Applying the HIPPORecommendations to the DRC:Toward Strategic, Prioritized,and Sequenced Mandates

JULY 2017

Introduction

In March 2017, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2348 renewing theUN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(MONUSCO). The resolution also requested that the secretary-generalundertake a strategic review of the mission to examine “the continuedrelevance of all mandated tasks, priorities and related resources, as well asnecessity to adapt the Mission’s mandate to the specific needs of the post-elections phase” and to report to the Security Council by the end ofSeptember. This review aims to provide the council options for reducingMONUSCO’s force and civilian components and for developing an exitstrategy in advance of its next mandate renewal.1

To inform the strategic review process and the subsequent renewal ofMONUSCO’s mandate in March 2018, the International Peace Institute (IPI),the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report co-organized a workshop onJuly 14, 2017. This workshop offered an opportunity for key stakeholders todevelop a shared understanding of the situation on the ground and a commonstrategic assessment of the mission’s policies in order to design realisticoptions for its mandate. The objective of the discussion was to contribute tothe Security Council’s evolving practice of developing strategic, prioritized,and sequenced mandates for UN peace operations, in line with the HIPPOrecommendations. The workshop’s first session was devoted to analyzing the evolving securityand political dynamics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) anddiscussing how MONUSCO’s political strategy could be adapted to respond tothese dynamics. The second session focused on the highest-priority objectivesfor the mission and how to sequence them in order to advance the politicalstrategy discussed in the previous session. Participants also tried to define the“stabilization” role of MONUSCO and discussed options for a possible exitstrategy.

Context Analysis and Political Strategy

The political crisis related to President Joseph Kabila’s stay in power beyondthe two terms provided for by the Congolese constitution has provokedinstability, political violence, and human rights abuses. Moreover, it has fueledand deepened separate but interlinked conflicts in the country, includingviolence by armed groups and intercommunal violence in North and South

On July 14, 2017, the International

Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson

Center, and Security Council Report

organized a workshop on the

challenges faced by the United

Nations Stabilization Mission in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUSCO). This was the fifth

workshop in a series of workshops

bringing together member states, UN

actors, and independent experts to

analyze how UN policies and the

June 2015 recommendations of the

High-Level Independent Panel on

Peace Operations (HIPPO) can be

applied to country-specific contexts.

This meeting note was drafted

collaboratively by IPI, the Stimson

Center, and Security Council Report.

It summarizes the main points raised

in the discussion under the Chatham

House rule of non-attribution and

does not necessarily represent the

views of all participants.

1 UN Security Council Resolution 2348 (March 31, 2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2348, para. 51.

2 MEETING NOTE

Kivu and Ituri provinces in the east and in thecentral Kasai provinces. Economic problems, adeepening humanitarian crisis, and destabilizingregional dynamics have exacerbated theseproblems.CHALLENGES TO THEIMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICALAGREEMENT

On December 31, 2016, the Catholic Churchsucceeded in negotiating a political agreementbetween the main political parties in the DRC. Thisagreement expressed the commitment of itssignatories to establishing transitional institutionsand holding free, fair, and credible nationalelections before the end of 2017. However, political infighting and division arecurrently hindering the ability of DRC’s mainpolitical parties to implement the December 31st

agreement. The commitment of Kabila’s Allianceof the Presidential Majority party to the provisionsof the agreement is weakening. Moreover, thedeath of the leading opposition figure ÉtienneTshisekedi in early 2017 weakened the opposition,which is now deeply fragmented. Due to thispolitical vacuum, the Presidential Majority hastaken full control over implementation of theagreement, undermining its inclusivity andcredibility. Opposition initiatives to boycott orabstain from the process as it moves forward haveproven ineffective. The Presidential Majority’s stalling has greatlyundermined and slowed down the implementationof the December 31st agreement. The implementa-tion committee (Conseil national de suivi del’Accord) has yet to be established. Key confidence-building measures, including protecting freedomof assembly and the rights of the media, releasingpolitical prisoners, and ensuring safe return forthose in political exile, have not been implemented. The electoral commission (Commissionélectorale nationale indépendante) has stated that itis effectively impossible for the country to holdelections before the end of 2017. The December 31st

agreement included provisions for such a scenario,but decisions regarding the extension of theelectoral timetable require consensus between theelectoral commission and the yet-to-be-establishedimplementation committee. The dysfunction andinternal divisions among the signatories make a

legitimate negotiated extension of the timetableunlikely. Many analysts are now concerned that thePresidential Majority will abandon the December31st framework altogether.DETERIORATING SECURITY ANDECONOMIC SITUATION

Security dynamics in the DRC have shifted over thepast year, taking on an increasingly ethnic natureand being marked by the eruption of violence innew areas and regions. The threat posed by somearmed groups in the east, such as the AlliedDemocratic Forces (Forces démocratiques alliées),the Democratic Forces for the Liberation ofRwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération duRwanda), and Mai Mai Kata Katanga, havediminished somewhat. But they have been replacedby other manifestations of ethnically motivatedviolence that threatens civilians and state authority.South of the city of Beni in North Kivu, tensionsbetween the Nande and Hutu ethnic groups havegiven rise to an alliance of Mai Mai groups that hascommitted violence against the population andattacked government forces. Ethnic violencebetween the Twa and Luba populations hasreignited, with violence on the border of SouthKivu and Tanganyika provinces. Additionally, violence and threats to civilianshave expanded geographically, spreading in partic-ular to the Kasai provinces in the center of thecountry. The Kasai conflict, originally linked tolocal grievances regarding the right of families todesignate the succession of chieftaincies, hasmorphed to include multiple provinces and ethnicgroups and appears increasingly tied to nationalpolitical grievances. This conflict has begun toinvolve more organized and self-sustainingviolence by armed groups as parties clash overcontrol of mines and other sources of revenue. Although many of these ethnic conflicts arerooted in long-standing local tensions, the nationalpolitical crisis has made it increasingly difficult forthe authorities to keep this violence in check. In theabsence of a credible political process, armedgroups have begun to reject the authority andlegitimacy of state institutions. Against thebackdrop of great political uncertainty, somecommunities are turning to armed groups as theysearch for more local guarantors of security.Moreover, certain national political figures have

deliberately incited local conflicts around thecountry in an effort to demonstrate their powerand further their interests. The socioeconomic situation in the DRCcontinues to deteriorate, with the Congolese franclosing half its value in the past year.2 This is mainlydue to exogenous shocks, including a drop in theprice of copper. This economic downturn hasincreased frustration among the population,worsening the humanitarian crisis and adding alevel of unpredictability to the conflict, including inmajor urban areas.REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Instability along the Congolese borders alsocontinues to fuel regional tensions. The Lord’sResistance Army (LRA) has become more activenear the DRC’s borders with the Central AfricanRepublic and South Sudan, following the departureof the joint US-Ugandan counter-LRA missionfrom the area. To the southwest, refugees fleeingconflict in the Kasais have fled into Angola, andthere are some signs that ethnic cleavages are beingreproduced and extended there. This has affectedhow Angola views the DRC and has also raisedconcerns for other neighboring states, which worrythat they, too, might receive an influx of refugees ifthe political crisis continues. Recognizing that he needs to maintain thesupport of neighboring countries if he is to remainin power, President Kabila has attempted to shoreup support throughout the region. For example,although he does not typically engage much withthe African Union (AU), Kabila attended the mostrecent AU summit in early July. The administra-tion has dispatched diplomatic delegations toSouth Africa, Uganda, and Niger, and severalAfrican leaders have made statements of supportfor President Kabila in recent months.3 One of theproblems is that the AU has so far not taken a clearstand on the situation in the DRC.HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

The current political uncertainty has also increasedinstances of human rights abuses throughout thecountry, particularly resulting from political

violence. Government officials and security forceshave banned opposition demonstrations,conducted arbitrary arrests, responded toprotesters with disproportionate force, shut downmedia outlets, and hindered the freedom ofmovement of opposition leaders. Moreover, as violence and instability spreads, thegovernment has failed to protect human rightsthroughout its territory. Armed groups continue toconduct extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, andother violations with impunity. Violence in theKasais led to the extrajudicial killing of two UNexperts in March, and the Congolese governmenthas publicly attempted to impede internationalinvestigations into the incident.IMPLICATIONS FOR MONUSCO’SPOLITICAL STRATEGY

Considering these conflict dynamics,MONUSCO’s political strategy should identifypressure points or incentives to ensure that theruling Presidential Majority party complies withthe December 31st framework. The strategy shouldalso be flexible enough to engage with severalpossible scenarios over the coming year. Flexibility: Three potential scenarios areplausible over the coming year, and MONUSCO’smandate must be flexible enough to accommodateany of the three.1. In the best-case scenario, the December 31st

agreement is credibly implemented. Electionscannot realistically be held by the end of thisyear, as envisaged by the agreement, but theparties make a good faith effort to modify theagreement and stay within the framework. Themission would then need to reorient itself afterelections are held to support stabilization effortsaround the country. Workshop participantsagreed that this was the least likely scenario.

2. In the status quo scenario, the ruling majoritycontinues to obfuscate and use stalling tactics,forcing the mission into the extremely difficultposition of needing to decide whether and whenthe framework has actually been abandoned. Acrisis of legitimacy develops. The Security

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to the DRC 3

2 Aaron Ross, “Congo Requests Financial Support from Donors amid Economic Crisis,” Reuters, July 6, 2017, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-economy-idUSKBN19R2MY .

3 Felix Share, “President Hailed for Standing by DRC,” The Herald, July 15, 2017, available at www.herald.co.zw/president-hailed-for-standing-by-drc/ ; NalediShange, “Zuma Lauds Embattled Kabila on ‘Progress’ in DRC‚ Despite Protest outside Talks Venue,” Times Live, June 25, 2017, available atwww.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-25-zuma-lauds-embattled-kabila-on-progress-in-drc-despite-protest-outside-talks-venue/ .

4 MEETING NOTE

Council would be forced to consider whether itis appropriate to maintain aspects ofMONUSCO’s mandate related to support to thehost state, which could be seen as providingsupport to an illegitimate government.

3. In the worst-case scenario, the December 31st

agreement is abandoned by one or more partiesor collapses after an attempt by the governmentto undertake actions (such as holding areferendum) outside of the framework of theagreement. Some participants also mentionedthe possibility that President Kabila stays inpower after non-credible elections and heavilyclamps down on security across the country. Inthis scenario, widespread conflict across thecountry is likely, including violent politicalcontestation at the local and national levels. TheSecurity Council would confront criticalquestions related not only to the mission’smandate to support the host state and questionsof partiality, but also to the protection ofcivilians, as the mission’s capacity for protectionwould likely be far outstripped by the scope ofthe violence.

Leverage: MONUSCO has relatively littleinfluence over President Kabila. In order toovercome this limitation, the UN Security Councilshould work with regional and financial partners toapply pressure on the Presidential Majority toabide by the December 31st framework. Regionalpartners, particularly neighboring countries, have astrong interest in peace and stability in the DRCbut have not yet taken bold action to pressure theruling government. MONUSCO can workcreatively and through informal channels withneighboring states, the Economic Community ofCentral African States (ECCAS), the SouthernAfrican Development Community (SADC), theAU, and the broader international community togalvanize the political pressure necessary to ensurefree, fair, and credible elections. Another solutionsuggested was to pressure investors to exertleverage on President Kabila’s family business.4

Prioritization andSequencing

The strategic priorities identified in Resolution2348—support to the political process and protec-tion of civilians—should remain the mission’shighest priority objectives, given the currentcontext. MONUSCO’s mandate and activitiesshould prioritize the conduct of free, fair, andcredible elections in the DRC, including bygalvanizing regional and international support forthe December 31st framework. MONUSCO shouldadopt a more mobile approach to the protection ofcivilians in order to adapt to the growing protec-tion needs throughout the country. Finally, themission must work with additional partners,specifically the UN country team, to identify andfill gaps that it does not have the capacity toaddress, and eventually work toward an exitstrategy.ELECTIONS

MONUSCO’s political strategy should prioritizesupport for free, fair, and credible nationalelections in the DRC that result in the peacefultransfer of power and increased political stability.This will require both political and technicalsupport. In pursuit of this objective, MONUSCO shouldwork to identify and facilitate internationalleverage to compel the ruling majority to abide bythe December 31st agreement. This will includesignificant diplomatic engagement with the DRC’sneighbors and other regional actors, such asECCAS, SADC, and the AU. MONUSCO shouldshare information with regional partners about theurgency of the political crisis, the progress of theDecember 31st agreement, and the likelyconsequences for the region if the crisis continues.MONUSCO should also focus its stabilizationefforts on creating a stable environment for theconduct of elections. The mission should identifyareas where security threats are hindering the

4 Congo Research Group, “All the President’s Wealth: The Kabila Family Business,” July 19, 2017, available at http://congoresearchgroup.org/all-the-presidents-wealth/ .

electoral process (including the voter registrationexercise) and prioritize the deployment of militaryand civilian assets in those areas. Furthermore, MONUSCO should focus civiliancapacities (and force capacities where relevant) onensuring that the elections are free, fair, andcredible, especially through good offices, politicalengagement, and the monitoring activities of thepolice component and the UN joint human rightsoffice. This will involve MONUSCO assisting thegovernment in implementing confidence-buildingmeasures, including protecting the right toassembly and the independence and freedom of themedia. Through all of these activities, human rightsmonitoring will remain important.PROTECTION THROUGH PROJECTION

MONUSCO operates with approximately 16,000troops in a territory comparable in size to WesternEurope with fewer than 2,000 miles of paved roads.5The mission’s ability to provide physical protectionthroughout the country is extremely limited,especially as threats to civilians continue to spreadgeographically. MONUSCO must therefore shift itsprotection strategy to focus on projection andamend its current approach, which is overly basedon protection by static forces in military bases. Amore dynamic posture could increase the mission’sability to deter violence and give it the flexibility torespond to the evolving dynamics of threats tocivilians as progress toward elections continues.Ultimately, the aim is to prevent attacks rather thanto intervene after an attack has taken place. Protection through projection will requiremember states to provide the requisite resourcesand equipment (in particular air assets) to allowMONUSCO to improve its mobility and its intelli-gence capabilities with a view toward successfullyanticipating and preemptively addressing potentialviolence against civilians throughout the country.This may require a fundamental shift in the natureof MONUSCO’s military assets, includingincreased intelligence capacities and rapid deploy-

ment capabilities. It will also require the mission tocontinue to expand its system of alerts and early-warning mechanisms throughout the country andto creatively revisit this alert system, which iscurrently tied to company operating bases thatcould potentially close. The mission’s military actions should be comple-mented by efforts to strengthen and expand protec-tion activities by civilian personnel. These includelocal conflict management (to address the growthof intercommunal conflict) and human rightsmonitoring and reporting (to address the growth ofpolitical violence). Local conflict managementefforts coordinated by civil affairs staff should becomplemented with efforts coordinated by politicalaffairs staff to identify and influence interlocutorsat the national level who may be mobilizing localconflict. Some workshop participants questioned thecontinued relevance of the Force InterventionBrigade over the coming year, noting that it hashad little military success since the defeat of theM23 armed group in 2013. Other participantsthought the brigade served an important politicalpurpose in maintaining the engagement of keySADC countries and also helped to improvepopular perceptions of the mission as a whole.EXIT STRATEGY

MONUSCO must think strategically about what itcan and cannot achieve and work with partners tofill the gaps. The UN country team will be a keypartner in stabilizing the DRC, contributing to therestoration of state authority and economic revital-ization. However, the country team is weaklypositioned on the ground due to limited funding. Atrust fund could be established to support both themission and the UN country team to addresschallenges that agencies face related tounpredictable levels of voluntary funding. It wasalso mentioned that the mission could become atest case for many management reforms movingforward.

Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to the DRC 5

5 Data from CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html .

Agenda

Friday, July 14, 2017

9.00–9:15 Opening Remarks

9:15–11:00 Session 1: Conflict Analysis and Political StrategyIn this session, the mission and experts will present a brief conflict analysis, outlining recentdevelopments, but also discuss their analysis of three possible scenarios moving forward.Participants will discuss the threats outlined in the conflict analysis and its consequences forMONUSCO. In particular, they will consider the likelihood of fair and acceptable elections inthe near future and its impact on security in the country. They will consider the strategicoptions for the mission in a context of political polarization and electoral violence.

Discussion questions: What is the current conflict analysis of the mission? What possiblescenarios are yet to come and what is the political strategy underlying the mission? Is thatpolitical strategy still viable? What are the primary obstacles to successful implementation ofthe political agreement? What are the primary obstacles to the successful transfer of tasks to thegovernment and the country team? What mission capabilities and approaches have proveneffective at influencing the conflict? What is the current understanding of local capacities andeffective local arrangements for peace? How can the Security Council remain engaged insupport of MONUSCO’s political strategy?

ChairArthur Boutellis, Director, Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, IPI

11:00–11:15 Coffee Break

11:15–1:00 Session 2: Prioritization and SequencingIn this session, participants will identify the mission’s highest priority objectives and focus inparticular on the activities of the mission, including political mediation, protection of civilians,and stabilization. They will highlight for discussion some of the main priorities in terms oftasks and try to identify what actions can have the most impact for sustainable peace andreinforcement of state authority. Participants will also discuss the sequence in which priorityobjectives should be undertaken. By sequencing the objectives, participants will aim to ensurethat the mission is not burdened by too many tasks at the same time. Participants will also aimto sequence objectives so that the mission is not asked to carry out certain tasks prematurely,before the conditions for their success are in place.

Discussion questions: On the basis of the secretary-general’s latest report, the conflict analysis,scenarios, and subsequent developments, which objectives in the current mandate should beprioritized? What aspects of the mandate has the mission successfully implemented? Whatobstacles have prevented the mission from translating mandated tasks into action, and whatconditions need to be in place for those tasks to be carried out? How can MONUSCO’smandate better allow the mission to adapt to changing conditions on the ground? What can bethe role of MONUSCO, including the Force Intervention Brigade, in reducing the conflict,contributing to the organization of fair and transparent elections, and strengthening state

6

authorities? What does the stabilization aspect of the mandate entail and what are its limita-tions? What are the options for an exit strategy for the mission? How can the political andsecurity aspects of the mandate be articulated?

ChairIan Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report, and former member of HIPPO

7

8

Ms. Ségolène AdamUnited Nations Children’s Fund

Mr. Karim Samir Ismail AlsayedPermanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egyptto the United Nations

Ms. Aïssata AthieInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Alexis BerthierPermanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Ms. Tatiana CarayannisSocial Science Research Council

Ms. Carla CardonaPermanent Mission of the Plurinational State ofBolivia to the United Nations

Mr. Victor Casanova AbosSecurity Council Report

Mr. Finnian CheshireSecurity Council Report

Mr. Remi ClavetUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Simon Collard-WexlerPermanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations

Ms. Lesley ConnollyInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Ginevra CucinottaUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Dr. Alessandro de FerrariUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Ms. Namie Di RazzaInternational Peace Institute

Ms. Rachel Eklou-AssogbaviUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Maj. Gen. Adrian FosterUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Ms. Aditi GorurHenry L. Stimson Center

Mr. David GresslyUnited Nations Organization StabilizationMission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ms. Chiho HoriuchiPermanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Ms. Julie JollesUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Ms. Mary KalemkerianOffice of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights

Col. Sandeep KapoorPermanent Mission of India to the United Nations

Ms. Elizabeth KissamUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Mohamed LakhalUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Baptiste MartinUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Ms. Delphine MechoulanInternational Peace Institute

Participants

9

Mr. Jonas MfouatieUnited Nations Development Programme

Mr. Craig MillsPermanent Mission of the United Kingdom to theUnited Nations

Dr. Alexandra NovosseloffInternational Peace Institute

Mr. Andrew PainterUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Mr. Volodymyr PavlichenkoPermanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations

Mr. Eduardo León PeñarandaPermanent Mission of the Plurinational State ofBolivia to the United Nations

Ms. Marie PlamadialaUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Ashish PradhanInternational Crisis Group

Mr. Christophe PradierUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Robert PulverUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Ms. Alexandra RiceUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Stephen Sylvain SambouPermanent Mission of the Republic of Senegal tothe United Nations

Mr. Satrajit SardarUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Jake ShermanUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Ugo SolinasUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Mr. Quentin TeisseirePermanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Ms. Madeline VellturoHenry L. Stimson Center

Mr. El-Ghassim WaneUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent, interna-tional not-for-profit think tank dedicated to managing risk and buildingresilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable development. Toachieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, strategic analysis,publishing, and convening. With staff from around the world and a broadrange of academic fields, IPI has offices facing United Nations headquartersin New York and offices in Vienna and Manama.

The STIMSON CENTER is a nonpartisan policy research center working to

solve the world’s greatest threats to security and prosperity. Stimson’s

Protecting Civilians in Conflict program engages policymakers, practitioners,

and communities on the ground to identify protection gaps and develop

tailored strategies to protect civilians in war-torn societies.

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT’s mission is to advance the transparency andeffectiveness of the UN Security Council. We seek to achieve this by makingavailable timely, balanced, high-quality information about the activities ofthe Council and its subsidiary bodies; by convening stakeholders to deepenthe analysis of issues before the Council and its working methods andperformance; by encouraging engagement of the Council with all memberstates and civil society; and by building capacity on Council practice andprocedure through assisting incoming members and other training andassistance programs. SCR is independent and impartial; it advocatestransparency but does not take positions on the issues before the Council.

777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017-3521, USA

TEL +1-212-687-4300 FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3, 1010 Vienna, Austria

TEL +43-1-533-8881 FAX +43-1-533-8881-11

51-52 Harbour House, Bahrain Financial Harbour

P.O. Box 1467, Manama, Bahrain

www.ipinst.org