The Industrialization of Invention - German Chemical Industry

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The Industrialization of Invention: A Case Study from the German Chemical IndustryAuthor(s): Georg Meyer-Thurow

Reviewed work(s):Source: Isis, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 363-381Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/231441 .

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T h e Industrializationf Invention:A C a s e S t u d y F r o m t h e German

Chem ica l IndustryBy Georg Meyer-Thurow*

IN THE LAST DECADES of the nineteenth century the relationship betweenscience and industry changed in a decisive way. Invention was industrialized.Large company laboratories were set up. The consulting scientist and the scien-tific entrepreneur were replaced by the salaried industrial research worker. Ap-plied science became a driving force for technical development and economicgrowth.'The German chemical industry has often served as the outstanding example ofan early science-based enterprise. In particular, it has become commonplace tostress the importance of research for the rise to world supremacy of German dyemanufacturers. But while this truism has been readily accepted, the manner inwhich science was turned into a productive force has not been subject to detailedinvestigation. "Because it turns out, ex post," Paul M. Hohenberg wrote in 1967,"that the gamble was a good one for the chemical industry in 19th-century Europe,identifying the sources of the industry's growth reduces largely to finding thefactors affecting the decisions to take the gamble." The prevalence of this attitudehas meant that apart from the work of John J. Beer, little is known about industrialresearch in the German chemical industry up to 1914.2The first small dyestuffs firms were founded in several western European coun-tries in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Although the number of workers employedand the amount of capital invested always remained small as compared with olderventures such as textiles, coal, or iron, the rise of the dye industry was remarkablein at least two ways. First, dye manufacturing was the prototype of a new type ofindustry based on science. Second, Germany dominated the manufacture of dye-

*Department of History and Philosophy, University of Bielefeld, Federal Republic of Germany(FRG).This article was first presented to a conference on "Obstacles and Innovations in the AppliedSciences" at the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris in May 1979. I wish to thankEdwin Layton and Arnold Thackray for their suggestions.'See John D. Bernal, Science and Industry in the 19th Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1953), p. 151. To Bernal I owe the phrase "industrialization of invention." More recently see DavidF. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and The Rise of Corporate Capitalism (NewYork: Knopf, 1977).2Paul M. Hohenberg, Chemicals in Western Europe: 1850-1914 (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.,1967), quoting p. 83; John J. Beer, "Coal Tar Dye Manufacture and the Origins of the ModernIndustrial Research Laboratory," Isis, 1958, 49:123-131; and John J. Beer, The Emergence of theGerman Dye Industry (Urbana: Univ. Illinois Press, 1959; Arno rpt. 1981), still the best work on thissubject. The latest monograph to deal in some detail with the history of the German dyestuffs industryis Peter Borscheid, Naturwissenschaft, Staat und Industrie in Baden (1848-1914) (Stuttgart: Klett,1976).ISIS, 1982, 73 (268) 363

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GEORG MEYER-THUROWstuffs. This leap to hegemony, almost to world monopoly, constituted, as DavidLandes has pointed out, "Imperial Germany's greatest industrial achievement."3But these traits were not apparent at the outset. For many years science andindustry were only loosely connected in dyestuffs manufacturing. Industrial re-search, often considered the most typical characteristic of German dyestuffs com-panies, was an evolutionary development. It was as much a result of the growth ofthese companies as a precondition for their furtherdevelopment. The turning pointlay somewhere in the 1880s.The present study examines the history of one company, the Bayer AG (foundedin 1863 and incorporated in 1881 as Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedrich Bayer &Co.), during the years 1880-1914, when scientific research began to play a deci-sive role in the development of the dyestuffs industry. It concentrates on themain scientific laboratory at the Bayer Company and on the research staff work-ing in this laboratory. After a short sketch of the early history of the dyestuffsindustry in the 1860s and 1870s, the study deals with five aspects of industrialresearch at the Bayer Company from the 1880s to 1914 in some detail: the originsof the industrial research laboratory; the gradual expansion of research laborato-ries and the elaboration of an infrastructure for research; the organization of theresearch chemist's work; the transformations that the process of research under-went; and the effects of industrial research.4

THE DYESTUFFS INDUSTRY, CHEMISTS, AND CHEMISTRY IN THE 1860s AND 1870sUp to the late 1870s the development of the dyestuffs business was divided intotwo distinct phases. First came the period of the aniline dyes, a handful of artificialcolors of great beauty but little fastness, mainly used to dye silk. Then, after thesynthesis of alizarin in 1868 by two German scientists, the production of alizarindyes dominated the field. Their successful synthesis led to the replacement for thefirst time of a natural dye, here madder,which was next to indigo in importance Table 1. Estimated world productionand widely used for the dyeing of cotton. of dyestuffsThe real growth in production of dye-stuffs is hard to measure, especially for Year alue (in mions of marks)these early years, because rapidly fallingprices characterized the industry. Evenso, the total value of dyes produced 1867 22.5seems to have risen rapidly (see Table 1872 301).5 Even though one has to rely n the 1878 70estimates of contemporary chemists 1883 92when trying to identify the proportional

3David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969), p. 276.4For a fuller account of the history of the Bayer Company and its chemists see Georg Meyer-Thurow, "Industriechemiker und Chemische Industrie: Eine Fallstudie zur Symbiose von Wissen-schaft und Industrie, 1857-1914," (Ph.D. diss., University of Bielefeld, FRG, 1982).5Figures for Tables 1 and 2 are based on estimates made by contemporary academic chemistsclosely connected with the dyestuffs industry. For 1862-1872 see August W. Hofmann, "Introduc-tion," Gruppe III: Chemische Industrie: Wiener Weltausstellung. Amtlicher Katalog der Ausstellungdes Deutschen Reiches (Berlin: Von Decker, 1873), p. 108; the figures for 1872 do not include thevalue of the production of alizarin dyes which, according to the same source (p. 109), amounted to 12million marks in 1873. For 1878 see M. Ch. Lauth, Exposition Universelle Internationale de 1878 dParis. Group V, Classe 47: Rapport sur les produits chimiques et pharmaceutique (Paris: Lacroix,1881), p. 115. For 1883 see Carl Engler, "Uber den heutigen Stand der Teerfarbenindustrie,"Zeitschrift des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure, 1884, 28:937-940, 953-958, on p. 957.

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~15 UIChemistshiredduring year1i4 Chemistsemployedat end of year ;13121110987654320 1863 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82

Figure 1. Recruitment of chemists at Bayer, 1863-1882. Out of thirty-one chemists engaged duringthis period, only eighteen remained with Bayer at the end of 1882; three of these entered into part-nership (two in 1872, one in 1877) and no longer appear in the tally of chemists employed after thatpoint. Turnoverrates were high: six chemists left during their firstyear of service, two during theirsecond, and four during their third.

Systematic and continuous industrial research at Bayer had to wait several moreyears. Until the 1880s progress was due to chance discoveries, which relied in parton empirical trial-and-error, in parton the results of academic research. Only once(in 1864) did Friedrich Bayer and Friedrich Weskott, founders of F. Bayer & Co.,engage a chemist to devote his time in the laboratory to the "invention of newcolors." About half a year later they ended this first unsuccessful experiment inindustrial research and did not dare repeat it for almost two decades.8 Producingindustrially useful knowledge was not yet the main partof any chemist's job; whatcounted was technical experience, not scientific competence. For some time,therefore, Bayer's management preferred to recruit chemists from other compa-nies, that is, from within the industry, rather than from the universities or Tech-nische Hochschulen. So far as can be determined, six of the eight chemists hiredduring 1863-1871 and five of the six hired during 1874-1878 were recruited fromother companies. No doubt this recruitment was one of the main routes of thetransfer of knowledge between companies; it usually took place after the introduc-tion of new products or new manufacturing processes. Figure 1 summarizes devel-opment at Bayer from 1863 to 1882. Peaks in the figure (based on a variety ofsources in the Bayer archives) clearly reflect the effect on company recruitingpolicy of the wave of dyestuff inventions in 1863-1864, the start of the alizarinproduction in the early 1870s, and the introduction of new aniline and azo dyes inthe late 1870s and early 1880s. Comparison of the number of chemists hired eachyear with the number employed also reflects the chemists' high mobility.Knowledge of organic chemistry as well as technical expertise certainly playeda role in the development of the dyestuffs industry. But the phenomenal success ofthe German chemical manufacturers-and the success of a small number of firms,among them Bayer, which quickly grew into big corporations-was due more toentrepreneurial strategies and favorable political and sociocultural factors than to

8See Friedrich Bayer's business correspondence, Bayer archives 16/1.2, 16/1.3, quoting Bayer toPhilip Passavant, 12 May 1864.

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THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF INVENTIONresearch effort or scientific open-mindedness. The necessary preconditions forefficient industrial research were still missing: the chemical formulae and modesof action of successful dyes remained mysterious. For instance, though Kekuleelucidated a structure for the benzene molecule in 1865, organic chemists wereslow to realize that this would elucidate coal-tar chemistry. The constitution ofmost dyestuffs was still unknown, and the possibility that commercially importantdyestuffs could be discovered by systematic research was not as yet envisioned.Research could not be guided or planned, its success was uncertain, and thefinancial risks of investing in "human capital" were incalculable. Moreover, thenumber of artificial colors was still very small, and manufacturers and managerswere primarily absorbed in the problems posed by production, purchase, andsales. Finally, the high mobility of chemists whose self-conceptions oriented themtowards teaching, private consulting, or an entrepreneurial career raised difficul-ties of integration and control which were hard to overcome. But all of thischanged in the late 1870s and the early 1880s.

THE ORIGINS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH LABORATORYThe factors that precipitated the institutionalization of science in industry fall intothree categories.The importance of research for industrial progress was rapidly becoming appar-ent. A new interest in organic dye chemistry, beginning in the 1860s, led towardsthe end of the 1870s to a whole series of scientific and technical breakthroughs.Emil and Otto Fischer, then pupils of Adolf von Baeyer, professor of chemistry atthe University of Munich, disclosed the structure of the first aniline dyes in aseries of masterful experiments. Von Baeyer himself managed to synthesize forthe first time the most important naturaldye, indigo, after many years of investiga-tion. The diazo reaction, a coupling reaction between diazonium compounds andamines or phenols, had been discovered by Peter Griess in the late 1850s and early1860s. His reaction showed the way to countless possible dye products. But it wasonly in the second half of the 1870s that the pioneer work of one English and oneFrench dyestuff firm raised the active interest of the dyestuffs industry in the azocolors, which in a very short time were to become the most numerous and mostimportant class of dyestuff colors. The interest of organic chemists turned to theapplication of dyestuffs as well. The work of a German chemist engaged to anEnglish dyestuff firm, Otto N. Witt (later professor of chemistry at the TechnischeHochschule Berlin), provided the first steps toward a deeper understanding of therelationship between the constitution and the quality of dyes. And finally, in theearly 1880s academic and industrial chemists realized that intermediates used forthe production of dyestuffs could also be used for the manufacture of pharmaceu-tical products.Economic factors encouraged institutional change in response to this rapid ad-vance of scientific work in the field of dyestuff chemistry. A small group of bigcorporations, among them Bayer, now dominated the market and therefore pos-sessed enough financial power to risk investing in the uncertain future of research.In addition, the crisis in the dyestuffs trade from 1875 to 1878 and after 1882 madethese companies receptive to change: research offered a strategy that might re-duce dependence on the ups and downs of the business cycle. Furthermore, thedepressed economy, especially in the mid-1880s, deeply affected chemists by

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reducing heirchancesof employmentandrestricting heirmobility, thuspromot-ing theirinvoluntaryacceptanceof the role of white collar workers.Aside from scientific advances and ecomomic developments,the firstGermanpatent aw encouraged he transplantationf researchfromacademe to industry.Enacted n 1877, thispatent aw had at leastthreeremarkableffects. Thepublica-tion of patentapplicationsandgrantedpatentsprovided nformation o all compa-nies on advances in the state of the art. 140Since the patent protection was confined 130 34to new chemical processes, chemists 120were stimulated to find and patent all 110possible processes, thus blocking their 1 /competitors. Last but not least, the re- 90suiting endless patent litigation constitut- 82ed a sort of legal warfare that intensified /the connections between manufacturersand the academic scientists called upon 0 52-to provide expert testimony. Thus co- 40 /operation between academic scientists 0 29*and industry, characteristicof the early 20 -history of the dyestuffs industry, contin- 210uedto be important.Yet when industrial ^ , ,researchbeganon a largerscale, the rela- 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900tionships between industry and academe Figure2. Numberofchemistsemployedatweredecisively altered,as the historyof Bayer, 1880-1900.the Bayer Companywell demonstrates.The necessityof investingin the productionof knowledge,however, was onlyslowly accepted.Threeimportant hangesdidoccurearlyon in the internalstruc-ture of the Bayer Companyin response to the scientific, economic, and legaldevelopmentsof the late 1870s and early 1880s. From 1882 on the number ofchemistsemployed,which started o rise continuallyonly in 1878, increasedatanacceleratedrate, as indicated by Figure 2.9 At the same time recruitmentofchemists shifted moreand morefromrival firmsto theuniversities,concentratingalmostexclusivelyon Ph.D.s. Finally,chemistsreplaced oremenas the directorsof theprocessof production.Scientific controlandimprovement f manufacturingprocesseswereinstitutionalized.As a by-product,productionpersonnelgraduallybeganto engage in thedevelopmentof new productionmethodsandthediscoveryof new dyes.The companyalso reorganized ts relationshipwith academicresearchaccord-ing to its growing need for innovations. The Bayermanagement ollowed threedifferentstrategies.It formed connections with severaloutstandingacademic re-searchchemists andformalizedthese connectionsby means of contractssecuringeverycommercially mportant cientific result for the company.Itengaged newlygraduatePh.D. chemists forone yearand sentthemto a universityor TechnischeHochschulelaboratory,where they worked on researchproblemsrelatedto thecompany productionprogram.In 1886 Bayeralso beganto supporta laboratory,

9Figures (the number of chemists employed at the end of the given year) are based on the Bayerchemists whom I could identify. Discrepancies with data used by Beer and others (cf., e.g., Emer-gence, pp. 83-84) may be due to my inability to identify every chemist engaged by Bayer; todifferences of definition, including apothecaries, physiologists, etc.; or to differences in the time thechemists were counted.

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THEINDUSTRIALIZATIONF INVENTIONalthough the firm did not own it, and it was separated from the manufacturingplant by more than a hundred miles. At first one and later two chemists spent sometime there doing research for Bayer.These early attempts to make research serve the company's goals were less thana complete success and reflected a certain unwillingness to integrate research fullyinto company activities. The Bayer Company was not yet prepared to create itsown research division, still preferring external laboratories. Instead of formulatinga consistent long-term research program, the management handed a variety ofshort-term research topics to young chemists who never had been a part of thedyestuffs industry and were ignorant of the industry's possibilities and needs.Guidance and control of their investigations were left to academic teachers. For ashort time research work done for Bayer continued in this transitional stage,suspended between academic institutions and industry.

Only in the second half of the 1880s did industrial research clearly begin tobecome institutionalized. The Bayer Company made a decisive step when it eman-cipated industrial chemists both from external academic research and from auxil-iary activities within the company. The key figure in this change was a youngchemist named Carl Duisberg, whose work led to the foundation of one of the mostimpressive industrial research laboratories known at that time.'0Duisberg had joined Bayer in 1884 after having done research for Bayer for oneyear at the University of Strassburg. He was appointed assistant chemist to thehead of the then very small azo manufacturing plant. There he continued hisresearch on azo direct dyes, a class of artificial organic colors introduced in 1884,which revolutionized dyeing practice because they could dye cotton directly, with-out prior treatment with a mordant.Duisberg's research proved to be extremely successful. A series of discoveriesfollowed, including dyes that turned out to be of the utmost commercial impor-tance. Without any planning, a group of research assistants began to gather aroundthis young inventor. These assistants were destined to follow up the lines ofresearch initiated by Duisberg and to make sure that an invention was fully ex-ploited: laboratory findings had to be tested with regard to their technical qualitiesand turned into production processes, and patent protection had to be gained andupheld against any possible infringement.While Carl Duisberg became the personal nucleus of an inspired group ofresearch-oriented young chemists, the group's cooperative effort decisively influ-enced the further development of Bayer. Duisberg's group performed many func-tions. Its members had to make rapid shifts among research, development,production, and sales. But their work meant an infusion of scientific modes ofwork, behavior, and thought into industry, and it demonstrated the value of acombined research effort. By about 1890 Bayer had recognized the distinctive roleof the research chemist and made research a salaried, lifelong, specialized occupa-tion. l Yet many difficulties remained. The laboratories were scattered all over theplant, located wherever there happened to be a free room. Their facilities wereprimitive and not always suitable for scientific research. And as the number ofyoung research chemists increased, there was a growing need for mechanisms toorganize and coordinate their work. These problems led to a momentous decision;

'?See also Beer, Emergence, pp. 80-88; Hans-Joachim Flechtner, Carl Duisberg: Vom Chemikerzum Wirtschaftsfuhrer (Dusseldorf: Econ, 1961)."Dr. Bernhard Heymann, who joined the Bayer Company in 1889 as a research chemist, was thefirst chemist to stay in research (until 1914).

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GEORG MEYER-THUROWthe BayerCompany n 1889 decidedto build a new main scientific laboratory, nwhich its full-time industrialresearchwas to be concentrated.Bayer opened thenew laboratory in August 1891.12

The arrangementof the laboratoryreflected the special needs of industrialresearch; t was widely imitated hroughouthe industry n subsequentyears. Onelargeroomwas fittedupfortwelve chemists with twelve box-likeworkingplaces,each of whichresembleda separate aboratory,although he whole roomretainedits unifiedcharacter.This arrangementmade it possible for each chemist to con-centrateon his line of research withoutinterruption nd with a modicum of pri-vacy, yet it permittedcommunication and consultation with fellow-chemists.Competitionwas stimulated,and the esprit de corps of a scientific communitystrengthened.Mostimportantly,heboxarrangementacilitated hegeneralsuper-vision of thelaboratory,allowinga strictcontrolof the activitiesof each chemistifnecessary.Moreover,the laboratory ontainedall necessaryauxiliaryservices. Inthis respectDuisberg's laboratorysurpassedevery universitylaboratory hen inexistence.These institutional nnovations of the Bayer Company cappedthe process ofseparating esearch rom otherfunctionsof chemistsin industry.By 1891researchin the mainlaboratoryhadseparated rom thepart-timeresearchworkdone in thelaboratories or the technical control of the manufacturing rocesses, so thatre-searchfound an acknowledged place beside productionand sales. The locus ofinvention had been transferred rom external, mostly academic institutions toindustry.But the institutionalizationof researchin this laboratorywas but oneaspectof the industrialization f invention.

CREATING AN INFRASTRUCTUREThe mainscientific laboratorybecame the centerof a developingresearchorgani-zation that continuouslyextended and improveduntil 1914. In the 1890s therewere limitations.First, research n this laboratory emainedconcentrated n onlysomesignificantsectorsof dye chemistry; t neglected,forinstance,thechemistryof pharmaceuticalsnd of alizarin,both of whichalreadywerepartof theproduc-tion program.Second, the researchchemist's work still included some analysis,some developmentof products, and, most importantly,a lot of routine patentwork. Third,for a long time the latent function of the main scientific laboratorywastoqualifyand socializechemists oining Bayer.Whenever herapidlyexpand-ing worksneeded a productionchemist, the managementpreferredo recruithimfromthe mainlaboratory taff. This practice ed to a highrateof turnover,whichinterruptedhe laboratory'sresearch. In an attempt o correctthese defects, sev-eralchangeswere made in the organizational tructureof research. Three trendscan be discerned: he expansionof research hrough he creation of new researchlaboratories, he furtherdivision of labor,and the elaborationof refinedmanage-rial techniques.Table 3 showstheexpansion n thenumberof research aboratories ndresearchchemists atBayerbetween 1897 and 1912. This tablegives anapproximatedea ofthe differentfields of researchand their relative importance.'3

12For a detailed description of the laboratory see "The Appreciation of Science by German Manu-facturers," Nature, 1893, 48:29-34. Cf. Beer, Emergence, pp. 84-85.'3These four years have been chosen because they are representative for those Bayer research

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THE NDUSTRIALIZATIONFINVENTIONTable 3. Number of chemists in research laboratoriesat the Bayer Company

1897 1902 1906 1912Mainscientificlaboratory(intermediates,niline,azo 15 15 16 16andindigo)Pharmaceuticalaboratory -8 6 12Bacteriologicalaboratory - 1Inorganic aboratory - - 4 7Alizarin aboratory - - 4 8Photographicndtechnicalproductsaboratory - 4 3Artificialrubberaboratory - 11

Total of research hemists,includingheads of laboratories 15 24 34 57Total of chemists 99 138 171 262Percentage f research hemists 15 17 20 22

As the number of research laboratories increased, the research became moreintensive, if one accepts the percentage of research chemists employed as a crudeyardstick. While the main laboratory remained the largest laboratory until 1912,the organization of research became more and more decentralized as specialists ina given branch of chemistry were combined in separate laboratories. Diversifica-tion of the research program tended to lag slightly behind diversification of pro-duction. Not until 1912 did all production departments have a correspondingscientific laboratory. But the creation of an artificial rubber laboratory in 1909reflects Bayer's deciding for the first time to invest heavily in research beforeundertaking production.14These laboratories, however, constituted only the core of the research workdone in industry. Apart from the "external differentiation" of research from pro-duction and the respective technical laboratories, an "internal differentiation" ofresearch came about, which led to the creation of a complex research infrastruc-ture.15laboratories xisting before 1914, and only for these years do the sources (all in Bayerarchives)provide easy calculationof the overall distribution f Bayer'schemistsaccording o placeof work.For(May) 1897: "StatistikderFarbenfabrikenorm. F. Bayer& Co.," pp. 22 ff. (1/5.2); for 1902:"Bildalben ur F. Bayerzum 25 jahrigenJubilaumals TeilhaberundDirektorder Farbenfabriken"(1902), 3 vols.; for 1906: "TabellarischeUbersichtuber die Organisationdes GesamtgeschaftsderFarbenfabriken orm. F. Bayer & Co., Elberfeld:Anlagen zur diesbezuglichenDenkschrift" 10/3.1); for 1912:"TabellarischeUbersichtenuberdie Organisation erFarbenfabrikenorm.F. Bayer& Co." (10/3.2). Again, these figuresmaydifferslightlyfrom those given in other studies.'4SeeFlechtner,Duisberg, pp. 227-230.'5For he terminologysee WilliamKornhauser, cientistsin Industry Berkeley:Univ. CaliforniaPress, 1963).

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THE NDUSTRIALIZATIONFINVENTIONTable 4. Personnel turnoverat the main scientific laboratory

Positions Entries Exits due to DeathorRetirementTransfer Notice

1897-1904 15 28 23 41905-1912 16 10 8 - 2

and socialize chemists joining Bayer. Table 4 shows that turnover subsequentlydiminished by two thirds.16ORGANIZINGESEARCH

The growing number of research laboratories and the intensified division of laboropened up new fields of activity and multiple career patterns for chemists. Thedifferences between academic institutions and industrial research facilities werereduced, and this eased the transition from university to industry. But the personalcontact between management and scientists diminished, confronting managementwith the problem of how to integrate the scientific expert within the organizationand how to control the process of invention.From the mid-1880s onward the difficult task of directing, coordinating, andcontrolling research activities kept the management of Bayer occupied. Laborcontract regulations served to keep research and its results strictly secret, and themanagement gradually developed elaborate techniques with which to control anddirect research processes.17 Research became embedded in a highly developed andinterwined complex of communication and supervision, incentives and controls.The Bayer Company employed four distinct managerial methods.First, financial incentives served a double purpose. The board of directorsoffered prizes and premiums for the solution of specific research problems definedby management. Bayer also gave every research chemist a royalty consisting of afixed percentage of the net profits accruing to the company from patented inven-tions; this was thought to stimulate the individual chemist's research and directhim to fields of commercial and industrial interest. The amount of money earnedfrom these royalties was considerable and often surpassed the researchers' regularannual salary. Table 5 gives the figures (in marks) for all chemists employed in themain laboratory throughout the period.18Second, the management introduced regular conferences of chemists in 1888.These conferences brought together all Bayer chemists to exchange information onthe latest scientific and technical advances, on new patents, and on broad trends inindustrial chemistry. Initially held weekly, these conferences were reduced to

'6Figures from Beamten-Verzeichniss, p. 2 (Bayer archives); Tabellarische Ubersichten 1906 and1912(cit. n. 3); andthe personnelfiles of the variouschemists.'7Theseregulationsprovidedthatchemistsemployed by Bayerkeep all business secrets strictlysecretand abstain from all communicationson methods of productionat Bayerboth duringtheirengagementand for a periodof upto threeyearsafter,and thatupon eavingtheBayerCompany heynotjoin rivalfirms,also forupto threeyears.On the role of managementn industrial nterprises eeAlfred B. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cam-bridge,Mass./London:BelknapPressof HarvardUniv. Press, 1977).'8Figuresromthe chemists'personnel iles, Bayerarchives.Thetoplinebelongsto thehead of thedepartment.

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GEORGMEYER-THUROWTable 5. Financial incentives for Bayer research chemists (in marks)

1902 1906 1912ChemistAnnual Royalties Annual Royalties Annual Royaltiessalary salary salary

1 7,500 19,041 9,500 28,685 20,000 51,7272 5,400 14,084 6,000 22,095 6,750 39,8783 4,800 3,993 6,250 7,655 7,750 13,2144 4,800 744 6,000 1,058 7,750 3,7855 4,000 651 4,600 5,766 6,800 9,2276 3,600 559 5,500 462 8,000 3,0507 3,000 - 4,300 575 6,600 1,377

biweekly in 1891 and later were held monthly. Patterned after the universityseminar, the meetings were supposed to counteract trends toward overspecializa-tion, isolation, or an all-too-academic orientation. They compensated for thestrictly limited flow of communication with the outside professional communityby encouraging informal coordination of work and exchange of ideas. Finally,they helped develop an esprit de corps.A third method of controlling the chemist's research activities consisted of theperiodic reports each chemist had to make on the progress and results of his work.When first introduced in 1887 the reports were required daily. This was changed toweekly in 1891. In 1906 the Bayer management asked the research chemists tosupplement the weekly reports by a yearly report. The head of the appropriatedepartment and the board of directors received these reports and thus were keptinformed about the ongoing investigations. Apart from satisfying the need forinformation and control, these written reports also helped decide conflictingclaims of priority between research chemists. Moreover, they could be used aslegal evidence of priority against the patent claims of competitors.Finally, the role of the research administrator was created. His duty was tocoordinate and direct industrial research and to stimulate, discipline, and controlthe research chemist. His most important functions were overseeing all scientificand technical publications and checking, promoting, and controlling subjects andmethods of research, using a cooperative style of supervision; maintaining contactwith the patent department to secure patent rights for all inventions made; under-taking all administrative tasks related to the library, the stores, and the technicalroom; handling the qualification and final selection of chemists joining Bayer; andfinally, heading the regular conferences of chemists.19At first Carl Duisberg, because of his many successes as inventor and patentattorney, supplemented by his organizational ability, became the head of thegrowing research staff at Bayer. In 1888, after only four years with the company,he received the title of Prokurist, which underlined his outstanding position asfirst chemist of the company.20But the administration of research was not his only

'9SeeCarlDuisberg'sworking nstructions or the researchdepartment"WissenschaftlicheAbtei-lungder Farbenfabriken orm. F. Bayer& Co., Elberfeld,"Bayerarchives 103/17.E.3.20Theitle Prokuristempoweredhim to transactbusiness in the name of the company.For mostchemiststhe title was only honorary.

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THEINDUSTRIALIZATIONF INVENTIONtask. He was head of the patent bureau until 1897. He planned and organized thepartial transfer of Bayer's manufacturing plant from Elberfeld to Leverkusen be-ginning in the early 1890s. And long before he was appointed a member of theboard of directors in 1900, he had in fact become managing director of the works,sharing the responsibility for the scientific and technical aspects with FriedrichBayer, the son of the company's founder.Only with the general reorganization of Bayer's management structures at thedepartment level in early 1896 was research administration formally institutional-ized. Following Duisberg's proposals, Bayer's board of directors appointed asection manager with sole responsibility for administering research within themain scientific laboratory: Bernhard Heymann, who held a doctorate from theUniversity of Munich and came recommended to Duisberg by Adolf von Baeyer in1889. After seven years in the main scientific laboratory engaging in successfulresearch and handling patent litigations competently, Heymann was an obviouschoice for the new post as head of the research department. But not everyoneshared this view.For the trend towards bureaucratic control by management ran counter to theprofessional consciousness of the research chemists. The company's policy ofpromoting chemists into the managerial hierarchy no doubt served to lessen thesetensions, but it did not eliminate them. On the contrary: while the elaborate systemof conferences and work reports, to some a symptom of needless overorganiza-tion, usually met with only passive resistance from individual chemists, the ap-pointment of Heymann almost produced a minor palace revolution. When in-formed about the forthcoming changes in late September 1895, a group of sixresearch chemists submitted a petition to the board of directors dated 30 Septem-ber 1895, demanding that this appointment be rescinded and that instead a re-nowned scientist be recruited from outside the company. But this protest met withno success. Just one day after their petition had been written, Duisberg, in thename of the board of directors, confronted these chemists with a simple alterna-tive: submit or quit. Three chemists preferred to leave Bayer.21This conflict between chemists and management was not simply a complaintabout promotion procedures, heated up by the fact that Dr. Heymann was a Jew. Itwas the first and only collective protest by research chemists prior to 1914 and, assuch, an obvious signal of rebellion against the introduction of hierarchical struc-tures into the small and relatively homogeneous group of Bayer's research chem-ists. This protest can also be understood as a symptom of the research chemist'sdifficulties in adjusting to qualitative changes in the process of industrial researchitself.

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF INVENTIONThe German dyestuffs industry reacted to the challenges and promises which thescientific and technical developments of the late 1870s and early 1880s had of-fered by creating splendid opportunities for research and organizing the researchprocess in ingenious ways. But dyestuffs corporations did not simply recognize

2Information bout hisprotestcomesfromthefragments f thepetition nthepersonnel ile of Dr.R., andfrom the selectionsof an almost identical etterplacedin thepersonnel iles of Drs. Ko., N.,S., andSt. They hadsent the letter,dated 1 or 2 Oct. 1895, to the boardof directors o justify theirpetition.

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GEORGMEYER-THUROWand accept the importance of research for their own further expansion; their grow-ing dependence on a continuous supply of inventions made them adapt science totheir particularrequirements. An irreversible industrialization of invention was theresult. It involved two processes: industrial research became increasingly autono-mous as it met industrial and commercial needs, and imitations, inventions, andinnovations were increasingly reduced to routine.Table 6 below conveys an idea of how far Bayer relied on the German system ofhigher education to supply its research chemists.22 All the research chemists had auniversity Ph.D.; several had also studied at a Technische Hochschule, but theuniversities played the dominant role in their education. After passing their exami-nation, the majority of these chemists had spent one or two years working asAssistenten, assisting the university or Hochschule professor in research or teach-ing. Only a small number of chemists were recruited from other chemical compa-nies. Thus not only the Ph.D. but prolonged academic training in all branches ofchemistry was regarded as more useful for research chemists than scientific andtechnical experience or knowledge of the dyestuffs industry. Reliance of industryon academia was not one-sided. After the mid-1880s industrial needs came toshape academic curricula, as dissatisfaction with chemical education in Germanyled the German chemical industry to sponsor reform at universities and Hochschu-len.23 The goals of the reform movement were to improve the quality of training inchemistry, standardize curricula, and acquaint chemistry students with the type of

Table 6. Qualifications of the main laboratorystaffPlace of study

University Universityand Technischeonly TechnischeHochschule Hochschuleonly1897 9 61912 11 4 1

Final examinationsUniversity Ph.D. and Technische TechnischeHochschulePh.D. only Hochschule diploma diploma only

1897 13 21912 15 1

Post-doctoratework at Industrialwork experienceuniversity or HochschuleYes No Yes No

1897 12 3 3 121912 9 6 4 12

22See hepersonnel iles of the chemists nvolved,Bayerarchives.23Lothar urchardt, DieAusbildungdes Chemikersm Kaiserreich," eitschriftfurUnternehmens-forschung, 1978,2:31-53. Cf. also JeffreyA. Johnson,"TheChemicalReichsanstalt ssociation:BigSciencein ImperialGermany," Ph.D. diss., PrincetonUniversity,1980),pp. 144-149.

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THE INDUSTRIALIZATIONF INVENTIONwork that the industry required; it gained momentum from the growing importanceof scientific research for, and the changing character of that research in, thechemical industry.

After the late 1880s industrial research was more and more characterized by twointerdependent factors: specialization and cooperation.24Specialization meant thatthe investigations of the chemist working in the main scientific laboratory wererestricted to a very narrow field of dye chemistry. A training course introduced inthe early 1890s, which lasted at least one year, tested the chemist's abilities andinclinations and gradually directed him into a special branch of color chemistry.This concentration on a tiny sector of chemistry seems to have been widely ac-cepted as necessary for successful research. Nevertheless, Bayer's management,especially Duisberg, was well aware of the dangers of overspecialization andisolation from the general advances of chemistry. The system of conferences wasconsidered one preventive. In addition, the working instructions of the researchdepartment explicitly warned the chemists against training as "one-sided special-ists," stressing that every research chemist not only had the right to turn to otherfields of chemistry temporarily, but had the duty to follow up all new develop-ments in chemistry.25 In practice, the research chemist remained committed pri-marily to his own special field of dye chemistry and to his principal task: inven-tions leading to innovations. And specialization did have the welcome-formanagement-secondary effect of reducing the chemist's mobility, by minimizinghis value to other chemical firms, should he leave Bayer.26The necessary complement to this carefully designed division of labor wascooperation. Apart from the informal consultation practiced in regular confer-ences, two types of interaction took place. A close and intensive personal coopera-tion existed between chemists in the main laboratory working on the same subfieldof dye chemistry; they constituted a small work group that the head of the researchdepartment sometimes joined. An impersonal functional cooperation was requiredbetween the research chemist in the main scientific laboratory and the color chem-ist, pharmacist, physician, or other production employee who checked the re-search results for applicability and developed methods of application in the experi-mental dye-house, the physiological laboratory, and elsewhere. Table 7 belowillustrates the ever-growing importance assumed by the screening of researchresults and the transformation of inventions into useful innovations, taking thedyestuffs sector as an example.27Cooperative research in a bureaucratic structure involved problems. Chemistscomplained about having their ideas stolen, and conflicts arose over how to allotrecognition among the different chemists working on a single project. Bayer had toshape its recruitment policy to the new needs; from the early 1890s the ability tocooperate became as important as scientific competence.With discoveries and inventions, not to speak of practical innovations, becom-ing the result of cooperative efforts by highly specialized experts, the entire

24Compareorscheid,"Die Industrie m ZeichenderSpezialisierung ndTeamarbeit,"n Naturwis-senschaft cit. n. 2), pp. 173-207.25SeeDuisberg,"Wissenschaftliche bteilung" cit. n. 18).26Cf.Beer,Emergence,pp. 87-88; see also laborcontract egulationsn n. 16above.27SeeMaxKitschelt,"DieEntwicklungsgeschichteerFarbereiAbteilung,"n Geschichte erFarben-fabriken . . . Bayer (cit. n. 7), p. 328. For comparable figures for the Hochst Company see HermannPinnow, Zur Erinnerungan die 75. Wiederkehrdes Grundungstagesder Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius& Bruning Munich:Bruckmann, 938),pp. 62, 65.

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GEORGMEYER-THUROWTable 7. Screening of dyes at Bayer

New dyestuff Dyes testedoncompounds rom a largerscalelaboratories aftera firstscreening Dyes marketed*

1896 2,378 36 371906 2,656 60 36

*Includesnewmixtures f olddyesandolderdyesof competitorshathad ost theirpatentprotection.process lost most of its individualized, art-like character. Empiricism, chancediscoveries, or the heroic deeds of lone inventors gave way to the systematicproduction of knowledge, guided by what Otto Witt, then professor at the Tech-nische Hochschule Berlin, in 1913 had called the "principle of purposive synthe-sis."28 The azo dyestuffs, the largest group of dyes and economically the mostimportant one, illustrate these changes well.First, the countless possible products of the diazo reaction, presumably morethan one hundred million, exceeded the research capacity of any one chemist.Individual research was superseded by the new "scientific mass work" (wissen-schaftliche Massenarbeit). Second, because the mechanisms of the diazo reactionand the ways to make azo dye compounds were well known, inventive activity wasturned into a routinized "construction bound to scientific rules" (an wissenschaft-liche Regeln gebanntes Konstruieren).29 This was true only when the constitutionof chemical substances and the relation between their constitution and their quali-ties were known. Even then, individual originality and creativity and chancediscoveries continued to have their place in industrial research. However, termslike "mass work" and "construction" show that "industrialization of invention"is not an artificial construct imposed on the past after the fact: these terms grew outof the experience of contemporary research chemists, who were all too familiarwith their routine, frequently fruitless research.30Moreover, the terms character-ize changes that produced two further negative effects.First, in spite of the continuously growing prosperity of the company after thedeep economic crisis of the mid-1880s, the chemist's share in the profits based onhis inventions was reduced. Chemists who in the late 1870s and early 880s hadreceived five percent of the net profits accruing to the company from their patentedinventions were paid only three percent from the late 1880s onward. The commer-cially valuable invention had lost its exceptional importance for the growth of thecompany as the number of research chemists rose and a stream of new discoveriesand inventions got underway.Second, the company became recognized as a sort of collective inventor. Theemergence of the word Etablissementerfindung in the course of the heated publicdebate on the payment of salaried inventors in the early twentieth century reflectsthis perception. The company management provided the means, methods, and

280ttoN. Witt, "Wechselwirkungenwischender chemischenForschung nd derchemischenTech-nik,"in Die KulturderGegenwart,Pt. 3, Div. 3, Vol. 2: Chemie Leipzig:Teubner,1913),p. 521.29Quoting einrichCaro BASFdirector f research,1883-1890),UberdieEntwicklungerTheerfar-ben-lndustrieBerlin:Friedlander, 893),p. 141;and HeinrichCaroto W. von Oechelhauser, 2 July1906,Carocorrespondence,DeutscheMuseum,Munich; f. Caro,Uberdie Entwicklung, . 137.30SeeTable 7 and n. 26.

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THEINDUSTRIALIZATIONFINVENTIONorganization for research and directed its course, and the company became therepository for a body of collective knowledge and experience from which re-searchers drew in making new discoveries. The research chemist had become asmall part in the total organization. Doubtless managers and entrepreneurs of thechemical industry used this term in order to repudiate the claims of researchchemists who asked for a more appropriate reward for their inventions.3' But allthe same it affords a glimpse of the depersonalized character of the research of thetime.

THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIALRESEARCHBy the early twentieth century institutionalization of research was essentiallycomplete at the Bayer Company. In the late 1870s and early 1880s scientific,economic, and legal developments had given the first impetus to a gradual andevolutionary change. The many successes of a young inventor, Carl Duisberg,accelerated this process and paved the way for the opening of the main scientificlaboratory in 1891. Other research laboratories followed. Meanwhile a complexresearch infrastructure developed. Organizing research became the foremost man-agerial task, and the process of invention itself became industrialized, the routin-ized work of cooperating specialists following the imperatives of industrial needsin a bureaucratic and hierarchical setting. While admittedly tentative, the remarksthat follow address the further effects of the new role of industrial research.The status and prestige of the research department within the Bayer Companyremained ambiguous. Remarkably, when Bayer's management structures werereorganized at the top level in 1906, the head of the research department became amember of the board of directors (without giving up research and research admin-istration!). But research chemists were scarcely represented among the company'sdirectors and Prokuristen, as Table 8 shows.32

Except for the position of head of the research department, until 1914 researchwas a dead-end career, since the only outlet for promotions was in management.Similarly, although Bayer's board of directors showed its appreciation of chem-ists' work by conferring the honorary title of Prokurist on them, the board passedover the research chemists with only one exception. It is therefore no surprise thatmost scientists attracted to industry did not go into research. Between 1897 and1912 Bayer's management transferred thirty chemists from the main scientificlaboratory, primarily to production, but only two chemists went the other way.One left again for a production post after a few years. The other stayed, but evenhe had vehemently opposed his transfer from production to research. Neither thegenerous patent royalties nor the superb working conditions succeeded in counter-balancing this tendency.One reason for this low standing of research in industry may have been that itsautonomy remained subordinated to industrial and commercial needs and that itsrange remained restricted. Truly basic research not directed towards industrially3'See Carl Duisberg, "Die Angestelltenerfindung in der chemischen Industrie," in Abhandlungen,Vortrageund Reden aus den Jahren 1882-1933, 2 vols. (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag Chemie), Vol. II (1933),pp. 738-748. For the role of the Etablissementerfindung in the Germanjurisdiction see E. C. Rassbach,Betrachtungen zur wirtschaftlichen Lage der technischen Privatangestellten in Deutschland (Karlsruhe:Braun, 1916), pp. 136-147.32For a list of the company's board of directors and Prokuristen see the appendix to Pinnow,Werksgeschichte.

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GEORGMEYER-THUROWTable 8. Chemists in management (1913)

Boardof directors ProkuristenTotal 17 43Chemists 10 25Researchchemists 1 I

andcommerciallyvaluableproductswas left to privateor state research nstitu-tions. "We esteem highly everybranchof purescience," Bayer'sboardof direc-torsexplainedits researchpolicies in 1910, "and we appreciate very activityonanyfield of theoreticalchemistryor teaching,but fromthe chemistsworkingforour company we have to demand industriallyuseful results of their work."33Moreover,Bayer'smanagement arelyallowed researchchemists to publishscien-tificallyinterestingresults,even whencompanysecretswere notinvolved. Conse-quently,the total numberof publicationsby researchchemistsworking n Bayer'smainscientific laboratorywas low; for the seven yearsfrom 1907 to 1914, it wasexactly zero.34Quite a few chemists, therefore, left Bayer for an academiccareer. 5Thedissatisfactionof individualchemistswho resentedhavingtheirfreedomtopursueinterestingproblemscurtailed was not the only limitationof industrialresearch.The dyestuffs industryknew well that, at least until 1914, it still de-pended uponthe explorationof new fields undertaken t "free" research nstitu-tions by men like Emil Fischer, Paul Ehrlich, and Fritz Haber,36 lthoughaca-demic researchcould no longer successfully compete with industrial researchwhere routineappliedscience was concerned. That researchprogram,followingentrepreneurialtrategiesof diversification,was extremelyeffective at maintain-ing andextendingthe company's superioritywherever t had established tself inthe market.Azo directdyes, alizarindyes, and pharmaceuticals re some well-knownexamples.But whenBayertriedto break nto marketsestablishedby othercompaniesor to break new technical and scientific ground, industrialresearchprovedto be less effective. Bayerendeavored n vain to produce ndigo. Researchon perfumesand fertilizers came to nothingof importance.Neither the photo-graphicdivision set up in 1902 nor the intensive research directedtowards theproductionof artificial rubber urnedout to be successful. The reasonsfor failurewere manifold. Scientific and technicalproblemscould be insurmountable.Thebarrierserectedby patentscould withstandany researchattack. And last but notleast, lack of experiencein productionor lack of knowledgeof the marketcouldpreventeconomic success, even if the research chemist had done his job. Thus

33Boardf directors o Dr. J. (wholeft Bayer or anacademic areer),11Apr. 1910,personnel iles,Bayerarchives.34Thiss the resultof a searchof the author ndexof theDecennial ndex oChemicalAbstracts;Vol. 1-10, 1907-1916. Forrefusalso allowpublicationee the etter f Dr.B., 30 Jan.1902,and he letterof Dr.Z., 23 Jan. 1913, personnel iles, Bayerarchives.35One f thebetterknownwasOttoDimroth,professor f chemistry t the universities f Greifswald(1913-1918) and Wurzburg (1918-1937).36Cf.Beer's udgement: Theconstant ependence f theGerman yecompanies n academic cience,even after heirresearchaboratories ad become mammoth ndertakings, ives testimonyo the limita-tionswhichsecrecyand ack of intellectualreedom mposedon industrial esearch"Emergence, . 72).For ndustry'support f academic cienceseeJohnson,"TheChemicalReichsanstalt ssociation"cit.n.2).

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THEINDUSTRIALIZATIONF INVENTIONindustrial research was not a master key to entrepreneurial growth. Its positiveaspect was its ability to concentrate on a restricted range of products and cover thatfield with an unmatched intensity, reacting to every impulse from the market, be itindustrial or scientific.It is extremely difficult to measure exactly the contribution of industrial re-search to economic growth.37The facts enumerated here illustrate developmentsloosely related to industrial research. The number of products which Bayer pro-duced rose steadily, from about 200 in 1886 to more than 1000 dyes and about 40pharmaceutical products in 1900, and to about 2000 dyes and about 150 pharma-ceutical products and photographical preparations at the end of 1913. Similarly,the number of German patents taken out by Bayer (in class 22) rose from 36 in theperiod 1877-1886, to 99 in the period 1887-1890, to 512 in the period 1891-1900. This rise reflects the growing intensity of research in the late 1880s and thestabilization of the research effort due to the foundation of the main scientificlaboratory in 1891. Bayer held more than 2500 German and foreign patents in1900, a quantity that again was more than trebled before 1914, to over 8000. Thesignificance in the jump in patents held in the mid-1880s is confirmed by thestatistics on Bayer's dyestuffs innovations from 1870 to 1899. While the numberof innovations was 12 for the period 1870 to 1884, it was 10 in 1885 alone and 151for the period 1885 to 1899. The annual reports of German Chambers of Trade inthe late 1880s and early 1890s offer furtherconfirmation in the form of complaintsfrom smaller dyestuffs firms directed against the large joint-stock companies,which, with their splendid laboratories, their research staff, and their patents,endangered the smaller firms' existence.38One of the indirect effects of industrial research was to make it harderfor a newfirm to enter the field. No new dyestuffs firms were successfully founded betweenthe mid-1880s and 1914; the corporations already dominating the dyestuff busi-ness in the early 1880s, before industrial research made headway, were still in thetop rank in 1914. Their previous economic success obviously was a prerequisitefor their successful industrial research, and their ingenious management strategiesof expansion, integration, and diversification surely remained a necessary comple-ment to the successful industrialization of invention. Industrial research was not,as many contemporary chemists (and some historians) had it, the "prime factor"in the development of the coal-tar color industry prior to 1914,39but after 1880 itcertainly played an important role in the development of firms like Bayer, whichturned from a small dyestuffs company into a big chemical corporation. No doubtindustrial research then contributed to Bayer's world-wide dominance on many achemical market, and its accumulating stock of knowledge has helped Bayersurvive as a giant chemical firm until today.

37As arasIcould indout,figures orBayer's inancial xpendituresn "research"reavailableoroneyearonly, 1909,when thecosts of all scientific aboratories erecalculated t827,128.29 marks Bayerarchives15/11.1),about1%of Bayer's alesfor theyear.A different pproachwouldbetocalculateromtheroyaltiesannuallypaidto theresearch hemists.Unfortunately,hematerials incomplete,andtheexactmethods f calculation reunclear,buta veryfirstassessmenteemsto indicate hat or 1902, 1906,and 1912about20%of Bayer'snetprofitscanbe traced o inventions f chemists n themainscientificlaboratory.38See ahresberichteerHandelskammeronBarmenur1894(Barmen,1895),pp.32-33;Jahresbe-richtderHandels-undGewerbekammeruLeipzig1893 (Leipzig, 1894),p. 157;HandelskammererfreienStadtFrankfurt: ahresberichtur 1889 (Frankfurt, 890),p. 271.39QuotingRaphaelMeldola, "TinctorialChemistry,Ancientand Modern" 1910), in WalterM.Gardner,d., TheBritishCoal-Tar ndustry:tsOrigin,Development, nd Decline(London:Williams&Norgate,1915), p. 265.

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