Faculty of Oriental StudiesM.St. in Oriental Studies

Mode B

A study of The Sundai zatsuwa of Muro Kyûsô

with special reference to his individualistic thinking

May 2004

Masaomi YanagisawaThe Queen’s College

CONTENTS

1 Purpose of the study..........................................................................................11 ) Researches.................................................................................................12 ) Questions....................................................................................................3

2 Muro Kyûsô and the Sundai zatsuwa.................................................................61 ) Muro Kyûsô.................................................................................................62 ) The Sundai zatsuwa....................................................................................8

(1) The text, its origin and diffusion..............................................................8(2) Structure of the book..............................................................................9

3 Kyûsô’s Confucianism....................................................................................111 ) His devotion to Neo-Confucianism..............................................................112 ) Aspects of rationalism..............................................................................133 ) Political aspect..........................................................................................164 ) The importance of righteousness..............................................................175 ) Individualistic thinking..............................................................................206 ) Regicide by Tang and Wu...........................................................................217 ) Remonstration..........................................................................................258 ) On the class system.................................................................................26

4 Conclusion – An Individualistic Neo-Confucian...............................................291 ) Kyûsô’s historical position...........................................................................292 ) Further study - Revolutionary idea in disguise...........................................31

Bibliography.......................................................................................................32

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1 Purpose of the study

In the rich soil of intellectual history in Tokugawa Japan, the importance of Confucianism has been widely recognized. Historians have attributed a number of different roles to this tradition: It has been identified as an ideology to support the Tokugawa shogunate and society; its development and disintegration have been seen as paving the way to a modern mode of thought1; and it has been identified as an ideology of rationalism and individualism which did not perfectly fit Tokugawa society but had a positive value in itself 2. Thinkers in the field have been examined and their unique thinking recognized. However, Muro Kyûsô ( 室 鳩 巣 , 1658-1734), a Neo-Confucian scholar of the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century who served the eighth Tokugawa shogun, Yoshimune ( 徳 川 吉 宗 , 1684-1751), directly as a lecturer, has not been regarded as one of the original Confucians such as the Ancient Learning (Kogaku, 古 学 ) scholars Yamaga Sokô ( 山 鹿 素

行,1622-1685), Itô Jinsai (伊藤仁斎,1627-1705) or Ogyû Sorai (荻生徂徠,1666-1728). To be more precise, Muro Kyûsô has been relatively neglected among modern scholars not only within Japan but also in Western writing on the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan.

1 ) ResearchesAs early as the Bunka period (文化, 1804-1818), Hara Nensai (原念斎, 1774-1820) remarked of Kyûsô in his book Sentetsu sôdan (先哲叢談 , Reports of earlier philosophers):

Kyûsô adhered to Neo-Confucianism and deeply detested those who deliberately advanced different opinions.3

Nensai’s view may have hindered later scholars in their understanding of Muro Kyûsô. Inoue Tetsujirô (井上哲次郎, 1855-1944), who established the field of intellectual history of Tokugawa as an academic subject in the Meiji era by

1 For example, Maruyama 1974.2 For example, Bitô 1961.3 Hara Nensai Sentetsu sôdan, p.263. Translations od the Japanese text in this paper are those of author’s unless otherwise stated.

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publishing a trilogy starting from Nihon Yômeigakuha no tetsugaku, described Kyûsô as a pure Neo-Confucian who believed in Zhu Xi through and through:

At the time when the Ancient Learning of Jinsai in the west and Sorai in the east acted in concert and shook the time, it was Kyûsô who firmly towered as a rock in raging billows.4

In later years this view has been repeated by scholars such as Iwahashi Junsei, Suzuki Naoharu, and Maruyama Masao. Maruyama dismisses Kyûsô in a brief description as ‘Muro Kyûsô, a loyal Zhu Xi scholar’, or ‘Muro Kyûsô, a very conscientious Zhu Xi scholar’ in his Studies in the Intellectual History of

Tokugawa Japan.5 These references convey the impression of Kyûsô as conservative and formalistic.

The authoritative Cambridge History of Japan (Early Modern Japan, vol. IV) touched on Kyûsô only twice in describing the Kyôhô Reforms, but not in the chapter discussing thought and religion at all:

So thoroughly did Yoshimune pare government expenditures that even Confucian scholars, themselves normally the most vociferous advocates of frugality, were led to complain when ceremonial life was adversely affected. “There is a difference between economy and parsimony,” complained Muro Kyûsô, “and this is parsimony.”6

The shogunate was also especially interested in learning that had practical applications. Scholars like Muro Kyûsô and Ogyû Sorai were often approached for advice on current affairs or else were asked to search ancient Chinese and Japanese histories for legal and historical precedents.7

When Herman Ooms discusses Neo-Confucianism in his Tokugawa Ideology, he hardly touches on Muro Kyûsô except in one footnote related to a discussion of possible Christian influences on the Honsaroku (本佐録, Record of Honda Sadono kami, c.1670).8

4 Inoue Tetsujirô 1905, p.190.5 Iwahashi 1927, p.36. Suzuki 1939, pp.430-432, Maruyama ibid., p.41, 72. 6 Tsuji Tatsuya, 1991, p.445.7 Ibid., p.455.8 Ooms 1985, p.158.

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Alongside this downplaying of Kyûsô’s importance goes the view that Neo-Confucianism was a homogeneous school of thought. Inoue Tetsujirô depicted Neo-Confucianism as simple and monolithic, a view quoted with implicit agreement by Maruyama.

Although there are many branches in the Zhu Xi school, it is very simple and homogeneous. The Zhu Xi scholars merely described and propagated Zhu Xi’s theories. If any of these scholars had been as bold as to criticize or to attempt to present his own ideas, he would not have belonged to the Zhu Xi school. Anyone wishing to belong to the Zhu Xi school had to stick faithfully to Zhu Xi’s theories. In other words, he had to be Zhu Xi’s spiritual slave. As a result we can read volumes of the Zhu Xi scholar’s works and find that they all say the same thing.9

This stereotype of Kyûsô as essentially orthodox and unoriginal is due for re-examination.

2 ) QuestionsThis dissertation attempts just such a re-examination. Its aim is to reassess Muro Kyûsô’s position in Tokugawa intellectual history. It addresses two related sets of questions. First, it is concerned with the perception of Neo-Confucianism as monolithic and, more particularly, with Muro Kyûsô’s position as a conforming member of the Tokugawa Neo-Confucian school. Did all Tokugawa Neo-Confucians think unanimously, as Inoue argued? Is Muro Kyûsô indeed properly identified as a member of a homogeneous Neo-Confucian school? Is his perceived membership of such a school the reason for his neglect? If the assumption of homogeneity is wrong, then what special characteristics set Kyûsô apart from his Neo-Confucian contemporaries? It would be misleading to conclude that Neo-Confucian scholars in the Tokugawa period had a unanimous understanding of the tradition with which they were associated. Even scholars within the rigid Kimon ( 崎門 ) school of Yamazaki Ansai ( 山 崎 闇 斎 , 1618-1682) held a variety of views, as demonstrated by the divergent thinking of Satô Naokata ( 佐 藤 直 方 , 1650-

9 Ibid., p.32-33.

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1719), Asami Keisai (浅見敬斎, 1652-1711) and Miyake Shôsai (三宅尚斎, 1662-1741). Among those who tried to promote the tradition of Neo-Confucianism, that tradition was understood idiosyncratically by each individual scholar; no shared original Neo-Confucian premises, it can be argued, linked the scholars of Neo-Confucianism in Japan.10

The response of scholars to the Akô Revenge provides an example of a spectrum of different views among Neo-Confucian scholars. Soon after the turn of the century, Japanese witnessed the revenge for the death of their lord by the Akô loyal retainers (1703). This event not only attracted general attention, but also shook the Tokugawa government. Many Confucian scholars expressed their views on the incident, including Muro Kyûsô, Hayashi Nobuatsu (林信篤, 1644-1732), Asami Keisai, and Miyake Kanran (三

宅観瀾, 1674-1718) in favor of or neutral to the revenge. Satô Naokata, Ogyû Sorai and Dazai Shundai (太宰春臺, 1680-1747), however, condemned it. The variety of the responses among these men suggests that Neo-Confucian thought is indeed varied; it should be carefully analyzed and generalizations avoided. Here, recent scholarship has already gone some way to dispelling Inoue’s view of homogeneity.11

The second set of questions is explicitly historical. It raises the broad question of the meaning of Neo-Confucianism in Tokugawa society. Given that Neo-Confucianism was in part at least a political ideology, this set of questions addresses the relationship of that ideology to the Tokugawa political order. Was Neo-Confucianism congruent with the Tokugawa polity and did it, as has been argued, legitimate that polity? Among scholars of Tokugawa intellectual history, widely divergent answers are to be found to this question. Maruyama clearly responded positively, maintaining that Neo-Confucianism suited the existing social conditions. For him the Tokugawa period was the golden age of

10 Kinugasa 1976, p.64.11 For recent discussion on Akô Revenge, see McMullen 2003.

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Confucianism in Japan.12 However, despite the persuasive argument of Maruyama, a contrary view has also existed consistently from the time of Tsuda Sôkichi (津田左右吉, 1873-1961)13. Bitô Masahide also points out the imported and thus foreign nature of Neo-Confucianism in Japanese society.14 This view is inherited by current scholars such as Watanabe Hiroshi15 and James McMullen16. These scholars point out that early Tokugawa Japan was a military polity, with a structure and ethos very different from the Confucian ideal. In the seventeenth century, there existed a wide gap between Confucian ideals and actual Tokugawa society. It has become an established view in recent scholarly works that the pursuit of Neo-Confucian ideals did not fit perfectly with Japanese society.17 If a divergence between Neo-Confucianism ideal and Tokugawa reality is conceded, a further range of possibilities arises. The first is to attach priority to the ideal, by negating, revolutionizing or reforming the social system which does not fit. The second is to adjust the interpretation of Confucianism to the system. Ogyû Sorai’s political thought, it can be argued, is an example of the latter.

Muro Kyûsô, it may be argued, is an appropriate thinker on whom to base discussion of these questions. His prominence is attested in the historical record, but historians have been strangely silent on the basis of his claim to distinction. At the same time, he served the eighth Tokugawa Shogun. He was taken into Yoshimune’s confidence and was respected as a devoted Neo-Confucian scholar. How did the ideals of the tradition that he espoused relate to his actual position in the shogunate? Was there any conflict between his political role and his thought as a Neo-Confucian? To answer these questions, thorough examination is required of Kyûsô’s thinking on particular issues concerning human moral and political morality. Through such an examination, it should be possible to identify the position of Muro Kyûsô in

12 Maruyama 1974, p.7.13 Tsuda 1953, vol.2, pp.556-570.14 Bitô 1961, p.24.15 Watanabe 1985, p.4.16 McMullen 1999, p.8, p.62.17 Maeda 1996, p.14.

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Tokugawa intellectual history. A more secure understanding of his place in the context of his contemporaries and of his originality should be established. It is proposed here to conduct this investigation principally with reference to Sundai zatsuwa.

Such are the issues addressed in this dissertation. It will be helpful at this stage to indicate the general direction in which the answer is to be sought. It is that Kyûsô’s thought is, contrary to the stereotype of him as a conformist, indeed distinctive. Much of his writing does, it is true, re-iterate standard Neo-Confucian beliefs. At the same time, there is a strong emphasis on the importance of the individual as moral agent that sets him apart as a Neo-Confucian thinker from most of his contemporaries. The contrast is particularly sharp, it will be argued, with the school of political thought associated with Ogyû Sorai. In what follows, this characteristic of Kyûsô’s thought is referred to as his ‘individualism’. Associated with it is the strong tendency to rationalism that is a feature of the Confucian tradition. It will be argued that a combination of these characters confers distinctiveness and originality on Kyûsô’s thought. It is further argued that these features of his thought resulted in a tension with Tokugawa society. For political and prudential reasons connected with his position with the Tokugawa administration, however, Kyûsô seems to have held back from working out explicitly the full implications of his beliefs for the society in which he lived.

2 Muro Kyûsô and the Sundai zatsuwa1 ) Muro KyûsôMuro Kyûsô was born in 1658. His activity as a Confucian scholar falls in the Genroku (1688-1703), through Hôei (1704-1710) and Shôtoku (1711-1716), to Kyôhô (1716-1735) periods. This was a period in which Arai Hakuseki (新井

白 石 , 1657-1725) and Amenomori Hôshû ( 雨 森 芳 洲 , 1668-1755) were also active. These three men were all disciples of Kinoshita Jun-an ( 木 下 順 庵

,1621-1698). At that time, Ogyû Sorai was also a competing intellectual

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figure. During this period, the shogun changed from the fifth, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (徳川綱吉, 1646-1709, reigned 1680-1709), successively to Ienobu ( 家 宣 , 1662-1712, r. 1709-1712), Ietsugu ( 家 継 , 1709-1716, r. 1713-1716), then to the eighth, Yoshimune (吉宗, 1684-1751, r. 1716-1745).

Kinoshita Jun-an, under whom Kyûsô studied in his youth, highly praised his ability. Subsequently, Kyûsô spent a number of years in both Kaga and Kyoto following Jun-an, before settling down in Kaga, where he served the daimyo Maeda Tsunanori (前田綱紀 , 1643-1724) for 19 years. When Kyûsô moved to Kaga, he met Haguro Yôsen ( 羽 黒 養 潜 , 1629-1702) and was intellectually stimulated by him. Kyûsô wrote that he owed much to both Jun-an and Yôsen. In 1711, recommended by Arai Hakuseki to the Tokugawa shogunate, he came to Edo at the age of 54. An official residence in Surugadai (Sundai) was provided for him in 1713. In 1716 Yoshimune became the eighth Tokugawa shogun and Arai Hakuseki was dismissed, but Muro Kyûsô continued in official employment. In 1719 Yoshimune ordered the opening of a college, the Takakura Yashiki ( 高倉屋敷 ), at which Kyûsô was responsible for presenting lectures on the Analects, Jôgan seiyô ( 貞 観 政 要 , Zheng guan zheng yao,

Political dialogues of Tai Zong of Tang), The Great Learning, Mencius and, later on, the Book of Changes. In 1721 Kyûsô became one of four lecturers to serve Yoshimune directly. Their responsibility was not only to give lectures but also to advise Yoshimune on important political issues. Kyûsô’s opinions and advice were more often acted upon than those of other colleagues.18 One of many recommendations that he made was one in 1723 for tashidaka (足

高 ), a measure to fill up the difference between the formally stipulated income for the position and the previous, inherited income of the appointed official.19 In 1725 he was appointed tutor to Tokugawa Ieshige ( 徳 川 家 重 ,

18 This fact is recorded in the entry of 1719/10/28 in Tokugawa Jikki, Vol.8, p.174. His lecture was praised by Yoshimune as clear, intelligible and popular. (Muro Kyûsô, Letter to Aochi Kenzan, as of 1722/3/9, in Kenzan hisaku, p.485). In 1722, at the Takakura Yashiki college, attendants for his I Ching lecture were 40 to 50, whereas Kinoshita’s Book of Odes lecture attracted 20, Ogyû Kan’s Books of Rites lecture saw just 7to 8. Kan was Sorai’s younger brother (Muro Kyûsô, Letter to Okumura Genzaemon, as of 1722/4/9, ibid., p.487). 19 Tokugawa Jikki, Vol.8, p.307.

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1711-1761, r. 1745-1760), Yoshimune’s heir. In 1727 he submitted a letter of resignation, due to illness, but was persuaded to remain in post while being allowed to stay at home. He died at his home seven years later in 1734.

Kyûsô appears to have been well treated by the government as an important scholar. Despite the high reputation of Sorai, it was Kyûsô who was prominent in academic circles and influenced the government. His role can be traced from the description in Tokugawa jikki (徳川実記 , True Tokugawa Record).20

The detail of Muro Kyûsô’s active role recorded in this source is shown in Appendix 1. Along with his distinguished service in the bakufu, Kyûsô built a reputation as a Neo-Confucian scholar. Even members of Sorai’s Ken-en school paid respect to his scholastic ability.21 Consistently with the stereotype that has come down of him, he was regarded as an isolated defender of Neo-Confucianism against Jinsai’s Ancient Learning school and Sorai’s Ken-en school.22

Kyûsô was a prolific writer. His many books include Akô gijin roku (赤穂義人録, Record of Akô loyal retainers), Meikun kakun (明君家訓, Instructions by a wise

lord), Kenzan hisaku (兼山秘策 , Correspondence of Muro Kyûsô with his

disciples), Kenka roku (献可録, Record of suggestions to Yoshimune), Seimei

shôgi (西銘詳義 Detailed account of the Inscription in a western window by Zhang Zai 1020-1077 ), Rikuyu engi taii (六諭衍義大意, Summary of Liu-yu yan-

yi or Extended Explanations of the Six Instructions), Sundai zatsuwa (駿台雑話, Essays at Surugadai), Taikyoku zu jutsu (太極図述 , Account on chart of

Supreme Ultimate or taiji) and Fubôshô (不亡鈔 , Immortal extracts). Kyûsô

sensei bunshû (鳩巣先生文集 , A collection of master Kyûsô’s compositions) were also published. Among these many works, Sundai zatsuwa has been chosen for its representative quality as we shall see in the next chapter.

20 Ibid, Vol. 8-9.21 Hara Nensai’s Sentetsu sôdan recorded an interesting interchange between Kyûsô and Hirano Kinka, a disciple of Sorai. Kinka asked Kyûsô to correct his writing and had to admit Kyûsô’s scholastic ability. p.262.22 Suzuki 1939, p.430.

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2 ) The Sundai zatsuwa

(1) The text, its origin and diffusionThe Sundai zatsuwa (駿台雑話) was written in 1732 when Muro Kyûsô was 74 years of age. In the postscript he gives a detailed account of how the book was conceived. In the first month of 1732 he began to record conversations with his disciples from the previous year. They had regularly visited Kyûsô to read Chinese classics and discussed on them with his supervision. The book was completed in the tenth month of 1732. The circumstances surrounding its publication are given in the introduction by Fujiwara Akitô ( 藤 原 明 遠 ), written in 1750, probably the year Sundai zatsuwa was published.23 The book was widely diffused after its publication. Here are some facts to show its popularity.

Under Sundai zatsuwa, Iwanami’s Kokusho sômokuroku catalogue of pre Restoration books and manuscripts (1967) has 17 entries for manuscripts, 5 hanpon printings for various years (in 1748, 1750, 1751, 1835 and 1856), 19 hanpon printings without any particular publication year, and 9 modern-printings, including the Iwanami Bunko version. This suggests that the book became fairly popular not only in manuscript form but also in printed versions.24 The popularity of the book is known from another source; Sundai

zatsuwa was catalogued soon after its publication as early as 1754 in Shoseki

mokuroku (書籍目録, the Publisher’s General Catalogue of Books) which is an essential material for the study of hanpon publications in the Edo period.25 By comparison, Gomô jigi, written in 1683, took 23 years to be catalogued in 1706 in Roku no mokuroku, or The Sixth Catalogue. Seidan by Ogyû Sorai

23 However, Iwanami’s Kokusyo sômokuroku 1963-76 records hanpon version published two years earlier in 1748. See Vol. 5, p. 63.24 Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 63. In comparison, Gomô zigi (語孟字義) by Itô Jinsai has 12 entries of manuscripts, 2 hanpon printings, and 3 type-printings. Ibid. Vol.3. p. 568. Seidan (政談) by Ogyû Sorai has 60 entries of manuscripts, 2 hanpon printings with publishing year, 24 hanpon printings without publishing year, and 7 type-printings. Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 99.25 Edo jidai shorin shuppan shoseki mokuroku shûsei (1962-63), Vol. 3, p. 159. Roku no mokuroku in 1706 is the increased and revised version by Maruya Genbei based on the 1696 catalogue.

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was not entered in any of those catalogues.26

The text used for this study is taken from Meika zuihitsushû jô, Yûhôdô bunko, 1930, edited by Take Ryûzô. This text, in turn, uses the hanpon original published in 1750. The text in Nihon zuihitsu zenshû, vol.3, Kokumin Tosho, 1929 was also consulted. The title was read as Shundai zatsuwa in the original; however it has become common practice to read it as Sundai

zatsuwa.27

(2) Structure of the bookSundai zatsuwa comprises introductions by Fujiwara Akitô and the author as well as the text, and is divided into five volumes, each bearing the name of one of the Five Constant Virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness) taken from Confucianism. The five volumes have 18, 18, 13, 17 and 17 (inclusive of postscript) chapters, respectively. In this paper, translated quotations from the book are indicated with the numbers of the volumes and chapters as shown in appendix 2.

The book is based on relaxed conversations concerning Confucian learning with Kyûsô’s close disciples; hence, its manner of writing is different from a systematically prepared text book. It includes wide and varied subjects taken up from not only the Chinese classics of Confucianism, their annotations, poetry, prose and history, but also Japanese history, essays and poems, both in Japanese tanka form and in Chinese. A concise table of subjects included in each chapter is provided in Appendix 3.

The subjects discussed can be divided broadly into two categories. The first category consists of a discussion of Neo-Confucianism, and is mainly developed in the first volume. Here, the author demonstrates his strong devotion to orthodox learning and a clear refutation of heterodox thought.

26 Ibid. Vol. 2, p. 309.27 Zuihitsi jiten 1961, p. 279.

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The names of books and scholars cited in his writing show Kyûsô’s extensive knowledge of Confucianism. They also show that he is well-informed concerning the contemporary situation among Chinese scholars. As early as the middle of the seventeenth century, all the main texts of Neo-Confucianism published in China were said to have been imported to Japan.28

The second category is related to Kyûsô’s interest in Japanese historical events and characters. Here, he illustrates benevolence, righteousness and other values of Neo-Confucianism using Japanese examples. These examples reveal his practical understanding of Neo-Confucianism and his adaptation of the tradition to Tokugawa Japan. The unique character of Kyûsô’s thinking can be found in the latter portion of his text.

3 Kyûsô’s Confucianism1 ) His devotion to Neo-ConfucianismIn Sundai zatsuwa Kyûsô declared that his belief in Neo-Confucianism was achieved by his own effort when he was around forty years old. After this, Muro Kyûsô maintained a strong belief in Neo-Confucianism which was clearly expressed in Sundai zatuwa and other works and letters. In the first volume of Sundai zatsuwa, he used many pages to assert the orthodoxy of Neo-Confucianism, providing examples and criticizing other schools. Sundai zatsuwa explicates Neo-Confucian values, and in terms of formal doctrines, it could be regarded as an example of the homogeneity of the tradition in Japan. Thus, when Muro Kyûsô refers to the basic Neo-Confucian notions of li, qi, investigating Principle and t’ai chi, his explanation is generally consistent with the writing of other followers of the Neo-Confucian tradition. Furthermore, he took the orthodoxy of the tradition for granted, saying that the way of Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi agrees with that of Confucius and Mencius.

This intellectually conservative position may be illustrated by Kyûsô’s discussion of the cardinal Confucian virtue of benevolence. In the Analects, benevolence, though notoriously difficult to define, seems to refer to the

28 Nakamura 1982, p.5. On the import of Chines books, see Ôba 1997. 11

consummation of personal ethical excellence. In later Confucian thinkers, benevolence was identified as akin to compassion. Mencius, for example, said that the feeling of commiseration is the beginning of benevolence29. In Neo-Confucianism, this view was maintained and given metaphysical support. Muro Kyûsô also followed this line and gave first priority to benevolence among the four virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, he argued, encompasses these four items. He maintained that benevolence stems from affection and love of one’s fellow human beings. It is essential to the mind, and once it is lost, the mind dies, in the same way that a human being dies when his pulse ceases.

As the mind of a human being is lively, man has affection and knows pity. Therefore it is natural to show affection to father and mother and to superiors. It is natural to be humble to senior people. You will be moved when you hear something righteous; you will be ashamed when you hear something unrighteous. Without affection and pity, the mind would become callous, like that of the brute, and would not feel any pain or itching sensations. How could a person with such a mind take care of himself, behave himself, and respect others? Based upon the foregoing, it must be concluded that the principle virtue of the mind is nothing but benevolence, even though benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are all elements of the virtue of the mind. (Sundai zatsuwa, 2-11)

Kyûsô illustrated the virtue from recent Japanese history. Tentokuji (天徳寺。佐

野房綱 Sano Fusatsuna, ?-1601, a brave general who served the Hôjô house), was highly praised by Muro Kyûsô for this quality. One day Tentokuji asked a minstrel with a biwa (a lute-like musical instrument) to tell tragic stories. The minstrel related the heroic tales of Sasaki Takatsuna (佐々木高綱 , a samurai warrior in the early Kamakura period) and Nasu no Yoichi (那須与一, another samurai warrior in early Kamakura). On hearing the story Tentokuji wept copiously, but his vassals could not understand why he was so moved. He deplored the insensitivity of his vassals and explained the importance of understanding the pathos of warriors under heavy pressure such as Sasaki

29 Mencius, Mencius, 2A6. In this paper, quotations of the texts of Mencius are taken from the website of Stephen R. McIntyre (http://nothingistic.org/ library/mencius/), whose texts are based on Mencius, Mencius, James Legge, trans., Clarendon Press, 1895.

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Takatsuna and Nasu no Yoichi. Tentokuji is an example of a man who had compassion. True militarism is based on benevolence and proceeds from commiseration (Ibid., 2-11) .

Even though benevolence is a universal idea which is applicable to everybody, Kyûsô tended to discuss benevolence in association with rulers, and, in particular, with reference to the behaviour of the ruler towards his subjects. This is understandable as benevolence is a general sense of responsibility for others and for the social order, an abstention from greed, an awareness of the interests and dignity of subjects, and a concern for justice. In this context, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉, 1536-1598) was criticised as a man lacking benevolence. Kyûsô censured Hideyoshi for mobilizing troops to invade Korea and causing many people to be killed. Kyûsô also criticised him for spending a large fortune to build a great Buddha statue. These acts did more harm than good to the whole country. These views were shared by other Confucians in the Tokugawa period.30

In contrast to Hideyoshi, Kyûsô highly praised Tokugawa Ieyasu ( 徳 川 家 康 , 1542-1616) for his benevolence. Ieyasu, Kyûsô said, knew that Tenka ( 天下 , the world) is not the possession of him who conquers the world, and that the world belongs to the world. In 1586, when war gradually came to an end and peace was about to be restored, Hideyoshi summoned Ieyasu several times to come to Kyoto. The summons was dangerous for Ieyasu as he might be killed by Hideyoshi. However, considering the possibility of another civil war should he refuse, Ieyasu decided to go to Kyoto. He risked his life for the sake of the peace of the whole country (Ibid., 3-1).

2 ) Aspects of rationalismA further feature of Kyûsô’s thought shared with other Neo-Confucians is its

30 Hideyoshi’s atrocity was a frequent theme among the Tokugawa intellectuals. Not only Kyûsô was critical to Hideyoshi. Similar criticism can be found in Ôta Kinjô (大田錦城, 1765-1825) Gosô manpitsu (梧窓漫筆), p.25.

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clarity and rationality, a quality vividly conveyed by a reading of Sundai

zatsuwa. How could Muro Kyûsô achieve such clarity? This is partly explained by the nature of Neo-Confucianism. From the beginning, indeed, Confucianism had possessed a rationalistic character and abhorred ambiguity; it seldom talks about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings. The learning draws a clear line between itself and gods, spirits and religion.31 Such rationality was the common property of Confucian thinkers. In the beginning of Jinsai nichirei, for instance, Itô Jinsai writes, ’The learning of Confucians abhors obscurity the most. When the Way is discussed or the classics are interpreted, we should be clear and straightforward.’32 This characterizes not only Jinsai’s view but was shared by many Confucians in the Tokugawa period. In particular, Neo-Confucianism as systematized by Zhu Xi developed a rationale which prefers clarity over any form of ambiguity. Zhu formed the Learning of Principle/Reason (理学, Li Xue) by creating a systematic and rationalistic doctrine around the concepts of the Supreme Ultimate (太極, taiji), principle (理, li), material force (気, qi), human nature (性 , xing), the investigation of things (格物 , gewu), and humaneness (仁, ren).

In order to strengthen the theoretical aspects of Confucianism, the Neo-Confucianism represented by Zhu Xi formulated a metaphysics encompassing both the universe and man. The ‘investigation of Principle’ (kyûri, 窮 理 ) is a central concept of Neo-Confucianism; it is an act of classification of things and investigation of essence. The concept is actually close to modern science in certain ways. It has moralistic, metaphysical, political and natural scientific aspects. It was a comprehensive system of

31 Confucius, Analects, VII-21, ‘Subjects avoided by Confucius in his conversation. The subjects on which the Master did not talk, were -- extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings. In the Analects, similar expressions related to the distance from religion can be found: ‘To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom.’ (VI-20) and ‘While you do not know life, how can you know about death?’ (XI-11) Quotations of the texts of the Annalects are taken from the website of Stephen R. McIntyre (http://nothingistic.org/library/confucius/analects/), whose texts are based on Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, James Legge, trans., Clarendon Press, 1893. 32 Itô Jinsai Jinsai nichirei, p.152.

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thought ranging from the rules of everyday behaviour to issues of ontology.33

When it arrived to Japan and began to spread in the early Tokugawa, as Nakamura Yukihiko puts it, it was the ‘learning of learning, the thought of thought’.34 Nakamura points out the fact that the unity of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism was explained based on the Principle of Neo-Confucianism in the early Tokugawa period. New Shinto such as Watarai and Suika also used Neo-Confucianism as their theoretical frame.35 The Zen Buddhism of Bankei ( 盤 珪 , 1622-1693) is also said to have been influenced by the teaching. Natural science and medicine were also explained by Neo-Confucianism.

However, the elements of the system started to develop individually from the Genroku (元禄, 1688-1704) to Kyôhô (享保, 1716-1732) period. The scientific aspect, for example, was developed during the Genroku period by Kaibara Ekiken (貝原益軒, 1630-1714), a thinker who, believing in Neo-Confucianism, was also conspicuous as a natural scientist. He had a practical view of learning, claiming that it should be useful.36 It was Ekiken who further developed the practical and empirical side of rationalism in Neo-Confucianism. The development was stimulated not only by his personality but also by the trends of the period.37

Muro Kyûsô was the heir to this tradition of rationality. From the following paragraph, we can detect an objective approach with a spirit of curiosity to gods, spirits and religion:

Sages essentially do not talk about extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings. However, to investigate this principle is a part of the investigative act of reason inherent in things, ... (Sundai zatsuwa, 1-13)

33 Maruyama 1974, p.20. 34 Nakamura 1972, p.494. 35 See also Maruyama 1974, p.150-152.36 Minamoto 1980, p.32.37 Inoue Tadashi 1970, p.503.

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His criticism of Hônen (法然, or Genkû 源空, 1133-1212, the founder of Pure Land Buddhism) provides an example of his rationalistic thinking:

Genkû [Hônen] swore that he would go to hell if his teaching was found to be false, in which he taught that people could go to paradise by chanting a prayer to the Buddha. From a Confucian’s point of view there is no more groundless an oath than that. If paradise does not exist, hell does not exist either (Sundai zatsuwa, 1-2).

This argument typically illustrates the logical and rationalistic way of thinking characteristic of Confucianism. The teachings of Neo-Confucianism were this-worldly and rational. They did not require, and did not receive, the sanctions or rewards of supernatural forces for their implementation.38 As a Neo-Confucian, Muro Kyûsô looked for solutions in the sublunary world. He dismissed religions such as Buddhism, Daoism and Shintôism.39 He made clear the selfish nature of Buddhism. In Volume 5 of Sundai zatsuwa, he pointed out:

When someone hopes to save oneself by giving up master and parents, it shows that he is not free from himself, even though he has given up worldly affairs, his master and his parents. Unless he gives himself up, he is not said to have given up worldly affairs. Despite the difference between sacred and secular, hoping for worldly fame and wealth and hoping to go to paradise by giving up worldly affairs are the same, as both are interested in self pleasure. (Ibid., 5-4)

It was natural for Muro Kyûsô to evaluate historical figures based on their attitude towards Buddhism. For example, Wang Shi-zhêng ( 王 世 貞 , 1526-1590) was regarded as a rash person who lacked the sense of duty, because of his devotion to Buddhism (Ibid., 5-11). Taira no Shigemori (平重盛, 1138－

1179), who has traditionally been regarded as a wise man, has his common sense doubted because of his belief in Buddhism (Ibid., 4-7). By contrast with

38 Jansen 2000, p.191.39 A predisposition to a rationalistic exploration of the inner issues of the individual can be seen as early as the beginning of the Tokugawa period. As the lengthy period of war ended, there emerged an acute need for a philosophy of life that was not primarily monastic or other-worldly, as the major forms of Zen and Pure Land Buddhism ( 浄 土 仏 教 , Jôdo Bukkyô) were perceived to be. Instead, there was a recognition of the importance of a system of philosophy and ethico-religious practice that would guide human actions and order human relations amidst the demands of daily affairs.

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Taira no Shigemori, Matsudaira Nobutsuna (松平信綱, 1596-1662) was praised not only for his ability as a commander and administrator but also for his decision to have coins made by melting down the Daibutsu ( 大 仏 , Great Buddha) in Kyoto. Kyûsô praised this on the grounds that his action enlightened people’s minds (Ibid., 4-8).

3 ) Political aspectSo far, expositions of Sundai zatsuwa suggest that Kyûsô shared much in common with other contemporary promoters of Neo-Confucian teaching. Examination of his thinking on political matters, however, suggests a rather different picture. Here while Kyûsô’s thinking is generally consistent with that of his Song mentors, he demonstrates a concern with the individual as moral agent that sets his thinking apart from that of most of his Tokugawa contemporaries.

To understand Kyûsô’s ideas in this field, it is necessary to glance first at the climate of political thought in his time. The spirit of the Kyôhô ( 享保 , 1716-1736) period demonstrates a trend similar to that of the Encyclopaedic movement in western Europe. Strong desire for knowledge prevailed during the period, from the ruling class of the central government to the commoners. Scholars with wide knowledge such as Arai Hakuseki, Muro Kyûsô and Ogyû Sorai were used as advisors to the Tokugawa government. Against the background of such trends, the political aspect of rationalism was developed by Ogyû Sorai. The thinking of Sorai supplied the grounds for legitimizing the ruling class. Sorai argued for the necessity of ruling the people by external measures such as the system of rites, the criminal code and other institutions. This view stands in sharp contrast with the Song scholars who thought that good governance of the people was a natural effect of the ruler’s moral and internal cultivation. According to Sorai, it is the duty of the statesman to position each individual correctly in the social framework. Each individual, on the other hand, should accept and discharge

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his own function according to the mandate from Heaven. Within the division of work, political activity is regarded as an independent and special function. A law proper to its field is sought after. That law is called the Way. If modernization is understood as the effort to increase efficiency of production and life by division of work and co-operation, the thought of Ogyû Sorai was very modern. It can be compared to the technological management of human beings in modern society.40 However, this view tended to regard individuals as mere objects for governing, neglecting the inner aspects of their lives. It was Muro Kyûsô who pursued the inner aspect of the individual.

Muro Kyûsô followed orthodox Neo-Confucianism in its stress on the individual moral agent. His views are revealed in his exposition of individual and political morality, particularly his discussion of righteousness, yi ( 義 ), remonstration, regicide and the emperor system. Here, his pursuit of rationalism developed in the direction of individualism. His privileging of the importance of individual morality over the social order of the Tokugawa polity becomes clear. Indeed, he had a strong sense of the individual as a locus of moral value.

4 ) The importance of righteousnessThe number of pages spent on righteousness in Sundai zatsuwa suggests that Muro Kyûsô had a stronger interest in righteousness than in benevolence. In Sundai zatsuwa, a great number of people are taken up for discussion from the late Heian to Edo periods, many of whom are featured in stories of loyal retainers, righteous persons and heroines. This material in fact makes up half the book, demonstrating a marked and life-long preoccupation with righteousness. The importance of this theme for Kyûsô had been evident since his early works, Akô gijin roku and Meikun kakun.

The importance of righteousness becomes clearer when it is contrasted with

40 Bitô 1974, pp.60-61.

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other moral values. First, Kyûsô gave priority to the moral value of righteousness over secular law in his analysis of the revenge by the Akô loyal retainers. Akô gijin roku was one of the earliest contemporary works to praise the Akô retainers for their loyalty to their executed lord. He tried to free righteousness from the domain of law and to privilege it over secular law.41

Ogyû Sorai, by contrast, advocated punishment of the retainers from the standpoint that obeying law is more important than adhering to private morality, even though he admitted the importance of righteousness in the private domain. Secondly, Kyûsô further privileged righteousness over life itself by quoting Confucius, ‘the brave officer never forgets that he may lose his head’ 42. The same idea was also mentioned in Meikun kakun: ‘I will never do what I should not do, even if I were to be beheaded’.43 Thirdly, the normative transcendence of righteousness led Kyûsô to criticize Yamaga Sokô ( 山 鹿 素 行 , 1622-1685), an early Tokugawa Confucian scholar and military thinker. Sokô had claimed the importance of money as indispensable, claiming that it was wrong to criticize samurais’ talking about money as a demeaning subject. For Kyûsô, however, the first priority of a gentleman or samurai is righteousness, then life, but it is better not to mention money. (Sundai zatsuwa, 5-13)

When Kyûsô’s emphasis on the value of righteousness becomes clearer, the question of his understanding of the value arises. Kyûsô seems to explain righteousness following the orthodox Neo-Confucian understanding. Even though there is no English equivalent of yi that serves all contexts, it is (1) the quality of an action that makes it ‘fitting’ or ‘appropriate’, (2) the quality of a person disposed to perform such acts, and (3) a disposition to feel shame or disdain towards certain actions.44 Mencius states that ‘The feeling

41 Kinugasa 1976, pp.14-15.42 Muro Kyûsô Sundai zatsuwa, 4-11. Mencius, Mencius, 3B1.43 Muro Kyûsô Meikun kakun, p.71.44 It could be translated as ‘right’, ‘rightness’, ‘righteous’, ‘righteousness’, ‘duty’, ‘dutiful’, or ‘moral’, according to context. However, the word ‘righteousness’ is used throughout the following analysis.

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of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness’45. Kyûsô said that benevolence and righteousness can be compared to the yin and yang of Heaven, or spring and autumn. Benevolence is yang and spring. In contrast, righteousness is yin and autumn. As autumn kills what has sprouted in spring, righteousness includes a rigorous element (Sundai zatsuwa, 2-12). Righteousness is the ‘punctuation’ of the mind (kokoro no kire, 心 の き れ ). Kyûsô developed this view in relation to the Five constants ( 五 常 , gojô) in Kenkaroku (献可録, Record of suggestions to Yoshimune), another work:

Righteousness is explained as the mind of cutting and dividing reason, as a tailor cuts cloth for a garment. It is the act of not receiving what you should not receive, not saying anything you should not say, living when you should live, dying when you should die. It is the act of deciding everything without contravening reason.46

This is a standard understanding of righteousness; it differs little from other neo-Confucian textbooks.

But Muro Kyûsô’s expansion of righteousness through plain examples in Meikun kakun exposes a further aspect of his perception of the idea of righteousness:

Not to tell a lie, not to be obstinate, to have a docile mind, not to keep up appearances for appearances sake, to conform to the rules of etiquette and to be polite, not to flatter superiors nor to despise inferiors, to keep one’s word, not to forsake hardship of others, to be brisk and reliable, not to use vulgar expression nor to speak ill of others, to have a sense of shame, not to do what one should not do even if one loses one’s head, never to retreat from the place of one’s death, to respect one’s duty always, to have a strong will, to be gentle and affectionate, to feel the pathos of things, to have sympathy to others. (Meikun kakun, p.71)

These examples show that Kyûsô’s understanding of righteousness stressed the personal side of the norm rather than the public side that might be interpreted to support the Tokugawa regime. His view should be contrasted with those of other contemporary scholars. In the Tokugawa period when the

45 Mencius, Mencius, 2A6.46 Muro Kyûsô Kenka roku, p.135.

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warrior ethos formed the keynote of society, it has been argued that moral obligation was understood as a direct projection of social hierarchy by Neo-Confucians such as Satô Naokata and Asami Keisai.47 In the hierarchical structure of the Tokugawa status quo, there was little room for recognition of the individual as an independent moral agent. But Kyûsô demonstrated a different understanding which may be more faithful to the humanist tradition of Confucian learning.

5 ) Individualistic thinkingThe Confucian tradition contains elements of a moral universalism as well as characteristics that derive from the nature of Chinese society, culture and history. The emphasis on the role of the individual in its learning is said to be one such element of moral universalism.48 Kyûsô developed this moral universalism in his thinking. He adopts a clear position among contemporary Japanese Confucians in recognizing righteousness as a universal virtue, one that transcended the constraints of the contemporary class system. His emphasis on the personal aspect of righteousness is different from Ogyû Sorai who regarded human beings as functional parts to serve society. The concern of Muro Kyûsô was in the mind of an independent self. In his thought, we find a strong tendency for individuals to be regarded as autonomous agents based on the premise that everybody is the master of himself.

The sages of the three dynasties said that ‘Oneself stands on the world, he is the only existence in the realm.’ Who can deny the determination of the individual? A wise man in later ages said that oneself stands out among thousands of people, the self knows that he is the only existence among millions of people. Therefore when you search for your own place, it exists in the place where thought does not occur yet, the place where innate nature does not yet arise. If a gentleman can nurture this without fail, heaven and earth are ranked according to oneself, everything under the sun grows up from oneself, gods and spirits respond to oneself. Nothing can originate but from oneself. (Sundai zatsuwa, 1-14)

This paragraph illustrates Kyûsô’s strong awareness of self. It also reflects the

47 McMullen 2003, p.306.48 McMullen 1999, p37.

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innate goodness of human beings as expressed in Neo-Confucianism, which prescribes regeneration of oneself by one’s own efforts. He also believed that an individual can control the gods and spirits but is not controlled by them. Thus, when he emphasized the state of an individual’s mind, he was minimizing the existence of gods and thus approaching atheism.

Gods and spirits cannot detect when one has no thought. As many ordinary people cannot drive worldly thoughts away from their mind and as everything comes from thinking and deliberation, they are distracted by various things and cannot establish themselves. Therefore not to lose control of yourself, you should try to nurture the innate mind. To try to nurture the innate mind to give up self-interest is the first priority. Once the mind gives up self-interest, as quietness makes response easy, everything comes out straightforwardly from quietness following reason, without thinking and deliberation. Matters are already decided before everything, and never come behind anything. Such a person can control the gods and spirits, and cannot be controlled by them. (Ibid., 1-14)

In Tokugawa Japan it was innovative to claim that one’s own way is independent not only from the gods and spirits but also from everyone else in the world; it instilled the idea of freedom based on the idea that everyone is the master of himself.49 If the dignity of man is defined as an idea that national and social categories are of secondary moral importance and in the social sphere only particular human beings really exist50, then Kyûsô might be called as an advocate of individual equality. His view of human beings could be thought to satisfy a modern definition of individualism. Just as Descartes established himself as a cognitive subject or a conscious self, and Hobbes concluded that individuals are subjects who create their own social order, Muro Kyûsô also realized the importance of individual independence from society.

6 ) Regicide by Tang and WuThe combination of the themes of rationality and Kyûsô’s concept of the

49 Maeda 2002, p.332.50 Lukes 1973, p.54.

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individual as a moral agent leads his discussion to the difficult problem of regicide, which occupied many Confucian scholars. Here his thinking, while largely conventional in terms of the Chinese Neo-Confucian tradition, represents an implicit challenge to the dominant Tokugawa ideology. The question of whether, or under what circumstances, the killing of a ruler was justified was one of the most vexed problems in the Confucian tradition. When Muro Kyûsô’s individualism was developed further by using rationalistic thinking, the result did not perfectly fit with the assumptions on which the Tokugawa order was based. This is particularly so when his idea is applied to political issues. He had in mind a revolutionary idea.

China had experienced frequent regicides and rule by different lineages. The regicide of King Jie of Xia by King Tang of the Yin dynasty (c. 16th century BC – c. 11th century BC), and that of King Zhou by Lord Wu of the Zhou dynasty (c. 11th century BC – 256 BC) were symbolic instances of the problem. Mencius had considered that King Zhou had violated all benevolence and righteousness. As a result he lost any qualification to ruler ship and was reduced to a man of mere mediocrity. It is natural that such a person is suppressed, and even if he is killed that act does not constitute regicide.51

Mencius thus allows for the expulsion of immoral kings.52 Likewise, Zhu Xi, discussing the relationship between sovereign and subject ( 大 義 名 分 ), was also supportive of regicide on condition that the ruler was a complete tyrant, such as King Jie or King Zhou, and that the retainer was a man of perfect benevolence, like King Tang or Lord Wu.53 Therefore Chinese Neo-Confucianism approved the expulsion of an immoral King, considering it commissioned by the will of Heaven (易姓革命).

As a Neo-Confucian, Muro Kyûsô was supportive of Tang and Wu. He criticized the school known as Kimon (崎門), named after its founder Yamazaki Ansai,

51 Mencius, Mencius, 1B8.52 Noguchi, 1986, p.27.53 Park 2002, p.123.

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whose members tended to take a rigorous and inflexible view condemning the regicides by King Tang and Lord Wu.54 Yamazaki Ansai was reluctant to regard these men as Sages. Asami Keisai ( 浅見敬斎 1652-1711), one of the three major disciples of Yamazaki Ansai, even regarded King Tang and Lord Wu simply as traitors.55 Kyûsô questioned this view. In Sundai zatsuwa, he wrote:

In any case, despite its name of ‘Shintôism’, having heard of the opinions, it supports our country and regards Tang and Wu as rebels. Is so-called Shintôism not outside of benevolence and righteousness? (Ibid., 1-3)

However, Kyûsô did not develop this discussion further. Compared to his thorough criticism of other schools, this critique seems too simple. But there was a good reason for his restraint. It is related to the orthodoxy promoted by the Tokugawa shogunate. In 1612 Tokugawa Ieyasu questioned Hayashi Razan (林羅山, 1583-1657) on the issue of the regicides by Tang and Wu. His enquiry was an attempt to try to find a justification for the overthrow of the Toyotomi regime.56 If the idea of justifiable regicide applied to Japan, however, its radical and dangerous ideology might also have posed a threat to the legitimacy of the Tokugawa shogunate itself; if the overthrow of the Toyotomi regime is justified, that of the Tokugawa shogunate might also become justifiable. Neo-Confucianism in the early Tokugawa period, therefore, had circumspectly left the issue somewhat ambiguous.57 Kyûsô seems therefore to have restrained himself, knowing the sensitive nature of the discussion. The reason why he did not develop the criticism against the Kimon school may also help explain why Kyûsô kept silence on the political

54 Taira 1972, p.549-550. Maruyama Masao points out the uniqueness of the school, in that they were the first to hold serious discussions of regicide from the point of view of the continuity of the emperorship. They had opposing standpoints even within the school. Maruyama 1980, p.619.55 Iwahashi 1927, p.116. 56 However, the real intention of the question asked by Ieyasu, who was a well seasoned politician, to young Razan, who was 25 years old, was not simply to confirm whether the overthrowing of the Toyotomi regime agree with the regicides by Tang and Wu. Ieyasu examined newly establishing Neo-Confucianism to see if it could work as an ideology to support the regime. See Noguchi 1986, pp.44-45.57 Ibid., p.44.

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issues posed by Ogyû Sorai. Within the very heart of Tokugawa shogunate Kyûsô preserved a position of caution on such potentially inflammatory issues.

The logic of the discussion of regicide suggests, under the appropriate circumstances, to a potential denial not only of delinquent shoguns but also that of the emperors. It was difficult to conceal completely the dangerous nature of this issue. Despite his restraint, Kyûsô’s inclination toward revolutionary ideas can be found in various places in his writings. In his third letter to Yusa Bokusai (遊佐木斎, 1658-1734), Muro Kyûsô consistently denies Shintôism and its view of the national polity. He sees no rationalistic reason for claiming the divinity of the emperorship of Japan simply by virtue of an unbroken line of emperors. He states:

The reason for the continuity of the emperorship is due to the foolish adoration of the Japanese people for spirits and gods, which prevented people from disgracing the emperor as the emperor is a divine descendant of the gods. If this continuity is regarded as the result of a virtuous nature or supreme morality, then the Chinese may blame us. As everything created changes, the continuity of the emperorship cannot be exempt from change.58

This description was perceived as subversive by those who advocated the national polity. Some contemporary scholars had already realized Kyûsô’s private position on such issues. In the middle of the Tokugawa period, in his Mokushikiroku (黙識録, Silent records), Miyake Shôsai (三宅尚斎,1662-1741) of the Kimon school criticized Kyûsô saying that he secretly had a revolutionary idea in mind.59

Associated with Kyûsô’s radical view of imperial sovereignty was a critical approach to the Shinto beliefs with which the emperorship was often

58 Muro Kyûsô Shokan shû, pp.250-251. It is also noteworthy that Kyûsô approved the magico-religious consciousness of the Japanese, but kept a necessary distance so as to see them objectively. 59 Miyake Shôsai Mokusikiroku, p.568.

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associated. His criticism of Shintôism is severe. His stance on Shintôism is unique among Confucian scholars of the Tokugawa period. The view that there is a similarity between Shintôism and Confucianism was professed by various scholars starting from Hayashi Razan of the early Tokugawa period, to Nakae Tôju (中江藤樹, 1608-1648), Kumazawa Banzan (熊沢蕃山, 1619-1691), Yamaga Sokô and Kaibara Ekiken. It was also a characteristic of the Kimon school. It is more difficult to find scholars who, like Muro Kyûsô, denied the compatibility of Shintôism with Confucianism.60 He defined the word ‘Shinto’ as the subtleness of the way of the sages, not as an independent way or indigenous tradition. He did not agree with the opinion claimed by scholars expounding Shintôism according to which the Japanese way is one grade higher than the way of the sages.

The sages taught in a sacred way (神道, Shinto). The word ‘Shinto’ is used to highlight the fact that the way of the sages rose above human knowledge. The expression is used in the same manner as [the way of the sages] is regarded the way of benevolence ( 仁 道 , Jindô). It is not an independent way. Nevertheless, on hearing the opinion of those who propagate Shintôism, they say it is the way of our country and one grade higher than the way of the sages. This is not understandable. (Sundai zatsuwa, 1-11)

Muro Kyûsô’s standpoint is unique as he criticized the narrow-minded self-righteousness of Shintôism from a universal view of the way.61

7 ) RemonstrationThe centrality of the individual as moral agent in Kyûsô’s thought is illustrated by his views of remonstration. When a practitioner of benevolence and righteousness acts in this world, those inner morals sometimes produce a strong tension in relation to external requirements, in particular, against the requirement of the actor’s master or parent. Here, the issue of remonstration, a Confucian imperative, arises. Remonstration is an act of reproach and request to a person’s master or parent asking for a reform of their misbehaviour. 60 Maruyama 1980, p.624.61 Maeda 2002, p.262.

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In Sundai zatsuwa Muro Kyûsô discussed this matter. By contrast with China, where a subject can leave his master when remonstration is not accepted by the master,62 a Japanese subject was expected to stay and must continue remonstration to his master. This places the Japanese subject in a difficult position. It may provoke the master’s rage and the person who made the remonstration may be executed by the master or confined to his house. In this context, Kyûsô praised Tokugawa Ieyasu who always accepted frank remonstrations made by his subjects. He quoted Ieyasu’s remark that it is more difficult to make remonstrations than to be in the vanguard of lancers.63

The importance of remonstration can be seen from the fact that Kyûsô wrote Meikun kakun (明君家訓 , Instructions by a wise lord), a work describing the relations desirable between lord and subject, starting with this issue. However, in the text, Kyûsô uniquely adopted the fiction that a lord ‘requests’ his subjects to make remonstrations. This suggests that remonstration was not a duty of the subject but a requirement of the lord. For subjects, making remonstration is a contractual duty asked by the lord. The following admonition indicates how Muro Kyûsô thought:

Even ancient sages asked for remonstrations by subjects. I have gained a position thanks to the good conduct of my ancestors and ruled over others. Therefore, I am unworthy by nature. Day and night I am afraid of being inconsistent with the way of the master and contravening your expectations of me. Do not hesitate to express your frank opinion on wrong doing in my behaviour, on ruling of the fief, regardless of the importance of the issue.64

When loyalty to his lord conflicts with how samurai warriors should behave, Kyûsô accepted the principle of resistance against the order of the lord, based on the universal value of righteousness. He advocated freedom to

62 Ishii 1974, pp.519-520. This is different from the attitude to his parent; when the remonstration is not accepted by the parent, the child should follow the parent, as filial piety has the priority to the Way.63 Muro Kyûsô Sundai zatsuwa, 3-2.64 Muro Kyûsô Meikun kakun, p.68

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leave the service of the lord when remonstration is not heeded.

In general, at the bottom my heart, I do not expect you to be loyal to me by bending your own righteousness. I would be happy as long as you do not contradict your righteousness, even if you go against me.65

This shows Kyûsô’s rejection of the feudalistic idea of a vassal’s absolute obedience to his lord. He assumed a basic reciprocity involved between rulers and the ruled. For samurai warriors, he presupposed a status based a covenant that seems in some ways surprisingly modern.

8 ) On the class systemKyûsô’s emphasis on the role of the individual also led to an idea of egalitarianism, thus to a critical attitude of one of the basic characteristics of the Tokugawa status, its class system. If Muro Kyûsô subscribed to a fundamentally egalitarian view of individuals as moral agents, what was his view of the basically ascriptive Tokugawa status system? Compared to the solution of Buddhism, which gave people freedom from a fixed class system in an afterlife, Confucianism did not find such freedom in another world. Confucianism solved the issue within this world by taking the class system and status as the given or natural way. Zhu Xi believed that man’s prosperity or poverty, long or short span of life are decided when he is born. 66 The idea that the destiny of human beings is determined from birth suited a society founded on an ascriptive status system.

However, new ideas sprang up that saw the class system differently. One was the argument of Ogyû Sorai, who claimed that the class system was created by the Sages with absolute authority. Another was an argument based on the universal nature of the inner morality of individuals which is contained in Neo-Confucianism. This was the view of Muro Kyûsô.67 Despite the common

65 Ibid., p.78.66 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Yulei, 朱子語類 vol.4-77.67 Kinugasa 1990, p.345.

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belief that Neo-Confucianism is associated with the samurai estate, Kyûsô regards the virtues of Neo-Confucianism as universal, applicable to high and low alike; even beggars could know righteousness. His egalitarian view of righteousness is, as a Neo-Confucian, based on his belief in the innate goodness of human nature, which originates from Mencius. Fidelity and loyalty have nothing to do with family origin or with custom.

In modern times, public decency has been corrupted and people have become greedy for gain. However, as human nature is originally good, unexpectedly even a beggar has a mind that knows the sense of duty and obligation, regardless of his family background and social tradition. (Sundai zatsuwa, 3-13)

The beggar Hachibei picked up a large amount of money which an employee of a rich merchant had lost. When the beggar returned the money he refused to accept any reward and said:

Would I have returned the thirty pounds, had I thought of the five pounds [of reward]? From the first it was not avarice that made me kept them. The person who lost the money would surely have been in great trouble, had it been his master’s money. The money would not have been returned, had I let the money be found by a stranger. Therefore I kept the money intending to return it to the person who lost it. As I have already returned the money to you, my wish has been fulfilled. I would therefore like to say good-bye. (Ibid., 3-13)

After introducing the examples of beggar Hachibei and a vagabond who lived in Mt. Noda in Kaga, Kyûsô wrote as follows:

When we see old anthologies compiled by imperial orders, names of humble monks in the countryside and prostitutes are listed along with emperors and nobles. In tanka poems, there is no discrimination. It is the virtue of tanka poems. The spirit is the same when I now list beggars along with the respectable and the prominent to explain fidelity and righteousness. Fidelity and righteousness have no distinction between high and low, which is the virtue of fidelity and righteousness. When you hear this, I ask you not to take my argument as immoral. (Ibid., 3-13)

These descriptions strongly suggest that the Neo-Confucianism Kyûsô espoused was to recognize the fundamental equality of people, rather than

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to bind them into the hierarchy of the unequal status system.68 Kyûsô’s view demonstrates that a fundamental denial of a society based on class system and freedom of human beings is to be found early in the eighteenth century.

If Muro Kyûsô’s view of the class system is as described above, what is his opinion about the samurai estate? He claimed that farmers, artisans and tradesmen feared the samurai and respected them because the nature of the task performed by the samurai was noble.69 This leads to the view that the samurai estate derived its legitimation not because it was innately or inherently superior but because the task that it executed was honourable.70

This functional view of status led Kyûsô to reconsider the relationship of social class and the duty associated with each social class. Task performance rather than birth into a hereditary class determine status. This idea enables people born into a humble background to advance to higher posts. It suggests a meritocracy. Farmers, artisans and tradesmen can become samurai according to their talents. Kyûsô, therefore, did not think of the status system as fixed. Consulted by shogun Yoshimune, Muro Kyûsô reiterated this idea three times (Kenkaroku, vol. 2 and 3). His advice resulted in the adoption of the policy known as tashidaka (足高, a measure to make up the difference between the required income for a position and the actual inherited income of the official appointed to it) in 1723.71

From old times official posts have been given according to person’s effort and discerning ability. One should not be promoted to a higher position because of his ancestor’s ranking.72

68 Kinugasa 1976, p.116.69 Muro Kyûsô Meikun kakun, p.81. 70 Ishii 1974, pp.499-500.71 In the Record of the Ogyû family origine, Ogyû Sorai also claimed that he advised the same measure. See Tsuji Tatsuya 1973, p.768.72 Muro Kyûsô Kenkaroku, p.192.

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4 Conclusion – An Individualistic Neo-Confucian1 ) Kyûsô’s historical positionWatanabe Hiroshi says that the first period of transplanting Confucianism into Japan, where the situation is different from the Chinese ancient and medieval age, started from the time of the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) and was completed during the Tenna period (天和, 1681-1684). Then Jinsai initiated a turning point. Confucianism became firmly established in Japan during the Genroku ( 元 禄 , 1688-1704), Hôei ( 宝 永 , 1704-1711), Shôtoku ( 正 徳 , 1711-1716) and Kyôhô (享保, 1716-1736) periods.73 According to this periodization, Muro Kyûsô was a Neo-Confucian active in the period of establishment of Confucian learning.

Even though Kyûsô has not attracted much attention in modern academic circles, his contemporary Sorai mentioned him, together with Itô Tôgai and Amenomori Hôshû, as a man of discerning opinion.74 Hirose Tansô (広瀬淡窓, 1782-1856) recognized him, following Arai Hakuseki, as a brilliant scholar taught by Kinoshita Jun-an. Inoue Tetsujirô also spared a number of pages on Kyûsô, saying that only Kyûsô and Tôgai were leading figures in rivalry with Sorai during the Kyôhô period.75 These opinions are based on his learning and on the style of his poems and prose.

After examining Muro Kyûsô‘s thought through this essay, it would be fair to add that he deserves recognition on another score. He was a thinker advocating individual moral subjectivity. His belief in the moral subjectivity of man was quiet and understated, but it was one of the rare examples of this view in the Tokugawa period. It is not associated with any sensational event such as an uprising of peasants or rebellion against the Tokugawa shogunate like that of Ôshio Heihachirô ( 大 塩 平 八 郎 , 1793-1837). His stand, therefore, has easily 73 Watanabe 1985, pp.191-192. During two hundred years from the beginning of the Edo period, Confucianism experienced three changes. Hirose Tansô ( 広 瀬 淡 窓 , 1782-1856) categorized the period into three phases. The first was the period dominated by the learning of Cheng and Zhu; the second was that of Jinsai and Sorai, then the period of eclectic learning. Hirose Tansô, Jurin hyô, p.7.74 Ogyû Sorai Sorai shû (Replying letter to Hori Keizan), p.531. 75 Inoue Tetsujirô 1905, p.173.

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escaped notice. But unless proper attention is paid to views such as Kyûsô’s, the whole picture of Tokugawa intellectual history is somewhat distorted.76

It would be reasonable to conclude that the Neo-Confucianism espoused by Muro Kyûsô was not a feudalistic ideology to overcome but a rationalistic way of thinking based on an anthropocentric idea, putting emphasis on individuals.77 Even though he was critical of Kumazawa Banzan’s views, he shares many of Banzan’s basic assumptions concerning the role of the individual. As was the case with Banzan, his views were incongruent with many of the assumptions of the Tokugawa government.78 The tension could not be entirely suppressed. Such difficulty emerges in an understated form in various places in his writings. This humanistic side of Neo-Confucianism may have contributed towards the nurturing of a degree of freedom and egalitarianism amongst individuals in the post-Tokugawa period.

A careful reading of Sundai zatsuwa suggest that Muro Kyûsô is not a conservative formalist or a philistine, but rather a man of erudition holding a rational and consistent stance, with clear emphasis on individuals as moral agents and on self-consciousness. His criticisms of other scholars can be seen as reasonable, even by present-day standards of scholarship.79

2 ) Further study - Revolutionary idea in disguiseIn Fubôshô (不亡鈔, Immortal extracts), another work by Kyûsô, ideas hinted at in Sundai zatsuwa are developed further. Here, he further put forward the idea that sovereignty has grounds on the contract (約) between the ruler and people, an idea incompatible with the assumptions of Tokugawa sovereignty. As there exists a slight ambiguity on its authenticity,80 great care should be taken in using it as evidence for Kyûsô’s views. But the argument in the book

76 See Banzan’s case in McMullen 1999, p.468.77 Maeda 1996, p.14.78 McMullen 1999. p.449.79 Nakamura 1970, p.7.80 Araki 1970, p.526.

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goes far beyond the discussion on whether rule by virtue is better than rule by force (王覇論):

Originally there was no distinction of high and low among people. Only popularity makes someone high.

Originally a lord was not high; he becomes high because of the will of the people… People came and asked me to take trouble [on their behalf]; I agreed to take the trouble. Therefore people worshipped me and made me lord. My taking trouble is the execution of that agreement.

There are cases of unifying a nation by power, … by entrustment. … The nation is not given by Heaven, by the king, let alone obtained by one’s own effort. It is given by the people. … Everything is owned by the people. (Fubôshô, Vol. 3)

Examination of Fubôshô suggests a topic for further study. Further research should also position Kyûsô in a wider perspective of East Asian and Western political thinkers.

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