.
Yemeni women traditionally wore shawls (maswan) but
did not cover their faces. But in conservative quarters
even today, a woman whose attire is considered
immodest by local norms may be subject to social
censure and harassment.261
Since a person‘s outward
aspect is considered a reflection of character and honor,
most Yemenis carefully manage their personal appearance. In northern Yemen, the
sharshaf, which is a black, hooded outer garment, is popular. Of Turkish origin, the
sharshaf is a sign of urban sophistication for it may reveal or conceal in a variety of
ways. The wearer may adjust it for a conservative or a modern look.262
Since 1990,
returnees from Saudi Arabia, who face a marginalized existence in their impoverished
homeland after being repatriated, have promoted the Saudi female dress ensemble. It
consists of an overcoat (abaya, known as a balto in Yemen), a headscarf (hijab), and a
face veil (niqab). In the words of one scholar, ―This clear expression of their adherence to
Saudi style covering…can be interpreted as a way to show their ‗modernity‘ and to
distance themselves from other Yemeni women who were in their eyes less strict and
therefore less civilized and modern.‖263
Often adorned with beading and embroidery, a balto and matching hijab, imported from
the Gulf States, are considered high fashion. While the hijab can be tied, the use of
colorful pins to secure it is more desirable. Baltos have displaced the traditional sitara
(setarrah), which is a large, often colorful cloth that women wear draped from the head
to near the ankles. Today, the sitara is only worn by elderly Yemeni women, although
some young women have baltos made using sitara designs.264
260 Caravan-Serai. ―Foods of Yemen.‖ No date. http://www.caravan-serai.com/countries/yemen/hb-
foods.html 261
Refworld. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. ―Yemen: Information on Whether There Is a
Dress Code in Aden According to Official Government Law or Policy, and on Restrictions on Women‘s
Employment.‖ 1 November 1995.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,IRBC,,YEM,3ae6ab5c34,0.html 262
―Dance: A Visual Marker of Qabili Identity in Highland Yemen [pp. 187–188].‖ Adra, Najwa. In Color
of Enchantment: Theatre, Dance, Music, and the Visual Arts of the Middle East. Sherifa Zuhur, Ed. 2001.
Cairo, Egypt: American University of Cairo Press. 263
Pioneers or Pawns? Women Health Workers and the Politics of Development in Yemen. De Regt,
Marina. ―Chapter 9: Dreaming of a Better Future: Women in New Squatter Areas [p. 262].‖ 2007.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 264
Yemen Observer. Al-Jarady, Eman. ―The Seterrah: An Endangered Species.‖ 28 August 2007.
http://www.yobserver.com/news-varieties/10012842.html
For men, traditional dress consists of a futah, or a pleated kilt that reaches below the
knees, and a shirt. In the highlands, where temperatures are cooler, sport coats and vests
are also worn. Another traditional garment for men is the thawb, which is a long, loose-
fitting robe, often worn over pants. Turbans are the most common headgear, although
some men wear a traditional kofia, a short, conical hat woven of bamboo. It carries
formal significance.265
The jambiya, or curved dagger, is the most important
accouterment for Yemeni men. It is worn in a scabbard on a wide belt. The type of handle
and the position of the knife indicate the social status of the bearer. A jambiya carried in
the center front of the belt is the mark of a tribesman. Government workers are prohibited
from wearing a jambiya to work and at official functions, although shaykhs, members of
parliament, and judges are exempt. The jambiya is often a family heirloom passed down
from father to son.266
Arts
Poetry
Poetry (qasida) is a significant component of Arab
culture.267
Cassette recordings of popular poets circulate
throughout Yemen.268
Poetry is more than just an art form
because it also serves as a conflict resolution
mechanism.269
For example, a shaykh mediating a dispute
will call the parties together and invite representatives of
other tribes who have no stake in the dispute. The
delegations will express their positions through poetry.
The shaykh will assess the disagreements and determine if a consensus can be reached.
―At various points in the dispute mediation, people can weigh in with the moral force of a
poem very effectively,‖ explains a scholar who has studied Yemeni poetry in relation to
political power.270
During the civil war (1962–1970), republicans and supporters of the
Zaydi imamate alike were given voice through poetic exchanges.271
More recently, the
265 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Cultural Life: Daily Life and Social Customs.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-273063 266
Yemen Post. Al-Shawthabi, Abdul Rahim. ―Jambiya: Deep-Rooted Tradition.‖ 12 March 2009.
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=100&SubID=170&MainCat=5 267
The Michigan Daily. McGovern, Ashley. ―Poetry Sheds Light on Arab Culture.‖ 15 November 2002.
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/poetry-sheds-light-arab-culture 268
The Moral Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen. Miller, Flagg.
―Chapter 1: Folk-Poetry Cassettes: Between Community and Conflict [p. 78].‖ 2007. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. 269
The Harvard University Gazette. Shen, Andrea. ―Poetry as Power: Caton Studies Complex Role of
Poetry in Yemen Society.‖ 9 December 1999. http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/12.09/caton.html 270
National Endowment for the Humanities. Humanities, Vol. 23, No. 1. Galvin, Rachel. ―Of Poets,
Prophets, and Politics.‖ January/February 2002. http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/2002-01/poets.html 271
Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen. Wedeen, Lisa. ―Chapter 1: Imagining
Unity [p. 46].‖ 2008. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
government has utilized poets to urge the citizenry to combat terrorism.272
In these
circumstances, Yemeni poems serve as tailored rhetorical appeals to secure the support of
their audience.
Dance
Yemeni dances are performed at rite-of-passage
ceremonies such as weddings. Dancers are segregated by
gender. Women use the word raks for dances that
originated outside the country, but refer to their own
dances as play (laeb). Men use the word laeb for
recreational dance and bara for the special, martial
dagger dance.273
The bara has become a symbol of
Yemeni culture and national identity. It is performed in
cities as well as in rural communities, where it originated. Tribes have each developed
distinctive movement and costume variations.274
In the northern highlands, the leader
dances in the center rather than at the head of a procession, reflecting his equality among
the others. All segments of society dance the bara, but it is essential to reinforce the
honor of a tribesman.275
The bara entails the coordination of as many as 20 dancers, who
must dance in horseshoe formation and carry jambiyas. Four different rhythms are played
on a large drum (tasa), and the tempo becomes progressively faster. The finale with the
fastest tempo conveys the dancers‘ fighting spirit and their readiness to go into battle.276
Architecture
Yemeni cities lack a ―hyper-modern skyline…with
mismatched skyscrapers‖—an urban architectural style
that is seen in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, and
elsewhere in the Middle East.277
The country‘s isolation
over centuries has influenced its approach to
contemporary architectural development. Until 1962,
portions of north Yemen had been ruled for almost a
millennium by xenophobic imams who had attempted to
272 The Christian Science Monitor. Brandon, James. ―In Poetry Loving Yemen, Tribal Bard Takes on Al
Qaeda—With his Verse.‖ 12 May 2006. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0512/p01s02-wome.html 273
Gilded Serpent. Jalilah. ―Dancing in Yemen, Part 2: El Arous.‖ No date.
http://www.gildedserpent.com/articles13/dancingyemen2jalilah.htm 274
Yemen (Cultures of the World). Hestler, Anna. ―Arts [p. 96].‖ 2000. Tarrytown, NY: Marshall
Cavendish. 275
Persee Scientific Journals. Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, Vol. 67, Issue 67. Adra,
Nawja. ―Tribal Dancing and Yemeni Nationalism: Steps to Unity.‖ 1993.
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0997-1327_1993_num_67_1_1595 276 The Arab Cultural and Community Center. ―15th Annual Arab Cultural Festival.‖ 2009.
http://www.arabculturalcenter.org/cultural_festival.html 277
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Yemen Finds Dreamland of Architecture.‖ 15 November
2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/world/middleeast/16yemen.html
repel outside influences. Thereafter, Yemen was preoccupied while it experimented with
various types of governments in an effort to achieve stability and lay the foundations for
economic growth. A focus on internal matters meant the country was largely excluded
from the social and intellectual dialog shared by the rest of the Arab world. As a result,
the urban renewal movement bypassed Yemen, in contrast to its expression in
neighboring countries. There, monarchical and republican governments alike razed
ancient neighborhoods and markets to bring their nations into the modern age. Yemen
began to engage the outside world only in the 1980s, when the benefits of preservation of
indigenous structures had come to be appreciated.
Distinctive Yemeni architecture is characterized by the use of stone and sun-dried brick.
Where stone is scarce, zubur houses, resembling a layer cake, are made entirely from clay
laid in horizontal segments.278
These buildings are now celebrated for their environmental
sustainability. Solid clay walls keep the interior temperature constant through the
seasons. The capital city of Sanaa, whose historic quarter has been named a UNESCO
World Heritage site, contains ancient tower houses. These buildings, some of which rise
30 m (100 fit) above street level, were constructed from ―locally quarried stone, hand-
mixed plaster and a naturally waterproof insulating material, qudad, made of volcanic
cinders and lime.‖279
In the words of one architect, ―This dense, walled city projects the
urban character typical of traditional Arab cities and contains many building types unique
to Southern Arabia.‖280
Sports
Camel racing, or al-hagen (literally, ―breeds of fine
quality‖), is an ancient Arabian sport that originated with
nomadic Bedouin tribes. Camels are revered for their
ability to survive in the harsh desert and are essential to
the livelihood of the desert nomads. The Yemeni
government began promoting camel racing in 1987 by
sponsoring a festival in the town of Al-Husineah, in Al-
Hudaydah governorate, where camel racing was a
longstanding tradition. Competitions consist of races and other events, such as a contest
in which participants jump over rows of camels.281
But the festival has not been held
every year. The government‘s attempts to promote camel racing as a national spectator
sport are unlikely to be widely successful, given that it is a better funded sport in the
278 Yemen (Cultures of the World). Hestler, Anna. ―Arts [p. 91].‖ 2000. Tarrytown, NY: Marshall
Cavendish. 279
Global Post. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Green Technology—It‘s Older Than You Think.‖ 11
December 2009. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/global-green/091210/green-yemen-houses 280 University of Arizona. Jeffery, Richard Brooks. ―Architecture, Modernity, and Preservation: The Tower
House of Sana'a, Yemen.‖ Arid Lands Newsletter, No. 28. Spring-Summer 1989.
http://ag.arizona.edu/oals/ALN/aln28/jeffery.html 281
eLanguages. ―Camel Racing: A Yemeni Historical Sport.‖ No date.
http://www.elanguages.org/view_pagecontent.php?resourceid=86745;id=r86745#r86745
wealthy Gulf States. Their ability to invest heavily in stadiums, and in breeding the best
camels for competition, has made them the center for camel racing.282
282 JSTOR. Ethnology, Vol. 39, No. 3. Khalaf, Sulyaman. ―Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented
Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab Emirates.‖ 2000.
http://www.jstor.org/pss/3774109
Security
Introduction
Yemen is the focus of international security concerns
owing to its connection to acts of terrorism against high-
profile targets. In October 2000, while refueling in the
southern Yemeni port of Aden, the U.S.S. Cole was
rammed by a small boat laden with explosives. The
resulting explosion ripped a hole in the naval destroyer
and killed 17 sailors. More recently, on Christmas Day
2009, the attempted bombing of a U.S.-bound jetliner was
attributed to a Nigerian who reportedly had trained for his mission in Yemen. This
incident renewed attention on the impoverished country as a breeding ground for Islamist
extremists. Of the approximately 200 remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay in January
2010, 90 were Yemeni nationals.283
That month, the Obama administration froze the
release of Yemeni detainees because of longstanding concerns that the Yemeni
government, which is saddled with a host of serious problems, could not adequately
supervise the detainees‘ rehabilitation.284
Yemen faces a number of pressing concerns, including ―disappearing oil and water
reserves; a mob of migrants, some allegedly with Al Qaeda ties, flooding in from
Somalia, the failed state next door; and a weak government increasingly unable to keep
things running.‖285
It is widely understood that the Yemeni government, headed by
President Ali Abdallah Saleh, lacks the capacity both to exert authority in many tribal
regions and to secure the country‘s borders.286
Analysts have noted that, in order to
prevent a total breakdown in state authority, not only the central government must be
strengthened, but also the lives of the Yemeni people must be improved.287
The deep-
seated grievances of many Yemenis toward their government, which provides neither
security (aman) nor stability (istiqrar), make Yemen a fertile recruiting ground for
insurgent groups.288
Because Al Qaeda does not seriously threaten the Saleh regime‘s
survival, however, the government accords it less attention than the secessionist
283 Time. ―Yemen: The Most Fragile Ally.‖ 7 January 2010.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1952142,00.html 284
Los Angeles Times. ―U.S. Suspends Transfer of Gitmo Inmates to Yemen.‖ 5 January 2010.
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dcnow/2010/01/us-suspends-transfer-of-gitmo-inmates-to-yemen.html 285
Foreign Policy. ―The Failed States Index 2009.‖ 2009.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index 286
Council for Foreign Relations. Stewart, Patrick. ―Are ‗Ungoverned Spaces‘ a Threat?‖ 11 January 2010.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21165/are_ungoverned_spaces_a_threat.html 287
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. Robbins, Michael. ―The Overlooked Threat in the Middle East.‖ 23 March 2009.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/middleeastnews/?tag=failed-state 288
Voice of America News. Grosshans, Todd. ―Is Yemen the Next Failed State?‖ 16 February 2010.
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Is-Yemen-The-Next-Failed-State-84475967.html
movement in the south or the Houthi rebellion in the north.289
In the eyes of many
Yemenis, their government‘s collaboration with U.S. counterterrorism initiatives—for
example, by allowing U.S. missile strikes in Yemen—is unwelcome.
Yemen: “Tribal Republic”
While Yemen is frequently described as ―the next
Afghanistan,‖ it is important to note that Yemen‘s central
government has not offered direct support to Al Qaeda.290
Yet the government lacks control over most of the
country, which has been described as a ―tribal
republic.‖291
Tribal groups in control of their territory
have sheltered militants, including those affiliated with
Al Qaeda, for tactical domestic reasons rather than to
further the strategic objectives of the militant groups. The tribes near Marib, in particular,
have established a precedent of accepting support from outside parties seeking to further
their own agendas. Patrons have included the then Marxist People‘s Democratic Republic
of Yemen (South Yemen); Saddam Hussein‘s Ba‘athist regime; the government of Saudi
Arabia; and, most recently, ―radical elements linked to al Qaeda.‖
The Yemeni national armed forces are disproportionately comprised of tribesmen. They
typically hesitate to fire on fellow tribesmen—an act that would likely provoke a tribal
feud. Such feuds can quickly attract additional participants, and soldiers may become
targets. In 2003, government security personnel intervened in a dispute between two
tribes and killed one man in the process. In retaliation, three government soldiers were
killed by members of the deceased man‘s tribe.292
The government‘s typical response to
tribal demands is to placate them through patronage, which in turn encourages further
demands. Such demands are more effective when the tribes are supported—in reality or
appearance—by outside groups.293
Tribes who are excluded from patronage, or find their
payoffs reduced due to declining oil revenues, may be particularly tempted by appeals
from radical groups as a means to increase their leverage with the Saleh government.294
289 International Affairs Review. McGee, Ronan. ―Yemen: The U.S. Partnership‘s Flawed Approach.‖ 15
February 2010. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/137 290
International Crisis Group. Middle East Report No. 8. ―Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in
a Fragile State.‖ 8 January 2003. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1675 291
Center for Global Development. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Engel,
Daniel. ―Tribal Diversity, Political Patronage and the Yemeni Decentralization Experiment [p. 7].‖ 12
January 2010. http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/Post-Doc%20Seminars/Daniel_Egel.pdf 292
Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism.
Phillips, Sarah. ―Chapter 4: Tribalism in a Weak State [p. 97].‖ 2008. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 293
Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 7. Katz, Mark. ―U.S.-Yemen Relations and the
War on Terror: A Portrait of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih.‖ 19 May 2005.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=404 294
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yemen on the Brink: A Carnegie Paper Series. Middle
East Program, No. 107. Phillips, Sarah. ―What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-
Building.‖ March 2010. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes.pdf
U.S.–Yemen Relations
While Yemen is ostensibly a partner of the U.S. in
international counterterrorism efforts, there are
significant differences between the two governments
regarding the identification of terrorists. For example,
Yemen-based Shaykh Abdul Majid al-Zindani was a
spiritual adviser to Osama bin Laden. Many Yemenis
regard him as a patriot.295
According to a U.S.-based
scholar, ―He is now widely respected around the
[Muslim] world, and one can argue that he is currently one of the most powerful four
men in Yemen…. Yemeni politicians and tribal leaders revere him and seek his advice on
national matters.‖296
Al-Zindani is the president of Al Iman (Eman) University, the
second-largest university in the capital, which trains Sunni religious scholars in the
Wahhabist form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. The school is viewed by the U.S. as
an Al Qaeda recruiting ground, and U.S. officials have designated al-Zindani a
terrorist.297
There is concern that the Saleh government is unprepared to address the
propagation of radical views that create Al Qaeda sympathizers.298
Saleh‘s successive electoral victories are based on the ability of pro-government shaykhs
to mobilize voters within their respective tribes after they have been bought off through
patronage. However, he has also used his power to prevent the formation of viable
opposition political parties.299
Washington‘s need for cooperation from Saleh requires
that criticism of his regime be downplayed. His willingness to cooperate with the U.S.
reduces the prospect of unilateral American military action in Yemen; any such action
would likely undermine his rule. The U.S. currently provides intelligence, equipment, and
tactical support to Yemen. In exchange, the U.S. has been allowed to conduct dozens of
raids on Yemeni soil, during which members of Al Qaeda have been killed or
295 Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Yemen: Clerics Condemn Foreign Intervention,
Threaten Global Jihad.‖14 January 2010. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/01/yemen-
clerics-condemn-foreign-intervention-threaten-global-jihad.html 296
Office of News and Communications, Duke University. ―News Tip: U.S. and Yemen Should Adopt
Clear Definition of ‗Terrorism.‘‖ 8 January 2010. http://news.duke.edu/2010/01/al_qaeda.html 297
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Prados, Alfred
B. and Jeremy M. Sharp. ―CRS Report for Congress: Yemen: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations [p.
3].‖ 4 January 2007. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21808.pdf 298
The Wall Street Journal. Coker, Margaret. ―Yemeni Sheik Courts, Warns Foreign Governments.‖ 12
January 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126321683002124521.html 299
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. 2009 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices. ―2009 Human Rights Report: Yemen.‖ 11 March 2010.
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm
apprehended.300
Yet claims that civilians have wrongfully been killed have placed Saleh‘s
government in a situation that can be exploited by opponents of the regime.301
In April 2010, the Obama administration authorized operations to capture or kill Anwar
al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric born in the U.S. but now based in Yemen. Al-Awlaki
is believed to have mentored Maj. Nidal Malik Hassan, accused of the Fort Hood
shootings in November 2009, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted
the Christmas Day 2009 bombing of a U.S.-bound jetliner.302
Claiming a lack of
evidence, Yemeni officials initially refuted the U.S. designation of al-Awlaki as a
terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda.303
However, they later agreed to seek him out ―…for
questioning so that he can clear his name…or face trial….‖ He is thought to be hiding in
southern Yemen under the protection of his tribe, but the Yemeni government has
complained that it lacks U.S. intelligence to confirm that fact.304
Relations with Regional Countries
Saudi Arabia
Yemen‘s longest land border is with Saudi Arabia. The boundary was
long a source of dispute between the two countries. In 1934,
following a territorial war, the Saudi kingdom and the Zaydi imamate
of North Yemen signed the Treaty of Taif, which drew the western
segment of their land border in Saudi Arabia‘s favor.305
Border
clashes flared in the 1990s, after the discovery of oil in Yemen and a
sharp downturn in Yemeni–Saudi relations. Tensions stemmed from
the Yemeni government‘s refusal to support the U.S.-led coalition
against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). Yemen‘s stance
led Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to cut foreign aid and to expel
several hundred thousand Yemeni workers. This move greatly
300 Washington Post. Priest, Dana. ―U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on
Strikes.‖ 27 January 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html 301
International Affairs Review. McGee, Ronan. ―Yemen: The U.S. Partnership‘s Flawed Approach.‖ 15
February 2010. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/137 302
Newsweek. Johnsen, Gregory D. ―An Act of Futility.‖ 13 April 2010.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/236292 303
The Christian Science Monitor. Topol, Sarah A. ―Yemen Balks at Possible US Strike on Cleric Anwar
al-Awlaki.‖ 12 April 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0412/Yemen-balks-at-
possible-US-strike-on-cleric-Anwar-al-Awlaki 304
The Washington Post. Reuters. ―Yemen Says Seeks Cleric, Yet to Get U.S. Intelligence.‖ 11 April 2010.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/11/AR2010041104056.html 305
Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy
Dimensions. Cordesman, Anthony H. ―Chapter 2: Foreign Relations and External Security [p. 64].‖ 2003.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
contributed to economic insecurity in Yemen, which relied heavily on remittances from
foreign-based workers.306
Conflict along the border erupted in 1994, after Saudi Arabia provided support to
southern secessionists in the Yemeni civil war. The Yemeni and Saudi Arabian
governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1995, which paved the way for
border demarcation talks in the following years. Despite additional clashes along the
border and on disputed islands in the Red Sea, the two sides came to a final border
agreement in June 2000.307
The agreement signaled that Yemeni–Saudi relations had
improved, including the possibility that Saudi Arabia would reopen its labor markets to
Yemeni workers.308
Yet, as of early 2010, Saudi Arabia remained reluctant to do so,
primarily due to security concerns.309
The border area remains difficult to patrol because
of its rugged and inhospitable terrain. It is therefore susceptible to smuggling and militant
infiltration. Saudi efforts to address these issues include constructing a security fence
along portions of the border.310
Some portions of the fence are electronically
monitored.311
A previous effort in the early 2000s to build such a fence created tension
between Yemeni and Saudi officials.312
The Houthi rebellion, which began in 2004, is of interest
to the Saudi government, since the conflict‘s center in the
northwest Yemeni governorate of Sa‘ada adjoins the
Saudi province of Najran. Najran is home to Ismaili
Muslims, who belong to a different sect of Shi‘a Islam
than the Shi‘ite Yemeni Zaydis. Thus, Shi‘ite minority
communities abut both sides of the border in this region.
Saudi Arabia, which is predominantly Sunni Muslim, has
provided Saleh‘s government with materiel to crush the Houthi rebellion. In November
2009, Saudi warplanes bombed Houthi positions in the border area, both within Saudi
territory and inside Yemen. This marked Saudi Arabia‘s first cross-border military
operation since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. In addition to its potential to incite Saudi
Shi‘ites, the unrest in Yemen concerns the Saudis because it offers Iran, a Shi‘ite Muslim
306 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: Unification of Yemen.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-273073 307
Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy
Dimensions. Cordesman, Anthony H. ―Chapter 2: Foreign Relations and External Security [pp. 65–68].‖
2003. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 308
Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: Territorial Disputes.‖ 2010.
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-280864 309
Reuters. Laessing, Ulf. ―Saudi-Western Interests in Yemen not Identical.‖ 25 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60O2HT20100125 310
Gulf News. Reuters. ―Saudi to Build Border Fence to Stop Militants.‖ 24 December 2009.
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-to-build-border-fence-to-stop-militants-1.557433 311
World Tribune. ―Saudis Urgently Erect New Border Fence to Block ‗Massive‘ Immigration of Shi‘ites.‖
15 December 2009. http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/me_saudis0966_12_15.asp 312
The Independent. Bradley, John R. ―Saudi Arabia Enrages Yemen with Fence.‖ 11 February 2004.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-enrages-yemen-with-fence-
569574.html
state, the opportunity to intervene on behalf of another Shi‘ite group. Yet the Saudis have
engaged in similar behavior in Yemen. In June 2008, the Saudi government allegedly
began funding pro-government tribal militias in Yemen. The influx of funds contributed
to a war economy in which major players—army officers, tribal shaykhs, and arms
dealers—had a vested interest in maintaining the conflict, which has an impact on the
country as a whole.313
The Saudi government‘s involvement in the Houthi conflict follows a precedent of
influencing Yemeni affairs. Saudi Arabia provided substantial support to the remnants of
the Zaydi imamate in their battle against republicans in the civil war in North Yemen
(1962–1970). Its support of the Zaydis, who ultimately deferred to the republicans, was
thereafter a source of tension with the government of the Yemen Arab Republic (1962–
1990). More recently, Saudis have invested heavily in promoting their conservative brand
of Islam, known as Wahhabism, in Yemen and other Muslim countries. They have done
so by funding mosques, religious schools, and charities that promote Saudi-style Sunni
Islam.314
This promotion has been associated with the spread of religious extremism in
Yemen and elsewhere.315
It also has been cited as one of the Houthis‘ primary sources of
complaint because Wahhabi influence has been pronounced in the Sa‘ada governorate of
the north. The Zaydis have therefore ―claimed…to be defending their own specific
branch of Shia Islam…from a Yemeni regime they say is too dependent on its northern
neighbor, Saudi Arabia….‖316
Although exact figures are unavailable, Saudi Arabia is
thought to provide USD 200 to 300 million in annual security aid to the Saleh regime.317
Oman
Yemen‘s neighbor to the east, Oman is a monarchy that
has been ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said since
1970.318
From 1962–1975, Oman was plagued by an
insurgency in the southwest region of Dhofar, bordering
Yemen. The socialist government of the then People‘s
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) provided aid to
the Dhofar rebels‘ attempt to topple the sultanate. In
313 Foreign Affairs. Hiltermann, Joost R. ―Disorder on the Border.‖ 16 December 2009.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border 314
Reuters. Laessing, Ulf. ―Saudi-Western Interests in Yemen not Identical.‖ 25 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60O2HT20100125 315
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Blanchard,
Christopher M. ―CRS Report for Congress: The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya [p. 5].‖ 24
January 2008. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf 316
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, Jeremy M. ―CRS Report for
Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [p. 17].‖ 13 January 2010.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf 317
Reuters. Laessing, Ulf. ―Saudi-Western Interests in Yemen not Identical.‖ 25 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60O2HT20100125 318
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Oman.‖ 1 April 2010.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mu.html
1983, South Yemen and Oman established diplomatic relations. In 1992, the unified
Republic of Yemen and Oman agreed to their border, which passes through desolate,
sparsely inhabited terrain.319
In 1994, after Yemen‘s Vice President al Baydh had
declared secession, Oman hosted President Saleh and al Baydh to mediate the conflict.
The Omani government supported a unified Yemeni state but still offered asylum to
fleeing southern leaders at the end of the civil war.320
Oman is much wealthier than
Yemen because it has roughly double the oil reserves but one-tenth the population.321
Oman has sponsored Yemen‘s bid to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, an economic and
security alliance comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman; however, Saudi Arabia has blocked it.322
This owes to fears
Yemen‘s accession could destabilize the alliance given its internal problems.323
Iran
The Yemeni government has persistently claimed that Iran supports
the Houthis, despite a dearth of hard evidence to support such
accusations.324
Exactly how Iran benefits from the civil strife in
northern Yemen is a matter of conjecture. Some analysts think it is
unlikely that Iran has provided anything more than rhetorical support
to the Houthis, another Shi‘ite group, because there are few obvious
benefits. There is no oil in that part of Yemen, and the conflict does
not resonate in the greater Arab Muslim world—in contrast, for
example, to the situation in Israel, where Iran has supported Hamas
and reaped favorable publicity in Arab nations. Moreover, the
religious ties between Iran and the Houthis are nominal because the
Houthis‘ brand of Zaydi Islam is more similar to Sunni Islam than to the ―Twelver‖ form
of Shi‘a Islam in Iran.325
But there may be secondary benefits to Iranian involvement.
The Houthi rebellion long proved unamenable to a military solution, despite several
cease-fire agreements. This increases the likelihood that a brokered settlement will be the
only way to create sustainable peace. In this case, Iran may be a party at the negotiating
table, and therefore increase its stature throughout the region as an advocate of Shi‘ite
319 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―Background Note: Oman.‖ March 2010.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35834.htm 320
Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy. Kechichian, Joseph. ―Chapter
10: Trends in Omani Foreign Policy [p. 255].‖ 1995. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 321
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. ―Bodine, Johnsen
Testify to US Senate on Yemen, Challenges Ahead.‖ 20 January 2010.
http://wws.princeton.edu/news/Bodine_Johnsen_Senate/ 322
Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, Jeremy M. ―CRS Report for
Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [p. 24].‖ 13 January 2010.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf 323
European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. ―Gulf Cooperation
Council (GGC).‖ No date. http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=32 324
Time. Hauslohner, Abigail. ―Yemen‘s Hidden War: Is Iran Causing Trouble?‖ 18 December 2009.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1947623,00.html 325
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Saudis‘ Efforts to Swat Rebels from Yemen Risk Inflaming
Larger Conflict.‖ 12 June 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/middleeast/13saudi.html
rights. Although the Houthi rebellion has been cast only as a ―proxy war‖ between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, both governments do share an interest in preventing the resurgence of Al
Qaeda in Yemen.326
Somalia
Somalia, as a failed state, is unable to curtail the rampant
piracy based on its shores. Somali pirates have attacked
passing tankers and Yemeni fishing boats. Such activity
has hurt the Yemeni economy because some of the nearly
20,000 ships that annually pass through the Gulf of Aden
have been rerouted, bypassing Yemen‘s refueling
facilities and other services at Aden.327
Yemen also is a
main destination and transit point for Somali refugees
from that country‘s ongoing civil conflict. Most of them undertake a dangerous journey
across the Gulf of Aden, often with the assistance of ruthless smugglers who require
payment for their services but offer no guarantee of safe and successful passage.328
Once
in Yemen, some Somali refugees who fail to cross the border into Saudi Arabia have
reportedly been pressed into military service by the Houthis.329
Terrorist and Insurgent Groups
Al Qaeda
Yemen has a complicated relationship with Al Qaeda.
Osama bin Laden‘s father was born in Yemen, and bin
Laden remains a popular figure in his ancestral homeland.
The so-called Afghan Arabs who fought alongside him in
Afghanistan against the Soviets were often not welcome
back to their home countries, and instead took up
residence in Yemen in accordance with the Prophet
Muhammad‘s hadith: ―When disorder threatens, seek
326 The Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 35. Rahimi, Babik. ―Iranian Leaders
Weigh Support for Houthi Rebellion in Yemen.‖ 19 November 2009.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35755&tx_ttnews[backPid]=61&cHa
sh=a364ab8e6d 327
Yemen News Agency. ―Somali Pirates Trail [sic] in Hadramout Started.‖ 8 March 2010.
http://www.sabanews.net/en/news208068.htm 328
Yemen Times. Jubran, Walid. ―The Crisis of Somali Fugitives to Yemen.‖ 12 August 2009.
http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=918&p=report&a=2 329
BBC News. ―Somali Refugees ‗Forced to Join Yemen Rebel War.‘‖ 16 December 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8416285.stm
refuge in Yemen.‖330
Al Qaeda operatives were responsible for the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole in 2000. Yet an affiliated and fully operational group was formed in Yemen only
after 2005.331
In January 2009, Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged to
create a new organization called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
AQAP represents what some analysts refer to as Yemen‘s second generation of Al
Qaeda. The group has some ties to the parent organization but acts with considerable
autonomy.332
It is under the leadership of Nasser al-Wahishi, a Yemeni who broke out of
a Sanaa detention center in February 2006. Yemeni security forces may have aided his
tunnel escape.333
His deputy, Saeed al-Shihri, is a Saudi national who was released from
detention at Guantanamo Bay in 2007. Al-Shihri is suspected of having played a role in a
deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa in September 2009.334
AQAP is said to have
approximately 100 core operatives, most of whom are in their 20s and 30s. Yet it
reportedly has an untold number of sympathizers and strong tribal support in the southern
and eastern governorates.335
AQAP has been able to operate while the Yemeni government‘s attention has been
focused on the Houthi rebellion in the north and the secessionist movement in the south.
President Saleh is obligated to some of its elements, who aided his security forces in
suppressing the southern secessionists in the 1994 civil war.336
The consequences of his
reliance on such parties remain, since Islamic fundamentalists are in the ranks of the
Yemeni armed forces and government.337
Houthi Rebellion
The Yemeni government has been battling an insurgency since 2004 in its mountainous
north, along the border with Saudi Arabia. The conflict began as a law enforcement
operation to arrest Hussein Al Houthi, a former parliament member. Several rounds of
330 The Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 4. Johnsen, Gregory D. ―Yemen‘s Passive
Role in the War on Terrorism.‖ 23 February 2006.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=686 331
BBC News. ―Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.‖ 3 January 2010.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8437724.stm 332 The New Republic. Shephard, Michelle. ―Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: A Primer.‖ 1 January
2010. http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/al-qaeda-the-arab-peninsula-primer 333
CBC News. ―Al Qaeda is Almost the Least of Yemen‘s Problems.‖ 29 January 2009.
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/01/28/f-indepth-yemen.html 334
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief.‖ 22 January
2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/world/middleeast/23yemen.html 335
The Washington Post. Raghavan, Sudarsan. ―Al-Qaeda Group in Yemen Gaining Prominence.‖ 28
December 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/27/AR2009122702022.html?sid=ST2009122800703 ―Al-Qaeda group in
Yemen gaining prominence.‖ 336
National Public Radio. Flintoff, Corey. ―Can the U.S. Trust Yemen to Fight Al Qaeda?‖ 5 January 2010.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122250796&ft=1&f=1001 337
Stratfor Global Intelligence. ―Yemen: Intensifying Problems for the Government.‖ 7 May 2009.
http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/137547/analysis/20090507_yemen_intensifying_problems_governm
ent
fighting ensued and the conflict expanded, enjoining local tribes and other regional and
foreign actors.338
The insurgents, known as Al-Shabab Al-Muminin (―the Young
Believers‖) or simply the Houthis, were estimated to number 6,000 in 2006.339
Their
strength is augmented by the fact that ―[they] know the geography, they know how to do
guerrilla warfare, and they have tribal connections.‖340
Much about the group remains contested. Although they have espoused anti-America and
anti-Israel rhetoric, the Houthis (unlike Al Qaeda) have not targeted Westerners within
Yemen. The Saleh government has claimed that the Houthis want to re-establish the
Zaydi imamate, which ruled portions of northern Yemen until 1962. It has also accused
them of receiving assistance from Iran and other Shi‘ite sympathizers.341
The Houthis
have accused the government of trying to marginalize their religion by ―installing Sunni
fundamentalists in mosques and official positions in some Zaydi areas.‖ They have also
decried Saudi Arabia‘s support of the Yemeni government, led by Saleh, whom they
regard as a pro-Washington tyrant.342
Local observers have stressed that although the
Houthis consider themselves descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and the rightful
rulers of Yemen, the insurgency is driven by frustration over their economic and social
marginalization.343
The Houthis have garnered tribal support in the north by working to
resolve local conflicts. Such efforts contrast with those of the government, which has
often pitted groups against each other to keep them from uniting against it. At the same
time, the Houthis have dealt ruthlessly with tribes that have sided with the government.344
The majority of the elites in Sanaa, including President Saleh, are of Zaydi origin but,
having embraced republicanism, they no longer base their political identity on their Zaydi
affiliation. In August 2009, the government launched ―Operation Scorched Earth,‖ an
aggressive military campaign that destroyed entire Houthi villages, displacing tens of
thousands of inhabitants. Some observers have asserted that, from the government‘s
perspective, the war is less about controlling territory than reinforcing the Saleh regime‘s
338 International Crisis Group. Middle East Report No. 86. ―Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb.‖ 27
May 2009. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6113&l=1 339 The Jamestown Foundation. Horton, Michael. ―Back From the Grave: The Re-emergence of Houthi
Rebel Leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi.‖ 1 April 2010. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36219&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHa
sh=05fd607dbe 340
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Saudis‘ Efforts to Swat Rebels from Yemen Risk Inflaming
Larger Conflict.‖ 12 June 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/middleeast/13saudi.html 341
Foreign Affairs. Hiltermann, Joost R. ―Disorder on the Border.‖ 16 December 2009.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border 342
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. ―Interview: Conflict in Yemen Widens Amid Charges of Iran
Involvement.‖ 20 November 2009.
http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_Conflict_In_Yemen_Widens_Amid_Charges_Of_Iran_Involvemen
t/1883769.html?page=1#relatedInfoContainer 343 IRIN, UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Analysis: Yemen‘s Rebellions Fuelled by
Economic Meltdown.‖ 4 February 2010. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87996 344
Human Rights Watch. ―All Quiet on the Northern Front: IV. Huthi Conduct and International
Humanitarian Law.‖ 7 April 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/node/89288/section/9
strength in the face of multiple insurgencies.345
In February 2010, the sixth ceasefire
since the conflict began was negotiated between the government and the Houthi rebels.
Although it remained unclear whether the truce would hold, there was speculation that
the Houthis may have been attracted by an arrangement that would enable them to play a
role in Yemeni politics akin to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Under such an arrangement,
the Houthis would theoretically be part of the Yemeni political process but not
completely under the control of the government.346
Some observers have postulated that
the truce was unlikely to hold because of a failure to resolve the problems underlying the
conflict.347
As of April 2010, the Houthis had ―not yet implemented the most important
condition [of the truce], which is going down from the mountains, and handing over their
weapons.‖348
Southern Mobility Movement
The southern mobility movement (al-harakat al-
janubiyya) is an umbrella opposition movement of groups
who feel that the south has been marginalized since
unification. This assertion is partly rooted in the country‘s
Cold War history, when the south was a socialist state.
After unification, the 1993 parliamentary elections swung
power decisively to northerners. Southern leadership
retreated to Aden and declared secession, sparking the
civil war of 1994. At that time, the conflict was primarily between government elites on
both sides; few southerners wished to secede only to be ruled by a reconstituted Marxist
leadership. Since that time, discontent has spread.
Among motivating factors is the lack of an equitable allocation of national resources.349
Yemen‘s oil is mostly located in the area of the former South Yemen, yet the income
accrues mostly to Sanaa, in the north, the seat of the central government. There is no
revenue-sharing arrangement. Businessmen in the south must cultivate connections in
Sanaa if they wish to receive state services, such as import licenses. In the absence of an
impartial judiciary to resolve commercial disputes, few are willing to risk the necessary
capital to raise the standard of living. Governors (who are appointed, not elected) and the
majority of high-ranking military officers in the south are northerners. They are not
accountable to local residents. Southerners complain that these elites have created
345 The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―In Yemen, War Centers on Authority, Not Terrain.‖ 24
October 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/middleeast/25yemen.html 346
Yemen Post. ―Houthi Ceasefire: Reality or War Tactic?‖ 31 January 2010.
http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=1&SubID=1825 347
The New York Times. Reuters. ―Yemen Declares End to War with Shi‘ite Rebels.‖ 19 March 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/03/19/world/international-us-yemen.html 348
Yemen Observer. Arrabyee, Nasser. ―Yemen Releases al-Houthi Supporters.‖ 8 April 2010.
http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10018491.html 349
Critical Threats, American Enterprise Institute. Zimmerman, Katherine. ―Yemen‘s Southern Challenge:
Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism.‖ 5 November 2009.
http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background-rising-threat-secessionism
patronage networks that exclude locals from access to resources. In short, economic
decentralization would be in the interest of the south.350
While the Yemeni government
has taken a few steps in that direction, the lack of cohesive leadership within the southern
mobility movement, which includes both Islamists and socialists, complicates the
prospect of negotiating new national policies. As of February 2010, more than 100 people
had been killed in outbursts of unrest, which have included protests, demonstrations, and
violent clashes with security forces.351
Water Security
The water situation in Yemen is dire. Because the country
lacks permanent rivers and lakes, it is wholly dependent
upon groundwater (aquifers) and rainfall for its water
supply. Yet water consumption has rapidly outpaced the
replenishment of Yemen‘s limited renewable water
resources. Estimates of Yemen‘s annual renewable water
resources per capita range from 125 to 200 cubic m
(4,414 to 7,062 cubic ft), which is well below the
international water poverty line of 1,000 cubic m (35,314 cubic ft).352, 353
Because of the
absence of regulatory oversight over water extraction, the country‘s natural aquifers are
being depleted at rapid rates for unsustainable irrigation and large-scale private
exploitation. A contrast with India is instructive: The large, South Asian country has
more than 50 times the population of Yemen. Yet India has less than one-eighth the
number of private water-drilling rigs.354
In Yemen, there is easy access to drilling
equipment, some of which was imported to drill for oil.355
The appearance of a new
drilling rig can cause tension within a community.356
In neighboring Oman, new wells
350 The Middle East Institute. Longley, April and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani. ―Fighting Brushfires with Batons:
An Analysis of the Political Crisis in South Yemen.‖ 11 February 2008.
http://www.mei.edu/Publications/WebPublications/PolicyBriefs/PolicyBriefArchive/tabid/539/ctl/Detail/mi
d/1611/xmid/157/xmfid/17/Default.aspx 351
The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―In Yemen‘s South, Protests Could Cause More Instability.‖ 27
February 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/world/middleeast/28yemen.html?scp=1&sq=southern%20seccesion%
20movement%20yemen&st=cse 352
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Unprecedented Water
Rationing in Cities.‖ 16 August 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85734 353
Intersecretariat Working Group on Environment Statistics, United Nations Statistics Division. Al-
Asbahi, Qahtan Yehya A.M. ―Water Resources Information in Yemen [p. 4].‖ June 2005.
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf/pap_wasess3a3yemen.pdf 354
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Policy. Boucek, Christopher and Gregory
Johnsen. ―The Well Runs Dry.‖ February 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23061 355
Yemen Observer. al-Montaser, Mansour. ―A Race for Drilling Water Wells.‖ 16 March 2010.
http://www.yobserver.com/reports/10018348.html 356
Middle East Report No. 254. Lichtenthaeler, Gerhard. ―Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen.‖
Spring 2010. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer254/lichtenthaeler.html
can not be drilled without the sultan‘s approval, a law the government seems able to
enforce.357
Yemen has not even ventured this far.
For the government to prevent a national water crisis, it would need to enforce laws
related to extraction. Since 99% of water extraction is currently unauthorized, regulation
is a formidable administrative challenge that the government is unlikely to meet.358
The
country‘s primary cash crop, qat, requires more water than food crops, making it difficult
to reduce usage. Water scarcity is exacerbated by the rapid growth of the population,
which is expected to double over the next two decades. The water crisis may lead to
―water refugees,‖ where Yemenis would seek refuge in other countries as life in Yemen
became intolerable. Competition over water rights has already been identified as the
source of many of Yemen‘s internal conflicts. According to Yemeni researchers, in rural
areas some 70–80% of conflicts are water-related.359
Threats to Internal Security
Corruption
The lack of oversight within the central government
means that the allocation of business licenses and the
execution of government contracts inevitably entail hefty
bribes to government officials. Any citizen who comes
into contact with an official will have to make an under-
the-table payment to procure a service that should be free
or provided at nominal cost, such as routine paperwork.
Once such a practice becomes the norm, it impedes the
development of a transparent administrative structure. Those with access to officials—
government or tribal—utilize them. Those without access seek to develop such ties.
Anyone who lands in a position of power will be expected to provide for family members
as well as for those who can claim other convincing connections. Smuggling of
practically any commodity for which there is a demand has become a big business that
government officials, military officers, and tribal shaykhs all participate in. The end
buyer may be a terrorist group.360
The government‘s policy of subsidizing diesel fuel,
which consumes almost one-third of the national budget, also enables smuggling and
357 Relief Web. Reuters AlertNet. Laessing, Ulf. ―Yemen‘s Water Crisis Eclipses Al Qaeda Threat.‖ 17
February 2010. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACIO-82RDZP?OpenDocument 358
Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Yemen Water Crisis Builds.‖ 11 October 2009.
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/11/world/fg-yemen-water11?pg=2 359
The Christian Science Monitor. Kasinof, Laura. ―At Heart of Yemen‘s Conflicts: Water Crisis.‖ 5
November 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1105/p06s13-wome.html 360
Human Security Gateway, HSRP, Simon Fraser University. Norwegian Peacebuilding Center. Noref
Report No. 4. Saif, Ahmed Abdelkareem. ―Complex Power Relations in Yemen Provide Opportunities for
Al Qaeda.‖ February 2010.
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/Noref_ComplexPowerRelationsInYemenProvideOppor
tunitiesForAlQaeda.pdf
bribery.361
Eliminating diesel fuel subsidies, however, forces consumers to pay more and
has led to riots in the past.362
Refugees and Economic Migrants
The government of Yemen is a signatory to the 1951
Refugees Convention, which accords the UN High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) the exclusive right
to determine which non-host country nationals are
eligible for asylum. Since the central government of their
country collapsed in 1991, Somalis have been entitled to
automatic refugee status in Yemen, as long as they
register with authorities. According to the UNHCR,
150,000 Somali refugees were living in Yemen as of December 2009.363
Once registered,
they are eligible for government-issued ID cards that they will likely have to pay bribes
for.364
Many more choose not to register; instead, they seek to use Yemen as a transit
point to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. These, in turn, have exerted diplomatic
pressure on Yemen to close the refugee pipeline. The Yemeni government is considering
revising its policy by reviewing refugee status on an individual basis, since they expect
the influx to continue. Furthermore, incoming boatloads of fleeing Somalis may also
contain insurgents.365
Ethiopians, whose country has been suffering a multi-year drought,
must demonstrate evidence of persecution there to gain refugee status. If apprehended by
Yemeni security forces, they risk deportation before they can make their political case to
the UNHCR. The Yemen government views them as ―economic migrants‖ in search of
jobs and therefore ineligible for asylum.366
In 2009, more than 74,000 Somalis and
Ethiopians arrived on Red Sea beaches, up from 50,000 in 2008.367
For the first time,
Ethiopians outnumbered Somalis.368
In early 2010, Sanaa announced it would ―close all
its main waterways‖ to prevent militant infiltration—a policy that would affect Somali
361 The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―U.S. to Join Talks on Helping Yemen.‖ 26 January 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/world/middleeast/27yemen.html 362
BBC News. ―Dozens Dead in Yemen Fuel Riots.‖ 22 July 2005.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4707145.stm 363
UN High Commissioner of Refugees. ―Some 74,000 Africans Cross Gulf of Aden to Yemen in Record-
Breaking Year.‖ 18 December 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/4b2bac179.html 364
Forced Migration Review. Forced Migration Review, Issue No. 34: Urban Displacement. Morris, Tim.
―Urban Somali Refugees in Yemen.‖ February 2010. http://www.fmreview.org/urban-
displacement/FMR34/36-38.pdf 365
Relief Web. Yemen Times. Al-Hilaly, Khaled. ―Yemen Examining Its Policy of Offering Somalis
Automatic Asylum.‖ 24 December 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SNAA-
7Z356G?OpenDocument 366
Voice of America News. Murdock, Heather. ―Tougher Times Ahead for Yemen‘s Somali Refugees.‖ 25
January 2010. http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Tougher-Times-Ahead-Yemens-Somali-
Refugees-82625192.html 367
Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Somali Refugees Risk Passage to Yemen.‖ 15
February 2010. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/15/world/la-fg-yemen-refugees15-2010feb15 368
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen-Horn of Africa: African
Arrivals in 2009 Up 55 Percent.‖ 17 January 2010. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87759
refugees attempting to reach Yemeni shores. Yet Yemen‘s Coast Guard lacks the
resources to enforce this policy.369
Poverty
One of the biggest predictors of social conflict is the
proportion of young men ages 15 to 24 in a society. The
median age for males in Yemen is 16.7 years.370
Most
face bleak job prospects in a country where 45% of the
population already lives on less than USD 2 per day.
Given the country‘s steeply declining oil wealth, there is
little prospect of an improvement in the job market, since
few other sectors of the economy have been developed.
In rural areas, land is often inequitably divided, leaving many unable to support
themselves. Since Yemen imports almost all its food, poor Yemenis must reduce
consumption when international prices rise.371
Although global food prices have declined
after reaching unprecedented heights in 2008, the prices of basic commodities remain too
high for many families. Malnutrition is widespread and presents a serious social
problem.372
If the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia were to allow Yemenis to again work in their
countries, as they did prior to the Persian Gulf War, unemployment in Yemen would be
reduced. Yet to re-establish this practice would also open the door to militants posing as
guest workers, a prospect that makes recipient governments nervous.
Armed Forces
When North and South Yemen were unified in 1990, their respective
armed forces were only nominally merged. The civil war in 1994
pitted the two armed forces against each other. It was not until March
1995 that a full merger of the two occurred. The number of
uniformed personnel is high, and the military budget is believed to
consume about 50% of the national budget. Military officers are in
control of key positions within the government. There are an
unknown number of fictitious soldiers on the payroll, which enables
369 The National. ―Yemen Moves to Leave Somali Militants High and Dry.‖ 22 February 2010.
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100223/FOREIGN/702229846/1135/WEEKEND
ER 370
Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Yemen.‖ 1 April 2010.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html# 371
IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Soaring Food Prices Force
More People Below Poverty Line.‖ 29 April 2008. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77965 372
Eurasia Review. Cirri, Giancarlo. ―Humanitarian Relief for Yemen in Jeopardy.‖ 3 February 2010.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/2010/02/31576-humanitarian-relief-for-yemen-in.html
their salaries to be spent in other ways.373
In 2007, active duty troops were spread among
the three branches of service as follows: Army: 60,000; Navy: 1,700; and Air Force:
5,000. Although the troop levels are high, a draft was still implemented in 2007 to reduce
unemployment and ensure a ready supply of recruits.374
Yemeni troops are poorly
equipped relative to other militaries in the region. Moreover, there is a formidable turf-
based bureaucracy governing their use. For example, the anti-terrorism unit (established
in the wake of the U.S.S. Cole bombing) under the Ministry of the Interior must request
helicopter support from the Air Force, which falls under the Ministry of Defense.375
The
Air Force may choose not to respond, which would likely impede the timeliness and
effectiveness of an appropriate response. Even as the Yemeni anti-terrorism unit is
receiving training from U.S. and UK troops, it remains to be seen if the Yemeni
bureaucracy is able of executing a coordinated response to a national threat.
In addition, there are tribal militias, sometimes referred to collectively as the ―tribal
military complex,‖ which do not want the national armed forces strengthened. The central
government has limited authority over tribal areas and does not control their militias;
therefore, it may not meet the definition of statehood.376
For example, unofficial prisons
exist in tribal areas. Detainees may have offended a shaykh or simply may need
protection from retaliation during a dispute. There is no regulation of these informal
facilities, which may simply be part of a shaykh’s residential complex rather than an
independent facility.377
Finally, the country is awash in arms. Male members of urban
households likely own a pistol, while rural Yemenis carry a rifle, typically an AK-47.378
Looking Ahead
In addition to the growing population, and depletion of
water and oil resources, a generational leadership change
could also bring instability to Yemen. Those who fought
for the Republican Revolution in the north and secession
in the south will pass from positions of power during the
373 Human Security Gateway, HSRP, Simon Fraser University. Norwegian Peacebuilding Center. Noref
Report No. 4. Saif, Ahmed Abdelkareem. ―Complex Power Relations in Yemen Provide Opportunities for
Al Qaeda.‖ February 2010.
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/Noref_ComplexPowerRelationsInYemenProvideOppor
tunitiesForAlQaeda.pdf 374
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf 375
The Wall Street Journal. Coker, Margaret and Charles Levinson. ―Bureaucracy Hampers Yemeni
Military Effort.‖ 11 January 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126316582583323587.html 376
Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern
Europe. Thomson, Janice. ―Chapter 1: The State, Violence and Sovereignty [p. 1].‖ 1994. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. 377
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. 2009 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices. ―2009 Human Rights Report: Yemen.‖ 11 March 2010.
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm 378
BBC News. ―Yemen‘s Weapon Culture.‖ 22 January 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1775938.stm
next decade.379
In Yemen, leadership positions are typically filled on a hereditary basis.
President Saleh is grooming his son Ahmed to succeed him. So far, Ahmed has kept a
low public profile. He is viewed in some quarters as a leader capable of holding the
country together.380
Yet in promoting his son as his successor, Saleh has been forced to
weaken potential rivals in the next generation, including the kin of key, longstanding
supporters, such as Shaykh Abdallah Al Ahmar, the leader of the important Hashid tribe.
Thus, ―with Saleh increasingly working to ensure that the presidency is transferred to his
own son, Ahmed, President Saleh has, as [scholar April] Alley pointed out, increasingly
marginalized Abdallah‘s son, Hamid—who retaliated by actively supporting Saleh‘s
electoral rival in 2006.‖381
With the loss of this important family‘s support, Ahmed‘s
potential to hold the country together in light of declining oil revenues is in doubt,
particularly since he is untested as a leader. The brunt of the unfolding economic crisis
will likely hit about the same time Saleh steps down after decades in power, forcing his
successor to confront hard choices in a country where the majority of people are already
only eking out a subsistence-level existence.382
379 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Bodine, Barbara K. ―Beware of False Analogies: Why
Yemen is Not Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia…It‘s Yemen.‖ 20 January 2010.
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/BodineTestimony100120a.pdf 380
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sadiki, Larbi. ―Like Father, Like Son: Dynastic
Republicanism in the Middle East.‖ No date.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/dynastic_republicanism.pdf 381
Middle East Strategy at Harvard. Katz, Mark N. ―Whither Yemen?‖ 18 November 2009.
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/11/whither-yemen/ 382
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Policy. Boucek, Christopher and Gregory
Johnsen. ―The Well Runs Dry.‖ February 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23061