Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 41327

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE

FOR THE

REPUBLIC OF CdTE D’IVOIRE

FOR THE PERIOD Fy08-Fy09

March 14,2008

Country Department for CBte d’Ivoire AFCF2 Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance o f their off icial duties. I t s contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wor ld Bank authorization.

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The last In te r im Country Assistance Strategy was discussed by the Executive Directors on June 11,2002.

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

US$ 1 = 428 CFAF (as o f M a r c h 10,2008) All figures in US$ unless specified

WEIGHTS ALW MEASURES Metr ic System

GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAA AFD AtDB APL A U BNI BOAD CARE CDD CECP CEDEAO

CFAF CGRAE

CPAR CSA DDR DPO DSA EC ECO WASKEDEAO EDRCR EGRG EITI EPCA ERC ESW F A 0 FMIS FN FPI GDP GEF HIPC

CI-PAST

Analytical and Advisory Activity Agence Franqaise de De'veloppement (French Agency for Development) African Development Bank Adaptable Program Loan African Union Banque Nutionale d 'Investissement (National Investment Bank) Banque Ouest Afiicaine de De'veloppement (West Afi ican Development Bank) Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere Community Driven Development Postal Savings Bank Communaute' Economique des Etats de I'Afiique de 1 'Ouest (Economic Community o f West African States) CFA Franc Civil Servants' Retirement Fund Transport Sector Adjustment and Investment Program Country Procurement Assessment Review Country Social Assessment National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration Development Policy Operation Debt Sustainability Assessment European Commission Economic Community of West African States Emergency Demobilization, Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation Project Economic Governance and Recovery Grant Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (IMF Program) Economic Recovery Credit Economic and Sector Work Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations Financial Management Information System Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivonan Popular Front) Gross Domestic Product Global Environment Facility Heavily-Indebted Poor Country

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HIViAIDS IBRD

IDA IDP IMF

I S N LICUS TF MAP MDG MDRI MFA MICS MJP MoU MPCI MPIGO

NGO OIF ONUCI

PACOM PASEF PAST PCAP PCF PDCI PEMFAR PER PIT PNGTER PRSP RDR UDCY UDPCI

UE UEMOA

UN UNDP UNICEF VAT WAEMU WAPP WB WBI WFP

I-CAS

I-PRSP

Human Immunodeficiency VirudAcquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Interim Country Assistance Strategy International Development Association Internally Displaced People International Monetary Fund Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Interim Strategy Note Low-Income Country Under Stress Trust Fund Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program Millenium Development Goals Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative Mouvement des Forces d‘Avenir (Movement of the Forces for the Future) Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Mouvement pour la Justice et la P a h (Movement for Justice and Peace) Memorandum of Understanding Mouvement Patriotique de Cote d’Ivoire (Ivorian Patriotic Movement) Mouvement Patriotique Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (Ivorian Patriotic Movement of the Great West) Non-Governmental Organization International Francophone Organization Opdration des Nations unies en Cote d ’Ivoire (United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in C6te d’Ivoire) Municipal Support Program Education Sector Support Program Transport Project Post-Conflict Assistance Project Post-Conflict Fund Parti Ddmocratique de Cote d’lvoire (Democratic Party o f C6te d’Ivoire) Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review Public Expenditure Review Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (Ivorian Workers’ Party) Rural Land Program Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Rassemblement des Rdpublicains (Regroupement of Republicans) Union Ddmocratique & Citoyenne (Citizens’ Union for Democracy) Union pour la Dkmocratie h la P a h en C6te d ’Ivoire (Union for Democracy and Peace in C6te d’Ivoire) Union Europdenne (European Union) Union Economique et Mondtaire Ouest Africaine (West Africa Economic and Monetary Union - WAEMU) United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children’s Fund Value Added Tax West African Economic and Monetary Union West Africa Power Pool World Bank World Bank Institute World Food Program

Vice President : Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director : James Bond

Country ManageriTTL : Bernard Harborne

has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance o f their off icial duties. I t s contents may not be otherwise disclosed without Wor ld Bank authorization.

INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE (ISN) FOR COTE D’IVOIRE Table of Contents

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... i

I .

I1 .

I11

I V .

V . V I . VI1 . VI11 .

COUNTRY CONTEXT .............................................................................. 1

A . Political Context ....................................................................................................................... 1

B . Economic and Regional Impact .............................................................................................. 3 a) Economic Context ............................................................................................................... -3

Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators ......................................................................................... 4 b) External and Domestic Debt ............................................................................................... 5 c) Regional Context .................................................................................................................. 6

C . Governance and Transparency .............................................................................................. 7

D . Social Context ........................................................................................................................... 9

E . The Environment ................................................................................................................... 11

BANK ENGAGEMENT TO DATE AND LESSONS LEARNED .............. 12 (a) The I-CAS and Program Suspension ............................................................................ 12 (b) LICUS and PCF Engagement ........................................................................................ 12 (c) LessonsLearned ............................................................................................................. 13 (d) IFC, M I G A and WBI activities ..................................................................................... 14

GOVERNMENT STRATEGY .................................................................. 14 (a) Program for Political and Security Stability ................................................................ 15 (b) Program for Economic Recovery .................................................................................. 15

THE BANK’S INTERIM STRATEGY ..................................................... 16

A . Rationale for the I S N ............................................................................................................. 16

B . C . Instruments for the I S N during the transition .................................................................... 19

Objective I: Stabilization and Peace Building ..................................................................... 19 Objective II: Support to War-A ffected Populations ........................................................... 20 Objective III: Kick-Starting Economic Recovery and Reform., ....................................... -21

Economic and Sector Work .................................................................................................. 23

Objectives of the ISN ............................................................................................................. 17

Regional Integration Programming ..................................................................................... 22

DONOR COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIPS ................................ 26

MAIN R I S K S AND MITIGATION RESPONSES ..................................... 28

MONITORING OF RESULTS AND EVALUATION ............................... 30

CONCLUDING REMARKS ..................................................................... 30

Tables Table 1: Table 2: Table 3: Table 4: Table 5:

Figures Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4:

Boxes Box 1: Box 2: Box 3:

Selected Economic Indicators ......................................................................................... 4 Selected External Public Debt Indicators ........................................................................ 5 Summary of the Impact o f the CGte d’Ivoire Crisis ...................................................... 11 Bank Assistance in Support o f the Emergency Transition ............................................ 18 The Bank‘s Reactivated Project Portfolio in CGte d’Ivoire ........................................... 21

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index . 2007 .................................... 7 CBte d’Ivoire Deteriorating Measures o f Governance 1998-2006 .................................. 8 Donor Aid to CGte d’Ivoire 2001-05 by Donor ............................................................. 26 Donor Aid to CGte d’Ivoire 2001-05 by Sector ............................................................. 27

HIV/AIDS Situation in CGte d’Ivoire ............................................................................ 10 LICUS and PCF Funding in CBte d’Ivoire 2004-2007 .................................................. 12 Phased Bank Engagement during Transition Period ..................................................... 17

Country Specific Appendices Appendix 1 : Appendix 2: Appendix 3: Appendix 4: Appendix 5: Appendix 6: Appendix 7: Appendix 8:

Interim Strategy Results Framework ................................................................... 32 World Bank Instruments in CGte d’Ivoire ........................................................... 35 CAS Summary o f Development Priorities ........................................................... 36 Update by the PRSP Unit - Ministry o f Finance ................................................. 37 The Framework for Peace .................................................................................... 38 The Bank Project Disbursement Ratio (in percent) ............................................. 40 Financial and Other Assistance to CBte d’Ivoire by Other Donors ..................... 41 Status of Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals .......................... 46

Standard CAS Annexes CAS Annex A2: CAS Annex B2: CAS Annex B3: CAS Annex B3: CAS Annex B4: CAS Annex B6: CAS Annex B7: CAS Annex B8: CAS Annex B8:

CBte d’Ivoire At a Glance ............................................................................. 48 Selected Indicators of Bank Portfolio Performance and Management ......... 51 IDA Program Summary ................................................................................ 52 IFC Investment Operations Program ............................................................. 53 Summary of Non-Lending Services .............................................................. 55 Key Economic Indicators .............................................................................. 56 Key Social Indicators .................................................................................... 58 Statements of IFC’s Held and Disbursed Portfolio ....................................... 59 Operations Portfolio (IDA and Grants) ......................................................... 60

Map No . IBRD 33393

The W o r l d Bank team for the I S N was led by Bernard Harborne (Country Manager) . The I S N was prepared in close collaboration with the two main operations teams for the country program: i) the PCAP team including Mawiz ia Tovo. Karene Melloul. Ibrahim Magazi and Jean-Paul Chausse; and ii) the EGRG team including Zel jko Bogetic. Richard Doffonsou. Francesco Scaduto.Mendola. Nicaise Ehoue. Andre Ryba. Emmanuel Diarra. Mourad Belguedj. Tjaarda Storm van Leuwen. and Danie l Sellen . The teamwork was carried out under the general direction and advice o f James Bond. Country Director for C6te d’Ivoire and the CMU including Sandra Normann. Evelyn Kennedy and Kathy Li T o w N g o w .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Since the late 199O’s, CBte d’Ivoire has been in politico-military crisis, culminating in a br ie f c i v i l war which effectively divided the country in two. W h i l s t the direct impact o f the war was limited, human rights abuse and the socio-economic and governance deterioration have had a significant impact on the population.

2. Over the last four years, following the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement o f January 2003, the country has been in a neither-peace-nor-war stalemate. The breakthrough was achieved with the signing o f the Ouagadougou Peace Accord o f March 2007 which resulted f rom direct dialogue between the two main protagonists, the President and the leader o f the rebels, the Forces Nouvelles. The Accord has underscored two immediate components o f the peace process which need to be resolved: i) the issuing o f identification papers for a significant proportion o f the population to enable their access to rights as Ivorian citizens and ii) reintegration o f the two armed forces and dismantling o f the milit ia. Longer term issues relate to polit ical and economic governance including greater transparency and accountability, strengthening o f c iv i l institutions, including regulation o f land use and ownership, and free and fair elections.

3. During 2000-06, the annual real GDP decline o f -0.4 percent, combined with the 1.7 percent average population growth, resulted in an annual per capita real GDP decline o f -2.1 percent. T h i s has aggravated the already very high unemployment, especially among youth, and increasing poverty levels. According to recent Bank analysis, poverty has increased from 38.2 percent just before the crisis in 2002 to 43.2 percent in 2006. Nearly one mi l l ion people have been displaced, primarily into urban areas, and particularly into Abidjan. According to the 2006 UNICEF M I C survey, 33 percent o f children under five are suffering f rom moderate malnutrition and 15 percent f rom severe malnutrition. Severe chronic malnutrition was particularly identified in the centre west (1 5 percent) and in the northwest (1 6.7 percent).

4. CBte d’Ivoire i s in debt distress. At the end o f 2006, external public debt accounted for US$12.9 b i l l ion or 73.2 percent o f GDP, o f which US$6.2 b i l l ion was owed to Paris Club creditors, US$2.7 b i l l ion to London Club creditors, US$2.5 b i l l ion to the Wor ld Bank, US$1 b i l l ion to the AfDB Group and US$0.2 b i l l ion to the IMF. Domestic public debt (including arrears to suppliers) amounted to 1 1.5 percent o f GDP at end o f 2006.

5 . The Ivorian conflict must be placed in a regional context. Most importantly a significant proportion o f the population consists o f those who have emigrated from neighboring countries. One o f the contested questions in the conflict i s whether those populations are in fact Ivorian, even though some have been resident for generations, or whether they are visiting workers. For the home countries, CBte d’Ivoire i s an important source o f remittances from migrant labor and critical for trade and access to markets.

6. There i s a general governance malaise in CBte d’Ivoire. Of real concern i s the breakdown in the rule o f law, ranging from wide-scale human rights abuse to weak enforcement and regulation o f contracts in the banking and financing sectors. Accountability and transparency deteriorated during the conflict. Corruption and lack o f transparency has been associated with the cocodcoffee regulatory bodies, the government’s procurement methods in some large public- private sector contracts and the important oil/energy sector.

7. The Ouaga Accord o f March 4, 2007 created a new political dispensation by putting the two main protagonists within the same power-sharing government and having the leader o f the Forces Nouvelles as the Prime Minister. The new government has focused i t s attention primarily

o n i) restoring polit ical and security stability as precondition for post-conflict recovery; and ii) economic stability and re-establishment o f relations with the international financial institutions, illustrated by the resumption o f payment o f debt service to the Wor ld Bank and AfDB and the repayment o f one ha l f o f the total stock o f arrears to the Wor ld Bank in February 2008.

8. The Ouaga Accord, based upon the peace agreements since January 2003, set out a plan for addressing the key issues at the heart o f the Ivorian crisis. The chronogram envisaged a period o f 10 months for implementation leading up to elections, anticipated in 2008. In addition, since M a y 2007, the government has developed an early program o f reform measures aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability and advancing structural reforms in the key sectors such as energy, cocoa and financial sectors. These commitments have been set out in the memoranda o f understanding between the government and Wor ld Bank and AfDB in April and July 2007. At the same time, the government i s working o n a full PRSP that will underpin the Government reform program over the coming years.

9. The Bank’s Inter im Strategy has three objectives: Support stabilization of the crisis and assist the government in addressing key conflict factors, through implementation o f the Ouaga accord and addressing core risk factors; Assist war-affected populations by way o f community rehabilitation and support to the provision o f basic social services; Assist economic recovery and reform by focusing o n economic governance and fostering demand for accountability and supporting sustainable economic growth.

10. The Bank‘s instruments during the I S N timeframe (July 2007 - July 2009) will include a blend o f Trust Funds and IDA operations as wel l as non-lending activities. The main support to the peace process i s a pre-arrears clearance grant, the Post-Conflict Assistance Program (PCAP) o f US$120 million which has three components: reintegration o f ex-combatants and youth at risk; support to local administration; and identification process and community recovery. The next key operation, the Economic Governance and Recovery Grant for US$[308] million, would be used for direct disbursement o f a bridge loan extended to clear C6te d’Ivoire’s arrears to IBRD and IDA, and budgeted fiscal needs in the period immediately after arrears clearance. Arrears clearance will allow the reactivation o f the o ld portfolio (four projects totaling US$104 mill ion) as wel l as three new projects with a total o f US$120 mill ion: an Emergency Infrastructure Reconstruction operation; an H IV /A IDS operation; and a Governance and Institutions project. The indicative allocation for FY09 i s US$100 million. Overall lending for the I S N period will be around US3763.5 million (outlined in Appendix 2). These operations will be backed by a comprehensive set o f analytical studies. The IFC i s also supporting WBG re- engagement with the country (see approach outlined in Annex B3).

11. processed pursuant to OP 8.0 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies.

In light o f the s t i l l fragile post-conflict situation, a l l new projects for FY08 will be

12. Given the fragility o f the peace process, the Bank i s also working closely with i t s partners, notably the European Commission and the UN system. On the structural reform side the Bank i s working closely with the IMF and the AfDB. There are high r isks involved in such engagement. However, the r isks o f non-engagement and allowing the crisis o f this major African economy to persist or worsen are far greater. The I S N sets out a framework o f interventions which mitigates the r isks involved in l ine with good practice o f Bank programs in post-conflict affected and fragile states.

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I. COUNTRY CONTEXT

A. POLITICAL CONTEXT

1. CGte d’Ivoire has stood apart in Africa’s story since independence. The second largest economy in the west African sub-region i t was for many years a beacon o f extraordinary per capita growth, dynamism and political stability. However, since the late 199O’s, CGte d’Ivoire has been in politico-military crisis, culminating in a br ie f c iv i l war which effectively divided the country in two. W h i l s t the direct impact o f the war was limited, human rights abuse and the socio-economic and governance deterioration have had a significant impact on the population.

2. This crisis has i t s structural roots in the Ivorian economic success o f the 1960’s to the early 1980’s, during most o f which CGte d’Ivoire enjoyed high real annual GDP growth rates’ o f more than 7 percent. The political and economic success o f these years was built on le compromis Houphoudtiste: the use o f burgeoning state resources to manage polit ical conflict, the encouragement o f labor to migrate f rom the north and neighboring countries to agriculturally productive areas in the south, and strong bilateral support f rom France. With a decline in commodity prices, increasing fiscal constraint, mounting debt, and declining international assistance, the death o f President Houphouet-Boigny in 1993 was the tipping point after which a series o f periodic constitutional and economic crises undermined the Ivorian model. Upon the contraction o f the economy in the 199O’s, the question o f who was an Ivorian (and who was not) - the concept o f “lvoiritk” - emerged as central to a whole range o f socio-economic issues around c iv i l and economic rights, land-ownership and national governance, and access to power including the identity o f the head o f state.

3. These underlying fissures resulted in the coup o f December 1999 and then open hostilities, triggered by a rebellion led by the Forces Nouvelles (FN), in the northern and western parts o f the country. The c iv i l war was brief, between September 2002 and January 2003, causing some 3,000 deaths2. The signing o f the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement in January 2003, brokered by the French Government, ushered in the ‘neither-war-nor-peace’ stalemate o f the last four years. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement provided a general framework for the resolution o f the major issues o f contention. In endorsing the agreement, the UN Security Council mandated UN peacekeeping forces (L’Opdration des Nations Unies en Cdte d’Ivoire - ONUCI), along with the French forces (Opdration Licorne) to create a buffer zone between the two belligerents. For the next four years, various internationally mediated attempts were made to resolve the crisis and move the country towards free and fair elections. A number o f transitional governments were formed, after each peace agreement, which took steps to resolve critical issues, with a particular focus on the questions o f identity and disarmament. Some progress was achieved, including National Assembly approval o f the modification o f Article 35 o f the Constitution on the eligibility o f presidential candidates and the passing o f certain legal reforms. Ultimately however, each agreement and consequent transitional government failed to take sufficient steps in implementation o f the peace process towards national elections.

4. On the security side, whilst the conflict between the two sides was effectively frozen by the creation o f the buffer zone, serious human rights abuse, including mass killing and outbreaks

GDP per capita grew from US$204 in 1965 to about US$602 on average over the second decade (1970- 1979), then to US$915 over the third decade (1980-1989), before it fe l l to US$741 from 1990 to 1999 and US$743 from 2000 to 2004. The highest level over the period, about US$1242 was reached in 1980. Associated Press, Wikipedia, Death Tolls

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o f violence, continued to occur. For example, in March 2004, suppression o f unarmed demonstrators in Abidjan by regular and irregular loyalist forces lef t a few hundred ki l led in the Youphogon suburbs. In turn, localized conflict between different ethnic groups along the Liberian border was particularly violent in the west.

5 . The launching o f a new round o f negotiations between the main parties resulted in the signing o f Ouagadougou Political Accord (the Ouaga Accord) o n 4 March 2007 between President Laurent Gbagbo and the head o f the FN, Guillaume Soro. Wh i l s t this i s the seventh accord since the beginning o f the crisis, the fact that it resulted f rom a direct dialogue between the two main parties and was facilitated by President CompaorC o f Burkina Faso has given i t additional credibility.

6. A fragile peace process remains. Yet, as indicated in the UN Secretary General’s reports o f M a y and October 2007 a number o f key steps have already been made in implementation, including the formation o f a new transitional government headed by Prime Minister Soro. Other steps have included the dismantling o f the buffer zone, the formation o f a new green line, symbolic start o f the disarmament o f the milit ias and the establishment o f an Integrated Command Centre to begin the integration o f the two armed forces into one. Further, laws have been passed, granting amnesty for crimes committed during the hostilities (save for crimes against humanity) as well as those pertaining to appointment o f magistrates and local administration (prdfets and sous-prtifets) necessary to restore the administration and begin the identification process.

7. The paradoxical fragility and the resilience o f the Ouaga Accord was highlighted by the rocket attack in late June 2007on the plane carrying the P M and his entourage to BouakC. Despite the enormous implications o f the incident, no unrest followed. Symbolic events continued in July and August, such as the ‘ceremony o f the flame o f peace’ in BouakC in which the President went to the north for the f irst time since the onset o f the crisis. Wh i l s t these were important to create confidence between the various stakeholders, further concrete steps envisaged in the Accord have not been taken.

8. The two critical aspects o f the peace process which have been further underscored by the ‘Ouaga Accord’ are i) the shift in emphasis f rom demobilization to the formation o f one national army and ii) the need to ho ld a credible identification process. These features have important implications for Bank support. With regard to the first, whilst init ially at least i t will create a large army;3 this i s an important cost for ensuring stabilization. In turn, there has been a shift away from a focus on cash payments for demobilization, as many combatants will continue to be employed as soldiers, to a focus on providing jobs for young people, particularly those associated with the militias. With regard to the second, the whole peace process will only become irreversible i f the population sees the establishment o f a credible process o f identification, by providing papers to Ivorians and foreigners alike, in advance o f the publication o f the electoral roll. As the question o f Ivoiritd remains contested there remains a large gulf in the estimations o f those who are Ivorian without necessary identification papers (such as birth certificates). These estimations range from 300,000 to some 3.4 mi l l ion persons. These persons have to be processed before they can be registered on the electoral ro l l . In light o f these evident polit ical and logistical constraints, the President o f the Electoral Commission said in September 2007 that elections could not take place until at least October 2008. The Bank’s work supporting modernization o f

Estimated at 45,000 men. No forward planning has been made by the Ministry o f Defense but i t is expected that the army wil l be reduced in out-years. This activity wil l also be complemented by a government ‘service’ program for young men - combined civi l ian and mi l i tary training.

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the c iv i l registry system assesses the timing o f a credible identification process to be a minimum 18 months, not accounting for those undeclared - as their number i s unknown. As importantly, provision o f ID papers will begin to lessen exclusion, victimization and discrimination based on ethnic origin and improve access to social services, especially education, as papers are required for the Ivorian schooling system.

B. ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL IMPACT

a) Economic Con text 9. The conflict and political instability have taken a heavy to l l on growth and poverty. In 2000-06, average economic growth turned negative (-0.4 percent) and was wel l below the rates in the rest o f WAEMU (4.1 percent) and sub-Saharan Afr ica (SSA, 4.9 percent). The partition o f the country disrupted trade within the country and diminished Cbte d’Ivoire’s role as a regional hub. Export volume growth fell between 1994-99 (8.7 percent) and 2000-06 (2.3 percent). Foreign direct investments took a major hit and many foreign businesses closed or significantly scaled down their operations awaiting the permanent resolution the crisis. This has aggravated the already very high unemployment, especially among the youth. The external current account held up (1.5 percent o f GDP during 2000-06) thanks to an increase in o i l exports since 2002 and overall favorable terms o f trade (notably for oil). The financial sector was adversely affected by the crisis, as al l 19 bank branches were closed in the Center-North-West region since 2002, the quality o f bank loans portfolios declined and the already weak judicial system deteriorated further. Developments in Cbte d’Ivoire also hurt the WAEMU regional trade and output.

10. Fiscal performance and transparency also suffered, owing to fall ing revenues and crisis- related expenditure pressures and weakened accountability. Whi le overall fiscal deficits narrowed (from 2.7 percent during 1994-99 to 1.3 percent during 2000-06) due to relatively disciplined cash management, the country could not comply with most fiscal WAEMU criteria and domestic and external arrears increased significantly. With frequent changes in government, polit ical and security concerns dominating daily l i fe and the absence o f an approved budget often until mid-year, the standard budget cycle was disrupted and governance worsened. An increasing share o f public expenditures (over 50 percent estimated in 2006) was executed outside regular budget procedures using discretionary treasury advances, some o i l revenue stayed off-budget and quasi-fiscal levies on cocoa and coffee were not used to benefit producers as intended. In this environment, Cbte d’Ivoire’s expenditure policy was increasingly focused on meeting ad-hoc and critical priority expenditures (wages and salaries, crisis-related expenditures) at the expense o f expenditures for achievement o f longer term economic and social objectives. Thus, the composition o f expenditure deteriorated as health and education spending fell as a share o f GDP, from 5.3 percent o f GDP in 1999 to 5.1 percent in 2006. In addition, most indicators o f governance ~ o r s e n e d . ~

11. Helped by the reunification, the economy registered a modest recovery in 2007. The estimated real GDP growth o f 1.6 percent was largely driven by the ongoing reunification process, a continued modest increase in private sector confidence and the ongoing rehabilitation

For example, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which relates to perceptions o f the degree o f corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, showed a decline in the country’s ranking f rom 75th in 1999 out o f 99 countries to 150th in 2007 out o f 180 countries. Other governance indicators, such as the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance) and the Bank’s Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) show similar trends.

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o f public infrastructure. Weather conditions adversely affected cotton and cocoa production and o i l production in volume decline but that was partly offset by higher o i l and cocoa prices. Despite an increase in food prices in the latter part o f 2007, inflation for the year remained at about 2 percent. The fiscal outcome in 2007 was broadly in l ine with budgetary policy targets. The primary basic surplus was 0.6 percent o f GDP, slightly below that target o f 1 percent o f GDP. However, operating spending, including sovereignty outlays and military premia, exceeded budget allocations, while post-conflict related and investment outlays were lower. Revenue was broadly on target, and the Government settled a significant amount o f domestic arrears (including o n subsidies to private schools) and resumed payment o f current debt service due f rom July 2007 to the Wor ld Bank and the AFDB. As indicated below, in early 2008 the Government also repaid about one ha l f o f the total stock o f Bank arrears.

Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Est. Proj. Proj. Proj.

National income GDP at constant prices Consumer price index (annual average)

External sector (on the basis of CFA francs) Exports, f.o.b., at current prices Imports, f.o.b., at current prices Real effective exchange rate (depreciation

Central government operations Total revenue and grants Total revenue Total expenditure Overall balance, incl. grants, payment order basis Primary basic balancc?

Gross Investment Gross domestic saving Gross national saving

External sector Current account balance (including official transfers) Current account balance (excluding official transfers) Overall balance External public debt

Memorandum items: Public debt in arrears (percent of GDP)

Domestic External

(Annual percentage changes, unless otherwise indicated)

1.6 1.8 -0.3 1.6 2.9 1.5 3.9 2.5 1.9 4.3

8.4 11.3 8.0 -5.0 12.8 21.9 22.9 -1.7 0.1 17.8

1.3 0.0 -0.4 1.6 ... (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

18.4 18.2 19.1 17.5 17.1 18.5 20.1 19.9 20.9 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 0.9 0.4 0.3

10.8 9.7 9.4 20.0 17.2 19.9 12.4 10.0 12.4

1.6 0.2 3.1 1.7 0.4 3.3

-3.6 -4.0 -2.7 72.4 73.5 71.8

19.4 25.1 27.7 6.4 5.7 5.5

13.0 19.4 22.3

19.8 20.7 19.4 19.4 20.6 21.1 -0.8 -0.4 0.6 0.8

8.7 10.4 16.0 16.8 10.1 11.6

1.4 1.2 -0.3 -0.6 -2.1 -0.8 70.1 66.8

27.4 21.3 2.9 1.6

24.5 19.7

5.1 2.7

4.0 6.0

...

20.7 19.6 21.4 -0.7 1.2

13.8 18.9 13.8

0.0 -1.4 0.2

61.5

5.6 2.7

3.4 6.4

...

20.7 19.7 21.6 -0.9 1.4

15.0 18.8 13.9

-1.2 -2.5 0.0 57.4

Sources: lvorian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

I’ Based on end-of-period changes In relative consumer prices and the nominal effective exchange rate.

‘ Defined as total revenue minus total expenditure, excluding all interest and foreign-financed investment expenditure.

12. The medium-term macroeconomic outlook i s based o n the assumption o f a durable resolution o f the socio-political conflict and a steady recovery after years o f c iv i l conflict. Real GDP growth i s projected to gradually p ick up f rom i t s stagnation during the 2000-06 crisis and

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settle at around 4.5 percent during 2008-10 (with a projected real GDP growth o f about 3 percent in 2008), and about 6 percent afterwards. The growth through the recovery phase would come from enhanced security, renewed private sector confidence and investments, the rehabilitation o f public infrastructure and redeployment o f government services in the Center-North-West which would permit an improved utilization o f existing capacity, especially in industry and services. Longer-term growth would be sustained by investment, helped by expected reforms in the cocoa, energy and financial sectors.

13. The primary basic balance i s assumed to steadily increase f rom the actual surplus o f 0.6 percent o f GDP in 2007 to 1.4 percent in 2010. In the short term, expenditures related to post- conflict recovery (including DDR, redeployment, identification, elections and reunification o f the country) will absorb a considerable share o f budgetary expenditures, whi le the share o f those devoted to the social sector, reunification and the rehabilitation o f the economic infrastructure will gradually increase. Fail ing progress o n the polit ical and security front, however, the country i s l ikely to remain in the grey area o f a stalemate where growth could remain positive but modest (1-2 percent per year), mainly o n the heels o f o i l production. Under any scenario, the regional monetary-exchange rate arrangement i s expected to ensure monetary and price stability (with inflation at about 3 percent in the short to medium term).

b) External and Domestic Debt 14. The recent Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) prepared by the Fund and IDA staffs shows that Cbte d’Ivoire i s in debt distress with large external arrears and an unsustainable public debt.5 Cbte d’Ivoire’s public debt, including arrears, at the end o f 2006, i s estimated at US$14.9 billion, or 84.8 percent o f GDP. External public debt accounted for US$12.9 billion, or 73.3 percent o f GDP. External arrears were US$3.6 billion, 20.5 percent o f GDP at end-2006. At that point, arrears to Paris Club creditors were 12.9 percent o f GDP, to London Club creditors 2.5 percent, to the AFDB Group 2.4 percent, and to the Wor ld Bank 2.2 percent o f GDP. Cbte d’Ivoire has n o arrears to the IMF. The Net Present Value (NPV) o f external debt ratios, although declining, i s wel l above country-specific indicative thresholds for most o f 2007-15. The public D S A does not change this assessment. The alternative scenarios and bound tests indicate that the debt indicators are sensitive to shocks that significantly prolong the period during which key ratios are above the thresholds, notably lower real GDP growth and export growth. These vulnerabilities underscore the importance o f a stable socioeconomic environment and sound policies to permit a sustained improvement in economic performance.

Table 2: Selected External Public Debt Indicators indicative 2006 2027

Threshold ’ (Est.) (Proj.) I I NPV of debt to GDP 30 64.0 33.0 NPV of debt to exports 100 124.7 107.1 NPV of debt to revenue (excl. grants) 200 351.1 169.8 Debt service to exports 15 9.0 9.8 Debt service to revenue (excl. grants) 25 25.4 15.5

Sources: Joint IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis, 2007.

’ Indicative policy-dependent threshold for a weak policy performer.

International Monetary Fund and International Development Association (2007). CBte d’Ivoire: Joint IMF/World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis 2007 under the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries (August 3,2007).

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15. CBte d’Ivoire has benefited f rom only l imi ted debt rel ief under the original HIPC Initiative. Based on the current projections o f debt ratios for end-2007, C8te d’Ivoire would qualify for re l ief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and MDRI. With domestic revenues exceeding 15 percent o f GDP, and exports exceeding 30 percent o f GDP, C8te d’Ivoire would meet the criteria for qualifying under the “fiscal window”, if i t s NPV o f debt-to-revenue exceeds the HIPC threshold o f 250 percent. Consistent with the HIPC Initiative framework, C8te d’Ivoire needs to clear arrears to major multilateral creditors pr ior to reaching the HIPC decision point and establish a track record o f reform. I t i s expected that satisfactory performance under two Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) programs could count towards that track record. The HIPC Preliminary Document could be submitted to the Boards o f the Bank and IMF in mid 2008, while the decision point could be reached in the second ha l f o f 2008. The AFDB i s also working to arrange financing for arrears clearance in April 2008.

16. The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that CBte d’Ivoire has a l imited capacity to contribute resources to the clearance o f i t s arrears with IBRD and IDA, and that an exceptional IDA allocation for a portion o f these arrears i s required. On the basis o f the tight fiscal framework underlying the Fund’s EPCA, the large post-conflict expenditure needs, and limited domestic and external financing available, in February 2008 the Government repaid one ha l f o f the total stock o f Bank arrears which as o f end-November 2007 stood at about US$46 mi l l ion and Euro 3 10 mi l l ion (approximately US$521 mi l l ion using March 2008 exchange rate).6 The remaining one ha l f would be financed through the Economic Governance and Recovery Grant which i s presented to the Board together with the ISN. The macro-fiscal projections take into account that this operation would likely deliver more than IDA’S anticipated HIPC rel ief up-front and therefore C8te d’Ivoire would not receive additional assistance from IDA under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, although it would expect to receive MDRI debt rel ief once the completion point has been achieved.

c) Regional Context

17. The Ivorian conflict must be placed in a regional context. Most importantly, as noted above, a significant proportion o f the population consists o f those who have emigrated from neighboring countries, particularly Burkina Faso, M a l i and Guinea. One o f the contested questions in this conflict i s whether those populations are in fact Ivorian, despite the fact that many have been resident for generations, or whether they are visiting workers. For the neighboring countries, C8te d’Ivoire i s an important source o f remittances f rom migrant labor and critical for trade and access to markets. From the outset, the Ivorian conflict has had a regional dimension. Many o f the Forces Nouvelles were originally based in Burkina Faso and in turn fighting in the west was undertaken by Liberian mercenaries on both sides. As the conflict has mutated, the war economy has resulted in increasing amounts o f commodities being smuggled across boundaries for onward sale, including cocoa, diamonds and timber as a means o f accumulation by both sides.

18. Whi ls t these transformations have certainly benefited certain elite interests, the conflict has also disrupted formal transport and trade. The ports o f LomC, Cotonou and Tema have increased business whilst conditions in Abidjan have been unstable. The conflict has also slowed down regional integration initiatives.

The Government issued Treasury bills in September and December 2007 in order to mobilize resources needed to repay 50 percent o f its arrears to the World Bank as well as part o f arrears to the AFDB.

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c. GOVERNANCE AND TRANSPARENCY

19. Governance and transparency deteriorated during the conflict (see Figures 1 and 2). T h i s i s particularly the case with the cocodcoffee bodies,’ whose resources are derived from taxes on producers (most o f whom l ive below the poverty line). Earlier attempts to audit these bodies were refuted on the grounds that they were private entities, exempt f rom government scrutiny. The disappearance and presumed death o f a Canadian journalist in 2004 who was investigating the cocoa sector i s but one illustration o f the deep vested interests in resisting transparency and reform. In turn, recent analysis o f the cocoa secto? suggests that revenues f rom cocoa exports have contributed to the financing o f the armed forces on both sides o f the conflict. On the positive side, the Government has started regular reports outlining revenues and investments and it has agreed to launch a strategic review process (including audits) for the sector in 2008.

20. There have also been transparency issues regarding contracts between the public and private sectors (e.g., the handling o f the concession for a port terminal and telecoms contracts) that will need to be addressed in the reconstruction phase as part o f the reforms to improve governance and transparency. An additional area o f concern relates to the management o f petroleum revenues which have assumed a growing importance as petroleum exports increased. Petroleum exports (both crude and refined) have become as important as traditional cocoa exports. With the coming on stream o f new o i l fields, these revenues are expected to increase significantly in the near term. On the positive side, the Government agreed to a number o f different audits in the energy sector in 2007 in the areas o f o i l exploration, o i l refining and electricity. I t i s anticipated that these will form the basis o f the Government’s fulf i l lment o f the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) criteria in 2008.

Figure 1 : Transparency International - Corruption Perception Index - 2007

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index - 2007

Senegal

Burkina Faso

Mali

Kenya

Cote d’lwire

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Score

’ CBte d’Ivoire i s the world’s biggest cocoa producer and this sector i s the backbone o f the rural economy,

* Hot Chocolate, How Cocoa Fuelled the Conflict in C6te d’Ivoire, Global Witness, June 2007. with millions o f rural households dependent on this crop for income and employment.

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2 1. As illustrated, there has been a general deterioration o f governance in C6te d’Ivoire. The allegations o f corruption and the ensuing protests relating to the toxic waste scandal (see paragraph 30) are but an example o f the challenge confronting agents for reform in both public and private spheres.

Figure 2: CBte d’Ivoire: Deteriorating Measures of Governance, 1998-2006 COTE D ’ I V O I R E

Comparison between 2006, 2002, 1998 (top-bottom order)

1 - - ! - Voice and Accountability

P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y

Government Effect iveness

Regulatory Qual i ty

Rule o f Lau

Control o f Corruption

B 25 58 75 Country’s Percent i le Rank (0-188)

Source: Kaufmann O., A . Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters V I : Governance Indicators f o r 1996-2006 Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the q u a l i t y o f governance provided by a large number o f enterprise, c i t i z e n and expert survey respondents i n indus t r ia l and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number o f survey ins t i tu tes , th ink tanks, non-governmental organizations, and internat ional organizations. The aggregate indicators do not r e f l e c t the o f f i c i a l views o f the World Bank, i t s Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Countries‘ r e l a t i v e posi t ions on these indicators are subject t o indicated margins o f er ror tha t should be taken i n t o consideration when making comparisons across countries and over time.

22. A major effect o f the crisis has been the break down o f the rule o f law. This has had an impact on the regulatory environment and resulted in a deterioration in the conditions for private and financing sector development. The rebuilding o f a competent and independent judiciary will be a key cornerstone for the country’s economy. In turn, outside the commercial arena, increasing lawlessness and impunity in the country during the crisis has severely impacted people’s lives as noted below. Wh i l s t l i tt le quantitative evidence i s yet available, i t i s clear f rom various reporting organizations that major aspects o f the criminal justice system, including the police and the local and higher courts, n o longer serve as protection for c iv i l and polit ical rights.

23. Governance has been the central theme in the Bank pol icy dialogue with the Ivorian authorities since the increased engagement in early 2007. Prior to arrears clearance the most significant portion o f Bank resources (sourced from LICUS and PCF trust funds - see paragraphs 36 and 37) has been focused o n strengthening the government’s reform agenda, particularly but not exclusively in the public finance, cocoa, energy and financial sectors. The government does not yet have a comprehensive governance or anti-corruption strategy. However, it has made noteworthy steps in i t s reform agenda, including working towards fulf i l lment of the EITI criteria

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based on the three major energy audit^,^ improving reporting and announcing a strategy review for the cocoa sector, and Ministry o f Finance regular reporting o n public finances to the Council o f Ministers, the Bank and the Fund. Upon more complete re-engagement, the Bank will continue working with authorities towards a more comprehensive governance and anti-corruption strategy.

D. SOCIAL CONTEXT

24. The direct impact o f the crisis o n the population has belied the short period o f the c i v i l war itself, CBte d’Ivoire has not endured the same kind o f massive human casualty as neighboring countries such as Liberia or Sierra Leone. However, the combined effects o f the violent hostilities between the two parties, an increase in human rights abuse, the worsening economic situation, and the contraction o f state provision o f basic social services have had a significant impact on Ivorian society. Regular human rights reports” highlight the continued breakdown o f Ivorian society, the increasing violence in daily l i f e and the impunity o f perpetrators, both in and out o f uniform. In the early years o f the crisis, scores o f civilians have been ki l led during c iv i l protests and were victims o f mi l i t ia violence. These kinds o f incidents have significantly abated, but the levels o f sexual violence and victimization particularly o f those without identification papers continue. Further, continued presence o f official and unofficial checkpoints throughout the territory act as instruments o f oppression and military control.

25. An over-simplification o f the Ivorian crisis describes it as a conflict between north and south or indeed between an Islamic north and a Christian south. The reality i s much more complex. The population i s made up o f some 60 distinct ethnic communities which are grouped into five large socio-linguistic groups: Akan, Voltaic or Gur, Kru, Northern MandC and Southern MandC. The Akan i s the largest ethnic group, comprising around 40 percent o f the population”, and found in eastern and central regions; the northern groups are the Northern MandC and Voltaic, comprising about 34 percent o f the population. As the Ivor ian economy has developed, it has also engineered massive demographic changes, including pulling significant populations f rom francophone countries - notably Burkina Faso, Guinea and M a l i - as wel l as those Ivorians living in the north, particularly towards the r ich agricultural areas in the south and conurbations. According to the 1998 census some 23 percent o f the Northern MandC population l ived in Abidjan. The same census revealed that up to 25 percent o f the population was o f foreign origin, over 4 mi l l ion persons, o f which about ha l f were born in CBte d’Ivoire.

26. Ethnic differences have contributed to the conflict and at the same time, have worsened as a result. This has largely centered on discrimination related to identity and nationality. Communities have increasingly been categorized as being “autochtones” (nationals native o f the place o f residence), “aZZochtones” (Ivorian nationals who n o longer reside in place o f origin) or “aZZog8nes” (foreigners - although they may have been in CBte d’Ivoire for two or three generations). Formal status and entitlements, including most importantly land tenure, as wel l as informal social relations and networks, have been increasingly demarcated according to these categories. Land tenure i s a conflict-factor which so far has been lef t unaddressed at the polit ical

Three energy audits were financed in 2007 - in the areas o f o i l exploration, refining and electricity. The first completed audit, a diagnostic o f the o i l ref inery was followed by a workshop in September 2007, attended by al l parties to disseminate the results. The second audit on o i l exploration and the organization o f PETROCI has been completed and submitted to the government for review. The third audit covers the electricity sub-sector and i s expected to be completed in 2008. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty Reports, UN Human Rights Reports, 2007 1998 Census.

9

10

1 1

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level during the various peace negotiations. T h i s will need to be addressed by the authorities in order to defuse potential conflicts at both the community and national levels.

conflict and the large displaced population. The incidence i s very high among the most vulnerable groups, especially in the areas separating the north and the south and along the main transport corridors. These rates are also associated with a dramatic increase in sexual violence associated with the increase in impunity amongst regular and irregular forces in the country. Table 3 below sets out some o f the socio-economic indicators which illustrate the impact o f the crisis on both the Ivorian population and

27. The indirect impact o f social collapse has likewise been significant. According to recent Bank analysis, poverty has increased from an official 38.2 percent just before the crisis (2002) to 43.2 percent in 2006. Nearly one mi l l ion people have been displaced, primarily into urban areas, and particularly into Abidjan. According to the 2006 UNICEF M I C S survey, 33 percent o f children under five are suffering from moderate malnutrition and 15 percent f rom severe malnutrition. Severe chronic malnutrition was particularly identified in the centre west (1 5 percent) and in the northwest (16.7 percent). Generally, social services are fail ing the poor, especially in the north and west. During the height o f the crisis at least 500,000 children were out o f school. In turn, a cycle o f strikes have impacted o n the quality o f education services available. School absenteeism and high drop-out rates have significantly increased the number o f street children, particularly in urban areas. Standards have also significantly deteriorated at university levels. The student union, FESCI, controls most o f the universities in Abidjan and has been allegedly involved in a number o f killings o f students, riots and demonstrations as wel l as playing a role in the country’s national politics.

Box 1: HIV/AIDS Situation in CBte d’Ivoire

836,600 people infected with AIDS at the end of 2005. Adult infection rate of 4.7% the highest in West Afr-ica.

Of aged l7 Or younger have lost one or both parents to AIDS since the beginning o f the epidemic.

28. The humanitarian context has improved over the last few years, although there are areas o f emergency need, particularly related to continuing displacement or return o f populations. Studies undertaken by WFP and FA0 in 2006 estimated that in ten o f the 19 regions o f the country about 566,500 persons or 9 percent o f rural households are food insecure and some 1,109,000 people, or 20 percent o f households are at-risk o f food insecurity. For 2007, the UN agencies have requested some US$60 mi l l ion to address humanitarian needs in their UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal.

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Table 3: SUI

S @ 3,000 persons killed during the

height o f c iv i l conflict. Close to one mi l l ion Internally Displaced People, o f which 120,000 in Abidjan.

UNDP Human Development Index: 1999: 154th out o f 174 countries; 2007: 166th out o f 177 countries.

D 500,000 children out o f school

Poverty:

o 38.2% before the crisis

o 43.2% after the crisis (2002)

(2006)

15% o f children severely

Increase in ethnic tensions and malnourished.

human rights violations.

Source: World Bank Staff

E, THE ENVIRONMENT

Cumulative per capita income decline during 1999-2006: -16% Measured real output growth

2002: - 1.4% 2003: - 1.6% 2004: 1.5% 2005: 1.8%

2007: 1.6% 2006: - 0.3%

Increasing arrears, deteriorating governance and transparency. Rising military expenditures, financed mainly from cocoa para- fiscal levies, o i l revenue and diamond smuggling. Decrease in capacity o f local and national administration to collect revenue and customs.

e Crisis

450,000 people had to re tum to their home countries.

Disruption in regional trade and transportation.

Significant decline in remittances from foreign workers in CBte d’Ivoire.

Decline in foreign direct investment.

Negative impact on economic growth in neighboring WAEMU countries.

Slowdown in regional integration.

30. The toxic waste scandal o f 2006, which led to the resignation o f the Banny transitional government, highlights the vulnerability o f Cdte d’Ivoire. Due to the crisis in governance, increase in corruption and the fragmentation o f state authority there i s not sufficient regulatory capacity to protect the country’s environment. In August 2006, over 400 tons o f toxic waste was dumped in residential areas o f Abidjan. An environmental crisis followed, leading to a recorded 15 deaths, thousands o f illnesses, and a breakdown o f the local economy. In addition to widespread il lness, the illegal dumping placed enormous strain on local government capacity. Approximately 100,000 people in Cdte d’Ivoire sought medical treatment, overrunning local hospitals. Businesses closed, workers were la id off, and many fishing, vegetable, and small livestock activities were halted. Protests erupted in the ci ty over suspicions o f possible government corruption in the scandal.

3 1. Whilst n o comprehensive evaluation o f the environmental context has been possible during the crisis years, there are also allegations of massive logging in both governmental and rebel areas, including in natural reserves and classified forest. Recent reporting points to large- scale destruction o f forests, including so-called protected areas such as national parks, accelerated during the crisis. Deforested areas in parks are now illegally occupied by squatter communities and farmers.

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11. BANK ENGAGEMENT TO DATE AND LESSONS LEARNED

(a) The I-CAS and Program Suspension

32. The previous Interim Country Assistance Strategy (I-CAS) for C8te d’Ivoire was approved by the Board in June 2002 and covered the period through the end o f 2003. The I-CAS objectives and scope were highly selective and limited to the high priority measures included in the Government’s Economic Recovery Program. The core objectives o f the I -CAS were: (i) supporting a return to robust growth; and (ii) improving service delivery. The Bank’s strategy provided a framework for poverty reduction within an existing portfolio o f some US$585 mi l l ion (of which U S 2 4 8 mi l l ion remained undisbursed), comprising 12 projects, and an anticipated new lending o f US$380 mi l l ion for 2002/03.

33. The cornerstone o f the new lending was a US$200 mi l l ion Economic Recovery Credit (ERC), aimed at improving public expenditure management, rural productivity, and basic social service delivery. The ERC was approved by the Board in FY02 and a first tranche o f US$lOO mi l l ion was disbursed. Further implementation was interrupted by the conflict, however, and the remaining tranche was canceled. Other projects in the pipeline included: HJY/AIDS MAP (USS50 million), Capacity Building for Poverty Reduction (US$80 million), and Urban Poverty Reduction and Improved Service Delivery (US$50 mill ion) projects. Analytical and advisory assistance was to be provided, inter alia, through preparatory work on a Public Expenditure Review and a Country Procurement Assessment Review to strengthen public expenditure management and support procurement reform.

34. The conflict-which started in September 2002-interrupted the implementation o f the I- CAS, including the ERC and other Bank activities in the ex-rebel held areas. Under these conditions, the Bank completed i t s f i rst post-conflict public expenditure review in December 2003 that documented the early social, economic and governance impact o f the conflict. When Cdte d’Ivoire fe l l into arrears in June 2004, the Bank IDA program was suspended.

(b) LICUS and PCF Engagement

35. In l ine with best practice, the Country Team launched a number o f analytical and program activities with the use o f L ICUS and PCF Trust Funds (see B o x 2). The current U S 6 . 4 mi l l ion L ICUS grant package finances activities such as youth employment, and support to identification and preparation for post-conflict recovery. The lessons learned from these activities have been critical in formulating the strategic outlines o f the ISN.

Box 2: LICUS and PCF Funding in CGte d’Ivoire 2004-2007

With the country in arrears, Bank support to C8te d’Ivoire during the past three years has been primarily in the form o f PCF and LICUS grants. This flexible, fast-to-get funding has proven crucial in providing strategic support for the implementation o f peace agreements, and post conflict recovery. In particular:

A PCF grant o f US$247,850 has made i t possible to pi lot an approach to the reintegration o f children associated with the armed groups and forces. In collaboration with UNICEF and local NGOs over 500 children were assisted in transitioning f rom military camps back to school or vocational training, and most o f them were reunited with their families. Lessons from the project have been incorporated in the National Program for the Prevention, Demobilization and

I Reintegration o f Children Associated with the k e d Groups and Forces.

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Two PCF grants totaling US$1.2 million financed community rehabilitation in both government and ex-rebel controlled areas. Using a community-driven approach, the NGO CARE helped communities define their needs and identify sub-projects that could address them. Some 50 communities benefited f rom rehabilitated social infrastructure, support to income generating activities and capacity building. The two grants have made it possible to test the methodology and refine the procedures for nation-wide operations supported by the PCAP. Close collaboration with the National Program for Community Rehabilitation as wel l as a host o f initiatives by NGOs and other donors has been established.

A PCF grant of US$269,800 financed communication programs to facilitate reconciliation and collaboration within and among communities. Radio soap operas, sketches and feature programs broadcasted by community radios have addressed social problems and prejudices in a fun, non- threatening way, while direct training taught village representatives how to manage conflicts. This project, implemented by a specialized NGO and also supported by the EC, collaborated with community rehabilitation efforts, resulting in the solution o f a number o f long-standing inter- communal conflicts ,

A LICUS Trust Fund grant package of US$6.4 million i s addressing what are arguably the main obstacles to a durable peace. A component focusing o n governance and post-conflict planning i s financing audits in the energy sector (oil and electricity) as wel l as targeted technical assistance and capacity building to improve preparedness both o n the government and Bank side for a full-fledged post-conflict program (e.g., a study o f the energy sector, information gathering on the social sectors, a workshop to harmonize community rehabilitation approaches). A second component supports the national identification process, jo int ly designed with the EC. A third component finances employment creation for youth at risk so as to prevent further recruitment by fighting groups and pi lot approaches for the reintegration o f ex-combatants.

A PCF grant o f US$732,759 to support protection f rom gender-based violence (GBV) by providing assistance to victims, raising awareness, targeting behavior change and improving available services.

(c) Lessons Learned

36. PCF: PCF grants were identified only 2 months after the official end o f hostilities. This early presence was key to the overall Bank re-engagement. The focus on chi ld soldiers at the earliest stage allowed children from armed groups to be released before practices o f chi ld recruitment were widely spread. Beyond this immediate impact, it allowed the Bank to be better informed and to develop a dialogue with the Ivorian and international partners on DDR related issues and be a well-informed player. Furthermore, involvement at the local level, with pi lot community-recovery activities, allowed Bank staff to comprehend the changing local reality and to be informed o f people’s economic and social concerns. These small-scale activities provided a window towards better understanding o f complex issues, such as security and economic related displacement and access to land, and therefore towards informing future Bank strategy and larger- scale projects, such as the PCAP.

37. LICUS: These grants permitted the provision o f key technical assistance, a major tool that brought expertise to polit ically and economically sensitive processes. Such efforts f rom a neutral player are critical for government officials to work towards a better informed consensus, based on expert analysis. In i t ia l audits for example in the energy sector assisted the government in demonstrating i t s commitment to address poor governance. Finally, exploring various economic sectors for j o b creation has been critical in scaling up reintegration programs for ex-

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combatants and youth-at-risk alike. Such efforts are needed for successful reintegration o f ex- combatants as wel l as building a strong foundation for analysis o n the sources o f growth. This has addressed the common lesson learned from DDR programs around the wor ld that highlight the lack o f preparation o f reintegration components and unsustainable options offered to ex- combatants.

(d) IFC, MIGA and W B I activities

38. The IFC Abidjan office remained open throughout the conflict with minimal staffing and most activities in CGte d’Ivoire are covered f rom Accra, Ghana where IFC’s Country Manager i s based. Activities will be further strengthened as stability i s regained. IFC’s role for most o f the crisis has been primarily to preserve the portfolio (US$ 77 mi l l ion as o f February 2007), invested mostly in o i l and gas and electricity generation. Throughout the crisis, IFC’s Special Operations Unit has been consistently working with clients facing difficulties in dealing with the prevailing economic conditions. IFC i s committed to taking an active role in the post-conflict private sector strategy and considering new investments in selected sectors, such as energy.

39. MIGA’s portfolio in CGte d’Ivoire consists o f one project, in support o f the country’s agribusiness and manufacturing sectors. The Agency has issued coverage to French investors against the r isks o f expropriation and war and c iv i l disturbance for i t s investment toward the rehabilitation o f three cocoa plantations and expansion o f cocoa production in CGte d’Ivoire. In addition to increasing the overall production o f cocoa, the project will have a positive impact on the country’s balance o f payments. The remaining gross exposure f rom this investment i s US$10.6 mill ion. As o f the f i rst quarter o f FY08, MIGA has not received any requests for support o f projects in C6te d’Ivoire but looks forward to increasing i ts engagement as the situation further stabilizes.

40. The number o f Ivorian participants in WBI activities had been increasing sharply since the launch o f the global distance learning network (GDLN) in Abidjan. Unfortunately, as a result o f the security situation in the country, that number dropped significantly. 70 percent o f those who participate in WBI learning activities do so through workshops offered by videoconference through the GDLN or through web-based courses. The rest participate in face-to-face events that take place in neighboring countries.

I11 GOVERNMENT STRATEGY

41. The polit ical crisis since the f i rst coup d’itat in 1999 has seriously undermined government efforts at launching an effective recovery and development plan. In early 2002, the government launched an interim-PRSP. This strategy had six central axes: i) sustainable economic growth; ii) rural development and promotion o f the private sector; iii) improvement o f social services; iv) decentralization; v) good governance and vi) strengthening o f human security.

42. Since the outbreak o f hostilities in November 2002 and the neither-war-nor-peace situation since the January 2003 Marcoussis agreement, several transitional governments have attempted to implement national recovery plans leading to new elections but have failed. As the country f e l l in arrears in November 2004, the Bank played a relatively l imi ted role in supporting these national strategies, pr imari ly focusing on L ICUSPCF funded pi lot projects and analytical work.

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43. The Ouaga Accord o f 4 March 2007 created a new polit ical dispensation by putting the two main protagonists within the same power-sharing government and having the leader o f the Forces Nouvelles as the Prime Minister. The new government that took office has focused i ts attention primarily o n i) restoring polit ical and security stability as precondition for post-conflict recovery and ii) economic recovery and resumption o f relations with the international financial institutions, illustrated by the resumption o f payment o f debt service to the Wor ld Bank and AfDB and the repayment o f one ha l f o f the total stock o f arrears to the Wor ld Bank in February 2008.

(a) Program for Political and Security Stability

44. The Ouaga Accord, based upon the previous agreements since January 2003, set out a plan for addressing the key issues at the heart o f the Ivorian crisis. The chronogram envisaged a period o f 10 months for implementation leading up to elections - anticipated in early 200812. This plan has five key pillars as outlined in the objectives o f the peace agreement itself:

0

0

0

Communication and reconciliation.

Security and stabilization: including integration o f the armed forces, demobilization and dismantling o f the militias; Identification and elections: including the establishment o f mobile courts to determine identity and issue o f cards and registers in advance o f the elections; Reinsertion of war-affected populations: particularly youth and those associated with weapons - for which the government has created a service civique; Redeployment of the administration: throughout the territory;

45. In June 2007, the government held a donor round-table in which further detailed plans were presented with attendant budgets. The total budget was estimated to be some 247 b i l l ion C F A o f which the government has indicated 197 b i l l ion CFA has been met by donor commitments. For 2007 and much o f 2008, the activities o f the government’s program are wel l funded. I t i s anticipated that the shortfall will only have a significant impact in 2009 by which time i t i s expected to be met either by additional government or donor resources.

(b) Program for Economic Recovery

46. Since M a y 2007, the government, led by the Ministers o f Finance and Planning, has developed, in close pol icy dialogue with the Bank, the Fund and the AfDB, an early program o f reform measures aiming at restoring macroeconomic stability and advancing structural reforms in key sectors such as energy, cocoa and the financial sector. This program has a focus on the strengthening o f governance and transparency during the remainder o f 2007 and 2008. These commitments have been set out in the Memoranda o f Understanding (MoUs) between the government and WB and AfDB in April and July 2007. The M o U s have been, in turn, followed by an IMF Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) program, which was approved in August 2007. The preparation o f the EGRG has further advanced the pol icy dialogue on public expenditure management, governance and transparency in the key sectors-energy, cocoa, and financial. At the same time, the government i s working o n a full PRSP that will underpin the government reform program over the coming years.

The President and Prime Minister signed a follow-up Ouaga Accord (Ouaga I1 and 111, 28 November 2007) which stated that elections would be held by end o f June 2008, although the head o f the Electoral Commission said that logistically they would not be possible until at least October 2008.

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IV. THE BANK’S INTERIM STRATEGY

A. RATIONALE FOR THE I S N

47. This Interim Strategy Note was prepared in accordance with OP/BP 2.30 on ‘Development Cooperation and Conflict.’ The I S N closely follows the outline o f the Country Presentation made to the Board in M a y 2007 and the Country Update which accompanied the Post-Conflict Assistance Program to the Board in July 2007.

48. Conditions in C6te d’Ivoire are appropriate for the development o f an Interim Strategy. The recent ‘Ouaga accord’ represents the most credible attempt thus far by the ex-belligerents to resolve the crisis. Analysis o f the current context gives the peace process a reasonable chance o f success, based upon the following factors:

i. a new government comprising the President and the leader o f the rebellion as the PM;

ii. concrete steps have been taken such as the dismantling o f the buffer zone, creation o f jo in t brigades, some disbanding o f the militias, and establishment o f an integrated command centre (a precursor to the formation o f one national army);

iii. full support o f regional actors, most importantly the Facilitator President CampaorC o f Burkina Faso.

49. In this context, and in light o f the government’s commitment to full arrears clearance and normalization o f relations with the international donor community, Wor ld Bank staff have calibrated that the r isks associated with non-engagement are greater than incremental and closely monitored engagement in support o f the new transitional government and the Ouaga Accord. In the current window o f opportunity, the Wor ld Bank has a critical and early role to play and, working very closely with the UN system and the European Commission, i t s technical and financial resources will provide the following:

i. the necessary international support for the implementation o f the five pillars o f the peace agreement so that they are undertaken in a reasonably free and fair manner;

ii. an immediate disbursement o f assistance to at-risk and war-affected populations including displaced populations and communities in areas affected by local conflict;

iii. contribution to the general stabilization process by way o f public investments in j o b creation, training and reintegration, particularly targeted at youth.

50. This Interim Strategy Note defines the Bank’s engagement in CGte d’Ivoire during the emergency transition in the immediate aftermath o f the Ouaga Accord and outlines a road map for comprehensive and sustained Bank engagement upon the clearance o f arrears. The period for the I S N starts with the first signal o f full Bank engagement, the Post-Conflict Assistance Program o f July 2007, and covers the next 24 months until July 2009, when it i s anticipated that the Bank will be in a position to present a Country Assistance Strategy supporting the PRSP. Above all, the strategy has sufficient built-in flexibil i ty in terms o f i t s activities that the Bank will be able to respond to differing circumstances and scenarios if for example the Ouaga process i s attenuated, and i t allows for disengagement in certain areas and continuation o f certain activities, such as community recovery, which are less at-risk to changes in the political environment.

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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE I S N

TRANSITIONAL PHASE

51. this transition has three objectives:

The Bank’s Interim Strategy in support o f CGte d’Ivoire’s emergency recovery during

FRAMEWORK

0 Support stabilization o f the crisis and assist the government in addressing key conflict factors (through implementation o f the Ouaga accord); Assist war-affected populations by way o f community rehabilitation and support to the provision o f basic social services; Assist economic recovery and reform by focusing o n economic governance reforms, institutional building, fostering demand for governance and accountability and supporting sustained economic growth.

1. Implementation of Peace Agreement

52. These three objectives will be undertaken according to a timeframe which i s concomitant with the timetable o f the Ouaga accord and the process o f normalization with the international community after f ive years o f crisis. T h e step from peace implementation to recovery (phase 1 and phase 2 below) i s contingent - in Bank terms - upon a successful clearance o f arrears. Such a timetable i s outlined as follows:

Ouagadougou Accord o f 4 March (and preceding

Box 3: Phased Bank Engagement during Transitic I

2. Recovery agreements). The M o U and Government sector

TIME PERIOD’’

+ 10-18 months

+ 6-18 months

+ 18-24 months and bevond

Period

BANK ENGAGEMENT

LICUS/ PCF and IDA Pre- Arrears clearance Grant

Arrears Clearance and Full IDA program

CAS

53. The three objectives will be addressed by way o f a number o f different cross-supporting activities which are envisaged to underpin the peace process and at the same time kick-start economic recovery (outlined in Table 3 below):

i. Stabilization and Peacebuilding: This pil lar will comprise support to the implementation o f the Ouaga Accord. Bank activities will be focused on medium term stabilization activities, such as emergency j ob creation and training for young people and labor-intensive public work programs. The Bank will also support the critical process o f identification by way o f longer term rehabilitation and modernization o f c iv i l registries and local administration.

ii. Assist War-Affected Populations: Given the socio-economic impact o f the prolonged crisis upon the Ivorian population, the Bank shall play a major role in supporting war-affected communities. Activities in the short term wil l include community rehabilitation and

Time period - calculated f rom March 2007, the date o f the Ouaga accord. The only f ixed timeframes include the Ouaga accord chronogram and the commitments made in the Bank-Government MoUs.

13

- 17-

infrastructure programs working at the local level with non-governmental actors as wel l as the local authorities, formal and informal. In the longer term and after arrears clearance, the Bank will be able to support basic social service. provision, with a focus o n education and water, as wel l as a grant to support H IV /A IDS programs.

PILLAR I Stabilization and Peace

Building

. . . 111. Kick-starting Economic Recovery and Reform: The key to sustaining the resolution o f the

crisis i s improving governance and transparency as a prerequisite for improved resource management and economic recovery (and diversification f rom the core sectors). Hence, the focus o f Bank support will be on fostering economic governance reform in order to stimulate private sector confidence, investment and growth. Improving governance and transparency in public resource management and, especially, in the energy, cocoa-coffee, and financial sectors will be critical.

PILLAR I1 Support to War-Affected

Populations

Table 4: CBte d’Ivoire: Bank Assistance in Support of the EmergencyAXecovery Transition

Youth reinsertion/ Job creation Individual ly targeted employment and training programs, labor-intensive public works. PCAP (Comp. A US$4Om) + L I C U S US$2.2 m

Fair and Transparent Identification Issuing o f id cards and creation o f electoral l i s t s as crit ical precursors for credible elections. PCAP(Comp. B US$2Om) + LICUS Grant (US$2.25 m)

Redeployment of the administration ,

Support to Civil Registries and prtfets and sous-prtfets. PCAP(Comp. D US$2Om)

Community Recovery Provision o f emergency social services and l ivel ihood support through non-governmental sectors. Bank PCAP(Comp. C US$4Om)

Delivery of Basic Social and Humanitarian Services A s territory unifies and administration deploys throughout increase in basic social service provision and infrastructure. Reactivation of portfolio suspended under arrears( US$I 04m), HIV/AIDS (US$2Om), Emergency Urban Infrastructure Reconstruction (US$9Om)

PCF Grant - in support o f victims o f sexual violence.

Peacekeeping forces (8,000 UN and 3,000 French) UN arms embargo and sanctions

Donor support to elections, identif ication and reinsertion (US$65m)

PILLAR I11 Kick starting Economic Recovery and Reform

UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal - (humanitarian aid) US$60m

Other donor support - US$50 m PEPFAR US$56 m (3 years) Global Fund US$20 m (3 years)

Institutional building and economic governance reform PCAP(Comp. D US$2Om),

LICUS Grants (US$2m), Governance and Institutional Project (US$I Om) GEF protected areas project (US$2.5m)

Budget support Economic Governance and Recovery Grant (EGRG), US$[308]m).

(Further Development Policy support and investments in key sectors, such as eneru, tbd for FY09)

OTHER INTERNATIONAL DONOR SUPPORT

IMF Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance I and I1 (US$60m x 2)

AfDB budget support (US$3Om)

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54. As the Bank has not been fully engaged in CBte d'Ivoire for a number o f years, these activities will be supported by a number o f formal and informal analytical activities. This Economic Sector Work includes a Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR), sources o f growth analysis, a governance and decentralization review as well as the preparation o f a rapid Country Social Assessment.

c. INSTRUMENTS FOR THE I S N DURING THE TRANSITION

55. The Bank's support instruments during the I S N Emergency and Recovery timeframe (July 2007-July 2009) will include a blend o f t rus t finds, IDA and GEF operations as wel l as non-lending activities. These are more specifically outlined below by objective and tabled in Appendix 2.

56. CBte d'Ivoire i s eligible for exceptional post-conflict allocations. In addition, extra resources are expected to be mobil ized from restructuring the existing IDA country portfolio which had been suspended during arrears. In terms o f new IDA resources for FY08, Cate d'Ivoire would receive a total o f US$428 mi l l ion which comprises an exceptional support for arrears clearance and an exceptional post-conflict allocation. (This excludes an IDA pre-arrears clearance grant o f US$120 mi l l ion provided in July o f FY08 to finance the post-conflict assistance program, PCAP, and existing L ICUS and PCF grants o f US$6 million). The FY09 indicative IDA post-conflict allocation i s around US$lOO mill ion, subject to confirmation on the basis o f progress on the peace process and overall country performance, as rated on the basis o f Post- Conflict Performance Indicators, and performance o f other eligible post-conflict countries. In addition to these new resources, CBte d'Ivoire would access US$104 mi l l ion f rom restructuring the existing portfolio (comprising four projects in education, rural development, transport and distance learning) and an additional US$2-3 m i l l i on each from L ICUS and GEF Trust Funds. The overall indicative resource envelope covering the I S N period FY08-FY09 would, therefore, amount to around US$763.5 mi l l ion (see Appendix 2). These resources will be utilized to meet the following objectives:

Objective I: Stabilization and Peace Building

57. Stabilization and peace building objectives will be supported by the continuation o f a number o f L ICUS and PCF funded activities as wel l as the core components o f the PCAP, launched in July 2007.

0 LICUS and PCF - ongoing and new activities including a grant in support o f victims o f sexual violence.

0 PCAP - Component A: reintegration (US$40 million); this activity aims to facilitate the economic reintegration o f ex-combatants, individuals associated with armed groups and youth at risk. Given the uncertainties about the number o f persons who will take part in the formal demobilization process, as well as the potential security risk posed by unemployed and disenfranchised youth, the services financed by the component will also be available to other youth at risk. Activities will include labor intensive public works and self-employment projects.

PCAP - Component B: identification (US$20 million); this activity will support key elements in the process o f identification including the financing o f costs o f updating and modernizing the national c iv i l registry, providing birth certificates and issuing o f identification cards. This component i s jo in t ly designed, financed and implemented with the E C .

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Objective 11: Support to War-Affected Populations

58. community rehabilitation component o f the PCAP and also by the reactivated projects.

Support to war-affected populations will be provided in the f i rst instance by the

PCAP Component C: community rehabilitation (US$40 million); this activity will help meet the short-to-medium term needs o f communities most affected by the conflict. The PCAP activities will complement those financed by the restructured projects o f the Bank’s existing portfolio by focusing on communities with the highest levels o f destruction and displacement. Through sub-project grants, the PCAP will support: i) reconstruction, rehabilitation, and re-equipment o f community-level infrastructure; ii) restoration o f social capital and social cohesion; and iii) capacity building for effective sub-project development and management and local governance.

HIV/AIDS Project (US%20 million): will be a multi-sector support operation to energize the ongoing national campaign to control the spread o f HIV/ A I D S . The operation will complement other initiatives by international and national partners. The operation will include the following components: i) prevention; ii) care an& treatment; iii) strengthening capacity and coordination; iv) research and epidemiological surveillance; and v) monitoring and evaluation.

The Education and Support Program (PASEF): with an undisbursed amount of US$51.9 million. The project will be restructured to focus on: (i) providing block grants directly to schools, thereby reinforcing links between community rehabilitation and education service delivery; and (ii) strengthening and building a quality, cost-effective teacher pre- service training system.

Rural Land Program (PNGTER): with an undisbursed amount of US$27.2 million. The project will be restructured into a rural C D D for communities that have been isolated as an impact o f the crisis. Land tenure will be another important priority, as security o f rights i s more necessary than ever for a return to peace and for resumption o f agriculture.

59. As noted above, the Bank has an o ld portfolio emanating f rom the last Country Assistance Strategy in the late 1990’s. This portfolio comprises the three last projects providing social services as wel l as the Transport Sector Adjustment and Investment Program (CI- PAST) with an undisbursed amount o f US%24.8 million. This project wil l be restructured to focus on road maintenance in a l l road networks, particularly in the northern and western parts o f the country to curb the fast-growing deterioration o f the road network in these areas. During the extension period, the CI-PAST will play an important role in terms o f stabilization by supporting youth employment and have a strong connection with the activities o f the PCAP.

60. The abovementioned projects that were suspended under arrears will be restructured and ready for presentation to the Bank Board fol lowing arrears clearance. In addition, the Bank has an outstanding GEF-financed project (PCGAP) for conservation and management o f protected areas which had reached appraisal stage at the time o f Bank suspension. This i s expected to be finalized in 2008.

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Table 5: The Bank’s Reactivated Project Portfolio in CBte d’Ivoire (As of M a y 24,2006 - US$ million)

Initial Closure

Project ID Project Approval Amount Amount Date revised Yearof LoanlCredit Undisbursed Closure Date

Portfolio Under Suspension

PO66353 Distance learning project (LIL) Subtotal

2000 2.0 0.5 03/31/2005 03/31/2005 2.0 0.5

Projects Closed Which Could be Extended Retroactively: Proposed:

PO35655 Education and training support project (PASEF) 1998 53.3 51.9 06/30/2003 12/31/2006 PO01 177 Transport adjustment project (CI-PAST) 1998 238.8 24.8 06/30/2003 12/31/2005 PO01194 Rural land project (PNGTER - CDD) 1997 41 .O 27.2 06/30/2004 06/30/2006

Subtotal 333.1 103.9

TOTAL 335.1 104.4

Source: ihe World Bank - Integrated CwRrdlets System - Summary Statement of LoandCrediWGrants

61. Further, an Emergency Basic Infrastructure Reconstruction operation (US$90 mill ion) i s anticipated to be presented to the Board before end o f FY08. This investment operation wi l l focus on supporting rehabilitation o f urban roads (using as much as possible labor intensive techniques with small scale local contractors), increasing water supply delivery and supporting the collection, transfer and management o f solid waste and l imi ted capacity building and institutional strengthening in war-affected areas o f the country with a focus o n urban areas in north, west and southern regions.

62. Given the importance o f the HN/AIDS challenge in a post-conflict context, opportunities for increasing sectoral support for H N prevention activities will be identified within al l Bank projects outlined in the I S N since the overall objective o f delivery o f basic social services should include basic H N prevention. For example, the education support program will note the increasing vulnerability o f HN/AIDS orphans and street children and identify opportunity for re- integration within the educational system.

Objective 111: Kick-Starting Economic Recovery and Reform

63. These objectives will be advanced by supporting economic governance, fostering demand for accountability and institutions building, and supporting infrastructure development. These activities will be supported principally by the Economic Governance and Recovery Grant (EGRG), a Governance and Institutional Development TA project, a Transport Sector Adjustment and Investment Program operation (being reactivated and restructured from the pre-arrears clearance portfolio, see paragraph 56) and a possible follow-on EGRG 11.

64. The objectives o f the Economic Governance and Recovery Grant (US$[308] million) to be presented to the Board together with the I S N are to: (i) facilitate the clearance o f CBte d’Ivoire’s arrears to IBRD and IDA, which i s required to restore normal relations between the country and the Wor ld Bank; and (ii) support CBte d’Ivoire in i t s post-conflict economic and social recovery. Given the complex post-conflict environment and governance and transparency issues facing the government, this second objective i s pursued by supporting government-owned reforms to improve governance, transparency and efficiency in public expenditure management as wel l as advance structural reforms aimed at strengthening governance and transparency in the

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key sectors o f the economy (energy, cocoa and financial sector). This strategy would lead over time to strengthened fiscal sustainability, improved economic governance and enhanced transparency o f State institutions and processes. Based on current projections o f debt ratios for end-2007, C6te d’Ivoire would qualify for re l ief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. The operation would then pave the way for HIPC debt relief with attainment o f the Decision Point expected in the second hal f o f CY2008.

65, Further support for economic governance and transparency reforms could be provided in FY09 through an Economic Governance and Recovery Grant 11. Such support would be predicated on a number o f fo l low up reforms as detailed in the Program Document o f the EGRG to further improve governance, transparency and efficiency in public expenditure management as wel l as in the key sectors o f the economy (energy, cocoa and financial sector).

66. A Governance and Institutional Development Technical Assistance project (US$lO mill ion) i s currently under preparation for Board presentation in FY08. The project would complement the above operations by providing technical and financial assistance for the strengthening o f key governance related institutions as wel l as the implementation o f the Government’s next phase o f governance reforms, notably in the areas identified by the P E M F A R as requiring strengthening, for transparency and accountability measures, and for deepening the recent reforms undertaken in the energy, cocoa and financial sectors.

67. Finally, it i s noted that the new investment projects to be launched in FY08 - namely the Emergency Infrastructure, HIV/ AIDS and Governance and Institutions operations - will be processed subject to the procedures outlined under OP 8.0 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies). The use o f OP 8.0 i s warranted for two reasons. First, the projects respond to two o f the objectives specifically highlighted in the OP, namely i) establishing and/or preserving human, institutional and/or social capital including economic reintegration o f vulnerable groups and ii) facilitating peace-building. Second the application o f OP 8 .O streamlined procedures wil l a l low for the timely processing o f the operations in direct response to the immediate needs o f the government in the post-conflict environment.

Tentative Program for 2008/2009

68. At this stage it i s not possible to determine exact IDA-15 allocations for the country program as these will be subject to country performance but the indicative allocation for the country program for FY09 i s expected to be around US$lOO million, to finance a further Development Policy operation in support o f the three overarching objectives outlined above. Particular focus and allocation will depend o n a measured calibration to the context and progress o f the peace process (as outlined in the risk section below). The continued accent will be o n the promotion o f economic governance reforms as wel l as service delivery and emergency investments planned in key sectors such as energy, for example. The I F C i s examining the possibility o f support to the energy sector as well.

Regional Integration Programming

69. As the situation in C6te d’Ivoire normalizes, regional integration programs will become more important in terms o f supporting both the Ivorian economy but also facilitating trade and infrastructure links with neighboring countries. I t i s expected that C6te d’Ivoire will continue to play a leading role in the emerging West Afr ican economy as the Union Economique et Monktaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) power-house and as the second largest Economic Community o f West African States (ECOWAS) economy behind Nigeria.

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70. Since 2003, CGte d’Ivoire has benefited f rom a US$16.6 mi l l ion grant supporting the activities associated with the fight against the spread o f H IV /A IDS along the Abidjan-Lagos corridor. A follow-up operation to continue to support the development o f this corridor i s being prepared and i s expected to be delivered in FY09. This operation will focus o n facilitating efficient movement o f traffic by improving road infrastructure and implementing comdor transport and transit facilitation measures. Other potential support will include, through the Banque Ouest Africaine de Dkveloppement (BOAD) line o f credit, the rehabilitation o f the San Pedro port and rehabilitation o f the Singrobo-Yamassoukro road. Also, CGte d’Ivoire may soon benefit f rom the Bank support to the WAPP (West Africa Power Pool) program as the WAPP Secretariat i s resuming preparation o f physical investments (e.g. construction o f the Cate d’Ivoire- M a l i transmission hub). In addition, CGte d’Ivoire may benefit f rom Wor ld Bank support to the West Afr ica Regional Program for Fisheries currently under preparation, to which the country could j o i n and participate, as the project i s being designed as a horizontal Adaptable Program Loan (APL) with co-financing from IDA and the GEF Strategic Partnership for Fisheries in Africa. Other areas o f work at the sub-regional level which will benefit CGte d’Ivoire include a strategy on mining, the harmonization o f procurement rules for the UEMOA sub-region, the development o f the UEMOA capital market, continuation o f work on the critical Abidjan-Lagos commercial corridor, and the establishment o f a West Afr ica Multi-Disease Surveillance Center.

Economic and Sector Work

7 1. Fol lowing good practice in other fragile and post-crisis countries, the Bank has started a program o f both formal and informal analysis and sector work. The objectives o f this work are to:

0 rebuild the Bank’s socio-economic knowledge o f Cbte d’Ivoire after several years o f absence and particularly to acquire a better understanding o f the structural reasons for the crisis and possible entry points to push for change, reform and conflict resolution;

0 assist the government in key reform processes particularly in the areas o f governance, such as envisaged by the PEMFAR for public finances, energy audits supporting the EITI process, and the cocoa strategy;

0 strengthen analysis to in form implementation o f key operations.

72. In the early crisis period, the Bank completed a Public Expenditure Review (PER) and a Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) in 2003. Also completed were informal papers on long-term economic growth and competitiveness, documenting the sensitivity o f CGte d’Ivoire’s growth to the wor ld price o f cocoa and the real exchange rate. The PER had been reformulated to better respond to post-conflict needs, focusing on the urgent issues o f deteriorating public expenditure management, accountability and expenditure controls. An important part o f the PER also dealt with selected governance issues, as wel l as institutional, public expenditure management, and capacity weaknesses behind the l o w disbursement o f Bank projects that threatened to block or cause delays in the implementation o f the Bank’s emergency program. The CPAR assisted the authorities in strengthening procurement reforms already underway and prepare for accelerated Bank reengagement with the new loans and restructured portfolio. Also, in 2007, a post-conflict poverty diagnostic was completed based on a l imited survey from the Abidjan region.

73. Since the signing o f the Ouaga accord, the Bank has also undertaken a number o f critical AAA activities to lay the knowledge and analytical foundation for accelerated Bank support in the future. These include the following:

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0

0

8

0

74.

Post-Conflict Needs Assessment Desk Review - in partnership with the UN system, the Bank completed in January 2008 a desk review o f a l l existing documentation on the crisis and in the sectors in order to provide an overall synthesis o f existing knowledge and information gaps.

Informal policy notes: o n key commodities including petrol and gas, cotton, cocoa, and the finance sector;

Audits: with a particular focus on the energy sector including oil/gas, the o i l refinery and electricity;

A Country Social Assessment: setting out macro and micro elements o f the crisis. This will be important to make a l l aspects o f community-driven programming more responsive to socio-economic concerns by identifying the opportunities, constraints, and social r isks resulting f rom the crisis. The CSA and poverty diagnostic will be key elements for broader social assessments under the post-conflict needs assessment.

As part o f the ongoing analytical agenda, a number o f further studies will be undertaken in FY08 and FY09 in line with the I S N objectives:

i) Support stabilization of the crisis and assist the government in addressing key conflict factors.

0 Local Administration: A rapid assessment o f needs and modalities for redeployment o f the administration throughout the territory.

ii) Assist war-affected populations

Education Country Status Report: Preparation o f a country status report on education which will provide a comprehensive analysis o f the education sector. T h i s CSR wil l be the basis for the preparation o f a new Education Sector Program and a new education policy, leading to an endorsement o f the EFA-FTI. The CSR was launched in November 2007 during a national workshop with government officials, education stakeholders, c iv i l society representatives and donors.

0 HIV/ AIDS: A financing study mapping out responses to the current national strategy and gaps.

iii) Assist economic recovery and reform

Governance and Reform

Governance Assessment: Based on the methodology o f the Governance and Anti- Corruption Survey developed by the Governance group o f WBI, a comprehensive initiative wil l adapt the tool to the post-conflict and fragile environment o f CGte d’Ivoire, by complementing it with prior qualitative work (a desk review) and a consequent participatory process. I t will contribute to expand the national dialogue with c i v i l society in an environment where national representative institutions have been suspended.

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Rapid Decentralization Study: In order to support adapted project implementation, a stock taking exercise on decentralization will ensure coherent and sustainable design o f projects, especially where the community-driven approach i s applied.

0 A Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR) to assist the authorities in strengthening systems for public financial management and procurement processes. The study i s undertaken with the FMI, the EU and AfDB.

0 Cocoa Strategy: In addition to the above, the Bank wil l be supporting through L ICUS funds a major review o f the cocoa sector that will bring in line the numerous studies, audits and recommendations outlining h o w the sector can be strengthened.

Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction

Poverty Diagnostic: Building on the 2007 poverty diagnostic based o n a limited, post- conflict survey in the Abidjan region, a new survey i s underway, which will be used to update the poverty profi le after the conflict and will support the development o f the government’s PRSP for 2008.

0 Agricultural/ Rural Sector: Other informal ESW will be continued to update the knowledge base on production and marketing o f key commodities.

0 Environment and Social Reviews: In light o f the rapid scale up in operations, several environmental and social studies will be undertaken in FY08/09. These will include a forestry sector study which has already started as wel l as a number o f critical environmental and social impact studies, including o n the energy sector and the distributional impacts o f reform in the cocoa sector.

0 Sources of growth and competitiveness study: This ESW will look into the future sources o f recovery and growth and assess the competitiveness o f the Ivorian economy using alternative analytical tools (e.g., investment climate survey).

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V. DONOR COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIPS

75. Given the fragility o f the peace agreement implementation, the Bank i s working very closely with the UN system and the European Commission o n stabilization and peace-building objectives. The E C i s currently the major donor in C6te d’Ivoire and key partner in the implementation o f the Ouaga accord. The E C i s planning to provide key support for the identification phase for the election process as wel l as fund the elections themselves. Current E C funding (not yet reflected in OECD figures shown in Figure 3 below) in 2004: Euro 40.4 m committed, Euro 47.2m disbursed in 2005: Euro 41.5 m, Euro 23.7 m disbursed; and in 2006: Euro 108.6m, Euro 56.6m disbursed.

76. For particular key programs, such as on the reintegration and identification processes, the Bank i s working jo int ly with the EC. In addition, other donors will provide US$25 mi l l ion in support for the reintegration and reinsertion programs and redeployment o f government administration in a l l areas o f the country. Other donors and agencies are complementing the Bank’s support to basic social service provision, particularly the UN agencies such as UNICEF and WFP. T o date, donor coordination both at the political and technical level has been strong, such as through the Groupe de Reflexion Strategique. An example o f due results has been the continued support to education services in areas outside o f government control in the north.

Figure 3: Donor Aid to CBte d’Ivoire 2001-05 - by Donor

Commitments - US$ million

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600

France

EC IDA

United States Germany

AfD F Canada Belgium Austria

Spain Italy

Jnited Kingdom Other

Source: OECD, DAC Statistical database. a/ Data exclude the IMF loans.

77. For the more medium-tern economic objectives, the Bank has been working very closely with the IMF and the AfDB. IMF and IDA staffs have coordinated closely o n the identification of the respective institutions’ arrears and are working together on arrears clearance and the HIPC

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process. Both institutions coordinated closely their advice o n governance and other economic issues and reforms, and are jo int ly supporting the preparation o f the Government's PRSP. AfDB and IDA staffs are also coordinating closely on supporting the Government's governance reform program as wel l as arrears clearance and the HIPC process. B o t h the IMF and AfDB are also actively participating in the ongoing PEMFAR, which i s led by the Wor ld Bank.

Figure 4: Donor Aid to CBte d'Ivoire 2001-05 - by Sector a'

Commitments -US$ million 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600

Multisector, Including Debt Reduction

Commodity Aid/General Program Assistance

Social Infrastructure and Services

Emergency Assistance

Productive Sectors

Economic Infrastructure

Other

Source: OECD, DAC Statistical database. a/ Data exclude the IMF loans.

78. In the past, sector composition o f donor aid and donor collaboration reflected the emphasis on aid related to debt relief, general programming assistance, and social and economic infrastructure and services (above Figure 4). However, f i o m 2007 on, the immediate focus o f the government and partners in anticipating financing needs has been on the implementation o f the peace agreement. Some o f these activities, where precise budgets have been provided, have been met, for example, by the European Commission and the Wor ld Bank.

79. In sum, donor coordination has been focused around financing o f the government's implementation plan o f the Ouaga accord. Coordinating mechanisms and resource mobilization were agreed at the last donor round-table in June 2007. In turn, subsequent planning by the E C and the Bank has resulted in jo in t programming in critical areas such as identification and reinsertion activities. For longer term needs, the government has expressed i t s commitment to proceed directly toward a PRSP without an interim recovery strategy. In light o f this, the UN and the Wor ld Bank have started a f i rst phase post-conflict assessment o f needs based on al l existing data and analysis. This will then enable the UN and the Bank working with the government to identify information gaps. In turn, this work will feed into a conflict sensitive PRSP by mid-2008. As engagement normalizes the Bank will be in a position to assist the government in donor mobilization around the PRSP in 2008 by, for example, holding a Consultative Group (CG).

- 27 -

VI. MAIN R I S K S AND MITIGATION RESPONSES

80. The I S N i s designed to support the nascent peace process, lay the groundwork for recovery, and minimize the risk o f a relapse. Nevertheless, there remain a number o f general and Bank-related r isks that could derail the progress made so far.

81. The main general r isks are internal and external, requiring different mitigation response^.'^

82. and policy outlooks.

Key internal risks are rooted in the remaining uncertainties associated with the security

0 On the security front , the main risk i s the continuation o f the no-war-no-peace crisis at the national level and the continuation o f human rights abuse and violence at the local level. The strong involvement o f the international community backed by the United Nations Security Council with the threat o f sanctions against those who block the peace process will reduce but not eliminate this risk. Also, the risk o f incidents in isolated areas (e.g., the west) cannot be ruled out. Bo th r isks can also be partially mitigated by the Bank’s and donor community’s timely support to the disarmament and army integration, reinsertion and job creation and the redeployment o f unified administration in the entire country, as a precondition for return o f the rule o f law.

0 On the domestic policy front, the main r isks are: (i) deteriorating pol icy coordination and governance commitment leading to a potential gridlock in decision making; (ii) the inabil ity o f the government to service debt towards the Bank; and (iii) the failure to reestablish basic social service delivery in the entire country. T o mitigate partially these risks, the Bank has intensified dialogue to support government reforms o n key structural policy issues (e.g., cocoa sector reform, social service delivery). Fol lowing the clearance o f arrears to the Bank in early 2008, the Bank and IMF will accelerate their assistance in concert with other partners. T o mitigate the risk o f CBte d’Ivoire fall ing back into arrears, the budget framework for 2008 focuses continued debt service payments to the Wor ld Bank as wel l as other creditors such as the AfDB. Finally, the post-conflict assessment will result in a detailed analysis o f social sector needs as a basis for rapid restoration o f education and health service delivery in the most vulnerable areas o f the country.

83. international prices for CGte d’Ivoire’s main exports (oil, cocoa, and coffee).

The main external risks are the lack o f coherent donor assistance and a major decline in

0 Delayed donor assistance. T o be effective, donor assistance must be timely, predictable, adequate, and well coordinated, especially in post-conflict.

0 New external shocks. Commodity prices (i.e., oil, cocoa and coffee) may decline, reducing export earnings,15 budget revenues, and incentives for farmers’ efficient production. Also, the rollout o f new o i l capacity and production may fal l short o f expectations. Prudent fiscal management and strengthened governance in general and in the cocoa/coffee sector, in particular, will help to somewhat mitigate these risks. Given

l4 On November 27, 2007, Bank staff conducted an all-day risk analysis exercise with various Ivorian and non-Ivorian academics and experts in order to deepen a socio-economic analysis o f the current context.

l5 A 10% decline in cocoa prices i s estimated to result in a loss o f annual export earnings o f about U S 2 7 0 million.

- 2 8 -

the large share o f cocoa exports in total export earnings, CBte d’Ivoire i s particularly vulnerable to cocoa price fluctuations. Finally, with fragile security and polit ical situation in neighboring countries (e.g., Liberia, Guinea), there i s a r isk o f spillovers. However, improving prospects in Liberia provide a basis to assume improved regional security in the near term. Swift restoration o f the rule o f law and demobilization and disarmament (including militia) and recovery in CBte d’Ivoire will, in turn, contribute to the regional peace.

84. fiduciary risk; and other r isks.

The main Bank-related risks to the implementation o f this Strategy include project and

Full Bank engagement without concomitant governance reform. There i s a danger that the Bank takes steps toward full normalization and a comprehensive IDA program whilst key polit ical and economic reforms remain outstanding, not least the holding o f credible national elections. This will put the subsequent IDA portfolio at risk - for i f these reforms are not implemented, CBte d’Ivoire will risk a resumption o f hostilities. T h i s risk i s mitigated by i) the Bank working very closely with other partners, notably the European Commission, the IMF and the UN system; and ii) placing key governance reforms as a key element o f the ISN, through the Economic Governance and Recovery Grant, a possible follow-up EGRG 11, and analytical and advisory work.

Project disbursement andfiduciary risks. With weak institutional and state capacity and remaining governance and transparency problems, project and fiduciary r i sks will remain significant in the transition phase o f reengagement. These r isks will be mitigated by (i) management o f the IDA-financed PCAP program, (ii) independent audits o f the PCAP programs, (iii) strengthened monitoring and reporting o f public finances under analytical and advisory work on public expenditure management in the context o f preparations for the Bank’s EGRG and EGRG 11, and (iv) implementation o f the new procurement code. In addition, the ongoing PEMFAR i s providing: (i) a diagnostic analysis o f the current strengths and weaknesses in the country’s public financial management (PFM) system and practices; (ii) input for the design and preparation o f the next phase o f the P F M reform strategy, including a time-bound sequenced action plan o f priority reforms; and (iii) a rating o f all key components o f the PFM system against international benchmarks, which can be used to judge future progress if P F M reforms. Finally, during the reactivation o f the existing portfolio, attention wi l l be paid to addressing any project and fiduciary risks. A national workshop was held in late 2007 with a l l project counterparts for training on existing and new procurement and FM guidelines. In the past, l o w disbursement ratios have been due to misunderstanding and misuse o f the FMIS namely SIGFIP (SystBrne Informatist4 de Gestion des Finances Publiques). Discussions are ongoing with the Ministry o f Economy and Finance about adopting flexible systems, which wil l allow for more rapid disbursement post-arrears clearance.

Macroeconomic risk. The country’s macroeconomic performance represents another important risk to the implementation o f the interim strategy. Economic recovery will depend critically o n the Government’s adherence to the medium-term macroeconomic framework elaborated in collaboration with the IMF and the Wor ld Bank. Also, delay in moving to the HIPC completion point would raise a risk o f renewed arrears. Since July 2007, the Government has satisfactorily implemented the macroeconomic program supported by the IMF EPCA. The IMF and the Wor ld Bank will continue to closely monitor the Government’s macroeconomic performance. The Government i s committed at a rapid attainment o f the HIPC decision and completion points. To mitigate the risk o f CBte d’Ivoire fall ing back into arrears before reaching the HIPC completion point, and

- 29 -

although the H P C decision point could be reached in the second ha l f o f 2008, the authorities have included in the fiscal framework underlying the second EPCA and intend to include in the fol low up PRGF the full expected debt service payments to the Wor ld Bank as wel l as that o f other creditors such as the AFDB.

Other risks. Other r isks include the fact that the country inevitably may face negative net flows during the transition phase due to the clearance o f large arrears to the Bank; net f lows will only turn positive in the next year as new inf lows begin to outweigh the regular debt service. The government i s aware o f this trajectory o f net flows, but nevertheless decided to reengage the Bank in order to regularize i t s relations with key external creditors. A risk remains that delays in the peace process would l ikely delay the turning point towards positive net flows, thereby undermining the authorities’ incentives to continue servicing their debt. This, however, i s the calculated risk jo in t ly taken on by the authorities and the Bank in the context o f the implementation o f this strategy.

VII. MONITORING OF RESULTS AND EVALUATION

85. This I S N i s results-oriented and will be monitored and evaluated using benchmark performance indicators. I S N performance indicators take account o f the centrality o f the polit ical process and are designed to capture some key, monitorable results and outcomes o f the authorities’ policy efforts and Bank assistance. Indicators o f performance were designed to be as unambiguous as possible and easy to monitor (see Appendix 1). Progress will be monitored and evaluated on a six-month basis.

86. The I S N performance indicators and the reconstruction needs will be l inked with CBte d’Ivoire’s new PRSP currently being developed. The Bank wil l urge the authorities to develop a results-based PRSP. I t will also encourage the authorities to develop a more ambitious vision o f poverty reduction with a corresponding set o f policies and results-oriented indicators.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

87. This I S N i s developed in an uncertain environment, but the Bank must be engaged early and in flexible manner to support the window o f opportunity in the current peace process, however diff icult the circumstances. The minimum credible conditions for durable peace are now in place and the new transitional government has taken bold steps to advance peace implementation, prepare for the elections and clear ha l f o f the arrears to the Bank. In such an environment, the I S N presents a program that i s able to calibrate interventions - scale-up or scale- down - according to the socio-economic conditions and opportunities presented. In particular, given the lessons learned over the past few years during the crisis, Bank staff have conceived a program which can be, if required, less prone to polit ical shocks in the process - such as the focus on community recovery and support to identification o f citizens through local authorities.

88. A number o f variables noted earlier will determine the financial envelope available for FY09 and fol lowing years, including the performance o f the country. It i s expected, however, that the focus o f the Bank’s program will remain on supporting economic governance reform; complemented by investment operations including one in the energy sector as wel l as strengthening decentralization and provision o f basic social services at the community levels.

- 30 -

89. As elaborated above, there remains a high risk o f non-implementation o f elements o f this strategy. Nevertheless, given the Bank’s leading development role in C6te d’Ivoire and the Ivorian economy’s importance in the broader regional context, this risk i s outweighed by the potentially high cost o f the Bank’s non-engagement and failure to support the reconciliation process at this time. Fol lowing the arrears clearance and the fulf i l lment o f the minimum polit ical and security conditions that may presage more stable security and rapid economic recovery, the Bank should move quickly to support the process o f state rebuilding, consolidating the peace process and strengthening accountability and transparency in key areas o f structural reforms.

- 3 1 -

I -

e e

e e

..

I

I

I

I

r4

m

I

. . 0

.

1. . 0

.

Y

z.

0.

0.

.

3 C

iw

rlw.5

. . . . .

.

..,

0

.

Appendix 2: World Bank Instruments in CGte d’Ivoire Proposed Emergency Assistance Programs FYOS-09

(Total GrantLending envelope for two fiscal years - about US%763.5 million)16

FYOS LENDING

1. Existing Portfolio

L I C U S Application I and PCF Grants

Post-Conflict Assistance Program

2. New Portfolio - Including Arrears Clearance

Economic Governance and Recovery Grant (EGRG)

Emergency Urban Infrastructure

MAPA-IIVIAIDS

Strengthening Institutions and Governance TA

3. LICUS Application I1 and PCF Grant

4. Reactivation of Old Portfolio

[Individual amounts are rounded]

Education and Training Support Project (PASEF)

Rural Land Project (PNGTER)

Transport Sector Adjustment and Investment (CI-PAST)

Distance Learning

5. Global Environment Facility (GEF-PCGAP)

FY09 - LENDING Economic Governance and Recovery Grant I1 (EGRG 11)

Emergency Investments in Energy and Infrastructure

Economic Sector Work inter alia

Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountabil ity Review (PEMFAR) Rapid Social Assessment (funded by Post-Conflict Fund - PCF) Cocoa/Coffee Study M in ing Sector Strategy Assessment (funded by TFESSD) Donors’ Forum Governanceitransparency dialogue (financial, petroleum, cocoahoffee) Power regional integration Emergency response (Toxics and Av ian Flu) CEM - Sources o f growth and competitiveness study

663.5

126

6

120

428

308

90

20

10

3

104

52

27

25

1

2.5

100 tbd

tbd

FY08 FY08 FY08 F Y 0 8 FY08 F Y 0 7 FY08 FY08 FY08

Tentative as exact amounts o f F Y 0 9 IDA envelope and available Trust Fund resources remain to be confirmed.

16

- 35 -

Appendix 3: CAS Summary o f Development Priorities

NETWORK CNTRY MAJOR COUNTRY BANK RECONCILIATION OF COUNTRY AREA PERF. ISSUES Priority Priority & BANK PRIORITIES

Poverty Reduction & Economic Management

Poverty Reduction Poor

Economic Policy Poor

Public sector

Gender

Human Development Department

Education

Health, Nutrition & Population

Social Protection

Environmental & Socially Sustainable Development

Rural Development

Environment

Social Development

Finance, Private Sector & Infrastructure

Financial Sector

Private Sector

Energy & Mining

Infrastructure

Poor

Poor

Poor

Poor

Poor

Fair

Fair

Poor

Fair

Fair

Fair

Poor

Rural poverty High

Need to strengthen economic management and coordination and High accelerate structural reforms

High

High

Weak governance in the management of public resources and expenditures’ High High execution and control

No policy initiatives currently under implementation to reduce gender gap Moderate Low a comparative advantage

Other donors are committed and have

Primary and secondary education mostly in war-affected areas (West and North)

Infrastructure, services delivery and HIV/AIDs mostly in war-affected areas.

Dysfunctional administration of social safety net programs. Implementation of the new pension scheme prepared in collaboration with ILO.

Weak governance and transparency in the cocdcoffee sector. Rural land law.

Weak urban waste management and of the protected area (forestry etc.)

Composition and quality of expenditures in social sectors remain problematic. As a result, achieve- ment of most MDGs i s off track.

Restoring transparency and strengthening financial sector

Restoring a business regulatory environment that i s favorable to economic activity

Restoring financial strength in the electricity sector and transparency in oillgas revenue

Rehabilitation of most economic infrastructures affected during the conflict

High

High

High

High

LOW

High

Moderate The Bank has the lead, but donors are committed

Other donors are committed. Programs are funded by external donors such as Global Fund and

bilateral cooperation.

Country situation has not provided favorable context to address these, but the Bank must show high priority in coming years.

Moderate PEPFAR (HIV/AIDS) and the

Low

High

LOW

High

Moderate Moderate

High High

High High

High High

- 36 -

Appendix 4: CBte d’Ivoire: Update by the PRSP Unit Ministry of Finance [May 20061

Millennium Development Goals

Goal 1 : Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

(2015 target : halve 1990 poverty and malnutrition rates)

(a) Population below US$l a day (%)

(b) Population below minimum level of dietary energy

Goal 2 : Achieve universal primary education

(2105 target : net enrolment to 100%)

(a) Net primary enrolment ratio (% of relevant age group)

(b) Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5

(c) Youth literacy rate (%ages 15-24)

Goal 3: Promote gender equality

(2015 Target: education ratio to 100 %)

(a) Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)

(b) Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament Goal 4 : Reduce child mortality

(2015 target: reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two thirds)

(a) Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000)

(b) Infant mortality rate (per 1.000 live births)

(c) Immunization. measles (% of children under 12 months) Goal 5 : Improve maternal health

(2015 target: Reduce 1990 maternal mortality by two thirds)

Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)

Consumption

(a)

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS. malaria and other diseases

(2015 target: halt. and begin to reverse AIDS. etc.)

(a) Prevalence of HIV. female (% ages 15-24) Goal 7 : Ensure environmental sustainability

(2015 target: see footnote a)

(a) Forest area (% o f total land area)

(b) Population without access to improved water source (% of population)

(c) Access to improved sanitation (% of population)

Goal 8 : Develop a global partnership for development

(2015 target: see footnote a)

(a) Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1.000 people)

(b) Personal computers (per 1.000 people)

1990

32.3%(1993)

48.8 % (1993)

5 1.3%

58.4% (1993)

69.5% (1993)

5.7%

150

97

27

45%(1994)

9%( 1997)

36.4%(1993)

62.2% (1993)

0.5% (1996)

Status Target I

100% 56.5%(2005)

100% 61%(2005)

100% 6 l%(2005) t 100% 74% (2005)

9% (2005)

195(2005)

1 18(2005)

51%(2005)

68%(2005)

6.4%(2005)

100%

16%(2005)

63% (2005)

10.8% (2005) 1 1.5% (2005)

- 37 -

Appendix 5: CBte d’Ivoire: The Framework for Peace

A Summary of the Peace Process

The Linas-Marcoussis Accord (January 15-23,2003)

The Accord brought together the main political parties and rebel groups: the FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY, and UDPCI. I t was facilitated by the UN, AU, and ECOWAS. The key elements were agreements on: (i) principles; (ii) a government o f national reconciliation; and (iii) the committee for implementing the Accord. The Principles were: (i) preserving territorial integrity and restoring state authority; (ii) respecting democratic principles and ensuring freedom o f speech; (iii) addressing humanitarian needs o f victims o f the conflict; and (iv) ensuring freedom o f movement and goods in al l o f the country. The Government of National Reconciliation would: (i) improve electoral procedures, laws on political party finding, and fight corruption among elected officials; (ii) prepare for credible and transparent elections; (iii) be headed by a Prime Minister who cannot be re-elected; (iv) be composed by ministers drawn from the roundtable; (v) be supported b y the National Assembly; and (vi) free al l detained and exiled soldiers. Also, the government would work to accelerate disarmament and accelerate the reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Specifically, it would: (i) propose amendments in land laws to protect the rights o f those who inherit land; (ii) strengthen media regulation, guarantee neutrality and independence o f the public service; (ii) create a National Commission on Human Rights and investigate violations since September 2002; (iii) jo in the Roundtable in condemning the activities o f Death Squads and their prosecution; (iv) encamp/disarm/demobilize military with support o f ECOWAS and France, and reform the military; and (v) prepare a reconstruction plan to re-launch the economy, and reinforce social cohesion. Monitoring Committee on Implementation consisting o f the representatives o f the European Union (EU), AU, ECOWAS, UN Secretary General, International Francophone Organization (OF), IMF and World Bank, a member o f the G8 countries, and France, was established to closely monitor implementation o f the peace accord and work with the Ivorian Government towards accelerated reconciliation. Linas-Marcoussis continues to underpin the subsequent accords and the peace process.

The Accra I11 Accord (July 29-30,2004)

The Accord was brokered with the participation o f the representatives o f CGte d’Ivoire’s main political parties and rebel groups and under the auspices o f the UN Secretary General and CEDEAO’s President. The Accord mandated: (i) the return to government o f opposition ministers; (ii) disarmament o f armed rebel forces and militias by October 15, 2004; (iii) the adoption by parliament, by end August, 2004, o f the laws for the implementation o f the Linas-Marcoussis accord, including: the criteria o f eligibility o f the President; new nationality law; an electoral commission; and specifications for the role o f the Prime Minister; and (iv) a deadline for the passage o f these laws (September 30, 2004) and the beginning o f the disarmament (October 15,2004).

The Pretoria Accord (April 6,2005)

The Accord was reached with the participation o f CGte d’Ivoire’s main political leaders, under the mediation o f Mr. Mbeki, President o f South Africa. Under the Accord: (i) the parties recommitted to the peace process, as under past agreements; (ii) the chiefs o f staff of the opposing armies were to meet immediately to implement the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Plan; (iii) security would be provided to the ex rebel ministers who would rejoin the government o f National Unity; (iv) amendments would be made to the composition, organization and functioning o f the current Independent Electoral Commission; (v) the laws to implement the Marcoussis Peace Agreement would be redrafted and adopted by the National Assembly by the end o f April 2005; (vi) Mr. Mbeki was authorized, after consultation wi th President Obasanjo o f Nigeria and the Secretary General o f the United Nations, to ru le on eligibility o f candidates for the Presidential elections scheduled for October 30, 2005; (vii) in the event o f a difference in interpretation o f any part o f the agreement, i t s signatories agreed to consult wi th Mr. Mbeki for a ruling.

- 38 -

The Pretor ia Two Accord (June 28-29,2005)

Under the chair o f President Mbeki , the main political factions in C6te d'Ivoire met in Pretoria on June 28 and 29,2005 to review the implementation o f the agreement they had reached on April 6,2005 and agree on a new timetable. The declaration signed by the Ivorian leaders stated that: (i) Disarmament o f the pro- Gbagbo mil i t ia forces, in the government-controlled South o f the country, would begin immediately and end by August 20, 2005; (ii) A new timetable would be agreed upon for disarming the rebel fighters from the north; their disarmament would start by the end o f July 2005; (iii) The legislation on the IEC (Independent Electoral Commission) should be adopted by July 15, 2005 and the IEC should become operational immediately thereafter and not later than July 31, 2005. The High level representative to oversee the electoral process would be appointed by the UN Secretary General; (iv) The National Assembly should adopt by July 15, 2005, al l the amendments to the seven laws proposed by the South African mediation team. These laws relate to the IEC, financing o f political parties, nationality, identification, the Human Rights Commission, the Print Media and audio-visual communication.

The Pretoria Two communiquk ended by recommending that the African Union and the UN Security Council would impose appropriate sanctions, as set out in Resolution 1572 o f November 15, 2004, against those parties who fail to implement the Pretoria agreements and block the peace process.

The Ouagadougou Political Accord (March 4,2007)

The Ouagadougou Accord i s the result o f a month o f 'direct dialogue' between President Laurent Gbagbo and northern rebel leader Guillaume Soro, mediated by President Blaise Compaore. The peace agreement i s the ninth attempt at formulating a roadmap towards peaceful resolution o f the conflict that has overshadowed Ivorian political l i f e since the 1990s and divided the country into armed camps since September 2002.

T h e Ouagadougou Accord contains a ten-step peace plan:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The installation of an Integrated Command Centre to coordinate and restructure the FN and government armed forces i s foreseen from March 18,2007.

Creation of an Institutional Implementation Office of presidential and FN representatives i s called for by April 1.

Formation of a new government i s foreseen by April 8.

Replacement of the demilitarized 'Zone o f Confidence' ceasefire l ine with a 'Green Line' patrolled by joint units i s envisaged from April 15. UN and French peacekeepers should then withdraw half of the remaining personnel every two months, completing withdrawal by end of year.

Dismantling of an estimated 11,000 non-government, non-FN militias i s envisaged to last two weeks, beginning by April 22 at latest.

Simultaneous regroupment and disarmament of up to 60,000 FN and government armed forces, identification of document-less citizens, and redeployment of civil servants i s to last three months, beginning April 22 at the latest.

Electoral registration i s to begin by May 22.

Unification o f the regrouped combatants and enrolment of willing ex-combatants in a Civic Service youth employment scheme i s foreseen to begin by June 6. Only pre-2002 members o f the security forces will not be demobilized and reintegrated.

Distribution of national and elector identity cards will take place only after these processes are completed, presumably in August.

National presidential and legislative elections should conclude the process.

- 39 -

Appendix 6: The Bank Project Disbursement Ratio (in percent) C8te d'Ivoire vs Total AFR Region

'ercent

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05

-+ - Cote d'lvoire -.-Total Africa

Source: World Bank Business Warehouse

1/ Disbursement ratio i s defined as disbursement in the Bank's fiscal year (July 1-June 30) divided by undisbursed balance at the beginning o f the year. The ratio applies only to investment loans.

- 40 -

Appendix 7: Financial and Other Assistance to CBte d'Ivoire by Other Donors

Year Donor Project Amount Sector Name Name US6

2002 2002 2002

2002 2002

rnillibn AfDF APPUI A LA FORMATION POUR INSERTION JEUNES 32.3 Basic Education AfDF SECTORS NOT SPECIFIED 29.5 Unallocated/Unspeclfied AfDF PROGRAMME D'APPUI A LA REFORME ECONOMIQUE 19.4 Government and civil society -

AfDF RURAL DEVELOPMENT REGION / MOYEN COMOE 19.4 Other Multisector AfDF APPUI BONNE GOUVERNANCE ET RENFORCEMENT 4.9 Government and civil society -

general

2002 2002

CAPACITE general AfDF ETUDE RENFORCEMENT AEP ABIDJAN ET BOUAKE 1.1 Water Supply & Sanitation AfDF ETUDE DU PLAN DU DEVELOPPEMNENT RURAL DE 1.1 Other Multisector

2002 2002 2002 2004

Austria INTEREST REDUCTION/RESCHEDULED LOANS 59.5 Action Relating t o Debt Belgium DEBT SERVICE REDUCTION 41.8 Action Relating t o Debt Belgium DEVELOPPEMENT LAITIER DANS LE SUD 1.3 Agriculture Belgium AIDE ALIMENTAIRE 2008 1.2 Other Emergency and Distress

2002 2002

Relief Canada OOF DEBT FORGIVENESS 74.2 Action Relating t o Debt Canada RENFORCEMENT €TAT DE DROIT-DEMOCRATIE 2.0 Government and civil society -

- 4 1 -

2003 2003 2003 2003

I qeneral Canada DEBT FORGIVENESS - NON ODA 8.6 Action Relating t o Debt Canada SURVEILLANCE EPIDEMIOLOGIQUE INTEGREE 8.2 Basic Health Canada BUREAU DE LA COOPERATION CANADA-IVOIRIEN 1.9 Other Multisector Canada WEST-AFRICA/GREAT-LAKES-UN HIGH COMMISSIONER 1.4 Other Emerqencv and Distress

2001 2001

- . FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) 2003 Relief

EC PROGRAMME D'APPUI A LA RELANCE ECONOMIQUE 9.9 General Budget Support EC COTE D'IVOIRE SFA 2001 - BANANA SUPPORT 2.6 Agriculture

2004 2004 2005

Relief EC AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 1.7 Agriculture EC FRANCHISE - PRODUITS DU CAFE 1.2 General Budget Support EC PROGRAMME D'URGENCE DE REHABILITATION POST- 41.3 Other Emeraencv and Distress

2005

2005 2005 2004

2001 2001 2001

- , CRISE PUR I11 Relief

EC APPUI AUX ELECTIONS DE 2005 9.8 Government and civil society - EC BAN-2005/ 017639 4.7 Agriculture EC FRANCHISE ART 195 A - PRODUITS DU CAFE 1.1 General Budget Support Finiand HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THROUGH ICRC 1.7 Other Emergency and Distress

France DEBT FORGIVENESS OPERATIONS, AGGREGATE 77.7 Action Relating t o Debt France GARANTIES DE CHANGE 21.4 General Budget Support France ASSAINISSEMENT AGGLOMERATION 14.3 Water Suoalv & Sanitation

general

Relief

2001 2001

2001 2001 2001 2001 2001

France EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION 11.2 Education, Level Unspecified France PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, GENERAL (TC : 3.5 General Environment Protection

France AGRICULTURE (TC : RECHERCHE) 2.4 Agriculture France SANTE, GENERAL (TC : RECHERCHE) 2.4 Health, General France APPUI A LA L U T E CONTRE LE SIDA 2.0 Population Programmes France APPUI A LA RELEVE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR 1.9 Post-Secondary Education France APPUI A L'EXTENSION DES CENTRES DES METIERS 1.4 Asriculture

RECHERCHE)

2001 2001 2001 2001

RURAUX France EDUCATION POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT 1.4 Education, Level Unspecified France PRIMARY EDUCATION 1.4 Basic Education France MULTISECTOR AID 1.3 Other Multisector France AUTRES SERVICES SOCIAUX (TC : RECHERCHE) 1.2 Other Social Infrastructure &

JCTURAL ADJUSTMENT I 7.9 I General Bud

2001

2001 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002

I

Services France PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX ADMINISTRATIONS 1.1 Government and civil society - France APPUI INSTITUTIONNEL AU SECTEUR AGRICOLE 1.0 Agriculture France DEBT FORGIVENESS OPERATIONS, AGGREGATE 366.1 Action Relating t o Debt France PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL 172.4 General Budget Support France AGREGAT : REECHELONNEMENT DE PRETS APD 125.1 Action Relating t o Debt France GARANTIES DE CHANGE 21.6 General Budget Support France COOPERATION TECHNIOUE : EDUCATION POST 14.6 Post-Secondarv Education

FINANCIERES ET ECONOMIQUES general

get S ~ p p o r t I 4 .9 I General BLoget S ~ p p o r t I 4.2 I Other Socia InfrastrJctLre &

2002 2002 2002

SECONDAIRE France STRl France STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT France FINANCT D'UN FONDS DE PREPARATION

2002 2002

- 42 -

Services France REDRESSEMENT ECO. & FINANC. 1995 3 .1 General Budget Support France PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT, GENERAL (TC : 2.6 General Environment Protection

2002 2002 2002 2002 2002

ZOO2 2002

RECHERCHE) France STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 2.3 General Budget Support France STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 2.3 General Budget Support France STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 2.3 General Budget Support France PAS RESTRUCTURAT. DETTE COMMERCIALE 2.0 Action Relating t o Debt France REDRESSEMNT ECON. & FIN. 96 1.9 Government and civil society - France PROGRAMME 9 6 REDRESS.EC0 & FIN. 1.9 General Budget Support France FINANCEMENT FONDS DE PREPARATION 1.8 Other Social Infrastructure &

general

2003 2003 2003

France MULTISECTEURS (TC RECHERCHE) 1.7 Other Multisector France PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT (TC RECHERCHE) 1.5 General Environment Protection France APPUI AU REDEPLOIEMENT DE L' ADMINISTRATION ET 1.2 Government and civil society -

2003 2003

DES SERVICES PUBLICS general France APPUI AUX FORMATIONS DES INGENIEURS IVOIRIENS 1.1 Post-Secondary Education France AIDE SORTIE DE CRISE : ACCOMPAGNEMENT 1.1 Other Emergency and Distress

PROCESSUS DE TRANSITION Relief

I Post-Secondary Education : PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX I 1.2 I Government and civil society -

2003 2003 2003 2003

2004 2004

France EDUCATION DE BASE 1.1 Basic Education France APPUI A L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR 1.1 Post-Secondary Education France AGRICULTURE (TC RECHERCHE) 1.0 Agriculture France PAAFIE-PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX ADMINISTRATIONS 1.0 Government and civil society - France AGREGAT : REMISE DE DETTE 63.3 Action Relating t o Debt France COOPERATION TECHNIOUE : EDUCATION POST 23.6 Post-Secondarv Education

FINANCIERES ET ECONOMIQUES general

2004 2004 2004

2004

SECONDAIRE France APPUI A LA SORTIE DE CRISE EN COTE D'IVOIRE 9.3 Conflict, Peace and Security France APPUI A LA SORTIE DE CRISE 4.6 Other Multisector France APPUI AU REDEPLOIEMENT DE L' ADMINISTRATION ET 2.0 Government and civil society -

France AIDE ALIMENTAIRE 1.9 Develoomental Food Aid/Food DES SERVICES PUBLICS general

2005 2005 2005

- 4 3 -

DES SERVICES PUBLICS general France SANTE GENERAL (TC RECHERCHE) 1.3 Health, General France APPUI A L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR 1.2 Post-Secondary Education France PAM 1.2 Other Emeraency and Distress

2005

2005

- . Relief

Relief France PAM 1.2 Other Emergency and Distress

France PROGRAMME D'APPUI AUX ADMINISTRATIONS 1.2 Government and civil society - 2005 2005 2005

FINANCIERES general France EDUCATION DE BASE 1.0 Basic Education France RECHERCHE MEDICALE APPLIQUEE 1.0 Post-Secondary Education France INSERTION SOCIALE ET PROFESSIONNELLE DES 1.0 Other Social Infrastructure &

I JEUNES I Services

2005 2003 2003 2003 2004 I Services 2005 I UNICEF I PROJECTSUPPORT I 1.4 I Other Social Infrastructure &

Relief Sweden REINTEGRATION AND SALW CONTROL 1.3 Conflict, Peace and Security UNFPA 2.8 Population Programmes UNICEF PROGRAMME SUPPORT 1.4 Unailocated/Unspecified UNICEF DISTRICT HEALTH SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 1.1 Basic Health UNICEF PROJECT SUPPORT 1.1 Other Social Infrastructure ti

APPUI A LA MISE EN OEUVRE DU PROG. NAT. DE LA SR

2005 2002

Services UNICEF PROGRAMME SUPPORT 1.0 Unallocated/Unspecified United DEBT FORGIVENESS OPERATION, AGGREGATE 11.4 Action Relating t o Debt

1 States I I I Security Assistan 2003 I United I FORGIVEN INTEREST I 13.7 I Action Relating t o Debt

2002

2002

States United FOOD FOR PROGRESS - DEV FOOD AID - 1.6 Developmental Food Aid/Food States COMMODITIES Security Assistan United FOOD FOR PROGRESS - DEV FOOD AID - FREIGHT 1.0 Developmental Food Aid/Food

2003

2003

States United FORGIVEN GUARANTEES OF USAID - HOUSING AND 12.2 Action Relating t o Debt

United FORGIVEN PRINCIPAL 10.1 Action Relatina to Debt States OTHER GUARANTEES

- 44 -

2003

2003

2003

States United HIV/AIDS PROGRAM IN-COUNTRY ACTIVITIES 7.8 Population Programmes States United FORGIVEN PRINCIPAL OF EXPORT-IMPORT BANK - 5.2 Action Relating t o Debt States DIRECT CREDITS United INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE AND FAMINE 1.6 Other Emeraencv and Distress

I States 1 ASSISTANCE - . I Relief

I S o m e OECD. DAC nternationa, Development Statistcs Online

- 45 -

gg

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0

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al Q

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E - 2 a

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W

CAS Annex A2: C6te d'Ivoire at a Glance

CGte d'Ivoire a t a glance 10/12/07

K e y Deve lopmen t I n d i c a t o r s

(ZOOS)

Population, mid-year (millions) Surface area (thousand sq km) Population growth (%) Urban population (Oh of total population)

GNI (Atlas method, US$ billions) GNI per capita (Atlas method, US$) GNI per capita (PPP, international $)

GDP growth (Oh) GDP per capita growth (Oh)

(moot recent estimate, Z000-200SJ

Poverty headcount ratio at 51 a day (PPP, %) Poverty headcount ratio at 52 a day (PPP. O h )

Life expectancy at birth (years) Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) Child malnutrition (Oh of children under 5)

Adult literacy, male (Oh of ages 15 and older) Adult literacy, female (Oh of ages 15 and older) Gross pnmary enrollment, male (YO of age group) Gross pnmary enrollment, female (Oh of age group)

Access to an improved water source (C of population) Access to improved sanitation facilities ("10 of population)

Cbte dlvoire

18.1 322 2.0

16.6 920

1,550

0.9 -1 .I

49 45

117 22

61 39 76 65

51

Sub- Saharan

Africa

770 24,265

2.3 36

E46 e42

2,032

5.6 3.2

41 72 47 96 29

69 50 96 86

56 37

LOW incnme

2,403 29,215

1.6 30

1,562 650

2,698

8.0 6.1

59 75

72 50

108 96

75 36

Net Aid Flows

(US$ millions) Ne1 ODA and official aid Top 3 donors (in 2005)

France United States Germany

Aid (Oh of GNI) Aid per capita (US51

Long-Term Economic T rends

Consumer pnces (annual Oh change) GDP impliut deflator (annual % change)

Exchange rate (annual average, lml per US$) Terms of trade index (2000 = 100)

Population, mid-year (millions) GDP (US5 millions)

Agriculture Industry

Services

Household final consumption expenditure General gov't final consumption expenditure Gross capital formation

Exports of gwds and sewices Imports of goods and services Gross savings

Manufactunng

1880

210

118 1

12

2.2 26

17.9 35.5

21 1.3 56

6.2 10,175

25.9 19.7 12.6 54.4

62.8 16.9 26.5

35.0 41.2 5.2

1990

686

416 17 19

6.9 59

4 . 7 -7.3

272.3 94

11.5 11,487

2000

35 1

156 10 16

3.6 22

2.5 -0.4

709.9 100

16.0 10.448

(% of GDP) 30.6 24.2 24.7 24.9 22.6 21.7 44.6 50.9

67.6 74.9 21.4 7.2

6.7 10.8

29.8 40.4 25.5 33.3 -5.2 6.0

2006 '

119

66 33 13

0.8 7

2.5 5.6

522.4 69

16.1 17,568

22.7 26.3 18.3 51.0

71.7 8.2 9.7

51.3 41.0 12.7

Aoe distribution, 2006

Male Female

7074

5084 5054 4c-44

3 0 %

2&24 1014

c-4- 20 10 0 I O 20

Dement

Jnder.5 mortality rate (per 1,000)

2w 7 180 180 140 120 1w 80 80 40 20 0

18w 1985 2wo 2004

OC6te d'ivoire OSubSaharan Africa

Srowth of GDP and GDP per capita (Oh)

IO -

0 io

0

.--O-GDP - GDP per capita

1980-Bo 1990-2000 2000-0~ (average annual growfh %)

3.4 3.3 2.1 2.7 6.1 0.1

0.3 4.1 1 .I 4.4 8.2 -1.3 3.0 7.6 -3.0 3.6 11.1 0.1

3.3 10.4 0.4 0.2 1.2 2.7

-12.2 19.6 -1.4

1.9 9.5 3.7 -2.5 16.3 5.1

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 2006 data are preliminary. .. indicates data are not available. a. Aid data are for 2005.

Development Economics, Development Data Group (DECDG).

- 48 -

C6te d'lvoire

Balance of Payments and Trade

(US$ millions) Total merchandise exports (fob) Total merchandise imports (tin Net trade in g w d s and services

Current account balance as a % of GDP

Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (receipts)

Reserves. including gold

Central Government Finance

(36 of GDPj Current revenue (including grants)

Current expenditure

Overall surplus/deflcit

Highest marginal tax rate (Oh)

Tax revenue

Individual Corporate

External Debt and Resource Flows

(US$ millions) Total debt outstanding and disbursed Total debt service Debt relief (HIPC MDRI)

Total debt (% of GDP) Total debt semce (Oh of exports)

Foreign direct investment (net inflows) Portfolio equity (net inflows)

2000

3,740 2,788

742

-293 -2.8

119

566

17.2 14.6 15.5

-0.6

10 35

16.876 820 -

161.5 18.3

134 81

2006

8,144 6,067 1,817

524 3 0

160

1,732

18 8 15.3 17.0

-0 3

10 35

16,407 667 - 93.4 7 7

246 117

:ornposltlon of total external debt, 2005

Pnvale, 8,288

IDA 353

Private Sector Development

Time required to start a business (days) Cost to start a business ( O h of GNI per capita) Time required to register property (days)

Ranked as a major constraint to business (Oh of managers surveyed who agreed)

n a n a

Stock market capitalization (Oh of GDP) Bank capita to asset ratio (Oh)

2000

11.3

2006

45 134.1

32

23.7

Governance Indicators, 2000 and 2006

Voice and acmuntabilily

POlibCBl stability

Regulatory quality

Rule of law

Contm of mrrupbon

0 25 50 75 I W

2006 02000

Country's percentile rank (0-100) Mghr valves impty beltor miims

Sourn: KaufmannXraav-Masl, Wodj Bank

Technology and Infrastructure 2000 2005

Paved roads (% of total) Fixed line and mobile phone

High technolcgyexports subscribers (per 1,000 people)

(Oh of manufactured exports)

9.7 8.1

2.0 8.4

Environment

Agricultural land (Oh of land area) 62 63 Forest area (% of land area) Nationally protected areas (Oh of land area)

Freshwater resources per capita (cu. meters) .. 4,231 Freshwater withdrawal (% of internal resources) 1.2

CO2 emissions per capita (mt) 0.35 0.32

GDP per unit of energy use (2000 PPP S per kg of oil equivalent) 3.9 3.8

Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 410 388

World Bank 0 006

(US$ miLonsj

IBRD Total debt outstanding and disbursed 1,557 1,734 Disbursements 0 0 Principal repayments 57 e4 Interest payments 32 12

IDA Total debt outstanding and disbursed 290 366

76 -1 Disbursements Total debt service 8 43

IFC (fiscal year) Total disbursed and outstanding portfolio 125 45

9 8 3 4 Disbursements for IFC own account 6 0 Portfolio d e s . prepayments and

repayments for IFC own account 3 5

of which IFC own account

MlGA Gross excesure 15 20 New guarantees 0 0

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 2006 data are preliminary. .. indicates data are not available. -indicates observation is not applicable.

10/12/07

- 49 -

Millennium Development Goals C6te d'lvoire

With selected targets to achieve between 1990 and 2075 (estimafe closest to date shown, +/- 2 years)

Goal 1: halve the rates for $1 a day poverty and malnutrition 1990 1995 2000 2005 Poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP, % of population) Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) 36.8 38.4 Share of income or consumption to the poorest qunitile (Oh) Prevalence of malnutrition (% of children under 5) 24.0 21.7

7.3 7.2

Goal 2: ensure that children are able to complete prlmaryschooling Primary school enrollment (net, %) Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group) 41 37 40 Secondary school enrollment (gross, %) 21 22 Youth literacy rate (% of people ages 15-24)

Goal 3: eliminate gender disparity In education and empower women Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) Women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of nonagricultural employment) Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)

Goal 4: reduce under-5 mortality by two-thirds Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000) 157 112 192 Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) Measles immunization (proportion of one-year olds immunized, %)

103 180 117

Goal 5: reduce maternal mortality by three-fourths Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)

Goal 6: halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIWAIDS and other major dlseases Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15-49) Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)

7.1

Goal 7: halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to bask needs Access to an improved water source (% of population) 69 50 51 Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) Forest area (% of total land area) Nationally protected areas (% of total land area) C02 emissions (metric tons per capita) 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2000 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent) 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.8

Goal 8: develop a global partnership for development Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) Internet users (per 1,000 people) Personal computers (per 1,000 people) Youth unemployment (Oh of total labor force ages 15-24)

Education indicators (%) Measles lmmunlzatlon (%of 1-year olds)

+Primary ne1 enrollment ratio ( ) L DCbtedlvoire(. ) DSub-Saharan Africa

0 11 0 2

CT Indicators (per 1,000 people)

10

0 2000 2w2 2 w 5

Fixed + nmblle subscribers ( ) @Internet users

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. .. indicates data are not available. 10/12/07

- 50 -

C A S Annex B2: CBte d'Ivoire Selected Indicators* of Bank Portfolio Performance and Management

As of Date 03/10/08

Indicator 2005 2008 Portfolio Assessment Number of Projects Under Implementation a

Average Implementation Period (years) ' Percent of Problem Projects by Number a , c

Percent of Problem Projects by Amount a,

Percent of Projects at Risk by Number a , d

Percent of Projects at Risk by Amount Disbursement Ratio (%) e

Portfolio Management CPPR during the year (yesho) Supervision Resources (total US$)

5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.6

No 402

1 0.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

0.0"

No 92

Average Supervision (US$/project) 80 92

Memorandum Item Since FY 80 Last Five FYs Proj Eva1 by OED by Number 70 6 Proj Eva1 by OED by Amt (US$ millions) 3,792.8 231.1 % of OED Projects Rated U or HU by Number 41.4 83.3 % of OED Proiects Rated U or HU bv Amt 36.7 73.4

a. As shown in the Annual Report on Portfolio Performance (except for current FY). b. Average age of projects in the Bank's country portfolio. c. Percent of projects rated U or HU on development objectives (DO) andlor implementation progress (IP). d. As defined under the Portfolio Improvement Program e. Ratio of disbursements during the year to the undisbursed balance of the Bank's portfolio at the

beginning of the year: Investment projects only. * All indicators are for projects active in the Portfolio, with the exception of Disbursement Ratio, which

includes all active projects as well as projects which exited during the fiscal year.

Note: No figures available for FY06 & FY07 (years of program suspension under arrears).

delayed at the beginning of FY08. Implementation arrangements have since been resolved with the implementing agency and first disbursements are expected soon, notably 20% of a US$20 million labor-intensive works component, executed by Ageroute, and procurement of vehicles through the UN Inter-Agency Procurement Services Unit (IAPSU) for about US$5 million.

Disbursements for pre-arrears clearance Post-Conflict Assistance Program (PCAP) were ++

- 5 1 -

CAS Annex B3 - IBRD/IDA Program Summary C8te d'Ivoire As of Date 03/10/2008

Proposed IBRD/IDA Base-Case Lending Program (pending clearance o f arrears)

Fiscal Proj ID US$(') Strategic Rewards Implementation Year (H/M/L) Risks (H/M/L)

2008

2009

Post-Conflict Assistance Program

Economic Governance and Recovery Grant (EGRG) Emergency Urban Infrastructure Reconstruction MAP HIV/AIDS Institutions and Governance TA Reactivation o f Existing Portfolio

(PCQ)

Result

Economic Governance and Recovery Grant I1 (EGRG 11) Emergency Investments in Energy & Infrastructure

Result

Overall Result

120.0

308.0

90.0

20.0 10.0

104.0

652.0

TBD

TBD

100.0

752.0

H

H

H

H H H

H

H

H

H

H

M H M

M

M

- 52 -

CAS Annex B3: Cdte d’Ivoire: IFC Investment Operations Program

1. Introduction

Over the period 2002-2007, IFC’s strategy in C6te d’Ivoire has been to safeguard the health o f the portfolio. IFC’s re-engagement in C6te d’Ivoire upon clearance o f the arrears will focus on supporting the private sector in the following sectors and areas:

2. Financial Markets:

The financial sector in C6te d’Ivoire exhibits oligopolistic features. The large banks and new players are attempting to expand their coverage to ensure access to a wider range o f banking services. Sti l l the l o w rate o f access to banking services i s a major concern. The banlung system includes 18 credit institutions (against 22 in 2003), 16 o f which are banks (10 in 2003) and 2 financial institutions (5 in 2003).

The banking sector in C6te d’Ivoire i s quite concentrated: the four main institutions account for approximately three-fourths o f the total net assets (excluding the Banque Nationale d’hvestissement -BNI). The credit institutions in C6te d’Ivoire account for approximately 30% o f West African Monetary Un ion bank balances. The spotlight was recently on other types o f financial organizations, such as the microfinance institutions, which, pr ior to the outbreak o f the crisis, were poised for significant development. In 2000, for example, the country counted 16 microfinance institutions, offering a total o f 287 points o f service (for about 33 1,000 customers), compared with 154 branches. The Bourse des Valeurs Mobilibres RCgionales (BVRM), located in Abidjan, offers alternative regional financing by enlarging the financial and banking market. However, this organization suffered from the crisis due to the prevalence o f Ivorian companies on i t s books.

Going forward, IFC wil l target banks and financial institutions that are prepared to enter in the SME sector by offering financing solutions to small and medium enterprises. This will be done via the IFC Afr ica M S M E program, which offers performance-based grants to banks to fund the development o f an S M E portfolio. IFC also intends to collaborate with local banks to develop certain products not already offered by the local financial institutions or to improve/enhance their array o f services, strengthen their balance sheets, reduce andor mitigate certain risks. IFC i s currently in discussion with several banks in C6te d’Ivoire for transactions ranging from credit line for trade finance, tier 2 capital and direct equity participation.

3. General Manufacturing and Services Sector:

IFC i s also considering the l ight manufacturing sector to provide direct financial and technical assistance to companies. This initiative will involve direct assistance from I F C via the SME EDI, Le. within the value-addition to f i rms’ business line. For certain enterprises, managerial and technical expertise o f A M S C O managers wi l l be leveraged o f f to provide capacity-building over a medium term.

4. Agribusiness:

As one o f the most important sectors o f the Ivorian economy, agriculture and agriculture related activities are among the top o f IFC’s priorities in C6te d’Ivoire. IFC has already supported the tree crops, rubber and o i l pa lm sectors in C6te d’Ivoire. These are sectors where increasing global

- 53 -

demand i s leading to growth and where I F C will be looking for opportunities to engage in the future.

IFC has already been approached by several existing and potential clients involved in the sector. In particular, SIFCA and OLAM are two operators that are eager to invest in CBte d’Ivoire and are looking forward to further partnership with IFC in the country.

5. Infrastructure:

Improving the infrastructure by supporting the rebuilding and improvement o f facilities in vital sectors (e.g. power, railway, waste management, etc.) will be one o f IFC’s main priorities. IFC will also work with the Ivorian government to promote publidprivate partnerships, and ensure successful and continued private participation in the different segments.

6. OiYGas & Mining:

CBte d’Ivoire has significant natural resources which l ie within the early Proterozoic Bir imian greenstone belts o f the West African Craton, which extend into M a l i and Ghana hosting multi- mi l l ion ounce deposits. With gold prices at an all-time high, the development o f mining projects should increase the royalties accruing to the country. I F C i s keen to engage with junior and major mining players to assist in developing sustainable mining projects that also benefit the mining community implanted near the mines, and are in compliance with environmental best practices. IFC wil l also offer technical assistance to the mining companies to help set up S M E linkages program and capacity building initiatives to ensure a maximum level o f participation by the community in the mining activity. IFC’s support also involves assisting the government, the affected municipalities and the mining companies in setting good governance practices that favor transparency and accountability.

IFC has been in discussion with a number o f junior mining companies to take early equity positions in financing feasibility studies, with a v iew to providing debt financing for mine constructions upon confirmation o f the resources by the feasibility study.

- 54 -

CAS Annex B4 Summary of Non-lending Services

As of Date 03/10/2008

Product Audiencea Objectiveb US$ '000 Completion FY

Recent completions Poverty Diagnostic/Capacity Bldg. Post Conflict Recovery Planning

Underway Country Social Analysis Interim Strategy Note PEMFAR (PER&CFAA) Cocoa & Coffee Study TA on Energy Multi-donor Assessment/CG

Planned CEM Support for PRSP Support to PRIS and M&E W-Africa Post Conflict Env. Analysis Health CSR Post Conflict ICA Education CSR Poverty Assessment CAS Support for PRSP Progress Report

FY 07 FY07

FY08 FY08 FY09 FY09 FY09 FY09

FY09 FY09 FY 09 FY 09 FYlO FYlO FY 10 FYlO FYlO FYlO

70 46

30 50

250 55 75

135

200 75 65 60 40 40 60

120 50 35

G,D,B,PD PD, KG G,D,B,PD PD, KG

KG KG

KG, PS KG

KG, PS KG, PS

KG PD, KG

KG KG

a. Government, donor, Bank, public dissemination. b. Knowledge generation, public debate, problem-solving,

- 55 -

CAS Annex B6: C8te d’Ivoire: Selected Economic Indicators

Actual Estimate Projected Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

National accounts (as % of GDP) Gross domestic producf

Agriculture Industry Senices

Total Consumption Gross domestic fixed investment

Government investment Private investment

E X P O ~ ~ S (GNFS~ Imports (GNFS)

Gross domestic savings

Memorandum items Gross domestic product (US$ million at current prices) GNI per capita (US$, Atlas method)

Real annual growth rates Gross domestic product at market prices

Real annual per capita growth rates Gross domestic product at market prices

100 23 23 54

80 11 3 8

49 39

20

15501

770

1.6

0.1

100 23 26 51

83 10 3 7

51 44

17

16373

840

1.8

0.0

100 23 26 51

80 9

3 6

52 42

20

17568

870

-0.3

-1.8

100 23 26 51

82 9

3 6

48 40

16

19438

-- 1.6

0.2

100 23 27 50

81 10 3 7

50 43

17

22743

_ _ 2.9

1.4

100 100 23 24 28 28 49 48

79 79 14 15 5 5

9 10

48 46 43 43

19 19

24600 26600

5.1 5.6

3.6 4.1

- 56 -

C6te d'Ivoire - K e y Economic Indicators (cont'd)

Actual Estimate Proiected Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Public finance (as O h of GDP at market pricbs) Revenues 17.5 17.1 18.5 19.4 19.4 19.6 19.7 Expenditures Primary basic balance Capital expenditure Foreign financing

20.1 19.9 20.9 20.6 21.1 21.4 21.6 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.4 2.8 2.7 3.1 2.6 3.1 4.5 5.2 0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.5 -4.1 _ _ _ _

Monetary indicators

Growth o f M 2 (%) 9.5 7.4 10.3 17.2 7.6 -- _ _

Price indices( YR86 =loo)

Terms o f trade (% change) -11.1 - 1 0 . 5 5 . 8 6.9 -2.1 _ _ _ _ Nominal exchange rate (CFAhJS$, period average) 527 521 522 479 446 _ _ _ _ Consumer price index (% change) 1.5 3.9 2.5 1.9 4.3 2.1 2.7

a. GDP at market prices b. "GNFS" denotes "goods and nonfactor services." c. Includes net unrequited transfers excluding official capital grants. d. Includes use o f IMF resources. e. Consolidated central government. f. "LCU" denotes "local currency units." An increase in US$/LCU denotes appreciation.

- 57 -

CAS Annex B7: C8te d'Ivoire - Key Social Indicators

Latest single year Same regionlincome group

Sub- Saharan

Africa

741.4 2.3

35.2 5.5

745 127

Low- income

2,353.0 1.9

30.0 3.7

580 128

1980-85

9.9 3.8

10.0

640 45

5.4 61.4

1990-95

13.6 3.3

36.8

770 86

7.2

1999-05

17.8 2.2

43.6

38.4

880 117

POPULATION Total population, mid-year (millions)

Urban population (% of population) Total fertility rate (births per woman)

POVERTY (% of population) National headcount index

Urban headcount index Rural headcount index

Growth rate (% annual average for period)

INCOME GNI per capita (US$) Consumer price index (2000=100) Food price index (2000=100)

INCOMElCONSUMPTlON DISTRIBUTION Gini index Lowest quintiie (% of income or consumption) Highest quintile (% of income or consumption)

SOCIAL INDICATORS Public expenditure

Health (% of GDP) Education (% of GNl)

Net primary school enrollment rate (% of age group)

Male Female

Access to an Improved water source (% of population)

Urban Rural

Total

Total

Immunization rate (% of children ages 12-23 months)

Measles DPT

Child malnutrition (% under 5 years) Life expectancy at birth (years)

Total Male Female

Mortality infant (per 1,000 live births) Under 5 (per 1,000) Adult (I 5-59)

Male (per 1,000 population) Female (per 1,000 population)

Maternal (per 100,000 live births) Births attended by skilled health staff (%)

3.4 3.1

80 83 77

69 51 56 80 43

75 88 70

64 64 29

63 67 39 24 22

50 45 47 47 48

58 58 59

103 157

117 192

100 168

80 122

489 467 921 42

298 244 684 41

CAS Annex 85. This table was produced from the CMU LDB system. 10102/07 Note: 0 or 0.0 means zero or less than half the unit shown. Net enrollment rate: break in series between 1997 and 1998 due to change from ISCED76 to ISCED97. Immunization: refers to children ages 12-23 months who received vaccinations before one year of age or at any time before the survey.

- 58 -

I

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Ln I

n

m

Y

I- a)

._ P e n P u 0

Map section

Mont NimbaMont Nimba(1,752 m)(1,752 m)

KKoommooéé

NNzzii

NNzzii

KKoommooéé

BBaanndd

aammaa

BBllaann

cc

BBaaggoo

éé

LLoobboo

BBoo uu

SSaassssaannddrraa

SSaassssaannddrraa

MMaarraaoouuéé

DDaavvoo

Lac deLac deKossouKossou

K O R H O G OK O R H O G O

B O U A K EB O U A K E

M A NM A N

D A L O AD A L O A

A B I D J A NA B I D J A N

ManMan

DaloaDaloa

BouakBouakéé

KorhogoKorhogoOdienneOdienne FerkessedougouFerkessedougou

DabakalaDabakala

BondoukouBondoukou

AbengourouAbengourou

DaoukroDaoukro

BBééoumioumi

SoubrSoubréé

BangoloBangolo

BoundialiBoundiali

KatiolaKatiola

SakassouSakassou

ZuenoulaZuenoula

MankonoMankonoSeguelaSeguela

TToubaouba

BiankoumaBiankouma

DananeDanane

DuekoueDuekoue

GuigloGuigloTToulepleuoulepleu

VVavouaavoua

IssiaIssia

Grand-LahouGrand-Lahou

AlepeAlepe

DabouDabou

DivoDivoLakotaLakota TTiassaleiassale AgbovilleAgboville

AdzopeAdzopeGagnoaGagnoa

OumOuméé

SinfraSinfra

BouafleBouafle

TToumodioumodi

TTiebissouiebissou

DimbokroDimbokro

BocandaBocanda

BongouanouBongouanou

M'BahiakroM'Bahiakro

BounaBouna

TTandaanda

AdiakeAdiake

AboissoAboisso

TTengrelengrel

AgnibilAgnibiléékroukrou

K O R H O G O

B O U A K E

M A N

D A L O A

A B I D J A N

Man

Daloa

Bouaké

KorhogoOdienne Ferkessedougou

Dabakala

Bondoukou

Abengourou

Daoukro

Béoumi

Soubré

Bangolo

Boundiali

Katiola

Sakassou

Zuenoula

MankonoSeguela

Touba

Biankouma

Danane

Duekoue

GuigloToulepleu

Vavoua

Issia

Tabou

San-Pedro

Sassandra

Grand-Lahou

Jacqueville Grand-Bassam

Alepe

Dabou

DivoLakota Tiassale Agboville

AdzopeGagnoa

Oumé

Sinfra

Bouafle

Toumodi

Tiebissou

Dimbokro

Bocanda

Bongouanou

M'Bahiakro

Bouna

Tanda

Adiake

Aboisso

Tengrel

Agnibilékrou

Abidjan

YAMOUSSOUKRO

GUINEA

LIBERIA

GHANA

BURKINAFASO

MALI

Komoé

Nzi

Nzi

Komoé

Band

ama

Blan

c

Bago

é

Lobo

Bo u

Sassandra

Sassandra

Maraoué

Davo

Lac deKossou

Gul f of Guinea

To Beyla

To Bamako To

Sikasso

To Bobo Dioulasso

To Kampti

To Batie

To Bole

To Wenchi

To Sunyani

To Prestea

To Monrovia

To Nzerekore

To Monrovia

Mont Nimba(1,752 m)

8°W 7°W 6°W 5°W 4°W 3°W

8°W 7°W 6°W 5°W 4°W 3°W

5°N

6°N

7°N

8°N

9°N

10°N

5°N

6°N

7°N

8°N

9°N

10°N

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

0 40 80

0 20 40 60 80 Miles

120 Kilometers IBRD 33393

SEPTEMBER 2004

CÔTE D' IVOIRE

DEPARTMENT CAPITALS*

REGION CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES

REGION BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

*Departments have the samename as their capital.