The Gridlock Illusion - WQ Magazine

7/30/2019 The Gridlock Illusion - WQ Magazine

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THE WILSON QUARTERLYWINTER 2013

THE GRIDLOCK ILLUSIOIf Washington seems to get much less done than it once did,it is partly because it is trying to do so much more.

BY R. SHEP MELNICK

OGPHOTO / GETTY IMAGESWhat gridlock?


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T IS HARD TO FIND A NEWS ARTICLE ON

Congress these days in which the word

gridlock does not gure prominently. A ter months o tense negotiations,Congress and President Barack Obamabarely avoided going over the iscalcli in January, and their last-minuteagreement leaves many more monthso inconclusive bargaining to come. Te

legislative branch has yet to revise a na-tional immigration policy that pleasesno one, or even to pass a stripped-down version o pathway-to-citizenship leg-islation that enjoys widespread popularsupport. Everyone knows that SocialSecurity is headed toward insolvency,

and that the longer we wait, the harderit will be to x the problem. But Con-gress a ter Congress has done nothing.Most important, almost everyone recog-nizes that in coming years we must bothraise taxes and cut entitlements in orderto avert scal disaster, yet Congress has

taken no signi cant steps in that direc-tion. Meanwhile, its approval rating hasslipped below 10 percent, to the lowestlevels ever recorded.

Te most common public response tothese developments has been to blameour elected representatives or engag-

ing in petty partisanship, to charge that

By R. SHEP MELNICK

they are beholden to special interests,and to insist that all would be ne i our

leaders would only listen to the peo-ple. But the people are really a ractious and increasingly partisan lot, andin 2012 they sent back to Washingtonnearly all o the hyperpartisan politi-cians who had achieved such stunninglylow approval ratings during the previ-

ous two years. As the political scientistRichard Fenno has pointed out, votersmay hate Congress, but they love theirown member o Congress. Consequent-ly, most members run or Congress byrunning against it. Voters routinely reward individual legislators or engaging

in behavior that regularly produces thecollective action they abhor. Tis pattern has led some scholars to

conclude that the heart o our currentproblems lies in our institutional arrange-ments. Our unusually complex structureo governmentone that combines sepa-

ration o powers, bicameralism, and ederalismnot only embeds numerous vetopoints in the legislative process, but rustrates accountability by making it nearlyimpossible or voters to know whom toblame or reward or public policy. Oucurrent discontents, particularly on bud-

get issues, give new urgency to a critique

I


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Gridlock is the new term avoredby critics who are rustrated with Wash-ington, and it is used by people acrossthe political spectrum, not just liberals. Te triumph o this neologism over the

more conventional descriptors stale-mate and deadlock is not an accidentIt reveals how criticism o our institu-tional arrangements has subtly shi tedas government has expanded. Te termgridlock caught on in 1980 as a wayto describe tra c congestion so severe

that cars block multiple intersections,

o our constitutional arrangements thatdates back to Woodrow Wilson and theProgressive Era. From the turn o thecentury through the 1960s, progressivesand New Dealers insisted that our horse

and buggy institutions were incompati-ble with the demands o modern govern-ment. Te result, they charged, was thedeadlock o democracy, which in e ectmeant that an unholy alliance o conser- vative Southern Democrats and Repub-licans in Congress could block the initia-

tives o liberal Democratic presidents.

CHRIS WEYANT / CARTOON STOCK


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United States began to eel the e ectso what political scientist Hugh Heclohas aptly called policy congestion. Athe government does more and more,

policies increasingly overlap, bumpinto one another, and, all too requent-ly, begin to contradict one another. Forexample, energy policy, born in the1970s, has grown into a motley collec-tion o hundreds o conficting policiesand programs, some o which seek to

subsidize or otherwise promote vari-ous orms o energy use and productiothat others tax and discourage. Similarcontradictions are ri e in wel are polic

preventing movement in any direction.It quickly became the leading metaphor

used to describe congressional politicsa ter President Ronald Reagans initiallegislative victories in 1981.

It was at about that time that the

STEFANO RELLANDINI / REUTERS / CORBIS

As the government doesmore and more, policies

increasingly overlap and,all too frequently, beginto contradict one another.

Gridlock stops at the waters edge. Congress has sustained Americas long commitmentin A ghanistan, where this moonlit ag ew in 2009, and enacted many other controversial policies.


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public instability would not only un-dermine public con dence and weakenthe United States internationally but would give an unreasonable advantage

to the sagacious, the enterprising, andthe moneyed ew over the industriousand uni ormed mass o the people.But by providing an opportunity or asober second thought, bicameralism would reduce the possibility that legis-lation would be the product o momen-

tary public passions or manipulation bypolitical insiders.Furthermore, by requiring very broad

majorities to enact laws, the Constitu-tion reduces the power o what Madisoncalled majority action. By combinina lower house whose members serve

two-year terms with an upper house whose members enjoy six-year termsthe Constitution also combines respon-siveness to current public opinion withattention to the long-term interests o the nation. Moreover, by dividing thelegislature into two parts and grant-

ing veto power to the president, theConstitution prevents the legislativebranchwhich necessarily predomi-nates in republican government, Madi-son wrote rom drawing all power intoits impetuous vortex. In other words, itprotects both judicial independence and

presidential power.

health care policy, and what we now callbudget policywhich includes virtually everything our enormous national gov-ernment does. Te stalemate argument

ocused on the obstacles to creating anextensive regulatory and wel are state.Gridlock, in contrast, re ers to thedi culty o managing and coordinat-ing the extensive wel are and regulatory state that we have somehow managedto build.

Tere can be no doubt but that thegridlock argument captures key eatureso American government. Who coulddeny that the Constitution establishes what civics textbooks call an obstaclecourse on Capitol Hill that makes itexcruciatingly di cult to enact legisla-

tion on controversial issues? We shouldremember, though, that the Foundershad good reason to make the legisla-tive process so arduous. James Madison was not enamored o every componento the Constitution he had helped tocreatehe was especially dismayed by

the clause providing or equal represen-tation o all states in the Senatebuthe provided a sophisticated de ense o the eatures that are commonly blamed

or gridlock.Making it easier to pass legislation,

Madison observed, would increase the

mutability o the law. Te resulting


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Supreme Court invalidate those por-tions o the law that ve o the justiceconsider un air.

Te Constitutions critics also tend

to assume that the dangers created by government inaction are ar greaterthan those caused by rash, premature,or intemperate action. hey expressno concern about the mutability andinstability that so worried Madison. hey tend to assumedespite over-

whelming evidence to the contrarythat governments mistakes can be eas-ily remedied. In reality, governmentprograms create constituencies thatare highly organized, acutely aware othe bene ts they receive rom govern-ment, and strategically placed to block

substantial change. In other words,

odays critics o the Constitutiontend to be less skeptical than Madison was o simple majoritarianism. From Woodrow Wilson a century ago to Uni-

versity o exas law pro essor San ordLevinson today, they have argued thatthe greatest shortcoming o the Con-stitution is its ailure to allow popularmajorities to prevail. What about thedanger o majority action and tyranny o the majority? Certainly no contem-

porary law pro essor can be indi erentto the plight o politically unpopularminorities. Te unstated assumption o contemporary progressives is that this job can sa ely be le t to the courts. Since we already have an activist judiciary, wecan now tolerate an activist Congress.

Let Congress do more, then let the

GETTY IMAGESA news ticker in New York Citys Times Square announces the passage o the $700 billion TroubledAsset Relie Program in 2008, one o several strong government responses to the nations fnancial crisis.


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control o Congress in 1995, party lead-ers in the House o Representativeshad acquired powers that rivaled thoseo the amous czar Speakers o t

House ( Joe Cannon, or example) whohad reigned a century earlier. Withinthe House, most o the veto points so

requently decried or promoting stalemate had been eliminated. oday, theSpeaker e ectively determines whicbills come to the loor, as well as the

rules or amending and voting on eachCommittee chairs, who once rose topower on the basis o seniority and ex-ercised near-baronial powers, are nowunder the control o party leaders. Voteson important issues ollow party lines What the majority-party leadership in

the House wants, it almost always gets.During the presidency o George W.Bush, or example, Republicans briefygained control o both the House andthe Senate, and they rammed through aseries o tax cuts and a major expansiono Medicare with virtually no support

rom Democrats. Advocates o party government hadassumed that stronger, more ideologicalparties would allow one dominant par-ty to give coherent direction to the gov-ernment as a whole. On occasion thatis true. But neither the Republicans nor

the Democrats have managed to build

delays are o ten temporary, but mistakeslast orever.

Inaction can certainly be costly butsometimes there are advantages to in-

action. Consider the case o acid rain. Itbecame a political issue in the 1970s, butCongress did nothing to address it until1990. For many years, this was consid-ered a prime example o gridlockjustas congressional inaction on greenhousegases is today. But the regulatory scheme

Congress eventually used to control acidrain, marketable emission rights, hasproved much better at reducing pollu-tion quickly and cheaply than the kindo command-and-control regulationCongress relied upon almost exclusively in the 1970s. In other words, delay pro-

duced smarter government action.

OLITICAL PARTIES HAVE LONG BEEN

the chie mechanism or buildingmajorities that pull together our

constitutionally separated institutions.For most o the 20th century, ours were

internally heterogeneous umbrella par-ties that provided the building blocks orlegislative coalitions without guarantee-ing partisan majorities in either houseo Congress. In the early 1990s, howev-er, it was clear that our legislative parties were undergoing a sea change.

By the time the Republicans took

P


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administration managed to push its pro-posal through Congress despite strongopposition rom Republicans.

With only tepid support from White House, Congress bailed outandessentially took overthe ederally created mortgage giants Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac, adding $142 billion to thetotal bailout. Several months later, the Obama T-

sury Department and the Federal Reserveannounced a plan to pump an additional$1 trillion into the banking system. After providing billions of doto keep General Motors, Chrysler, and AIG a loat, the ederal governmentplayed a central role in managing their

downsizing. Te government suddenly became the largest stockholder in threeo the nations biggest companies. Even before the nancial meltdoCongress passed a $168 billion bipar-tisan stimulus package negotiated bySpeaker o the House Nancy Pelosi,

House Minority Leader John Boehner,

resilient electoral majorities. Indeed,as soon as one party seems to be gain-ing e ective control o government,the voters revoke its mandate. he

2010 election, which ended the Dem-ocrats brie monopoly on power by giving the House to the Republicans, was just the latest mani estation o thisdynamic. Te same thing happened in1994 and 2006. Te public, it seems,is not enamored o either party, and

pre ers divided government to party government. In short, party polariza-tion, once considered a cure or stale-mate, now only seems to make theproblem worse.

On the sur ace this combinationo constitutional structure, partisan

polarization, and a ickle electorateseems to create the per ect storm o gridlock. Be ore we despair, though,it would be worth taking a closerlook at the extent o the problem.On many ronts, things are not asbad as they seem. Consider, or ex-

ample, some o the steps the ederalgovernment took in response to thenancial crisis o 200708:

In the autumn of 2008, Congresscreated the $700 billion roubled As-set Relie Program ( ARP) to address

the subprime mortgage crisis. Te Bush

Party polarization, onceconsidered a cure for

stalemate, now only seemsto make the problem worse.


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margin in the House a ter the 2000election was only nine votes, the slim-mest partisan margin in 50 years. Inthe 2006 elections the Democrats re-

gained control o both the House andthe Senate, and the country returnedto divided government. Animosity be-tween the parties (and against the pres-ident) ran unusually high. But consider what Congress accomplished duringthose years:

It passed the No Child Left Be Act, the biggest change in ederal edu-cation policy since 1965 and the mostprescriptive ederal education legislationever enacted. It created Medicare Part D, the-

est entitlement expansion since passageo Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. It passed the Bush administratitax cuts in 2001, 2003, and 2004. o-gether they constituted the largest taxcuts in American history. Despite stiff opposition from-

publicans, it approved the ar-reachingMcCain-Feingold campaign inancere orm law. It passed the Sarbanes-Oxleyo 2002, whichCQ Weekly describedas the biggest increase in the regula-tion o publicly traded companies since

the Depression.

and Secretary o the reasury Henry Paulson.

Te United States has responded to

the nancial crisis much more aggres-sively than has Europe, with its sup-posedly more e ective parliamentary governments, and our banks are now in better shape than Europes. Mucho the ARP money has been repaid,and the auto companies seem to be re-

covering. Whether or not one approveso these policies, it is hard to describethe government that initiated them asgridlocked.

NE COULD RESPOND TO THE REMARK-

able events o 2008 and 09 by

saying that the American politi-cal system is capable o responding toemergencies, but not so good at ash-ioning policies that prevent them inthe rst place. So lets look back at the

rst seven years o the George W. Bushadministration. Here, it seemed, was a

recipe or stalemate. Te electorate wasdivided 50-50 in presidential elections, with Bush losing the popular vote in2000 and eking out a narrow victory in 2004. Te Senate, too, was divid-ed 50-50 in 2001, and soon shi ted tothe Democrats when James Je ords o

Vermont le t the GOP. Te Republican

O


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de eating two vicious and expansionistotalitarian powersour constitutionalstructure seems to have served us well.

he record o the Congress that

convened in 2009 rivals that o any sincthe historic 89th o 196566. Te 111thCongress demonstrates how partisanpolarization can produce dramatic poli-cy change when one party seizes controlo the White House and both chamberso the legislative branch. While many o

these enactments are well known, it is worth recounting them to indicate therange o congressional action:

Most important, Congress enacta pro ound overhaul o the Americanhealth care system, extending coverage

to 30 million Americans; imposing ex-tensive mandates on insurance carri-ers, employers, and state governments;creating new insurance exchanges; im-posing an array o new taxes, ees, anpenalties; extending drug bene ts; andmaking signi cant cuts in the Medicare

program. Four months later, Congress enaca 2,300-page law to create a new regu-latory structure or the entire nancialservices sector and to establish a mech-anism or winding down ailing bankand brokerage houses. According toCQ

Weekly , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street

A ew o these laws received biparti-san support; passage o others reliedalmost entirely on Republican votes. While some o these policies might have

been ill advised and excessively partisan,no one would describe the Congressesthat produced them as do nothing.

Foreign and de ense policy rarely comes up in discussions o gridlock. In-deed, those who have complained mostbitterly about legislative stalemate also

criticized the Bush administration oracting too aggressively and Congressor delegating too much authority to

the executive. Foreign policy during theBush administration hardly looks likegridlock: Te administration launched wars in A ghanistan and Iraq (in each

case with congressional approval), an-nounced a controversial new policy onpreventative wars, and established theequally controversial detention acility at Guantnamo Bay. Meanwhile, Con-gress established the Department o Homeland Security, enacted the USA

Patriot Act, overhauled the Foreign In-telligence Surveillance Act, and passedseveral pieces o legislation on the use o military commissions and the rights o detainees. When one looks at the sweepo U.S. oreign policy over the course o the 20th centuryespecially the piv-

otal role the United States played in


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gins and without the threat o a libuster.

On top o this, the Obama admin-istration augmented the U.S. military

commitment in A ghanistan, the sec-ond major American war zone surgein recent years. It substantially increased American drone strikes against suspect-ed terrorists. In short, 2009 and 10 were years o intense partisan animosity bunot o gridlock.

o be sure, over the past our yearsCongress has ailed to pass any immi-gration legislation. An omnibus, jer-ry-built climate change bill passed theHouse but died quietly in the Senate. Te administrations signature healthcare legislation nearly ailed or want

a 60th vote in the Senate. I the Per-ils-o -Pauline story o the A ordablCare Act illustrates the di culty o en-acting major legislation, it also pointsto a shortcoming o the conventionalgridlock narrative. Gridlock is almostalways used to imply that an obstinate

minority is rustrating the will o themajority. But in 2010 Obamacare wasin grave danger because public opinion was turning against it. I anything, thehealth care battle shows that the eder-al government is capable o taking dra-matic action even when public support

is shallow.

Re orm and Consumer Protection Acttouches just about every major pieceo nancial regulatory law o the 20thcentury. It created two new regulatory

agencies, and required these and otheragencies to produce 250 additional setso regulations to govern the nancialsector. Soon after convening, Congresspassed another stimulus package, topump $800 billion into the slowing

economy. Te legislation included a di- verse mix o tax cuts; an extension o unemployment bene ts; grants to thestates or in rastructure, education, andhealth care; and measures to encouragethe development o clean energy. After decades of debate, Congress

passed legislation authorizing the Foodand Drug Administration (FDA) toregulate the content and marketing o tobacco products. Congress made major changes in the

ederal student loan program, and provided more than $4.35 billion or the

Obama administrations Race to the op initiative to encourage innovationin elementary and secondary education. By repealing Dont Ask, Dont Tell,Congress allowed gays to serve openly in the military. It also con rmed twoSupreme Court nominees, Sonia Soto-

mayor and Elena Kagan, by wide mar-


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governor Arnold Schwarzeneggersigned an agreement to curb global warming by capping certain emissions,declaring, Cali ornia will not wait o

our ederal government to take strongaction on global warming.

More important, the Supreme Courthas ordered the Environmental Protec-tion Agency to regulate greenhouse gas-es. In response, the EPA has issued new rules that limit carbon dioxide emissions

rom industrial sources. Tis is just thebeginning o its regulatory e orts. Giv-

en the structure o the Clean Air Act, itis unlikely that this will be a particularlye ective or e cient orm o regulationBut the worse the EPA proposal, thestronger the incentives or congressio-nal action. A ter all, i Congress ails act, the EPAs fawed plan will go into

e ect. As Te New York imes reported,

HE STALEMATE/GRIDLOCK ARGUMENT is misleading not only because itignores so many accomplishments,

but also because it ocuses so intently on

just one small part o domestic policy,namely passage o major pieces o legis-lation at the national level. Lost in thispicture are the daily decisions o admin-istrators, judges, and state and local o -

cials, as well as members o Congressengaged in the quotidian business o

passing appropriations, reauthorizations,and budget reconciliation bills. akenindividually, these decisions might seemlike small potatoes, but collectively they can produce signi cant policy change.

Critics o the Constitution overlook the act that by creating multiple veto

points, our political system simultane-ously creates multiple points o accessor policy entrepreneurs and claimants.

Every veto point that can be usedto block action is also an opportuni-ty point that can be used to initiate oraugment government activity.

Consider, or example, the problem o global warming. Neither Congress northe White House has yet taken steps toreduce carbon emissions. But state gov-ernments have acted. Nine northeast-ern states reached an accord promisingto reduce power plant emissions by 10

percent by 2020. In 2006, Cali ornia

Every veto point thatcan be used to block actionis also an opportunitypoint that can be usedto initiate or augmentgovernment activity.

T


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How did a rmative actionhighly unpopular with the American publicbecome embedded in so many ederaprograms? Slowly, subtly, and at times

surreptitiously, a long series o court de-cisions, agency rules, and complex legis-lative provisions injected the presump-tion o proportional representation into

ederal civil rights programs. How didthe ederal government come to set na-tional standards or state mental insti-

tutions, schools or the developmentallydisabled, nursing homes, and prisons?Largely through litigation and consentdecrees negotiated by the Departmento Justice.

Why has the means-tested Medicaidprogram grown aster than the suppos-

edly sacrosanct Medicare program? Ater all, the ormer serves the poor, whilethe latter provides bene ts to one o themost potent political orces in Ameri-can politics, the elderly. According toLawrence Brown and Michael Spar-er o the Columbia School o Publi

Health, part o the explanation is theshrewd incrementalism o congressionaentrepreneurs such as Henry Waxman(D-Cali .), who steadily added ederaMedicaid mandates to budget reconcil-iation bills in the late 1980s. Te com-bination o state and ederal undin

and control over Medicaid, Brown and

Administration o cials consistently say they would much pre er that Con-gress write new legislation . . . but they are clearly holding it in reserve as a prod

to reluctant lawmakers. o take another example, how didCongress manage to pass controversiallegislation guaranteeing every disabledstudent a ree appropriate public educa-tion, complete with an individualizededucation plan, provision o related

services, and a promise that each stu-dent would be placed in the least restric-tive environment? Te answer is thatthe courts acted rst, suggesting (ratherobliquely) that students with disabili-ties might have a constitutional right toan adequate education. Tis orced state

governments to spend much more onspecial education, which led them todemand that the ederal governmentprovide the money needed to comply with this ederal mandate, which ledCongress to provide both more money and more ederal regulation, which led

to more litigation and more ederal re-quirements, which led to state demandsor even more money, and so on. Tis

is a vivid illustration o how separationo powers and ederalism can producenot gridlock, but a game o institutionalleap rog that results in a steady expan-

sion o government programs.


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Sparer note, had the e ect o promptingcoverage expansions during good times(the eds paid most o the bill) and de-terring cutbacks even in bad times (ev-

ery state dollar saved meant two or threeederal dollars lost).Instead o promoting a race to the

bottom, our postNew Deal cooper-ative ederalism has stimulated expan-sion o the wel are state. Tis e ect isnot limited to health care. Te respected

ederalism scholar Richard Nathan hasconcluded that U.S. ederalisms domi-nant e ect has been to expand the scopeand spending o the social sector.

Tose looking or evidence o grid-

lock in Washington might point to Con-gresss ailure in 1998 to pass legislationimposing a large tax on tobacco prod-ucts and limiting tobacco advertising.Soon a ter that bill died in the Senate,though, state attorneys general reached asettlement with tobacco companies that

included a $250 billion settlementto

be paid to state treasuriesand unprec-edented limits on advertising, sponsor-ships, and lobbying by tobacco compa-nies. Having lost narrowly in one arena,

antitobacco activists prevailed in another. When the Securities and ExchangeCommission was criticized or regu-lating Wall Street too laxly, anotherstate attorney general, New Yorks EliotSpitzer, stepped into what he perceivedas a policy void. When the Obama ad-

ministration appeared too tolerant o AIGs bonuses, Spitzers successor, An-drew Cuomo, took aggressive steps toexpose the miscreants. In area a ter areathe competition and multiple avenues oaccess created by the Constitution provide opportunities to prevail or those

who seek to expand the public sector.Policy entrepreneurs have learned howto use these eatures o our political system to their advantage. As Representa-tive Waxman, one o the most success-

ul o these entrepreneurs, once put itIncrementalism may not get much

press, but it does work.In he Welfare State Nobody Know (2008), political scientist ChristopherHoward argues that the American wel-

are state is much larger than is gener-ally recognized. We ail to appreciate itssize because our wel are state provide

bene ts through so many programs (at

Incrementalism may

not get much press, butit does work, says onecongressman.


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than 60 years. Rather, re ormers assumethat we would naturally develop thestable two- or three-party Westmin-ster-style parliamentary government

ound in Britain, Australia, and (at onetime, at least) Canada.My guess is that these re ormers would

have a hard time convincing most Amer-icans that the British orm o governmenis more democratic than what we havenow. Who voted or Prime Minister Da-

vid Cameron other than 34,000 mem-bers o his Witney constituency? Whatdo you mean, ordinary people cant votein party primariesyou intend to allow party bosses to choose the nominees?Elections held whenever the incumbentprime minister nds it convenient? A

power ul elite senior civil service withoumuch oversight by elected representa-tives? Signi cant movement in that di-rection would provoke a populist revoltin this country that would make the eaParty look, well, like weak tea.

Do we have any evidence that par-

liamentary governments are any bet-ter at governing? Te answer, I think,is no. Te best analysis I know o is aBrookings Institution volume editedby political scientists R. Kent Weaverand Bert A. Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the

United States and Abroad . At the risk o

least 77 separate means-tested ederalprograms provide assistance to the poor)and in such indirect ways (such as loanguarantees, re undable tax credits, and

tax exemptions). Our ragmented wel-are state refects our ragmented politi-cal system. As Howard suggests, we needto understand how our peculiar politicalsystem has produced a di erent type o wel are state, not simply keep repeatingthe mistaken claim that it has produced

a small one.

T THE HEART OF ALL SERIOUS POLIT-

ical analysis lies Henny Young-mans amous response to the ques-

tion Hows your wi e?: Compared to what? At one time or another we have

all been rustrated or even enraged by the delays, irrationalities, and complex-ities o our political system. I we werestarting rom scratch, no one in his rightmind would give Wyoming, Vermont,or Rhode Island two seats in the U.S.Senate. Te big question is, What is the

alternative? Most critics seem to assumethat the answer is parliamentary govern-ment. Not, o course, the unstable, ac-tious, multiparty coalition governmentsone nds in Italy or Israel. Nor wouldthey welcome the insulated, action-rid-den, and corrupt system o Japan, where

a single party has dominated or more

A


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the di erences between regimes. Sec-ond-tier institutional arrangementssuch as electoral rules and norms es-tablished within legislative bodies in-

fuence government capacity at least asmuch as do the separation or usion oexecutive and legislative power.

I undamental political change sucas a shi t to a parliamentary system iunlikely to produce signi cant bene ts,and even less likely to gain public sup-

port, then it behooves us to ocus in-stead on the second-tier institutionalarrangements that are equally import-ant and considerably more malleable.Consider, or example, that today a sin-gle U.S. senator can put a hold on anomination or a piece o legislation be-

cause the Senate conducts so much oits business through unanimous consentagreements. Use o both senatorial holdsand libusters has escalated in recent years, o ten with serious consequencesSenate ruleseven those on libusterand cloturecan probably be changed

by majority vote once obstructionismbecomes too obvious and too unpopular.In 2005, Democrats used the li-

busters to block a number o Presi-dent Bushs judicial nominees. Tisled the Republican majority to threat-en to pull the trigger on the nucle-

ar option, that is, to limit libusters

oversimpli ying the books care ul analysis, let me note three o the editorsconclusions, which ring even truer to-day than when the book was published

20 years ago.First, most o the problems acingthe United States today are shared by all industrial democracies. In particu-lar, problems with balancing budgetsare ubiquitous. All elected (and mostunelected) governments are reluctant to

impose losses on pensioners. . . . Partic-ular institutional arrangements do notcause these governance problems; they are inherent in complex societies and indemocratic government.

Second, there are direct tradeo s be-tween institutional capabilities. Te rag-

mented American political system gen-erates a lot o policy innovation becauseit promotes policy entrepreneurship romdisparate sources. But this innovationtends to be at the piecemeal level o individual programs rather than comprehen-sive, sector-wide policies. Un ortunately,

institutional arrangements that are betterat producing comprehensive re orm arealso likely to create risks o policy insta-bility and to overlook interests not wellrepresented within party organizations.

Tird, the contrast between par-liamentary and separation-o -powers

systems captures only a small part o


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considered outmoded. Legislation ex-empting budget reconciliation bills

rom libusters has made the budgetprocess somewhat more rational and

majoritarianand allowed the Obamaadministrations health care proposal tobecome law.

Conventional arguments about grid-lock not only ignore our political sys-tems capacity or major policy changebut imprudently ocus our attentionon constitutional changes that are nei-

ther easible nor likely to address oupresent discontents. Te gridlock met-aphor tends to gloss over the act thatour political institutions are surprising-ly good at innovation, but depressinglybad at coordinating the many respon-sibilities we have taken on. Nowhere is

this more apparent than in our inability

on judicial nominations. Te result was a compromise: Democrats agreedto place holds on only two nomineesi the Republicans would not change

the ormal rules. A number o Dem-ocratic senators have advocated insti-tuting urther limits on the libuster when the 113th Congress convenesthis January. Democrats and Repub-licans alike have been the victims o senatorial obstructionism, and the

Senates reputation has su ered. As aconsequence, rules that once seemedinvulnerable might soon be subjectto revision.

Tere are many other ways Congressand the executive can alter second-tierrules to increase our capacity to cope

with the serious problems that con-ront us. For example, during the 1990sthe so-called PAYGO rules ( or pay-as-you-go) helped Congress reducethe ederal budget de cit by requiringthat any new tax cuts or spending beo set by new revenue or by savings

elsewhere in the budget. Fast-trackprocedures have helped temper paro-chialism in trade legislation. Te BaseRealignment and Closure Commis-sion gave Congress a mechanism toreduce unnecessary military spendingby shutting down the many congres-

sionally protected bases the Pentagon

Our political institutionsare surprisingly goodat innovation, butdepressingly bad atcoordinating the manyresponsibilities wehave taken on.


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rather, adjustment o a variety o second-tier rules in order to ocus public at-tention on the aggregate and long-termconsequences o renetic governmen

activity.n

to bring taxing and spending into line.Since 2000, Congress has done an ex-cellent job o enacting tax cuts and cre-ating new entitlements. But that has

only made our scal problems worse.Imposing budgetary pain in a politicalsystem as responsive to public opinionas ours is extraordinarily hard. Makingprogress on this crucial task does not re-quire systemic institutional re orm, but,

R . S H E P M E L N I C K is the Tomas P.ONeill Jr. Pro essor o American Politicsat Boston College.

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