World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · cancelled on June 10, 1997. In...

Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 19454

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

FOOD SECURITY PROJECT(LOAN 3388-CM)

June 21, 1999

Rural Development 2Africa Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

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EXCHANGE RATE

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

The CFAF is pegged to the French Franc. Following the devaluation of the CFAF on January 12, 1994,the ratio changed from FF 1 for 50CFAF to FF 1 for CFAF 100.

US$1.00 = CFAF 283 (1991)US$1.00 = CFAF 263 (1992)US$1.00 = CFAF 288 (1993)US$1.00 = CFAF 536 (1994)US$1.00 = CFAF 512 (1995)US$1.00 = CFAF 512 (1996)US$1.00= CFAF 583 (1997)US$1.00 = CFAF 590 (1998)

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric system

BORROWER'S FISCAL YEAR

Government: July 01 - June 31Food Security Project: Jan. 01 - December 31

Vice President Jean-Louis SarbibDirector Serge Michailof

Sector Manager Joseph Baah-DwomohStaff Member Jean Delion

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADIE Association pour le Developpement de l'Information Environnementale

APCU Aerial Pest Control UnitCAA Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (External)

Debt AgencyCFAF CFA FrancCFC Credit Foncier du CamerounFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFIMAC Fund for Micro-Projects in Agriculture and Community Development (Fonds

d'Intervention pour les Micro-Realisations Agricoles et Communautaires)

FONADER National Rural Development FundFSAR I First Rural Development Fund ProjectFSAR II Second Rural Development Fund Project

FSP Food Security ProjectIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA International Development AssociationIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIRAD Institut de Recherche Agricole pour le DeveloppementMESIRES Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

MINAGRI Ministry of AgricultureMINASCOF Ministry of Soc. Affairs and Feminine ConditionMINAT Ministry of Territorial Administration

MINSANTE Ministry of HealthNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationPPDR Small-Scale Rural Development Activities (Petits Projets de Developpement

Rural)SAL Structural Adjustment LoanSAP Structural Adjustment ProgramSNAR National Early Warning Agency (Service National d'Alerte Rapide)

SODECOTON Societe de Developpement du CotonSOWEDA South West Development AssociationUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUTAVA Aerial Pest Control Unit (Unite de Traitements Agricoles par Voie Aerienne)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the

performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without

World Bank authorization.

Table of Contents

1. PREFACE .1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. EVALUATION SUMMARY .1

Project Objectives.iiAchievement of Objectives .iii

Micro-project component.iiiLocust control component . iiiEarly Warning System component .ivMarket infrastructure component ...........................Iv..............I..,.,.,.,.,,,,.,,..I .,, ivPilot nutrition education component .iv

Major Factors affecting the Project .ivProject Sustainability.vBank Performance.vBorrower Performance .vAssessment of outcome .viFuture operations .viLessons learnt and recommendations .vi

3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .1

INTRODUCTION.1A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES .2B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES .3

Micro-project component .3Locust control component .4Early Warning System .5Market infrastructure component .5Nutrition education component .6

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT .6Factors Not Subject to Borrower's Control .6Factors Generally Subject to Borrower 's Control .6Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency's Control .7

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABLITY .7E. BANK PERFORMANCE .................... 8................................... 8F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ............ 9G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ............ 9H. FUTURE OPERATIONS .10I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .11

4. PART 1: STATISTICAL TABLES .13

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS .13TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS/CREDITS .14TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE .15TABLE 4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS ................................................ 15TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION . 16TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION .... 17TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT . 17

TABLE 8 A-A: PROJECT COSTS BY COMPONENT .................................................. 19TABLE 8 A-B: PROJECT COSTS BY CATEGORY (BANK FUNDING ONLY) .................................................. 1 9TABLE 8 B: PROJECT FINANCING .................................................. 20TABLE 9: EcONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS .................................................. 20TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS .................................................. 28TABLE 1 1: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENT .................................... .............. 33TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS .................................................. 33TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS .................................................. 34

5. APPENDIX A: MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE ..................................................... 35

6. APPENDIX B: BORROWER CONTRIBUT'ION TO THE ICR ..................................................... 43

7. APPENDIX C: MISCELLANEOUS .54

8. APPENDIX D: MAPS ................ ,58

Map no. IBRD 302'13


CAMEROON


1. PREFACE

1.1 This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Food Security Project inCameroon for which loan 3388-CM in the amount of US$23.0 million equivalent was approved onJuly 02, 1991 and made effective on May 27, 1992. An amount of US$10.6 million equivalent wascancelled on June 10, 1997. In addition to the Bank loan, the Project also benefited from a JapaneseGovernment Grant (US$5.1 million equivalent).

1.2 The loan was closed on December 31, 1998, six months earlier than the initially planned dateof June 30, 1999 except for one component, the locust control, which was closed on May 31, 1999. Itis expected to be fully disbursed, and the last disbursement is expected to take place before June 30,1999.

1.3 Preparation of the ICR began during the Bank's final supervision mission which took place inNov/Dec 1998. The borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by preparing its ownevaluation of the project's execution and submitting it to the ICR mission in November 1998.

1.4 A first draft of he ICR was prepared during the ICR mission by Jean Delion, Angeline Mani,Georges Minang, Clotilde Ndomb and Ndjebet Yaka Helene of the Resident Mission in Yaounde.This draft was later consolidated by Jean Delion, Aly Sy and Thierry Brun.


CAMEROON


2. EVALUATION SUMMARY

2.1 The Cameroon Food Security Project (Loan No. 3388-CM) was the first of its kind in theAfrica Region. It was initiated after the Government adopted a revised food security strategy withBank assistance in a context of severe deterioration of the economy. This new strategy emphasizedthe removal of supply and demand constraints in order to generate agricultural growth, which wasconsidered to be the basic factor for food security. To address these constraints, the project aimed atsupporting income generating, social and infrastructure micro-projects and at increasing foodmarketing efficiency.

2.2 The Food Security Project (FSP) was also an integral part of the structural adjustmentstrategy and was intended to alleviate the negative impact of adjustment measures on the population'saccessibility to food, and foster participation of the poor in the growth process. The Loan amountwas US$23.00 million equivalent. The Project benefited also from a Japanese Grant (US$5.1 millionequivalent).

Project Objectives

2.3 The overall objective was poverty reduction. The general strategy was to improve foodsecurity through capacity building and increasing the incomes of targeted segments of the ruralpopulation. The project outputs were: a) to create employment opportunities and raise thepurchasing power of rural groups, particularly women; b) to reduce the impact of locust attacks onfood production in northern regions; c) to increase the efficiency of staple foods marketing, and; d) totest nutrition interventions aimed at improving the dietary practices of vulnerable groups.

2.4 Implementation was carried out under five components:

a) micro-projects: Entrusted to the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), this component was tofinance income-generating micro-projects prepared by farmer groups at the grass roots level(including commercial, non-commercial activities and micro-infrastructures). In the SAR, it wasto absorb 52% of the total project funding;b) locust control: Entrusted to the Aerial Pest Control Unit (UTAVA), this component was toreduce the impact of locust attacks by aerial spraying in the North and extreme North of thecountry;c) early warning system: Entrusted to MINAGRI, this component was to establish a fullyoperational Early Warning Market and Information Agency (SNAR) on food shortages;

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d) market infrastructure: This component, entrusted to the "Credit Foncier du Cameroon"(CFC), was to build and renovate market facilities in secondary cities and rural communes; ande) pilot nutrition education: Entrusted to the Ministry of Health (MINSANTE), this componentwas to implement a pilot nutrition education program for vulnerable groups.

Achievement of Objectives

2.5 The involvement of many agencies and sectors in the FSP, and the absence of a reliablemonitoring and evaluation system for every project componen, make it difficult to get a fully accuratemeasure of achievement. Overall, project objeatives were only partially achieved but many lessonswere learned, on the ways to mobilize community participation, on the need to apply market basedinterest rates even i:n poverty alleviation projects such as this one. The Bank applied these lessons inother countries in similar projects, and the borrower will apply them in forthcoming food security andrural finance projects in preparation with IFAD support

Micro-project compionent

2.6 This component partially achieved its objective of raising the purchasing power of ruralgroups and creating employment opportunities. However from a micro-finance standpoint, poorresults were achieved.

2.7 Within MINAGRI, the component was implemented by the Fund for Micro-Projects inAgriculture and Coimmunity Development (FINMAC). By providing training and extending credit to2,906 groups (39% more than initially targeted), the component had a positive impact on ruralemployment and incomes. Of the 20,206 beneficiaries involved in these groups, 43% were women.FIMAC covered all the 52 districts of the coantry. Based on the internal rates of return (IRR)generated by the "modeles de reference" prepared by FIMAC, most of the activities financed underthis component have been generally more profitable than what was initially forecast in the SAR,therefore bringing substantial financial gains to the beneficiary groups.

2.8 From a micro-finance standpoint, however, FIMAC experienced a low recovery rate (about73%) for the first generation loans. The component did not achieve its objective regarding theexperimental micro-credit fund for cash-generating activities; this fund was never implemented.However, before the end of the project, recycled funds were transferred into trust funds managed bynearly 300 private micro-finance institutions (MFIs). Groups who benefited from first generationloans are being linked to these MFIs who will use the trust funds to finance second generation micro-projects. FIMAC has been able to link 81% of these beneficiary groups to MFIs. 11% were due tobe linked in March/April 1999, bringing the total linkage rate to 92%.

2.9 This component used US$1.9 million equivalent from the Japanese grant to finance technicalassistance, training and the first micro-projects from 1991 to 1994.

Locust control com;7onent

2.10 Achievements were negligible for this component. UTAVA has been constantly plagued byprocurement problems and was able to acquire only one plane at the very end of the project. Itscapacity to carry out aerial spraying has been very limited throughout the project. However UTAVAwas restructured and, as a consequence, its wage bill was cut down making it more cost effective.Spare parts were bought to repair two planes and personnel were trained overseas in pest control andaeronautical mechanics. A few rural communities in the Northern provinces were trained in the use

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of satellite Global Positioning System (GPS) in order to test their ability to alert intervention teams incase of locust attacks. This training was a success and UTAVA is planning to expand it in thecoming years.

Early Warning System component

2.11 This component achieved its objective in a substantial way. Its main financing source wasthe Japanese Grant and, from 1991 to 1997, US$3.2 million equivalent was used to fund technicalassistance, training, equipment and operational expenses. The Early Warning System has been fullyoperational since 1997. Information on prices and volume of staple foods available in 56 rural andurban markets nationwide has been provided through a monthly publication, rural radio programs andpostings in markets. In the three provinces most exposed to food shortages (Far North, North andEast), 26 groups at risk have been monitored monthly and this information made available to decisionmakers. This has enabled appropriate measures to be taken in order to avert famine. Local stafftrained and equipped at the district, provincial and national levels have demonstrated their ability tocarry out food security surveillance without external assistance.

Market infrastructure component

2.12 Achievements under this component have been negligible. Out of the planned 30 markets,only 6 were built. Of these six markets, only two are fully operational. CFC was very slow inimplementing this component because it wanted to be very careful in protecting its financial interestas it was lending to municipalities plagued by internal problems.

2.13 The component was able to train 20 provincial directors of CFC agencies, 13 trainers fromCFC, and 15 from the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) but only two seminars wereprovided for mayors. Study tours were organized in Morocco and Burkina Paso to visit markets andother economic activities implemented and managed by municipalities.

Pilot nutrition education component

2.14 This component partially achieved its objectives. It conducted several nutrition educationresearch and training activities. It provided training to 357 staff members from four differentministries (Health, Agriculture, Social Affairs and Higher Education), to NGOs and to over 1,500community leaders and field agents. The community leaders organized "nutrition groups" in theircommunities and trained their members (essentially women). Evaluation studies were completed andindicated that around 40% of the women in these nutrition groups improved their nutritionalknowledge, and that 20% of these women actually improved their nutritional practices.

Major Factors affecting the Project

2.15 Two major factors outside of the borrower's control adversely affected the project. Thecancellation of US$10.6 millions equivalent of the initial IBRD loan of US$23 million in 1997,following the devaluation of the CFA Franc (CFAF) in 1994. Contrary to what the Borrower hadexpected the cancelled amount on the IBRD loan was not replaced by an IDA credit.

2.16 The following factors, under the borrower's control, adversely affected the project: (a) animportant public service salary reduction in 1993 which affected the morale of civil servants; (b) theinability of the project to involve commercial banks in the micro-credit aspect of FIMAC; (c) the lack

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of proper coordination during project implementation; and (d) the insufficient knowledge ofprocurement procedures which caused major delays.

2.17 The borrower also took initiatives thal: had positive impacts on the project, such as (i)decentralization of the decision making process; (ii) creation of a strong coordinating unit in 1997(iii) hiring of an internal controller in the micro-credit scheme to improve financial management (iv)active campaigns in the media to support project implementation; and (v) strong political supportfrom ministers, governors and district authorities.

Project Sustainability

2.18 Globally, project sustainability is uncertain. The capacity building effort generated across allcomponents is likely to have a sustained impact, as is the emphasis put on beneficiary participation.For example, the beneficiaries are likely to continue to use their knowledge on micro-investments, theuse of financial services and nutritional practices. However, at the component level, the picture ismixed.

2.19 Activities carried out under the micro-project component are likely to continue outside theFIMAC scheme provided that beneficiaries react positively to the introduction of interest rates andthat the first generation loans are completely reimbursed. The Borrower is capitalizing on thepositive achievements of this component in an upcoming IFAD Food Security/Rural Finance Project.For the locust control component, sustainability is uncertain; UTAVA has been stocked with enoughpesticides for the next three years and has a new plane. It will be less dependent on governmentfunding following its restructuring. If the plane is well managed, UTAVA's activities are likely to besustainable. The Early Warning System is the component most likely to be sustainable because, withSNAR, the country has the necessary tool to produce the data needed to warn of food shortages. Thegovernment has allocated resources to support this agency and FAO is committed to providetechnical support. Sustainability is uncertain for the market infrastructure component, as only twomarkets are operational. However, CFC has leanied from this experience and it has started to commitits own funds to continue building two new markets. Sustainability is also likely for the nutritioneducation component which should be integrated into the MINSANTE programs.

Bank Performance

2.20 Bank perfonnance was unsatisfactory. Although it was good at the identification andpreparation stages, it became less satisfactory at the appraisal and negotiation stages. Duringappraisal, the Bank overestimated the Borrower's institutional capacity to implement such a complexproject. During the negotiations, it agreed to provide interest-free loans on micro-projects, as theproject was focusing on poverty alleviation. This was in contradiction with the bank guidelines onthe development of sustainable micro-finance instituions. During implementation, although the Bankhad the proper skills mix, there were numerous changes of task manager, thus causing a continuityproblem. There was no formal mid-tenn evaluation.

Borrower Performance

2.21 Overall, Bonrower performance has beer[ unsatisfactory. Although project preparation wassatisfactory as the Borrower conducted participatory appraisals in the ten provinces, project designwas deficient as it took interest rates out of the micro-project component and gave a pivotal role tocivil servants rather than NGOs and private organizations. Project implementation was slow and

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deficient in coordination and procurement aspects. Overall, however, covenant compliance wassatisfactory.

Assessment of outcome

2.22 Overall the project outcome is unsatisfactory. Furthermore, this outcome was hard tomeasure. The activities were well monitored for the micro credit and the market information system,which used databases on microcomputers at the provincial and central levels. The project conductedimpact assessment studies for two components (micro-credit and nutrition) and a beneficiaryassessment for the whole project. But these studies did not produce reliable information on impact.

2.23 The project had poorly integrated components and its implementation by civil servants wastoo slow. In the micro-project component, a zero interest rate and a lack of service fees corrupted theproject design. This distorted the basic rules of sustainable micro-finance. The 73% recovery ratefor first generation loans was too low, leaving FIMAC with the burden to recover the CFAF I billionstill outstanding. The most significant project outcome is that it was able to train the 20,606 membersof the 2,906 beneficiary groups in the use of micro-credits. It was also able to "graduate" 92% of thegroups, which became clients of sustainable MFIs by the end of the project. The Locust Controlcomponent did not achieve any significant outcome but UTAVA has been properly outfitted in termsof equipment, pesticide and trained personnel to face future operations. The Early Warning Systemcomponent has achieved a significant outcome by setting up an efficient data gathering andprocessing system and by becoming a service provider for development agencies and programs. TheMarket Infrastructure component did not achieve any significant outcome but was able to definemore precise financing rules for building community markets. Finally, the Pilot Nutrition Educationcomponent developed efficient nutrition education methods at the community level.

Future operations

2.24 As a follow up to the micro-project component, the MINAGRI is designing a rural financeproject with IFAD. This new project will benefit from the institutional and technical capacities builtat MINAGRI by the FSP.

Lessons learnt and recommendations

2.25 Three types of lessons and recommendations can be drawn from this project:

a) Lessons and recommendations on the design and implementation of FSPs:* Civil servants should not be given a pivotal role in community micro-financemanagement;* Decentralizing most management responsibilities can have a stimulating impact onproject outreach;* Reliable monitoring and evaluation systems are needed;* Intensive and broad-based training is a pre-condition for adequate fieldimplementation performance;* A consistent and homogeneous supervision team is needed on both the Borrower andthe Bank sides;

b) Lessons and recommendations on micro-credit:

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* Micro-credit schemes should not be implemented with zero interest rates and withoutservice fees;* Micro-credits repaid by communities must be recycled rapidly;* More attention should be paid to the financial rates of return on micro-projects and tobeneficiary creditworthiness;

c) Lessons and recommendations on the achievement of objectives:* From a poverty reduction standpoint, the FSP suggests that mechanisms adopted inthis project caLn be effective in selecting, designing, and implementing thousands of micro-projects to reach remote villages in all provinces, based on poverty criteria;* The FSP showed how a sustained participatory process could breed innovations,create ownership and build capacities at the community level.


CAMEROON


3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

3.1 Following a period of strong economic growth from 1980 to 1985, the Cameroonianeconomy entered a period of economic crisis due not only to external factors (falling oil prices andsharp deterioration in its terms of trade) but also to wide-spread economic mismanagement. Facedwith this situation, in the early nineties, the Government adopted far-reaching macroeconomic andsectoral adjustment measures including a Structural Adjustment Program.

3.2 As the economy deteriorated, the agriculture sector, which had been growing annually atabout 4% in the 1965-1985 period, started to stagnate. This sector employed close to 60% of thepopulation and represented, on average, about 25% of Cameroon's GDP from 1980 to 1990. In 1990,it contributed about 35% of total export earnings. Although the country was widely recognized ashaving a high ratio of food self-sufficiency (96%), this situation tended to hide structural and naturalconstraints which greatly affected food security.

3.3 In order to improve this situation, the Government revised its food security strategy withBank assistance. The new strategy emphasized agricultural growth as a basic condition for foodsecurity and saw the removal of supply and demand constraints as the proper instruments to achievethis. The Government had already begun implementing this strategy through various policy andinvestment decisions. The Food Security Project (FSP) was designed to complete the strategyimplementation by increasing food marketing efficiency and supporting income generating andinfrastructure micro-projects.

3.4 The Bank had already been involved in poverty alleviation in Cameroon by financing SocialFunds. The first Social Fund, known as the Rural Development Fund Project (Credit No. 723-CM)which was approved in 1977, was followed in 1985 by a new project called the Second RuralDevelopment Fund or FSAR II (Loan No. 2567-CM). The FSP (Loan No. 3388-CM) which, for itsmajor component described below, builds on the experiences of these two previous projects(especially the PPDR component of the FSAR), was signed on September 16, 1991 between theGovernment of the Republic of Cameroon and the Bank. It became effective on May 27, 1992.

3.5 The project formed an integral part of the structural adjustment strategy by alleviating thenegative impact of adjustment measures on the population's accessibility to food, and fostering

2

participation of the poor in the growth process. The project, which was originally scheduled to closeon June 30, 1999, amounted to US$23.00 million equivalent and project implementation wasentrusted to five agencies: the MINSANTE, the MINAGRI, the CFC, the UTAVA and the SNAR.The Project, financed by the Bank, the Government of Cameroon, local municipalities andbeneficiaries, also benefitted from a Japanese Grant (US$5.1 million equivalent). This grant wasmainly used to prepare and initiate the project, fi-om 1991 to 1994 and to cover some expenses on theEarly Warning System which were carried out until 1997. Out of the US$5.1 million equivalent, 1.9million was used by the Micro-project component to finance technical assistance, training and thefirst micro-projects. The remaining US$3.2 million was used by the Early Warning Systemcomponent to fund technical assistance, training, equipment and operational expenses.

A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.6 The overall objective was poverty reduction. The general strategy was to improve foodsecurity through capacity building and increasing the incomes of targeted segments of the ruralpopulation. The project outputs were: a) to create employment opportunities and raise thepurchasing power of rural groups, particularly women; b) to reduce the impact of locust attacks onfood production in northern regions; c) to increase the efficiency of staple foods marketing and; d) totest nutrition interventions aimed at improving the dietary practices of vulnerable groups.

3.7 The objectives were very clear and closely related to production, physical availability,financial accessibility and utilization of food. They were also in line with the National Food SecurityStrategy in that they dealt as much with incentives to increase supply (by focussing on reducing theimpact of locust attacks and on increasing efficiency in marketing and storage of foodstuffs) as theydid with demand side measures (increase of employment opportunities and improvement of feedinghabits) and information and planning aspects. Imnplementation of these objectives was to be carriedout under the following five components.

3.8 A micro-project component: This component was to finance commercial cash-generatingactivities, non-commercial productive activities, infrastructure, and village storage facilities. At thetime of appraisal, this component, entrusted to the FIMAC, was to absorb 52% of the total funding.A second objective of this component was to bring rural groups into the mainstream of the privatecommercial credit system.

3.9 A locust control component. Entrusted to the UTAVA, this component was to reduce theimpact of locust attacks on food production in the North and Extreme North of the country. It was tolast over a three year period.

3.10 An Early Warning System component: Entrusted to the SNAR, this component was toestablish an Early Warning Market and Information System on food shortages.

3.11 A pilot market infrastructure component: Entrusted to the CFC, this component was to buildand renovate market facilities in urban (secondary cities) and rural communes.

3.12 A pilot nutrition education component: Entrusted to the MINSANTE, this component was todevelop and implement a pilot nutrition education program through research, testing anddissemination of nutrition messages. It was to last over a three year period (in one department in theExtreme North, Eastern and Western Provinces and the urban slums of Douala) and targeted high riskgroups, specifically children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women.

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B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

3.13 The multi-sectoral nature of the project makes its achievements difficult to measure globally.Criteria for judging the achievement of objectives were quantified in the SAR in terms of outreach.Depending on the component, a very uneven effort was made to define adequate performancecriteria; therefore the different components have to be looked at separately. Overall, projectobjectives were only partially achieved but many lessons were learned, on the ways to mobilizecommunity participation, on the need to apply market based interest rates even in poverty alleviationprojects such as this one. The Bank applied these lessons in other countries in similar projects, andthe borrower will apply them in forthcoming food security and rural finance projects in preparationwith IFAD support.

Micro-project component

3.14 This component achieved its objective of training the group members on the use of financialservices, of raising the purchasing power of the group members and creating employmentopportunities. However from a micro-finance standpoint, the results were limited. Before the projectstart, the Japanese Grant was used to pay for the training of 10 regional coordinators during one yearin Gabon. It was further used to train district supervisors and members of the first groups, from 1991to 1993.

3.15 From an outreach standpoint, a well-trained team was able to extend credit to 2,906 groups(involving 20,606 members, of which 43% were women) against a target of 2,067 groups. Thegroups came from the 52 districts of the country, as illustrated on the map in appendix D. Training inmicro-project management was initially provided by projet staff, and subcontracted to NGOs after1993. The members from 1,595 groups benefited from formal organizational, financial and technicaltraining sessions. The other groups benefited from informal training on preparation andimplementation of the micro-projects. The above results were achieved at a time when public supportto agricultural credit had ceased and when investment funding was not available to farmers.

3.16 Group members used the micro-credits provided by the project essentially for foodproduction and processing, as illustrated in the graph in appendix C: 32% of the groups were engagedin food crops production, 24% in livestock, 18% in animal traction, 7% in vegetable growing and16% in processing (flour and oil mills). Very few groups used the funds for village infrastructure(3%) as most villagers were mainly attracted by income generating activities.

3.17 Activities financed under this component were generally profitable as indicated by abeneficiary assessment carried on in 1995 and as suggested by the Internal Rates of Return computedby the project staff. The project trained 10 provincial staff in micro-project management during oneyear in Gabon. The trainees prepared 10 "reference activity models", including IRRS. These activitymodels were updated, based upon samples of real activities conducted by groups in differentprovinces. When compared to similar models shown in the SAR, the IRRs from the real cases aresubstantially higher than the initially estimated 15%. Some examples are provided in table 9 of theannex, they report very high IRRs, above 150%. The figures could not be verified during the ICRprocess as time did not premit to elaborate detailed activity models. Still, the beneficiary assessmentreports that group members felt that food availability and income had been improved by their accessto micro-credit. Furthermore, 90% of the groups became clients of MFIs by the end of the project,and are willing to continue using credit services, even with market based interest rates. This suggeststhat they are convinced to get a positive return on their future investments.

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3.18 From a micro-finance standpoint, however, the component did not achieve all its objectives.The average recoveiy rate for micro-projects loans has been low (73% on March 31, 1999) andvariable depending on the province (only three reached rates higher than 85%). This low rate ismainly due to the fact that these loans were not perceived as real loans, as they were handled by civilservants, they had ze:ro interest rates and they did not charge service fees.

3.19 The component did not achieve its micro-finance objective regarding the experimental micro-credit fund for cash-generating activities. Th.is sub-component was never implemented mainlybecause the commercial banks were not interested in managing this experimental fund. Theborrower's own experience with micro-credit management through MINAGRI had ended with theliquidation (in 1989) of FONADER, the agricultural credit institution created inside the MINAGRI.Still, this objective was partly met by the links that were established, by the project's end, withprivate MFIs. Two years before the end of the project, the revolving funds were transferred as TrustFunds to about 30(0 private MFIs. In this new approach, management responsibilities weretransferred from MINAGRI to autonomous private rural development structures. For this secondround of loans, the first generation beneficiary groups have been linked to private MFIs which lentthem money partly guaranteed by the revolving funds and partly by their own savings. Thisguarantees the availability, at local levels, of more financial resources at affordable interest rates forsmall farmers who cannot meet the requirements of the formal banking sector and therefore it closesthe gap between the formal and informal financial sectors.

3.20 The first step of this new approach has been quite successful. Of the 2,810 groups whichwere involved in productive investments in the first round, 81% were linked to MFIs by February 28,1999 (the 96 groups which were involved in village infrastructure were not taken into accountbecause they did not pay back their loans but simply made provisions for depreciation). Half of theremaining groups was due to be linked in March/April 1999. The other half is located in very remoteareas where there are no MFIs. In those cases, the revolving funds will be transformed into villagedevelopment funds which will be used to build local infrastructure. This new approach cannot yet beconsidered a success as the linkage with private MFIs started in the last two years of the project andhas not had the time to prove that it can function properly.

3.21 Finally, the component did not achieve its objective regarding the construction of villagestorage facilities in the Far North. This sub-component was never implemented; a study conducted in1991 showed that formner attempts carried by NGOs were not successful.

Locust control component

3.22 This component achieved negligible results. The capacity of UTAVA to carry out aerialspraying of locusts has been limited from 1992 to 1997 by the lack of pesticides while in 1998, thelast year of the project, it was by the lack of operational planes (there were enough pesticides but onlyone plane was available to do the spraying). Activities foreseen under the component included thepurchase of two planes and spare parts to enable aerial spraying of locusts, training of personnel, andfinancing operating costs. When this component first became operational, spare parts were bought torepair two planes. Major delays due to procurement problems have plagued UTAVA all along theproject. One plane was bought in April 1999, about three months after the end of all other projectactivities.

3.23 As planned, two studies have been completed for this component. The first dealt with theimprovement of UTAVA's performance and has led to the restructuring of UTAVA and the ensuing

5

reduction of its work force to between 15 and 18, thereby reducing its wage bill. The second study,focussing on the cost-benefit aspect of crop protection services, was completed in 1994. Four pilots(specialized training in crop-dusting techniques) and two mechanics (aircraft maintenance and repair)have been trained and local communities in the beneficiary provinces have also been trained to bettermonitor and alert technical teams who are then able to carry out rapid interventions.

Early Warning System

3.24 This component has achieved its objective in a substantial way. From 1991 to 1997, thiscomponent, totally financed by the Japanese Grant, was implemented in two phases. The first phasewas slow and led, in 1995, to a new approach. The second phase was implemented with FAOsupport and was very efficient.

3.25 During the first phase, a National Early Warning System (SNAR) was established byMINAGRI at district, provincial and national levels. Staff at these three levels were trained from1991 to 1995. This phase was slow and plagued by accounting and audit problems that stoppeddisbursements in 1995 and 1996. The central disbursement agency in Cameroon, the "CaisseAutonome d'Amortissement" (CAA) was slow in making funds available to SNAR.

3.26 During the second phase, starting in 1995, the whole system was reorganized, with FAOproviding technical assistance to a small national team. The new Early Warning System, fullyoperational since 1997, has been of particular importance to the Northern provinces of the countrywhere food crop production is constantly exposed to droughts and attacks from migratory locusts andbirds. Adequate information on food security in the country has been provided through a regularmonthly publication and this has been very useful. For instance, two early warnings (in 1994 and1997) have helped avert serious food shortages in difficult circumstances.

3.27 Information on food crop availability in different parts of the country has been provided todecision makers and farmers alike in a bid to influence market supply and to avoid price hikes. Thisinformation has been made available through rural radios on a weekly basis and has provided pricesand volume of foodstuff available in 56 rural and urban markets nationwide. This information hasalso been posted in those markets.

3.28 In the three provinces most exposed to food shortages (Far North, North and East), 26 groupsat risk have been monitored on a monthly basis, and information collected on these groups has beenmade available to decision makers thus enabling them to take appropriate measures to avert famine.

3.29 Local staff have been trained and equipped at the district, provincial and national levels of theMINAGRI and this team have shown their ability to produce all the information needed by SNARwithout external assistance.

Market infrastructure component

3.30 Achievements under this component have been negligible as major problems occurred on thefirst investments. The component started late (early 1994) because CFC was still using funds fromanother project (the Second Urban Development Project; Loan No. 2999-CM) for the same purpose.CAA and CFC had disagreements on who would be managing the Special Account set up for thiscomponent. Community Councils were not able to finance the required feasibility studies.

6

3.31 Out of the planned total of 30 to 40 markets, only 6 were built by municipalities, with CFCloans. During the first years, CFC mainly conducted training for its staff and for mayors. A total of20 provincial directors of CFC agencies, 13 facilitators from CFC, 15 facilitators from the MINATand 146 mayors were trained. Study tours were organized in Morocco and Burkina Faso. Then threemarkets were built in 1996 and three others in 1997. Social cohesion was hard to establish as theimplementation started during a period of political turmoil and instability. Market construction insome municipalities was hampered by personality and political differences and conflicts over marketlocation. Of the six markets that were built, only two are fully operational but two more can reachthat status if the Councils have full control of the management responsibilities. The remaining twomarkets are not used by the municipalities.

Nutrition education component

3.32 This component partially achieved its objectives. The activities started slowly, as thecomponent was providing training to health staff in public hospitals and dispensaries. The approachwas drastically revised in 1994 and the emphasis was put on training community groups in areasaffected by food insecurity. It conducted several nutrition education research and training activitiesin selected test areas, in the North, West and Littoral regions. It provided training to 357 staffmembers from four different ministries (Health, Agriculture, Social Affairs and Higher Education), toNGOs and to over 1,500 community leaders and field agents. The community leaders organized"nutrition groups" in their communities and trained their members (essentially women). Evaluationstudies were completed and indicated that around 40% of the women in these nutrition groupsimproved their nutritional knowledge, and that 20% of these women actually improved theirnutritional practices.

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT

Factors Not Subject to Borrower's Control

3.33 Changes in the economic environment. The devaluation of the CFAF in January 1994 hadnegative impacts on the project. Cameroon beamne eligible for IDA funds and, as the project hadbeen slow in disbursing, part of the IBRD loan was cancelled in 1997 (US$ 10.6 million equivalent).At the time, around 2,600 groups had submitted ifunding requests to FIMAC and MINAGRI and wereexpecting that IDA funds would replace the cancelled amount. As this did not happen, FIMAC staffand candidate groups were discouraged. The word quickly spread that "FIMAC was closing" andthat it was not necessary to pay back the on going credits anymore. This resulted in a further drop inthe repayment rates.

Factors Generally Subject to Borrower's Conl:rol

3.34 Cuts in civil servants' purchasing power. The 50% salary cut suffered by all Camerooniancivil servants, (compounded by the 50% devaluation) de-motivated project staff and prevented themfrom fully contributing to project implementation.

3.35 The commercial micro-credit aspect of FIMAC was not implemented. The borrowercould not find the proper incentives to involve commercial banks in this scheme. After this activitywas dropped, the borrower did not take the decision to find an alternative until the last two years ofthe project when it b:rought in MFIs under the second generation loan scheme. As a consequence, the

7

viability of a micro-credit program including interest rates had still not been tested at the end of theproject.

Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency's Control

3.36 Coordination of the implementing agencies. Insufficient project coordination causedimplementation delays. This was due to the fact that different Ministries and agencies, which werenot answerable to the MINAGRI, had management responsibilities in some project components. Theborrower established a coordinating unit in 1997, and this measure had a positive impact on projectactivities.

3.37 Handling of procurement procedures. Delays in awarding procurement contracts seriouslyhampered project implementation. For instance, the purchase of the plane by UTAVA happened onlyin May 1999, bringing about two extensions of the loan closing date. The borrower hired an InternalController for the micro-credit component in 1998, which resulted in improvements in procurementand financial management.

3.38 Changes in implementation procedures. The change in the minimum contribution requiredfrom FIMAC beneficiaries opened project funding to a larger number of beneficiary groups thanwould have been the case with the original arrangements. The borrower also took appropriate stepsto decentralize the decision making and disbursement processes at the provincial level for loans notexceeding CFAF 500,000 speeding up the loan approval and disbursement process.

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

3.39 Although some components may be sustainable, overall the sustainability of the FSP isuncertain. The emphasis put on beneficiary participation and the linkage with the private financialsector are important factors in sustaining the achievements of this project.

3.40 The capacity and institution building effort generated across all components of the project islikely to be sustained. The skills acquired by beneficiary groups have prepared them for futuremicro-credit operations. The skills acquired by government staff will enable them to continueproviding useful advice in the various components. This is especially true for the MINAGRI wherearound 90 high-level staff have acquired the necessary expertise to provide technical assistance tofarmers in agricultural credit. Skills acquired by beneficiary groups in micro-project management arealso likely to be sustained.

3.41 The micro-projects component is likely to become sustainable: the MFIs should be able toextend more credit to small farmer groups, using the trust funds as partial guarantee for 25% of theloan amounts. Their operations are likely to be sustainable, as they will be charging market basedinterest rates. MINAGRI has expressed its commitment to continue monitoring the use of the trustfunds managed by the MFIs and expressed its willingness to sustain the FSP achievements in micro-project implementation. These achievements will be extended in the upcoming IFAD rural financeproject.

3.42 Sustainability is uncertain for the locust control component. UTAVA's sustainability willrely on the quality of its management. If well managed, it will become sustainable, as it is wellequipped and has stocks of insecticides. The fact that UTAVA was restructured early in the projecthas made it more efficient and has increased its financial sustainability by making it less dependant

8

on government funding (from 1990 to 1998 government funding has decreased from 80 to 20%). Asa test, UTAVA has trained some farmers in the art of setting traps and has organized them in "locustprevention brigades", providing them with Global Positioning Systems. This test proved to be asuccess, as the aerial spraying could be accurately targeted.

3.43 The Early Warning System component is likely to be sustainable. With SNAR, the countryhas developed a lasting capacity to monitor food markets and prices and to produce in a timelyfashion the data needed by decision makers to avert famines and food shortages. Furthermore, theEarly Warning Systern has been integrated into MINAGRI's operations by way of a budget allocationline made especially for the team in charge of SNAR by the Government of Cameroon since 1997.FAO has expressed its willingness to continue supporting data analysis and forecast as needed.Contracts signed by SNAR with SODECOTON, SOWEDA, ADIE, IRAD, CRDP, UNDP 1 and FAO,provide evidence that its achievements are widely recognized by its local and international partners.

3.44 Sustainability is unlikely for the market infrastructure component managed by CFC. Onlytwo markets out of the six that were built should continue their operations, covering their costs andpaying back their loans to CFC. Still, CFC has learned how to assess political risks by involving thebeneficiaries from the start. Construction has started for two other markets in 1998, with financingfrom CFC's own funds.

3.45 Sustainability is likely for the nutrition eaducation component. The achievements of this pilotintervention, mainly in terms of community participation, have been integrated into some ofMINSANTE and MDIAGRI programs, especially in the new "Health and Nutrition" project.

E. BANK PERFORMANCE

3.46 Overall Bank performance has not been satisfactory: The Bank did not resolve theunderlying dual aim of achieving social development objectives and achieving sound financialobjectives. This resulted in different judgments on project performance. In the identification stage,the performance was satisfactory in that it was consistent with the country's food security strategyand with the Bank's strategy which, at the time, was to protect poor segments of the populationduring a structural adjustment period.

3.47 In the appraisal stage, the Bank initially identified the supervision and implementation riskslinked to the complexity of the project but overestimated the Borrower's institutional capacity toimplement such a project. The Bank did not clarify whether the emphasis was on the social or on thefinancial side. The Bank agreed to fund micro-projects with interest-free loans. This was notcompatible with the basic rules of micro-finance: in the absence of interest rates the beneficiariescould not learn to use real credit instruments and ihe institutions involved could not cover their costs.The confusion between the social and financial objectives of the micro-project component wasmirrored in hesitations on where to anchor the project within the Bank. The project started in anAgricultural division, then it moved to a Human I)evelopment division in 1992, and it finally movedback to an agricultural division in 1996.

3.48 During implementation, performance was deficient although the Bank used the proper skillsmix and conducted two to four supervision missions per year, during project implementation. Therewas a lack of continuity in the Bank supervision efforts shown by the numerous changes of task

I See acronyms definition on the introductory part of this document.

9

managers during the project life (five in all, with each task manager bringing a differentunderstanding of the project's objectives). The lack of a formal mid-term evaluation prevented somecorrective measures from being taken at the right time. However, the Bank showed great flexibilitywith regard to implementation changes and to the reallocation of funds when the project wasrestructured in 1997. It was also instrumental in helping define a new approach that would improvethe chances of making the micro-project component sustainable.

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE

3.49 Overall, the Borrower's performance was not satisfactory. During project preparation,performance was satisfactory as the borrower conducted participatory appraisals in 6 provinces overthree months. During project implementation, the performance was not fully satisfactory asmanagement capacities in some of the implementing agencies (UTAVA and CFC) wereoverestimated. Although the Borrower was instrumental in creating conditions favorable to anincrease in the number of beneficiary groups funded through FIMAC (by amending the LoanAgreement and by decentralizing the loan processing procedures to provincial capitals), the Borrowerwas deficient in the coordination and management aspects of the project. A lack of propercoordination between the various agencies implementing the different components led toimplementation delays. So did the centralized disbursement system at the CAA which, by delayingthe submission of Statements of Expenditure (SOEs), hindered the replenishment of some of thespecial accounts. Nonetheless, all funds earmarked for the project after restructuring were disbursed.

3.50 Covenant compliance has been satisfactory. Procurement activities have been completed forall components but with major delays for the purchase of a plane for UTAVA. The govemment hasbeen slow in awarding some procurement contracts, especially for the purchase of replacementvehicles and motorcycles to continue certain activities after Bank funding stops. The CFCcomponent suffered setbacks due to a misunderstanding about the component's objectives by theimplementing agency. In 1998, an extemal compliance audit focussing on procurement proceduresimplemented by all Bank projects in Cameroon found no significant problems in the FSP whencompared to the other projects.

3.51 Audits for the various components of the project were late in 1994 and 1995. Majorproblems occurred on three components. SNAR did not set up a satisfactory accounting system until1994. These problems were all corrected in 1997. From 1997 to 1999 all audit reports were receivedby the Bank.

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME

3.52 Overall, the project outcome has been unsatisfactory although it was able to achievemeaningful but limited results from a poverty reduction standpoint. For the components managed bySNAR and MINSANTE, the outcome is partly satisfactory. However, for those componentsmanaged by FIMAC, UTAVA and CFC, it is not satisfactory.

3.53 The project outcome was hard to measure. The activities were well monitored for the microcredit and the market information system, which used databases on microcomputers at the provincialand central levels. The project conducted impact assessment studies for two components (micro-credit and nutrition) and a beneficiary assessment for the whole project. These studies did notproduce reliable information on impact.

10

3.54 The micro-project component did not achieve a satisfactory outcome. On one hand, thiscomponent had important outreach as it made financial resources available to poor rural farmers.From a food security standpoint, this component contributed to the increase in food production andrevenues for the expected beneficiaries. Fronr a social point of view, FIMAC had an importantimpact on capacity building for more than 20,000 beneficiaries, training them in the proper use offinancial services. These beneficiaries were later linked to formal MFIs. From these two laststandpoints, the project met its objectives. This component was also satisfactory in transforming therevolving funds into Trust Funds in private MFIs. On the other hand, however, the design of thiscomponent was corrupted by the absence of interest rates in the micro-credit process and itsimplementation by civil servants was very slow. As a consequence, the concept of sustainable micro-credit was distorted. In addition, the recovery rate was low (73%) and FIMAC needs to recover theCFAF one billion still outstanding from the first generation loans. Finally, two sub-components, themicro-credit fund for cash-generating activities and the village storage facilities were neverimplemented. Therefore, globally, the outcome is not satisfactory.

3.55 The locust control component did not achieve any significant outcome during the project but,at the end of the pro.ject, UTAVA is properly outfitted in terms of equipment, pesticide stocks, trainedpersonnel and restructured management to face future operations.

3.56 The Early Marning System componeni: achieved a significant outcome. It has set up anefficient data gathering and processing system and is financed in part by the Government and in partby service contracts with development agencies and programs.

3.57 The market infrastructure component has not achieved a significant outcome in terms of newmarkets built. Howvever, the project was successful in defining more precise financing rules forbuilding community markets and CFC has already started to build new markets with its own funds.

3.58 The pilot nutrition education component undertook baseline studies and developed efficientnutrition education rnethods at the community level. It reached a large number of people in its targetpopulation and improved their feeding habits.

H. FUTURE OPERATIONS

3.59 Institutional and technical capacities have been built up at the MINAGRI and this will enablethe Ministry to design and implement future proj ects with little external support. The monitoring andevaluation skills developed by the staff and those acquired and integrated in the Ministry's operationsare useful for on-going as well as future operations to be carried out by the Ministry.

3.60 As a follow up to the micro-project cornponent, the MINAGRI is preparing a rural financeproject with IFAD. This new project is likely to support the emerging private MFIs, without directinvolvement of civil servants into loan operations. MINAGRI will mainly monitor trust funds use bycooperating MFIs. It will keep a small team to monitor: (i) the recovery of the CFAF one billion stilloutstanding from the first generation loans; (ii) 1he annual reports of each cooperating MFI; and (iii)the financial return on micro-projects. Interest payments to the managing MFIs are likely to sustaincredit operations for the next five to ten years.

I1

I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.61 This project was rated by the beneficiaries of micro-credits and nutrition education assatisfactory or very satisfactory. Their main complaint was that 2,600 micro-projects were preparedand were not funded. Although the project faced many limitations, the beneficiaries indicated that itwas the first project in Cameroon that brought them concrete support, increasing directly their foodproduction and generating income through credit. The financial set-up of micro-credits was notsatisfactory and consequently less successful from a micro-finance standpoint.

Lessons on Food Security Project design

3.62 Civil servants should not be given a pivotal role in community micro-finance management.Implementation of similar activities in future projects should be handled by private NGOs or otherlocal organizations and local civil servants should have only a peripheral role if any.

3.63 Decentralizing most management responsibilities can have a stimulating impact on projectoutreach. MINAGRI opened ten sub-accounts, one in each province. Procurement of inputs formicro-projects was based on three pro-forma prepared by the groups themselves. MINAGRI createdten regional development committees to review FIMAC micro-project applications. These wereselection committees with a mandate broad enough to include resource allocation responsibilities.The central level could only oppose by using its veto, if needed. This veto was never used during theproject. The involvement of many participants at the regional level has created strong ownership andleft considerable experience and expertise at decentralized levels for similar operations in the future.

3.64 More reliable monitoring and evaluation systems are needed. The micro-credit and thenutrition components maintained a computerized database at the provincial and central levels, butapart from that, project monitoring and evaluation was not well organized. The project failed to makeprovisions for an independent impact evaluation system. This led to difficulties in assesing theeffects of the various components. Beneficiary assessments were useful to compensate for theseweaknesses. However they were qualitative and did not provide measurable evidence of impact onfood security.

Lessons on FSP implementation

3.65 Intensive and broad-based training is a pre-condition for adequate field implementationperformance. Such projects can have an important impact on capacity building; the project hasachieved good results in the number and diversity of training sessions provided to staff in allcomponents and to beneficiaries in the micro-project and nutrition component.

3.66 A consistent and homogeneous supervision team is needed, on the Borrower and the Banksides. Frequent changes of task managers are detrimental to project supervision. Such changes arespecially detrimental in the case of innovative projects such as this one: different task managers,brought their own perspective, putting more emphasis on one or the other sides of the project. Incontrast, projects of similar nature which have benefited from a consistent and homogeneoussupervision team have performed better.

Lessons on micro-credit

3.67 Micro-credit schemes cannot be implemented without interest rates. The absence of interestrates on micro-credits was one of the weakest points in the design of the project. As other African

12

food security and micro-credit projects have shown, market based interest rates are not an obstacle todissemination and are a condition for sustainability. They are also necessary to initiate poorcommunities in the use of genuine micro-credit.

3.68 Micro-credits repaid by communities must be recycled rapidly: Project design failed to makeappropriate arrangements to recycle the funds repaid by rural groups. The refunded sums werefrozen in bank accounts from 1992 until 1997 when innovative solutions were found to use them astrust funds incooperating MFIs. Similar projects would need to set up clear arrangements for secondgeneration loans to sitart at an early stage and to stimulate the whole process. The most appropriateway seems to link the beneficiary groups with existing micro-finance institutions from the beginning.

3.69 Such projects can raise local expertise in assessing rates of return of rural investments anddraw attention on the profitability of specific rural activities: The fact that three quarters of theparticipating rural groups were able to repay the initial loans suggests that most investments onductedby the groups were profitable. The project demonstrated that it could contribute to raise the expertiseof agricultural technical services to assess these rates of return and capitalize on the information onprofitability for future investments. It also showed that it was effective in building credit worthinessamong rural producers. Intensive training of beneficiaries and frequent site-visits made thousands ofrural groups capable of managing micro-projects. The fact that most of the groups became clients ofMFIS at the end of the project, indicates that they are willing to use credits for rural investments.

Lessons learned on achievement of poverty and participation objectives

3.70 From a poverty reduction standpoint, the project suggests that the mechanisms adopted canbe effective. It was able to select, design and implement thousands of micro-projects, located inremote villages in all provinces, "bringing for the first time concrete signs of external aid" accordingto the report from the beneficiary participation. 'However another lesson is that this mechanism wastoo rooted in the daily operations of the civil service, and was therefore slow and costly.

3.71 A sustained participatory process can breed innovations, create ownership and buildcapacities at the community level. The beneficiary assessment showed that FIMAC was perceivedby thousands of farmers as "their" project: addressing their needs for small lines of credit in a timeof financial crisis. Project staff and beneficiaries were able to influence markedly the FIMACimplementation manual which was revised thirteen times during the project. Many groups usedtechnical innovations which they would have not tested without FIMAC support: for example onprocessing equipment, animal husbandry, small irrigation techniques, vegetable production, foodprocessing and preservation, pest prevention and treatment, transportation, etc. Most group membersgained self-confidence in the use of micro-finance tools or in their capacity to improve theirnutritional practices, by themselves.


CAMEROON


4. PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS

A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable

Macro Policies x

Sector Policies x

Financial Objectives X

Institutional Development x

Physical Objectives X

Poverty Reduction X

Gender Issues X

Other Social Objectives X

Environmental Objectives X

Public Sector Management x

Private Sector Development X

Other (specify) X

B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain

x

HighlyC. Bank Performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Identification X

Preparation Assistance X

Appraisal X

Supervision X

HighlyD. Borrower Performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

14

Preparation X

Implementation x

Covenant Compliance X

Operation (if applicable)

Highly E. Assessment of OutcDme satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory

x

TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS/CREDITS

Preceding Operations

1. Rural Development Develop, strengthen and 1977 Credit closed on December 31, 1983. In spite of earlyFund Project support institutions involved management problems and slow disbursements which led(Credit 723-CM) in rural development and to two closing date extensions, the project achieved a

thus increase their satisfactory performance of its physical targets: 1,400capabilities to carry out high- wells were renovated (100% achievement); 60 wellspriority, small-scale capped (100%); 230 positive boreholes drilled (53%);development projects 315 manual pumps installed (64%); 4 small damsthroughout the country. constructed (40%); 1,100 cattle fattening credits

allocated (55%); 60 market garden loans made (100%)and 300 ha of bottom land developed (100%).

2. Second Rural Strengthen rural 1985 Credit closed on December 31, 1993 two years later thanDevelopment Fund development institutions at scheduled and with an undisbursed balance of US$4.5Project village, provincial and million which was cancelled effective August 16, 1994.(Loan 2567-CM) national levels; and improve For the most important component, rural water supply,

living conditions and the project objectives were over-achieved: 1,117 wellsincomes in rural areas were installed (111.7% achievement) at a per unit costthrough the implementation that was 24 percent lower than planned; the projectedof selected, high priority beneficiaries per well rose to 450 compared to the 350operations, not covered by originally planned. Achievements of specific objectivesother projects and programs. of the PPDR component were modest, especially as

measured by original standards. Direct achievements inother areas were very small or nil.

Following Operations _

3 National Agricultural Increase Agricultural 1990 Credit closed on December 31, 1998 one year later thanExtension and Training Production and Income by scheduled. The impact of the agricultural extensionProject improving the testing and services supported by the project is clearly positive as the(Loan 31850-CM) dissemination of new July 1997 Beneficiary Assessment has confirmed. The

agricultural technologies in a project has made a major contribution to assisting thecost effective manner. Government in the implementation of a national

agricultural extension strategy.

15

TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE

Identification 04/11/1988 I

Preparation I11/88

Pre-appraisal 07/12/1989 l

Appraisal 11/1989 10/14/1989

Negotiations 04/1991 04/03/1991

Board presentation N/A 07/02/1991

Signing N/A 09/16/1991

Effectiveness 08/1991 05/27/1992

Midterm review 12/31/1994 (FIMAC) Informal review 09/1994

Project completion 12/31/1998 12/31/1998

Credit closing 06/30/1999 03/31/1999

TABLE 4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS(US$ million)

Appraisal Estimate 1.15 2.99 4.37 5.06 3.22 2.07 2.99 1.15Original Cumulative 1.15 4.14 8.51 13.57 16.79 18.86 21.85 23.00Revised 2.01 0 1.10 2.57 1.32 1.80 1.85 1.75Revised Cumulative 2.01 2.01 3.11 5.68 7.00 8.80 10.65 12.40Actual 2.01 0 1.10 2.57 2.63 1.68 1.54 0.36Actual-Cumulative 2.01 2.01 3.11 5.69 8.33 9.99 11.53 11.83Actualas%ofRevised 100 100 100 199 93 83 21Actual as % of Estimate 175 0 25 51 82 81 51 31Date of Final Expected

Disbursement (for 06/99UTAVA plane)

16

TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

a. Micro"rojects _.Number of groups supported 2 000 2,906. Number of micro-projects 1_867 2_906

.Community leaders training Completed Not done

. Farmer's groups training 2000 1595

. Field staff training Completed Completed (9). Training extension workers Completed N/A

._NGOs training Completed Not done

. Training in storage techniques to beneficiary Completed N/A

groups. Groups financed by the Village Storage Pilot 200 0

Program in the Extreme North

b. Locust control. Percentage of infested area covered by anti-locust 65 N/A

aerial spray

. Percentage of anti-locust government campaign 20 N/Afinanced by APCU _ .__ .

| Study on cost-effectiveness of ground treatment Completed Completed* Training in crop dusting techniques Completed Completed for 4 pilots. Training in maintenance and repair techniques Completed Completed for 2 mechanics

c. Information systemii __| Publication and diffusion of quarterly news bulletin Completed Completed. Weekly or bi-weekly radio programs reporting Completed Completed

pricing and marketing information at provinciallevel

. Publication of an annual report Completed N/A

* Training for enumerators and MINAGRI personnel Completed Completed

. lMarket infrastructure.Number of markets renovated or built 30-40 6 (including 2 inadequate). Training seminars for rural and urban Councils Completed 146 mayors trained

e. IPilot Nutrition education

. Field agents trained in community techniques 400 N/A

. Training for technical coordination committees and Completed N/Afield staff

. Train staff in qualitative research Completed Completed

. Education material development testing Completed Completed

. Baseline study Completed Completed

. Repeat study Completed Completed

. Formulation of a national education strategy Completed Not done

17

TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION

Not Applicable

TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT

Locust Control Study To determine the cost- Completed Conclusions of the study were used toffectiveness of the ground in August revise UTAVA's strategy, for example

treatment activities of the 1994 regarding the use of village brigades andCrop Protection Service and ground interventionsthe possibility of farmerparticipation in cropprotection in the two NorthernProvinces

"Improvement of UTAVA's Study not included in Completed The study led to the restructuring ofperformance" Study appraisal document. The UTAVA and to a reduction of its work

purpose was to analyze force and therefore to a reduction of itsUTAVA in order to improve wage billts performance.

Nutrition Baseline Study To examine mothers' Completed The study provided a detailed descriptionowledge, attitudes and of the nutrition status, with significative

practices and nutrition status differences from one region to another. Itof the high risk population was used to prepare specific strategies inand a comparison group each region. The baseline survey was used

as a basis for comparison in the followingstudies

Nutrition Repeat Survey To show changes from Completed Positive changes were reported, calling theBaseline Study. attention of senior officials and other

donors.Nutrition Evaluation Study To evaluate the Pilot Program Completed The evaluation was used to prepare

proposals for further actions in a newhealth project

18

TABLE 8 A-A: PROJECT COSTS BY COMPONENT

Micro-Projects Development 11l.l 7.3 1843,7 -3,7 1

Locust Control Programi 11.1 3.9 5.0 0,4 1,0 1,4 1

Information Systems 0.6 0.7 1.3 2,4 1,7 4,1

Market Infrastructure 3.5 2.4 6.0 0,69 0,07 0,76

Nutrition 0.6 0.8 1.4 0,6 0,1 0,7

Total Base 17.0 15.1 32.1 7,79 2,87 10,66

Price Contingencies 1.2 1.2 2.4

Physical Contingencies 0.5 0.7 1.3

Total Cost (incl. Taxes) 18.7 17.0 35.7

Taxes 1(0.4) 0.0 (0.4) 0,2 0,2

Total Project Cost (Net of Taxes) 118.3 17.0 35.3

TABLE 8 A-B: PROJECT COSTS BY CATEGORY (BANK FUNDING ONLY)

IS MIN4AGRI -Small-scale Projects 8,500,0001 4,500,000 3,731,320 | 2 | MINAGRI - Vehicles/Equipment/Materials 00,000 900,000 606,8336 MINAGRI - Consultants Services/Training 2,000,000 2,000,000 271,803,957

|4 |MINAGRI - Operating Costs | 1,000,000 |2,000,000 |2,350,353|5! MIN4SANTE -Vehicles/Equipmenl. 400,000 | 150,000 L 50ooo0

|6 |MIN4SANTE - Consultants Services,/Training | 600,000 |250,000 | 271,002|7 MINSANTE - Operating Costs 600,000 300,000 317,8268 UTAVA - Vehicles/Equipment 2,000,000 1,250,000 1,322,0089 UTAVA - Training 200,000 150,000 181,17410 CFC - Sub-loans 4,100,000 600,000 455,97411 CFC - Training 500,000 200,000 311,47212 ; Unallocated 2,200,000 100,000

| Total 23,000,000 12,400,000 11,501,919

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TABLE 8 B: PROJECT FINANCING

IBRD 8.9 1.1 23.0 8 3 11l

World Food Program l

Japan 0.9 2.9 3.8 2,8 2,3 5,1

Government 1.8 - 1.8 0,5 - 0,5

Municipalities 1.7 - 1.7 0,18 - 0,18

Beneficiaries 3.6 - 3.6 2,4 - 2,4

APCU 1.4 - 1.4 0,1 - 0,1l

Total 18.3 17.0 35.3 19,9 5,3 19,2

TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS

The main point that should be kept in mind for this section is the fact that no Internal Rate of Return(IRR) was initially computed for this project in the Staff Appraisal Report. What was done was tobuild production models for a few of the projects included in the components and then computefinancial benefits and the associated IRRs. These hypothetical models, mostly related to the firstobjective and carried out through the FIMAC, produced rates of returns generally higher than 15%;hence the assumption that the overall IRR for the project should be equal or higher than 15%. Datacollected by the project staff and applied to some of the same production models allowed us tocompute the actual financial benefits (and the associated IRRs) accruing to the groups who adoptedthese models. These are shown below on the FIMAC section. For the other components, we took adifferent approach to show the economic effects generated.

a) Locust control. Although no IRR could be computed for this component, one can look atthe economic effects linked to a fully operational UTAVA. In 1996, 300,000 Tons were harvested on360,000 Ha of cultivated land in the target regions. Of these 360,000 Ha, 100,000 were infested withlocusts. Taking into account the fact that the average loss on infested land is about 50%, the yield fornon-infested land can be computed as: YNI = 300,000 / ((360,000-100,000) + (100,000/2)) = 0.97Ton per Ha. This means that if the 100,000 Ha were sprayed by UTAVA, the harvest could beincreased by 48,397 Ha (i.e. 100,000 * 0.97 * 0.5). Even if losses were cut by only 50%, there stillwould be an increase of 24,198 Tons on the 360,000 Ha.

b) Early Warning System. This component has a major role in improving food security evenif no IRR was computed. The Early Warning system has reduced crop losses and therefore increasedfood availability and farmers revenues. By publishing information on prices and products availabilityon the 56 markets, CFC has reduced the variations in food prices and has reduced food shortages.

c) Market infrastructure and Pilot Nutrition education. These two components should beviewed as tests. Therefore, at this stage, the associated economic effects are minimal. These aspectsshould become more important in the next phases. Nevertheless potential positive effects have

20

already been detected. For CFC, for instance, one of the markets which is operating normally hasgenerated a 30% increase in sales in 1996 and enough revenues to pay for local expenses (taxes,maintenance, etc.). For the PPEN, the main economic effect is the potential reduction in healthexpenditures induced by the reduction in malnutrition.

d) Micro-projects. In comparing the SA]R estimates to the actual figures, a word of caution isnecessary. The underlying assumption behind the models (also called "modeles de reference")presented by the project is that they are representative of the average production process for theactivities shown. These models did not originate from random sampling and no survey was done tosubstantiate the uncderlying assumption.

The three activities presented in the SAR and -For which data were available at the project are FlourMill, Chicken Farm and Palm Oil Press. Actual data for two electrical flour mill projects showedinternal rates of return of 148% and 201% respectively compared to 15.7% for the SAR model.Provided that the beneficiary groups were able to invest the required start-up amount, they wouldcollect respectively 4,494,000 and 2,530,350 CFAF in 10 years (i.e. an average of 449,400 and253,035 CFAF respectively per year). Even if the two projects were to stop after only 4 years, theIRR (137% and 196% respectively) would still be much higher than the 15% shown in the SAR,resulting in cash benefits of 437,675 and 306,750 CFAF respectively per year. Going one stepfurther and including in the analysis the amount that has to be put aside in order to renew theequipment at the end of the project (i.e. for depreciation), the two groups would still be able to renewtheir equipment witLhout any outside funding.

What would have happened if the groups being financed had had to pay interest on the loan as wasoriginally the plan in the SAR? Profitability would still be assured because the net financial benefitwould still be positive and the computed IRR would respectively be 128% and 174%.

According to the "modeles de reference" presented, the manual or mechanized Palm Oil Press modelsare even more profitable than the flour mill projects because, contrary to the model presented in theSAR, they generate profits on their first year of operation. As all cash flows are positive no IRRs canbe calculated, the NPV being positive. The main difference with the assumptions of the SAR modellies in the amount of sales made. The actual mechanized Palm Oil Press sells ten times more than theSAR model. This compounds over the years tc end up generating benefits more than 10 times higher(41,442,950 against 3,137,500 CFAF) in the case of the mechanized process. These figures are quiteastonishing!

However, when it comes to the Chicken Farm activity, the picture is not so encouraging. The IRRcomputed for an operation lasting 10 years is negative (minus 2) and the cumulative cash flow forthis activity remains negative for 9 of the 10 years. It generates a very small profit of 23,600 CFAFonly on the I 0th year and the cash flow available at that time is far from being sufficient to allow theactivity to continue without external financing. This is too long for such a small profit and is very farfrom the 55% IRR shown in the SAR. Here the difference lies in the size of the operating costswhich are about three times higher in the case of the actual figures. These figures show that, if theproject was to stop after 4 years, it would be a disaster with a debt load of more than CFAF 240,000after the FIMAC loan has been repaid.

21

FLOUR MILL OPERATION

(Appraisal)

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year S Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10

(Units: CFAF)

Investment

Mill 1,350,000

Transformer 80,000 0

Mill Installation 20,000

Buckets 20,000 20,000

F.R.

Sub-total 1,450,000 0 0 20,000 0 0 20,000 0 0 0

Operating Costs

Electricity 18,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000

Maintenance 7,200 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400

Rent 3,250 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500

Bags 6,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000 12,000

Wages 0 0 0

Miscellaneous (2%)

Sub-total 34,450 68,900 68,900 68,900 68,900 68,900 68,900 68,900 68,900 68,900

Total Expenditures 1,484,450 68,900 68,900 88,900 68,900 68,900 88,900 68,900 68,900 68,900

Receipts

Milling Charges 144,000 288,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000 360,000

Residual Value 5,760 11,520 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400 14,400

Sub-total 149,760 299,520 374,400 374,400 374,400 374,400 374,400 374,400 374,400 374,400

Cash Flow -1,334,690 230,620 305,500 285,500 305,500 305,500 285,500 305,500 305,500 305,500

Cumulated Cash Flow -1,334,690 -1,104,070 -798,570 -513,070 -207,570 97,930 383,430 688,930 994,430 1,299,930

IRR for 8 years 15.73%

IRR for 4 years -20.31%

'.J7h Financing

FIMAC Contribution 870,000

Revised Cash Flow -464,690 230,620 305,500 285,500 305,500 305,500 285,500 305,500 305,500 305,500

Reconstitution 217,500 217,500 217,500 217,500

Balance Remaining -464,690 13,120 88,000 68,000 88,000 305,500 285,500 305,500 305,500 305,500

Cumulative Balance Remaining -464,690 -451,570 -363,570 -295,570 -207,570 97,930 383,430 688,930 994,430 1,299,930

22


(Actual figures: Group Forji Farmter's Youth de Loum Chantiers)

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year,4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10

(Units: CFAF)

Investment

Mill 550,000 550,000

Transformer 120,000 0

Mill Installation 110,000 110,000

Buckets 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000

FR. 25,000

Sub-total 810,000 0 5,000 0 5,000 0 5,000 0 665,000 0

Operating CostsElectricity 48,000 48,000 48,000 46,000 42,000 40,000 40,000 35,000 48,000 48,000

Maintenance 60,000 60,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 60,000 60000

Rent 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60 000 60,000 60,000

Bags 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750

Wages 0 0 0 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000

Miscellaneous (2%) 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 4,400 4,400 4,100 3,750 3,750

Sub-total 172,500 172,500 172,500 300,500 306,500 325,150 325,150 319,850 292,500 292,500

Total Expenditures 982,500 172,500 177,500 300,500 311,500 325,150 330,150 319,850 957,500 292,500

ReceiptsMilling Charges 720,000 720,000 720,000 700,000 650,000 600,000 550,000 500,000 720,000 720,000

Residual Value 100,000

Sub-total 720,000 720,000 720,000 700,000 650,000 600,000 550,000 500,000 820,000 720,000

Cash Flow -262,500 547,500 542,500 399,500 338,500 274,850 219,850 180,150 -137,500 427,500

Cumulated Cash Flow -262,500 285,000 827,500 1,227,000 1,565,500 1,840,350 2,060,200 2,240,350 2,102,850 2,530,350



With Financing

FIMAC Contribution 500,000

Revised Cash Flow 237,500 547,500 542,500 399,500 338,500 274,850 219,850 180,150 -137,500 427,500

Reconstitution 200,000 200,000 100,000

Balance Remaining 37,500 347,500 442,500 399,500 338,500 274,850 219,850 180,150 -137,500 427,500

Cumulative Balance Remaining 37,500 385,000 827,500 1,227,000 1,565,500 1,840,350 2,060,200 2,240,350 2,102,850 2,530,350

23


(Actual figures: Group Toksl do Nkangsi Mbangs)

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year6 Year7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10

(Units: CFAF)

Investment

Mills 950,000 950,000Transformer 150,000 0

Mill Installation 110,000 110,000

F.R. 47,500

Sub-total 1,257,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,060,000

Operating Costs

Electricity 97,200 97,200 97,200 97,200 97,200 95,000 90,000 90,000 85,000 80,000

Maintenance 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 65,000 70,000

Rent 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000 72,000

Bags, etc. 4,500 1,000 4,500 1,000 4,500 1,000 4,500 1,000 4,500 1,000

Wages 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000

Sub-total 329,700 326,200 329,700 326,200 329,700 328,000 336,500 343,000 346,500 343,000

Total Expenditures 1,587,200 326,200 329,700 326,200 329,700 328,000 336,500 343,000 346,500 1,403,000

ReceiptsMilling Charges 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,020,000 960,000 900,000 840,000 780,000Residual Value 250,000

Sub-total 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,080,000 1,020,000 960,000 900,000 840,000 1,030,000

Cash Flow -554,700 706,300 702,800 753,800 750,300 692,000 623,500 557,000 493,500 -373,000

Cumulated Cash Flow -554,700 151,600 854,400 1,608,200 2,358,500 3,050,500 3,674,000 4,231,000 4,724,500 4,351,500



With Financing

FIMAC Contribution 950,000Revised Cash Flow 395,300 706,300 702,800 753,800 750,300 692,000 623,500 557,000 493,500 -373,000

Reconstitution 388,000 384,000 178,000

Balance Remaining 7,300 322,300 524,800 753,800 750,300 692,000 623,500 557,000 493,500 -373,000Cumulative Balance Remaining 7,300 329,600 854,400 1,608,200 2,358,500 3,050,500 3,674,000 4,231,000 4,724,500 4,351,500

24

CHICKEN FARM

(Appraisal)

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year S Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10

(Units: CFAF)

Investrnent

Building 500,000

Equipment 300,000 300,000 300,000

Sub-total 800,000 0 0 300,000 0 0 300,000 0 0 0

Operating CostsChicks 150,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000

Feed 504,000 2,016,000 2,()16,000 2,016,000 2,016,000 2,016,000 2,016,000 2,016,000 2,016,000 2,016,000

Veter-inary Products 50,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000

Personnel 15,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000

Fuel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Litter 0 70,000 60,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000

Sub-total 719,000 2,946,000 2,956,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 2,966,000

Tota Ixpen ditures 1,519,000 2,946,000 2,'356,000 3,266,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 3,266,000 2,966,000 2,966,000 2,966,000

Sales 0 3,360,000 3,840,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000Sub-total 0 3,360,000 3,640,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320,000 4,320.000

Cash Flow -1,519,000 414,000 664,000 1,054,000 1,354,000 1,354,000 1,054,000 1,354,000 1,354,000 1,354,000

Curmulated Cash Flow -1,519,000 -1,105,000 -2:21,000 833,000 2,187,000 3,541,000 4,595,000 5,949,000 7,303,000 8,657,000


IRRfor4yearn 21.80%

W7th Financing

FIMAC Contribution 911,400Revised Cash Flow -607,600 414,000 B84,000 1,054,000 1,354,000 1,354,000 1,054,000 1,354,000 1,354,000 1,354,000

Reconstitution 0 303,800 303,800 303,800Balance Remaining -607,600 110,200 580,200 750,200 1,354,000 1,354,000 1,054,000 1,354,W00 1,354,000 1,354,000

Cumulative Balance Remaining -607,600 -497,400 82,800 833,000 2,187.000 3,541,000 4,595,000 5,949,000 7,303,000 8,657,000

25

CHICKEN FARM

(Actual Figures)

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year t Year 9 Year 10(Units: CFAF)

Investment

Building 425,000

Equipment 142,000 142,000 142,000

Sub-total 567,000 0 0 0 142,000 0 0 0 0 142,000

Operating CostsChicks 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000 420,000

Feed 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000 1,230,000

Veterinary Products 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000

Personnel 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,000

Fuel 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000

Litter 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600 15,600

Sub-total 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600

Total Expenditures 2,622,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,197,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,055,600 2,197,600

Sales 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000

Sub-total 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000 2,137,000

Cash Flow -485,600 81,400 81,400 81,400 -60,600 81,400 81,400 81,400 81,400 -60,600

Cumulated Cash Flow -485,600 -404,200 -322,800 -241,400 -302,000 -220,600 -139,200 -57,800 23,600 -37,000

IRR for I0 years -1.92%

IRR for 4 years -27.83%

With Financing

FIMAC Contribution 427,000Revised Cash Flow -58,600 81,400 81,400 81,400 -60,600 81,400 81,400 81,400 81,400 -60,600

Reconstitution 170,800 128,100 128,100

Balance Remaining -229,400 -46,700 -46,700 81,400 -60,600 81,400 81,400 81,400 81,400 -60,600

Cumulative Balance Remaining -229,400 -276,100 -322,800 -241,400 -302,000 -220,600 -139,200 -57,800 23,600 -37,000

26

PALM OIL PRESS

(Appraisal)

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 YearS Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year9 Year 10

(Units: CFAF)

InvestmentPress 3,000,000

Building 350,000

Sub-total 3,350,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Operating CostsO & M Supplies 50,000 50,000 50,100 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000

0 & M Labor 0 37,500 75,0)00 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000

Sub-total 50,000 87,500 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125000 125,000

Total Sxpenditures 3,400,000 87,500 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000

Sales 550,000 675,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 500,000

TonsFFBprocessed 50 75 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

LitersofOilextracted 7500 11250 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000 15000

Sub-total 550,000 675,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000

Cash Flow -2,850,000 587,500 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000

Cumulated Cash Flow -2,850,000 -2,262,500 -1,587,500 -912,500 -237,500 437,500 1,112,500 1,787,500 2,462,500 3,137,500

IRR for 10 years 17.80%IRR for 4 years -16.76%

Wrth Financing

FIMAC Contribution 2,010,000Revised Cash Flow -840,000 587,500 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000

Reconstitution 0 502,500 502,500 502,500 502,500Balance Remaining -840,000 85,000 172,500 172,500 172,500 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000 675,000

Cumulative Balance Remaining -840,000 -755,000 -582,500 -410,000 -237,500 437,500 1,112,500 1,787,500 2,462,500 3,137,500

27

PALM OIL PRESS

(Actual Figures)

Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10(Units: CFAF)

Investment

Press 3,370,550 6,000 6,000 126,000 6,000 6,000 126,000 6,000 6,000 3,170,500

Building 400,000

Sub-total 3,770,550 6,000 6,000 126,000 6,000 6,000 126,000 6,000 6,000 3,170,500

Operating CostsFuel & Lubricants 316,000 316,000 316,000 320,000 320,000 320,000 320,000 330,000 330,000 330,000

Maintenance 120,000 120,000 120,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 125,000 130,000 130,000 130,000

Supplies 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000 246,000

Containers 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000

Labor 830,000 880,000 880,000 880,000 880,000 880,000 880,000 880,000 860,000 880,000

Taxes 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000

Sub-total 1,622,000 1,622,000 1,622,000 1,631,000 1,631,000 1,631,000 1,631,000 1,646,000 1,646,000 1,646,000

Total Expenditures 5,392,550 1,628,000 1,628,000 1,757,000 1,637,000 1,637,000 1,757,000 1,652,000 1,652,000 4,816,500

Sales 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000

Tons FFB processed

Liters of Oil extracted

Sub-total 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,500,000

Cash Flow 1,107.450 4,872,000 4,872,000 4,743,000 4,863,000 4,863,000 4,743,000 4,848,000 4,848,000 1,683,500

Cumulated Cash Flow 1,107,450 5,979,450 10,851,450 15,594,450 20,457,450 25,320,450 30,063,450 34,911,450 39,759,450 41,442,950

IRR for 10 years #NUM!

IRR for 4 years #NUM!

With Financing

FIMAC Contribution 1,000,000

Revised Cash Flow 2,107,450 4,872,000 4,872,000 4,743,000 4,863,000 4,863,000 4,743,000 4,648,000 4,848,000 1,683,500

Reconstitution 400,000 400,000 200,000Balance Remaining 1,707,450 4,472,000 4,672,000 4,743,000 4,863,000 4,863,000 4,743,000 4,848,000 4,848,000 1,683,500

Cumulative Balance Remaining 1,707,450 6,179,450 10,851,450 15,594,450 20,457,450 25,320,450 30,063,450 34,911,450 39,759,450 41,442,950

28

TABLE 10: STATlUJS OF LEGAL COVENANI'S

Main 3.01 Tile Born-ower shall:l.. ~ ~ ~ '... _l._~. I ~/\.~Jr ..

3(0arry out Pa,ILs A, B (b) and C of fir rioJLc; tihUughi

(i) MINAGRI and Part E of the Project throughMINSANTE in conformity with appropriateadministrative and financial practices and provide,promptly as needed, the funds, facilities, servicesand othet resources required for such Parts of the

_____________ _ _ _ _ Project. __

3.01 (a) 10 C Cause UTAVA and CFC to perform all their(ii) respective obligations set forth in the tlTAVA

Project Agreement and the CFC Project Agreement;the Borrower shall also take or cause to be taken allactions, including the provision of funds, facilities,services and other resources, necessary to unableUTAVA and CFC to perform such obligations.

3.01 (c) 10 C Make available to UTAVA on a grant basis theproceeds of the Loan allocated to Categories (8) and(9) of the table set forth in paragraph I of Schedule Ito this Agreement under a grant agreement to beentered into between the Borrower and UTAVA,under terms and conditions which shall have been

l_____ _approved by the Bank.

3.01 (d) 10 C (i) make available to CFC, on a grant basis theproceeds of the Loan allocated to Categories ( I I ) ofthe table set forth in paragraph I of Schedule I tothis Agreement; and (ii) re-lend to CFC the proceedsof the Loan allocated to Category (10) of said table,tunder a subsidiary loan Agreement to be entered intobetween the Borrower and C'FC, under terms andconditions which shall have been approved by thelBank.

29

Main 3.02 The Borrower shall:

3.02(a) 2 C Follow procurement provisions under Schedule 4 Procurement has been acceptablealthough UJTAVA has faced difficultiesbuying a plane and spare parts.

3.02 (b) C Employ a specialized non-governmental CARE was contracted to work on this

organization, satisfactory to the Bank, to assist in the part of the Project.

technical coordination of Part E of the Project.

Main 3.03 9 UTAVA and CFC shall carry out the obligations set

forthi in Sections 9.04, 9.05, 9.06, 9.07, 9.08 and9.09 of the General Conditions in respect of PartB(a) and D of the Project, respectively, pursuant toSection 2.03 of the UTAVA Project Agreement andof the CFC Project Agreement. l

Main 4.01 The Borrower shall:

4.01 (a) I C Maintain or cause to be maintained records andaccounts adequate to reflect in accordance withsound accounting practices the operations, resources

and expenditures in respect of the Project of thedepartments or agencies of the Borrower responsiblefor carrying out the Project or any part thereof.

4.01 (b) I C Have the records and accounts referred to in section Audits have been done by components

li) 4.01 (a), including those for the Special accounts and until a decision was made to group all

those for the FIMAC Scheme under Part A of the audits starting in July 98.

Project at the central, provincial and departmentallevels, for each fiscal year audited, in accordancewith appropriate auditing principles consistentlyapplied, by independent auditors acceptable to the.Bank.

30

Mainl 4.01 (b) I C ForuliS to tle n aik as sooi res available, but in anyw(iti) case not later than six months after the end of eac:

suc( year, tha report 0fU ch abmdit by said auditors,nof sucri scope aatd il such detail as the Bank shallhave reasonab uy req oested. f

Main 4 () 1 (c) I C For all expenditures with respect to whichlwithdrawals from the Credit Account were made onnthe basis of statements of expenditure:;(a) enbaiiltaih a or cause to be ataivstained, in

accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section,records and accounts refecting such

i (ii) rctain, until at least one year after the Bank has

pareceived the audit sepondt for the fiscal year ino siicu the last withdrawal from the LooanAccount or payso ent out of the Special Accounts

l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~was made, all r-ecot-ds (contracts, orders,l . h~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~iivoices, bills, receipts and other documenits)

evidencing sucit expenditure; f(iii) enable the Bank's representatives to examine

l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~suich records; anidl ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(iv) ensLure that suchi records and accounits are

included in th i a tiral apdit reprerred to inpara-raph (b) of this Section and that thd reportof sLuch auidit conitains a separate opinion by saidauiditors as to whether the statements ofexpenditure submnitted during sucli fiscal year,tog,cther withi the procedLures anid internalconitrols involved in their preparation, cani berelied Llpon to sLupport thie related withdrawals.

31

Ag teme__t _____c___Date ' Dte

Main Schedule 10 C rhe Borrower shall, through MINAGRI, beginning Work programs for 95/96 and 96/97

l ~~~~5 November 1991 and thereafter not later than June 30 were received. For 97/98, work

l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~of eachi year, furnislh to the Bank, for its review and program for FIMAC, the only

approval, in respect of the forthcoming year, detailed component fully active was received.

work programs, where applicable. In addition,together with the detailed work programs and

budgets for Part A of the Project, the Borrower shall,

through MINAGRI, furnish to the Bank anevaluation report of activities undertaken during the

previous twelve-month period of FIMAC records

and accounts at the central, provincial anddepartmental levels referred to in Section 4.01 of this

_______ Agreement.

CFC 2.02 9 C Except as the Bank shall otherwise agree, Bidding for the construction of tlhe

procurement of the goods works and consultants' market for Foumba, Mbangante and

services required for Part D of the Project and to be Meyo-Messala was done in accordance

financed out of the proceeds of the Loan shall be with Bank procedures, three more bids

governed by the provisions of Schedule 4 to the covering three markets were also donc

Loan Agreement. according to Bank procedures.

CFC 2.05 (b) 9 C CFC shall promptly inform the Bank of anycondition which interferes or threatens to interferewith the progress of Part D of the Project, theaccomplishment of the purposes of the Loan, or the

performance by CFC of its obligations under this

Agreement and under the CFC Subsidiary l oan

lAgreement.

32

Ci-c 3 .( I SC CF^C shiall carry oni its operations and conduct its The Deputy Director is the head of thc laffaiils in accordance with sound admiinistrative, project working with his staff.|econiotiiic anid financial practices under thelsupervision of qualified and experiencedmanagement assisted by competent staff in adequatenumbers.

| JT'AVA 2.05 (b) 9 C lJTAVA shall promptly inform the Bank of any The Bank was informed by UTAVA incondition which interferes or threatens to interfere 1994 of the loss of one of its aircraftswith the progress of Part B (a) of the Project, the destroyed by fire.accomplishment of the purposes of the Loan, or theperformance by UTAVA of its obligations under thisAgreement and under thle lJTAVA GrantAgreement.

Covenant types:

1. = Accounts/audits 8. Indigenous people2. Financial performance/revenue generation 9. -- Monitoring, review, and reporting

from beneficiaries 10. Project implementation not covered by3. Flow and utilization of project funds categories 1-94. = Counterpart funding 11. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or5. = Management aspects of the project or other resource allocation

executing agency 12. Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/6 = Environmienital covenanits regulatory/inistitutionial action7. Involintary resettlemenit 13. Other

8 P'resent Status:

C = covenant complied withCD = complied withl after delayCP- complied with partiallyNC = not complied with

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TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMIENT

No Major lack of compliance was observed.

TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS

St_A_ , ..,. . AP:.i::

Weeks US$ '000 Weeks US$ 000 Weeks US$ '000

Preparation to Appraisal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.0 133.4Appraisal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 84.6 183.4Negotiations through Board 16.5 22.8 0.0 0.0 28.0 66.7Supervision 72.6 138.7 97.9 164.7 239.8 436.0Completion 5.0 9.1 5 9.1 5.3 12.2Total 94 1 170.6 102.9 173.8 425.7 831.7

Source: World Bank Cost Accounting System (FACT. March 1999).

The staff weeks planned in the appendix to the SAR are different from what has been compiled in theFACT database. In order to keep original, revised and actual data comparable, the figures shown here arethe ones retrieved from the FACT database.

34

TABLE 13: BANkh RESOURCES: MISSIONS

AgRim~~~~~~~~~~~~~Stage o Moutb/NumberDays Spcialize Partiipated mplemeDevelopmaent Types of

Through N/AAppraisalAppraisal N/Athrough Boardapproval ___Board approval N/AthrougheffectivenessSupervision 1 04/92 1 AG Y !Supervision 2 01/93 2 21.0 AG,CO Y,N I I TA. TPSupervision 3 11/93 3 22.0 EC(,RD,CO Y,Y,N 1 2 FCSupervision 4 04/94 1 18.0 EC Y 2 PR,TA.TRSupervision 5 09/94 4 NG,CO,EC,RD Y,Y,Y,Y S HSSupervision 6 0:3/96 3 45.0 OA,EC,EC N,Y,N U S OC, PMSupervision 7 09/96 3 45.0 EC,EC,AE Y,Y,N U S OC, PMSupervision 8 0:3/97 2 24.0 AE,AE Y,N U S PRSupervision 9 07/97 2 14.0 RD,AE N,Y S S PRSupervision 10 11/97 2 12.0 RD,NG Y,Y S SSupervision II 06/98 3 35.0 R[),AE,MF Y,Y,N U U FC,ME,PRCompletion 1:2/98 4 25.0 RD,AE,MF,NG Y,Y,Y,Y U U ME,PM,PR

Key to StatusPerformance Raiig,g Specialized Stalf Types of Problems

I = Problem Free AG: Agriculturalist FC: Financial CovenantsHS = Highly Satisfactory AE: Agricultural Economist LC: Legal Covenants2= Moderate Plroblems CO: Consultant ME: Monitoring and Evaluation3= Major Problems EC: Economist OC: Other Legal CovenantsS= Satisfactory MF: Micro-Finance Specialist PM: Project ManagementUS= Unsatisfactory NG: NGC) Specialist PR: ProcurementNA: Not available. OA: Operations Analyst ST: Studies Progress

RD: Rural Development TA: Technical AssistanceSpecialist

TP: Training Progress


CAMEROON


5. APPENDIX A: MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE

PROJET SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE - PRET 3388-CMMission de supervision du 2 au 7 novembre et du 17 novembre au ler decembre 1998

Objectifs de la mission

1. Une mission de supervision et de preparation du rapport de fin de projet s'est deroulee aumois de novembre 1998. Cette mission avait pour but: (i) de superviser les activites de la demierecomposante en execution, le FIMAC (ii) de planifier les etapes de cloture des comptes provinciaux etd'arret des activites du projet au 31 decembre 1998 (iii) de collecter le maximum d'information autitre de la preparation du rapport de fin de projet. Le rapport de fin de projet sera consolide par unemission en fevrier 1999, apres cloture des comptes du FIMAC. Le present aide-memoire seddcompose en deux parties, l'une relative a la supervision du projet, l'autre resumant les observationsrelatives au rapport de fin de projet.

Deroulement de la mission

2. La mission s'est deroulee en plusieurs temps pour bdn6ficier du passage au Cameroun deGuy Bedard, en appui A d'autres programmes:

a) Du 2 au 7 novembre G. Bedard, specialiste en micro-finance a supervise les activites de transfertdes groupes FIMAC, A Yaounde et dans les provinces du Centre et de l'Ouest.b) Les 17 et 18 novembre, la mission, composee de J. Delion, C. Ndomb, G. Minang, H. Ndjebet etA. Mani a lance le processus de preparation du rapport de fin de projet de la Banque Mondiale: Ellea particip6 a une s6ance de presentation du rapport provisoire de fin de projet 6labore par la DEPA.Elle a rencontre le Directeur de la Cooperation Economique et Technique du Ministere desInvestissements Publics, le Ministre de l'Agriculture, le Directeur de la DEPA, le Directeur duDeveloppement Communautaire et du Genie Rural et les responsables des composantes du projet.Elle a indique le besoin de foumir des informations supplementaires, et, particulierement, desindicateurs chiffr6s. Parallelement, dans le cadre de la supervision des activit6s du projet, ils ontparticipe A un seance de programmation des dernieres missions de terrain des equipes FIMAC et ilsont clarifie les demieres etapes 1iees A la livraison d'equipement d'UTAVA. La mission a egalementtenu une seance de travail avec le Representant Resident de la Banque Mondiale au Cameroun.

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c) Du 26 novembre au ler d6cembre, la mission a approfondi 1'analyse des activites et des resultatsde chaque responsable, avec les responsables de chaque composante, en mettant l'accent sur lacollecte d'indications chiffrees.d) Le ler decembre, le present aide-memoire a, et revu et amende au cours d'une reunion prdsidcepar le Directeur de la Coop6ration Economique et Technique du Ministere des InvestissementsPublics. Le meme jour, la mission a egalement participe A une reunion sur les perspectives ded6veloppement des systemes financiers decentralises, sous la presidence du Directeur de la Divisiondes Etudes et Projets Agricoles. Les listes des participants A ces deux reunions sont jointes enannexe. Le meme jour, enfin, la mission a ete re,cu en audience par le Ministre de I'Agriculture et apresente le present aide-memoire.

3. La mission remercie le Ministre de I'Agriculture, le Directeur de la Cooperation Economiqueet Technique du Ministere des Investissements Publics, les personnalites, les cadres et les membresdes groupes rencontres. Tous les participants ont exprime une forte motivation A poursuivre lesactivites engag6es apres la fin du projet. Les actions convenues pendant la mission sont resumeesdans le texte qui suit et dans l'annexe. Elles devront etre confirm6es par la Direction de la BanqueMondiale.

PREPARATION DU RAPPORT DE FIN DE ]PROJET

Etat d'avancement du rapport de fin de proje1: de 1'emprunteur

4. La mission a participe A une seance de presentation du rapport provisoire de fin de projetprepare par la DEPA. La mission a constate que l'equipe de la DEPA avait visite plusieurs provinceset rencontre les agences d'execution et des beneficiaires de chaque composante du projet. Elle aconstate que les composantes n'etaient pas parvenues A fournir des indications chiffr6es necessairespour soutenir une evaluation des resultats du projet. La mission a coopere avec 1'equipe de la DEPApour collecter ces infonnations chiffrees aupres de chaque composante.

Taches complimentaires pour la finalisation dii rapport de fin de projet

5. La mission a conduit une analyse d6taill6e de la situation de chaque composante, et a partag6ses observations avec 1'6quipe de la DEPA. Compte tenu de l'insuffisance d'indicateurs chiffres, lamission n'a pas r6dige immediatement de texte final. La mission a convenu que l1'quipe responsablede la preparation du rapport de fin de projet A la mission residente poursuivrait sa cooperation avec1'equipe de la DEPA. pour la collecte d'indicateurs chiffres et pour l'evaluation des resultats duprojet, notamment pour l'analyse des effets economiques. Un calendrier des 6tapes de finalisation ae prepare: la DEPA devrait remettre son rapport avant le 151/1999. L'6quipe de la BanqueMondiale devrait remettre un premier jet de son rapport avant le 31/1/1999.

Principales observatilons sur l'ensemble du projet et sur chaque composante

6. Un consensus s'est developpe entre la mission de la Banque, les responsables de la DEPA etla Direction de la Cooperation Economique et Technique du Ministere des Investissements Publicssur les point principaux qui suivent. Ces observaltions sont provisoire, elles devront etre confirmeespar la Direction de la Banque Mondiale. Dans tous les cas, elles sont d'ordre general, elles devrontetre confirmees par chacune des parties dans son rapport de fin de projet.

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Contexte

7. Le projet doit etre per,u dans son contexte: en 1989, le Gouvernement du Cameroun (GDC)s'engageait dans un pret d'Ajustement structurel. La meme annee, une dtude de revue du secteuragricole orientait les actions de la Banque mondiale vers des actions sectorielles telles que le soutienA la securit6 alimentaire. le projet Securite Alimentaire etait concu comme l'un des moyens de limiterles effets de l'ajustement structurel sur les populations defavorisees. Le projet s'inserait dans unepolitique nationale de securite alimentaire; il visait A initier ou a consolider des activites dansdifferents domaines: soutien A la production et aux revenus de groupes A risques, mise au point d'unsysteme d'alerte sur la situation nutritionnelle, test de methodes d'education nutritionnelle, tests demise en place de marches sur financements bancaires, soutiens aux activitds de protection descultures contre les acridiens et les oiseaux granivores dans les provinces du Nord. Le projet a eexecute dans un contexte difficile: il a et gravement affecte par les reductions des salaires desfonctionnaires, suivis par les effets de la d6valuation du FCFA et par les effets de la reduction dumontant du pret (50% en 1996 cette reduction a 6te decidee en raison du fait que le Cameroun etaitdevenu eligible au guichet IDA, et que les deboursements etaient tres lents. Le Ministere deI'Agriculture a rappele que ce montant avait ete annule dans la perspective de la mise en place d'unautre projet de finances rurales sur fonds IDA et que ceci n'a pas ete fait.

RWsumn des observations sur les objectifs et les resultats de chaque composante

Composante micro-projets (FIMAC)

8. OBJECTIFS: Cette composante etait la plus importante du projet en terme de financement.L'objectif g6neral etait de creer des opportunites d'emplois et d'augmenter la pouvoir d'achat degroupes ruraux d6favorises, en particulier les femmes, en vue d'accroitre leur acces aux produitsalimentaires. Dans le contexte decrit ci-dessus, ces objectifs se sont precises dans une dimension plussociale qu'economique: Il n'y avait pas de reference claire sur des modeles de financement dumonde rural et le projet se situait entre la lutte contre la pauvrete et le developpement de systemesfinanciers viables. Les financements mis en place etaient intermediaires entre des micro-credit et desfonds sociaux: la categorie dite "prets commerciaux" avec taux d'interet du marche, n'a jamaisfonctionne. Le projet s'est limite A des petits prets contribuant A la s6curite alimentaire et A 96 petitesinfrastructures villageoises. En l'absence d'interets, les financements de petits prets n'dtaient doncpas de veritables prets. Ils ont ete consentis sur des periodes relativement longues (souvent 4 ans) etil n'y avait pas d'incitations majeures a rembourser dans les delais, en 1'absence d'int6r8ts de retard.Dans ces conditions, ces financements se rapprochaient davantage d'un fonds social pour limiter leseffets de l'ajustement structurel, avec un objectif de formation des emprunteurs par experience depremiers investissements A credit. L'objectif majeur de cette composante etait de soutenir laproduction et les revenus de populations A risque, de les entrainer dans l'utilisation de servicesfinanciers et de les aider A se relier aux systemes financiers forrnels en fin de projet.

9. RESULTATS: Cette composante a atteint l'objectif specifique ci-dessous: en terme debeneficiaires, l'objectif a et6 depasse, environ 30.000 familles, membres de 2.700 groupes, ontam6liore leurs productions alimentaires et leurs revenus en utilisant les financements du projet. Deplus, environ 10.000 familles ont beneficie d'ameliorations d'infrastructures villageoises, A travers 96projets d'infrastructures. Le projet a connu des ralentissements importants A cause de lourdeurs deprocedures de gestion des fonds. II a ete affecte par un decouragement des populations et des cadresquand les deboursements ont et suspendus en 1996: les agents se sont demobilisds, les populationsont considere que "le FIMAC etait termine" et les taux de remboursements ont fortement chute. Les

38

activites ont repris plus lentement par la suite, mais les performances 6taient faibles. Ledecouragement a e profond, car plus de 2500 dossiers avaient ete prepares par les groupes, instruitspar les agents FIMAIC et agrees par les commissions provinciales. Les agents se sont alors trouves enbutte A des critiques rmassives des populations qui les accusaient d'avoir monte des dossiers pour rien.Ces 2500 demandes dejA agreees sont toujours en recherche de financement, elles vont se retoumerprogressivement vers les nouvelles IMF qui ont pris le relais des financements FIMAC.

10. Le projet a egalement atteint ses objectifs de formation A l'usage de credits: les membres desgroupes ont et formes, et, pour plus des trois quarts, ils ont bien maitris6 l'utilisation de credits et lagestion des remboursements. Le projet n'a pas atteint un niveau de remboursement satisfaisant danstoutes les provinces. Certaines provinces affichent des taux de 90% tandis que d'autres ont des tauxde 65%. En moyenne, le niveau de remboursement est nettement insuffisant. Le projet ne pretendaitpas niettre en place un systeme durable de micro-credit, et il s'est contente de soutenir despopulations A risques et de les aider A "migrer" vers des institutions de micro-finance en fin de projet.Ce transfert a 6te concu et mis en oeuvre trop tard, dans les deux dernieres annees du projet. Mais leprojet a reussi a transferer les fonds rotatifs de l'ensemble des 2700 groupes beneficiaires de cr6ditsproductifs (1,7 milliard FCFA) A des institutions de micro-finance qui offrent des perspectives dequadnipler l'offre de volume de credit. Le projet n'est pas parvenu a impliquer des banquescommerciales dans 1'execution de tests de credit commercial au taux du marche. Ces aspects avaient.t6 mal apprecies au moment de 1'6valuation du projet. La mission a considere qu'il s'agissait IAd'une indication sur la difficult6 de meler des fonds sociaux sans inter& avec des fonds de micro-credit, dans un meme projet. La mission s'est inquiete du fait que le transfert A des IMF s'est fait troprapidement au cours de la derniere annee, et surtout au cours des demiers mois: ces transferts sonttres fragiles, le GDC a entame des negociations avec des bailleurs bailleurs pour assurer unfinancement relais en 1999 pour soutenir le suivi des IMF dans leur gestion des fonds transferes.

ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DES OPERATIONS DE TRANSFORMATION DES FONDSROTATIFS VILLAGEOIS FIMAC EN FONDS FIDUCIAIRES GERES PAR DES INSTITUTIONSDE MICRO-FINANCE

11. Les fonds roi;atifs des groupes FIMAC sont en cours de transformation par contrats A desInstitutions de Micro-Finance (IMF) selectionnees par les groupes et agrees par le projet. Lessommes seront utilis,&es par ces IMF comme fonds fiduciaires pour soutenir leurs operations decredits rural. Les signatures de contrats sont bien entamees elles se poursuivent a un rythme rapidedans toutes les provinces. Elles devraient etre terminees mi-decembre 1998. Un demier seminaireest ensuite prevu les 29 et 30 decembre, pour consolider le r6le des agents FIMAC dans le suivi degestion de ces fonds liduciaires dans les IMF. Le tableau qui suit resume la ventilation des groupesFIMAC dans leur "arrimage" A des IMF:

Caisses Caisses COOPEC Caisses COOPEC ONGs pour TotalCAMCCUL MC2 de aidees par villa,e;eoises autonomes infrastruc.

CCEI -Bank CAMCCUL CIDR villageoises954 147 708 57 785 222 2874

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Composante d'education Nutritionnelle:

12. OBJECTIFS: L'objectif de cette composante 6tait d'am6liorer les pratiques alimentaires desgroupes A haut risques d'insecurite alimentaire, les femmes enceintes et allaitantes et les enfants demoins de cinq ans. Dans ce cadre, les objectifs specifiques etaient d'aider des equipespluridisciplinaires A conduire des recherches sur la situation nutritionnelle des populations A risques,et A tester des methodes d'education nutritionnelle adaptees A ces populations A risque.

13. RESULTATS: Dans un premier temps, le projet s'est concentre sur des actions desensibilisation de responsables provinciaux, de constitution d'6quipes composees de representants deplusieurs ministeres, d'acquisition de materiel et de realisation de recherches quantitatives etqualitatives, etalees sur un A deux ans sur trois regions. En 1995 le projet a et gravement affecte parune demobilisation des agents qui ne voyaient pas venir les equipements prevus et qui etaient frapp6spar la devaluation. Le projet a modifie sa strategie, il s'est appuye davantage sur les leaderscommunautaires: des actions massives ont ete entreprises apres une phase d'essai en fin 1995, enappui sur des methodes et des materiels pedagogiques bien adaptes: au total 580.000 personnes ontbeneficie de ces actions dans 51 aires de sante en zones rurales (dans l'Ouest, I'Est et l'extremeNord) et en zone urbaine (A Douala dans le Littoral). La mission a considerd que cette composante aatteint globalement ses objectifs, malgre un demarrage tres lent: le projet a developpe une strategie etdes methodes efficaces d'6ducation nutritionnelle au niveau communautaire. La mission a not6 quedes ONGs et des programmes d'aide bilaterale ont commence a utiliser les services des equipesconcemres et que des groupes engages dans ces actions continuent leurs efforts, avec l'appui de leursinfirmiers, particulierement au milieu des populations les plus d6favoris6es dans l'Extreme-Nord. Lamission a prevu que le plan d'operations precisera les modalites de poursuite des activites, enimpliquant autant que possible des equipes puridisciplinaires.

Composante de lutte contre les acridiens et les oiseaux granivores

14. OBJECTIFS: L'objectifde cette composante etait de contribuer a la reduction des effets desattaques d'acridiens et d'oiseaux granivores sur les cerdales dans la partie Nord du pays. Lesobjectifs specifiques etaient de contribuer A une restructuration de l'organisme de traitement aerien(UTAVA) et de le soutenir par l'achat d'equipement.

15. RESULTATS: en terme de restructuration de l'UTAVA, le projet a obtenu de bons resultats:Les etudes preparatoires A la restructuration de l'UTAVA ont ete executees, et les conclusions de cesetudes ont e appliquees: En 1990, 1'UTAVA dependait A 80% de financements de l'etat. En 1998il depend seulement A 20% de ces financements. Le personnel a ete reduit et bien formd a ses taches.la structure est plus efficace. En termes de protection des cultures, le projet n'a pas obtenu deresultats significatifs durant la plus grande partie du projet: pendant cette periode, I'etat n'a plus misde produits de traitements A la disposition de l'UTAVA. Une crise importante est survenue en 1997,elle a necessite des soutiens exterieurs majeurs et le GDC a consolide sa strategie dans ce domaine.En 1998 l'UTAVA a retrouve des stocks importants de produits (50.000 litres de produits anti-acridiens et 5.0001 de produits contre les oiseaux granivores) ces stocks representent plusieurs anndesd'avance. Le GDC a entame lune restructuration juridique et financiere de l'UTAVA, dans desconditions qui preservent les aspects de services de protection des cultures contre les acridiens et lesoiseaux granivores. L'UTAVA a beneficie de formations importantes pour son personnel, il vabeneficier d'un avion monoplace de traitement agricole debut 1999, il est donc en bonne positionpour participer A la protection des cultures dans le Nord du Pays.

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Composante de systeme d'alerte rapide

16. OBJECTIFS: l'objectif de cette composante etait d'amdliorer l'efficacite de lacommercialisation et du stockage des produits alimentaires. L'objectif specifique etait d'ameliorer lacollecte et la diffusion d'informations sur les quantites et les prix de produits alimentaires sur lesmarches et d'analyser les informations pour mettre en place un systeme d'alerte rapide surl'insecurite alimentaire.

17. RESULTATS: Le projet a commence relativement lentement, en appui sur un dispositifassez lourd de collecte d'infornation. II a evolue en 1995, il a ensuite beneficie d'un appui importantde la FAO, finance par un don japonais au titre du present projet. Cette assistance de la FAO apermis la mise en place d'un systeme efficace de collecte de donnees par des agents de vulgarisation.Des chefs d'antenne dans chaque province traitent ensuite ces donnees, qui sont ensuite consolideesau niveau national. Le systeme distribue l'informtation dans 56 marches (marches ruraux, marches decollecte, marches urbains, marches frontaliers) et par la radio rurale. Cette diffusion est utilisee parles commer,ants et les producteurs. Le systeme integre les tubercules et les feculents. Cettecomposante a egalement effectue un suivi des groupes A risques. Elle a permis de declencher deuxalertes concemant des situations d'insecurite alimentaire. La derni&e alerte a permis d'avancer d'unmois environ la reponse a la situation de crise et de limiter s6rieusement les effets de cette situation.Cette composante a donc globalement atteint les resultats escomptes malgre un demarrage assez lent.Les performances de ces services sont appreciees par differents programmes: le SNAR est soutenupar une dotation speciale de l'etat, il a signe des conventions avec des societes de developpementregional, avec la SOI)ECOTON pour l'information sur tous les marches de la zone cotonniere, avecI'IRAD (sur les fruits et legumes) avec le CRBP (sur la banane) avec le PNUD (pour la cartographiedes groupes a risques), avec l'ADIE pour le suivi des produits reglementes et proteges.

Composante de consitructions de marches sur financement bancaire

18. OBJECTIFS: L'objectif general etait de tester des methodes d'accroissement des capacitesde commercialisation et de stockage des denrees alimentaires par la construction ou renovationd' infrastructures de rnarche sous forme de financement bancaire, par la canal du Credit Foncier duCameroun.

19. RESULTATS: Cette composante a egalement commence tres lentement; le concept definancement de marches sur prets des commtnes avait ete lance dans le cadre du projet dedeveloppement urbain et des essais avaient ete faits dans deux grandes villes, A Bertoua et A Belabo,avec un soutien important en terme de formation des agents locaux et d'appuis A la gestion. L'id6en'a pas rencontre beaucoup d'echos au cours ctes premieres annees du projet, le CFC a surtouteffectue des sensibilisations. Trois marches ont finalement e finances et r6alises en 1996 et troisautres en 1997. Les premiers marches ont ete mis en place sans negociation prealable des contrats etconditions d'utilisation et sans participation importante des futurs utilisateurs. Deux des troispremiers marches ont rencontre des difficultes majeures A cause de changements d'equipes de gestiondans les municipalites et de rivalites internes sur le choix du site. Ceci est intervenu au moment oules communes faisaLient l'apprentissage de l'ouverture et de l'alternance politique, avec ledeveloppement du multipartisme. Des nouvelles equipes ont rejete les projets de leurs predecesseurset ont critique les sites retenus. Neanmoins un niarchU fonctionne normalement. Les trois marchesconstruits en 1997 ont ete acheves en 1998, il est trop t6t pour donner un avis sur leurfonctionnement. Dans l'ensemble, les resultats de cette composante sont faibles. Pourtant, sur lefonds, le test est positif: Le principal probleme semble &tre le risque de changement d'equipe a la t@te

41

des municipalites. Dans des villes ou il semble y avoir une certaine stabilite, ce type d'investissementapparait maintenant comme possible. Le CFC finance actuellement 4 autres constructions sur sesfonds propres, ce qui montre que le test a eu des consequences positives. Le CFC a appris a evaluerles risques politiques en impliquant A l'avance les populations concernees, par exemple pour le choixdu site, les modalit6s d'utilisation, les conditions de paiement de taxes de marche, etc.

Observations generales sur les aspects institutionnels

20. Le projet a et difficile A gerer, avec cinq composantes relativement autonomes, conduitessans veritable coordination: le montage institutionnel etait complexe, la coordination n'a pas etfacile A mettre en oeuvre, entre plusieurs instituions relevant de ministeres differents. Elle a etparticulierement difficile avec le CFC. Le projet manquait d'indicateurs precis permettant de suivreles activites des diff6rentes composantes. Les coats de fonctionnement du projet avaient et sous-estimes: le budget de fonctionnement du MINAGRI, par exemple, est passe de 250.000 US$ A1.000.000 US$. Le fonctionnement du projet a e lent, le projet a eu du mal a maitriser lesprocedures de gestion de la Banque Mondiale. Les rapports d'audit ont et tres critiques au milieu duprojet, des mesures ont ete prises pour renforcer le contr6le de gestion, par exemple par la mise enplace d'un cabinet prive en contr6le interne de gestion. Neanmoins, ce montage institutionnel a eudes avantages: il a pernis d'impliquer plus de 130 cadres fonctionnaires de niveau ingenieur, dont 90pour la composante de micro-credits. II a profondement marque ces agents qui ont accompagne, parexemple, les micro-credits des petits groupes. II a mis en valeur des dimensions de couits et derentabilit6 des innovations agricoles, auparavant mal maitris6es.

Plan d'operations apres projet

21. Le Ministre de 1'Agriculture et le Directeur Gen6ral de la cooperation ont rappele A lamission que toutes les dispositions ont ete prises pour assurer la suite des activites apres la fin duprojet. Le plan d'operation pr6cisera les activites prevues. Par exemple, les fonds rotatifs du FIMAC(1,7 milliard de FCFA) sont en securite, ils sont geres par des IMF priv6es, ils sont suivis par lesautorites provinciales sans aucune interference dans leur gestion. Dans ce sens, les acquis du projetseront preserves. La mission a esquisse les lignes du plan d'operations pour chaque composante,elles seront finalisees avant le 31/1/98.

22. Neanmoins, le Ministre de 1'Agriculture et le Directeur General de la Cooperation duMinistere du Plan ont rappele qu'ils souhaiteraient vivement la poursuite des appuis de la BanqueMondiale dans le domaine de la securite alimentaire. Une demande ecrite a deja e transmise en cesens en juin 1997, et cette demande a ete formellement rappelee par le Ministre de l'Agriculture achaque mission de supervision depuis juillet 1997. Le Ministere de l'Agriculture a rappele qu'il adonne son accord sur la l'evolution recente de la reglementation bancaire, A condition que desmoyens soient mis en place pour soutenir son application, sous forme d'un projet de soutien enmicro-finance. Le Ministere de l'Agriculture a organise une seance de travail sous la presidence duDirecteur de la DEPA, avec la participation d'un responsable de la Direction de la CooperationEconomique et Technique du Ministere des Investissements Publics et des bailleurs dans ce domaine.Cette reunion a revu l'etat des programmes en cours dans le domaine de la micro-finance. Le compterendu de cette seance de travail est joint en annexe 2. Il est ressorti des besoins importants sur lesaxes suivants:

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23. Developpement de capacites et reglementation d'IMF priv6es:

(i) Appuis de formation et d'information sur la reglementation.(ii) Appuis A la mise en oeuvre des enregistrements et des contr6les.(iii) Soutien au developpement d'IMF dans des provinces oui aucun bailleur n'intervient.(iv) Soutiens A des prestataires de formatlion aux agents des IMF sur 1'ensemble du pays.(v) Poursuite de soutiens A des COOPEC actuellement appuyees par CAMCCUL.(vi) Besoin dle preciser ces appuis dans une programmation des appuis au developpement deservices de micro-finance, avec des details par region.

24. DNveloppement de petites infrastructures rurales:

Soutiens A des mecanismes decentralises de financement d'infrastructures villageoisesvariees: infrastructures de soutien A la production et infrastructures d'amelioration des conditions devie comme les amenagements de points d'eau et la construction de maisons communautaires. Cessoutiens pourraient se traduire par la fourniture de financements sous forme de subventions souscondition d'apports importants des communautes, dans le prolongement des resultats positifs obtenuspar le FIMAC: 96 petites infrastructures ont ainsi ete realis6es A titre de test, avec des apports ennature variant de 10 a 30% et des apports en esp&ces variant de 5 A 10%. Dans leur grande majorite,ces infrastructures sont bien entretenues, et 72 %/c des comites villageois concernes sont A jour dansleurs versements a des comptes d'amortissement des infrastructures; ces comptes sont tenusseparement des comptes de fonctionnement des infrastructures; les versements sont effectues sur descomptes d'epargne specifiques au nom des comites, ils sont bloques pour toute la perioded'amortissement, ils sont places sous le contr6le des comites provinciaux de developpement.


CAMEROON


6. APPENDIX B: BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR

SUMMARY REPORT

I. Project Preparation

I. After a period of strong economic growth from 1980 to 1985, Cameroon suffered anunprecedented economic crisis marked by deteriorating terms of trade and a drop in oil production,exacerbated by disastrous economic management. Government interventionism was also verydamaging. In order to control the dysfunctional effects that the crisis was having on the overallmacroeconomic picture, Cameroon signed an agreement in September 1988 with the IMF toimplement macroeconomic stabilization measures. In 1989, the country signed a structuraladjustment loan agreement with the World Bank which was to take up where stabilization efforts hadleft off. It was in this environment of economic stagnation that the project was identified andprepared.

HI. Evaluation of project implementation

2. The project's initial overall goal was to improve the country's food security. In order toachieve this goal, the project had the following specific objectives: (i) create job opportunities andincrease the buying power of disadvantaged rural groups, especially women, in order to increase theiraccess to foodstuffs; (ii) reduce the impact of crop parasites; (iii) increase the efficiency of marketingand storage of food products; (iv) improve food preparation practices and dietary habits of such highrisk groups as pregnant and lactating women and children under the age of five. These specificobjectives were manifested in each of the project's five components.

III. Achievement of objectives

3. The general observation is that the various accomplishments made here and there bear littlerelation to the main objective of improving the population's food security, and more particularly tothe goal of overcoming the constraints inherent in food distribution. Such is the case with the CFCcomponent: there has been almost no financing of conservation/storage structures for foodstuffs.

4. In addition, there was no close collaboration from a technical standpoint between the variouscomponents that were supposed to contribute to the Project's overall objective. This lack of

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monitoring, attributable to the fact that the CON1,AN was put on the back burner, also contributed tothe deviation from initial objectives.

5. Attainment of the global objective can therefore be considered unsatisfactory. Thisobservation needs to be nuanced, however, when one considers each component separately.

6. Crop forecasts were fulfilled for the country's western provinces, which are more or lesspermanently exposed to vagaries of all kinds. Information on the status of the cropping season wasregularly collected and made available to donors and decision-makers. However, some weaknesswas sometimes observed at the level of the authorities responsible for mobilizing resources to dealwith emergencies: thus, the warning of a locust invasion that caused serious food shortages in the FarNorth province was issued in a timely manner, but the corresponding measures were not immediatelytaken.

7. Concerning the monitoring of food markets, each week the national radio system broadcastsinformation on prices and marketed volumes on 56 markets (rural or base-level, urban or consumer,and border). Data thus collected and disseminated helps economic actors identify zones with deficitsor overflows, and helps stimulate the flow of foodstuffs among different zones and stabilize supply.In addition, the surveillance of border markets m.akes it possible to assess the volume of imports vis-a-vis exports, and thus to better evaluate the availability of food within the country.

8. In the opinion of the SNAR managers met in the field, however, more urban than ruralmarkets are being monitored. Since rural markets are the ones closest to production zones, thismeans that there is no accurate information on the quantities being produced. In addition, thebroadcast of prices noted on urban markets sometimes causes the price of certain foodstuffs to rise onrural markets, an indication of a faulty perception of market information on the part of farmers.

9. Groups at risk for food insecurity are being monitored in the three high-risk provinces,namely East, North and Far North. This monitoring is done on a monthly basis and suppliesdecision-makers withi information on the food sitWation of at-risk groups.

10. At the time of its appraisal, the stated objective of the CFC component, which is concernedwith food security, was to increase food marketing and storage capacities. One indication of adeviation from the objective was the fact that the only criterion considered in selecting projectdossiers was immediate financial return. Indeecl, the World Bank required a 15% rate of return onprojects. A financial institution such as the CFC could do nothing more than see that this stipulationwas respected, since it was a condition of the Bank's non-objection to a loan.

11. In addition, the CFC's cumbersome procedures and the poor fit between the project selectioncriteria and the realities prevailing within the mayoral offices of Cameroon meant that only 6 marketswere financed instead of the 30 or 40 that had been planned. Only two (2) outreach seminars formayors' offices were organized with prior World Bank consent, at a total cost of 21 million CFAF.This outreach effort was insufficient given the fact that the mayors' offices had no prior familiaritywith credit issues.

12. The mayors' offices received no support in resolving difficulties associated withimplementing feasibility studies, due to a lack of human and financial resource in almost all districts.In addition, over 30% of the counterpart funds demanded were difficult to mobilize for smalldistricts, given their totally deficitary financial situation. As a result, the credit line intended to

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finance market infrastructures could not be fully used; this resulted in an additional exchange rate riskand generated more debt service for the Government vis-a-vis the World Bank.

13. The objective of improving dietary practices was attained overall. More specifically, impactindicators obtained from the baseline survey and the internal evaluation after two years ofimplementation show a clear and generally positive trend in behaviors between the base year (1994)and the test year (1997). The relevant figures are provided in an appendix. In addition, in placeswhere the reaction was weak, it is apparent that this situation was caused by economic constraints.

14. Regarding impact indicators of an increase in the population's nutritional knowledge, theinitial appraisal goal was to reach 40% of the 587,195 persons at high risk for malnutrition. Aftersome revision based on the acceptability of nutritional messages and agro-ecological zones, the goalwas fixed at 20-30% and actual achievement rates were on the order of 15-45%.

15. Concerning the development of a national nutritional education strategy, it should be notedthat, after implementation of the initial approach based on research, training and intervention in theFar North, the limits of this approach became apparent. These limits had to do with: a considerablereduction in the Government budget allocated to these services, a drop in salaries of Governmentpersonnel, which caused a loss of morale, and the cumbersome nature of certain methodologies usedfor quantitative surveys. The intervention strategy was therefore refashioned into a communityapproach.

16. FIMAC exceeded its goals in terms of the number of projects financed. Indeed, as of June30, 1996, 2,300 projects were actually operational, and over 100 more were on the verge of being setup. This surpassing of goals can be explained by two factors: the expansion of the mechanism to all58 departements of the country and the creation of a streamlined but efficient implementationstructure for the program.

17. The target number of groups to be created was far exceeded (5,365 recognized, of which2,641 financed, as against an objective of 2,000 groups). The target number of production supportinfrastructure projects was also far exceeded. This level of over-achievement may be attributable toobjectives that were set too low at the outset, or to an underestimation of the dynamism of targetpopulations and local managers which determined the setting of goals at that level.

18. Although the implementation of the FIMAC did increase food production, the failure toimplement the «village granaries> component, and the low level of financing of processingequipment, storage and preservation infrastructures and rural markets mean that serious food securityneeds (in terms of accessibility and availability of food) still remain.

IV. Main factors affecting the Project

19. The following overall factors were detrimental to the Project:

* The existence of a single special account for three PSA components, and the financing needsresulting from the expansion of those components, often caused cash flow problems;* World Bank procedures were not thoroughly understood;* The rapid turnover in project Task Managers, each with his own vision of the project, led tosome inconsistencies that hampered project implementation;* There were delays in the obtention of non-objection agreements;

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* The devaluation of the CFA franc was a serious blow to the project, especially as regards thespecial account, which was replenished in local currency;a The slow pace of disbursements led to the payment of additional interest on undisbursedfunds.

20. More specific difficulties at the level of each component include the following:

At the level of the FIMAC:

The weak development of community spirit in rnost provinces was detrimental to credit repayment.In sorme provinces such as Sud-Ouest, there was great instability of provincial coordinators during thefirst three years of project implementation.Delays in replenishing provincial accounts seriously limited the number of micro-projects recognizedand alpproved for financing.Certain provinces saw their credit suspended because of the low level of loan repayment.The bankruptcy of savings and loan cooperatives that had been created in the context of economicliberalization made farmers suspicious of this type of institution.The devaluation of the CFAF led to an underestirnate of the cost of several investments.

At the level of the SNAR:

Managernent difficulties hampered normal activity under this component during its first three yearsof operation. The SNAR lacked an accounting system.At the level of the PPENCommunity spirit was slow to develop at first in some zones. The drastic reduction in civil servants'salaries was a factor in a loss of morale on the part of outreach personnel. The drop in purchasingpower caused rural communities to sell all of their production without keeping reserves for familyconsumption. An additional factor was the lack of motivation on the part of the Community NutritionAuxiliaries and group leaders.

At the level of market infrastructure:

Communities wishing to obtain credit encountered difficulties in financing feasibility studies for theirprojects. Small communities cannot mobilize the cash (30%) demanded of them as a contribution tothe fiinancing of their projects.Communities lack the financial management autonomy that would allow them to enter into acommitment to using CFC funds.Poor management of some infrastructures prevented them from generating financial returns; this inturn caused huge delays in the reimbursement of funds loaned.Conflicts among political figures prevented the operation of some infrastructures. In addition, therewere conflicts between mayors' offices and local elites concerning the location of infrastructures to bebuilt.

At the level of UTAVA:

UTAVA's Garoua location made it difficult to establish an ongoing relationship with the World Bankand the Project's coordination staff.Procurement procedures were not thoroughly understood prior to the program's start-up.The Bank's hesitancy on numerous occasions to adopt UTAVA's action program was manifested inthe many consultant missions dispatched to determine UTAVA's needs.There were administrative delays in the issuance of regulatory texts.

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Actions to be carried out were not well identified.

V. Project Sustainability

21. The Government has committed itself to ensuring the sustainability of SNAR's achievements.To this end, it has institutionalized project activities by integrating them into the organizationalscheme of the Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, local managers now have the technical ability tocarry SNAR activities forward with confidence. From the technical standpoint, all methodologieshave been finalized. Data collection problems persist, but should soon be resolved by a budgetallocation from the Government. These funds may at some point be used to expand project activities.

22. The Ministry of Agriculture will maintain a mechanism for monitoring the last creditrepayments which run until 2002, and this will also ensure monitoring of the proper use of thereconstituted funds. A budget allocation of 200 million CFAF is included in the 1997/98 budget tocover FIMAC's operations. However, these measures alone are not enough to put rural micro-financeon solid footing. In the absence of long-term support, the Ministry of Agriculture will need to seek atleast 300 million CFAF in financing over two years for the continuation of two contracts, namely:the CAMCCUL technical assistance contract and the IPD training contract for training of micro-financing institutions not supported by CAMCCUL.

23. The integration of FIMAC groups into COOPECs for the management of second generationcredits is part of the strategy for promoting Financial System Decentralization (FSD) in Cameroon.The government feels that the development of FSD is a priority in it poverty alleviation efforts. Suchsystems seem to better meet the needs of rural and low-income populations.

VI. Evaluation of the institutional environment

24. The Project overestimated the capacities of service providers (NGOs and other administrativestructures.). Most of these providers were more motivated by the lure of material gain than by adesire to help achieve food security goals. This would explain to a large extent the low rate ofFIMAC credit recovery, as well as the SNAR's difficult relationship with the CRTV concerningmarket data on the one hand, and with the meteorological services on the other with regard to harvestforecasts.

25. Some NGOs, however, once they are well implanted in the field and in contact with farmers,are able to organize reliable groups that repay all their credits vis-a-vis FIMAC.

26. The Coordination Unit achieved its overall goals from an administrative standpoint,especially as regards the monitoring of disbursements, procurement, and follow-up on donors'recommendations. On the other hand, it did not fulfill its technical role. Indeed, it proved incapableof designing a system for monitoring and evaluation of activities under the components, nor did itgenerate any ideas for ensuring the sustainability of the program. It should also be noted that therewere latent conflicts among the components' coordinators, who accused the Coordination Unit ofinterfering with their management. The Unit was dissolved by MINAGRI in April 1998.

27. In addition, there was no management officer for the Food Security Project as a whole: thisfunction should have been located within the Coordination Unit. This lack was highly detrimental tothe monitoring of disbursements out of the Special Account for each component, and this hamperedthe management of the Food Security Project.

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28. There was no collaboration among different project components. There were no globalperformance indicators that would have made it possible to assess the extent to which the Project'soverall objective - improving food security of disadvantaged groups to alleviate poverty - had beenachieved.

World Bank Interventions

29. By helping to identify and prepare the Project, the Bank manifested its willingness to supportthe government's efforts to mitigate the harmful effects of the Structural Adjustment Program on low-income rural and urban populations. Staff from Bank headquarters and the Resident Mission sparedno effort in advising the Cameroonian team charged with carrying out the preparatory studies.

30. During Project appraisal and negotiations, the Bank failed to recognize the full extent of thedifficulty of setting up micro-credit programs in a rural environment plagued by poverty and foodinsecurity. Credits belonging to the second category under the FIMAC component (the so-called((commercial credits))) are a typical example cf this. These credits did not work because of theinterest rates imposed by the commercial banks responsible for managing them. The proposedinterest rates proved unsuited to field conditions.

31. During the implementation phase, the project had 6 task managers in as many years. Thispresented a problem of follow-up and continuity in Bank interventions. The Bank failed at the outsetto familiarize project managers with implementation procedures.

32. Project start-up was delayed because of the failure the master these procedures. In addition,project activities were held up by a non-objection mechanism that did not take into account budgetand activity programs previously approved by the Bank.

33. The mid-term review, which should have made it possible to re-assess project goals andresults and ensure its sustainability, was a missed opportunity. It was only in 1997, i.e., a year beforethe credit was to close, that the Bank became preoccupied with the project's sustainability, andparticularly with the merging of FIMAC groups into COOPECS and other IMFs (?) for purposes ofmanaging the reconstituted funds.

34. However, it should be stressed that it was thanks to the Bank's interventions, through itssupervision missions, that considerable improvement in project performance was achieved, with theintroduction of more systematic auditing and the training of staff in disbursement procedures.

Government interventions

35. The establishment of this program is proof that poverty alleviation is a priority for theGovernment.

36. Government. intervention was crucial in obtaining the amendment to the FSAR II loanagreement intended to finance the pilot phase of the FIMAC, especially as regards the amount of theloan and contributions by groups, as well as the simplification of procedures and the establishment ofprovincial accounts. The Government provided the project with staff and physical assets.

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37. The structures put in place by the Government, whether provincial planning commissions forsmall community projects or the provincial committee for crop monitoring, contributed to projectactivities.

38. Among the Government's failings, one should note that administrative procedures, especiallyfor procurement, are slow, and that this contributed to the slow pace of project disbursements. Thedrop in civil servants' salaries that occurred in 1993 caused a loss of motivation on the part ofGovernment personnel. This situation caused governmental support structures to be less effective inimplementing field activities.

39. Upon noting the slow pace of disbursements and the high cost of the IBRD loan, theGovernment requested and obtained partial cancellation (US$10.6 million) of the loan. From thefinancial point of view, this cancellation made it possible to lighten the debt burden in public financeat a time when Cameroon was becoming eligible for IDA funds. From the standpoint of projectsustainability, however, instead of canceling the loan the Government should have requested arevision of the financing plan. Such a revision would have made it possible to strengthen the mostactive disbursement categories, such as the financing of small "category 1" projects. The revision ofthe financing plan presupposes an in-depth assessment of the Project's future. Any arguments on thissubject would need to be put forth in such a way as to persuade the financing partner of the validityof the proposals. This is precisely what the Government has failed to do.

40. In conclusion, the Government was very passive during Project implementation. When it didtake initiatives (for example in preparing a project eligible for IDA funds), such initiatives were notalways supported.

VII. Project Effects/Impacts

41. The FIMAC program fostered the assumption of responsibility by groups in the initiating ofprojects, the identification of needed equipment and the choice of suppliers from whom they wantedto obtain the equipment. This was important to making groups feel that they "own" the project.

42. Beneficiary groups were introciuced to the notion of savings and loan activities in connectionwith their contribution to the financing of each project. The groups must first make an effort toaccumulate savings; then they must use the proceeds to back up a request for credit; and, finally theymust implement their project, which will generate income allowing them to improve their standard ofliving and repay the loan.

43. In order to make these accomplishments viable, however, there should have been an effort toinvolve beneficiary groups in discussions of the strategy to be followed to cycle the credits through,and to see the linkages between them, with a view to getting to know their own needs better andreflecting together on problems that all groups have in common and that remain once credit has beenobtained. It may have been more advisable to stimulate the creation of a different form of group,instead of doing the groups' thinking for them and hastily giving them responsibilities for which theywere ill-prepared. The chances of success for such a procedures are rather remote in the currentenvironment which favors self-promotion and participatory development.

44. Some groups that were oriented only towards social service objectives (religious associations,development committees, etc.) took advantage of the FIMAC credits to transform their members intoreal agricultural producers. This was the case of the KAMAJOWO group in Sonayo (arrondissement

50

of Pitoa) which had a single producer of onions before obtaining the credit (for a motorized pump.)With the credit, 9 other people began to cultivate this crop.

45. All beneficiary groups that made rational use of the equipment obtained saw their members'incomes increase substantially, provided that they did not have persistent marketing and storageproblems.

46. The project, by allowing women to improve their feel for group culture and to familiarizethemselves with the notion of savings and loans, helped improve their social status. Women weretherefore extremely enthusiastic about the FIMAC program. The staff has a thorough understandingof project appraisal and credit recovery in a rural environment, as well as of interpersonalrelationships in a difficult socio-political context.

47. A manual of sample dossiers put together by FIMAC from a sampling of micro-projects andinfrastructure projects, and including complete feasibility studies accompanied by importantrecommendations for implementation, was added to MINAGRI's store of documentation.

48. The approach adopted for project implementation made it possible for allocated credits toreach target populations, something that had not always occurred under other financing programs.This manual can be used by any individual or entity wishing to embark upon agriculturalentrepreneurship or rural finance.

49. Professional NGOs with their own operating resources, that have intervention goals in well-defined geographic areas and that are based in those areas, were undeniably helpful in implementingprojects within their zones of intervention.

50. Ten provincial planning commissions operated for 9 years and spent time discussinginvestments in the agricultural sector. The work of these commissions was strengthened by thedecision to decentralize credit management to the provincial level. These provincial commissionswill be an indispensable tool in bringing about decentralization.

51. FIMAC deserves praise for having financed underprivileged groups, allowing them toundertake income-generating activities. In emulation of this initiative, some projects, such astheDecentralized Rural Credit project, are establishing themselves by implanting village banks inareas where the population has viable activities to generate rural savings. Several other privatenationwide initiatives of this type, or along the lines of the Grameen Bank, exist in pilot zones of highproduction potential.

52. Managerial autonomy obtained by mayors' offices (by presidential decree) reinforced theircredibility vis-a-vis financial partners and even in the eyes of the population. Mayors' offices arenow on the front lines of the ongoing decentralization effort.

53. Most projects were begun with an emphasis on beneficiary participation and the assumptionof responsibility by a management committee, starting with the site identification phase. The publictransport depot at Bertoua, co-located with the market, has become a model of siting, organizationand profitability.

54. The pilot experiment with financing markets through loans to districts (communes) allowsthe CFC, based on the valorization of previous accomplishments, to continue the process using itsown funds, and relying on profitable operations.

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55. The project made it possible to:

- improve food and dietary habits and practices;- improve the feeding and health of children and their parents;- increase incomes, due to the reduction in childhood illnesses;- reduce the amount of time that mothers spend with [sick] children, due to the increasedwholesomeness and variety of diets;- develop the capacity for nutritional intervention on the part of health and nutrition staff.Training modules have been developed for the four agro-ecological zones chosen. Pedagogicalmaterial developed by the PPEN is widely used today by NGOs and religious organizations. Thecommunity approach developed by the project is widely recognized and used by NGOs.

VIII. Main lessons to be learned

56. An evaluation of the project's institutional aspects must be done during the preparation phaseby the institutions that are to be involved in implementation. Indeed, the success or failure of aproject depends to a large extent on the way in which institutional issues are assessed during thepreparation phase.

57. Socio-economic analysis during the project preparation phase should be a prerequisite forany project requiring the participation of the target group to ensure the sustainability of projectachievements.

58. NGOs and other actors, when they are well implanted in the field, are an effective tool fortransferring innovations in the rural milieu.

Dietary habits vary from one agro-ecological zone to another, and within a single agro-ecologicalzone.These dietary practices are not immutable; they can be improved so long as one takes thesociocultural context into account.Nutritional knowledge can be improved.A well conducted community approach can yield noticeable results.The resolution of nutrition problems is a multisectoral matter.Complementary local skills can yield appreciable results even in the absence of support from externalconsultants.There is still a substantial sociological aspect to rural finance, and the success of this activity requirespatience and an understanding of the milieu.Decisions made at the central level for implementation by provincial units are not very useful tofarmers.The participatory approach should still be preferred, since it takes Cameroon's diverse reality intoaccount and avoids the unproductive generalization of principles and methods.The selection of groups in the rural milieu must be based on objective criteria in order to ensurecredit recovery.Extensive (i.e., nomadic style) stockraising is difficult to monitor and credits granted under suchcomponents are difficult to recover.Rural women are the best customers for micro-finance, followed by old men and young marriedcouples.Credits for food self-sufficiency (500,000 CFAF maximum) are easily reimbu of patience before themodel "takes" and begins to spread.

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IX. RECOMMEFNDATIONS

59. During the project preparation period, the "planning by objectives" method - in addition tothe development of performance indicators -- should be an absolute requirement, since this methodmakes it possible to determine whether project objectives, results and activities are internallyconsistent. Indeed, this approach also makes a project much more "readable" for those responsiblefor implementation as well as for evaluation.

60. In order to ensure the success of its second generation credits, FIMAC must: quantify, byprovince, objectives and results to be achieved, and must earmark the required resources; allowprovincial coordinators to develop, under the supervision of provincial delegates, their activityprogram and the associated budgets; increase managers' compensation by means of a percentage (tobe determined) of funds recovered through their efforts; put groups that have received credits incontact with one another in order to stimulate repayments and put the process on solid footing.

61. Development projects in general and health projects in particular, whether current or planned,must: take the nutritional component into consideration in implementation; take advantage of thetools developed; and follow the community approach model developed by PPEN.

X. Operational Plan

62. Disbursements for the SNAR component have been closed since December 1997. TheSNAR's activities are continuing on the Governnent budget thanks to an allocation that will be setaside for SNAR on a regular basis under the MINAGRI's budget as of the 1998/99 fiscal year. Thus,SNAR will continue its activities under the aegis of MINAGRI.

63. Some of MINAGRI's tasks could be transferred, eventually to professional entities. Othertasks, such as data collection on high-risk groups, could be expanded to the entire country with thesupport of projects such as the Health, Fertility a.nd Nutrition Project, perhaps in collaboration withthe National Agricultural Extension project.

64. The PPEN component achieved its goal of demonstrating an efficient method of nutritionaleducation in the four pilot zones assigned to it. The procedure may be extended to the entire countrywith the help of the Bank-supported Health, Fertil:ity and Nutrition Project.

65. Regarding the «market infrastructure>> component implemented by CFC after it had tested themarket financing mechanism through loans to districts (communes), CFC has officially added this toits roster of activities, as a supplemental financial product that enriches its portfolio of activities.

66. Under the component dealing with crop predation by insects and birds, UTAVA acquiredsome procurement experience. Although UTAVA is being considered for possible privatization, itwill continue, through MINAGRI, to pursue its public mandate of controlling bird and insectpredators in the western part of the country.

XI. CONCLUSION

67. The project was designed and implemented in an atmosphere of economic crisis. This crisisled the Government, with the help of donors including the World Bank, to establish a structural

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adjustment program. The project made it possible to attenuate this program's harmful effects on therural sector.

68. Although it is still too early to determine the extent to which the project's overall foodsecurity goal has been reached, it is still evident, where specific objectives are concerned, that theproject has helped to create jobs in rural areas by financing income-generating activities. In addition,there has been improvement in the dietary habits of such high risk groups as pregnant women andchildren under the age of five.

69. Project performance would have been better if, during preparation, particular attention hadbeen paid to socio-economic analysis of the target population, making it possible to take into accountregional peculiarities in the implementation of each component and, on the other hand, to evaluateinstitutions responsible for implementing the projects (local administrations, NGOs, etc.).

70. In any case, the PSA demonstrated that poverty is not inevitable: it is possible to mobilizethe rural population by means of a participatory and community approach to poverty alleviation.

71. In the end, the project pointed up the fact that it is possible to mobilize rural savings throughthe financing of income-generating micro-investments. Looking ahead, the next phase of the povertyalleviation effort will be the consolidation of the Rural Development Fund (Fonds de D6veloppementRural) which has been ceded to the micro-financing institutions. The success of this phase will beadditional proof that it is possible to bring the formal and informal sectors together to mobilize ruralsavings.


CAM:EROON


7. APPENDIX C: MISCELLANEOUS

Premiere Categorie

Exercice Pr6vu Agree Financ6

91/92 99 65 32

92/93 244 256 256

93/94 i30 879 422

94/95 493 907 645

95/96 605 954 850

96/97 2224 332

97/98 154 194

26 sem98

TOTAL 1771 5439 2731

Evolution des prets de Premiere Categorie

2500

2000

1500

1000

E0

091192 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98

Exercice

* Pr6wv gAgr66 r-0 Financ~

55

Deuxieme categorie

Exercice Pr6vu Agree Finance91/9292/93 6 1

93/94 43 2594/95 46 2795/96 45 4396197 50 897/98 154 2

26 sem 98TOTAL 344 106

Evolution des prets de Troisieme Cat6gorie

180

160140

120 12

2 80E 600z 40

20

91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98

Exercice

* RPvu *Agree nFmanc=6

56

Constitution des groupes - situation des femmeso1-5 membres cO6-10 membres Iz1 1-15 membres |1o6-20 membres

; 360 1 245 r 75 104

<> 1l 6-20<>11-15 mernbres<>1 1-15membres _ <> 1-5

membres

<>6-1 0membres

Constitution des groupes - situation globale<o'1-5membres |o~6-10Omembres 1C>11-15membres '106-20membres

1610 ' 777 184 170

<>16-20<>1 1-15 membresmembres

<>6-1 0<>-membres membJres <>1m5

57

Adamaoua 18 4 68 92 1 2 24 34 243

Centre 41 29 2 31 8 34 8 153

Est 145 4 2 6 15 1 77 4 254

Ext. Nord 9 18 206 17 13 4 267

Nord 12 15 238 66 6 2 34 9 382

Nord-Ouest 183 20 6 103 96 1 113 18 540

Sud-Ouest 113 12 33 1 13 7 179

Sud-Ouest 145 5 5 23 21 5 204

Ouest 122 73 68 11 94 2 370

Littoral 99 9 61 11 60 5 245

FIMAC Micro-projects

1000 1 i | ili 11

900

800

700

0 500

z300

200

100

0

Culture Culture Culture Elevage Petit Elevage Pisciculture Moulin- InfrastructureVivriere Maraichere Attelee Bovin Presse

Project type


CAMEROON


8. APPENDIX D: MAPS

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CAMEROON

FOOD SECURITY PROJECT

- INFRASTRUCTUPE PROJECTS

FINANCED PROJECTS

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DEPARTMENT CAPITALS

e PROVINCE CAPITALS f P.1i

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World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · cancelled on June 10, 1997. In...

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Transcript of World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · cancelled on June 10, 1997. In...