Media and Gridlock

Daniel F. Stone1

9th Media Economics Workshop - New Economic SchoolOctober 2011

1Oregon State University

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Political gridlock in the U.S. seems to be growing problem

I Term only coined after 1980 elections; now a cliche

I Is it really getting worse?

I Anecdotal evidence: minority parties blocked major new policyproposals (social security reform, health care reform, jobs bill?)

I Binder (APSR, 1999): hard evidence of increasing gridlock in 80sand 90s (term coined in 80s)

I Cloture motions way up over time, especially in last two Congresses

Cloture trends

Cloture trends

I examine the relation between media and strategicobstructionism

I Previous media econ lit on politics focuses on other issues (Prat andStromberg, WP, 2011)

I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether minorityparty obstructs or not

I Punchline: obstructionism more effective politically with lessinformative media

I Hope also to improve understanding on other recent observedphenomena in politics, clarify gridlock/polarization causes/relation

I examine the relation between media and strategicobstructionism

I Previous media econ lit on politics focuses on other issues (Prat andStromberg, WP, 2011)

I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether minorityparty obstructs or not

I Punchline: obstructionism more effective politically with lessinformative media

I Hope also to improve understanding on other recent observedphenomena in politics, clarify gridlock/polarization causes/relation

I examine the relation between media and strategicobstructionism

I Previous media econ lit on politics focuses on other issues (Prat andStromberg, WP, 2011)

I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether minorityparty obstructs or not

I Punchline: obstructionism more effective politically with lessinformative media

I Hope also to improve understanding on other recent observedphenomena in politics, clarify gridlock/polarization causes/relation

I examine the relation between media and strategicobstructionism

I Previous media econ lit on politics focuses on other issues (Prat andStromberg, WP, 2011)

I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether minorityparty obstructs or not

I Punchline: obstructionism more effective politically with lessinformative media

I Hope also to improve understanding on other recent observedphenomena in politics, clarify gridlock/polarization causes/relation

I examine the relation between media and strategicobstructionism

I Previous media econ lit on politics focuses on other issues (Prat andStromberg, WP, 2011)

I I model most salient aspect of legislative process: whether minorityparty obstructs or not

I Punchline: obstructionism more effective politically with lessinformative media

I Hope also to improve understanding on other recent observedphenomena in politics, clarify gridlock/polarization causes/relation

Relation to poli sci lit on gridlock

I Focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e.ideology dispersion

I Can interpret my paper as highlighting necessary condition for mediaenvironment

I Or, as suggesting alternative explanation

I (Changing media, not ideologies, causing political behavioral change)

I Also maybe even alternative explanation for ‘stylized fact’ ofincreased party polarization?

Relation to poli sci lit on gridlock

I Focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e.ideology dispersion

I Can interpret my paper as highlighting necessary condition for mediaenvironment

I Or, as suggesting alternative explanation

I (Changing media, not ideologies, causing political behavioral change)

I Also maybe even alternative explanation for ‘stylized fact’ ofincreased party polarization?

Relation to poli sci lit on gridlock

I Focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e.ideology dispersion

I Can interpret my paper as highlighting necessary condition for mediaenvironment

I Or, as suggesting alternative explanation

I (Changing media, not ideologies, causing political behavioral change)

I Also maybe even alternative explanation for ‘stylized fact’ ofincreased party polarization?

Relation to poli sci lit on gridlock

I Focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e.ideology dispersion

I Can interpret my paper as highlighting necessary condition for mediaenvironment

I Or, as suggesting alternative explanation

I (Changing media, not ideologies, causing political behavioral change)

I Also maybe even alternative explanation for ‘stylized fact’ ofincreased party polarization?

Relation to poli sci lit on gridlock

I Focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e.ideology dispersion

I Can interpret my paper as highlighting necessary condition for mediaenvironment

I Or, as suggesting alternative explanation

I (Changing media, not ideologies, causing political behavioral change)

I Also maybe even alternative explanation for ‘stylized fact’ ofincreased party polarization?

Relation to poli sci lit on gridlock

I Focuses on party polarization (Layman et al, APSR, 2006) - i.e.ideology dispersion

I Can interpret my paper as highlighting necessary condition for mediaenvironment

I Or, as suggesting alternative explanation

I (Changing media, not ideologies, causing political behavioral change)

I Also maybe even alternative explanation for ‘stylized fact’ ofincreased party polarization?

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})

I Based on US system where minority party can block policy byfilibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

The model

I Two parties, a majority and minority

I Majority proposes policy; either efficient, E , or partisan anddeadweight loss, D (X ∈ {D,E})

I Minority then either accepts (A) or blocks (B) (Y ∈ {A,B})I Based on US system where minority party can block policy by

filibuster

I X = post-bargaining proposal (bargaining process exogenous)

I If D accepted, partisan benefits to majority, costs to minority andsociety

I If E accepted, benefits to society, no direct effects on parties

I Before minority acts, news reports r ∈ {rD , rE}I ‘Public opinion’ based on reports boiled down to policy =

‘bad’/‘good’; publicly observable

I Media environment parameterized byπ = Pr(r = rE |E ) = Pr(r = rD |D) ∈ [0.5, 1]

I Media behavior/incentives not modeled explicitly (focus of other lit)

I Minority may also have private information on X

I Before minority acts, news reports r ∈ {rD , rE}

I ‘Public opinion’ based on reports boiled down to policy =‘bad’/‘good’; publicly observable

I Media environment parameterized byπ = Pr(r = rE |E ) = Pr(r = rD |D) ∈ [0.5, 1]

I Media behavior/incentives not modeled explicitly (focus of other lit)

I Minority may also have private information on X

I Before minority acts, news reports r ∈ {rD , rE}I ‘Public opinion’ based on reports boiled down to policy =

‘bad’/‘good’; publicly observable

I Media environment parameterized byπ = Pr(r = rE |E ) = Pr(r = rD |D) ∈ [0.5, 1]

I Media behavior/incentives not modeled explicitly (focus of other lit)

I Minority may also have private information on X

I Before minority acts, news reports r ∈ {rD , rE}I ‘Public opinion’ based on reports boiled down to policy =

‘bad’/‘good’; publicly observable

I Media environment parameterized byπ = Pr(r = rE |E ) = Pr(r = rD |D) ∈ [0.5, 1]

I Media behavior/incentives not modeled explicitly (focus of other lit)

I Minority may also have private information on X

I Before minority acts, news reports r ∈ {rD , rE}I ‘Public opinion’ based on reports boiled down to policy =

‘bad’/‘good’; publicly observable

I Media environment parameterized byπ = Pr(r = rE |E ) = Pr(r = rD |D) ∈ [0.5, 1]

I Media behavior/incentives not modeled explicitly (focus of other lit)

I Minority may also have private information on X

I Before minority acts, news reports r ∈ {rD , rE}I ‘Public opinion’ based on reports boiled down to policy =

‘bad’/‘good’; publicly observable

I Media environment parameterized byπ = Pr(r = rE |E ) = Pr(r = rD |D) ∈ [0.5, 1]

I Media behavior/incentives not modeled explicitly (focus of other lit)

I Minority may also have private information on X

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Key assumption (for application to recent data): newmedia environment less informative (lower π)

I As we all know, new media–cable television, Internet–have emerged,and old media (newspapers, network TV) declined

I Why less informative?

I 0. Only assuming for more political, ambiguous issues–not for hardfacts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006)

I 1. More partisan (Baum and Groeling, 2008)

I 2. Faster news cycle, less vetting (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008)

I 3. Newspapers cutting staff, oversight; Internet media less careful(Silverman and Jarvis, 2009)

I 4. Views of public

Trends in public views of news accuracy

Trends in public views of news accuracy

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist or

competent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})

I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist orcompetent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist or

competent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist or

competent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist or

competent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist or

competent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

I Each party one of two types, high or low (θi ∈ {θ, θ})I Conventional interpretation: centrist/extremist or

competent/incompetent

I More realistic (?) given focus on motives (accusations of “playingpolitics”): idealist/cynic

I High-type is non-strategic and tries to be good public servant;low-type strategic and weighs partisan benefits versus future electionprospects

I Which are function of centrist voters’ beliefs that parties are thehigh type (priors are λmaj and λmin, with 0.5 > λmaj > λmin)

I Need some noise: ε is probability low type acts like high type

Illustration of timing

I Solve with PBE:voters beliefs about strategies are correct and posteriors about partytypes are Bayesian;X ∗ is optimal given voters beliefs and σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I );σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I ) is optimal given voters beliefs and X ∗

Illustration of timing

I Solve with PBE:voters beliefs about strategies are correct and posteriors about partytypes are Bayesian;X ∗ is optimal given voters beliefs and σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I );σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I ) is optimal given voters beliefs and X ∗

Illustration of timing

I Solve with PBE:

voters beliefs about strategies are correct and posteriors about partytypes are Bayesian;X ∗ is optimal given voters beliefs and σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I );σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I ) is optimal given voters beliefs and X ∗

Illustration of timing

I Solve with PBE:voters beliefs about strategies are correct and posteriors about partytypes are Bayesian;

X ∗ is optimal given voters beliefs and σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I );σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I ) is optimal given voters beliefs and X ∗

Illustration of timing

I Solve with PBE:voters beliefs about strategies are correct and posteriors about partytypes are Bayesian;X ∗ is optimal given voters beliefs and σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I );

σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I ) is optimal given voters beliefs and X ∗

Illustration of timing

I Solve with PBE:voters beliefs about strategies are correct and posteriors about partytypes are Bayesian;X ∗ is optimal given voters beliefs and σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I );σ∗(r , I ) = Pr(A|r , I ) is optimal given voters beliefs and X ∗

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Results: I first show there exists a ‘total gridlock’ PBE forlow π

I PropositionThere exists a PBE in which the (strategic) majority always plays D, andminority always plays B, iff π sufficiently small.

I D more likely to ‘slip by’ for small π

I And when news uninformative voters mainly update based onminority’s action–and B makes majority look bad

I PBE more likely to exist when λmin small–implies only λmaj

substantially changes due to actions

I (minority has ‘nothing to lose’)

I As π increases, B hurts minority more, majority less when r = rEproof

Otherwise, if ε is large enough, there is still near-totalgridlock

I PropositionIf a total gridlock PBE fails to exist, then, iff π is sufficiently small and εlarge, in PBE the majority still always plays D and the minority onlymixes (sometimes A) when I = E and r = rE .

I ε dilutes the positive effect of A on reputations, more so for theminority

I Prevents strategic A, along with assumption λmaj < 0.5proof

Otherwise, if ε is large enough, there is still near-totalgridlock

I PropositionIf a total gridlock PBE fails to exist, then, iff π is sufficiently small and εlarge, in PBE the majority still always plays D and the minority onlymixes (sometimes A) when I = E and r = rE .

I ε dilutes the positive effect of A on reputations, more so for theminority

I Prevents strategic A, along with assumption λmaj < 0.5proof

Otherwise, if ε is large enough, there is still near-totalgridlock

I PropositionIf a total gridlock PBE fails to exist, then, iff π is sufficiently small and εlarge, in PBE the majority still always plays D and the minority onlymixes (sometimes A) when I = E and r = rE .

I ε dilutes the positive effect of A on reputations, more so for theminority

I Prevents strategic A, along with assumption λmaj < 0.5proof

Otherwise, if ε is large enough, there is still near-totalgridlock

I PropositionIf a total gridlock PBE fails to exist, then, iff π is sufficiently small and εlarge, in PBE the majority still always plays D and the minority onlymixes (sometimes A) when I = E and r = rE .

I ε dilutes the positive effect of A on reputations, more so for theminority

I Prevents strategic A, along with assumption λmaj < 0.5proof

Parameter regions for total, partial gridlock equilibria; π = 0.55 (x-axis = λmin; y-axis = λmaj )

If π is large, the parties cooperate

I PropositionIff π is sufficiently large, there exists a PBE in which the majority alwaysplays E and the minority is more likely to play A, conditional on I and r ,than in any gridlock PBE.

I Summary: large π, cooperative PBE exists, no gridlock PBE; smallπ, gridlock PBE exists, no cooperative PBE

I Media good watchdog when accurate–forces both parties to “do theright thing”

I Minority party good ‘backup watchdog’ when π large–worse when πis small!

If π is large, the parties cooperate

I PropositionIff π is sufficiently large, there exists a PBE in which the majority alwaysplays E and the minority is more likely to play A, conditional on I and r ,than in any gridlock PBE.

I Summary: large π, cooperative PBE exists, no gridlock PBE; smallπ, gridlock PBE exists, no cooperative PBE

I Media good watchdog when accurate–forces both parties to “do theright thing”

I Minority party good ‘backup watchdog’ when π large–worse when πis small!

If π is large, the parties cooperate

I PropositionIff π is sufficiently large, there exists a PBE in which the majority alwaysplays E and the minority is more likely to play A, conditional on I and r ,than in any gridlock PBE.

I Summary: large π, cooperative PBE exists, no gridlock PBE; smallπ, gridlock PBE exists, no cooperative PBE

I Media good watchdog when accurate–forces both parties to “do theright thing”

I Minority party good ‘backup watchdog’ when π large–worse when πis small!

If π is large, the parties cooperate

I PropositionIff π is sufficiently large, there exists a PBE in which the majority alwaysplays E and the minority is more likely to play A, conditional on I and r ,than in any gridlock PBE.

I Summary: large π, cooperative PBE exists, no gridlock PBE; smallπ, gridlock PBE exists, no cooperative PBE

I Media good watchdog when accurate–forces both parties to “do theright thing”

I Minority party good ‘backup watchdog’ when π large–worse when πis small!

If π is large, the parties cooperate

I PropositionIff π is sufficiently large, there exists a PBE in which the majority alwaysplays E and the minority is more likely to play A, conditional on I and r ,than in any gridlock PBE.

I Summary: large π, cooperative PBE exists, no gridlock PBE; smallπ, gridlock PBE exists, no cooperative PBE

I Media good watchdog when accurate–forces both parties to “do theright thing”

I Minority party good ‘backup watchdog’ when π large–worse when πis small!

Gridlock is indeed more likely in what I call the gridlockPBE

PropositionFor any πg ≤ πc , B is more likely to be played in a gridlock equilibriumwith π = πg than a cooperative equilibrium with π = πc .

I (Actually non-trivial - but intuition uninteresting)

I (Welfare results similar - actually less clean)

Gridlock is indeed more likely in what I call the gridlockPBE

PropositionFor any πg ≤ πc , B is more likely to be played in a gridlock equilibriumwith π = πg than a cooperative equilibrium with π = πc .

I (Actually non-trivial - but intuition uninteresting)

I (Welfare results similar - actually less clean)

Gridlock is indeed more likely in what I call the gridlockPBE

PropositionFor any πg ≤ πc , B is more likely to be played in a gridlock equilibriumwith π = πg than a cooperative equilibrium with π = πc .

I (Actually non-trivial - but intuition uninteresting)

I (Welfare results similar - actually less clean)

Gridlock is indeed more likely in what I call the gridlockPBE

PropositionFor any πg ≤ πc , B is more likely to be played in a gridlock equilibriumwith π = πg than a cooperative equilibrium with π = πc .

I (Actually non-trivial - but intuition uninteresting)

I (Welfare results similar - actually less clean)

Reputation effects

PropositionFor any gridlock PBE with sufficiently small πg and cooperative PBEwith sufficiently large πc , the majority is more likely to both lose absolutereputation, and lose reputation relative to the minority, in gridlock PBEthan cooperative PBE.

I Unsurprising given news, and minority action, more likely to disfavormajority in gridlock PBE

I CorollaryIn gridlock PBE outcomes in which the majority loses relative reputation,the minority loses absolute reputation.

I More subtle

I Simple proof: Pr(r ,B|θmin) = 1 > Pr(r ,B|θmin)

Reputation effects

PropositionFor any gridlock PBE with sufficiently small πg and cooperative PBEwith sufficiently large πc , the majority is more likely to both lose absolutereputation, and lose reputation relative to the minority, in gridlock PBEthan cooperative PBE.

I Unsurprising given news, and minority action, more likely to disfavormajority in gridlock PBE

I CorollaryIn gridlock PBE outcomes in which the majority loses relative reputation,the minority loses absolute reputation.

I More subtle

I Simple proof: Pr(r ,B|θmin) = 1 > Pr(r ,B|θmin)

Reputation effects

PropositionFor any gridlock PBE with sufficiently small πg and cooperative PBEwith sufficiently large πc , the majority is more likely to both lose absolutereputation, and lose reputation relative to the minority, in gridlock PBEthan cooperative PBE.

I Unsurprising given news, and minority action, more likely to disfavormajority in gridlock PBE

I CorollaryIn gridlock PBE outcomes in which the majority loses relative reputation,the minority loses absolute reputation.

I More subtle

I Simple proof: Pr(r ,B|θmin) = 1 > Pr(r ,B|θmin)

Reputation effects

PropositionFor any gridlock PBE with sufficiently small πg and cooperative PBEwith sufficiently large πc , the majority is more likely to both lose absolutereputation, and lose reputation relative to the minority, in gridlock PBEthan cooperative PBE.

I Unsurprising given news, and minority action, more likely to disfavormajority in gridlock PBE

I CorollaryIn gridlock PBE outcomes in which the majority loses relative reputation,the minority loses absolute reputation.

I More subtle

I Simple proof: Pr(r ,B|θmin) = 1 > Pr(r ,B|θmin)

Reputation effects

PropositionFor any gridlock PBE with sufficiently small πg and cooperative PBEwith sufficiently large πc , the majority is more likely to both lose absolutereputation, and lose reputation relative to the minority, in gridlock PBEthan cooperative PBE.

I Unsurprising given news, and minority action, more likely to disfavormajority in gridlock PBE

I CorollaryIn gridlock PBE outcomes in which the majority loses relative reputation,the minority loses absolute reputation.

I More subtle

I Simple proof: Pr(r ,B|θmin) = 1 > Pr(r ,B|θmin)

PropositionLet λmin = δλmaj . Let δ∗(λmaj) equal the min δ such that∼λmin(rD ,B) >

∼λmaj(rD ,B). Then, for gridlock PBE, δ∗(λmaj) is weakly

increasing in λmaj (strictly if π > 0.5).

I Reversals in reputation advantage (i.e.,∼λmin >

∼λmaj) more likely, for

given percentage advantage of majority, when the majority has lowerinitial reputation.

PropositionLet λmin = δλmaj . Let δ∗(λmaj) equal the min δ such that∼λmin(rD ,B) >

∼λmaj(rD ,B). Then, for gridlock PBE, δ∗(λmaj) is weakly

increasing in λmaj (strictly if π > 0.5).

I Reversals in reputation advantage (i.e.,∼λmin >

∼λmaj) more likely, for

given percentage advantage of majority, when the majority has lowerinitial reputation.

PropositionLet λmin = δλmaj . Let δ∗(λmaj) equal the min δ such that∼λmin(rD ,B) >

∼λmaj(rD ,B). Then, for gridlock PBE, δ∗(λmaj) is weakly

increasing in λmaj (strictly if π > 0.5).

I Reversals in reputation advantage (i.e.,∼λmin >

∼λmaj) more likely, for

given percentage advantage of majority, when the majority has lowerinitial reputation.

Re-election probabilities

Re-election probabilities; π = 0.55 in gridlock PBE, = 0.95 in cooperative PBE;

ε = 0.25, φ = 0.75, ψ = 0.95, α = 2, f (∼λmaj −

∼λmin) = 0.5(1 + (

∼λmaj −

∼λmin)

0.3) if∼λmaj ≥

∼λmin, and = 0.5(1 − (

∼λmin −

∼λmaj )

0.3) otherwise.

Re-election probabilities

Re-election probabilities; π = 0.55 in gridlock PBE, = 0.95 in cooperative PBE;

ε = 0.25, φ = 0.75, ψ = 0.95, α = 2, f (∼λmaj −

∼λmin) = 0.5(1 + (

∼λmaj −

∼λmin)

0.3) if∼λmaj ≥

∼λmin, and = 0.5(1 − (

∼λmin −

∼λmaj )

0.3) otherwise.

What about voter polarization?

I Natural to interpret model as implying partisan voters’ opinions ofopposing party decline as gridlock increases

I If I am pro-majority partisan, and policy blocked, I think minoritymore likely ‘bad’ (blocked good policy for political gain)

I If I am pro-minority partisan, and policy blocked, I think majoritymore likely ‘bad’ (proposed bad policy)

What about voter polarization?

I Natural to interpret model as implying partisan voters’ opinions ofopposing party decline as gridlock increases

I If I am pro-majority partisan, and policy blocked, I think minoritymore likely ‘bad’ (blocked good policy for political gain)

I If I am pro-minority partisan, and policy blocked, I think majoritymore likely ‘bad’ (proposed bad policy)

What about voter polarization?

I Natural to interpret model as implying partisan voters’ opinions ofopposing party decline as gridlock increases

I If I am pro-majority partisan, and policy blocked, I think minoritymore likely ‘bad’ (blocked good policy for political gain)

I If I am pro-minority partisan, and policy blocked, I think majoritymore likely ‘bad’ (proposed bad policy)

What about voter polarization?

I Natural to interpret model as implying partisan voters’ opinions ofopposing party decline as gridlock increases

I If I am pro-majority partisan, and policy blocked, I think minoritymore likely ‘bad’ (blocked good policy for political gain)

I If I am pro-minority partisan, and policy blocked, I think majoritymore likely ‘bad’ (proposed bad policy)

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:

(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)

1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)

2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)

3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)

4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)

5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)

6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical implications

I In less accurate media environments there should be:(Increased gridlock – Props 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5)1. Greater probability of the majority losing reputation (Prop 3.7)2. Greater probability of political turnover (Prop 3.7, Figure 4)3. Decrease in minority’s reputation even just before turnover(Coroll 3.8)4. Exacerbation of gridlock trends as minority’s reputation worsens,especially relative to majority (Prop 3.1, Fig 2)5. Exacerbation of turnover trends as majority reputation worsens(Prop 3.9)6. Greater polarization of more partisan voters

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)

2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and2010

3. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover

4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?

5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up

6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Empirical trends

1. Congress approval ratings at historical lows (13%, Gallup)2. House majority control same 1954-94; turnover in 1994, 2006 and20103. Evidence that minority’s reputation declined even prior to turnover4. Gridlock appears up - especially after newly elected president (2005,2009)?5. Turnover rates up6. Partisan voters beliefs have diverged

Concluding remarks

I Model highlights role of media underlying obstructionism

I Parties may act in more polarized way directly due to media changes(and not just bc of effects on voter beliefs)

I Positive feedback effect due to obstructionist incentives strongerwhen minority has poor reputation; obstructionism further worsensreputation

I Model highly stylized and many important factors ignored (maybeturnout, in particular)

Concluding remarks

I Model highlights role of media underlying obstructionism

I Parties may act in more polarized way directly due to media changes(and not just bc of effects on voter beliefs)

I Positive feedback effect due to obstructionist incentives strongerwhen minority has poor reputation; obstructionism further worsensreputation

I Model highly stylized and many important factors ignored (maybeturnout, in particular)

Concluding remarks

I Model highlights role of media underlying obstructionism

I Parties may act in more polarized way directly due to media changes(and not just bc of effects on voter beliefs)

I Positive feedback effect due to obstructionist incentives strongerwhen minority has poor reputation; obstructionism further worsensreputation

I Model highly stylized and many important factors ignored (maybeturnout, in particular)

Concluding remarks

I Model highlights role of media underlying obstructionism

I Parties may act in more polarized way directly due to media changes(and not just bc of effects on voter beliefs)

I Positive feedback effect due to obstructionist incentives strongerwhen minority has poor reputation; obstructionism further worsensreputation

I Model highly stylized and many important factors ignored (maybeturnout, in particular)

Concluding remarks

I Model highlights role of media underlying obstructionism

I Parties may act in more polarized way directly due to media changes(and not just bc of effects on voter beliefs)

I Positive feedback effect due to obstructionist incentives strongerwhen minority has poor reputation; obstructionism further worsensreputation

I Model highly stylized and many important factors ignored (maybeturnout, in particular)