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Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 55, No.3, March 2007 ( 93 )

On vijnanaparif}ame in rirrzszkakarika

MATSUOKA iroko

0. In the first verse of his T r i r r t ~ i k i i . k i i . r i k i i . T r K ) Vasubandhu states: ii.tmadharmopacii.rohi vividho ya ; pr v rt te I vijnii.napari Jii.me 'sau pari Jii.mal; s ca tridhii. (TrKl[Ll3.3-4]). This verse is well known as expressing the core of the Yogacara doctrineaccepted by Vasubandhu. Thus, a correct interpretation of the verse is crucial to aproper understanding ofVasubandhu's doctrine. This paper will examine two interpretations of the verse: one commonly adopted by modern scholars, such as Unebeand another put forth by the commentator Sthiramati. In fact, Sthiramati anticipatesthe interpretation of modern scholars and presents an argument to reject it. This argument is also presented below.I To begin with, let us see what Unebe says.

Unebe[2004:137.6-13]: According to him (Sthiramati), the verse (pada abc) means thatvarious verbal expressions such as "atman" or "jiva" for human beings and "dharma" or"ayatana" for other constituents of this world are used among people ( aka) as well as inthe scientific system (sastra), but they refer to the transformations of consciousness (vijnana-pari Ji'ima) in reality and, therefore, they are mere secondary applications (upacara)."

The important point to note here is that Unebe takes vijnii.napari Jii.ma as the referent of a 'verbal expression' (upacara). According to Unebe [2004:137.3-5], the ex-pression upacii.ral; pr v rt te vijnii.napari Jii.me is a construction of the typefobdal;pravartate rthe A certain word occurs in the domain of a certain meaning',so that it means A verbal expression refers to vijnii.napari Jii.ma'.

t is debatable, however, whether the expression in question can be a constructionof the type described above. I think that it is difficult to establish a signifier-significand relation between upacii.ra as a verbal expression and vijnii.napari Jii.ma.2.1. Sthiramati introduces the following arguments made on the assumption that theterm upacii.ra means a metaphorical expression.

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( 94 On vijiiiinapari1Jiime in T r i m ~ l k i i k i i r i k i i H. MATSUOKAIt is not proper to have a metaphorical expression upacara) when there do not exist -

m n and dh rm s as primary referents mukhya). For, a metaphorical expression mustmeet three conditions: the primary referent of the word, the actual referent resembling theprimary one, and a common quality existing between the two. (TrBh[Ll7.7-9])

The point made here is this: Suppose that the word ii.tman refers to the self whichreally exists. f the same word is used to refer to a thing which is not tm n andsimilar to it, this use of the word ii.tman is called upacii.ra or secondary. In this caseit is also said that the word ii.tman has two meanings: primary and secondarygaw:ia).

2.2. Sthiramati denies such a distinction:There is also no primary referent for a word since the essence of that [i.e., the primary

thing] goes beyond the scope of thought Jiiana) and language abhidhana). For, it is onlyto grasp and to convey an [unreal] secondary aspect gw:iarupa) that a cognition and averbal expression occur, because they do not touch the essence of the primary thing. Otherwise [a cognition and a verbal expression, which are related only to] an [unreal] secondary aspect, would become useless. Indeed, there is no means of determining the essenceof the primary thing other than a cognition and a verbal expression. Thus it is to beunderstood that there cannot be any primary referent since there is no cognition or verbalexpression to grasp or to convey it. (TrBh[Ll7.23-27])

Sthiramati argues that a cognition and a verbal expression do not touch the very essence of a primary thing but its unreal secondary aspect, which amounts to sayingthat they do not occur with reference to the ultimate reality but to the conventionalreality. t is clear that he intends to imply here that the use of any word is secondary upacii.ra), so that no essential distinction can be made between the use of a certain word with reference to a certain thing and that of the same word with referenceto another similar thing.

Thus we may say that to take the term upacii.ra as meaning a metaphorical ex-pression as opposed to a primary expression carries us too far away from the original intention ofVasubandhu.3.1. We have to consider what Sthiramati states in his comments on the verse, tosee how he understands Vasubandhu's statement i i t m a d h a r m o p a c i i r a ~ pr v rt te vijnii.naparil}ii.me.

In that [vijiianapari1Jama] tatra) there arise from storehouse consciousness alayavij--1122-

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On vijiiiinapari Jiime in TrimS kiikiirikii (H. MATSUOKA) ( 95iiiina) the conceptual cognition (vikalpa) in which [a thing such as] iitman (the self) appears (nirbhiisa) and the one in which [dharmas (constituent factors of experience) suchas] a material factor (rupa) appear, on the basis of the full development (paripo,rn) of theimpression (viisanii) left by the conceptualization of iitman and the like and on the basisof the full development of the impression left by the conceptualization of a material factorand the like.

Although iitman and dharmas do not exist externally, there occur the conceptual construction (upaciira) of [such a thing as] iitman and that of [such dharmas as] a materialfactor, which arc beginningless, by means of thinking of the appearance of [a thing suchas] iitman and the appearance of [dharmas such as] a material factor as if they were entities outside the conceptual cognition, and clinging to them. (TrBh[Ll6.2-6])

Here it is pointed out that in the vijniinapari Jiima there arise from iilayavijniina theconceptual cognitions in which iitman and dharmas appear and that when such conceptual cognitions are produced, the conceptual construction, which I think ismeant by the term upaciira here, of iitman and dharmas occur. Thus Sthiramatishows that the expression upaciirah pravartate vijniinaparif}iime does not admit ofUnebe's interpretation.3.2. Then we have to determine exactly what is meant by the locative ending in theword vijniinapari Jiime. Sthiramati says:

Moreover, [it must be said that] when x does not exist in y then x is conceptually constructed in y (yac ca y tr nii.sti tat tatropacaryate); for instance, [when the cause for theuse of the word] go [does not exist in a Bahika then] it is conceptually constructed in theBahika.

Similarly, because ii.Iman and dharmas exist neither in the [transformation of] consciousness itself nor outside of it, ii.tman and dharmas are just conceptual constructs (parikalpita)and do not exist from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth (paramii.rthatas). Therefore, theone-sided view should not be accepted that as a cognition (vijiiiina) exists as a real entity(dravyatas , so also does something to be cognized (vijiieya).

Since no conceptual construction can take place without a locus (iidhii.ra), it should necessarily be accepted that the vijiiiinapari1Jiima, in which occurs the conceptual constructionof iitman and dharmas, exists as a real entity (vastutas . Therefore, it is not reasonable toaccept that as something to be cognized is simply conventionally real and not ultimatelyreal (samvrtitas), so is also a cognition. For, the undesirable consequence would follow

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( 96 On vijniinapariJJiime in Trimslkiikiirikii H. MATSUOKAthat the cognition does not exist even at the conventional level. Indeed it is not proper tosay that a conventional reality has no basis (nirupiidiina). (TrBh[Ll6.6-l I])

The point to note here is that the vijniinaparitJiima is described as the locus inwhich the conceptual construction of iitman and dharmas occurs. According toSthiramati, iitman and dharmas are simply conceptual constructs (parikalpita; TrBh[Ll5.20-2ll: iitmii dharmiis ca upacaryanta ity iitmadharmopaciirah), whereas the vijn-iinaparitJiima exists as a real entity. t is patent that he takes the locative ending invijniinaparitJiime as signifying a locus. f the vijniinaparitJiima serves as locus insuch a conceptual construction, it is properly to be said to be the cause of the conceptual construction.

Thus we may say that there obtains a causal relation between vijniinaparitJiimaand upaciira as a conceptual construction.4. The following points have become clear:I) The term upaciira in iitmadharmopaciira is to be understood as signifying con

ceptual construction or a conceptual construct, leading to conventional discourse,rather than a metaphorical expression.2) The locative ending of the word vijniinaparitJiime signifies the locus (iidhiira) in

which occur the conceptual construction (upaciira) of iitman and that of dharmas.This shows that the vijniinaparitJiima is the cause for the occurrence of the conceptual constructions.

Unebe cannot be justified in saying that various verbal expressions (upaciira) referto the transformation of consciousness. According to the Yogacara doctrine, the vij-niinaparitJiima exists as a real entity and hence cannot be referred to by any verbalexpression. Rather, what can be the referent of a verbal expression is simply iitmanor dharmas which are just conceptual constructs.

Thus the verse (piidas a-c) is to be translated as follows:Indeed, the different kinds of conceptual construction (upaciira) of iitman and dharmas,

which occur in everyday life (loka) and in theoretical discourse (siistra), occur in the transformation of consciousness.

(References) TrBh[L]: Trimsikiibhii(fya (Sthiramati). See TrK[L]. TrK[L]: T r i m ~ i k i i k i i r i k i iVasubandhu). Sylvain Levi ed., Vijnaptimiitratiisiddhi: deux Traites de Vasubandhu: Vim

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On vijnanapari1Jame in Tril'flsikakarika H. MATSUOKA) ( 97 )fotika (la Vingtaine) accompagnee d'une Explication en Prose et Trimsika (la Trentaine)avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion Press,1925. Unebe, Toshiya [2004): The Grammarian's Objection in Sthiramati's Trif lsikii.-bhii.$ya and Bhartrhari's Argument on the Secondary Application of Words, in ThreeMountains and Seven Rivers: Prof Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Mo-tilal Banarsidass.

(Key Words) TrilJ1sikii.kii.rikii. upacii.ra, vijnii.napari1Jii.ma(Graduate Student, Hiroshima University)

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