HR70-14

PPROVED FOR.

RELEASE - HISTORICALCOLLECTION DIVISIONHR70-14 DATE:

OSR-1539/2 07-18-201215 May 1973

Paper 2, NSSM 168-1,

Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO

4j n SalR~i "'. /

"Contents

Page

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - 1

I. Characteristics of the Warsaw PactForces Facing NATO. ......... -.- 9

A. Thumbnail Overview of Forces....... 91. Ground Forces. . . . . . . . . -.... 92. Air Forces . . . ........ 103. Naval Forces . . .. . .. .... .10

4. Peripheral Strategic Attack Forces . 12B. Salient Characteristics of Pact Forces . 13

1. Ground Forces. . . ......... 132. Air Forces . . . . . . ....... 143. Naval Forces . ......... 144. Theater Nuclear Forces ....... 15

C. Trends in Forces and Doctrine. . . . .. 151. Force Trends . . . . . . . . . . .. 152. Doctrinal Trends . . . . . .. 17

Implications of Force Trendsfor Doctrine . . . . . . . . . 17

II. Issues in Assessing Pact Capabilities. . . . 18A. Capabilities of the Standing Forces. . . 18B. Pact Mobilization Capability . . .... 19

Issue... ........ . . . . ... 21C. Strategic Redeployment.. . . . . . . . 21

Issues . . .. ...... 23D. The Pattern and Sequence of the

Buildup of Naval Forces at Sea . . 23Norwegian Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Baltic Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Mediterranean Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . 24North Atlantic . ... ......... 24

E. Logistic Capabilities. .. ...,..... 25Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Stocks in

the Forward Area . ... . . . . . . . 25Logistic Transport . . . ....-. . 25Stocks for Pact Air Forces in EastGermany ... . . . . . . . . 26

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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Contents

Page

F. Combat Effectiveness. . . . . . . . . . . 27Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

G. Operational Concepts. . . . . . . . . 281. The Ground Campaign . . . . . . . 282. The Air Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . 293. Naval Campaigns . . . . . -. . . . .. 30

Norwegian Sea-Barents SeaOperations. . . . . . . . . .30

Baltic Sea Operations . . . . . . 31North Atlantic Operations . . 31Mediterranean-Black Sea

Operations. . . . . . . . 314. The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan . . . 32Issues..... ........... 33

Soviet Response to NATO Use ofNuclear Weapons..... . . . . 33

Feasibility of Soviet PreemptiveStrike.... . . . .. 36

The Questions of the Use ofNuclear -Weapons-at-Sea. . -.--36

Soviet Response to AdvancedBuildup of Western Europe . . . 36

The Interdiction of Oil Shippingfrom the Persian Gulf ..... 37

Other Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

V. Tables . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . 41A. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Divisions . . -. 42B. Warsaw Pact Air Forces in East Europe . . 43C. Soviet Tactical and Long Range Air

Forces West of The Urals. . . . . . . . 44

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Contents

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D. Current Disposition of Naval Forces. . . 45E. Surface Ship and Submarine Availability. 46F. Soviet Major Surface Ships and Sub-

marines Typically Available byArea Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

G. Naval Aviation . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 48

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Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO

Summary

Ground Forces

The Pact ground forces use a system in whichthe peacetime structure nearly duplicates the wartimestructure, but is manned at a.reduced level. Thisprovides a framework for rapid mobilization andmovement. Universal conscription, contingencyassignment of reservists to units and provisionfor mobilization of trucks, rail transport, andother services supports the peacetime posture.

Of some 60 Pact divisions inEast Europeopposite. the NATO Central Region, 33 do not .requiremobilization and could be immediately committedto combat. An additional 18 understrength divi-sions also could be committed immediately withoutmobilization -if circumstances-warranted but -would--only have limited offensive effectiveness and endurance.

'About 3 days (DIA believes less than a week) would berequired to bring the entire force to full strength, withservice support elements also fully manned.

The structure, equipment, and posture ofWarsaw Pact ground forces accentuates initialcombat and shock power. The divisions are heavilyarmored and have good tactical mobility, althoughlogistic support is-relatively austere.

Air Forces

Pact air forces in East Europe are composedof some 3800 aircraft, including those assigned toNational Air Defense forces which would be used to

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provide defense of rear areas. About 2800 of theseare located opposite the NATO Central Region.Performance limitations impair the capabilities ofPact tactical air forces for deep strikes. Forthis mission, the Pact relies mainly on the Sovietmedium bombers based in the USSR, most of whichare aging TU-16 Badgers.

Naval Forces

The western fleets of the Soviet Navy have alarge force of attack submarines--some 210 units--with cruise missile strike systems on aircraft,surface ships, and submarines available for usein a conflict with NATO.

Soviet Navy general purpose forces employdefensive barriers with attack submarines, missile-equipped strike aircraft, and missile-equippedsurface ships. The three fleets are widely separatedgeographically, which prevents rapid interfleetaugmentation. Consequently, the Soviets rely on _each fleet to perform--its role-autoroxtously.

Theater Nuclear Forces

Theater nuclear forces include a large tacticalcomponent stationed in the forward area with the bulk,of the force--mainly MR/IRBMs and medium bombers--based inside the USSR. These forces are characterizedby their reliance principally on missiles and second-arily on aircraft. We estimate a lack of tacticalnuclear options at the low end of the spectrum, andabsence of low yield systems with small CEP.

Trends in Forces and Doctrine

The Pact is increasing and modernizing tankforces and delivering new infantry combat vehicles.Divisional artillery has been strengthened in recent years,and there is evidence that self-propelled artillery

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may soon be introduced. Ground air defense systems

are being increased and modernized, aircraft with

better low-level attack and load-carrying capabili-

ties are being introduced, and reconnaissancecapabilities are being improved.

Some of these force trends are compatible

with a continuation of long-standing concepts for

theater nuclear war; others reflect acceptance of

conventional warfare for an indefinite period.

Soviet military theorists maintain that war with

NATO would probably escalate to theater-widenuclear warfare. Soviet doctrine,-as reflectedin Warsaw Pact exercises and outlined in the Sovietclassified and open military press, rejects the.

concept of graduated nuclear warfare and indicatesthat any use of nuclear weapons by NATO -would be metwith a massive, theater-wide Pact nuclear response.

Although there is a risk that the Soviets would infact follow this doctrine, the Soviet politicalleadership would retain the authority to modify ortailor any Pact nuclear strike to less than massiveor theater-wide proportions.

Issues in Assessing Pact Capabilities

The Standing Forces

The posture df the Pact forces and viewsexpressed in Pact documents do not indicate seriouscontemplation of either side attacking without aperiod of tension sufficient to allow the forcesin East Europe to complete mobilization and con-vert to a war footing. The normal posture ofPact forces does not provide them with a capabilityto undertake a large-scale offensive without abuildup of about three days (DIA believes less than

a week). The forces stationed

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in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, however,could launch a conventional attack on short notice,but could achieve only limited objectives withoutreinforcement and more logistic support.

Strategic Redeployment

Analysis suggests that about 90 divisions couldbe deployed opposite the central region of NATOwithin 21 days. This estimate is based on an as-sumption of nearly ideal conditions for carryingout the redeployment. A key question is whetheror not the Soviets would initiate a massive rein-forcement prior to start of hostilities in view ofthe provocative nature of such an undertaking,and the concern they would have that such a movemight invite a preemptive nuclear attack by NATO.

Operational Concepts

-- 'The Ground Campaign

The initial objective of the ground campaignis the rapid breakthrough of NATO's forward defenses.Massive preparatory fires would be followed by themassing of forces on chosen axes of advance. Abreakthrough is to be followed by a high speedthrust of armor and mechanized infantry deep intoNATO territory intended to isolate and neutralizemajor NATO force elements, delay NATO mobilization,and prevent reinforcement from the US.

The operation is seen as a two-punchcampaign. The forward force is expected to achievean objective deep in NATO territory--possibly theRhine River. The second punch is to be deliveredby the second echelon of the Pact, primarily by

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land armies brought forward from the western USSR.These armies are then expected to drive to therapid conclusion of the European campaign.

-- The Air Campaign

In conventional war the air forces wouldbe the principal means for destroying criticaltargets throughout the theater. The Pact hasdevised an elaborate air operation employingfighters and medium bombers to strike quickly be-fore NATO air can fully respond or reinforce.Primary targets would be NATO air forces, nuclear systems,and command and control. This reflects the importance thePact attaches to attaining air superiority in conventionalwarfare, and a desire to limit NATO's ability toescalate to nuclear.war. It is also an attempt tocompensate for the current limitations of Pactfighter and bomber aircraft.

In nuclear war, however, Pact tactical airforces would be of secondary importance to_.the-tactical and strategic missile forces. The tacticalair forces then would have the main function ofproviding air defense of the ground forces anddelivering nuclear strikes on mobile targets inthe more immediate combat zone.

-- The Naval Campaign

During a period of political tension whichcould lead to conflict with NATO we would expectto see the Soviet Navy curtail peacetime surfaceship deployments. Combat-ready submarines andsurface ships would get underway.

The principal objective of the NorthernFleet would be to defeat carriers and amphibioustask forces in the Norwegian Sea, defend the sea

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approaches to the USSR and interdict logistics andreinforcements from the CONUS. The primary effortof the Baltic Fleet would be directed towardseizing control of the Baltic Sea and its approaches.It would also conduct amphibious operations insupport of Pact ground forces. The Black Sea Fleet,augmented in the Mediterranean by submarines ofthe Northern Fleet, would attempt to neutralize NATOaircraft carriers and amphibious assault forcesin the Mediterranean and would assist in operationsaimed at. seizing control of the Turkish Straits.

-- The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan.

Pact planners proceed on the assumption thatNATO, if confronted with the probability of defeatby conventional Pact forces, would resort to nuclearweapons. Furthermore, they presume that a limitednuclear response by the Pact to NATO's use oftactical nuclear weapons would offer the West theopportunity to deliver first a massive and decisivetheater nuclear strike. The Soviets plan, therefore,-that-the-initial-Pact nuclaF strike be theater-wide and include Soviet strategic nuclear forcesbased in the USSR as well as forward-based tacticalsystems. Some evidence is available which suggeststhat Pact planners feel that they would receivesufficient warning of NATO's preparations to usenuclear weapons in order to preempt.

Probably the overriding consideration inthe Soviets' reluctance to entertain the notion ofa graduated nuclear strategy is a fundamentalskepticism that such a strategy is feasible. Theymay feel that once nuclear weapons are used, a psychologicalbarrier is passed beyond which human behavior becomesunpredictable. They may also have doubts that theability to discern between varying nuclear weaponsyields and to determine what constitutes -strategicor tactical targets exists outside a narrow group

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of specialists. Consequently, in the Soviet viewthe main distinction with respect to the employmentof nuclear weapons appears to lie.between use andnonuse.

Key Remaining Issues

The effectiveness of mobilized Pact divisionsremains a key issue in assessing Pact forces. Presentcategorization systems are useful as a descriptivetool but are not suitable for assessing force combateffectiveness. Methodologies are under development -in the intelligence community which will provideuseful insights into the potential effectiveness ofvarious Pact divisions. A question that has yet tobe resolved, however, is what weight is to beattached to the findings of these methodologies inan overall assessment of the NATO-Warsaw Pactbalance? Another question to be-addressed is howare such difficult-to-measure factors as economicand psychological constraints, national objectives,political reliability, and threat perceptions tobe weighed in_ assessing the balance?__

Pact. logistic capabilities appear comensuratewith their doctrinal concepts of a short intensivecampaign. The issues remain, however:

-= Would logistics constrain the size andintensity of initial attack?

-- Would logistics limit endurance ofPact forces in offensive operations?

Other key issues include:

- Capacity of the Pact to effectively employmasses of tanks and the effectiveness ofNATO anti-tank systems.

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-- Implications of success or failure of theinitial Pact air operations for NATO and thePact. Strengths anid weaknesses of $hePact concept for air operations.

-- Implications of nuclear war at sea.

-- Capacity of the Soviet Navy to find anddestroy carriers.

-- Implications of Soviet sea lane inter-diction.

All of these issues have been the subject oflengthy study, but the information or systems ofanalysis required for a commonly accepted resolutiondo not now exist.

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OSR-1539/1

Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO

I. Characteristics of the Warsaw Pact Forces Facing NATO

A. Thumbnail Overview of Forces

1. Ground Forces

The Warsaw Pact ground force structure isan adaptation of the continental European militarysystem. Features are;

-- Universal conscription and large .numbersof reservists with prior active-duty militarytraining.

-- Large army force structure; most ofstructure active in peacetime but only a partfully manned.

-- Comprehensive mobilization system which,because of general Pact shortage of motor vehicles,includes trucks as well as men.

-- A transportation system designed to meetmilitary requirements and a plan for rapid strategicdeployment of mobilized forces to frontiers orcombat zones.

The 26 Warsaw Pact divisions in EastGermany do not require mobilization and could beimmediately committed to combat operations, ascould five Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia.and two in Poland.

Eight understrength divisions of the

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Czechoslovak first echelon and ten understrengthdivisions, including two small special purposedivisions, of the Polish first echelon also couldbe committed immediately without mobilization ifthe situation dictated. These ground force divi-sions would have limited effectiveness and enduranceif so used. After about three days of mobilization (DIA

believes less than a week), two additional East German reserve

divisions would be activated, Czechoslovak forces would increase

to 12 divisions and Polish forces to 15 divisions, allfully manned. Support forces also would be broughtto wartime strength. These divisions would be atvarying levels of initial combat effectiveness,depending mainly on the number of reservists ineach division.

2. Air Forces

Pact air forces are composed of a largenumber of aircraft including those assigned to

National Air Defense forces which would provide

defense of rear areas.

Soviet tactical air units in East Europeare fully-manned and equ-ipped,-and- could be - -immediately committed to combat operations. East.European air units also could be committed im-mediately, but initially would be missing somesupport personnel and would have limited capabilityfor sustained operations.

3. Naval Forces

The Northern Fleet includes more than 130

general purpose submarines of varying age andcapability, and a force of missile-equipped surfacecombatants and land-based strike aircraft. Aprincipal objective would be to defend the seaapproaches (Norwegian Sea) to the USSR, and toconduct submarine campaigns in the North Atlanticand Mediterranean.. Amphibious assaults might alsobe conducted in support of operations in the NATONorthern Region.

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The Baltic Fleet submarine force consistsof fewer than 30 medium- and short-range diesel

submarines and a variety of missile-equipped and

gun-armed surface combatants. Emphasis in thisfleet is on a large force of cruise-missile

equipped small combatants. The Baltic Fleet also

has, with assistance from Polish and EastGerman Navies, a modest amphibious assault cap-ability. The primary mission of these forces wouldbe to gain control of the Baltic and its approaches

and to conduct operations in support of Pact

ground forces in the NATO Northern and CentralRegions. Additionally, submarine elements of theBaltic.Fleet probably would contribute to anyNorthern Fleet interdiction campaign against theUK and the Low Countries.

The Black Sea Fleet has fewer than 30submarines. It is the largest of all Soviet fleetsin numbers of modern, major surface combatants, andhas substantial numbers of missile equippedsmall combatants and land-based strike aircraft,and two brigades of naval infantry. The BlackSea Fleet provides almost all of the surfacecombatants in the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.The primary mission of this force would be toneutralize NATO aircraft carriers and amphibiousassault forces in the Mediterranean in order toestablish naval supremacy along NATO's southernflank. Bulgarian forces would probably assistthe USSR in attempting to gain control of theTurkish Straits.

Except in the Mediterranean, where theSoviets continuously maintain a large naval force,normal Soviet naval posture is typifiedby scattered deployments of two or three smalltask groups, seasonal exercises and trainingoperations in local waters. The bulk of Sovietships and submarines remain in port. Presumablymost could get underway in a crisis. Shipspreviously idle for extended periods, includingthose in upkeep, would be of questionable effectiveness.

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4. Peripheral Strategic At-tack Forces

The main theater nuclear strike forceconsists of the Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces basedin the western USSR. This force of older SS-4 andSS-5 missiles has been declining in recent years.At the same time the Soviets have been deploying anew ICBM--the SS-ll--some of which are believedto have a mission for strikes in the Europeantheater. Soviet medium bombers have a primaryresponsibility for strikes in Eurasia. .

Of the current Soviet SLBM force, at mostfive G-I and six G-II class diesel powered sub-marines are targeted for strikes in the Europeantheater. Deployment patterns of the six nuclearpowered H-class SSBNs indicate they are presentlytargeted against the United States. However, thesesubmarines could be retargeted against NATO Europewith little impact on Soviet strategic capabilitiesagainst CONUS.

Soviet Peripheral Strategic AttackForces Operational Land-Based

Missile Launchers1 July 1973

Total.. Targeted AgainstOperational Western Europe

Soft MultilauncherSS-4 420 400SS-5 40 40

Subtotal

Hard MultilauncherSS-4 80 70SS-5 -45 30

Subtota, I! lO~

Total 585 540

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B.. Salient Characteristics' of Fact Forces

1. Ground Forces

The structure, equipment, and posture ofWarsaw Pact ground forces accentuate initial combatand shock power and austere logistic support. Pacttroop strength is concentrated mainly in heavilyarmored divisions*'which are both smaller and morenumerous than NATO divisions, while service supportand logistic elements are relatively austere.

The divisional maneuver elements are com-prised entirely of tanks and mechanized infantryelements. The divisions have high ratios of tanksto personnel, and when fully equipped have hightactical mobility. However, about one-third ofthe infantry in the Pact divisions--mainly thosein the second echelon forces--would have to ridein trucks because.of a shortage of APCs.

Pact ground forces also contain sizeableamounts of field artillery, including a considerablenumbher-of multi-round rocket launchers-MRLs) .Most of the field artillery, including all of theMRL units, is subordinated to line divisions ratherthan higher echelons.

Other than the MRL units and a small numberof direct fire assault guns, Pact forces do nothave self-propelled artillery. Development of firecontrol systems and techniques and munitions alsolags behind NATO, and there is no evidence thatPact forces have been supplied with improved con-ventional munitions (ICMs).

ft divisions in the Group of Soviet Forcesin Germany, for example, 10 are tank divisions. The10 motorized rifle divisions of GSFG each.have a tankregiment plus a tank battalion in each rifle regiment.In addition, GSFG has separate tank units subordi-nate to higher headquarters.

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2. Air Forces

Most of the aircraft in Warsaw Pact tacticalair forces were-originally designed in the mid-Fifties as interceptors. They are generallycharacterized by short combat radius and smallpayload capacities--about 4,000 pounds or less.The primary emphasis in Pact air forces since the .early Sixties has been on air defense capabilities.

With only a limited number of light bombers,Pact tactical air forces have no signi-ficant capabilities for deep strikes. For heavy pay-load strikes against targets as far west as the Rhine,for example, the Pact would have to rely mainly on themedium bombers based in the USSR, most of which areolder model TU-16 Badgers.

Much the same is true of Pact capabilitiesfor aerial reconnaissance, although during the pastfew years there have been considerable improvementsin the capabilities for reconnaissance in theimmediate battlefield area. Target acquisitioncapabilities for deep strikes are limited and relymainly on subsonic aircraft based in the USSR.

3. Naval Forces

The most prominent characteristics of the-Soviet-Navy- a-re the-la-rge--force- of attack--submarines __

-- some 210 units--and the cruisemissile strike systems for use on aircraft, surfaceships, and submarines.

New Soviet ships and submarines withhigh weapons density are continuallybeing introduced into the fleet to offset theanticipated retirement of a large number of older,less capable units.

Soviet Naval Aviation is almost exclusivelyland based, thus air support to the fleet issharply reduced beyond range of these aircraft.The deployment of the USSR's first aircraft carrierby 1976 will be a step towards alleviating thislimitation.

Soviet amphibious units are designed forshort range raids and are not suitable for majoramphibious operations.

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The three western fleets are hampered bytheir division among three widely separated locations,two of which--the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets--are susceptible to blocked straits.

Soviet ASW forces have no significantcapability for defending an area or a sea lanefrom submarines and would even be hard pressed todefend themselves from submarine attack on the highseas.

4..Theater Nuclear Forces

Theater nuclear forces include a large tacticalcomponent stationed in the forward area with the bulkof the force--mainly MR/IRBMs and medium bombers--based inside the USSR. These forces. arecharacterized by a lack of tactical nuclear optionsat the low end of limited nuclear war spectrum andabsence of low yield systems with small CEP. ThePact, for example, has not deployed nuclear artillery,and the FROG, which has the lowest yield and smallestCEP of any nuclear, delivery system in the groundforceswstwarheads with yields estimat as lowas and an estimated CEP of meters.

C. Trends in Forces and Doctrine

There are some indications that the Pact iscurrently altering its force structure and perhapsre-evaluating some aspects of its doctrine. It istoo early to draw conclusions from observed changes.The following trends, however, are noted:

1. Force Trends

The Soviets are increasing the number oftanks in motorized 'rifle divisions and are de-livering new Infantry Combat Vehicles, the latestof which, the BMP, is a tracked amphibious vehiclearmed with anti-tank guided missiles.and a 73 mmgun firing a rocket assisted round.

Since about 1967 the Pact hasincreased the artillery firepower of its divisionsby as much as 50 percent and there is evidence that

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self-propelled artillery may soon beintroduced.

The Soviets are increasing and modernizingtheir ground force air defense systems. The mostnotable developments have been the deployment ofthe ZSU-23/4 rapid fire antiaircraft gun and theintroduction of mobile SAM systems at army anddivision level for defense against low, medium,and high altitude attack. In addition, a small,man-portable SAM designed for use against aircraftflying at low altitude has been in production sinceat least 1967. The system has been used inVietnam and Egypt and is probably with Sovietforces in the USSR or Eastern Europe.

Soviet tactical air units are now beingequipped with the new MIG-23 Flogger, a relativelylight swing-wing fighter which has a good lowaltitude performance capability and can be usedfor both air defense and ground attack. A new.longer-range tactical strike aircraft similar insize-and configuration -to the US F-111 also is

being produced and should enter service soon.

In recent years,Soviet reconnaissance unitshave received late model aircraft. These areequipped with more advanced sensor devices thanare the older models and some are capable ofattack as well as reconnaissance. A small numberof Mach 3 Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft also havebeen introduced.

Introduction of the Backfire, a swing-wing bomber capable of supersonic speeds at lowaltitude, will improve the medium bomber force'sability to penetrate NATO air defenses and extendthe strike range of the force at lower altitudes.

Soviet logistical transport has been

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improved at tactical levels with the replacementof older vehicles with newer vehicles with greaterlift capacities. In addition, the number ofvehicles assigned to motor transport units hasincreased.

2. Doctrinal Trends

Implications of Force Trends for Doctrine

-- Some force trends, such as' those in the tankand motorized infantry force, indicate continuationof long-standing concepts for blitzkrieg.

-- Others, such as the increased fieldartillery and better ground attack'~aircraft, reflect trendtoward acceptance of a conventional war phase,possibly as a result of NATO's declared doctrineof flexible response.

-- Logistic transport improvements arepartly a reflection of artillery and armor in-creases,-which entail- a -greater ammunition- re-___quirement but may also reflect requirement forgreater logistical endurance.

-- Air defense improvements, includingthe construction of shelters, mainly reflectsensitivity to the Western air threat and reactionto the demonstrated effectiveness of conventionalair power in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

-- The peripheral strike force is beingprovided greater flexibility in targeting andreduced vulnerability by the deployment of theSS-ll and the expected introduction of the Backfire.

Soviet doctrinal developments indicate:

-- The declared doctrinal concept that

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war with NATO is likely to escalate to theaternuclear war is still in effect and the forcescontinue to be configured for optimum efficiencyin the nuclear environment, but,

-- The contingency of conventional warappears to be gaining in importance and the forceis being modified accordingly.. Further, if aconflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact beginswithout the use of nuclear weapons, the Sovietswould probably attempt to bring it to a conclusionusing conventional means only.

II. Issues in Assessing Pact Capabilities

A. Capabilities of the Standing Forces

The likelihood of Pact initiation of hostilitieswithout prior buildup, and the capabilities ofthe standing forces should such an event occur,constitute major issues in the overall assess-ment of Pact military capabilities. Because oftheir-n-ormal day-to-day--readiness-andposture, Pact - --forces would require some period of mobilizationprior to undertaking a sustained offensive.The forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, andPoland, however, could launch a conventionalattack on short notice but probably could notachieve more than limited objectives.

The overall military posture of the Pact forcesand the plans and views expressed in Pact militarydocuments do not indicate serious contemplationof either side attacking without at least somebuildup. Pact documents and exercise scenariosduring the past several years usuallyassume a period of tension sufficient to allow thePact forces in East Europe to complete mobilization

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and convert to a war footing. Pact planners appearto deal with surprise attack only from the stand-point of NATO nuclear strike, and even then it isaddressed mainly as a "worst case" planning hypo-thesis.

B. Pact Mobilization Capability

The goal of Pact mobilization is the conversionof military and economic resources required bythe armed forces to a war footing in the shortest

possible time.

A study of Pact mobilization procedures in-dicates that Pact forces requiring mobilization areexpected to be fully expanded within 24 hours.Evidence available on practice mobilizations ofSoviet divisions, including some in cadre status,suggests that within about three days after startof mobilization most Soviet forces in the westernUSSR would be available for movement. Pact groundforces have been specifically structured forrapid expansion. The required stocks of combat-equipment and-supplies and the additional - -

trained manpower are available.

Although designed primarily for amassing andconcentrating forces in the shortest possible time,the Pact mobilization system can also handle awide range of other options short of full mobili-zation.

According to Pact documentsthe Pact has mobilization plans or

both overt and covert contingencies. Covertmobilization of selected elements of the armedforces can be carried out through use of the armed-forces-wide communications networks belonging toeach country's Ministry of National Defense andtested courier systems.

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The mobilization of air forces can be carriedout in a similar fashion using the same mobili-zation system. Tactical air units, which are

generally manned and equipped at higher levelsthan are ground forces units and have lessermobilization requirements, could probably mobilizea greater proportion of their units secretly.

The Soviet Navy probably does not rely onmobilization to achieve required force levels forthe initial period of war or any period of tensionpreceding it. The Soviets do, however, have someships laid up'in some form of preservation forwhich crews might be mobilized. The ships, however,are of older classes and would probably requireseveral months before they could be usefullycommitted to combat.

Little information is available on Pact in-tentions to generate forces over and above thoseof the identified force structure. The Warsaw Pactcountries have enough reservists to mobilize addi-tional combat divisions. If, during an unhindered

--general-mobilization,--the Pactperceived a require-ment to prepare for protracted conflict, theirground force generation capabilities (especiallyin the Soviet Union) would be constrained principallyby the availability of major items of combat andlogistic equipment. Some Pact countries are knownto have some combat equipment in depotstorage, much of it obsolete. Production esti-mates indicate that no Pact country could equipmany additional divisions over the short term.Additional forces, therefore, would probably belightly equipped, primarily infantry-type units.Although the Pact maintains a large number oftraining aircraft and old aircraft in storage,there is no evidence of a supply of reservepilots and technicians to generate new units.

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__ssue'

-- The principal issue in examining Pact mobili-zation capabilities centers not on the Pact'scapacity to expand and assemble existing under-strength units, or to generate additional units,but on the effectiveness of the forces mobilized.The emphasis in Pact mobilization planning is onthe rapidity with which units can be assembledand made ready for either movement or commitmentto battle. Pact planners do not contemplatelarge-scale retraining to improve the combatproficiency of reservists once mobilization isinitiated. The qualitative status of individualelements or of entire units,-therefore, is not aconsideration in Pact standards for determining aunit's readiness for deployment. Units are in-tended to be committed to combat according to aschedule or as operational need dictates--regard-less of qualitative -shortcomings that woulddetract from their effectiveness.

C. Strategic Redeployment

Assessments of Pact reinforcement capabilitiesare mainly movement calculations based on estimatedcapabilities of transport s stems and are depend-ent on assumptions.

Analysis to date suggests that approximately 90 divi-sions could be deployed opposite the NATO CentralRegion within 21 days. This estimate is basedon a number of critical assumptions, including:

-- The completion of mobilization andreinforcement prior to the initiationof hostilities

-- mobilization and reinforcement planned

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at maximum speed, and with maximumreasonable utilization of capacity offacilities

-- no efforts toward concealment attempted .

-- use of the most appropriate means androute of movement

-- route capacity not limited by nonmilitarytraffic, outages, or by the extent of themilitary requirement

-- ideal operating conditions with nointerference by NATO forces

The timing of strategic redeployment of Sovietforces from the western USSR is dependent on threefactors: warning, the rapidity of mobilization,and the schedule for their commitment.

Pact documents, ___ ndicate-that Pact -planners--- ---

expec that a period of tension would precede anyoutbreak of hostilities. Pact plannersappear to rely heavily on a period of tension toprovide them with the necessary time to mobilizetheir forces and put their nations on a war footing.

Most units in the western USSR would be readyfor movement within about three days of the startof mobilization. Where the forces would be de-ployed once they were brought forward is unknown.Additional time would be required to complete theorganization of the units into armies and frontsin the forward area and to prepare for coordinatedoffensive operations.

The manner in which large scale redeploymentsare to be carried out has been the subject of much

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debate among Soviet military strategists. Theirchief concern has been to be able to do so whileminimizing potential losses from NATO preemptivestrikes.

Issues:

-- A key issue with respect to strategic re-deployment is how long it would take to accomplishsuch a movement under less than optimum conditionssuch as transportation bottlenecks.and NATO inter-dictive strikes.

-- Another- issue of .-major concern is whetheror not the Soviets would initiate a massive re-inforcement prior to start of hostilities in viewof the provocative nature of such an undertaking,and the concern they would have that such a move mightinvite a preemptive nuclear attack by NATO.

D. The Pattern and Sequence of the Buildup ofNaval Forces at Sea

Norwegian Sea

we wouldexpect-to see the deployment of intelligencecollection vessels into the southern Norwegian Seaand the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap area at the be-ginning of a period of political tension. Atabout the same time submarine reconnaissancepatrols would be established in the same regions,as well as the central and northern part of theNorwegian Sea. Soviet naval aircraft wouldbegin daylight reconnaissance flights over theNorwegian Sea and Gap areas.

If the tension continued to build, the Sovietswould position more submarines and surface shipsin the Norwegian Sea--and probably a few to the

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south--to establish an echeloned reconnaissanceand strike network, as seen in major fleet exercises.

Baltic Sea

The Soviets would probably sortie some of theirmajor combatants from the Baltic Sea. With thesmaller cruise missile and ASW ships, they wouldprepare to neutralize West European submarine anddestroyer forces.

Mediterranean Sea

The Soviets apparently maintain a minimumwar-fighting naval force in the Mediterranean duringpeacetime. With the onset of tension, reinforcementfor surface ships and-auxiliaries would come fromthe Black Sea Fleet and for submarines from theNorthern Fleet.

North Atlantic

Early warning forces consisting of intelligenceships and submarines would probably be positionedoff Gibraltar, west of the UK, and in the vicinityof the Azores. Long range reconnaissance flightswould extend into the northern North Atlantic, andprobably along the eastern US coast, with Cubaas the turn-around point.

Soviet naval units based in the Pacific probablywould be held there in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pactconventional war in Europe. The Soviets would in-crease surveillance operations in the Pacific mari-time approaches and establish barriers in the threemajor straits leading into the Sea of Japan. Sovietattack submarines would take up surveillance patrolsoff the Soviet coast and along the major Pacificsea lanes. A few of the

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some 80 naval strike aircraft based in the FarEast could be moved to the European area, butMoscow would want to retain most of these aircraftas well as the reconnaissance and ASW units in thePacific. Moscow probably would also improve itsstrategic posture by deploying additional ballisticmissile submarines off the US coast.

E. Logistics Capabilities

Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Stocks. in the ForwardArea

Estimates of levels of ammunition stocks inthe forward area when measured against estimated'act requirements suggest there are sufficientstocks on hand for about 20 days (DIA believes 30 days),of combat during a high-intensity, i.e., full scaleconventional campaign with NATO. During a less intensivecampaign these stocks would be sufficient forabout 50 days of combat.

Because of major uncertainties inherent in.such analysis, however, this judgment--based on acomparison of estimated stocks with estimatedrequirements--should be viewed only as a roughapproximation. Estimates of logistic requirementsand consumption rates are heavily dependent onassumptions regarding the different types ofoperations that could be undertaken, and thedifferent intensities of combat that would beencountered.

Logistic Transport

Warsaw Pact logistic doctrine describes amodern logistic system as consisting of truck-bornestores and vehicular transport to serve forceneeds from the army level down. To the rear of the

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army level stores, Pact planners see the combineduse of road and rail to serve logistic transportlinks.

Pact motor transport elements are not sufficientto support the all-mobile stock and transportsystem stated as a goal in Soviet doctrine. Pactlogistic writings reflect recognition of theinadequacy of the military vehicular inventoryalone to satisfy their potential needs in a warwith NATO. They indicate that until such time asthe goal of an all vehicular logistic transportsystem is met, measures would be taken to in-corporate railroad, barge transport, and forwardstorage into various parts of the system.

Stocks for Pact Air Forces in East Germany

Most Soviet air supplies in East Germany arestored in depots located either on the airfieldsor nearby. Calculations of the capacity of these_facilities indicate that there probably are suf-ficient stocks of ordnance and POL available tosupport the intensive air campaign Pact plannersenvision for a war against NATO. This includesallowance for a sizeable augmentation of the airforces now in East Germany by deploying tacticalaircraft forward from Poland and the western USSR.

Issues:

-- To what extent would logistics con-strain the size and intensity of initial attackwithout logistical buildup?

-- What is the functional relationshipbetween logistics endurance time and logisticalbuildup? How many months buildup, for example,is required per week of additional endurance?

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-- Would logistics limit endurance ofPact forces in offensive operations?

F. Combat Effectiveness

The approximately 90 divisions the Soviets andtheir allies plan to have ready for deploymentopposite the NATO Center Region will vary con-siderably in their potential combat effectivenessimmediately after mobilization. Less than halfof these divisions, for example, are maintainedat full combat strength during peacetime. Mostwould be manned by a high proportion of reservists andwhile many of these would have served recently, somewould not have seen active duty in 20 to 30 years andwould have had no recent refresher training.

Categorization systems currently in use inthe intelligence community reflect.differencesonly in the peacetime status of. Pact divisionsand do not serve as useful indicators of potentialcombat effectiveness. Both CIA and DIA, therefore,have sought to develop methodologies for ratingthe-potential effectiveness of Warsaw-Pact-divi-sions. The methodologies of both agencies aredesigned to measure the relative, rather thanabsolute, combat effectiveness of various Pactdivisions by comparing them against a singlestandard--a Soviet division judged to be fullytrained and at full strength.

Issues:

-- Although- these methodologies will pro-vide useful insights into aspects of forceeffectiveness measurement, means are not yetavailable to determine the weight to be attached totheir findings as well as to such less measurablefactors as economic and psychological constraints,national objectives, political reliability, andthreat perceptions in overall assessments of theNATO-Warsaw Pact balance.

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G. Operational Concepts

1. ' The Ground Campaign

Soviet operational concepts for the postu-lated ground campaign in Europe are the product ofan evolutionary process. Combining the lessons of theirWorld War II experience with their perceptions of currentWestern forces and doctrine, the Soviets have designeda Warsaw Pact ground campaign concept which may becharacterized as follows:

The initial Pact objective--regardless of howthe war may start or of the opening scenario--isthe rapid breakthrough of whatever initial-de-fenses NATO may have erected. In classic Sovietfashion, leaning heavily on the experiences andsuccesses of WW II, the breakthrough effort willbe preceded by massive preparatory fires deliveredthroughout the depths of NATO defenses and by themassing of overwhelming force and shockpower on thechosen axes of advance. All of these efforts aredirected toward accomplishing the breakthrough ofNATO---forward defenses--and the-neutral-ization offorces most detrimental to the campaign.

The breakthrough in the Pact ground campaignconstitutes the vital first step. It is pre-liminary to a high speed thrust of armor andmechanized infantry forces to achieve key ob-jectives deep in NATO territory; to isolate andneutralize major NATO force elements; and to delaymobilization if possible and to prevent reinforce-ment of NATO by forces from the continental US.The ground campaign, whether nuclear or conventional,is seen by the Soviets as being of short durationand not a prolonged grinding battle. The speed andtempo of the campaign and the weight and shock-power of the force committed are the key consid-erations. Armored columns accompanied, and sup-ported by massed artillery and mobile logistics

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are expected to drive to objectives rapidly.

Forces initially in the forward area oppositeNATO's central region make up the initial punch ofwhat is seen to be an essentially two-punch campaign.This forward force is expected to rapidly achievean initial objective deep in NATO territory. Someevidence suggests that this objective may be aline generally defined by the Rhine River.

The second punch is to be provided by thesecond echelon of the Warsaw Pact, primarily theland armies mobilized and brought forward fromthe western USSR. These armies with or withoutthe remnants of the forward echelon are expectedby the Soviets to drive to the .rapid conclusionof the European campaign.

The conclusion of the European campaign hasnever been discussed or defined by Pact sources.It could be expressed geographically as- the EnglishChannel. It may simply be seen to conclude atthat point in time when hostilities end andnegotiations begin. Possibly, the campaign end is

---perceived -in- Soviet planning -as -that -point--in war __

at which the theater campaign is overshadowed byescalation of the conflict to intercontinentalnuclear war.

2. The Air Campaign

Under conventional war planning the airforces become the principal means for destroyingcritical targets throughout the theater. Primaryobjectives of the Pact air forces during conven-tional warfare in Europe would be to destroy theNATO air forces, NATO nuclear delivery systemsand stockpiles, and disrupt NATO command and con-trol. This is partly a reflection of Pactsensitivity to the threat posed by NATO's tacticalstrike aircraft, and the importance the Pactattaches to air superiority in conventional warfare,as well as a desire to limit NATO's capability to.

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escalate the conflict to nuclear war. Suppressionof NATO air defenses by tactical aircraft is con-sidered to be a prerequisite, because--due to thelimited range and payload capabilities of currentFrontal Aviation aircraft--the Pact is forced torely on conventionally armed medium bombers forthe major strike on NATO air bases.

About one third of the LRA medium bombers andone fourth of the tactical attack aircraft wouldbe withheld from the conventional attacks inreadiness to deliver nuclear strikes should theconflict escalate.

In nuclear war, however, the offensive roleof Pact tactical.air forces is of distinctlysecondary importance to the strategic and tacticalmissile forces. In nuclear war, the main functionsof the tactical air forces are to provide airdefense of the ground forces, and deliver nuclearstrikes on mobile targets in the more-immediatecombat zone. Pact planning calls for the airforces to disperse to numerous auxiliary basesto limit the destruction of air units from NATOnuclear -attack.

3. Naval Campaigns

Norwegian Sea-Barents Sea Operations

The objective of forces deployed to theNorwegian Sea is to protect the open path to theBarents Sea. Cruise missile equipped forces arrayedfrom the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap to North Capewould strike intruding task forces simultaneouslywith strikes in the Baltic and Mediterranean andwith the air strikes by Warsaw Pact tactical airforces. Antisubmarine surveillance will probablybe the responsibility of submarine barriers northand south of the Gap while aircraft, surface ships,and other submarines constitute the weapons de-livery forces.

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After the initiation of hostilities someof these forces would move south to attack carriertask forces in the eastern Atlantic. Once theimmediate carrier threat was eliminated, submarinesfrom the Northern Fleet would be assigned interdic-tion roles.

The Northern Fleet amphibious forces wouldconduct small raids against key targets in Norwayin support of Warsaw Pact ground forces in theNATO northern region.

Baltic Sea Operations

After strikes against the West EuropeanNavies, Soviet, Polish, and East German amphibiousforces would combine in an effort to capturestrategic points in the Danish Straits.

North Atlantic Operations

After the carrier strike phase, surveillanceand interdiction forces would move from the Norwegianand Mediterranean Seas into the North Atlantic tointerdict resupply and fleet reinforcement move-ments. Some of the force would soon be affectedby limitations of ordnance, with individual unitsreturning to base for resupply_.---------

Mediterranean-Black Sea Operations

As tension builds prior to hostilities, theconcern of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterraneanwill be location of all Sixth Fleet major combatants--particularly aircraft carriers. Soviet submarineswould probably take barrier stations for earlywarning against both submarine and surface shipsmoving to the eastern Mediterranean. Surfaceships would stalk NATO carriers, and other heavysurface ships, to relay current tactical informationto command authorities.

With the initiation of hostilities, surfaceships, submarines, and possibly aircraft, wouldattack the carrier forces with cruise missiles. Theattack force would select other major surface com-batants and amphibious units for secondary strikes.Soviet and Bulgarian amphibious forces would assistthe ground forces in attempting to take the TurkishStraits.

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4. The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan

The Soviets apparently do not plan to followa series of controlled transitional steps fromconventional warfare through strikes with nuclearweapons of increasingly greater numbers or yieldto general nuclear war. They believe that nuclearwarfare in Europe could not be restricted to theuse of tactical nuclear weapons only and that alimited nuclear response by the Pact to NATO's use oftactical nuclear weapons would offer the Westthe opportunity to deliver first a massive anddecisive strategic nuclear strike. The evidence avail-able suggests, therefore, that the initial Pact .nuclearstrike would be theater-wide and include Soviet strategicnuclear forces based in the USSR as well as forward-based tactical systems. The Soviets do not now have agood capability for graduated or flexibleresponse to any NATO nuclear initiative at a lowlevel--for example, with the use of atomic demolitionmunitions or low-yield nuclear artillery projectiles.

Soviet -and-Pact strategists forsee-thesh ft to nuclear weapons as most likely if:

-- NATO has lost the initiative and lostimportant areas.

-- NATO's main groupings have beendestroyed.

-- NATO counteroperations are weak.

-- NATO perceives that conditions arefavorable for rapid attacks by Pacttroops deep into its own territory.

In sum, Pact strategists apparently plan onthe basis that NATO, if confronted with the pro-bability of defeat by conventional Pact forces,

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{ .

would resort to nuclear weapons. They haveundoubtedly been encouraged in this view by thecontinued stress on nuclear escalation in NATOdoctrine and exercises. Beating NATO to thenuclear punch, therefore, is not only regarded asmilitarily advantageous but also as potentiallydecisive. On the other hand, they may alsoconsider that the initial use by NATO of tacticalnuclear weapons may be constrained by politicalconsiderations. DIA believes that with the presentimbalance of conventional forces in Europe theSoviets almost certainly would not initiate the useof nuclear weapons in a conflict between NATO andthe Pact except possibly for preemption if they areconvinced that NATO intends. to employ such weapons.They would prefer to bring such a conflict to asuccessful conclusion by conventional means alone.Nevertheless, they will maintain and perhaps improvetheir theater nuclear capabilities as a deterrentto the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons byNATO.

Issues:

-- So-viet Response °to NATO Use of NuclearWeapons -- If NATO uses tactical nuclear weaponsagainst Warsaw Pact forces in Europe there is arisk that the Soviets would, in fact, follow thedoctrine outlined in their exercises and respondwith a massive theater-wide nuclear strike. Itmust be remembered, however, that this doctrine,whatever its military value, is subject to reviewand approval by the political leadership. Infact, only the leadership can make the decision tolaunch such a strike. Nevertheless, Soviet militarydoctrine, as perceived from analysis of classifieddocuments and military exercises, and publicdeclaratory policy continue to reject the conceptof graduated nuclear warfare.

The public stance of Soviet officials onsuch a strategy is well known and may be intendedat least partially for political effect. It canreasonably be argued, however, that the Sovietreluctance to entertain the notion of graduatednuclear warfare reflects a deep-seated skepticismthat such a strategy would produce the restrainedresponse it is designed to elicit.

Among possible Soviet political motives forrejecting the concept of a graduated nuclearstrategy may simply be a reluctance to ascribe any

validity to what is widely known to be NATO'sstrategy for war in Europe. By the same token,rejecting the concept of even the limited use of

nuclear weapons may be intended to reinforce the

"unthinkability" of nuclear warfare. Beyond theseconsiderations may be a calculated effort to makea decision by NATO to introduce nuclear weapons intoa conflict all the more onerous.

Fear of raising doubts about the credibilityof the Soviet nuclear umbrella for Eastern Europemay also account for the Soviet reluctance toentertain the notion of gradual nuclear escalation.Soviet endorsement of such a policy could raisesuspicions in Warsaw Pact councils that the USSRwas opting for a strategy that would avoid de-vastation of its own territory if war broke outin Europe. Similar considerations were a factorin France's decision to reexamine.its rolewithin NATO and develop its own nuclear deterrent.

Another possible explanation for the Soviet-attitude toward a graduated nuclear- _strategy_ mayhinge on the difficulty of reconciling the notionof restraint, which is implicit in such a strategy,with the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Dis-courses by Soviet military theorists on the natureof nuclear wars generally stress the uncompromisingmanner in which they will be fought and suggestthat their outcomes will not be decided short ofthe destruction of one of the opposing sides.Furthermore, the Soviet definition of what wouldconstitute targets in a nuclear war containslittle indication that restraint would bepracticed. Targets are said to be any instal-lation that would contribute to an enemy's abilityto fight, a definition which could include nearlyall significant population centers since theirdestruction would have a serious demoralizingeffect.

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Probably the overriding consideration in theSoviet stand on nuclear escalation is a funda-mental skepticism that a graduated nuclear strategyis feasible. Given the general lack of experienceamong nations in nuclear warfare, the Soviets mayfeel that once nuclear weapons are used, even ona limited scale, a psychological barrier iscrossed beyond which human behavior becomes un-predictable. The Soviets may feel that thepressures on political leaders from the militaryand possibly the general public to respond force-fully and without restraint would likely be thesame regardless of the weight of an aggressor'sattack or the targeting concepts he employed.

The Soviets apparently also believe that therequisites for implementing a graduated nuclearstrategy--the ability to discern between varyingnuclear weapons yields and to determine whatconstitutes a strategic or tactical target--aretoo esoteric to be appreciated outside a narrowgroup of specialists. In a commentary on nuclear

-escalation in the--July -1969 issue of--the-Soviet--classified journal Military Thou ht, Major GeneralZemskov, its editor in chief, cite variousWestern testimony which he said "convincingly"demonstrated the unreality of such a strategy.In one instance Zemskov referred specifically to aBritish press article of early 1969 which arguedthat the only valid distinction with respect tonuclear weapons was between their use and nonuse.Targeting Warsaw with a tactical rather.thanstrategic nuclear weapon, the article contended,is a distinction that would be lost on the Poles.

Finally, there is probably a belief in Moscowthat a graduated, or limited, nuclear strategy doesnot have any validity in the European context. Inanother commentary on nuclear escalation in anearlier issue of Military Thought, Army General S.Ivanov professed that for the thickly populated

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regions of Europe, .the employment of only tacticalnuclear weapons will also spell complete catas-trophe. Ivanov, who is commandant of the Sovietgeneral staff academy, also characterized anotheraspect of graduated nuclear strategy--use ofselected nuclear strikes to demonstrate resolve--as a concept that is valid only in a theoreticalsense.

Feasibility of Soviet Preemptive Strike --

Some evidence is available which suggests thatPact planners feel they would receive timelywarning of NATO's preparations to use nuclear weapons.During NATO exercises, the Pact has interceptedrequests by NATO commanders for permission to usenuclear weapons, has monitored authorizations re-leasing them for use, and has identified thedelivery systems to be used. These intelligencecapabilities may attest to Pact confidence in theability to preempt NATO since such indicators wouldbe essential to any calculation of the odds forsuccessfully executing a preemptive strategy.

The Questions of the Use of NuclearWeapons at Sea -- The issue is whether the Sovietswould restrict the use of tactical nuclear weapons. . ..-to the sea war without introducing them into theground war. The Soviets could introduce tacticalnuclear weapons into naval combat at almost. anystage. Information on Soviet planning in this con-tingency is lacking.

Soviet Response to Advanced Buildup ofWestern Europe -- Western nations might commencethe buildup of NATO forces faster and earlier thananticipated by the Soviets. The Soviets, underthese circumstances, might question their plansfor a quick and decisive thrust against NATO. TheSoviets could respond with a blockade or an inter-diction campaign to prevent materiel from reachingEurope, to preserve the pre-crisis Soviet advantage.Alternatively, the Soviets could seize the initiativeby beginning ground, air, and naval operationssimultaneously, before the advantage shifted.

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The Interdiction of Oil Shipping fromthe Persian Gulf -- During NATO-Warsaw Pacthostilities, supplies for Western Europe would bethreatened by Soviet submarines. The issue iswhether the Soviets would allocate a part of theirforce to undertake a major effort to interdict theflow of crude oil from the Persian Gulf.

Other Issues:

-- Capacity of Pact to effectively employmasses of tanks and the vulnerability of Pact tanksto NATO anti-tank systems. If NATO succeeded inblunting Pact armored thrusts, would the Pact re-sort to first use of nuclear weapons to achievebreakthroughs or maintain the tempo and momentumof the campaign?

-- Implications of success or failure ofthe initial Pact air operations for NATO.If the air operation failed, would the Pactescalate immediately .to.. theater-wide nuclear war- - -

fare?.

-- To what extent is the vulnerabilityof NATO nuclear forces a consideration in Pactdoctrine for theater nuclear warfare? What wouldbe the effect on this doctrine if NATO reducedthe vulnerability of its tactical nuclear forces?

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HR70-14

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Blank Page

-

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V. TABLES

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II

Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Divisions

Opposite NATO Center Region Divisions Brigades Total

In Eastern Europe Tank MRD ASH ASLD RES Tank Div/Dde

Stationed Soviet

East Germany 10 10 20Poland 2 2Czechoslovakia 2 3 5

Subtotal T3 I3 -7

Indigenous

East Germany 2 4 2 8Poland 5 8 1 1 15Czechoslovakia 5 5 2 12

Subtotal 17 17 T T 2 35Total in Eastorn Europe 26 30 1 1 4

In Westorn USSR

. Baltic MD' 3 33 1 7Belorussian MD 8 2 10Carpathian MD 3 .8 1 - 12

Subtotal TI 13 7 29 .

Total Opposite Center Region .0 3 1 91

Opposite NATO Northern Flank

Leningrad MD 2 6 A - 9Total Opposite Northern Flank 7 T -

Qpposite NATO Southern Flank

In Eastern Europe

Stationed Soviet

Hungary (1)2 2 (3)4BulgariaRomania -.--- -

- - -Subtotal--- -- TTIM - - -- ---- - ------ - 3

Indigenous

Hungary 2 4 6Bulgaria (8)6 (3)5 5 11/5BRomania 2 . 10

Subtotal 2~ (2VM JT 27/5

- In Southwestern USSR

Odessa MD 1 5 1 7Transcaucasus MD (1) (10)11 1 12North Caucasus MD (1) (5)6 - 6

Subtotal (3)T (20)22 2 - -

Total Opposite SouthernFlank .(87 4.2 2 5 5 (55/5)56/5

Soviet Strategic Reserves

Kiev MD 6 4 10Moscow MD 2 3 1 6Ural MD 1 2 3Volga MD 3 3

Total Strategic Reserves P T7 T 77

RES - Reserve DivisionKey: TD - Tank Division Activated on M-Day

MRD - Motorized Rifle Division BDE - brigadeABND - Airborne Division (all Airborne MD - Military District

divisions are strategic reserve . ASLD - Assault Landing Divisionsubordinate to Ministry of Defense)

Data in parenthanco indicate DIA ' differencea uith currant CrA catimaten.

, WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES IN EAST EUROPE

East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania Total

Soviet Indigenous Soviet Indigenous

Tactical Air Forces

Fighter 504(600) 216(220) 108(120) 72(80) 900(1020)

Ftr./Bmr. 324(400) 324(360) 36(40) 72(80) 756(880)

Lt. Bmr. 0 30(30) 60(65) 0 90(95)

Recce. 158(240) 111(150) 12(15) 30(50) 311(455)

TOTAL TAC 986(1240) 681(760) 216(240) 174(210) 2057(2450)

National Air DefenseInterceptors 724(810) 408(490) 1132(1300)

TOTAL AIRCRAFT ' 986(1240) 1402(1570) 210(240) . 582(700) 3163 (3750)

Numbers i'n parentheses indicate total combat aircraft estimated to be operationaZly available (OA).with Pact combat

air unite. They include aircraft with these unite in excess of. the estimated standard unit equipment (UEJ aircraft shown

by the nunbere not in parentheses. The eatra aircraft are believed to be intended to provide ready replacements for wartime

losses as wetl as serving to replace aircraft temporarily inactive due to maintenance or repair.

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t t

C, SOVIET TACTICAL AND LONG RANGC AIR FORCES WEST OF THE URALS

Baltic Belorussia Carpathia Odessa Transcaucasus Kiev Leningrad Moscow Total

Tactical AirForces

Fighter 72(80) 120(140) 72(80) 108(120) 108(120) 72(80) 0(0) 108(150) 660(735)

Ftr./mr. 36(40) 108(120) 108(120) 36(40) 36(40) 0(0) 72(80) 36(40) 432(480)

Lt. Bmr. 90(100) 0(0) 60(70) 0(0) 30 (30) 0(0) 10(10) 0(0) 190(2i0)

) Pecce. 30(45) 30(30) 46(50) 63(65) 62(70) 0(0) 46(50) 62(65) 339(375)

TOTAL TA - 228(265) 258(290) 286(320) 207(225) 236(260) 72(80) 128(140) 206(220) 1621(1800)

Long Range Air Force Northwest Bomber Command Southwest Bomber Command Total

Medium Bombers 350 200 550

!lumbers in parehthsees indicate total combat aircraft estimated to be, operationalZy available (OA) with Pact combat

air unite. They include aircraft with these unite in exaess of the estimated standard unit equipment (UE) aircraft shacMt

ey the nuMbere not in parentheses. The extra aircraft are believed to be intended to provide ready replacemente for Vartime

lcesse as well ae serving to replace aircraft temporarily inactive due to maintenance or repair.

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D. Current Disposition of Naval Forces

Submarines FleetNorthern Baltic Black

Peripheral Strike Nuclear 7 0 0

Peripheral Strike Diesel 13 0 0

Cruise Missile Nuclear 26 0 0

Cruise Missile Diesel 12 2 5

Nuclear Attack 21 0 0

Long Range Diesel Attack 45 4 1

Medium Range Diesel Attack 30 19 17

Short Range Diesel 0 4 5

Grand Total Submarines 154 29 28

Surface Ships

Guided Missile HelicopterShips - - -0 0 2

Missile Cruisers 5 2 4

Cruisers 1 4 6

Missile Destroyers 6 10 16

Destroyers 5 9 11

Destroyer Escorts 28 25 24

Amphibious 18 28 20

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E. Surface Ship and Submarine Availability*

Northern Fleet Baltic Fleet Black Sea Fleet

Helicopter Carriers 0 0 1

Missile Cruisers 4- 5 0- 1 1-3

Cruisers 1 3 4

(t ssile Destroyers 5 5- 6 13

Destroyers 2 6 5-6

Escorts 14-15 13-15 13

SubmarinesNuclear Cruise Missile 15-17 - - -- - - 0 - -- - - 0-- -

Nuclear Torpedo Attack 10-14 0 0Diesel Cruise Missile 6- 7 ,0 0Diesel** Torpedo Attack 25-27 1- 2 0

Relevant Transit Times

Surface Ships andNuclear Submarines-25 kts Diesel Submarines-12 kts

Barents to Southern Norwegian Sea 1-1/2 D 3 D

Barents to West Irish Coast 3 D 6 D-

Sevastople to Kithira 1 D 2 D

* Forces designed for distant operations capable of getting underway within three days.* Long range only.

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F. Soviet Maior Surface Ships and SubmarinesTypically Available by Area Over Time*

Atlantic Ocean Norwegian Sea Mediterranean Seaithin Within Within Within On Within Within

3 Days -7-10 Days 3 Days 7-10 Days 0 Days 3 Days 7-10 Da;

a rface Combatants

Large (In 1 1-2 3- 5 3- 5excess of0,000 tons)

Medium (2,000- 1 .1 10-12 10-12 5-6 12-15 17-2010,000 tons) _ --_

j Escorts 6- 8 6- 8 4-5 4- 8 10-14

Submarines -Nuclear

Cruise IMissile 7- 8 9-10 2- 5 5- 7 1 1 1

Torpedo 9-11 11-15 0- 4 0--4 1 1 1

Diesel

Cruise Missile 2- 4 4- 5 1 1 1

Torpedo 2 15-25 15-40 10-20 8 8 8

This table has not been coordinated witk the Defense IntelZigence Agency.

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G. Naval Aviation

FleetNorthern Baltic Black Sea

Light Bombers 34

Medium Bombers w/asm 66 61 64

Medium Bombers w/o asm 0 49 28

Tankers 21 13 13

Reconnaissance 50 10 -3

ASW-Fixed Wing 52 10 28

ASW-Helicopters 60 40 90

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Navies

Bulgaria E. Germany Poland Romania

Submarines 4 0 4 0

Destroyer 2 2 4 0

Amphibious 0 6 22 0

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S n ____________________