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go on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The said certification shall state the condition of his docket based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Thus, for traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, Justice Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v. P/SSPT. MARLOU C. CHAN and P/SUPT. WILLIAM O. FANG

G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)

The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275) creating the Zearosa Commission (Commission) which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the Office of the President.

Marynette Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte (PNP) conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides, and classified her as a PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded the information gathered on her to the Commission, causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

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Gamboas association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboas petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the forwarding of information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioners right to privacy

2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper

HELD:

Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is not an intrusion of petitioners right to privacy

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically

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created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter. The fact that the PNP released information to the Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Petition for writ of habeas data is not proper

In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that PNP was responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper. Finally, the Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, Chan and Fang sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.