Warsaw Pact Forces 02

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Chap t e r 4

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Forces Threat

to Europe


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CONTENTS

Page

S oviet Milit a ry D octr ine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Wa rsa w P a ct F orces in the Western Thea ter of Milita ry Opera tions . . . . . 57P rinciples of Soviet S tr a tegy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Soviet/Wa rsa w P a ct Gr ound Offensive Int o Europe:

A Notiona l S cena rio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Soviet a nd Wa rsa w P a ct Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Area s of Contr oversy a nd U ncerta inty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Tables

Table No. Page

4-1. S tr uctur e of Soviet Motorized Rifle a nd Ta nk Div isions . . . . . . . . . . . . 604-2. Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

FiguresFigure No. Page

4-l. NATO/Wa rsa w P a ct F orce Compa risons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584-2. Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634-3. Soviet/Wa rsa w P a ct Wa rt ime Comma nd Or ga niza tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

4-4. Example of Soviet Front-Loading of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69


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Chapter 4

The Soviet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Forces Threat to Europe

In 1984, SACEUR General Rogers describedFOFA as an attempt to come to grips with

th e realities presented by S oviet doctr ine foroffensive operat ions a nd t he cont inuing ma s-sive Soviet conventional force build-up. Thischapter examines some of these realities, bothwha t w e know about a potential Soviet groundoffensive in Central Europe, and the uncertain-ties surrounding those realities.

The Soviets h a ve massed in E urope a lar genumber of ground forces with an enormousamount of f irepower: at present, the strength

of the in-place Warsaw Pact forces in the Cen-tral Region-in terms of divisions, tanks, andartil lery-is in each category close to twice thatof NATOs in-place forces, and Warsaw Pactforces possess a good deal more strategic depth,for defensive purposes and to bring more forces

to bear .2NATO, being a defensive alliance,

Genera l Bernard W. Rogers, Fo11ow on Forces Attack

\ ~ ~ ~ A~ : ~ l ~ t h s an d Realit ies , VatoRetriew No. 6, December

J hi le the territory of the J a r s a w Pact extends thousandsof kilometers back into the U. S. S. R., NATO has little depth

must be prepared to react to however the So-viets might choose to use those forces shoulda conflict arise. But how the Soviets might ac-tually launch an offensive has generated a good

deal of controversy.

This chapter, therefore, examines what weknow a nd do not know a bout t hose a spects ofSoviet s trategy, operat ional planning and tac-tics of significance for FOFA: the role of con-ventional forces in Soviet doctrine; the Sovietground forces facing NATO; the principles whichgovern Soviet military planning and strategy;

the way a Soviet conventional offensive intoWestern Europe might be waged; and impli-cations for FOFA.

for defensive purposes: it is less tha n 500 kilometers from th einter-Germa n border to the English channel ; and the importanceof Germany as a NATO land power in the Centra l Region makesit more difficult for NATO to trade space for time than it wouldbe for Warsa w P act forces to fa ll back when a t ta cked to reor-ganize a nd counterat ta ck. The U.S .S.R. is a lso bet ter placedtha n NATO to bring a ddi t ional forces forwar d to susta in thoseat the front line, as a good portion of NATOs reinforcementsof men and equipment would have to come across the Atlanticfrom North America .

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Among Western analysts, one of the mostcontroversial aspects of Soviet military plan-ning is the role of conventional weapons in anoffensive. This is due largely to different assess-ments of Soviet military doctrine and mili-

tary thought .

Soviet mili tary doctrine lies a t the hea rt ofthe overall Soviet approach to war, which isquite different from that of the West. War, asthe Soviets see it, is a science, something gov-erned by certain laws and principles reflectedin military history, and past and present wars,

tests, maneuvers, and the like. Soviet militarydoctrine comprises a set of views definingthe goals and nature of a possible war, and how

the U.S.S.R. should prepare for and conduct

such a w a r should it be deemed necessa ry. Itprovides a context for deciding the size andcomposition of the Soviet Armed Forces, andfor integrating their organization, tactics,training and equipment into a cohesive f ight-ing force. Although viewed as scientific, mili-tary doctrine is not rigid or fixed; instead, ithas proven to be quite dynamic but, oncedecided on, is rarely questioned except at thehighest levels.

It is generally accepted among Western ob-servers tha t a ma jor shif t in S oviet doctrineoccurred in t he mid-1960s, from a near tota lreliance on nuclear weapons in Soviet militaryplanning, to a more balanced approach to de-

55


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56 New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

veloping nuclear and conventional forces. Fromthe late 1950s until the mid 1960s, the Sovietsbelieved any potential war would begin withmassive nuclear strikes that would totally, andirreparably, destroy the losing sides entire so-

cial and political system. With the ouster of

Khrushchev, however, and the adoption of astrategy of Flexible Response in the West, theSoviets began to consider t he possibility of awar remaining conventional. Although theycontinued to believe that nuclear weaponswould be decisive in any conflict, the Sovietmilitary no longer contended that a conflictwould inevitably escalate to all-out nuclearwar. Since the mid 1960s, then, the Sovietshave emphasized the need to be able to winat all levels of conflict, and have developed thecapabilities to fight with or without nuclearweapons .

These developments have led to a good dealof controversy in t he West rega rding currentSoviet doctrine and possible intentions. Someobservers cont end th a t t he Soviets st ill placegreat weight on a nuclear option so that ,should military conflict start, nuclear weap-ons would play a role from the beginning ofthat conflict. According to this view, theSoviets perceive a totally integrated nuclear-conventional operation, within the frameworkof which nuclear and conventional weaponssupplement and reinforce each other, creatingthe synergistic effect deemed necessary for theattainment of victory.3

A more common view among Western observ-

ers, however, is that should war be precipitated,

the Soviets would want to keep the conflict con-ventiona l a nd regard nuclear release only a sa last resort. They believe that the Soviets have

become increasingly skeptical a bout t he use-fulness of nuclear weapons in combat today

31. Kass and M. Deane, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in theModem Theater Battlefield: The Current Soviet View, Comp

a r a t i v e St ra tegy4 3):212,

1984.

both for ideological reasons, and for operationalones.

4These observers view the continued So-

viet buildup of nuclear capabilities not asmeant necessarily to wage a nuclear offensive,but instead: 1) to discourage initial NATO nu-clear use; and 2) should NATO call for nuclear

release, to be prepared to win at whatever levelof nuclear conflict might ensue.5

The fact that these differing views are de-rived from Soviet sources and actions suggeststhe possibility of some degree of debate amongSoviet military planners themselves. For now,the Soviets are apparently keeping their op-tions open, with Soviet doctrine stipulatingthat any potential wars could begin with ei-ther conventional or nuclear weapons. If theyare initiated with conventional weapons, i tst ipulates that they may st i l l escalate to a nu-clear exchange.

6

Wha t th is mea ns for FOF A, a nd for NATOas a whole, is that NATO cannot rule out, andth us ought t o be prepar ed for, a conventiona lpha se in an y potentia l Soviet offensive. Whati t al so suggests i s th atwha tever str ategies

th e West may adopt, or wh atever systems we

may bu y today--evi dence for assessi ng Soviet

concepts is pat chy and cont r over sial , and So-

vi et str ategy and tacti cs may change. Sincethis report deals with the conventional defense

of Europe, the remainder of this chapter ex-a mines how th e Soviets might conduct a con-

ventional offensive today should such an ac-tion be precipitated.

4Nuclear w eapons would lower t he Soviet ra te of adva nce and

greatly confuse the battlefield, disrupting troop control andfairly precisely defined operational plans. See, for example, Lt.Col. John H ines and P hilLip Petersen, The Soviet Conven t ion~Offensive in Europe, I k f i l i t a r y Review, April 1985, p. 3.

See vol. 2, a pp. 4A, note 1. Volume 2 conta ins t he classifiedappendices to this report.

6See, for example, Capt . 1st Rank A. Belyayev, Scientif icConcepts of Modern Warfare-An Important Element in the

A w a re n e s s o f t h e Sov ie t F ig h t in g M a n , Komrnunistooruzh mykh S i l No. 7, 1985, as translated in J oint P ublica-tion Research Service, J P RS U MA 85 050 Aug. 29, 1985, pp.17-22.


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Ch. 4 The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe 57

WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE WESTERN THEATER OFMILITARY OPERATIONS

The Soviet threat facing Western Europe isa matter both of the numbers and equipmentof Warsaw Pact forces, and of Soviet strategy

for employing those forces. The main non-nu-clear threat comes from the continental forcesof the Wa rsaw P a ct, concentra ted in Centra lEurope along the eastern border of West Ger-many in what the Warsaw Pac t des ignates asits Western Theater of Military Operations(TVD).

7This region contains generally-although

by no means exclusivelyflat terrain (espe-cially northern Germany), well suited to themovement of a rmored combat units , a nd t heroad to the key economic and political centersof Western Europe.

The Warsaw Pacts Western TVD consistsof Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)forces in P oland, E a st G ermany, a nd Czecho-slovakia, and the Bal t ic , Belorussian and Car-pathian military districts of the U.S.S.R. Witha standing force of roughly 4 million person-nel facing Europe, this area houses the War-saw Pa ct la rgest , most ready, a nd most mod-ern force, which far outnumbers NATOs in-placeforces.

8The Soviet forces include roughly 19

divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces Ger-many (GSFG) in East Germany, f ive divisionsin the Central Group of Forces (CGF) in Czech-

oslovakia, and two divisions in the Northern

For planning purposes, the Soviets ha ve divided th e ar eas

contiguous with their borders into five theaters of militaryoperations or TVDs--the Northwest, the Western, the South-western, the Southern, and the Far Easternin which theywould expect milita ry a ct ion on a s tra tegic scale; the milita ryassets employed in each TVD vary, but the strongest force isconsidered t o be in th e Western TVD. The S oviet Un ion itselfis divided into 16 military districts.

The S oviet termteatr vo nnykh deistvhas been variouslytra nslated in Western wr it ings as Theater of Military Opera-tions (TMO), Theater of Strategic Military Actions (TSMA),and Theater of Military Actions (TMA). This report follows

DODs current usage of theat ers of military operat ions. andthe a cronym t aken from the R ussian, TVD.

According to a 1984 NATO force comparison, the WarsawPact countries have a standing force of about 6 million person-nel, of which about 4 million face NATO in Europe. The stand-ing force of the NATO countries comprise about 4.5 million per-sonnel, of which about 2.6 million are stationed in Europe. SeeNATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Compari sons, NATO In-formation Service, Brussels, 1984, p. 4.

Group of Forces (NGF) in Poland. NSWP forces

include somewhere around 6 East German, 15Polish, and 10 Czech divisions. Another 38 So-

viet divisions lie in the three western militarydistr icts of the U . S.S.R.

9

All of the Soviet Groups of Forces stationedin Eastern Europe are considered readyforces, i.e., are highly manned, well-equippedand trained, and are at least minimally pre-pared for combat with li ttle or no mobilizationand preparation. Most of the approximately38 divisions in the western military districtsof the U.S.S.R. are characterized as not-readyi.e., they would require extensivemobilization and are not available for imme-

dia te comba t opera tions. The Wa rsa w P a ctforces in the Western TVD are equipped withclose to 30,000 tanks and 20,000 artillery andmortar pieces. About two-thirds of these tanksand about three-fourths of all arti l lery is con-centrated in the Soviet divisions, with the re-mainder in the NSWP divisions.

11By con tras t ,

NATO forces comprise far fewer ready divi-sions in Central Europe,

12and roughly hal f as

many ta nks , ar t i l lery and morta rs , armoredpersonnel carriers and attack helicopters. Fig-ure 4-1 presents some rough comparisons ofNATO and War saw P act s t rengths in the Cen-

tra l Region a s published by t he U.S. D epa rt-ment of Defense. There are disagreements,however, among published estimates due todifferences such as state of mobilization, which

forces a re counted, a nd a ge of da ta .

See vol. 2, app . 4A, note 2. For an unclassified discussion,see Laurence Mart in , NATO an d t he Defense of the Wrest, Ne wYork:

Ho l t ,

Rinehart & Winston, 1985, p. 24. See vol. 2, app . 4A, note 3.U.S .

Depart ment of Defense,Sov ie t M i l i t a r ~ P ower , 1986

p. 12. See vol. 2, app . 4A, note 4.

Unclassified estimates vary on the number of NATO andWarsaw Pact divisions in the Central Region, and there are many

differencesin personnel and equipmentbetween NATO andWP divisions. These numbers , ther efore, provide th e basis fora r ough force comparison, but should not be viewed a s a com-parison of equivalent units. See Soviet M il itar y Power, 1987,est imates from the Internat ional Inst i tute for Stra tegic Studies(11SS), London, and L. Martin, NATO and the Defense of theWrest, pp. 24-25.


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Figure 4-1 .NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Comparisonsa

Fighter-bomberground-attack

aircraft

Total militaryincluding naval forces

KEY

570

380

Reconnaissanceaircraft

Divisionequivalents

75

0

Bombers

Mainbattle tanks

41,000

18,600

Artillery/mortar

WARSAW PACT

forces and rapidly forces and rapidly

deployable forces deployable forces

aE~tlmate~ vary n the n~la~~ fled IIterature regarding all of these force comparisons The above should be taken onlY as a 9ulde as viewed by heu s

epartment f

Defense The chart reflects U S est mates of 1985 data NATO estimates exclude France and Spain

SOURCE Sov/ef A4///fary Power, 7986, pp 89, 91


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Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe 59

hofo

cred~t

U S Deoartmen ofDefense

Soviet missi le launchers.


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60 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

The main elements of the Soviet ground forces

are the tank, motorized rif le, and airborne di-visions.

13Each of the tank and motorized rif le

divisions contains a similar complement of ar-t i l lery, a nti-a ircra ft guns a nd m issiles, ta cti-cal surface-to-surface missiles, and supportunits, with the chief difference between themlying in the number of motorized rifle regiments

and tank regiments in each: a Soviet tank di-vision (estimated at about 11,000 men) includes

th ree ta nk regiments a nd one motorized rifleregiment; the motorized rifle division, slightlylarger (an estimated 13,000 men), has threemotorized rifle regiments and one tank regi-ment

14(table 4-l). An important point to note

wit h rega rd t o FOFA, however, is th e overallra tio of ar mored to non-a rmored vehicles: inboth tank and motorized rif le divisions, thereare more than twice as many trucks and other

light vehicles a s th ere are a rmored vehicles

15

(table 4-2). The airborne divisions include threeairborne regiments a nd combat support a ndservice units. In addition to the regular air-borne divisions, t he Soviets ha ve also formedair a ssaul t br igades and bat t a l ions .

According to preliminary research from theRoya l Mili tar y Aca demy, Sa ndhurst, t he So-viets may now be moving toward a more f lexi-ble organization of their forces as well, by turn-ing more towa rd t he corps/briga de str ucturea s a possible a lterna tive to the focus on divi-sions and regiments. Researchers at Sandhurstbelieve the reorgan izat ion of some Soviet di-visions into corps may presage a larger reorga-niza tion of the Soviet force stru cture overa ll.Such changes would only reinforce the beliefof the U.S. DoD that these forces have been

3See vol. 2, app . 4A, note 5.

S ee

Soviet Mih ta ry Power 986 p. 65, and U .S . Depar tmentof the Army, Soviet A rm y Operat ions, April 1978, IAG -13-U -78, pp. 2-10-2-13.

KS ee vol. 2, app. 3A, footnote 6.

and are being expanded and reorganized to cre-ate a larger, more capable and higher-speedfighting force for a conventional or nuclear bat-

tlefield.

Table 4-1 .Structure of Soviet Motorized Rifleand Tank Divisions

MR Tank

T o t a l p e r s o n n e l 12,695 11,470Division HQ & HQ company 245 245T a n k r e g i m e n t s 1 regiment 3 regiments, each

1,145 personnel w/1 ,575 personnelM R r e g i m e n t s ( B M P ) 1 regiment 1 regiment

2.225 personnel 2,225 personnelMR r eg im en ts (B TR) 2 regiments, each

w/2,31 5 personnelA r t i l l e r y r e g im e n t . 1,030 1,030SAM regiment (SA-6) 480 480FROG battalion 170 170Multiple rocket launcher

battalion 255 255

A n t i t a n k b a t t a l i o n 195

Reconnaissance battalion 340 340Engineer battalion 395 395Signal battalion 270 270Motor transport battalion 370 370Maintenance battalion 230 250Chemical defense battalion 225 225M e d i c a l b a t t a l i o n 175 175Artillery command battery 70 70Mobile field bakery 45 45Helicopter squadron 200 200

SOURCEOefense

Intelligence Agency SowelDwmorM/ Orgm/zaf/on Gude OO I

100333-82

July 1982, repr nted May 1985 pp. 9 80

Table 4-2.Vehicles Soviet Tank and Motorized

Rifle Divisions

Motorized Rifle Division Tank Division

Tota l combat veh ic les 1,029 976of whichTanks 220 238Armored personnel

c a r r i e r s 649 488A r t i l l e r y 108 108Air defense 52 52

T r u c k s 2,501 2,427SOURCE

Oefense

Intell igence Agencywef

L w s ona OrgamzahonGude OOB 1 100-33382

July 1982repr nted

May 1985

PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET STRATEGYI n assessing Soviet st ra tegy, the extent to saw Pact : a l l Warsaw Pact armies are orga-

which the Warsaw Pact is dominated by the nized along the same lines, have highly stand-U.S.S.R . means t hat wha t t he Sovie ts th ink ardized equipment, and have largely the sameand do will generally apply to the entire War- tact ics and doctrine as in the U.S.S.R. During


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wartime, the NSWP forces would be completelysubordinated to the Soviet Supreme HighCommand through intermediate-level theatercommands.

Soviet wr itings outline a number of princi-ples which would govern the use of these forces

in any Warsaw Pact conventional of fensiveinto Western Europe. The overriding princi-ple would be to adopt a s tra tegy, operat iona lplans and tactics that would allow Soviet forces

to penetra te a nd n eutra lize NATOs defensesvery quickly, while at the same time: 1) mini-mizing the risk of escalation to a nuclear catas-trophe, and 2) keeping the conflict off the ter-ritory of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet aim wouldbe to get rapidly into NATOs depths and seizekey objectivesNATOs nuclear arsenals, C

3I

assets, air force assets, logistic elements,etc.before NATO would have a chance to

fully mobilize, before reinforcements would beable to arr ive from the Uni ted Sta tes , and be-fore NATO could reach a decision to use nu-clear wea pons.

Of key import a nce in achieving th is princi-ple, the Soviets emphasize, are the two factorsof speed an d surprise. In order to reach t heirobjectives quicklyi.e., before Western coun-tries could prepare their defenses fully or agreeto use nuclear weaponsthe Soviets believetha t a E uropean w ar mus t s t a r t suddenly , t ak-ing NATO by surprise. This does not neces-

sarily mean total surprise, or even military sur-prise, but political surprisei.e., an offensivewhich would catch off guard those NATOleaders who make the political decision to mobi-lize, prepare defenses, or release nuclear weap-

ons. Although there could never be total surprise,a reasonable degree is regarded a s essentia l ,largely as an important force multiplier: a cer-tain degree of surprise would make it possibleto reach objectives with fewer forces thanwould be needed aga inst a n enemy prepa redfor batt le.

To achieve this speed and surprise, a Soviet

offensive would probably be accompanied bysome kind of deception scheme to make troop

movements and mobilizations appear to beoccurring for reasons other than planned ag-

gression. Ma ny believe tha t NATO w ould befar less likely to react if any Soviet prepara-tions for war were ambiguous. And once anoffensive is initiated, the Soviets emphasizethe importance of speedi.e., of sei zin g andholdi ng the in it iat ive, retaining the offensive,an d mai ntai ni ng a hi gh rat e of advance. TheSoviets place overriding stress on the offen-sive as the only decisive and therefore theonly possible form of war.

In an initial offensive, the Soviets wouldlikely concent r at e th ei r effort s along certainfronts , a t t empting deep, heavy th rusts a longnarrow sectors, and would look to exploit theenemy w eaknesses. The purpose would be toconfront NATO with an overwhelming attackon a few sma ll area s w hich NATO would notbe able to match. With the different NATOcorps at different states of readiness, the Soviets

are expected to exploit the gaps in NATOsdefense, and to place the main weight of at-tack on the more vulnerable areas-i . e., on theU. K. , Belgian, Dutch and Danish cont ingents .(The U.S. and German corps are considered tobe the most formidable forces in NATO, so itis considered unlikely tha t t he Soviets woulda tt a ck them h ead-on. ) This concentra tion ofpower in narrow sectors would be conductedas part of an overal l plan that would be de-signed to lead to a rapid penetration of NATOdefenses and NATOs collapse.

The Soviets would divide their forces intotheater level forcesconsisting of fronts a ndarmies-and tactical units, consisting of divi-sions, regiments , batt al ions, a nd sma ller. Inother words, fronts would be comprised of ar-mies; a rmies a re comprised of divisions; divi-sions, of regiments; regiments, of battalions;and battal ions, of companies and platoons.Fronts have no fixed organization. Anywherefrom one to six fronts might be put togetherto participate in a specific strategic operationin a TVD (Soviet military theater).

16Armies

consist of two main types: the Tank Army,

(comprised of mainly ta nk divisions), a nd t heFor a fuller description, see Soviet Arm y Operati ons, De-

partment of the Army, U.S. Army I ntelligence and SecurityCommand, and U.S. Army Intelligence and Threat AnalysisCen ter , IAG -13-u-78, April 1978.


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Combined Arms Army, (with more motorizedrifle divisions). When tailored for combat oper-ations, either type of Army would normallyinclude: three to seven divisions; SSM brigade;several arti l lery brigades; antitank units; AAAunits; S AM regiments; signa l regiment; com-bat engineer units; pontoon units; assaultcrossing units; transport units; supply facil-ities; evacuation and repair units; medical units

and facilities.17

Soviet forces a re a lso dividedinto corps and brigades; corps are generallycomprised of two or three divisions, for opera-tions which would not require a full army.

In order to threaten a quick breakthroughand a rapid, continuous penetration deep intoNATO territory, these forces have been orga-nized into successive waves, or echelons, dis-persed in great depth. The purpose is to be ableto bring f resh forces against the adversary at

th e right t imes to buildup pressure and forceand sustain a breakthrough. Thus, Soviet forces

throughout the entire force structure down tothe battalion level are divided into echelons--first, second, and perhaps even third-and re-serves. Each regiment contains first and sec-ond echelon battalions; each division, f irst andsecond echelon regiments; each army, first and

second echelon divisions; each front, first andsecond echelon armies; and the entire theaterof opera tions would likely ha ve first a nd sec-ond echelon fronts. As figure 4-2 illustrates,NATO Central Region ground forces in theirmain defensive positions would likely have tocontend with three different second eche-ions, or waves of enemy forces following thelead divisions of the assault armies: the Sec-ond Tactical Echelon, or the follow-on divisionsof the assault armies; the Second OperationalEchelon, or the follow-on armies deployingfrom Poland, Czechoslovakia and Western Mil-

i tary Districts; and the Second Strategic Eche-lon, or Second Echelon Front, consisting of thefollow-on armies from the western military dis-

tricts (WMD). As illustrated below, however,

the Soviets have demonstrated a good deal offlexibility in how echelonment may be carried

out, and these waves would not necessarilybe of equal weight or significance.

Ibid, pp. 2.7-2.10.

Ea ch Wa rsaw P act unit w ould probably beassigned a sector to attack and, if of divisionsize or larger, a main and secondary axis ofadvance within that sector . In addition, al lunits of brigade size or larger would be as-signed a depth of attack which contains an im-mediate and subsequent objective or mission.In this sense, therefore, second echelons wouldnot be reserves in the usual sense, but rather

itted reserves that wouldwould act as pr ecommhave been assigned their pre-planned missionsbefore the offensive begins. The reserves, asmall proportion of Warsaw Pact forces,

18would

be contingency forces to use against unantici-pated threats and to take advantage of unex-pected opportunities.

To exploit these breakthroughs, the Sovietshave revived the World War II concept of mo-bile groups, which would take advantage of any

breakthrough to move into NATOs rear. Itis believed that these independent divisions,armies, or regiments-with their new capabil-ities, now commonly called Operat i onal M a-neuver Gr oups (OMGs)would be assigned tooperate on their own to capture key objectivesin the NATO rear that would both pave theway for the follow-on forces and neutralizeNATOs th eater nuclea r t hreat . In this w ay ,their task would be to create the conditionsfor turning a tactical successi.e. , an initialbreakthrough of NATO defensesinto an op-erational success, by paving the way for thesecond echelons of the army or front of whichthey are a part to achieve their preassignedobjectives.

The Soviets expect a ba tt lefield th a t w ouldbe very confused. There would be no clearlydiscernible front line, forces would mingle indepth a nd w ould enga ge primarily in bat tlesof encounter (i.e., when both sides engage whileon the move).

19The Soviets plan to win a deci-

sion q uickly, but a re prepa red to fight a longwar i f they have to.

*See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 7.see Christopher N. Donnelly, The Warsaw Pact View of

the Future B at t lefield, 120A Nat ional Secur it y Report (RoyalMilitary Academy, Sandhurst, A68), pp. 11-14.


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Figure 4-2. Warsaw Pact Concept of Employment

-

KEY

XX Division boundary XXXXX (Front boundary)

IXXXX Army boundary XXXXXX Theater boundary

In place forces

NOTE It IS Important to keep In mind thatthis diagram is highly schematic, fOr IIlustratlve PurPoses only The Warsaw Pact forces have demonstrated flexlblllty nechelomng

forces Ftrst and second echelons whether tactlcali Operational. orstrate91c would Ilkely not be of equal we19ht

orslgnlflcance

(See text]

SOURCE Genera l Be rna rd W Rogers , Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) Myth and Realltles NATORev/ew No 6 December 1984 p 2

Soviet planners believe that their system of size a top down command and control sys-command and control, or troop control, has tern, with commanders at the TVD establish-been structured in the best way to meet the ing concrete strategic goals, and then movingdemands of such an offensive. The Soviet the- particular missions and requirements down thea te r command s t ruc ture is h igh ly centra l i zed , h ierarchy , to the f ron t , the army, d iv is ion , andwith all Warsaw Pact forces under a single, so on (figure 4-3). The Soviets also engage incentra lized mili ta ry comma nd a uthority, the a good deal of pre-planning of operations,Soviet Supreme High Command (VGK) and i .e . , anticipating what future operations mightthe Soviet General Staf f .

20The Soviets empha- look like, and providing specific norms by

which commanders would make decisions. Thus,)For a comparison of the Warsa w P act a nd NATO comma nd less initiative would be expected of Warsaw

and control systems, see John H ines and P hil Petersen,4

I s

NATO Thinking Too Sm all? A Compa rison of Comm a nd S t ruc - Pact commanders at the tactical levels thant u re s , Zn t e r n a t imm lD efense Review, N o. 5 1986, pp. 563-572. in the West.


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Figure 4-3.Soviet/Warsaw Pact Wartime Command Organization

Supreme High Command (VGK)(Moscow)

I

Soviet General Staff

Strategic ForcesAviationMissilesNavalAir/Space/Missile

Defense

I

I Battalion I

OperationalForces

In time of war, the NSWP forces would be broughtSoviet fronts.

acountera[r and deep Interdiction

bcounteralrand deep nterdiction and airSuPPOrt for frontcAir support for army

under direct Soviet command and integrated with the various

SOURCES Adapted from Phil Petersen and John Hines, Changing the Soviet System of Control, /rrterrratiorra/ Defense Review No 3, 1966, and Science Applications,Inc., SovieV?Varsaw Pact EJatflefleld

lanning

Procedures, Draft, SAIC-W6064FSRC May 26, 1966.


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Ch. 4The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 65

SOVIET/WARSAW PACT GROUND OFFENSIVE INTO EUROPE:A NOTIONAL SCENARIO

Although there is a good deal of uncertaintyabout how the Soviets might put these princi-ples into practice should war in Europe occur,the following notional scenario suggests whata Soviet offensive into Europe might entail .

Should hosti l i t ies be initiated, the organiza-tion of forces in the Soviet Western TVD wouldproba bly include th ree first echelon front s: aNorthern Front, comprised mainly of Polishforces, with i ts headqua rters dra wn from thePolish Ministry of Defense; a Centr a l Fr ont,formed from the GS FG , NGF, and E as t G er-man forces , wi th i ts headquarters s ta f f drawnfrom the s ta f f of the GSFG headquarters ; anda Czech Front, consisting of Czech forces andthe Soviet CGF, wi th i ts headquarters drawn

from the Czechoslovak Western Military Dis-trict headquarters.

21 During wartime, the North-

ern Front would likely be deployed to the north-ern GDR, tasked to at tack northern WestGermany, the Netherlands, and Denmark and,along with airborne and amphibious opera-t ions , to take the Danish s tra i ts . The Centra lFront would conduct the main theater a t tackacross West G erman y a nd into B elgium, thesouthern Netherlands and Luxembourg. TheCzech Fronts mission would likely be to at-tack from Czechoslovakia into the southernFRG to the FRG-Swiss-Austrian border. In

addition, a Danube Front, formed from the So-viet Southern G roup of Forces (SG F) in H un-gary and from the Hungarian Army, might betasked to at tack through Austria into theSouthern FRG. Soviet forces in the Belorus-s ian and Carpathian Mil i tary Dis tr ic ts mightcomprise tw o second echelon front s, w ith th eB alt ic Mili tary District providing t heat er re-serves.

As discussed above, the Warsaw Pact groundforces vary widely in their peacetime levels ofreadiness, with a good number of divisions

manned at levels well below their wartime au-thorizations; these forces would require exten-

sive preparation for war. The preparationw ould include mobilizing personnel, t ra iningand preparing them to conduct combat opera-tions, moving units from t heir dispersa l loca-t ions, making final preparations, and, finally,deploying units to combat.

22

Because the Soviets would l ikely want someof their follow-on forces to be prepa red t o ex-ploit any successes at the FLOT, it is expectedtha t they w ould mobilize par t ial ly a nd begindeployment before t hey w ould at ta ck NATO.Most of the Warsaw Pacts first and secondoperational echelons are at high states of read-

iness in peacetime. Accordingly, these unitscan be rapidly deployed from their peacetime

locations into assembly areas . For many ofthose forces in the rear, however, it would takea good deal longer, depending on what levelof proficiency the Soviets would want them toreach before hostilities begin. B eca use of theSoviet emphasis on surprise, and on depriv-ing NATO of any unambiguous warning of ana tt a ck, NATO plann ers believe th a t t he bulkof Soviet forces would be well back from theborder between NATO a nd t he War saw P actbefore hostilities would start. According to onesource, NATOs strategy for meeting a Sovietconventiona l a t ta ck is based on th e assump-

t ion of at least some 96 hours warning t ime, although some believe it might well be shorter.

Soviet doctrine for deploying these forceswould pose some demanding requirements onthe timing of movement of the second echelondivisions, ar mies an d fronts. These would bedeployed according to a carefully coordinat edplan, where each succeeding echelon would becommitted at the time and place consideredmost effective for exploiting the success of itspredecessor and advancing deeper into NATOterritory. Thus, second echelon divisions of the

f irst echelon a rmies would sta rt a t a part icu-

21

However, estimates vary on the number and compositionof fronts, and how they would likely be deployed during war.

22 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 8.23

Laurence Martin, op. cit., p. 50.24

See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 9


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lar distance behind the forces at the FLOT,to be commi tted to battle to achieve objectivesa certain distance beyond the FLOT accord-ing to schedule. Second echelon armies wouldbe scheduled to arrive a few day s lat er , hav-ing started some distance behind in WarsawPact territory and with an objective deeper into

NATO territory. Second echelon fronts wouldlikewise start even farther back, with a sched-ule for attaining objectives even farther intoNATOs depths. OMGsparts of armies orfronts designed to carry out deep penetrationsand raids as the opportunities arise on the mainaxes of the attackwould be committed earlyand would operate well into NATOs rear areas

on their own, without the support of the usualsupply lines.

25

Thus, depending on levels of readiness andhow they fit into the overall Soviet offensive

plan, the follow-on forces would start anywherefrom just behind the initial attack forces, tofar ther back in East Germany, Poland, Czech-

oslovakia, and then the U.S.S.R. i tself . Thosefarthest back would be transported across arelat ively sparse highway and rai l network ineastern Poland. According to one set of calcu-lations, the Soviets might bring forward ana vera ge of tw o divisions per day by r a il,

26a nd

up to one division per da y by road.27

I t is esti-mated that at least 140 trains would be needed

per day to transport forces across the seven

25 See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 10.*The actual number may well be higher.Those forces being tran sported by t rain would a rrive at tra ns-

loading complexes near t he Russia n/P olish border, w here theywould change from broad gauge to narrow gauge before s tart-ing across most of Poland. There are about eight complexes along

the Ru ssian /P olish border w here equipment is off-loaded fromRussian broad gauge to East European narrow-gauge; t ime fort ransloading is est imated at about 4 hours per tra in.

East-West rail lines in Poland. According tothese calculations, this would suggest about20 trains departing along each rail line per day,

depart ing just about every hour wi th an aver-age maximum spacing of about 35 kilometersbetween trains.

28After crossing most of Po-

land, units would proceed to Forward Assem-

bly Areas.

Closer in, the follow-on forces would groupinto combat units and continue under their ownpower toward the bat t le . Tanks and other ar-mored vehicles would first be loaded onto trac-tor-trailer transporters before being unloadedto move under th eir own pow er. An a rmoredcombat division would, if possible, move ontwo, three, or four parallel routes; thus, anyone division moving over roads could stretchwell over 40 kilometers.

29

A division on the move would stop from timeto time in assembly areas: to reorganize, main-

tain vehicles, and rest. Soviet doctrine callsfor short or long stops, depending on the rea-sons, the distance from the FLOT, and the di-visions schedule. Upon arrival in the immedi-at e batt le area, a division w ould assemble inf ina l assembly a reas, or depa rture a reasbefore forming into a tactical march formationto be committed to battle. At this point, themajority of support vehicles would move awayto their own assembly areas, so that columnsmoving forward from this point on would con-

sist mainly of armored vehicles. Having beencommitted, a divisions regiments would againstop closer in somewhere in th e ra nge of 5to 30 kilometers from the FLOTin regimenta ssembly a reas for their f inal move forwa rdinto battle .

30

aSee vol. 2, app . 4A, note 11.*

e

See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 12.30

See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 13.

SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT VULNERABILITIES

The above scenario implies some potentiallyserious vulnerabilities in the Warsaw Pactsystemsuch as rigidity in Soviet planning,

their C3 system, the vulnerability of largecolumns of Warsaw Pact troops on the march,and the fact that Warsaw Pact troops wil l have


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to move through crit ical chokepoints--which could suggest important targets forFOFA.

For example, some argue that the large num-

ber of Wa rsa w P a ct follow-on forces, a nd t heprecise timing with which they would move

forward, would leave little room for flexibilityin a Soviet offensive; if this is true, a chang-ing situation in the movement of follow-onforces, such as might be caused by FOFA,could significantly disrupt the Warsaw Pactt imetable for war .

31 Likewise, they contend, ahighly structured plan could strain Soviet com-mand and control, whose disruption would alsocause Warsaw Pact planners serious problems.The size of the Warsaw Pact columns couldcomprise another major weakness, leavingWa rsaw P act forces vulnerable to air a tt a ck.

See vol 2 app. 4A, note 14.

And potential chokepoints, such as at bridgesover t he Oder an d E lbe Rivers, would also bepotentially major vulnerabilities; creation ofthese chokepoints would delay and disruptWa rsa w P a ct follow-on forces, a nd a s th e de-layed forces bunch up, would offer good tar-

gets for follow-up attacks. As Soviet rearservices centrally control all logistic supporta ctivities a nd supplies, disrupting a mmunit ionresupply and delaying the arrival of the sec-ond echelon could also disrupt Soviet oper-at ions.

Thus, within the framework of this generalscenario, key targets for FOFA might includenot only fixed targets-such as bridges acrossth e Oder a nd E lbe/Vlta va rivers, railya rds,depots, etc.but the Warsaw Pact forces them-selves, including columns of second-echelon ar-


Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Soviet tanks.


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mored and support vehicles (moving both by tacking these targets would l ikely delay therail and by road), units in assembly areas, enemy reinforcement and resupply at the FLOT,chokepoints, and Wa rsaw P a ct hea dqua rters and might so erode morale in the rear, that theand command posts. Identifying OMGs prior Soviet offensive would be degraded and madeto their commitment to battle is also some- more manageable for NATO forces at the front.

times considered a ma jor t a sk for FOF A. At-

AREAS OF CONTROVERSY AND UNCERTAINTY

This overall scenario, however, has raised anumber of serious questions a mong Westernobservers. In general, these questions concernhow flexible the Soviets might be in implement-

ing this overall plan, a nd thus w ha t i t w ouldta ke to delay or disrupt War saw P a ct follow-on forces enough to have a significant effecton the overall war. In the above scenario, thevalue of FOFA would depend on two important

conditions:

1.

2.

that there will be follow-on forces, and that

these follow-on forces will be importantto Warsaw Pact s tra tegy; andthat NATOs attack on the follow-on forcescan have a significant effect on their utilityi.e., enough losses can be inflicted tomatter; delays cannot be sufficiently com-pensated for; Warsaw Pact C2 can be de-graded enough to make a difference; mo-rale can be eroded enough to significantlyaffect the cohesion of Warsaw Pact troops.

Ea ch of th ese conditions, h owever, is cont ro-versial .

With regard to the first, although Soviet doc-

tr ine ma y ca ll for t he echelonment of forces,th ere is not necessa rily a prescribed formulaor part icula r m ix of forces necessa ry for t his,and the Soviets have demonstrated a good deal

of flexibility in how echelonment ma y be car -ried out. In an offensive into Western Europe,the Soviets may well frontload their forcesin the first echelon, and Soviet field commandersmay well echelon their forces differently from

each other. These decisions would probably de-pend on: 1) how ready the NATO forces arefacing them, and how much surprise they couldexpect; a nd 2) over w ha t kind of terra in th eywould have to deploy. Especially given long

mobilization times, the Soviets could frontload their forces, enhancing the threat at theFLOT and reducing the importance of the fol-low-on forces

33(figure 4-4).

The question is how much the Warsaw Pactmight front load i ts forces, and what thiswould mean for the value of the follow-onforces. H owever flexible Soviet pla nning ma y

be, i t sti l l makes sense tha t a ny front load-ing of forces would be limited by certain phys-ica l an d doctr ina l constra ints. Terra in is lim-ited; and placing a good deal more forces upfront would complicate logistics problems, re-duce the amount of surprise, and would makeWarsaw Pact forces more vulnerable to NATOsnuclea r or h igh-a ccura cy conventional wea p-ons. Thus, i t is expected tha t t here will alwa ysbe a certain number of follow-on forces com-ing up behind. As stated by General Rogers:

. , . cri t ics . . . e rr in assuming tha t we are un-aware that under certain circumstances the So-viets might press their second echelon forcesup against, or among, those forces of the firstechelon. Not only are we aware of this possi-bili ty , we a lso ta ke account of the fact th at ter-rain can only accommodate a finite number ofWarsaw Pact ba t ta l ions abreas t , thus caus ingthe rest to be out of contact, i.e., to be follow-on forces.

34

Indeed, some contend that the Soviets would

find it difficult to significantly front load theirforces beyond those already in place withoutexceedingly long mobilization times.

35I t i s

l ikely t ha t i f the Soviets w ere preparing t o ini-tia te a n offensive, they w ould provide a good

33See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 16.

General Bernard W. Rogers, op. cit., p. 4.35



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Figure 4-4. Example of Soviet Front-Loading of Forces

Structure in anticipation of no surprise

1st Army

2nd Army

Structure in anticipation of surprise: Front-Loading

1st Army

2nd Army

3rd

4th

Army

Army

SOURCE Soviet Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK

deal of trainin g for newly mobilized, not ready

units, and conduct relatively comprehensivepreparations before bringing them up to theFLOT. But doing so would take a good dealof time.

Physical constraints, however, would still al-

low the Soviets to place many more forces for-ward than are now est imated to be there ,

36a nd

bAccording to one observer, current Warsaw Pa ct organiza-

tion and operational doctrine suggests that there would likelybe around 20 to 25 divisions in the first echelon of an attackagainst NATOs Central Region. Analysis of the terrain in West-ern Europe, however, suggests that this region could supportwell over 30 divisions in t he first echelon. In order t o increase

many Western observers contend that doingso might well lower the target value of the

follow-on forces for the overall offensivenotjust q uant i tat ively, but qua l ita t ively. This wa sreflected by U.S. Air Forces Headquarters inEurope, in a briefing which spelled out the fol-lowing concern with FOFA (as distinct frominterdiction):

the combat power of the first echelon by at least 20 percent,therefore, this observer suggests that the Warsa w P act needdo l i t t le more tha n ma ke changes in opera t ional

p lan s a

rela-tively quick fix option. See Boyd D. Sutton, et a l . , DeepAttack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe, Survival,Ma rch /April 1984, pp. 64-65.


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Soviet doctrine calls for the wave, or eche-lon, attack arrangement. We here at USAFEdo not believe this is the only possible scenario.A minor shift in Soviet employment conceptan d/or change in t heir reinforcement p l a n m a y

leave us with attack capabilities for whichthere are few targets. Few targets, that is , thatwill produce tangible returns in a limited spanof time.

37

Others have pointed out similar concerns.For example, some point out that a conceptthat considers attacking forces in transit acrossPoland tacitly assumes that those forces would

be mobilized an d moved aft er D-Da y. Sh ouldthese forces be mobilized earlier, however, andthus be in Eas t G ermany when the wa r s tar t s ,interdiction in Poland would be futile. Even

if follow-on forces are present, many believetheir value would be limited in terms of affect-ing the overal l wa r . I t i s the extended f irs t

37FOFA :USAFE View, B riefing to OTA staff , HQ U SAFE,Apr. 16, 1986.

echelon that is now critical . . . The reinforc-ing formations from the Western military dis-tricts . . . serve a vita l function, but t hey ar eredundant in numbers a nd they a re mostly not

f irst-l ine combat units . . . I t is the G SFG it-self that must be destroyed . . . If these are notcontained, they will collapse NATOs ability(and will) to defend.

38

These questions are complicated by uncer-tainties over what i t would take for attackson individual follow-on forces to have a signif-ica nt impact on their effectiveness. How pre-cisely timed would a Soviet offensive be? Ifa Soviet second-echelon division is delayed acertain number of hours, would its missionhave been obviated? Or might it make up thattime elsewhere, for example, by staying forshorter times in assembly areas? At what level

38See St even L. C an by, The New Technologies, November,

1983, p. 25. These sentimen ts w ere repeat ed to OTA sta ff byWest Europeans in the FRG and Belgium, April 1986.


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Ch. 4 The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 71

of da ma ge would the performa nce of a S ovietunit-at any levelbe degraded enough to sig-nificantly af fect the overall war? And whatwould i t take to target OMGs or commandposts?

As mentioned, some suggest that Warsaw

Pact operations are so precisely timed that dis-ruption of that plan could throw their entireoperation off course.

39B ut S oviet w ritings sug

-

gest that the Soviets may build a good dealof slack time into operational plansfor ex-ample , into wai t ing t imes in assembly areasto compensate for delays. Similarly, it is un-certa in how critica l delay of logistics supportmight be, given that the Soviets keep a goodamount of their stocks already forward.

40While

delaying the follow-on forces would clearlyha ve an effect, therefore, th ere is a good dea lof debate concerning how high a level of dam-

age there would have to be for delaying theseforces to have a significant effect on the over-a l l war .

A similar debate surrounds the relevance ofthe OMG to a follow-on forces attack concept.The OMG has commonly been viewed as com-prising a specialized forma tion, specific in itsstructure and mission, so that an OMG mightwell be an identifiable target in the enemysrear.41 According to General Rogers:

We consider the OMG to be a high prioritytarget for FOFA . . . Much of the new target

detection and sensing capability we seek to ac-quire is necessary for us to identify which fol-low-on forces are organized as OMGs so theycan be attacked early on.

42

But others emphasize that the OMG ma yalso be considered as a task, a concept of oper-ations, without necessarily any definite struc-ture. In this sense, the OMG would not com-prise something that could be targeted indepth, but rather something that would notbe identifiable un til deployedi.e. , unt il rela-tively near th e FLOT. Viewed this w a y, indi-

vidual divisions or armies would not neces-

ee vol. 2, app . 4A, note 1 8] eeVO1.2, app. 4A, note 19See vol. 2, app. 4A, note 20General Bernard Rogers, op. cit . , p. 4

sari ly be structured in advance to work as anOMG, but rather resources would be allocatedas necessary to exploit breakthroughs and getinto NATOs rear. The Soviets may be provid-ing capabilities in such a way that perhaps any

group of regiments, combining fire power, airassets, and mobile forces, could be put togetheras an exploitation force, or OMG, as deemednecessary.

There is also debate over the degree to which

disruption of Warsaw Pact C3I in the rear

might disrupt Soviet forces as a whole. Theinherent difficulties in detecting and target-ing Warsaw Pact command posts are many:1) Soviet command posts are well defended andcamouflaged; 2) th ey a re dispersed w idely; 3)there is a good deal of redundancy in command

posts and in various communications modes;4) command posts at the front and army level

are largely prepared in advance and thereforeare bunkered or hardened; and 5) because trans-mitter antennas are generally several kilome-ters from command posts, it would be difficultto determine the precise locations of commandposts.

43

Aside from these difficulties, there is differ-ence of opinion over how much damage couldbe done should certain units be decapitated,a nd how m uch flexibility m a y be worked intoth e Soviet decisionma king process. Some a r-gue that because the Soviet command and con-

trol system is so highly centralizedwherecommands pass down a str ictly hierarchicalsystem and where, at the tactical level, infor-mation is l imited and initiative discourageddisrupting command and control would be themost effective wa y t o stop a Wa rsa w P a ct of-fensive. But Soviet writings also reflect a gooddeal of effort to introduce more flexibility intoth eir decisionma king process to ta ke an y po-tential disruptions into account.

44It is unclear

how flexible Soviet t roop cont rol would proveto be in combat.

A final area of contention concerns the ef-fect of FOFA on the cohesion among Soviet

and Warsaw Pact forcesi.e., the effect of

43 See 2, app. 4A, note 2144

See vol. 2 app. 4A, note 22


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FOFA operations on Soviet and Warsaw Pactmorale, and how that might af fect the capa-bilities of their troops for implementing Sovietoperational plans. FOFA could well have a pro-

found psychological effect on the enemysforces, by extending the battlefield into theenemys depths. According to one military his-

torian, hitt ing units while they are sti l l onthe line of march, and do not expect it, will have

a far more serious effect than hitt ing themharder later, when they are deployed and ex-

pecting casualties.45 Most people, this histo-

rian suggests, can face terrors, such as goinginto battle, on a predictable basis; they becomepsychologically prepared. But FOFA wouldmake the line of battle unpredictable. And with

a military doctrine that emphasizes the impor-tance of taking the offensive from the firstshot, Soviet troops might quickly acquire aprofound loss of confidence or sense of defeat.

It is by using indirect fire to breed th is fea r,it is by killing the morale of 90 percent of theenemy in a ddition t o killing th e bodies of 10percent of his soldiers, th a t w e ca n ma ke ourmost effective contribution to the defence ofthe Central Front.

46

Many believe that these psychological effectsmight only be compounded in the Warsaw Pact,

given the already questionable loyalty amongmany Sovie ts and East Europeans towardMoscow. Questions have been raised as towhose side the East Europeans would f ight on

should hostilities begin, and whether FOFAwould further erode the cohesion of a n a lreadytenuous alliance. Likewise, demographic changein the U. S. S. R., and the growth in the numbera nd proportion of non-Russia ns in th e Sovietarmed forces, has raised important questionsabout loyal ty and performance in the USSRs

Richard Holmes, The Psychological Effects of ArtilleryFire, lecture presented to a DRA (Director Royal Artillery)ta ctical seminar , J une 1983. Quoted with permission of theauthor .

Ibid.

own forces. For example, the fact that an esti-mated one-fourth to one-third of all Soviet con-

scripts are projected to be of Muslim descentwithin the next 10 to 15 years-with lower edu-cational and technical training, often severelack of Russian language skills, and question-able loyalty-has raised serious questions

about the potential performance of the non-Russian nationalities in combat. Evidence ofrecent riots among Soviet conscripts whorefused to go to Afghanistan, and defectionsof Central Asians and Russians within Af-ghanistan itself, have only highlighted theseconcerns.

But the Soviets are also aware of these prob-lems, and have ta ken steps to deal w i th them.Moscow has tightened institutional controlsover its Warsaw Pact allies-e. g. , by creatingpeacetime TVD High Commands in the late

1970s, which creates a clearly defined, pre-planned wartime command structure in whichEastern Europe is clearly subordinate to Mos-cow; and by assuring that procedures, C2 sys-tems and equipment are al l s tandardized, andtha t Russian is the langua ge of comma nd. Athome, Soviet discussions focus on the need totra in a ll of their na tiona li ty groups t o be bet-ter soldierse.g., th rough increased R ussia nlanguage training, better technical training,and retaining mixed nationality units for bet-ter controland for restructuring their ownforces to take account of the changing compo-

sition of the conscript pool. On the evidenceavailable, it would be impossible to gauge theirlevel of success on either count.

All of these questions remain complex andcontroversial. Several efforts are now under-way to at tempt to resolve them, or at least tonarrow the margin of uncertainty, but manyof the answers cannot be known. At present,these questions remain at the heart of the de-bate over how much emphasis should be placedon FOFA in the West, and how it should beimplemented.

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