Nato and warsaw Pact force comparison

8/17/2019 Nato and warsaw Pact force comparison

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RC

C MPARIS NS


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NAT

ANDTHE

WARSAW

PACT

FORCE

COMPARISONS

N A T O I N F O R M A T I O N S E R V I C E • B R U S S E L S * 1 98 4


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CONTENTS

Page

Foreword

INTRODUCTION

- General 1

- Comp aring NATO and Wa rsaw Pact Forces 3

- The Probl ems of Mobilisation and R einforcement 6

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

- Land Forces 7

- Air Forces and Air Defenc e Forces 10

- Ma ritime Forces 14

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Northern and Central Re gion s 19

- Southern Region 21

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE NUCLEAR EQUATION

- Strategic Nuclear Forces 26

- Interme diate- and Sho rt-Rang e Nuclear Forces 30

- Sea-Based Nuclear Forces 43

NATO AND W AR SA W PACT DEFENCE/MILITARY EXPENDITURE 45

M IL I TAR Y PRODUCTION AND TECHNOLO GY CAPABILITIES 47

EXPLAN ATOR Y NOTES FOR DATA 49

Editorial Note

France and Spain are members of the North Atlantic Alliance but do not participate in its

integrated m ilitary structure. A t the ir request therefore no account of French and Spanish forces

is taken in this comparison, although fu ll statements o f these forces are available in documents

publishe d nationally.


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I LLUSTRAT I ONS

o Geographical Dissimilarities - A NATO Problem Fig. 1

o NATO - Wa rsaw Pact Force Comparison Fig. 2

Relative Trend s in Ma in Battle Tan ks and Artillery Fig. 3

NATO - Wa rsaw Pact Com bat Air cra ft: quantitative comp arisons Fig. 4

Relative Trends in Anti-Aircraft Arti l lery and M ob ile Surface to Air Mis siles Fig. 5

o Defen ce of Northern and Central Re gion s Fig. 0

Defence of Southern Region Fig. 7

o Strategic Nuclear Force - Mode rnisation Comparison :

introduction of selected systems year by year Fig. 8

Total Strategic M issiles and Bombers Fig. 9

Strategic Forces - Trend s in Relative Ad vanta ges Fig. 10

Sho rt and Interm edia te Range Delivery Syste ms : range com parison Fig. 11

Short and Intermediate Range Delivery Sy ste m s: modern isation comparison Fig. 12

Longer-Rang e INF M issile Systems deployed end 198 3 Fig. 13

Longer-Rang e INF M issile War head s (global deploym ents) Fig. 14

Target Coverage of Soviet SS-20 and Target Coverage of

NAT O Pershing II and GLC M Fig. 15

Coverage of Europe from S S -2 0 Bases East of the Urals Fig. 16

NATO GLCM and Pershing I I Cove rage Fig. 17

Land-Based INF Aircraft deployed end 19 83 Fig. 18

Short-Ra nge Nuclear Forces (SNF) dep loyed end 19 83 Fig. 19

o NATO and Wa rsaw Pact Countries in Europe and Soviet Military Districts Fig. 20


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FOREWORD

In 1982 NATO p ublish ed fo r the first time an official comparison o f the

fo rces belonging to the nations in the integrated military structure o f the

Alliance with those o f the countries o f the Warsaw Pact. The objective o f this

publica tion was to provid e an authoritative, fa ctu al and objective source from

which the public could assess the relative strengths o f the two alliances and

hence the existing balance o f power. In order to continue this process mem ber

nations have decide d to pub lish a new edition prov iding more recent and up-to-

date information.

Any comparison o f mili ta ry forces is inevitably a highly complex process

involving a wide range ofjudgem ents, each o f which is capable o f a wide range

o f interpretations. Furthermore a NA TO Force Comparison represents the

consensus of fourteen nations. A definitive assessm ent is therefore difficult to

achieve. However, every effort has been made to ensure a high degree of

accuracy and consistency. In this respect, and mindful o f the need to retain as

much continuity as possible, several changes in the presentation o f ma terial

have been m ade in order to improve the document. In particu lar the method of

counting NA TO and Warsaw P act forces readily ava ilable in Europe has been

changed in order to present a more realistic picture.

The maintenance o fan adequate balance offorces between E as t and West

is a fundam ental requirement fo r Alliance security. NA TO remains de termined

to pursue pea ce a nd stability through a ll possible means, including those of

dialogue and com munication. B ut this can only be done on the basis o f a sound

military posture. The last 35 years bear testimony to NA TO ’s success in

maintaining the peace. This document also serves to dem onstrate the very

substantia l resources and capabilities member nations have made and continue

to m ake ava ilable fo r the common defence o f the Alliance. Bu t perhaps more

significantly it illustrates that while we can be reasonably satisfied with our

perform ance in the past , the fu ture gives less room fo r comfort. Disparities in a

number o f critical areas exist which if left unattended could further reduce the

fl exib ili ty o f response necessary fo r credible deterrence.

This document demonstrates that our basic defence posture remains sound. I believe it also underlines tha t continued efforts are necessary i f we are


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INTRODUCTION

General

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a defensive alliance ofsovereiqn and independent nations. It is dedicated to safeguarding the

freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, and is foundedon the principles of individual liberty and the rule of law. The Allianceaims to prevent war; indeed the ultimate political purpose of the Allianceis to achieve a lasting peaceful order accompanied by appropriate securityguarantees. It works to achieve this by strivinq to improve understandingbetween East and West and by possessing sufficient strength to deter anattack on any member of the Alliance. The Treaty provides that Alliancemembers will come to each other's assistance in the event of an armedattack upon any one of them.

2. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn in June1982, the Heads of State and Government declared: "Our purpose is toprevent war, and while safeauardinq democracy, to build the foundations of

lastino peace. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response toattack. We respect the sovereignty, equality, independence and territorialinteqrity of all states. In fulfilment of our purpose, we shall maintainadequate military strength and political solidarity. On that basis, wewill persevere in efforts to establish, whenever Soviet behaviour makesthis possible, a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue,negotiation and mutually advantageous co-operation."

3. While NATO must ensure that its defences are adeguate to meet anythreat, it has consistently striven, through the pursuit of balanced,verifiable and militarily significant arms control agreements, to ensuresec uri ty at a redu ced level of armaments. On the basis of a West ern

initiative, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)Follow-up Meeting held in Madrid agreed to a mandate for a Conference onConfidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, theCDE, which opened in Stockholm in January 1984. The Allies co-ordinatetheir policies in this Conference and as a result a package of concretemeasures was presented to the CDE which, if agreed, will lead to greateropenness in the military activities which take place in the whole ofEurope. In addition, the NATO governments concerned continue to pursueactively reductions and limitations on conventional forces in CentralEurope in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna.At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States has presenteda comprehensive proposal for a complet e ban on chemical weapons.

4. The Soviet Union discontinued the two negotiations with theUnited States on intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons in November andDecember 1983. Nevertheless, in keeping with the 1979 two track decision,the Allies continue to consult actively with a view toward the eventualresumption of the talks on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). On thebasis of a concrete, balanced and verifiable agreement, the Allies arewilling to halt, modify or reverse the deployments now under way, in orderto obtain reductions to the lowest possible level on United States andSoviet longer range INF. The Allies also fully support the efforts of theUnited States in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) to achievereduct ions in United States and Soviet strateg ic weapons. Progress

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achieved thus far in the INF negotiations and S TART indicate that resultsare possible but these obviously require the return of the Soviet Union tothe negotiating table in Geneva. Meanwhile, negotiations to reach militarily significant, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements remainan integral part of the security policies of the NATO Allies.

5. Negotiations for phased arms limitations and reductions need totake account of the military efforts of the other side so that theAlliance's defensive capabilities remain guaranteed at each stage of thenegotiating process. Unilateral nuclear disarmament by NATO would give theSoviet Union, which could not be relied upon to follow suit, an overwhelming military advantage. These efforts need the backing of a firmdefence policy and sufficient military strength to implement it. NATO mustcontinue to make clear to any potential aggressor that it has both thepolitical will and the military capabilities to defend its members. Thisis deterrence. Such a policy is the greatest safeguard against an attackon any member of the Alliance or against the use of a threat of militaryforce as a means of coercion.

6. The size and type of forces which could be used against NATO

influence the kinds of forces the Alliance needs to deter a military threatand thereby to prev ent aggre ssi on in any form. NATO as a defe nsi vealliance does not seek superiority nor does it attempt to match the WarsawPact man for man or system for system. However, if peace and stability areto be preserved, the relationship between the overall military capabilitiesboth nuclear and conventional of NATO and the Warsaw Pact must not becomeso unbalanced that the credibility of NATO’s deterrent could be called intoquestion. In other words, the Alliance requires enough forces of the rightkinds to make clear that it would be able to respond to any type of aggression in an effective way. The NATO deterrent compr ises conventionalforces, intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces and strategic nuclearforces. Adequate conventional forces are required in order to deprive the

Warsaw Pact of the chance of military success without recourse to othercapabilities. To achieve this, NATO's conventional forces must be capableof the forward defence of NATO's territories and the safeguarding of thesea lines of communication. The United States strategic nuclear forces arethe ultimate guarantee of NATO's security in that they link an aggressor'sdecision to attack with the incalculable risk of total destruction. Wellbalanced intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces are essential to NATOas the link between the conventional and strategic legs of the NATO Triad.Possession of these capabilities is necessary to enable the Alliance tochoose amongst a number of options and to ensure that an aggressor is leftin no doubt about NATO's readiness and will to defend itself while leavingit uncertain about the form that defence would take. This is the essenceof NATO's overall strategy known as "flexible response". For deterrence tobe effective the Alliance must be able both to make credible its capabilityand willingness to defend itself and to make the risks unacceptable forany potential aggressor.

7. The Warsaw Pact leadership has repeatedly stated that the WarsawPact is strictly defensive in nature. Past and present policies havehowever contradicted their statements. Further, the Warsaw Pact's militarystrength is on a scale well in excess of that reasonably justifiable fordefence. The Warsaw Pact maintains large-scale strategic nuclear forces,intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces, and massive conventionalforces. Moreover, Warsaw Pact military strategy as shown by its literature

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and military exercises calls for large scale penetration into enemy territory in order to secure strategic objectives; it continues to emphasisethe element of surprise and the necessity of rapid offensive operations.

8. Warsaw Pact forces are organised and equipped and trained to takethe offensive right from the beginning of a conflict. This involvescombined arms operations in which all forces, conventional and nuclear, canbe brought to bear in a unified manner, using all necessary assets. Tothis end, some fundamental reorganisation and restructuring of Sovietforces has been in progress for several years and is still incomplete. Themain outcome has been leaner combat units with proportionately highercombat power in support of updated tactics and concepts. For example, thereorganisation of the Soviet tank and motorised divisions is resulting inan increased number of tanks and especially artillery pieces. With regardto the air forces, the control of the Soviet Strategic and TacticalBomber forces has been centralised recently under the command of four airarmies in those parts of the Warsaw Pact which face NATO. Soviet militarycapabilities would enable the use of chemical weapons on a large scale.

Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces

9. Many factors contribute to the capability to deter or defendagainst aggression. These include political and social stability, geography, economic strength, human resources, industrial and technologicalresources, as well as military capabilities. The military forces possessedby each side are clearly important but are not the only elements in thisequation and in comparing each side's military forces it is important toavoid over-simplification. A complete assessment of the global balance ofpower would have to take into account forces other than those that areavailable to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Even if consideration was to berestricted to NATO and the Warsaw Pact capabilities only, a full assessment

would have to take into account not just the conventional forces deployedby each side in Europe but also certain worldwide deployments by a numberof NATO countries as well as by the Soviet Union. For instance, both theUnited States and the Soviet Union maintain substantial forces in Asia andthe Pacific.

10. In addition to quantifiable force differences there are alsoother elements important to an understanding of the balance. These include,for example, differences in military strategy and structure, politicalorganisation and cohesion, the qualitative aspect of forces and the availability of timely reinforcements. Other important considerations are theamount of ammunition, fuel and other stocks possessed by each side, the

quality of their equipment, the quality of their civil and military infrastructur e, their organisation, their personnel, their leaders hip andmorale, as well as each side's economic, industrial and technologicalability to sustain a military conflict. This publication cannot attempt tocover all these issues. Instead, it supplies up-to-date information on themore important aspects of the military postures of NATO and the WarsawPact, thus providinq the reader with a basis for forming his own judgements. In addition, it must be realised that both NATO and the WarsawPact deploy a number of weapon systems capable of being used both in aconventional and a nuclear role; in general such systems are considered inboth the conventional and the nuclear sections. The allocation of forcesshown in this publication is for comparative purposes only and does notnecessarily correspond to any specific scenario or situation.

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11. Geographic and economic dissimilarities between NATO and theWarsaw Pact directly affect the roles and missions of their armed forces.For example, the Warsaw Pact is one geographic entity in contrast to NATO,which is separated by oceans, seas and in some regions, particularly in thesouth, by the territory of nations which are not members of the Alliance.This allows the Warsaw Pact to transfer land and air forces and supportbetween different areas via internal and generally secure lines ofcommunications. It also contributes to enabling the Warsaw Pact to select

the time and place in which to concentrate its forces. However, Sovietnaval forces are divided into four widely separated fleets; this makes itdifficult for them to mass naval power for joint operations or to maintainan effective naval presence for sustained periods away from home ports.

12. NATO, on the other hand, must transfer resources along lengthyand vulnerable air and sea routes to and around Europe. The most powerfulpartner in NATO, the United States, is separated from its European alliesby an ocean 6,000 km wide. Moreover, NATO nations, to a far greater extentthan those of the Warsaw Pact, depend on shipping for vital economicpurposes. Thus, unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO has a fundamental dependenceon shipping during peace and war. This fact requires markedly different

missions for Warsaw Pact naval forces on the one hand and NATO naval forceson the other. Addition ally, NATO lacks geog raphi cal depth in Europebetween the possible areas of conflict and the coasts, so rendering itsrear areas, headquarters and supplies more vulnerable to enemy attack andmore difficult to defend.

13. The Warsaw Pact nations have a standing force of some 6 millionpersonnel of which some 4 million face NATO in Europe. In addition, thereare over 800,000 personnel with some military training enrolled in thenational security forces. Warsaw Pact active and reserve forces worldwideinclude 246 divisions plus 29 brigades, with 61,000 main battle tanks andair forces equipped with nearly 13,000 aircraft. Ground and air forces inEurope are forward deployed, well structured, positioned and prepared foroffensive operations. The Warsaw Pact possesses an impressive inventory ofnaval forces, the largest co mpo nen t of whic h is the Soviet Navy. Inaddition to ballistic missile submarines Warsaw Pact active naval forcesinclude nearly 290 other submarines (a number of which are equipped tolaunch Cruise missiles), about 40 major surface combatant ships (Kievclass ships and cruisers) and about 400 naval bombers (most of which areequipped to deliver anti-ship missiles). A large number of these forcesare not in the NATO/ Warsaw Pact area and indeed some, primarily those ofthe Soviet Union, are deployed worldwide. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has, inrecent years, sign ifican tly impr ove d the quality of equipme nt in allcomponents of its armed forces; strategic, ground, air and naval.

14. The standing forces of the NATO nations total 4.5 million personnel, of which nearly 2.6 million are stationed in Europe. There arealso nearly 400,000 other militarily trained personnel, such as Home Guardsand Gendarmerie. Total active and reserve forces belong ing to NATOnations, but not all committed to NATO, include 82 divisions and over 180independent brigades (normally in NATO 3 brigades equal 1 division), withabout 25,000 main battle tanks and air forces equipped with approximately11,200 combat aircraft. NATO forces are well trained and, given the fullrange of capabilities at their disposal, are capable of presenting acredible defence of Alliance territory. In most NATO countries, modern andeffective aircraft, tanks and anti-tank weapons are being introduced into

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GEOGRAPHICAL DISSIMILARIT IES

A NATO PROBLEM

Reinforcements 6000 km

from North America

Reinforcements 650 km

from Western Borders of USSR

FIGURE 1


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the armed forces. The naval forces of some NATO nations include elementsdeployed on a worldwide basis. Of an overall total of just over 200 attacksubmarines, 45 major combatant ships (carriers and cruisers), and some3,700 land and sea based maritime aircraft (including helicopters), not allcould be made available in the NATO area. That is to say, the forces shownas available to NATO are not a simple aggregation of the forces possessedby each member country, but are based on availability and allocation(1).

15. The global figures given in the previous paragraphs have beenmentioned so that the statistics and comparisons which follow can be seenin their proper persp ectiv e. For the most part, the disc uss ion thatfollows includes only those forces which could be expected to be availableto NATO (less those of France and Spain) and those of the Warsaw Pactwhich it is considered would be facing them. The focus is on Europe.Brief reference is made to the United States, Canadian and Soviet navalforces in the Pacific but the Soviet forces facing China have not been

included.

The Problems of Mobilisation and Reinforcement

16. NATO and Warsaw Pact forces rely heavily on the mobilization ofreservists to bring active duty formations up to strength and to manmobilizable formations. However the closely controlled social structuresof the Warsaw Pact nations and the length and intensiveness of the trainingof their military conscripts permit them to maintain a more significantpool of trained reserve manpower than is maintained by NATO.

17. The bulk of NATO's reinforcements of men and equipment must bemoved across the Atlantic and the English Channel largely by sea. TheWarsaw Pact on the other hand can move many of its central reserves rapidlyby means of internal road, rail and air links. NATO could not sustain an

effective defence against these reinforced Warsaw Pact forces solely within-place forces. Therefore a successful defence would be largely dependentupon the timely arrival of substantial reinforcements, principally from theUnited States, but also from Canada and in Europe itself from the UnitedKingdom and Portugal. However, the problems would be considerable evenwith reasonable warning time. The rapid reinforcement of land forces is avery complex operation that demands the timely availability of numerousresources, particularly transport aircraft and shipping as well as reception and prepositioned equipment storage facilities. Reinforcement ofair forces involves infrastructure and logistic problems of a different butalso complex nature, particularly in the areas of survivability and combatsupport. While there are a cons iderab le number of rein forcem ent airsquadrons available to cross the Atlantic within a few hours, they would

have to wait for the subsequent arrival of their ground crew and supportequipment before they could become operational.

18. As will be seen from the sections that follow, standing WarsawPact forces are more numerous than those of NATO. This advantage for theWarsaw Pact is likely to remain and indeed could increase at least for someconsiderable time as both sides reinforce. NATO would have to bring mostof its reinforcements, and particularly the associated equipment, acrossthe Atlantic, while the Warsaw Pact would benefit from internal and shorterlines of communication.

(1) For more detailed explanation see Explanatory Notes.

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CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Land f orces

19. Warsaw Pact forces facing Allied Command Europe (ACE), which isthe NATO military command which stretches from the northern tip of Norwayto the eastern borders of Turkey, consist of about 167 active and mobilis

able divisions plus the eguivalent of 9 divisions of airborne, air assaultand air-mobile formations, which could be used in a number of differentareas. Taking account of the forces of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pactcountries, the Soviet forces located in those countries but only the highreadiness forces of the six Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union,there are some 115 divisions positioned well forward or considered ready tofight at very short notice. Moreover, these standing Warsaw Pact forcescan be reinforced by about 16 divisions from the Strategic Reserve based inthe central Military Districts of Russia (Moscow, Ural and Volga MilitaryDistricts). Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel thanNATO divisions but contain more tanks and artillery, thereby producingsimilar combat power. Their principal offensive conventional capabilities consist of tanks, modern mechanised infantry vehicles and highlymobile long-range artillery and mortars; large numbers of these are to befound in all their units. Soviet forces possess a wide variety of chemicalagents and delivery systems and are the best eguipped in the world tosustain operations in a chemical environment. Growing numbers of transport, support and attack helicopters provide the Warsaw Pact with a quickassault and reaction capability, and with a supplement to their fixed-wingtactical aircraft in the battlefield area. A significant number of newelectronic warfare helicopters have appeared in Soviet units during thepast two years.

20. Land forces committed to NATO and stationed in or rapidly deployable to Europe, consist of the equivalent of some 88 active and mobilisable

divisions (includinq three airborne/air mobile divisions), many of whichare also ready to fight at very short notice. There are in addition theequivalent of 12 active United States divisions plus one Armoured CavalryRegiment, two United States Marine divisions and a Canadian brigade inNorth America which could be made available in Europe in due course. Fourof these United States' divisions have their eguipment prepositioned inEurope. Almost half of NATO's tank and mechanised divisions are equippedwith modern weapons although a very unfavourable ratio continues betweenNATO anti-tank guided weapons and Warsaw Pact tanks and armoured personnelvehicles. NATO similarly has a lower proportion of armed attack helicopters. Only the United States has a retaliatory chemical capability,and a number of NATO nations lack even adequate protection against chemical

weapons.

21. The comparison of NATO and the Warsaw Pact division equivalentstrenqth and numbers of major equipments has been made in a different wayfrom that used in the 1982 edition of this publication. Figure 2 illustrates the imbalance of land forces in favour of the Warsaw Pact under twoconditions - forces in place in Europe reinforced by rapidly deployableforces; and forces under condit ions of full reinforce ment. With theexception of helicopters, the ratios of major formations and eguipmentsworsen appreciably with full reinforcement. The total number of WarsawPact armoured vehicles includes armoured personnel carriers and infantry

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NATO - WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISON

NATOtegiSf/iæssi

WARSAW PACT |

ces in Place in EuropeReinforced by Rapidly

Deployable Forces *

Fully Reinforced Forces

TO TA L MIL ITA RY

I N C L U D I N G

N A V A L F O R C E S

D IV IS IO N

E Q U I V A L E N T S

M A I N B A T T L E T A N K S

{Main armament SO mm

and above)

A N T I - T A N K

G U I D E D W E A P O N L A U N C H E R S

(Crew served and/or mounied)

A R T I L L E R Y / M O R T A R S

{tubes 100 mm and above

including Rocket Launchers)

A R M O U R E D P E R S O N N E L

C A R R I E R S & I N F A N T R Y

F I G H T I N G V E H I C L E S

6 O T H E R A R M O U R E D

V E H I C L E S

A TTA C K

H E L I C O P T E R S

T R A N S P O R T / S U P P O R T

H E L I C O P T E R S

NOTES: WARSA W PACT DIVISIONS NORM ALLY CONSIST OF FEWER PERSONNEL THAN MAN Y NATO DIVISIONS

BUT CONTAIN MORE TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THEREBY OBTAINING SIMILAR CO MBAT POWER.

RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES - INCLUDE THOSE U.S. FORCES WHOSE EQ UIPMENT IS STORED IN

EUROPE AND HIGH-READINESS SOVIET FORCES LOCATED IN THE BALTIC. BELORUSSIAN, CARPATHIAN. O DESSA

KIEV AND NORTH CAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICTS.

FULLY REINFORCED FORCES - INCLUDE NORTH AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS AND ALL WARSAW PACT FORCES

LOCATED WEST OF THE URAL MOUNTAINS

F I G U R E 2


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RELATIVE TRENDS IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND ARTILLERY(IN PLACE IN EUROPE)

MAIN BATTLE TANKS

( M A I N A R M A M E N T 9 0 m m A N D A B O V E )

ARTILLERY/MORTARS

(TUBES 100mm AND ABOVE

INCLUDING ROCKET LAUNCHERS)

FIGURE 3


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fighting vehicles, and additional armoured vehicles whose primary role iscommand and control, forward air control and reconnaissance but which alsohave a secondary rôle of direct combat. NATO forces have been counted in asimilar manner. The anti-tank guid ed weapons mounted on Wars aw Pactvehicles for self-defence have been included in the total figures as havebeen helicopter-mounted anti-tank guided weapons to ensure an accuratecomparison with NATO forces. The number of NATO and Warsaw Pact crew-served anti-tank guided weapon launchers in place in Europe is about thesame but a significant imbalance exists in favour of the Warsaw Pact forlaunchers mounted on helicopters and armoured vehicles.

22. Relative trends over the last few years for NATO main battletanks and artillery/mortars in place in Europe and those of the Warsaw Pactincluding all those located in the six Western Military Districts, areshown in Figure 3.

Air Forces and Air Defence Forces

23. The over all global total of War saw Pact aircr aft is near ly

13,000(2). More than 10,000(2) of these are facing NATO Europe, of which7,500(2) are of types technically capable of delivering nuclear weapons.The majority of these aircraft would likely be used in conventional attacksover NATO Europe. The total number of combat aircraft in operational unitsfacing NATO Europe is 7,430 (see Figure 4 ). Warsaw Pact air defence forcesas far east as the Urals (but excluding those in the Moscow Militaryand Air Defence Districts) consist of some 4,195 interceptor/air-combataircraft. Many of these aircraft can be used in offensive roles such asassuring air superiority over the battlefield and they are backed up byextensive modern surface-to-air missile systems. Additionally there aresome 2,250 ground-attack fighter bombers, 585 reconnaissance aircraft andabout 400 bombers (including 65 Backfire bombers), the majority of which

would likely be used in a conve ntio nal role. The Backfire and otherstrategic bombers however, are dealt with in the nuclear section. Theseair forces could be reinforced rapidly with some 540 combat aircraft fromcentral Russia. S ignificant numbers of new combat aircraft are introducedeach year, replacing older models which were less capable than NATO aircraft of the same generation. The introduction of these modern tacticalaircraft has considerably increased the Warsaw Pact's offensive capability.These latest aircraft are capable of carrying up to twice the payload, cantravel over three times the range, at higher speeds, and can conductoperations at lower altitudes than the aircraft they are replacing; thisrenders them less vulnerable to NATO air defences. Their increased combatradius would allow for Warsaw Pact operations from more distant bases in

case of Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO. This would mean that NATOfighter-bombers would have to penetrate much deeper into defended enemyairspace to counter-attack Warsaw Pact airbases. Additionally, an increasing proportion of these modern aircraft can operate in adverse weatherconditions by day or by night.

(2) These totals include all aircraft of corribat types includinq those innon-combat units as well as combat units (a criterion essential forarms control); all other numbers are based on aircraft in combatunits.

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NATO-WARSAW PACT COMBAT AIRCRAFTQUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS

SELECTED TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN EUROPE

(EXCLUDING MOSCOW AIR DEFENCE DISTRICT)

4 1 9 5WARSAW PACT

BACKFIRE TU-22M

BADGER TU-I6

BLINDER TU-22

BREWER YAK-28

FENCER SU-24

FIDDLER TU-28FISHBED MIG-21

FITTER A SU-7FITTER C/D/H/E/G/H/J SU-I7/22

FLAGON SU-I5

FLOGGEP B/G MIG-23FLOGGER D/J MIG-27

FOXBAT A/B/D/E MIG-25FOXHOUND A MIG-31FROGFOOT SU-25FULCRUM MIG-29

NATO

ALPHA-JET -

BUCCANEER -

CORSAIR II A-7

EAGLE F-I5

FIGHTING FALCON F-I6FREEDOM FIGHTER F-5.RF-5

HARRIER -

JAGUAR -

MIRAGE 5 M5BR.M5BAMIRAGE F-I

PHANTOM F-4.RF-4

STARFIGHTER F-I04, RF-10

THUNDERBOLT II A-IO

TORNADO -. F-III

EF-IIITR-I

NATO Aircra ft

2,990 Total in Europe

A L P HA-JETBUCCANEERCORSAIR IIFIGHTING FALCON

FREEDOM FIGHTERHARRIERJAGUAR

PHANTOMSTARFIGHTERTHUNDERBOLT IITORNADOF-III---------------- > -

WARSAW PACTAircraft

7,430 Total in Europe

FENCERFITTERFLÜGGER D/H/JFROGFOOT

2 2 5 0

BACKFIRE

BADGERBLINDER

N A T O 0

1 9 7 4 1 9 8 3 1 9 7 4

BOMBERS

1 9 6 0

N A T O

EAGLEFIGHTING FALCON

MIRAGEPHANTOMSTARFIGHTER

FIDDLER

FISHBED

FLAGONFLOGGER B/GFOXBAT A/EFOXHOUNDFULCRUM

----------

FREEDOM FIGHTER BADGERJAGUARMIRAGE 5PHANTOM

STARFIGHTERTORNADOEF-IIITR-I

BLINDER C

BREWERFISHBED H

FITTER HFOXBAT B/D

1 9 8 3 1 9 74 1 9 8 3 1 97 4 1 98 3

F I G H T E R B O M B E R SG R O U N D / A T T A C K

1 9 7 4 1 9 8 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 8 3

I N T E R C E P T O R S

1 9 7 4 1 9 8 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 8 3

R E C O N N A I S S A N C E

NB. A LARGE PROPORTION OF INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT CAN BE USED IN GROUND / ATTACK ROLES.

THE FIGURES MENTIONED ABOVE REFER TO COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS ONLY.

F I G U R E 4


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RELATIVE TRENDS IN ANTI-AI RCRAFT ARTILLERY

AND MOBILE SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES

(IN PLACE I N EUROPE)

ANTI -AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY MOB I LE SURFACE TO AIR20mm CALIBRE AND OVER MISSILE LAUNCHERS

e x c l u d i n g m a n -p o r t a b l e

I N F A N T R Y W E A P O N SFIGURE 5


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24. The Warsaw P act airlift capability is substantial. Soviet military transport aviation alone, consisting of over 610 long and mediumrange aircraft, provides sufficient airlift to transport one completeairborne division and its equipment at any one time up to distances of2,000 km. This capability can be supplemented in particular by Aeroflotcivilian aircraft.

N A T 0 - W A R S A W P A C T C O M B A T A I R C R A F T IN P L A C E I N E U R O P E

Fighter-BomberGround-Attack

Interceptor Reconnaissance Bombers

NATO

WARSAW PACT

1,960

2,250

795

4,195

235

585 400(3)

N .B. Some interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

25. The overall qlobal total of aircraft belonging to NATO countriesis sliqhtly more than 11,000. The land-based air forces, available inplace for NATO's Allied Command Europe, consist of 1,960 qround-attackfighter bombers, 795 interceptors and 235 reconnaissance aircraft. Inaddition to fiqhtinq the air battle air forces would have to assist NATOqround forces in repulsing a Warsaw Pact attack. The United States andCanada could reinforce rapidly with some 1,750 more combat aircraft, thoughairlift would be required for qround crew and equipment. The quality ofNATO aircraft has improved with the introduction into service of the F—15,F-16 and the Tornado. These aircraft have a qreater ranqe, payload andall-weather capability than the previous qeneration of NATO aircraft.However, since NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft now have comparable ranqe and

payload characteristics the quantitative advantaqe of the Warsaw Pact ismore siqnificant than formerly.

26. NATO's military airlift assets consist of nearly 750 transportaircraft, which can be augmented by the civil air fleets of the Alliedcountries. These are considerably larger than the civil air fleets available to the Warsaw Pact. However the latter are centrally controlled.

27. NATO nations have made considerable progress in improving theability of their air forces to operate and survive in a hostile environment, particularly by providing better protection for vital operational andlogistical facilities. To a considerable degree, NATO air forces maintaina hiqh state of readiness and are qualitatively superior to those of theWars aw Pact in terms of traini no and weapons systems. The tacticalflexibility of NATO air forces and the ability to augment in-place forcesrapidly in time of tension or war are also positive factors.

28. Warsaw Pact forces have an extensive range of static and mobileair defences, including a variety of surface-to-air missiles and guns.

(3) This fiqure does not include Bison and Bear strateoic bombers orsupport aircraft such as tankers or those used for command and controlor electronic warfare.

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Figure 5 shows the relative trends over the past few years for NATOanti-aircraft artillery and mobile surface-to-air missile launchers inplace in Europe and those of the Warsaw Pact including all those located inthe six Western Military Districts. As Figure 5 shows, the Warsaw Pact hasnearly 4,000 more anti-aircraft guns than NATO has and more than threetimes as many mobile surface-to-air missile systems (SAM) as NATO. This,together with large numbers of interceptors, produces a very hostile airenvironment over and behind advancing enemy ground formations; this

requires a combination of low-level tactics and electronic countermeasuresfor NATO aircraft. All this wo uld make it very difficu lt to conductoperations successfully over and behind the battle area.

Maritime Forces

29. As noted earlier there are fundamental differences in the missions of the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO that result fromqeographic and economic dissimilarities. The security of NATO nationsdepends on the unimpeded use of the sea both to link the potential of NorthAmerica and Europe and to provide access for trade, raw materials and

energy. The role of the NATO navies as for all NATO forces is in the firstinstance to deter aqqression. They must be able to demonstrate a capability in peace and take action in war to preserve, protect and maintain thesea lines of communication, neutralise hostile forces, and to projectmaritime power in support of land and air forces. In other words, the roleof NATO maritime forces is sea control, which means using the seas forNATO's purposes. Conversely, as cont inent al powers, the Warsaw Pactnations have far less dependence on the sea. The role of their naviesincludes the denial to NATO of its use of maritime power, the disruption ofNATO's sea lines of communication and possibly the conduct and support ofamphibious operations in North Norway, on the Baltic exits and in NorthernTurkey.

30. Historical precedents demonstrate that the defence of the use ofthe sea demands far greater resources than the denial of its use, and thusthe maritime balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be seen in thisperspective. Accordingly, in the Atlantic, NATO's emphasis would be onprotection of reinforcement and supply shipping primarily from submarineattacks; whereas in the critically important Channel area in addition tosubmarines the greatest risks to reinforcement and supply routes would befrom mines, aircraft and missile systems.

31. Allied control of the Norwegian Sea in the event of conflictwould have to be sufficient to inhibit access by Soviet naval forces intothe Atlantic. It would also be necessary in conjunction with land and air

forces, to protect NATO's Northern Region as a whole, including Norway,especially its air and naval facilities, Iceland, Denmark and the Faroesand to control the Baltic Straits to prevent the Soviet Fleet from transiting to and from the North Sea and Channel areas.

32. The Iberian Atlantic area is of importance to NATO's defencebecause of the vital sea lines of communication to the NATO Southern Regionand to sources of vital raw materials and oil.

33. In NATO's Southern Region itself, maritime forces have a majorpart to play in the defence of the region as a whole. Their role is to

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support the land and air forces and maintain the sea lines of communicationin the Mediterranean in the face of the Soviet Mediterranean S quadron.They also have the task of securing the Turkish and Gibraltar S traits,in order to deny the Soviet Black Sea fleet access to the Mediterranean andto guarantee the flow of reinforcements and resupplies to NATO SouthernRegion.

34. These and other differences in the naval missions of NATO and theWarsaw Pact are reflected in the different types and quantities of theirnaval forces. Simple numerical comparisons of types of ships do not tellthe full story. The naval balance may be more usefully compared in termsof the abilities of the naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to accomplish their respective missions in the face of opposition by the other side.

Warsaw Pact Naval Forces

35. The Warsaw Pact navies include an increasingly modernised submarine force which poses a serious threat to NATO's sea lines of communication. There is also a wide range of modern surface vessels fitted withanti-submarine weapons systems, anti-air missiles and some which carryfixed-wing aircraft and/or helicopters. The capabilities of these navalforces, com ple men ted by a force of land-based naval attack aircraft,include stand-off weapons and cruise missiles. Approximate numbers ofWarsaw Pact naval forces expected to face NATO (i.e. excluding the PacificFleet) are shown on page 16 for 1971, 1981 and 1983, to provide a trend inquantitative terms.

36. Together with the numerical increases in larger ships, nuclear-

powered submarines and attack aircraft, major qualitative improvements arebeing made in Soviet naval forces, particularly in submarines and largewarships but also in naval aircraft. The Soviet Navy has thus been transformed during the last decade from a mainly coastal defence force to anoffensive force capable of global power projection. This improved capability is demonstrated by the number of new classes of Soviet major warshipsand nuclear submarines in their construction programme. The Soviet Navycontinues to develop its modern anti-ship missile forces by constructingfour new classes of heavily armed missile cruisers and destroyers includingthe 25, OOO ton nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov. In the Kiev class ships, theSoviet Union, for the first time, has sea-based fixed-wing Forger aircraftin operation. In the last three years the Soviet Navy has introduced

higher-performance submarines. The Oscar class was deployed in 1980, thefirst Typhoon class, the largest submarine ever built, was commissioned in1981; and the new 40 knot Alpha class boats, with titanium hulls whichenable them to dive deeper and thus make them harder to detect, are inservice.

Soviet Pacific Fleet

37. In addition to the Warsaw Pact maritime assets that face NATO,there are significant Soviet naval and naval air forces located elsewhere

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that could be deployed against NATO forces. The numbers of major units andaircraft are:

Kiev class ships 1Cruisers 13Destroyers and frigates 74Ballistic missile submarines 31

Warsaw Pact Auxiliary Fleets

38. The Warsaw Pact merchant, fishing and oceanographic fleets,unlike those belonging to NATO nations, are state-owned and under centralised command and control: this enables them to operate on a regularbasis in support of naval forces. Particularly important are their intelligence gathering and logistic support operations. In wartime these assetswould become even more valuable. Additional roles would then includesupport of amphibious operations and possibly minelaying.

NATO A ND WARSAW PACT MARITIME FORCES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND S EAS BORDERING EUROPE

C ATEG OR YN A T O W A R S A W P A C T

1 9 7 1 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 7 1 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3

AIRCRAFT CAR RIE R S : VS T OL CARRIE RS 9 7 10 - -

KIEV CLASS SHIPS - - - - 2 2

H E L ICO P T E R CAR R IE R S 6 2'

2 2

CR UIS E R S 11 15 14 20 21 23

D E S T R O Y ER S A ND FRIGAT ES 38 1 274 277 142 182 1 87

CO AS T AL E S CO R T S AND F AS T P AT R O L B O AT S 180 1 67 192 553 551 5 1 5

AMP H IB IO US S H IP S - O CE AN- GO IN G 24 41 44 7 16 19

- IND E P E ND E NT

COASTAL CRAFT

62 69 69 190 1 5 5 174

MINE W ARFAR E SH IPS 349 25 7 273 374 360 378

TOTAL SUBMARINES (ALL TYPES) 195 19 0 19 7 248 258 246

- B AL L IS T IC MIS S IL E S UB MAR INE S 3 8 ( 1 ) 3 5 ( 1 ) 3 5 ( 1 ) 3 8 ( 1 ) 5 2 ( 1 ) 4 9 ( 1 )

- L O NG R ANGE AT T ACK S UB MAR INE S 72 60 67 1 1 5 149 142

- OT HER TYPES 85 95 95 95 57 55

- % S U B M A R I N E S N UC L E AR P O W E R E D 5 0 % 49 % 50 % 32 % 45 % 6 4 %

S E A- B AS E O T ACT ICAL AS W ANO S UP P O R T

A IR CR AF T INCL UD ING H E L ICO P T E R S

801 7 1 2 685 36 146 18 1

U N O - B A S E D T A C T I C A L A N D S U P P O R T

A IR CR AF T INCL UD ING H E L ICO P T E R S

1 1 2 1 80 3 6 6 ( 2 ) 52 1 (3) 7 1 9 (3) 700 (3)

L AND - B AS E D ANT I - S UB MAR INE W AR F AR E

F IX E D - W ING A IR CR AF T AND H E L ICO P T E R S

47 1 450 454 225 17 9 228

(1) Also referred to in the section o n nuclea r forces

(2) For 1983. includes U.S. Marine Corps aircraft and helicopters

(3) About 300 of these are bombers

Cruise missile submarines 22Long-range attack submarines 43Naval aviation aircraftincluding helicopters 440

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NATO Naval Forces

39. There have been major qualitative improvements in individualnaval units and supporting systems of the NATO navies which are reflectedboth in new construction and modernisation programmes. Included amongstsuch improvements are the capabilities of shipborne aircraft, anti-surfaceship missiles, anti-submarine warfare detection systems, command andcontrol, electronic warfare, and submarine noise suppression. The strat

egic missile submarine forces have been enhanced with the introduction ofthe OHIO class submarines and the Trident missile system. Despite theseimprovements, the high cost of ship construction has set a trend towardsless than one-for-one replacement.

40. The numbers in the tables comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact maritimeforces indicate the strengths and capabilities called for by the differentmissions of the forces concerned. For example, NATO is strong in sea-basedtactical air, land-based ASW/surveillance patrol aircraft, anti-submarinesystems, long-range amphibious forces and endurance at sea through underway logisti c support and nuclear propulsion. On the other hand, theWarsaw Pact is particularly strong in anti-ship missile equipped ships,

submarines, and land-based attack aircraft, as well as in torpedo-attacksubmarines and mine warfare forces. Warsaw Pact naval forces have thegeographic handicap of long access routes from Murmansk around the NorthCape and the choke points created by the Baltic and the Turkish Straits.However, since NATO is a defensive Alliance, the Warsaw Pact holds theinitiative of time and place in deploying its forces and in interdictingNATO sea lines of communication upon which NATO depends. In these circumstances, a substantial numerical advantage is needed by NATO as thedefending side.

41. However, NATO does not have the numerical advantage necessary fora satisfactory or safe balance of maritime forces. This is made worse bythe responsibilities which have fallen to some nations of the Alliance,particularly the United States, to deploy forces outside the NATO area todeter aggression and to respond to reguests by nations for help in resisting threats to their security and independence. If this imbalance were tocontinue the effect would be that essential maritime tasks could not becarried out concurrently and that the priorities would be imposed by theWarsaw Pact; moreover, a severe price might be paid in loss of control incertain regions and this would result in early shipping losses before theSoviet naval threat could be countered.

United States and Canadian Maritime Assets

42. In addition to maritime forces located in the North Atlantic andthe seas bordering Europe and 34 United States ballistic missile submarinesdeployed worldwide, the United States and Canada maintain additionalmaritime assets elsewhere that could be deployed in support of NATO. Someof these forces are already earmarked for NATO.

Aircraft carriers 6Cruisers 15Destroyers and frigates 73Long-range attack submarines 42Sea-based tactical, anti-submarinewarfare (ASW) and support aircraftincluding helicopters 687

Land-based tactical and support

aircraft including helicopters 31

United States Marine Corps aircraft 1,203

Land-based ASW fixed wing aircraft

and helicopters 284

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REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONSNorthern and Central Regions

Land Forces

43. Warsaw Pact forces facing this area consist of the equivalent ofsome 104 divisions drawn from the armies of the Soviet Union, GermanDemocratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland and deploying some 27,380tanks and 20,800 artillery and mortar pieces. In the far north the WarsawPact has two Soviet divisions. Further south within the same MilitaryDistrict are an additional 7 divisions including one airborne division.The equivalent of 95 divisions face the southern part of the NorthernRegion and Central Europe. Of these, the equivalent of almost 61 divisionswith 16,620 tanks and 10,270 artiller y and mortar pieces are eitherdeployed in the forward areas or are held at high states of readiness. TheWarsaw Pact also has considerable amphibious capabilities in the BarentsSea and the Baltic.

44. Opposing the Warsaw Pact, NATO's in-place and rapidly deployableland forces are composed of armed forces from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, theFederal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, theUnited Kingdom and the United States. The in-place and rapidly deployableland forces of NATO in this area consist of the equivalent of nearly 43divisions including those forces in the United Kingdom, fielding about8,165 tanks and 4,920 artillery and mortar pieces including prepositionedequipment. Most of these Northern and Central Region land forces are keptin a high state of readiness, but deficiencies include some maldeployment,and lines of supply which run too near and parallel to the border. All

NATO formations are dependent in varying degrees on mobilisation andredeployment: despite these problems approximately 75% of these forcescould be in position very quickly indeed. There are in addition active andmobilisable United States forces located in North America amounting to some20 divisions and 24 brigades which together with their associated equipmentand tanks, drawn from an overall total of some 4,100 tanks and 3,670artillery/mortars, could be available to move to Europe in due course.Some of these could be allocated to the Southern Region. Up to three ofthe divisions would arrive quickly by air. Other United States divisions,with their equipment, would arrive later by sea. A Canadian brigade groupwould also reinforce the area.

45. As mentioned previously, some 61 of the 104 divisions in theGerman Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Northern andWestern Military Districts of the Soviet Union could launch operationswith in a few days of mobilisation. In the best situation, ass umingsimultaneous mobilisation and deployment forward within the region, NATOcould count on the equivalent of nearly 43 divisions, which would have tohold out until additional United States and Canadian forces arrive by sea.In the meantime, the Warsaw Pact forces could be quickly expanded to theirfull 104 divisions, plus a proportion of the 16 Strategic Reserve Divisionsfrom the three Central Military Districts.

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DEFENCE OF NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS

W A R S A W P AC T

D I V I SI O NS

T A NK S

A R T I L L E R Y / M O R T A R

W A R S A W P A C T

D I V I SI O NS

T A NK S


1300

1950

W A R S A W P A C T

61 DIVISIONS

1 6 6 2 0 T A NK S

1 0 2 7 0 A R T I L L E R Y / M O R T A RW A R S A W P A C T

1 5 5 5 F I G H T E R / B O M B E R S

2 6 3 5 I NT ER C EPT O R S

3 9 0 R EC O NNA I SSA NC E

NATO AIR FORCES

1345 F I G H T E R / B O M B E R S

5 0 0 I NT E R CE P TO R S

1 45 R E CO N N A IS S A NC E

38

8 0 5 0

4 4 0 0

NATO

1 4 B R I G A D E G R O UPS

1 1 5 T A NK S

5 2 0 A R T I L L E R Y / M O R T A R

NATO

D I V I SI O NS

T A NK S


Depicts Forces in place in Europe reinforced by rapidly deployable forces.

FIGURE 6


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Air Forces

46. The Warsaw Pact is numerically superior in terms of fixed-wingtactical aircraft in this area. The NATO figures shown below includeUnited Kingdom based aircraft and United States aircraft based in Europe inpeacetime. The high proportion of ground-attack fighter bomber aircraftin NATO air forces is partly required to counter the Warsaw Pact preponderance in armour on the Central Front. Against this force, however, the

Warsaw Pact can deploy interceptor forces, many of which can also be usedfor ground attack, and exceptionally strong surface-to-air defence systems.Aircraft of the Moscow Military and Air Defence District are excluded fromthe following table because of their distance from the Northern andSouthern R egions. Also nearly 1,800 United States and Canadian-basedreinforcement aircraft, which are situated even further from these regions,are excluded.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS - IN PLACE AIR FORCES

NATO

F ighter/Bomber

Ground/Attack

1,345

Interceptors

500

Reconnaissance

145

WARSAW PACT 1,555 2,635 390

N.B. Some interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

Southern Region

Land Forces47. The Warsaw Pact has 10 Soviet and Hungarian divisions, equipped

with over 2,340 tanks and 1,560 artillery pieces which could be employedagainst North-East Italy. These divisions, located in Hungary, could bereinforced by 7 more divisions including 2,000 tanks and 1,300 artillerypieces coming from the Kiev Military District. These 7 divisions, however,are not maintained at high states of readiness. Warsaw Pact forces additionally include the equivalent of 3 divisions of airborne, air mobile andair assault troops which could be used anywhere within the region. Furthermore, options against the Central Mediterranean could be possible. NATOland forces consist of the equivalent of 8 Italian divisions (i.e. 4divisions and 12 independent brigades) with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 artilleryand mortar pieces. The Italian forces are generally well deployed andimpr oveme nts are planne d to meet the support requirem ents for theirreinforcement. Portugal also participates in the collective defence ofthis region by providing a reinforcement brigade for deployment in NorthernItaly.

48. The equivalent of 34 Soviet, Romanian and Bulgarian divisions areavailable in the area north of Greece and Turkish Thrace. These forces arelargely mechanised and are equipped with a total of 6,570 tanks and over6,400 artiller y and mortar pieces. They are on terrain suit able forarmoured offensive operations and could be reinforced by amphibious forces

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D EFENCE OF SOUTHERN REGION

WARSAW PACT

10 DIVISIONS

2340 TANKS

1560 ARTILLERY/MORTAR

WARSAW PACT

12 DIVISIO NS

2435 TANKS


WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES

695 FIGHTER/BOMBERS

1560 INTERCEPTORS

195 RECONNAISSANCE

NATO

8 DIVISIONS

1250 TANKS


WARSAW PACT

22 DI VISIONS

3680 TANKS


NATO

12 DIVISIONS

1000 TANKS

1800 ARTILLERY/MORTARNATO AIR FORCES

615 FIGHTER/BOMBERS

295 INTERCEPTORS

90 RECONNAISSANCE

NATO

25 DIVISIONS

3000 TANKS


FIGURE 7


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and by the Warsaw Pact airborne/air mobile divisions referred to above. Ofthese 34 divisions, the equivalent of just over 22 divisions with 3,680tanks and 2,940 artillery and mortar pieces are either deployed forward orare maintained at high states of readiness. NATO's 25 Greek and Turkishdivisions in the area are mainly infantry. Their task is rendered difficult for defensive operations by the narrowness of the area between theborders and the Aegean.

49. There are 20 Soviet divisions which could be committed againstEastern Turkey equipped with about 4,300 tanks and over 4,800 artillerypieces. Of this number, just over 12 divisions with 2,435 tanks and 2,735artillery and mortar pieces are deployed forward. These forces couldbe reinforced by the airborne or air assault/mobile divisions referred toabove and by amphibious forces. The Turkish Army retains 8 divisions inNorth-East Turkey. Four more divisions in South-East Turkey are for usethere to protect its extensive borders, but would be available for defenceagainst the Warsaw Pact.

50. Greece and Turkey together have 4,000 tanks and 4,600 artillerypieces, in comparison with 11,000 tanks and 11,300 artillery pieces oppo

sing them. The geographical separation of the Italian, Greece/TurkishThrace and Eastern Turkish territories would make reinforcement and resupply among the respective theatres difficult, particularly when lines ofcommunication are under attack.

Air Forces

51. As with other regions, the flexibility of air forces renderscomparison difficult. In-place forces available to the Warsaw Pact andNATO are approximately as follows:

SOUTHERN REGION - IN PLACE AIR FORCES

F ighter/Bomber Interceptors ReconnaissanceGround/Attack

NATO 615 295 90

WARSAW PACT 695 1,560 195

N.B. Some interceptors can be used in ground attack roles.

The range of some of the modern Warsaw Pact aircraft is such that they havethe potential to operate anywhere in the Mediterranean, endangering thesecurity of sea lines of communication which are of vital importance to theNATO nations in the Southern Flank. The geography of the Mediterraneanemphasises the interaction between the maritime land and air situations.The NATO naval forces and Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would have to faceopposing land-based and naval aviation; naval operations would in turngreatly influence land/air operations in the three sub-regions. Externalair reinforcements from the Alliance could be of crucial importance.

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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE ANDTHE NUCLEAR EQUATION

Nuclear Forces in NATO's Strategy

52. As part of NATO's strateqy, nuclear forces exist in combinationwith conventional forces to maintain peace through deterring aggression.To deter successfully, NATO's nuclear forces must be viewed by the WarsawPact as being credible by providing a wide range of options for their usein response to aggression. They must be, and be seen to be, capable ofbeing employed effectively and adequately, to convince a potential aggressor that in any attack against NATO the costs would outweigh any conceivable gains.

53. At the same time, it is NATO's policy to maintain these forcesat the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat, takingaccount of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces. Inpursuance of this policy, NATO decided in October 1983 at Montebello,Canada, to reduce the number of warheads in Europe by 1,400 over the

followinq five to six years, in addition to the withdrawal of 1,000 warheads comp lete d in 1980 indep enden tly of any arms control agreement.Moreover, this overall reduction of 2,400 warheads in NATO's stockpilein Europe will not be affected by the deployment of Longer-Range INF(LRINF) m issi les since one further warh ead will be removed for eachPERSHING II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed,as envisaged in the December 1979 dual-track decision. This sustainedprogramme of reductions will reduce NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europeto the lowest level in over 20 years.

54. This red uct ion will not be allo wed to degrad e deter rence;hence, for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contri

bution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads mustbe survivable, responsive, and effective. A range of possible improvementsto these ends has been identified. The strengthening of conventionalforces also remains important. Moreover, the Alliance must take accountat all times of changes to Soviet capabilities.

55. The primary role of nuclear weapons is to support deterrence.They are not generally direct military counters to each other. Thus,it is not necessary for the Alliance to match the Warsaw Pact system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead. Individual nuclear weapon systems cannot beconsidered in isolation from other nuclear systems or from conventionalforces. However, to avoid miscalculation by a potential adversary and to

ensure the preservation of stability and peace, there m ust be a balancedrelationship in the overall capabilities of the nuclear forces of NATO andthe Warsaw Pact in order that the credibility of NATO's deterrent is notcalled into question.

Note on C omparison of Nuclear Forces

56. The following sections (Strategic Nuclear Forces, Intermediate-and Short-Range Nuclear Forces, and Sea-Based Nuclear Forces) present anassessment of systems that are broadly comparable and, where possible,identify clearly discernible trends. In categories other than strategic

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nuclear forces, comparisons are affected to a greater extent by qualitativeand quantitative differences between forces which result in individualsystems often not being directly comparable. The following sections listthe numbers of aircraft, missile launchers and artillery tubes in eachcategory; several of these systems' are capable of firing additional missiles and warheads, and aircraft are capable of performing more than onemission.

Strategic Nuclear Force s

57. Strategic nuclear forces consist of Intercontinental BallisticMissiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and bombers. Each of them is different with respect to readiness, survivability,flexibility, accur acy and ability to pene trate enemy defences. Theycomplement each other - thus the strategic forces need to be viewed, intheir entirety.

58. NATO's ultimate deterrent is provided by the strategic forces ofthe United States. The United Kingdom also provides national strategic

forces which contribute to this deterrent. On the Warsaw Pact side, theSoviet Union maintains all types of strategic nuclear forces. Over thepast decade the Warsaw Pact has improved the quality of these forces to asignificantly greater extent than NATO and has also substantially increasedtheir number. Figure 8, which compares the main developments in strategicnuclear systems on both sides, depicts a growing mo mentu m in Sovietmodernisation. The comparison shows that this momentum has increased inthe last decade in contrast to the modernisation proqramme pursued by NATO.For example, excluding major variants of existing systems, the Soviet Unionhas deployed at least three new types of ICBMs, four new SLBMs, and a newbomber, while in the same period the United States deployed only one newSLBM and the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). To ensure that stabilityis preserved in the future, programmes are now underway in the United

States and the United Kingdom to maintain the continued adequacy of thisessential part of NATO's overall deterrent.

59. Over the last decade the Soviet Union has surpassed NATO inseveral critical measures traditionally used to evaluate the strategicbalance. For instance, by 1973, the Warsaw Pact achieved, for the firsttime, a superiority in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles(see Figure 9 ). Similarly, the relative advantage has shifted to theWarsaw Pact in the important categories of equivalent megatons, the capability to hold hardened targets at risk and especially the capability tohold these targets at risk with ballistic missiles with their short flighttime (as shown in Figure 10 ). NATO retains a slight advantage in the

number of strateqic warheads but this has been rapidly reduced by thecontinui ng Soviet depl oyment of multiple warheads, known as Mul tipleIndepend ently-Targetab le Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). The qualitativeand quantitative enhancements of the Soviet strategic forces result incapab iliti es which threate n to underm ine the strat egic balance. Forexample, increases in the number and accuracy of Soviet ICBM warheads,especially those on the SS-18 and SS-19, provide the Warsaw Pact withthe potential of holding at risk the bulk of the current United StatesICBMs using only a part of its overall ICBM force. Almost three quartersof Soviet strategic warheads are deployed in their ICBM forces; by comparison, less than one quarter of United States warheads are so deployed.

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s t r a t eg i c nuc l e a r force - mod e r n i s a t i o n c om p a r i s o n i n t r oduc t i o n o f selected s y s t e m s b y y ea r

UNITE D STATES and UNITED KI NGDOM

B O MB ERS A B - 52 H A FB-ffl O B -1 B

NTERC O NT INENTA L

ALLISTIC MISSILES

A T IT AN I I A M I N U TE M A N II

A t i t a n 1 A MINU TEMA N I

A MINU TEMA N I I I A MINU TEMA N I II O P EA C EK EEPER

(MK 12A) (MX)

MA RINE - L A U NC H ED

LISTIC MISSILES A POLARIS A-2 A POLARIS A-3 A P O S E ID O N C - 3 A T R I D EN T 1 ( C -4 )

S U B MA RINES

ur.o L

A ETHAN ALLAN A 8ENJ FRANKLIN CLASS

C U S S c t A S S

OHIO CLASS

1 9 60 1 9 65 ' 1970 1975 1980 1985

B O MB ERS A BACKFIRE A B EA R H O B L A CK J A CK

INTERC O NT INENTA L

BALLISTIC MISSILES

A S S - 7 A SS-8 A SS-9

A S S - 6 A SS-9 Mod 2

A S S - 1 1

A s s - 1 3 A SS-9 Mod 3 A S S - 1 1 Mod 2 A SS-17 Mod 2 A S S - 1 9 M o d 3 O S S - X -2 5

A S S - 1 3 A S S - 1 1 Mod 3 A S S - 1 8 M o d 2 O S S - X- 2 4

MOd 2 S S - 1 8 A A S S - 1 7 A S S - 1 8 M od 3 A SS-17 Mod 3

A s s - i 9 Dss-m A s s - i 8 M o d 4

A s s - 1 9 M O D 2

MA RINE - L A U NC H ED

LISTIC MISSILES

A S S - N- 5 A S S - N- 6 A S S - N- 8 A S S - N -1 8 A s S - N - 2 0 O S S- NX -2 3

A S S - N- 6 Mod 2 A S S - N- 1 8 Mod 2

A S S - N- 6 Mod 3 S S - N- 8 Mod 2A S S - N - 1 8 A A S S - N - 1 7Mod 3

S U B MA RINES A GOLF II A HOTEL I I A YANKEE

K E Y .

A DELTA 1 A DELTA II A DELTA III A TYPHOON

A YANKEE II

SOVIET UNION A A

A A

ss

SS-N

OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS

SYSTEMS NOW OUT OF SERVICE

SURFACE TO SURFACE MISSILE

SUBMARINE TO SURFACE MISSILE

O o SYSTEMS IN FLIGHT TEST □ SS -16 OPERA TIONALL Y CAPABLE. A VAILABLE

INFORMAT ION DOES NOT ALLOW CONCLUSIVE

JUDG EME NT ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION

HAS DEPLOYED THE SS-16 BU T DOES INDICATE

PROBABLE DEPLOYMENT.

FI G UR E 8


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M I S S I L E S

A N D

B O M B E R S

TOTAL STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS

A . N U M B E R O F S TR A TE GIC DELIVERY VEHICLE S B. TOTAL STRATEGIC DELIVERY VE H I CLES

BY COMPOSITION

YEAR

(a) WARSA W PAC T figures include Soviet strategic missiles and BEAR. BISON, an d BACKFIRE bombers; the BACK FIRE bomber has been included

in this figure because it has an inheren t intercontinental capability although in its maritime an d European land-attack rôles it poses a serious threat

to NATO Europe.

(b) NA TO figures include United States s trategic missiles, 64 British strategic POLA RIS SLB Ms an d operational United States B-52s and FB- 111s.

The United States-based FB-111 is included because it has a strategic mission.

FIGURE 9


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STRATEGIC FORCESTRENDS IN RELATIVE ADVANTAGES

NATO

ADVANTAGE

PARITY

YEAR

73 75 77 79 81 83

6 : 1

5 . 1

4 : 1

3 : 1

2 :1

1 : 1 PARITY

2 : 1

3 : 1

4 : 1

5 : 1

6 : 1

WARSAW PACT

ADVANTAGE

YEAR

FIGURE 10


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The United S tates maintains about half of its strategic warheads in itsSLBM forces. This mode of deployment is more stable due to the greatsurvivability of submarines at sea.

60. The Soviet Union is continuing to produce existing strategicsystems such as the BACKFIRE bomber and the TYPHOO N submarine (the world'slargest) which is being deployed with the new SS-N-20 SLBM. It also has inan advanced stage of development two ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25), a

new SLBM (the SS-NX-23) and another strategic bomber, the BLACKJACK.Long-range cruise missiles for launch from sea and air are also underdevelopment; their deployment could take place within the next year ortwo. These cruise missiles, with ranges estimated at up to 3,000 kms, willbe primarily for nuclear strike. In addition, the Warsaw Pact air defences- already the most comprehensive in the world - are being modernised withimproved sensors, interceptors and ground-to-air missiles.

61. In the light of the continuing Soviet modernisation programme andthe age of United States strategic systems, the United States has initiateda modernization programme to be carried out over the next decade. Inaddition to the deployment of TRIDENT submarines, TRIDENT I (C-4) missiles,

and ALCMs on B-52 bombers, and the forthcoming deployment of SLCMs as partof the reserve force, this programme includes the deployment of Command,Control and Communications systems that are more survivable and effective;the procurement of a limited number (100) of B-1B bombers; the deploymentof a limite d number (100) of PEACEKEEPE R (MX) l and-ba sed missiles inMINUTEMAN silos beginning in 1986; and for the longer term the developmentof the TRIDENT II (D-5) SLBM, the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) and anew small ICBM.

62. During this modernisation process deterrence is maintained by theoverall capabilities of NATO's strategic deterrent forces. Submarines atsea and bombers (although facing dense and effective Warsaw Pact airdefences) contribute highly survivable strategic systems. The diversity ofstrategic forces also provides a hedge against an unexpected Soviet technological breakthrough in countering one or another part of NATO's deterrentforces. In the absence of an effective NATO ICBM force, a potential aggressor would be able to concentrate his efforts on overcoming the deterrentcapabilities of strategic submarines and bombers. The realisation of theUnited States strategic modernisation programme will reduce Soviet asymmetries (see Figure 10 ) and thereby contribute to stability and to theassurance of deterrence into the next century. It will also contributeto the creation of more stable conditions for negotiating far-reaching,sound and verifiable arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union.

Intermediate- and Short-Range Nuclear Forces

63. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have a variety of systems of lessthan inter-continental range capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Theseinclude Intermediate-Range N uclear Forces (INF), further sub-divided intolonger- and shorter-range INF missiles and INF aircraft, and Short-RangeNuclear Forces (SNF). INF and SNF consist of land-based missiles, aircraftand tube artillery. There are major differences between the forces of NATOand the Warsaw Pact. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has a substantial numericaladvantage. This is particularly significant in the case of land-basedINF and SNF missiles where the Warsaw Pact maintains about 2,000 delivery

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SHORT ÄND INTERMEDIATE RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

RANGE COMPARISON (a)

155 mm

203 m m

H O N E S T J O H NLANCE

NATO

F-4, F-104, F-16, JAGUAR

PERSHING ia

TORNADO. BUCCANEER

F-111PERSHING II

GLCM

r !

50 100I I

200

"H Change I I I I I I

3 0 0 of 500 1000 2000 3000> c , , l e » ' I I _ _ _ _ _ I_ _ _ _ _ J _ _ _ _ _ 1 =

240 m mRANGE, IN KILOMETERS

4000 5000 km

152, 203 mm

FROGSS-21

W A RSAW PACT

scuo

FITTER. FISHBED

S S - 12/ 22

FLOGGER

FENCER

SS-4

BLINDER

BADGER

SS-20

(a) Bar length gives the range of the systems Bar thickness gives a gene ral indication of the relative num ber of delivery

systems. For further information, including counting rules, see paragraphs 63 to 71. Fo r NAT O the data refle ct forces

deployed in NA TO Europe: for the WARS A W P A C T for ce s fa cing NA TO Eu rope , e x c ep t for SS-4 and S S -2 0 w here

global figures are given

F I G U R E 11


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A r t i l l e r y

M

i s s i l e s

A i r c r a f t

- <

A r t i l l e r y

M i s s i l e s

A

i r c r a f t

SHORT A ND INTERMEDIATE RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMSMODERNISATION COMPARISON

i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s y s t e m s b y y e a r

NATO

AF'1M Buccanee r A f - 1 1 1 ^ J ag u a r A f - 1 6 A r m a d o

A f-4

*w.«22

£ A ' 203mm«t

Y P a r I , , i 1 1 1

J L 1 5 5 m m

1 i I i i i i I

1955

2 À k . Badger5W.

1960

A s U - 7 Fitter Blinder

1965

Mi F ishbed

1970

Flogger

1975 1980

A SU-17 F itterFencer

M® A5; JBfc, Scu d

O

A S S - 4 A

Frog

SS-5 A s s -1 2 A SS 20 A s s -21 A s s -22

SS-23 O

\ 240mm A 152mm

¿Ék 203mm

WARSAW PACT

A A OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS

O DEVELOPMENT COMPLETED. NOT DEPLOYED AS OF END 1983.

IGURE 12


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systems as opposed to about 300 for NATO. This Warsaw Pact advantage isfurther increased by the fact that missiles in flight are far less vulnerable than aircraft which form the greater proportion of NATO's INF. Sincethe 1950s the Warsaw Pact has maintained forces of sufficient range and sodeployed as to, be able to strike NATO Europe from all its member countriesincluding the Soviet Union. Warsaw Pact SNF and INF systems have tended tohave longer ranges than the NATO systems. The Warsaw Pact now has anadvantage in every range band as can be seen in Figure 11. In fact, the

Warsaw Pact retains a complete monopoly in land-based forces over 2,500 kmsin range, and retains a very substantial advantage in the longer-range INFcategories even following initial deployments of GLCM and Pershing IIin Europe. A Warsaw Pact monopoly in these categories would give it thepotential to destroy any target in Europe without using strategic weapons,while NATO would lack a sufficient capability, short of strategic weapons,to put targets on Soviet territory at risk and thus to deter the SovietUnion from exploiting this military advantage in Europe. Furthermore,taken as a whole, the Warsaw Pact's arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe ismore modern than that of NATO. Figure 12 depicts this advantage, showingthat the extent of modernisation is much greater for the Warsaw Pact thanfor NATO.

Longer-Range INF Missile Systems

64. At the end of 1983 the Warsaw Pact had deployed in the SovietUnion a large force of these land-based missiles consisting of the SS-20,SS-4 and SS-5 (the SS-5 was being retired at end-1983 and has now beenwithdrawn from service). The capabilities added to Warsaw Pact forces bythe deployment of the mobile SS-20 missile which became operational in 1977were a particular source of concern that contributed to the NATO 12thDecember 1979 dual-track decision to deploy PERSHING II and Ground-LaunchedCruise Missiles and to pursue arms control negotiations involving these

systems between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of1983, in the abse nce of a concr ete arms control agreement obv iatingthe need for deployment, NATO began the deployment of LRINF missiles (seeFigures 13 and 14). NATO has always made clear that deployments can behalted, modified or even reversed upon achievement of a balanced, equitableand verifiable agreement calling for such actions.

65. Figure 14 depicts the global number of land-based LRINF missilewarheads. Since 1977 the Soviet Union has been deploying SS-20 launchersat an aver age rate of about one per week. It cont inu es to const ructadditional bases in both the Eastern and Western Soviet Union. While theoverall number of Soviet missile-launchers has remained roughly the same inrecent years the number of warheads on launchers has increased considerablyduring the period. This is because each SS-20 has three independentlytargetable warheads. The number of SS-20 warheads has almost trebledsince December 1979 (when NATO decided, as part of its dual-track decision,to deploy 572 PERSHING II and GLCMs) to 1,134 at end 1983. These SS-20warheads, together with the warheads on earlier deployed LRINF missiles,amounted to a total of close to 1,400 missile warheads. There is alsoevidence for the existence of reload missiles for the SS-20 which wouldraise the overall number of warheads substantially. A long-range qround-launched cruise missile is also under development by the Soviet Union andcou ld be deploy ed with in the next year or two. By comp aris on to theWarsaw Pact's LRINF build-up, NATO's deployment did not begin until late

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LONGER-RAN GE INF MISSILE SYSTEMS DEPLOYED END 1983 (a)

S S - 5

Warheads 1 1 3 M IR V 1 1 Warheads

Range (km) 2 .0 0 0 4 ,1 0 0 4 ,4 0 0 -5 ,0 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 5 0 0 Range (km)

OperationalM o d e

Fixed Fixed — M ob ile M o b ile M ob i le Operational

M o d e

Global NumberDeployed

22 4 13 (b) 378 (c) 9 32 (d) Global NumberDeployed

Year

OperationalLate 1 9 50 's Early 1 9 6 0's 1977 1983 1983 Year

Operational

(a) This table is prepared on the b asis of missiles on launchers.

(b) By end 83 all SS-5 m issiles were being retired.

(c) Excludes refire missiles.

fd) N ot all of the 32 GLCMs had reached initial operational capability at end 1983.

FIGURE 13


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W

A R H E A D S

LONGER -RANGE INF MISSILE WARHEADS(GLOBAL DEPLOYMENTS)

_

1 4 0 0 -

1200 -

-

1000.

8 0 0 .

6 0 0 -

4 0 0 -

Warsaw Pact warheads-on-launchers

Beginning of Soviet

deployments of SS-20sarmed with 3 warheads

Construction on further bases is continuing

Includes operational SS-4, SS-5. and SS-20.

Excludes retire missiles and additional warheads.

200

]

%%t«al111111111111/ N AT O planiplanned

warheads-on-launchers

(With full LRINF deployment)

NA TO d ecided on 12 December, 1979 to deploy 572 missiles

(108 Pershing Us and 464 G LCM s) beginning at the end of 1983.

In the absence of a concrete arms control agreem ent obviating

the need for deployment, NA TO began the deployment of LRIN F

missiles at the end of 1983. D eploym ents can be halted, modified

or even reversed upon the achieve ment of a balanced equitable

and verifiable agreement calling for such actions.

71 73 75 77 79 81 83

YEAR

FIGURE 14


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1983 when the deployment uf the first 41 PERSHING II and GLCMs was initiated as scheduled. Moreover, this programme will not result in anyincrease in the total number of nuclear warheads in NATO Europe since NATOhas aqreed to remove one older nuclear warhead from Europe for each LRINFmissile warhead deployed.

66. SS-20 missiles are deployed in the western, central and easternreqions of the Soviet Union. From sites in the western region SS-20s can

strike all of NATO Europe including Iceland, the Azores and the CanaryIslands (see Figure 15 ). Those deployed in the central region and someof those based in the Far East can also strike substantial parts of NATOEurope (see Figure 16 ). The SS-20s in the western and central regionscomprise more than two-thirds of the SS-20 launchers and warheads deployed.Moreover, SS-20 missiles are readily transportable and could be relocatedwestward at short notice. Figure 17 shows that the PERSHING II couldstrike targets only as far as the western-most military districts of theSoviet Union, but not Moscow and beyond. The GLCM has a longer range thanPERSHING II but is not capable of reaching targets as far as the UralMountains or further to the East. Furthermore, since most of the SovietICBM silos are beyond the reach of NATO's systems (see Figure 15 ) NATO's

LRINF do not present a disarming first strike threat. In addition, thelimited numbers planned for deployment and, in the case of cruise missilestheir Iona fliaht time of several hours, make NATO's LRINF unsuitable forsuch use.

Shorter-Range INF Missile Systems

67. Warsaw Pact shorter-range INF missile systems such as the SovietSS-12/22 and SCUD can, especially when deployed forward, attack many of thesame taraets covered by the SS-20 and SS-4. There are indications that forthe first time SS-12/22 missiles are being deployed forward in the GermanDemocratic Republic and Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union. The WarsawPact has deployed approximately 650 SS-12/22s and SCUDs, and, in addition,has developed and tested the SS-23 missile which has a longer range thanthe SCUD for which it is a follow-on. In contrast, NATO's PERSHING IAswould continue to be reduced from 171 at end 1983 to 72 upon full deployment of PERSHING IIs. Furthermore, the new Soviet missiles are much moreaccurate than those they replace; thus smaller yield warheads could be usedwith the same dearee of military effectiveness. In sum, the Warsaw Pacthas substantial advantages over the whole ranqe of INF missile systems.

INF Aircraft

68. The ranges of aircraft vary considerably depending on the heightand speed at which they are flown and how much they are carrying. Normally, the majority of INF aircraft carry only one warhead but some types,particularly those with lonqer ranges, can carry two or three. Theircoverage could also depend on the location of suitably equipped basesthrouqh which aircraft could transit or to which they could return. Thecomparisons that follow in this section cover land-based aircraft(4)

(4) Carrier-based aircraft are dealt with under Sea-Based Nuclear Forcesin paragraph 72.

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TARGET COVERAGE OF SOVIET SS-20 AND

TARGET COVERAGE OF NATO PERSHING II AND GLCM

GLCMSoviet Union

Pe rsh ing 11

M o scow a

I SS -20 l oc ation

A ICB M location

F IG UR E 15


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COVERAGE OF EUROPE FROM SS-20 BASES EAST OF THE URALS

F I G URE 16


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NATO GLCM AND PERSHING II COVERAGE

F I GURE 17


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located in NATO Europe and, in the case of the Warsaw Pact, opposite NATOEurope. The BACKFIRE bomber with its primary nuclear role has been included in the strategic section because it has an inherent intercontinentalcapability. However, in its maritime and European land-attack roles theBACKFIRE also poses a serious nuclear and conventional threat to NATOEurope.

69. The comparison of lonqer-range INF aircraft in operational units

shows that the Warsaw Pact has a considerable numerical advantage. NATOhas about 150 F—111 aircraft in Europe; the Soviet Union has about 325nuclear capable BADGERs and BLINDERs in its Strategic Aviation forces andan additional 175 aircraft of these types in the Soviet Naval Aviation(SNA) forces, makinq a total of 500 lonqer-range INF aircraft. This totalexcludes BADGERs and BLINDERs not configured for weapons delivery, such asthose for Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), reconnaissance, and air-to-airrefuel

Nato and warsaw Pact force comparison

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