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- - -0HISTORICALCOLLECTIONDIVISION DATE:06-18-2012

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP 5 FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 84

Final Report of the Working Group

THE WARSAW PACT THREAT TO NATO

SR JS 70-3May 1970

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The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO(NSSM-84)

Introduction

This is the final report of Working Group5 of the Interagency Steering Committee forNational Security Study Memorandum 84. PartsI and II, devoted primarily to Warsaw Pactcapabilities and composition, constitute arevision of the First Phase report (SR JS70-2) on the Warsaw Pact threat to NATOissued by the Working Group in February 1970.Part III, which considers contingencies inwhich Pact forces might be used, was issuedas a separate report by the Working Groupin April. Part IV estimates Pact militaryreactions to alternative US-NATO force struc-tures and strategies. A summary of thisfinal report begins on page 5. At the endof the report is a Statistical Annex, orig-inally appended to the First Phase report,containing tables on Warsaw Pact forcestrengths.

Working Group 5 includes representativesof the National Security Council Staff, theDepartment of State, the Office of the Secre-tary of Defense (Systems Analysis) , the Officeof the Secretary of Defense (InternationalSecurity Affairs), the Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.The intelligence data and estimates in thisreport were provided by the Central Intelli-gence Agency (chair), the Defense IntelligenceAgency, and the Bureau of Intelligence andResearch of the Department of State.

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Contents

Page

Summary . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

I. Strategy, Structure, and Posture . . . . 9

Warsaw Pact Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Khrushchev Strategy . . . . . . . . . . 10Military Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Warsaw Pact War Planning . . . . . . . . . 14Nonnuclear Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 19Nuclear Warfare Capability in Europe . . . 22Warsaw Pact Strengths . . . -. . . . . . . . 23Warsaw Pact Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . 24Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

II. Composition of the Forces . . . . . . . . . .31

Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Fronts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Armies and Corps . . . . . . . . . . . 32Divisions . . . . .. . . . . . ..... 33Categories of Readiness . . ...... 34Division Equipment . . . . . . . . . . 35Armlored Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . 36Artillery Support . . . . . . . . . . 37Airborne Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Amphibious Forces . . . . . . . . . .. 39Missile Support . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Tactical Air Support and Theater AirDefense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Frontal Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . 40Ground Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Transport Aviation and Helicopters . . 43Air Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Service Support of Theater Forces . . . . . 46

Naval Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

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Contents(continued)

Page

Mediterranean Sea.. . . . . . . . 49Baltic Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Black Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Theater Forces Facing NATO . . . . . . . . 50

Possible Variations in the War Plan . . . 52

Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

III. Contingencies Leading to NATO - WarsawPact Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Factors Inhibiting Soviet Initiationof Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 55

The China Factor . . . . . . . . . 56The Mediterranean - Middle East

Region . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 57

Possible Contingencies-- -.- --....-. ... .. 57---

Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . 57Miscalculation of Effects of Tension

in Berlin . . . . . . . ....... . . 59The Mediterranean - Middle East

Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

All-Out Attack in the Central Region . . 61

The Case of Nuclear Preemption . . . . . . 62

Surprise Attack With Limited Objectives 63

Capture of West Berlin . ... . . . . . . . 64

Invasion of Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . .. 64

The NATO Extremities . . . . . . . . . . . 65

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Contents(continued)

Page

IV. Warsaw Pact Reactions to AlternativeNATO Postures and Strategies . . . . . . . 67

Factors Bearing on Soviet Planning forTheater Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

The Political Factor . . . . . . . . . 68The Imperial Factor . . . . . . . . . . 69The Bureaucratic Factor . . . . . . . . 69The Economic Factor . . . . . . . . . . 70

Reactions to Alternative US and NATOForce Structures and Strategies . . . . . 71

Continuation of Present Situation 71A Small Cut in US Forces . . . . . . . 72A Larger Cut . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Nuclear Strategy . . . . . . . . . .. 73NATO Time Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Soviet Attitude Toward Use of Force UnderAlternative US and NATO Force Structuresand Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

V. Statistical Annex . . . . . . . . . . . 77

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S ummary

The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armed forces havefour basic military missions on the continent of Europe:

-- To defend the USSR against overt anddirect military threats emanating fromor through the continent of Europe

-- To bring to a favorable conclusionmilitary conflicts which may occur

-- To defend the territories of the WarsawPact member states and to maintain theSoviet hegemony in Eastern Europe

-- To support Soviet political policies inEurope.

The structure, deployment, and state of readinessof Soviet and Pact forces indicate that their missiondoes not presently include either territorial aggran-dizement or the expansion of Soviet influence bymilitary aggression.

Soviet forces, military doctrine, writings, andstatements and the scenarios of military exercisesall indicate that, once hostilities were under way,or appeared inevitable, Warsaw Pact forces wouldseek to take the initiative as early as possiblelaunching a large scale offensive campaign whichwould have as its objective the destruction of NATO'smilitary forces and the occupation of Western Europe.

There is general agreement, both within the USGovernment and throughout the Alliance, on the mainoutlines of the Warsaw Pact threat. In general thePact forces were designed for short duration combatin the wake of strategic nuclear exchange. In addi-tion to their conventional artillery and other arms,they are equipped with a variety of nuclear-capablesystems, including rockets, missiles, and tacticalaircraft. The Soviets have about 630 strategic

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missiles and 595 medium bombers in the western USSRwhose targets are in Western Europe. In addition,Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the SovietNorthern Fleet are,for the most part, also targetedagainst Western Europe. In recent years Sovietstatements and Pact exercises reflect a concern forthe possibility of conventional operations as well,and some steps are being taken to improve Sovietcapabilities for nonnuclear war.

In the main area of possible conflict with NATO--opposite the Central Region--the Pact maintains alarge combat-ready force of about 600,000 men in 52divisions (27 Soviet, 6 East German, 12 Polish, and7 Czechoslovak) and 11,500 tanks supported by about2,800 tactical aircraft. The Pact employs a compre-hensive mobilization system, under which reservistsand trucks are to be taken from the civilian economyto bring reduced strength units up to combat strength.Successful execution of this plan could raise Pactstrength in the Central Region up to about 1,290,000men (60 percent of them Soviet) , -20,000 -tanks, 6,-200conventional artillery pieces, 3,700 combat aircraft,and some 500 nuclear-capable tactical missile androcket launchers. Complete mobilization, deployment,and integration of these forces would almost certainlytake at least three weeks. This process would generateindications to Western intelligence, but an under-standing of ultimate Pact intentions would probablyremain uncertain and might not provide a convincing basisfor NATO mobilization.

In any crisis period which raised the possibilityof war, the Pact would put a high premium upon com-pleting the process of mobilization and reinforcementbefore hostilities began, yet it might be willing,under some circumstances, to attack earlier.

Some analysts believe that limitations in. the Pactlogistic system, such as low ammunition supply ratesand insufficient transport, constitute significantweaknesses. These analysts also regard the Pact asvulnerable to an effective NATO antitank capabilityand to restrictions on Soviet lines of supply. Otheranalysts consider that the evidence on logistic

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weaknesses is inconclusive and that reliance oncivilian resources would not be a significant weak-ness.

Some analysts doubt that East European forceswould prove reliable in a variety of contingencieswhile others consider that the East Europeans wouldbe reliable in most circumstances.

We have considered a number of ways in which theWarsaw Pact might deliberately initiate hostilities,ranging from isolated attacks on NATO extremitiesthrough limited aggression in the Central Region toall-out attack on all NATO fronts. We conclude that,under the present East-West military relationship,the likelihood of a deliberate Pact attack is verylow. It is possible, however, that Pact-NATO hostil-ities might develop in unintended ways, e.g., outof widespread revolts in Eastern Europe.

In considering how the Soviets might react tochanges in NATO force structure. and strategy, wenote that Soviet planning is influenced not onlyby the basic military missions cited earlier, butalso by economic constraints and a certain bureau-cratic resistance to change. In general, Sovietplanning probably would not be highly reactive tochanges on the NATO side.

If the US were to reaffirm roughly its presentdeployments and NATO strategy remained unaltered,the Pact would probably continue at the deliberatepace of recent years with modernization programsdesigned to improve both conventional and nuclearcapabilities. Withdrawals on the order of tenpercent of US forces in Europe would have a negli-gible effect. A larger withdrawal--say on the orderof one-third--would, in the view of some analysts,lead the Soviets to maintain or even step up the paceof their modernization programs in order to gain auseful military advantage. Other analysts believethat the Soviets would probably take the opportunityto level off or reduce these programs in order tomeet other military and civilian priorities.

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Changes in NATO strategy to emphasize theaternuclear warfare or to reduce the 90-day norms forconventional capabilities would reduce the require-ments Moscow now perceives for improving Pact capa-bilities for sustained nonnuclear combat. Other-wise, these changes would not materially affectSoviet force planning, which already rests on adoctrine which assumes nuclear war in the theater.

Implementation of. the force structures and stra-tegies considered in NSSM-84 probably would not sub-stantially alter the Soviet belief that militaryadventures against or all-out attack upon NATO wouldbe a highly dangerous course of action. This is trueeven in the case of US withdrawals down to a levelof, say, 100,000 men in Europe. This case wouldstill require the Soviets to reckon with a substantialchance of nuclear retaliation. More important thanUS deployments, in the USSR's calculations on thismatter, would be its interpretation of overall USbehavior, and the inferences it would draw from thisconcerning US willingness -to-invoke its strategicpower in extreme cases.

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I. Strategy, Structure, and Posture

This section discusses the general considerationsand factors which have shaped the Soviet strategy,military force structure, and posture in Europe andwhich probably will also influence the formation offuture Soviet European strategies and forces. Impli-cations are provided on pages 27-30.

Warsaw Pact Mission

The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armed forceshave four basic military missions on the continentof Europe:

-- To defend the USSR against overt anddirect military threats emanatingfrom or through the continent ofEurope

-- To bring to a favorable conclusionmilitary conflicts which may occur

-- To defend the territories of the War-saw Pact member states and to main-tain the Soviet hegemony in Eastern -- -Europe

-- To support Soviet political policiesin Europe.

The structure, deployment, and state of readinessof Soviet and Pact forces indicate that their missiondoes not presently include either territorial aggran-dizement or the expansion of Soviet influence bymilitary aggression.

The Defense Intelligence Agency agreesgenerally with the conclusion in the aboveparagraph that the Warsaw Pact mission doesnot now include either territorial aggran-dizement or the expansion of Soviet influenceby military means. It is essential to note,however, that the Soviet and Eastern EuropeanPact forces are capable of, and indeed de-signed primarily for, the conduct of offensivemilitary operations in the Central Region ofNATO should a war occur for reasons otherthan deliberate Soviet aggression.

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T

At the end of World War II the USSR found itselfwith massive armed forces deep in Europe, withgreater opportunity for the expansion of Russianinfluence there than had ever been possible underthe tsars. At the beginning of the Fifties theSoviets had realized most of their objectivesin Eastern Europe. Prospects for the expansionof Soviet power and influence elsewhere in Europe,however, had greatly diminished partly because ofthe nuclear monopoly held by the United States andpartly because of an increased resolve on the partof the Western allies and the rapid recovery ofWestern Europe. The main objective remained, ofcourse, the security of the USSR, but now thissecurity was more closely tied to the stability andsecurity of Eastern Europe.

In May 1955, West Germany joined NATO. Inresponse to this event, as well as to provide ameans of furthering Soviet political and militaryobjectives in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact cameinto being on 14 May 1955. As a military alliancethe Pact provided a new means for Soviet controland coordination of bloc military capabilities inpreparation for the execution of the new SovietEuropean strategy--the Khrushchev nuclear strategy.

The Khrushchev Strategy

Around the end of the Fifties the Soviets beganto see war in Europe as nuclear from the outset. Thestrategy of the Khrushchev era called for the rapidexploitation of the initiation of hostilities toachieve long-standing Soviet European objectives. Tothis strategy it made little difference by whom orhow hostilities were initiated.

The Soviet ground and tactical air forces whichevolved in the early Sixties from this doctrine andstrategy were structured to maximize their capabilitiesfor general war and advance swiftly across WesternEurope in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. Theresulting forces had shortcomings for fighting aprotracted, large scale conventional war.

Soviet forces were structured on the concept thata quick war obviated the need for heavy service support,

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o RFT

and the nuclear nature of the war and the fluidity of

the battle required less conventional fire support fromartillery and tactical aircraft. Instead of massedartillery and infantry, nuclear strikes were to creategaps in NATO's defenses and destroy its reserves.Large tank forces would then pass through these gaps

and advance rapidly through Western Europe, bypassingor encircling any remaining NATO forces.

To fit their concepts, the Soviets acceleratedthe mechanization and streamlining process under waysince World War II, discarding the infantry divisions,which had made up the bulk of their theater forces,and much of the massive artillery and tactical airsupport. They substituted a highly mobile forcecomposed essentially of tanks supported by rocketsand missiles with nuclear warheads. In addition theforce had tactical aircraft with good mobility anddispersal characteristics but small payload capacities.By the early Sixties the reorganization was virtuallycomplete.

At that point the Soviets and their Warsaw Pactallies could assemble a heavily armored force of some20,000 tanks opposite NATO's Central Region. Incomparison with previous Soviet concepts this forcehad a low infantry-to-tank-ratio: The infantry thatwas retained was to be mounted in armored personnelcarriers. There was little combat and logistical

support.

The Soviet concept required the motorized infantryto keep pace with the tanks, but most of the armoredpersonnel carriers available were deficient in mobilityand protection for the infantry being transported, andeven these were in short supply. Artillery forceslacked mobility, firepower, and armor for protectionin a fluid tactical situation.

The Soviets evidently had concluded that tanks werethe essential ingredient and that a relatively low infan-try and artillery strength was acceptable. Except forunits already deployed on the frontiers with NATO, thenewly reorganized ground forces relied on mobilizationfrom the civilian economy for most of their cargo trucksand much of the manpower needed to make them ready forcombat.

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Some Soviet military leaders began to question theestablished theater warfare doctrine in the light ofthe condition of mutual deterrence which was thenemerging and US advocacy of the doctrine of flexibleresponse. These Soviet military spokesmen generallyagreed that the war with NATO would not necessarilybe nuclear from the outset, but there was consider-able disagreement over the probable duration of anonnuclear phase of conflict.

Beginning about 1960, the Soviets accelerated theconversion of their East European satellites into ef-fective military allies. The East European armed forces--particularly those of Poland and Czechoslovakia--werebeing organized and equipped to conduct semi-indepen-dent military operations under overall Soviet control.The Soviets probably believed that in the event of aNATO attack these forces--being in the forward areaand capable of quick reaction--could be relied onto fight effectively until the arrival of Soviet rein-forcements. At the least the East Europeans, togetherwith the Soviet forces in the-forward area, could-be - --counted on to take much of the edge off the initialcombat effectiveness of NATO's forces.

Thus the aim of the Soviets was to build up themilitary potential of their allies and at the sametime to realize substantial peacetime economies intheir own forces. In this way they evidently expectedto ensure the:successful defense of their forward areapositions while mobilizing and deploying the largereinforcements which they consider necessary to seizethe initiative and complete the military occupation ofEurope.

Military Posture

Soviet military actions in Europe have, to date,been intended; to preserve the status quo and testWestern will and determination. The present WarsawPact force is:certainly adequate to this task thoughthe force remains postured for the execution of itsbasic military missions.

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The Soviets, however, do not have--and apparentlyhave not sought to posture their theater forces in amanner to provide them with--the capability to over-whelm NATO by attacking without prior buildup. Theyhave relied on strategic warning and a period of in-creasing international tension for the time to buildup sufficient forces to neutralize NATO forces andoccupy Western Europe. They have not provided theirforces in the forward area with the kind of logisticalsupport necessary for a successful offensive acrossWestern Europe. Soviet security depends heavily onlarge semiautonomous East European national armieswhose reliability is uncertain, particularly if usedas striking forces in a Soviet-led aggression.

The Defense Intelligence Agency agreesthat Pact forces currently deployed in theforward area could not "overwhelm NATO" with-out prior buildup. They do, however, con-stitute a very formidable striking force.They could be used offensively either togain limited objectives or to disrupt NATOforces in the Central Region and keep them"off balance" prior to commitment of alarger bloc force with greater overall combatpower. Such an option would most likelyappeal to the Soviets in a crisis situationwhere the advantages of taking direct actionseemed to outweigh the disadvantages offorgoing deliberate pre-preparation of theirforces.

DIA feels that definitive informationis lacking on the order of battle and thefunction of Soviet combat service support.The extensive POL and ammunition storagefacilities throughout Eastern Europe indi-cate that the Soviets should be able tosatisfactorily support the forces currentlydeployed.

DIA further believes that the EasternEuropean countries would be reliable in any

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action where NATO, in particular West Germany,was the aggressor or in any action where theWarsaw Pact was on the offensive, at least inthe early stages of a future conflict.

Despite the defensive nature of their overall mili-tary posture in Europe, the Soviets' forces, militarydoctrine, writings, and statements and the scenariosof their military exercises all indicate that, oncehostilities were under way, or appeared inevitable,the USSR would seek to take the initiative as earlyas possible. Soviet forces would then launch a largescale offensive campaign which would have as its ob-jectives the destruction of NATO's military forcesand the occupation of Western Europe.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feelsthat the Soviet posture in Eastern Europecontains substantial offensive capabilities.Therefore, the Soviet overall military posturecannot be described as either offensive ordefensive.

Soviet strategic planning appears to be premisedon an estimate that the Warsaw Pact holds the advantagein the balance of Warsaw Pact versus NATO -theater forcecapabilities. The Pact leaders apparently believethat, in the event of a conflict in Europe, which maybe conventional at the outset, NATO would resort totactical nuclear weapons rather than suffer totaldefeat. Moreover, the Soviets apparently assumethat a surprise NATO-initiated military action, whiletheoretically possible, is unlikely; they assume thata full NATO offensive against the Pact without strategicwarning is militarily and politically unlikely. TheWarsaw Pact force structure and strategy are positedon the assumption that any major NATO military actionwould be detected in time to permit reaction by WarsawPact forces, perhaps including some preemptive moves.

Warsaw Pact War Planning

Consideration of the organization and deploymentof the Warsaw Pact forces, and of Warsaw Pact mili-tary writings and exercise scenarios, leads to theconclusion that the Soviets have developed a basic

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plan for the conduct of war against NATO. The mainvariable in the execution of the plan, and the onewhich would govern the configuration in which WarsawPact forces would enter combat in the critical CentralRegion, is the timing of the onset of hostilities.

In general, the plan calls for the organization offive Warsaw Pact army groups--called fronts--in twoechelons* opposite NATO's Central Region. During thefirst ten days after the Pact initiated its buildup,only three fronts would actually be available forcombat while the other two were being mobilized andmoved forward from the western USSR. The three forwardfronts would include a central one made up from combat-ready Soviet and East German forces now located inEast Germany, a southern front made up of. Czechoslovakand Soviet forces now in Czechoslovakia, and a northernfront made up initially of Polish forces. .The Sovietand East German forces are combat ready now. However,Polish and Czechoslovak armies and fronts requiresubstantial mobilization.

The units of the two reinforcing fronts from thewestern USSR would have to be filled out with largenumbers of civilian vehicles -and reservists- to -achieve- - --combat strength. To achieve a rapid reinforcement,Soviet plans provide for a piecemeal movement of theseunits as they become available. Some of the combatelements of the reinforcing fronts could arrive inPoland and Czechoslovakia in about five or six daysand all of the divisions could probably arrive in

A "Echelon" has a special meaning in the Soviet viewof military operations. Soviet doctrine envisageslarge groupings of troops deployed behind the frontline or first echelon units and not engaged in combat.This second echelon would be committed only after thefirst echelon forces had been substantially engagedby the enemy. To some extent the second echelon canbe viewed as a reserve, but it is primarily a maneuveringforce, often with predetermined objectives. The Sovietconcept of echelons is applicable at all levels, includingarmy, front, and even theater.

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about ten days. Most of the trucks and a substantialamount of the personnel of the service support organi-zation at front and army level would have to be mobilizedfrom the Soviet economy. It is estimated that thecomplete organization of these two fronts into forcesprepared to conduct a coordinated offensive would almostcertainly take at least three weeks.

When this Warsaw Pact force is assembled its fivefronts would contain about 1,290,000 men (60 percentof them Soviet), 20,000 tanks, 6,200 conventionalartillery pieces, 3,700 combat aircraft, and 500nuclear-capable tactical missile and rocket launchers.

By the end of the first week after a buildup hadbegun the Soviets would probably be in a position--if they chose--to begin introducing more Sovietcombat units into the northern and southern fronts.By this time, effective Soviet command and controlcould be imposed over all the fronts. Even if hostil-ities did not begin until the Soviets' reinforcementwas completed, however, they would probably stillkeep many of the East European forces in the firstechelon while retaining a large-Soviet second echelon.This would tend to ensure the East Europeans' commit-ment to the war since the bulk of Polish, East German,and Czechoslovak forces would be engaged while Sovietcontingents were behind them. Moreover, it wouldpreserve large Soviet uncommitted forces for use inthe main Warsaw Pact westward offensive.

In addition to the forces assigned opposite theCentral Region the Soviets would have a large strategicreserve composed of forces from the Kiyev and MoscowMilitary Districts. The Soviets would probably committhese reserves should serious reverses occur in anyarea but would always first view such commitment inthe light of the situation in the Central Region. Inany case, by definition the strategic reserve would bewithheld from combat at the outset of hostilities andwould be retained in a central location from which itcould be quickly deployed to the important potentialtrouble spots or to exploit favorable opportunities,especially in the Central Region. Soviet forces inHungary could support operations in either the centralarea or in the south.

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E GRT

Much less is known about Soviet planning for cam-paigns outside the Central Region.. Should the Sovietselect to execute the above described buildup againstNATO, they would probably also mobilize their forcesopposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATOfor contingencies in those areas.

On the southern flank only the Bulgarians arelikely to contribute to offensive action. Supportedby the Soviet theater forces from the Odessa MilitaryDistrict, they could launch an offensive against Greeceand European Turkey. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet wouldbe important to such an offensive. The fleet is abalanced force designed to maintain Soviet navalsupremacy in the Black Sea and provide logistic supportfor the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean.This fleet could also support land operations andconduct amphibious assault operations in the BlackSea. Should the Soviets fail to secure the Black Seaexit, they would be unable to reinforce or supportthe Mediterranean Squadron quickly. In any combatsituation with NATO, short of general nuclear war,the Soviet surface forces in the Mediterranean wouldlack air cover and have limited underway replenishmentfacilities. They would seek to attack Western navalforces, particularly aircraft carriers. In addition,the Soviet threat to Western naval forces and sea linesof communication would be enhanced by the difficultiesof detecting Soviet submarines, and by the USSR's capa-bility of bringing more submarines into the Mediterraneanfrom the Atlantic.

Undoubtedly, the territories controlling theentrances to the Baltic and Black seas are desirableprizes in Soviet eyes. Neither, however, would beessential to the success of the main campaign againstthe Central Region. An attack on the Turkish Straits,in particular, would tend to divert Soviet forceswhich might be needed as reserves for the main campaign,but would not be likely to draw substantial NATO forcesaway from the critical Central Region. In the case ofeastern Turkey, the difficulty of mounting a campaign,and the lack of important objectives, suggest that theSoviets would prefer to maintain a threatening stancethere with minimum forces in order to keep Turkishforces in place.

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The Defense Intelligence Agency feelsthat an attack on the Turkish Straits wouldnot tend to divert Soviet forces intended forthe Central Region. The Warsaw Pact hasBulgarian; possibly Romanians and Sovietforces from the Odessa Military District whichcould be employed in an attack in this area.Soviet strategic reserves exist. The Sovietforces in Hungary and the Hungarian forcesalso could be used.

Soviet naval forces in the north pose a major threatto NATO control of the Atlantic. The Northern Fleetis the largest Soviet fleet and the only one of thethree Soviet European fleets with unimpeded access tothe'open ocean. In times of crisis the Soviets wouldseek to augment the Northern Fleet with units fromthe Baltic.

Despite the difficult terrain and climate ofnorthern Norway, a Soviet attack there would bemilitarily feasible

The main objectives of suchan attack wou dbe to take Norway out of NATO andpreclude NATO use of Norwegian territory and, inthe event of prolonged hostilities, to providebases for Soviet naval and air operations.

If the Soviets planned an attack on Norway theymight violate Finnish territory as a means of strengthen-ing and broadening the attack. However, to do so wouldrisk involving both Finland and Sweden and entanglinglarge Soviet forces in Scandinavia.

In the light of the cost weighed against the gainsto be had in Scandinavia, a more reasonable Soviet courseof action would seem to be to attempt to frighten Norwayinto inaction by threats rather than attacks. In anycase, a successful campaign in the NATO Central Regionwould probably put the Soviets in a position to dictatethe fate of Scandinavia without direct use of force.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feelsthat Norway is the key to control of thesea and air routes used by Soviet air andnaval forces to reach the Atlantic. Sovietoccupation of Norway would provide ice-freenaval bases for tactical operations against

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northern Europe and would jeopardize NATO'sability to protect sea lines of communicationsin the Atlantic. In the light of the advan-tages that would accrue to the Soviets it isprobable that they would carry out such anoperation in the event of hostilities withNATO.

The Warsaw Pact planning provides few options withregard to the size of forces, axes of their employment,or the area of the conflict. Specifically, any actionexecuted against any part of NATO for any objective runsthe risk of triggering the full NATO response againstthe Warsaw Pact. In short, no matter how hostilitiesbegin, the Soviets would attempt to develop theirforces in accordance with the basic war plans.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact armed forces are militarilycapable of conducting operations not involving the mainforce of either side. However, a decision to limitoperations would not change the requirement to standready for a full scale NATO response against any or allof the Warsaw Pact area. As a result, the basic WarsawPact force levels, structures, dispositions, or planswould not change substantially should an action occur,be threatened, or be planned on the flanks.

Nonnuclear Capability

"Flexible response" concepts have entered Sovietmilitary doctrine during the past few years. Strate-gic force advocates who in the past have warned thatany conflict with the West would inevitably and quicklyescalate into a general nuclear war are now arguingthat new conventional war options exist because ofthe growing strategic nuclear capability of the, USSR.

The clearest evidence that Soviet thinking hasgone beyond the talking stage and that some modifi-cation in practice of the strict nuclear war doctrinehas already taken place comes from Warsaw Pact exer-cises. In recent years a number of these have followedscenarios which assumed that the war began with a NATOconventional attack. Typically, Warsaw Pact conven-tional-forces would defeat this attack, whereupon NATOwould resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

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~EGR

Then the Warsaw Pact forces, reinforced from the USSRand using nuclear weapons, would launch a counteroffen-sive that would overrun Europe. Earlier exercisessimply depicted an initial nuclear exchange afterwhich surviving Soviet forces achieved victory.

Recent changes in the structure of Soviet forcesare more tangible evidence of Soviet acceptance ofthe possibility of nonnuclear war. Field artilleryin line divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces inGermany (GSFG) has been increased. In the motorizedrifle divisions, 6 152mm howitzers were added to theartillery regiment and 6 122mm howitzers were addedto each motorized rifle regiment--overall a 50-percentincrease in GSFG motorized rifle division artillery.In the tank divisions of GSFG, 18 122mm howitzers wereadded to the division artillery regiment and 6 122mmhowitzers were added to the rifle regiment--overalla 65-percent increase in tank division artillery.In both the motorized rifle and the tank divisionsthe number of multiple rocket launchers was in-creased from 12 to 18, and the FROG battalion ofeach division gained one launcher, raising thetotal number of divisional FROG launchers to 4.

Aside from these artillery increases, however, itis not evident that the Soviets are attempting to re-structure their ground forces to improve their capa-bilities for :a sustained nonnuclear war.

The Soviets have not increased their infantrystrength facing NATO. In fact, the more recent trendsin armored personnel carriers--i.e., the developmentof the BTR-60 PB and the tracked infantry combatvehicle, which carry a single infantry squadin a low-silhouette, tracked, heavily armed, amphibiousarmored vehicle--support that Soviet thinking on in-fantry organization and tactics remains relativelyunchanged since the early Sixties. With this newscale of equipment, infantry combat power will prob-ably increase, but the logistical and service supportburdens imposed by these vehicles will increase as well.

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The Soviets' greatest potential weakness in pro-longed combat is logistic support. For example,although the Soviets have increased the number ofartillery pieces they have not increased their ammuni-tion supply rates, which are low by US standards.

Combat-strength Soviet line divisions carry threedays' supplies for intensive combat, and Soviet fieldarmy mobile reserves amount to about two days' addi-tional supplies per division. Soviet combat unitsthen would be dependent for resupply on the rearservices of the front. Most of the trucks and asubstantial number of personnel of the rear servicesorganization called for in the basic plan must bemobilized. Major elements of the rear serviceswere successfully mobilized and tested during the1968 Czechoslovak crisis, although the total rearservices organization has not been comprehensivelytested.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feelsthat definitive information is Zacking onthe order of battle and the function ofSoviet combat service -support.----The extensivePOL and ammunition storage facilities through-out Eastern Europe indicate that the Sovietsshould be able to satisfactorily support theforces currently deployed.

DIA also believes that there is insuf-ficient substantive intelligence availableto draw the conclusion that the Soviets"have not increased their ammunition supplyrates."

The central and inescapable characteristic ofthe Soviet forces is their superiority in numbersof tanks. Even in a nuclear war, Soviet doctrineprescribes--and the current order of battle wouldreadily permit--the concentration of up to 1,500tanks in a breakthrough zone approximately 40 kilo-meters wide. In a nonnuclear situation, the Soviets

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liGRT

might concentrate that number of tanks on even lessfrontage.

This reliance on armor has resulted in a lowratio of infantry to tanks in the Warsaw Pact forces.In pure numbers, the Soviets and their Polish, EastGerman, and :Czechoslovak allies could assemble some20,000 medium and heavy tanks opposite NATO's CentralRegion and back these up with about 4,000 more instrategic reserves (in the Moscow and Kiyev militarydistricts). This would give them a numerical super-iority in battle tanks over NATO on the order of 3.5to 1. On the other hand, after reinforcement, theWarsaw Pact forces in the Central Region and in thestrategic reserve would have only about 130,000riflemen, which is about the same as NATO has inthe Central Region.

After being reorganized about 1960, the SovietTactical Air Force emphasized qualitative improve-ments in its air defense capabilities and put lessemphasis on the development of nonnuclear groundattack capabilities. Most new aircraft (the MIG-21and the SU-7) were originally designed as interceptors.The use of these aircraft in the ground.attack role-is limited by their small payload capacities (nomore than 4,000 pounds) and short combat radii.The YAK-28 Brewer light bomber, which entered servicein the early' Sixties, also has a small payload capacity(about 3,500 pounds), and it is out of production,with only some 180 deployed. Recently the Soviets haveincreased the survivability of the tactical air forcesby constructing aircraft shelters and by adding SA-3missiles and antiaircraft guns for airfield defense.

Nuclear Warfare Capability in Europe

The Soviets now accept the possibility that aNATO - Warsaw Pact conflict can be fought solely withconventional weapons. The exercise scenarios probablyreflect genuine contingency plans but the nonnuclearphase portrayed has not involved a Warsaw Pact offen-sive of more than a few days. The Soviets apparentlydo not believe that NATO would accept total defeatwithout resort to all available weapons.

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The Soviets have equipped their theater forceswith a variety of nuclear-capable weapon systems,including rockets, missiles, and tactical aircraft.In addition, the Soviets have about 630 strategicmissiles located in the USSR whose targets are almostcertainly in Western Europe. Soviet Long RangeAviation contains a large force of medium rangebombers that would be used for strikes against Western

Europe. The diesel powered ballistic missile sub-marines in the Soviet Northern Fleet are also esti-mated to be tarqeted for the most part against Western

Europe. oes not indicate thetargeting, target priorities, or command and controlprocedures which the Soviets would use in employingthese strategic means of attack in support of oper-

ations in Central or Eastern Europe. (See Table 11,Section V.)

Warsaw Pact Strengths

A major strength of the Warsaw Pact is its capa-bility to rapidly concentrate large, tank-heavy forces

against NATO frontiers. In the main areas of possibleconflict with NATO--opposite the Central Region--theWarsaw Pact maintains a large combat-ready force ofsome 50 divisions with more than 11,500 tanks supportedby about 2,800 tactical aircraft.

In about three weeks the Warsaw Pact could prob-ably build up forces totaling about 33 armies consistingof some 144 divisions against the various NATO frontiers--

about 20 of these armies against NATO's Central Regionalone. These forces would give the Warsaw Pact a tank

superiority over NATO of about three to one.

Valuable practice and training of Pact active andreserve personnel was provided by the 1968 invasion ofCzechoslovakia. During this operation some of the forcesfrom five countries were ultimately deployed. In addi-tion frequent training exercises are conducted by compo-nents of Pact forces in the forward areas geared to war-time contingency plans against NATO. MultinationalPact exercises are also conducted several times a year.

Nearly all Soviet fighter bases in Eastern Europehave hardened shelters for all of their aircraft,

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SECRET,

thereby increasing their chances for survival in theevent of hostilities particularly in conventional war.

The Warsaw Pact fronts have strong organic tacticalnuclear capability. In addition, the Soviets have thecapability to support these fronts with MRBMs, IRBMs,and other strategic weapon systems.. The Soviets alsohave some 250 submarines of all types for use insupport of hostilities in Europe.

Warsaw Pact Weaknesses

Despite the overall numerical superiority of theWarsaw Pact forces available for the Central Region,these forces have some weaknesses and potentialvulnerabilities. Except for the Soviet and EastGerman forces now deployed in the forward area,Warsaw Pact forces would require large numbers ofreservists and civilian trucks to reach combatstrength. These reservists, which would make upthe bulk of the support forces as well as theinfantry, generally lacked training in their wartimeassignments prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.During the crisis, 13 Soviet divisions and some sup-port units were built up to combat strength withreservists. Since the Czechoslovak crisis, however,there has been no indication of an effort to increaseor improve Soviet reservist training. The civiliantrucks lack many of the mechanical capabilities ofmilitary trucks and are less well maintained.

The Defense Intelligence Agency believesthat the discussion given of reserve trainingis highly misleading. The Soviet and EastEuropean countries maintain very extensivepremilitary, active duty, and reserve trainingprograms. The great bulk of the fit youngmen serve two or three years of conscriptduty in the active forces. More than half amillion such men are returned to civilianlife from the services each year. Any ofthose whd had been released from servicewithin the past year or two would be almostimmediately effective in their militaryspecialities--particularly in the infantryand support categories--upon mobilization.

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The amount of reserve refresher traininggiven to men out of the service varies andprobably diminishes as they grow older.Many thousands of reserves receive sometraining with the active forces each year,however. On balance, the ready availabilityof very.large numbers of suitably trainedmen is a Pact strength, not a weakness.

DIA further. believes that the bulk ofthe Pact civilian trucks are comparable inbasic characteristics to their militarycounterparts.

After mobilization, the infantry strength of theWarsaw Pact forces would be light and would includea large proportion of reservists. More than halfthe infantry in the force lacks modern amphibiousarmored personnel carriers (APCs), and some divisionswould have to substitute trucks for APCs.

Soviet tube artillery is towed rather than self-propelled; it is generally lighter in caliber thanNATO artillery and is outranged by some. Soviettechniques for the employment of artillery are notup to those of the US. In Soviet artillery unitsthere is a strong tendency to rely on rigid priorplanning, and they do not practice many of themodern techniques for the massing of fires.

Although the Warsaw Pact would have about 2.5times as many artillery weapons as NATO, includingroughly twice as many guns and howitzers, plannedWarsaw Pact supply rates for artillery are only alittle more than one-third of NATO rates. Takinginto account the weaknesses in Soviet artillerytactics and gunnery techniques, and the Soviets'low ammunition supply rates, it appears that NATOartillery would probably be capable of deliveringa greater overall volume of accurate artillery firethan Warsaw Pact artillery.

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SwT

The Defense Intelligence Agency does notconcur that all the views represented arePact weaknesses. To do so would force oneto believe that the Soviets have not givencareful thought to the manner in which theyhave organized and equipped their forces forany future combat. DIA also believes thatthere is insufficient substantive intelligenceavailable to draw the conclusion that theSoviets have not increased their ammunitionsupply rates.

The need to sustain a force of 20,000 tanks plannedfor employment in the Central Region in intensive combatover great distances will surely tax the limited logis-tics capability of the Pact. Warsaw Pact forces wouldbe vulnerable to a combination of effective antiarmorwarfare tactics, forces, and weapons and successfulinterdiction of the logistic system.

The Defense Intelligence Agency believesthat the large number of tanks in the Pactforce is a strength, not a source of weak-ness. Any logistics limitations are, in fact,a function of the number of tanks to be em-ployed. This would be accounted for in plan-ning by the Soviets and it is unlikely thatthey intend to employ more tanks than theycan -effectively support. Further, even inthe initial phase of operations, all the tankswill not be engaged continuously in "intensivecombat," but rather, at times, also at "average"or even "Zow" combat levels. Whether or notthey range over "great distances" will dependon the logistics support available as well ascombat success. DIA agrees that "Pact forces

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would be vulnerable to a combination of effec-tive antiarmor warfare... and successful in-terdiction of the logistic system," but thisis a vulnerability that is contingent uponuncertain NATO capabilities and not a Pactweakness.

Implications

The present posture of Warsaw Pact forces intendedfor employment against NATO is essentially defensive.This is evidenced by the structure, disposition, andstate of readiness of Pact forces both in the forwardareas and in the western USSR. However, Warsaw Pacttactical doctrine emphasizes offensive operations and,once hostilities began in the Central Region or appearedinevitable, the Soviets would probably attempt to seizethe initiative as soon as possible and launch a largescale offensive.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feels thatWarsaw Pact forces cannot be categorized aseither offensive. or defensive because theSoviet posture in Eastern Europe contains sub-stantial offensive capabilities.

Without reinforcement, the forward elements ofthe Warsaw Pact forces are not capable of overwhelmingNATO in the Central Region. To ensure success, theSoviets would probably judge it mandatory to completethe mobilization and assembly of the bulk of all fivefronts in the forward area before launching an attack.This process would almost certainly take at least threeweeks and be identified by NATO.

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The Defense Intelligence Agency agreesthat "without reinforcement, the forwardelements of the Warsaw Pact are not capableof overwhelming NATO in the Central Region,"in the full meaning of the term "overwhelm."The forward deployed Pact forces could,however, launch a powerful attack, achievesignificant penetration, and maintain for-ward tactical momentum until additionalforces were brought up. This attack couldoccur with Zittle or no prior detectionby NATO.

Additionally, the Pact could increasethe strength of the forces in the forwardarea without eliciting a reaction by theWest by disguising their reinforcementin the form of an exercise or they couldprepare forces in the western edge of theUSSR for rapid reinforcement with littlechance of detection. Nevertheless, theSoviets could not have high confidencethat their plans would go undetected orthat they could overrun NATO withoutmobilization.

In the Soviet view, the forces of the WarsawPact are not intended for a surprise general offen-sive. They are designed to resist any NATO militaryinitiative while being reinforced, and to counterwith a force capable of neutralizing NATO militarycapabilities and securing the continent of Europe.The Pact forces are intended to execute this missionwhatever the broader world military situation, whichmay or may not include general war.

To achieve their objectives, the Soviets have abasic war plan for the employment of Warsaw Pact

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forces against NATO. This plan provides, after mo-bilization and reinforcement, for employing fivefronts against NATO's Central Region. This align-ment and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact do notexclude the possibility of Soviet military operationsin other areas. However, any such operations wouldhave to take into account the major threat to theWarsaw Pact in .the Central Region. This threat pre-cludes major shifts of Pact reinforcements from theirdesignated areas of employment to other areas.

The Warsaw Pact has vulnerabilities, particularlyin hostilities which extend beyond the period of rela-tively short endurance for which the Pact forces arenow configured. With its heavy dependence on tanks,the Pact would be vulnerable to an effective NATOantitank capability combined with restriction ofSoviet lines of supply. The present posture of theWarsaw Pact necessitates the mobilization and movementof large reserves over-great distances before they canbe committed against NATO.

The Defense Intelligence Agency does notbelieve that the capabilities of Pact forcesare of "short endurance." Rather, theircapabilities would grow steadily as they drawupon their extensive reserves of manpower andequipment and take advantage of their directoverland access to the battle area.

Moreover, the configuration of thepresent forces, which gives rise to thejudgment in the paragraph above, would bedrastically altered with mobilization. Inparticular, the current "low" infantry-to-tank ratio and the relatively "limited"rear services (logistics) apparatus wouldbe steadily overcome as these would be

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precisely the areas of greatest emphasis formobiZization.

DIA questions whether the "heavy dependence"of the Pact on tanks makes it vulnerable toantitank warfare. It certainly cannot bepresumed that the Pact would be less vuZ-nerabZe if the attacking force containedless armor. Additionally, DIA believesthat the degree of Pact vulnerability toNATO antitank and interdiction efforts isalmost entirely dependent on NATO capabilitieswhich axse not discussed in this paper.

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II. Composition of the Forces

This section discusses the organization, currentdispositions, and peacetime combat readiness of theWarsaw Pact general-purpose forces facing NATO. Theability of the US intelligence community to estimatethe size and capability of these forces has greatlyimproved over the last three years. New informationfrom a variety of sources and improved methodologyhas enabled a comprehensive reassessment of the capa-bilities and status of the Soviet ground and tacticalair forces which constitute the bulk of the WarsawPact forces available for war in Europe.

Ground Forces

The Soviets maintain a large number of relativelysmall, heavily armored divisions at various levels ofreadiness. For the most part, divisions at the higherlevels of readiness are subordinated to armies (insome cases to corps). In wartime these armies andcorps would be incorporated into the so-called fronts.The combat power of Soviet ground forces is concen-trated in the division to a greater extent than inWestern forces, and the higher Soviet echelons haire- __fewer combat and support units. In general, thelevels of service support are austere.

Fronts

There is no evidence that the Soviets consider anyof their present large theater force commands asfronts--a term apparently reserved for wartime situ-ations. A wartime front would consist of at leastthree ground armies (and/or corps) and a tactical airarmy. It might also include one or more airbornedivisions. In addition, fronts would contain suchnondivisional support as artillery divisions or bri-gades, tactical missile units, air defense missileunits, engineer units, and rear services.

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The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) isvirtually a front in being. Upon mobilization foroperations in Europe, two fronts would probably beformed in the USSR's western military districts (MDs)for reinforcement opposite the Central Region of NATO,and one might be formed in the Odessa MD on the southernflank of NATO.

In wartime, the Soviets would probably establishtheater level headquarters in areas involving more thanone front and/or elements from several types of forces--e.g. theater forces, air defense forces, and strategicattack forces.

Armies and Corps

It is believed that in wartime Soviet groundforces would be deployed and fought primarily asarmies or corps. There are 19 Soviet ground armies;it is expected that additional armies will be formedin the Sino-Soviet border area. Most of the armieswithin the USSR would require mobilization of armylevel support units prior to commitment. The armiesin GSFG, however, are almost certainly combat readyas they now stand.

Soviet armies have from 3 to 5 line divisions andadditional supporting units. These armies are prob-ably intended for commitment with their normallyassigned division structure, but the Soviets havedemonstrated that divisions can be readily trans-ferred among armies if necessary. Armies are nom-inally of two types: the tank army, in which allor a majority of the divisions are tank divisions,and the combined-arms army, in which all or a majorityof the divisions are motorized rifle divisions. Mostarmies now appear to be of the combined-arms type.

Soviet armies have rather light combat support.Typical of army level combat support units are: anartillery brigade (54 guns); a Scud missile brigade(6 or 9 launchers); an air defense missile regiment;

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a signal regiment; engineer bridging and assault rivercrossing units. The inclusion of such units in thevarious armies apparently depends upon wartime missionsand peacetime readiness levels. For example, in GSFGone, possibly two, of the five armies lack an artillerybrigade. The army troops of Soviet armies in the GSFGrange from 9,000 to 12,000 men.

There are a dozen or so Soviet corps headquarters.They do not represent an intermediate echelon betweendivision and army headquarters. In most cases theyfunction as small army headquarters. They have fewnondivisional support units, sometimes none. Threeof the five divisions now deployed in Czechoslovakiaare subordinated to a corps heaquarters.

Divisions

The Soviets now have a total of at least 157 linedivisons of three different types: 97 motorized rifle,53 tank, and 7 airborne. On the basis of the avail-ability of forces, some 30 divisions of this totalare intended to confront NATO in the event hostilitiesbegan before Warsaw Pact mobilization.

The Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions arebasically designed for combat of. short duration on anuclear battlefield. They have a very high proportionof tanks to personnel, and when fully equipped withvehicles they have excellent tactical mobility. Toachieve these characteristics the Soviets have sacri-ficed staying power to some extent. The divisionsare apparently designed to fight until relieved byfresh divisions.

East European line divisions are generally pat-terned on the Soviet model, although there are sub-stantial variations in some countries. In general,East European field armies do not exist as separateentities in peacetime, but East European groundforces conduct army level exercises, and some frontlevel elements probably exist in peacetime. Inwartime, armies would be formed during mobilization

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from staff elements and units of the territorialmilitary commands. They would contain from 3 to5 divisions and combat and service support units,and would be similar to the Soviet combined-arms armies.

Categories of Readiness

Soviet ground divisions vary widely in terms ofpeacetime personnel strength, levels of major itemsof equipment on hand, and modernity of equipment.They also vary as to the extent and type of trainingconducted. Available evidence on Soviet divisionsprovides a reiasonably firm basis for estimating equip-ment levels and the extent of training activity.Information on personnel strengths is less complete.It is believed, however, that there is a relationshipbetween equipment and personnel levels.

Despite considerable variation, Soviet divisionsfall into three general groupings consistent with thestates of readiness described in Soviet militarywritings. Divisions stationed in areas where fillerpersonnel and equipment are not readily available,such as those in Eastern Europe and some of those inthe Sino-Soviet border area, probably have all oralmost all of, their equipment and personnel. Theseven Soviet airborne divisions are probably equippedand manned at the same general levels. These divi-sions are essentially combat ready as they stand.These are designated Category I.

Also designated Category I are a number of divi-sions located in the western USSR which can be readiedfor commitment very quickly. They are not manned andequipped at the same high levels as those describedabove, but can be fleshed out with specified localreservists and 400 to 600 civilian vehicles and bemade ready to move within a day or two, thus meetingthe criteria for a high state of readiness. Thesedivisions have 75 to 80 percent of their equipment onhand. Their personnel strengths probably range aroundtwo-thirds of the level found in divisions in the GSFG,

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but with considerable variation among divisions. Per-sonnel strengths would tend to be higher in subordi-nate tank units and lower in motorized rifle units.

The second major grouping consists of divisionshaving about 45 to 65 percent of their equipment.Their personnel strengths vary considerably, probablyranging from about one-quarter to one-half of GSFGlevels. These divisions could be filled up with re-servists, augmented with up to 1,300 civilian vehicles,and deployed within several days to a week. These aredesignated Category II.

There are some Soviet divisions with even lessequipment than Category II divisions. They probablycontain about 1,000 men each, primarily an officercadre and enlisted caretaker elements. They appearto be intended for later mobilization, and probablycould not be equipped like other Soviet divisionswithout increased new production. These are desig-nated Category III or cadre divisions.

Few, if any, of the East European divisions aremaintained at full strength during peacetime. Thebest of these would contain 10 to 20 percent reservistsafter mobilization. Some of the lower-strength andnewly activated units would require 50 to 80 percentreservists as fillers. Like the Soviets, the EastEuropeans would require significant numbers of re-servists in order to form army and front level units.

Division Equipment

The Soviet motorized rifle division (MRD) at fullstrength has about 10,000 men and about 2,450 majoritems of equipment. The equipment includes 186 mediumtanks, 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 72artillery pieces. The Soviet tank division at fullstrength has about 8,000 men and 2,300 major items ofequipment, including 310 medium tanks, 80 APCs, and60 artillery pieces. Soviet airborne divisions haveabout 6,000 men and 1,000 major items of equipment.

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A few tank divisions have previously been carriedas "heavy tank divisions." These were smaller (lackinga motorized rifle regiment) and contained heavy tanks(T-10 and JS-3). Heavy tanks are still observed insome tank divisions, but it is not certain now whethera "heavy tank division" exists as a separate type.

Soviet divisions inside the USSR, with the ex-ception of those along the Sino-Soviet border, areprobably not as generously equipped with new modelequipment as those in GSFG. There is, however, noapparent uniform distribution of new equipment. Newmodels of armored vehicles have been detected in somedivisions of each category, but a Carpathian MD Cate-gory I division which participated in the invasion ofCzechoslovakia lacked antitank guided missiles andwas short of APCs. (After it became part of theoccupation force, these deficiencies were corrected.)Two Category II divisions mobilized at the time ofthe invasion had few or no APCs. On the other hand,one division from the Baltic MD was fully equippedwith the newest Soviet medium tank, the T-62.

Armored Vehicles

By far the predominant feature of Soviet groundforce equipment is the tank. The Soviets would requireover 34,000 medium tanks to equip all categories ofdivisions fully. Even a modest estimate of tanks notin divisionswould raise this number to over 35,000.Large scale and continuous peacetime tank productionwould be necessary to meet these requirements and tomaintain a modernization program. It is believedthat the annual production of T-54 and T-55 modelmedium tanks through 1968 was adequate to provide acurrent inventory of about 24,000 of these tanks andto account for Soviet exports to other countries. Thenewest medium tank, the T-62, has been produced at amore moderate pace; about 6,500 are probably now ininventory. The remaining requirement (about 4,500tanks) appears to have been met at least to some ex-tent by the use of older model tanks and assault guns.No large reserves of Soviet tanks are known to exist.

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Soviet tactical doctrine calls for the mountingof all infantry in amphibious APCs, preferably on thebasis of one per squad--this would require about 37,000vehicles. To equip all Soviet forces with APCs on thelesser scale evident in GSFG, the Soviets would requirean inventory of about 26,000 such vehicles. Analysisindicates that there are about 16,000 APCs in theSoviet inventory, fewer than half of which are newamphibious models (BTR-50 and BTR-60). The rest areolder model BTR-152s and BTR-40s which are essentiallynonamphibious armored trucks with relatively poorcross-country mobility. Some APCs are found in divisionsat all levels of readiness, but in general Category Idivisions in the USSR probably have fewer APCs (andolder models) than found in GSFG divisions. ManyCategory II divisions probably depend primarily onusing mobilized civilian trucks for personnel carriers.

Artillery Support

A high density of tanks provides Soviet ground.forces with very heavy direct fire support. Soviet ca-pabilities to provide continuous indirect fire supportare less impressive. One common Soviet practice de-signed to compensate for -this-is-the-use of tanks toprovide indirect fire support from defilade positions.The emphasis on tank fire is fully consistent withSoviet concepts of ground force operations in the nu-clear environment.

Recent changes in Soviet artillery strength in theGSFG have resulted in an overall increase of 480 inthe number of guns available. In addition, there hasbeen a 50-percent increase in the number of multiplerocket launchers. These increases have probably alsooccurred in some of the forces along the Sino-Sovietborder, but there is no evidence of them in otherground forces elsewhere in the USSR. These develop-ments improve the capabilities of the ground forcesfor conventional operations. All Soviet tube artilleryis towed rather than self-propelled. It is generallylighter in caliber than NATO artillery and is out-ranged by some.

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Soviet techniques for the employment of artilleryare not up to those of the US. There is a strong ten-dency for Soviet artillery to rely on rigid prior.planning. The Soviets do not practice many of themodern techniques for the massing of fires. Muchof the recentiincrease in Soviet field artilleryresults from increased organic artillery in motorizedinfantry regiments.

Airborne Forces

The Soviets have seven airborne divisions, all underthe direct control of the Ministry of Defense. Five ofthese seven divisions are available for early commitmentagainst NATO.. These airborne divisions, which are prob-ably combat ready, have about 6,000 men and 1,000 majoritems of equipment.

There are now as many as 975 medium transportsassigned to military transport units, of which about800 are AN-12 Cubs. Some 725 to 750 of the latterprovide the main intertheater lift for theater forcesand have as a main mission the support of airbornetroops. These could lift assault elements of two air-borne divisions for airdrop to a radius of about 950nautical miles. . Some Cubs have improved range andweight-carrying capabilities; 350 of these could liftabout 5,000 paratroops with supporting equipment to aradius of about 1,500 nm, or a maximum range of 2,800 nm.In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmentedby other military transport and by medium and long rangeaircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

Only one East European member of the Warsaw Pact--Poland--has an airborne division. The Polish airbornedivision, however, is about two-thirds the size of aSoviet airborne division and the Poles must rely onSoviet military air transports to lift the entiredivision at one time.

Czechoslovakia has one 1,800- to 2,000-man airbornebrigade subordinate to its Ministry of Defense, plus aseparate Special Forces type airborne regiment sub-ordinate to the Military Intelligence Section of the

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General Staff. This regiment is intended for covertoperations in enemy rear areas. Czechoslovakia hassome organic airborne transports, but relies onSoviet transports to lift its entire brigade. Romaniahas one 1,300-man Parachute Regiment; Bulgaria andEast Germany each have a single battalion of about 400men and Hungary has an airborne training unit.

Amphibious Forces

There are currently about 14,000 men in the Sovietnaval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, withtwo brigades located in the Baltic Fleet, two in theBlack Sea Fleet, two in the Pacific Fleet, and onein the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missionsare apparently to assist in seizing critical beach-heads and to conduct diversionary operations on theseaward flank. A small force of naval infantry hasbeen present from time to time in the Mediterraneansince June 1967; they have conducted several landingexercises. The current small number of landing shipsin each of the fleet areas restricts the landing forceto battalion or brigade size.

Poland also has an amphibious landing force. This

force of about 3,700 men consists of three regiments(two operational and one trai-ning-) and-one medium tankbattalion, and one two-launcher FROG (free rocketover ground) section. Poland's 22 Polnocny classLSMs and 38 LCPs could transport about one regimentin an assault landing.

Missile Support

The general support. tactical ballistic missileis the Scud, which is allocated to army and frontechelons of organization. It is believed there areabout 40 Scud brigades in the USSR and in the GSFG.In the GSFG, each army is believed to have one 9-launcher brigade. There are probably two largerbrigades (up to 12 launchers) subordinate to GSFGHeadquarters. Ground forces in the USSR probablyhave about the same level of Scud support as in theGSFG.

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Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe haveFROG battalions probably with four launchers each.Category I and II divisions within the USSR are be-lieved to have three FROG launchers; Category IIIdivisions may have two launchers each.

Soviet ground commanders have long complained ofthe lack of a tactical missile system with the rangeand mobility suited to the needs of the front. TheSoviets have developed a missile, the SS-12, whichcan meet these needs: it is estimated to be capableof carrying a 1,500-pound warhead to a range of 500nautical miles. There is no evidence, however, thatthe SS-12 missile is deployed with the ground forces.

The SS-12 is believed to be carried by the Scale-board transporter-erector-launcher. Scaleboard unitsare probably under the control of the Strategic RocketForces rather than the ground forces. It is likely,however, that Scaleboard would be used in support oftheater operations if required. This is especiallytrue in the Sino-Soviet border area, where Sovietground forces cannot call upon the heavy missilesupport from medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. (IRBMs)available in the west. There may also be some mobileShaddock cruise-missile units which could provide ad-ditional front level support.

The Soviets have conventional high explosive war-heads for Frogs and Scuds, but there is little evi-dence indicating the numbers of such warheads availableor their tactical use. These warheads probably nowinclude someiof the high fragmentation, improvedconventional munitions type. This type of warheadfor FROGs and Scuds would greatly improve theireffectiveness for nonnuclear operations.

Tactical Air Support and Theater Air Defense

Frontal Aviation

The mission of the Soviet Tactical Aviation--alsocalled "Aviation of the Front"--is to support thetheater/front commander. The functions of Tactical

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Aviation include air superiority operations, closeair support and interdiction in conjunction withground force operations, strikes against targets ofstrategic importance to the front, and air defenseof the theater of operations. Tactical Aviation alsoprovides reconnaissance support and operations, and.some air transportation. The air elements to performthese functions are organized into tactical air armies(TAAs), which in wartime are assigned to fronts.

The 14 identified TAAs vary greatly in size andcomposition. The largest is the 24th TAA, deployedin East Germany. It is estimated to have about 730combat aircraft, 10 percent fewer than last year.This reduction is due to last year's withdrawal ofBrewer-equipped light bomber units to the USSR. Anew air army has probably been created in the Trans-Baikal-Mongolia area since 1966; it now contains about310 combat aircraft. The other air armies in theFar East have been strengthened also. The additionalaircraft were drawn primarily from reserves.

Tactical Aviation is now composed largely offighter aircraft. It is estimated that there noware about 1,600 fighters in regiments whose primarymission is air defense and 1,100 in regiments whoseprimary mission is ground attack. In addition, thereare about 390 light bombers in strike units and about600 fighter and light bomber types in reconnaissanceand strike reconnaissance units.

There are in addition 200 to 300 older modeltactical aircraft collocated at Tactical Aviationbases. There is some evidence indicating that groundattack r.egiments have 48 fighters instead of the 36currently estimated. If so, this would indicate thatabout half of the collocated aircraft are in fact as-signed to Tactical Aviation. The Soviets continueto maintain a reserve of older aircraft which has beenused to equip new Tactical Aviation units along theSino-Soviet border and for deliveries to other nations,particularly the Arab states. Some of these aircraftare believed to have gone to the Soviet air trainingestablishment, which has been substantially increased.

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Ground Attack

There are about 1,500 fighters and light bombersin Tactical Aviation whose primary function is to per-form close air support, air strike, and interdictionmissions. The capabilities of this force were improvedin recent years through reequipping of fighter unitswith the SU-7 Fitter and light bomber units with theYAK-28 Brewer. However, this reequipment programceased a year or so ago, leaving over half the groundattack/tactical strike force still equipped with theobsolescent MIG-17 Frescos and IL-28 Beagles.

Both the Fresco and the Fitter were designed asinterceptors. Their performance in ground attackroles is characterized by short combat.radii and smallpayloads. Their design and rugged construction, how-ever, make them well suited for operations from unim-proved or improvised airfields. Soviet tactical airdoctrine indicates that ground attack fighters wouldbe rather widely dispersed on unimproved fields andsuitable highway sections 70 to 100 kilometers behindthe front lines. Bomber and reconnaissance regimentswould apparently be deployed 200 to 300 kilometersbehind the front lines.

The Soviet nuclear stockpile includes bombs fordelivery by tactical aircraft. Soviet TacticalAviation can deliver nuclear bombs with both fightersand light bombers. Ground attack fighter regimentsare trained in sophisticated bombing techniques. TheSoviets also have toxic chemical bombs available fortactical use and some aircrews specially trained fortheir delievery. There is no evidence of Soviet useof tactical aircraft for spray dissemination of chemi-cal warfare (CW) agents, but a capability to employthis technique cannot be ruled out. The Soviets havea -variety of conventional munitions for delivery byTactical Aviation, including bombs weighing 550, 1,100,and 2,200 pounds.

Judged in the light of equipment, training, andnormal operations, East European air forces are largelyfor national air defense. Of about 2,500 combat air-craft, almost all are interceptors. The proportion of

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new model aircraft in East European air forces has in-creased from one-quarter last year to one-third nowthrough the delivery of new fighters. Almost allaircraft delivered to the East Europeans during thepast two years have been all-weather MIG-21 Fishbedinterceptors.

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria have groundattack air regiments, but only the Czechs have asignificant number of new model ground attack fighters(SU-7). The Poles have mostly older models in groundattack roles. The Bulgarians have two regiments ofMIG-17s. All East European fighter regiments, however,are cross-trained, probably to about the same extent asSoviet tactical air units.

Transport Aviation and Helicopters

Soviet Tactical Aviation units provide light trooptransport and utility support to the ground forces withabout 250 light and medium transports such as Cab,Crate, and Camp and about 850 helicopters, primarilyHound and Hook. Most of the TAAs have one or moreregiments equipped with helicopters. Over half theregiments have 10 to 15 heavy and 25 to 30 mediumhelicopters.

The Soviets continue to demonstrate a growingappreciation for the tactical employment of armedhelicopters, but there is no evidence that they havedeveloped a helicopter intended specifically forarmed missions. Light and medium helicopters havebeen observed armed with a variety of weapons such asmachine guns, rockets, and antitank guided missiles.

Air Defense

Soviet theater force air defenses in Eastern Europeare coordinated with the national air defenses of theother Warsaw Pact countries and with the air defensesof the USSR. Air defenses of all theater forces wouldprobably act in accordance with the general plans ofthe Soviet Commander of Air Defense until those forceswere committed to ground operations. At that time,control would probably be maintained by the Deputiesfor Air Defense of the major force commanders.

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During the past year, the Soviets have continuedto exhibit major concern for improving their air de-fense posture in the forward area, particularly againstlow-altitude attack. The Soviets have approximately60 radar stations in Eastern Europe, and are continuingto deploy the tower-mounted Squat Eye radar at thosestations. This radar, first observed in 1966, is im-proving the low-altitude surveillance and tracking ca-pability down to 200 to 300 feet. It is possible thatwhere the terrain is suitable this capability is better--perhaps as low as 100 feet. Since 1968 a track-mountedair surveillance radar, Long Track, has also beendeployed in Eastern Europe at Soviet radar stations.Data transmission systems for rapid reporting oftracking information and for ground control of inter-ceptors have probably been widely deployed with Sovietforces in Eastern Europe.

There are about 350 East European radar stations.These stations are equipped with the same types ofradars employed by Soviet forces. Each nation oper-ates its own air warning and control system. It isnot known how warning and control information is co-ordinated among the several East European systemsand those of the Soviet theater forces, but suchcoordination almost certainly exists.

Since 1960 the Soviets have made a substantialqualitative improvement in the air defense elementsof Tactical Aviation. Most of the aircraft deliveredto the force in recent years have been late model,all-weather MIG-21 Fishbeds, which now constitute morethan 85 percent of the aircraft in air defense regi-ments. The Fishbed, a lightweight, ruggedly designed,Mach 2 all-weather interceptor, can also perform theair superiority mission. This aircraft has operatedfor sustained periods from unimproved airfields. Ithas been produced in eight, possibly nine, variants.The latest variant, identified in East Germany, hasimproved payload capabilities and improved air interceptradar.

As in the case of tactical air support aircraft,Soviet tactical air defense fighters can theoreticallysustain a flying rate of four or five sorties per day.

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The principal constraint on sortie rates is pilotfatigue and logistic support. The pilot-to-aircraftratio in air defense regiments is about 1.5 to 1; thelogistic support at permanent improved airfields couldsupport a sortie rate of 4 to 5 per day for at leasta few days. Soviet tactical air defense aircraft weredesigned to operate under the austere conditions of abattlefield environment. The sortie rates of unitsoperating from unimproved airfields would probably below.

Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have about 40SA-2 surface-to-air missile battalions. An SA-2regiment, which usually consists of three battalions,is deployed with the Groups of Soviet Forces inPoland, Hungary, and probably Czechoslovakia. InEast Germany there are 10 SA-2 regiments deployed fordefense of GSFG. In the USSR, there are probably 45to 65 additional SA-2 battalions manned by air de-fense troops of the ground forces. The SA-2 systemdeployed with theater forces has a capability toin_texcept targets

It is used primarily for defense of relatively staticrear area installations, as it is not mobile enoughto provide continuous support to maneuvering troops.

The SA-3 has been deployed in East Europe toprovide low altitude point defense of Soviet tacticalairfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Underfavorable conditions, including optimum acquisition,this system can intercept aircraft at about 500 feetat a range of 2 to 7 nm. Depending on the conditionsof weather, site masking, elevation of the fire con-trol radar, speed and reflective area of the target,the minimum altitude could be as low as 300 feet atranges of 2 to 4 nm.

The Soviets are now deploying the track-mountedSA-4 system into the theater forces. The SA-4 hasbeen identified at training sites in East Germany.The SA-4 has a range of 25 to 30 nm and is believedto be able to engage targets down to about 2,000 feetat shorter ranges.

The Soviets rely heavily on light antiaircraftartillery (AAA) for air defense of ground forces.

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ERT

They have introduced a new radar-controlled, quad-

mounted 23mm weapon, which is carried on a trackedchassis that also mounts the AAA fire control radarGun Dish. Both the Gun Dish and the Flap Wheel(used with 57mm and lower caliber) operate in theX band. The'older Fire Can radar is also still inuse with AAA guns.

In addition to the improvement of their activedefenses, the Soviets have, since mid-1967, engagedin a program to improve the survivability of theirforces, especially in Eastern Europe. Revetmentsand/or hard shelters have been constructed at Sovietradar, command and control, ground and air installa-tions to protect those resources. Camouflaging hasbeen identified at radar sites and airfields.

The Soviets have the capability to jam airborne

radar bombsights and to screen headquarters facilities,troop concentrations, and other critical targets inconjunction with air defense weaponssystemsoner -

tions in the field.

Electronic counter-counter-measures ECCM) capabilities probably have beenincorporated into the Gun Dish and Flap Wheel AAAradars.

Use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) by theSoviets to protect their tactical aircraft has beenof rather limited nature. Generally they use speci-ally fitted ECM aircraft for protection of tacticalstrike lighti bombers against enemy ground-based radarand weapons;. active noise jammers and chaff, includingthe rocket-fired variety constitute the bulk of theirECM equipment. The strike aircraft have ECM equipmentdesigned to defend against enemy fighters. This equip-ment includes an AI radar threat-warning system andchaff dispensers, and possibly jammers. Ground attack

fighters may have cannon shell chaff for use againstground-based fire control radars.

Service Support of Theater Forces

The Soviet system of supply and maintenance support

was designed to support theater forces in the context

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of a brief nuclear war. Mobile stocks of conventionalammunition and fuel at division and army level are ade-quate for about five days of combat. Little is knownof the availability of supplies at front level. TheSoviet resupply system down to front level remainsheavily dependent on the railways. The Soviet main-tenance system is apparently based in large part onminimum peacetime use of essential items of equipment.This equipment is retained as much as possible incovered storage, with wheeled vehicles often up onblocks, combat loaded. Unit maintenance organizationsat all levels are small. The Soviet system wouldprobably be adequate for a brief nuclear war, but itappears less well suited for major conventional oper-ations of long duration.

The rear services of the front are responsiblefor the resupply of tactical air armies as well asthe ground armies. Supply levels at permanent basesof TAAs are probably adequate to suppor't sustainedcombat by air units for about the same duration asis the case with ground armies--i.e. about five days.Resupply after this period would be restricted some-what by the limited availability of transport, par-ticularly fuel trucks and pipeline equipment, atboth front and air army levels. The extensive logis-tical support system which would be required for sus-tained air operations from dispersed unimprovedairfields does not appear to be available in Sovietforces in East Germany.

The general austerity of rear service support hasbeen sharply criticized by Soviet logisticians over thepast several years, and some efforts have been madeto remedy the situation. The fuel supply system hasbeen improved through the introduction of collapsibleportable storage tanks and pipeline units. Thecarrying capacity of general purpose transport hasbeen increased -through the introduction of new heavyduty trucks with four-wheeled trailers. The logisticsload on the railroads has been reduced somewhat bythe introduction of tank transporters, and by theexpansion of the capabilities of transport aviation.

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Naval Forces

In recent years the Soviets have made increasinguse of naval forces for political ends, most notablyin the Mediterranean. With its growing capabilitiesfor long-range operations, the Soviet Navy will bemore in evidence in support of specific politicalobjectives in areas vital to NATO interests. Inaddition, Soviet naval units act as a force in beingcapable of reacting to Western naval forces.

The Soviet concept of general war requires flanksupport for land forces in Europe, and probably forthe seizure of the Black Sea and Baltic Sea exits.

To fulfill naval responsibilities in the defenseof the Soviet homeland, the Soviet Navy has a strongcapability in the immediate offshore areas, and isgradually extending the distance at which it caneffectively conduct operations. By fitting surface-to-air missiles'in its larger ships it has enhanced itscapability to operate beyond the range of shore basedair cover.

The Soviets are deeply concerned with the threatposed by Western carrier stri-ke--forces, -and -arestriving to improve their capabilities in this areaby improving |their early warning and reconnaissancecapabilities and by introducing new sophisticatedweapons systems in submarines and surface units. Inthe Mediterranean, where US carriers are deployed soas to be continually within strike range of the USSR,Soviet policy is to maintain missile armed submarinesand/or surface ships within missile range of the USships.

The Soviets are not now capable of counteringthe threat posed by NATO ballistic missile submarines.However, they are placing considerable emphasis onantisubmarine warfare.

Soviet capabilities against NATO sea lines of com-munications are greatest in the Northeast Atlanticand the Mediterranean and the primary threat to theselines is posed by the Soviet submarine force. It is

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estimated that approximately one-third of the torpedoattack and cruise missile submarines in the NorthernFleet, could be maintained continuously on station,although more could be at sea at any one time.

While the new Soviet ballistic missile submarinesof the Y class will be targeted against the US, olderclasses of ballistic missile submarines will probablybe assigned targets in Western Europe. In addition,cruise missile submarines could attack land targets inWestern Europe, although their primary wartime missionis to seek out and destroy Western naval forces.

East German and Polish naval capabilities continueto improve with the acquisition of more modern equip-ment and the broadening of operational experience, whilethose of Romania and Bulgaria have lagged behind theother Warsaw Pact countries. Warsaw Pact interfleetcoordination has increased, and East European naviesare playing a greater role in Pact naval operations.

Mediterranean Sea

Since 1964 the Soviets have maintained naval vesselsin the Mediterranean. However, lacking adequate aircover, the Soviet squadron is not capable of conductingextended operations against the Western navies. Atthe outset of hostilities, the Soviets would attemptto destroy Western carrier striking forces, and sealoff the Mediterranean from naval reinforcement. Shouldthe Soviets succeed in providing air cover, they couldattempt to seal off the southeastern Mediterraneanbasin.

Baltic Sea

Baltic Warsaw Pact naval forces, in particular thenumerous guided missile patrol boats and the amphibiousforces, pose a threat to NATO control of the BalticSea outlets, and are capable of offensive operationsagainst NATO forces.

Black Sea

Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian naval forces arecapable of supporting land operations against the

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Turkish Straits and of conducting small-scale amphibiouslandings and other operations against the Turkish BlackSea coast.

Theater Forces Facing NATO

Soviet theater force strength in Europe is con-centrated opposite the Central Region of NATO. InEast Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the Sovietsmaintain 27 combat-ready divisions and about 1,100combat aircraft. The East Germans, Poles, and Czechscan provide an additional 25 full strength divisionswithin a day or so of a mobilization order and 1,750combat aircraft immediately.

The Soviets apparently consider remote the like-lihood of a sudden outbreak of hostilities requiringthe Warsaw Pact to fight without reinforcement. Theybase their planning on the assumption of a period ofpre-hostilities tension and mobilization on bothsides, and maintain a large number of divisions inthe border MDs of the USSR which can be mobilizedand readied to move westward quickly. The EastEuropeans model their mobilization system after theSoviet example.

We have good evidence from documents and defectorsabout Warsaw Pact goals for the scope and speed ofreinforcement in Central Europe. According to thisevidence, the Warsaw Pact would seek to confront NATOwith a large force at the outset of hostilities. Wehave no direct evidence as to the total size of sucha force, but on the basis of.availability of forceswe believe it would probably consist of 80 to 90 divi-sions organized into 20 or more armies and five fronts.A major Warsaw Pact goal has been to be able to assemblesuch a force and have it prepared for combat in abouttwo weeks after a mobilization order. The Sovietsand some of their East European allies have vigorouslyattempted toachieve this goal despite limitationson resources available and the political struggles inEastern Europe. By early 1968 they had come closeto reaching that goal.

Prior to the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968,Warsaw Pact planning probably called for the deploy-

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ment of three key first echelon fronts opposite NATOin a matter of a few days. These fronts would havecontained 22 Soviet and 26 East European combat-readydivisions. The central front (the main effort) con-sisting of GSFG and some East German formations wouldhave been complete. The northern and southern frontscomposed primarily of Polish and Czech forces wouldhave lagged behind the central front in the readinessof army and front level support because of the re-quirement for mobilization. Within about 10 days, upto 30 additional divisions drawn from the USSR couldhave been assembled with minimum essential army andfront level support in eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia.These forces would have constituted the two fronts ofa second strategic echelon. Tactical air reinforcementfrom the western USSR would require little if anymobilization, and could be deployed into Eastern Europewithin a matter of hours.

The situation which has evolved since the invasionof Czechoslovakia has probably altered Warsaw Pactreinforcement planning with respect to the Czechfront. For the near term, the Soviets probably donot count on the Czechs to form an effective and re-liable front, although they have not disposed theirdivisions to take over Czech-positions opposite NATO.The Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia--called theCentral Group of Forces (CGF)--are not large enoughto constitute a front; in particular, army and frontlevel support is minimal and combat air support con-sists of only about 85 fighters. In a sudden militaryconfrontation with NATO the Soviets would have torely on the Czechs backed up by the CGF. If the Sovietswere to anticipate a serious military confrontationwith NATO they would probably expedite the forwardmovement of the front from the Carpathian MD toreinforce or take over the southern sector.

In current circumstances, and with speed theprimary requirement, the Warsaw Pact could in abouttwo weeks assemble the key combat elements of fivefronts (including the Czechs) opposing NATO--threein the first echelon and two in the second. Thecomplete integration of divisions into effectivearmies and fronts would require more time. In asituation where offensive capability against NATO

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(rather than maximum speed) was the prime consider-ation, the Soviets would almost certainly take atleast three weeks to complete mobilization and forwarddeployment to concentration areas in Eastern Europe.

The Warsaw Pact countries., including the USSR,evidently intend to begin deploying the ready portionsof their fronts from the interiors of their countriesbefore the whole force is completely mobilized. Theleading elements of the two Soviet fronts from thewestern USSR are expected to arrive in central Polandand Czechoslovakia within three to six days aftermobilization begins. The Soviets anticipate that themain elements of these two fronts could participatein combat operations within two weeks after mobili-zation is ordered.

This plan shifts part of the burden of maintaininglarge combat-ready forces from the USSR to Poland andCzechoslovakia. Of greater importance, the establish-ment of a combat-ready Warsaw Pact force in the forwardarea partially resolves the problem which has facedthe Soviets since the rearming of the West Germansand the formation of NATO: how to provide a defenseof Central Europe with the Soviet forces there untilreinforcements could be brought up some 600 milesfrom the western USSR. Reinforcement is still -con--sidered necessary to provide a force large enoughto ensure seizing the initiative from NATO and mountinga counteroffensive.

Possible Variations in the War Plan

In Warsaw Pact exercises which have rehearsed thewar plan, the Pact's actions always appear to be reac-tions to either an outright attack by NATO forces orto some other NATO military actions which appear topresage a NATO attack. The exercise scenarios usuallyallow for a brief defensive phase during which the Pactcompletes mobilization and reinforcement, after whichthe Pact seizes the initiative and launches an offensive.

If the Soviets were to deliberately initiate afull scale attack on NATO, they would probably makefundamental changes in their contingency plan. Inthat scheme, the East Europeans provide 60 percentof the first echelon forces. If the Soviets were toundertake a deliberate aggression, they would probably

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not be willing to rely on Poland and East Germany tofurnish so large a proportion of the striking force.They would almost certainly not depend on the Czech-oslovak Army, which was seriously demoralized by theSoviet intervention of August 1968 and by the sub-sequent purges and manpower reductions. Rather, theSoviets would probably incorporate substantial Sovietcombat elements into both the Czechoslovak and Polishfronts, and would probably impose direct Soviet commandand control over all fronts. Even if hostilities didnot begin before the Soviet reinforcement was completed,however, they would probably keep many of the EastEuropean forces in the first echelon while retaining alarge Soviet second echelon. This would tend toensure East European commitment to the war sincethe bulk of Polish, East German, and Czechoslovakforces would be engaged while Soviet contingentswere behind them.

The Soviets would have to take into account thatthe massive mobilization and large troop movementswhich such a scheme would necessitate prior to hos-tilities would greatly increase the likelihood ofearly detection by NATO of their reinforcement. Theywould probably assume that this would increase therisk of a preemptive NATO attack in which--if nuclearweapons were employed--forward--deployment would be - -

severely hampered.

The war plan outlined on pages 14 through 19,with minor variations, is the only one practiced inWarsaw Pact exercises. If a plan for initiating anunprovoked attack exists, it would probably not berehearsed overtly. Major variations in the opera-tional use of forces--particularly variations em-phasizing the maximum initial use of Soviet forces--might appear in an exercise with a disguised aggressionscenario. This has apparently not happened in anyof the exercises so far.

Mobilization

The Soviet conscription and reserve system pro-vides more than adequate total numbers of relativelyyoung. reservists to flesh out all divisions. However,in the interests of speed of mobilization, the combatunits draw their reservists from the civilian popula-tion in the immediate vicinity of their peacetime

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garrisons. These reservists are designated by nameby the voyenkomats (local military committees). Asa result, quickly mobilized Soviet units would probablycontain some enlisted reservists in older age groups.

The Soviet reserve system calls for frequentmobilization exercises and periods of active dutyfor reservists. If the practice in one Category Idivision is typical, however, it appears that suchexercises are infrequent and reservist training prob-ably consists; of lectures to reserve officers. Thereis some evidence that lessons learned from mobilizationfor the invasion of Czechoslovakia have prompted newemphasis on practice mobilization and reserve training.

The Soviet mobilization system can probably fleshout all divisions except Category III within a fewdays of a mobilization order and have them ready tomove. In situations where speed of reinforcement isthe overriding factor, mobilized divisions would bedeployed regardless of their equipment status.

The Soviets rely on a well organized system formobilizing civilian motor transport to offset theshortage of general purpose trucks in the groundforces. Portions of Soviet city motor pools are ear-marked for military use. Trucks and buses manned byreservists are formed into military transport columnswhich report to nearby divisions upon mobilization,where they are reassigned to various units. Most ofthese trucks -probably serve as logistic supportvehicles, but some are used in place of APCs. Armyand front level truck transport units are probablymobilized similarly. The biggest drawback to thissystem is that, on the whole, the mobilized trucksare not well suited for military use, particularlywith regard to off-road mobility.

The Soviets also plan to draw directly from thecivilian economy other types of supporting units,e.g., engineer construction, railroad, signal, andmedical units. They apparently do not count on quickmobilization of new units requiring a high degree ofspecialized military training, such as Tactical Avi-ation and missile units, although there is probablya fairly large pool of trained personnel to serve asfillers and replacements for standing units.

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III. Contingencies Leading to NATO - WarsawPact Hostilities

This section discusses contingencies in whichNATO - Warsaw Pact hostilities might arise, theirrelative likelihood, and various actions the Pactcould undertake on its own initiative.

Factors Inhibiting Soviet Initiation of Hostilities

In the mind of the Communist leadership, thepreservation of the Soviet state enjoys a priorityfar exceeding all other interests. During the post-Stalin period, the successive leaderships have givenevery indication of a belief that, in the nuclearage, general war would pose the gravest risks to thisobjective.

This is not to say that Soviet policy has notbeen aggressive during this period, or that the USSRhas not sought to use the weight of its militarypower to alter the status quo in its favor. But theUSSR has periodically been aggressive, not in themilitary risks which it was willing to run, but ratherin its probing to calculate exactly what-military-risks would be involved in. any contemplated advance.In West Berlin, despite Khrushchev's repeated pro-fessions of disbelief that the US would go to warover the city's fate, the USSR eventually backed offfrom its ultimatum without putting this propositionto the test. In the Cuban missile crisis, he retreat-ed when he discovered that he had miscalculated andthat holding to his intended course would involveappreciable military risks. During the six-day Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the USSR was careful to avoidmilitary risks.

Barring the advent of a highly irrational leader-ship--and unless the USSR comes to underestimatethe determination of the US to defend its interests--this pattern of behavior will probably continue.This presumes a continuation of an East-West stra-tegic relationship which denies Moscow the certaintythat the USSR could escape unacceptable damage in

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general war. It also presumes that situations willnot develop which appear to the Soviet leaders topresent grave external threats to their system.

The China Factor

Sino-Soviet hostility is an additional factorwhich tends to reduce the likelihood of Soviet de-liberate attack or of Soviet escalation of conflictswhich might arise by accident. Moscow is highlysensitive to the possibility of Chinese pressuresin general and to Chinese exploitation of Soviettroubles in Europe or, particularly, in relations withthe US.

Reliable intelligence information indicates theSoviet leaders concluded in mid-1969 that, in viewof the Chinese problem, it would be best for themto take a cautious approach in dealing with the USand to avoid an increase in tensions in Europe. Whilethe degree of Sino-Soviet hostility may fluctuateover the coming decade, a substantial and durableimprovement is unlikely. Indeed, Soviet distrustof China will probably deepen as the Chinese acquirenuclear delivery capabilities against the USSR.

The USSR now has about 30 divisions deployed inthe military districts bordering China, and some ofthese could be moved westward to meet contingenciesinvolving NATO. Given the distances involved, how-ever, and the availability of low-strength divisionsin the western USSR which could be mobilized--pluswhat the USSR would probably see as an increase,during a period of European tension or combat, inthe dangers from China against which these forcesare intended to guard--the Soviets probably wouldnot make such redeployments. Air units might betransferred at some stage, particularly if combatin the West turned out to be both intense and pro-longed. Similarly, unless the USSR faced prolongedground combat with China, it would not reduce itsforces earmarked for the Central Front for the pur-pose of reinforcing against China.

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The Mediterranean - Middle East Region

In recent years, the Soviets have expanded theirinfluence in the Mediterranean - Middle East region.However, the USSR's concerns there are less importantthan its vital interests in Eastern Europe, itsdispute with China, and its basic relations withthe West. The Soviet leaders wish to avoid a seriousconfrontation with the West and probably considerthat preserving their position in the Mediterranean -Middle East region would not be worth the seriousrisk of nuclear war.

Possible Contingencies

The following contingencies are highly unlikelyto arise primarily for the reasons discussed above.The ones which have the most plausibility are thosearising in circumstances which are not under completeSoviet control.

Eastern Europe

Postwar Soviet behavior has made it clear thatthe USSR is willing to use military force againstserious threats to its position-in-the-Communist - --states of Eastern Europe, as was reflected in theso-called "Brezhnev doctrine." One way, therefore,in which hostilities between Warsaw Pact and NATOforces could arise is as a spillover from large-scalerevolts in Eastern Europe. Large-scale revolts aredefined as uprisings which are sustained for at leasta week, an assumption which requires that the localEast European armed forces either stand aside oractually participate against Soviet forces. Theforce of nationalism in the area, the vicissitudesto which Communist parties are subject, and the ca-pacity of the Soviet leaders for mismanagement aresuch that revolts of this kind in one or severalEast European countries must be considered among thepossibilities of the Seventies.

At the outset the USSR would make every effortto confine the fighting within the country or countriesinvolved, and NATO presumably would avoid intervention.

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But if those East Europeans opposing the Sovietscame to believe that their only chance of victorylay in involving the West in the fighting, they wouldtry to provoke an expansion of the conflict--eventhough Western nonintervention in previous instances,for example East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956,and Czechoslovakia in 1968, would argue against thistactic. The chance of expansion would be greatestif the fighting were centered in East Germany, whichwould tempt West German intervention. Further analysis,therefore, is confined to this case.

This cantingency might arise suddenly, catchingthe USSR unprepared. It is more likely, however, tobe the culmination of a period of ferment and tension.This could give the USSR time, if it chose, to mobi-lize the fqrces assigned to the Central Region inwar planning.

In the contingency of large-scale revolt which,among other things, found the East German army stand-ing aside or opposing Soviet forces--the contingencymost likely to spill over into the West--some membersof the Working Group believe that the other EastEuropean farces in the Central Region could probablybecome almost totally unreliable for use against NATO.Other members feel that in certain cases these forceswould be reliable--for example, Polish forces incontingencies which raised the specter of East Germany'sreunification with West Germany.

The size of the force--out of the total of 53Soviet and 33 East European divisions earmarked forthe Central Region*--which would be available foruse against NATO in these circumstances would dependnot only upon the reliability of the East Europeans,but also on such unpredictable factors as the scaleof the revolt, the degree of real or threatened op-position being offered by the East European forces,

* This does not include the USSR's strategic reserveof 16 divisions and the forces in Hungary (6 Hungarianand 4 Soviet divisions).

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the usability of Polish and Czechoslovak territoryfor reinforcement from the western USSR, and thedegree of prior Soviet mobilization.

Miscalculation of Effects of Tension in Berlin

Berlin has been frequently harassed during theentire post-blockade period without any serious mis-calculation occurring, a fact which strongly arguesthat the USSR has devised elaborate procedures com-parable to those of the West to maintain constantand close control over these matters. These pro-cedures are probably sufficient to check unintendedescalation. Nevertheless, it remains possible thatmajor combat could develop in an unintended fashionover Berlin (the case of a deliberate Communist take-over of West Berlin is considered on page 64).

Although such a contingency might develop slowly,providing considerable time for mobilization, it isnot certain that the USSR would mobilize. By defini-tion, it would not be expecting hostilities, and itcould count on its overwhelming local superiorityin the Berlin area in case of miscalculation. Mo-bilization might be forgone, therefore, on the groundsthat it would needlessly raise tensions and provokeNATO mobilization. Thus a war arising from miscal-culation over Berlin might find the Central Regionof the Warsaw Pact fully mobilized, partially mobilized,or not mobilized.*

At the ontset, the Soviets would probably try tokeep the conflict limited. So long as they did so,they probably would not employ any East Europeanforces except those of East Germany. We expect thatthe East German forces would be reliable at the out-set; their ultimate reliability would depend on thecourse of the battle and, in particular, on whetherthey engaged West German forces.

* That is, anywhere between the present strength ofabout 50 combat-ready divisions and the mobilizedstrength of about 85 divisions.

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The Mediterranean - Middle East Region

The relationship of this area, and particularlythe Middle tast, to the defense of NATO is complexand not completely defined. If the Arab-Israeliconflict escalated and came to involve the US and theUSSR, this would not be, strictly speaking, a NATOmatter (although the outcome could have significantimplications for NATO). But such a great-power in-volvement might include naval hostilities in theMediterranean, and this would tend to engage NATO,even though certain of the European members wouldresist this tendency.

Both the US and the USSR are deeply involved inthe Middle East and specifically in the Arab-Israelidispute. Each operates naval forces in the easternMediterranean where, unlike areas ashore, there isno demarcation line tending to maintain the separationof forces. Should large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilitiesbe renewed, and if they were more prolonged than onprevious occasions, both the US and the USSR mightfind themselves drawn into a situation which--similarto that which could result from large-scale revoltin Eastern Europe or a miscalculation over Berlin--would not be under their full control. Thus militarysituations involving the US and the Soviets couldarise out of existing conditions in the Mediterraneanand represent plausible contingencies.

In the case of struggle or imminent hostilitiesbetween rival Arab groups, Moscow might try to movein troops, perhaps in an effort to preempt Westernintervention. At present the Soviets have a limitedcapability for rapid intervention. The estimated 300to 500 naval infantry troops with the MediterraneanSquadron could make a token landing against littleor light opposition (but not against the defense theIsraelis could muster). The Soviets could move ina larger force rapidly by air from the USSR, butthis would entail problems of overflight and air cover.

The Soviet leaders would be reluctant to committheir armed forces for such operations in the Medi-terranean area. Coups in the Middle East normally

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happen too fast for intervention by outside powersto be decisive. Further, the Soviets do not desireto entangle themselves in inter-Arab strife, partic-ularly if they might end up on the losing side. How-

" ever, the presence of even an inferior Soviet forcecould inhibit Western freedom of action in such sit-uations.

Although there may be intermittent acts of violenceoccurring in Cyprus, it is highly unlikely that suchviolence would cause the Soviets to intervene withmilitary air or naval forces. The continuation ofthe communal talks, the desire of both communitiesfor peace, the bilateral efforts of Greece and Turkeyto improve their relations, plus the efforts of NATOand the UN seem to be mitigating factors to any con-tingency that might be exploited by the Soviets,especially through their use of airborne or navalforces.

If the talks for any reason are broken off, orif- they end in a clear failure leaving an unsettledsituation, it is foreseeable that pressures coulddevelop on both sides in favor of a new attempt toimpose a solution unilaterally. Such an attemptwould revive the danger of a Greek-Turkish war. Aproblem might then be created for NATO and othersand possibly set the stage for exploitation by theSoviets. In such circumstances, while the Sovietswould attempt to influence the outcome of the event,they are not likely to push to the point of a probableor inevitable confrontation with the West.

All-Out Attack in the Central Region

In Part I of this report we describe how theSoviets plan to prepare for war in the Central Regionand review Soviet expectations of a period of ten-sion during which mobilization would occur. Thisplan calls for the assembly of three forward frontsand two reinforcing fronts which would contain about1,290,000 men (60 percent of them Soviet), 20,000tanks, 6,200 conventional artillery pieces, 3,700combat aircraft, and some 500 nuclear-capable tacticalmissile and rocket launchers. Under this plan, optionsfor conventional and nuclear fighting are available.

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The Soviets. have never undertaken full mobiliza-tion in peacetime, and they recognize that it wouldbe costly, would raise tensions, and might set inmotion a train of actions and reactions which couldincrease the risks of miscalculation. Nevertheless,it is possible that they might undertake it at somefuture time if they thought that, in this way, theycould force political concessions from the West with-out actually; going to war. If in these circumstancesmiscalculation did propel the two alliances intoconflict, and if no way were found to terminate hos-tilities quickly, the Warsaw Pact plan for the conductof the war probably would be that described above;any mobilization and reinforcement not completedby this time would be rushed to completion.

The Case of Nuclear Preemption

Because qeneral nuclear war is highly unlikelyto occur as 'the result of deliberate, preplannedSoviet initiative, Soviet nuclear preemption againstEurope is not plausible unless it is part of an es-calatory situation in which survival of the SovietUnion is at stake. In the circumstances of mutualmobilization amid rising tensions, however, the USSRmight become uncertain about whether NATO was aboutto go to war. This could lead the Soviet leadersto consider the option of a nuclear preemptive attackdesigned to gain the advantages of a first strike.

Soviet "preemption" in this report is definedas an attack undertaken because of a belief that anenemy attack threatening the existence of the USSRhas become imminent and certain. If the Sovietscame to this belief, they would have to considerwhether to strike at European NATO alone or at theUS as well. Including the US in the attack wouldreduce the weight of retaliation, but the USSR couldhave no hope that it would escape retaliation al-together. It might see a hope that nuclear preemptionagainst European NATO alone would not inevitably bringon full retaliation against the Soviet homeland.

If the Soviet leaders acted on this calculation,the forces available for a preemptive nuclear attack

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include, besides those described above, 630 strategicmissile launchers in the western USSR, almost 600medium bombers deployed at Long Range Air Force basesin this region, and 16 diesel ballistic missile sub-marines (46 launchers) in the Soviet Northern Fleet.

Surprise Attack With Limited Objectives

Using forces in being, and avoiding any precedingperiod of tension, the Warsaw Pact could stage asurprise conventional attack in the Central Region.This could be aimed at occupying a part or all ofWest Germany. A small amount of mobilization, limitedto that which the Soviets felt confident would notbe detected by NATO, might precede such an attack.By definition, there would be no warning.

Such attacks in the Central Region would beplausible only in special circumstances, quite dif-ferent from those which presently obtain. If theSoviet leaders were convinced that the US nuclearguarantee had been so deeply eroded that the risksof immediate or eventual nuclear war were negligible,and if they believed that NATO had become so demoralizedthat a shock of this kind would complete the disin-tegration of the alliance-, they-might undertake this--course of action. Even in these circumstances, how-ever, they might equally well forbear on the groundsthat political evolution in Western Europe was al-ready proceeding rapidly in a direction highly favor-able to their interests.

If they undertook such an attack, the Sovietswould probably not include East German forces amongthe invaders, out of concern that pre-attack secrecymight be compromised and that the East Germans mightprove unreliable in an offensive role against WestGermany.

If the attack were aimed at overrunning only thenorthern part of West Germany, the USSR would have tolimit the size of the attacking force in order toavoid troop movements which might compromise secrecyand to maintain a strong posture against possibleNATO reactions. Probably the Soviets would not commit

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more than half of the 20 divisions in GSFG to anattack limited in this fashion.

Capture of. West Berlin

Drawing upon its forces already in East Germany,the USSR could overrun West Berlin. Moving withappropriate stealth, the Soviets could enjoy all ofthe advantages of surprise in such an action.

Moscow has long had this capability but has neverchosen to exercise it. Indeed, occupation of WestBerlin has not been a goal of Soviet Berlin policy.Rather than run the risks of war which taking WestBerlin would entail, the Soviets have preferred toexperiment from time to time with varying degreesof pressure in an effort to divide the Federal Re-public of Germany and the three Western Allies. TheSoviets found in pressure and harassment--and thethreat of a separate peace treaty which would turncontrol oflaccess over to the East German regime--vehicles for playing upon Berlin's vulnerabilitiesin a manner which allowed for maximum control overthe potential risks involved.

For the present, the Soviets evidently believethat refraining from pressure on Berlin--in particularon Allied access--avoids the kind of challenge towhich a unifying Western response would be likely.The Soviets might at some time in the future returnto pressure tactics on Berlin--indeed, the incidentsof delay of convoys in 1963 illustrated how, evenin a period of detente, a minor access crisis coulddevelop rapidly. But it seems unlikely that, inthe absence of wider hostilities, the calculus ofthe undesirability of direct military action to takeWest Berlin would change.

Invasion of Yugoslavia

A Warsaw Pact invasion of Yugoslavia would prob-ably produce early successes in the northern plainsand prolonged guerrilla-type warfare in the mountainousregions. NATO might become involved.

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Such an invasion is highly unlikely at presentbut might become conceivable under the followingcircumstances: Yugoslav revisionism proves so at-tractive as to cause serious strains in EasternEurope; Tito's death produces deep internal divisions;the Soviets believe that significant Yugoslavianmilitary and political elements would collaboratewith them; or the Soviets are confident NATO willnot intervene.

The chances of detecting at least some of theSoviet preparations appear good. The attack probablywould be preceded by a period of overt politicaltension. Mobilization of the necessary forces andtheir deployment to the Yugoslav border would probablyextend over several weeks. Movement into the Medi-terranean of the additional naval forces needed toimpose an effective blockade of the Yugoslav coastwould be detected. It would be in the Yugoslav in-terest to pass to the US indications of impendingattack. While preparations would thus be evident,it is doubtful that precise Soviet intentions ortiming would be known in advance.

For the initial phase, the Soviets, with Bulgarianand Hungarian participation-,-would -probably employ -some six or eight armies containing 25 to 30 divisionsand 300,000 to 400,000 men. To assemble this force,some Soviet forces normally earmarked for commitmentto the Central Region would have to be shifted south-ward in numbers which would weaken Soviet reinforce-ment capabilities opposite NATO.

The NATO Extremities

In northern Norway, Thrace, and eastern Turkeythe borders are well defined, and large militaryunits are not positioned directly on the borders.Serious incidents suggesting a potential for accidentalwar have not occurred in recent years, and in allthree locales accidental war appears to be a highlyunlikely contingency.

Opposite northern Norway, the Soviets maintainone combat-ready division and could mobilize two

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more within about five days. Opposite eastern Turkeyis the Transcaucasus Military District, which containstwo combat-ready divisions and an additional sevendivisions which could be brought up to strength withinabout five days. Against Thrace is the Bulgarianarmy, containing five motorized rifle divisions, fivetank brigades, and three training units; the OdessaMilitary District, which would provide reinforcements,contains four divisions which could be brought up tostrength in about ten days. Further substantialreinforcement of any of these potential theaters,without at the same time weakening Warsaw Pact capa-bilities in the Central Region, would require themobilization of low-strength Category III divisionsfrom interior military districts of the USSR. Somemembers of the Working Group believe that the forcesin the Moscow and Kiyev military districts--oneCategory I and 15 Category II divisions--would beavailable for these contingencies, while other mem-bers believe that the USSR would judge it necessary,in these circumstances, to retain them for possibleuse in the Central Region.

For substantially the same reasons as apply tothe case of limited surprise attack in the CentralRegion, deliberate Warsaw Pact-attacks -in these---- - -areas, in the absence of hostilities in the CentralRegion, appear to be highly unlikely contingencies.The USSR would recognize that such attacks could setin motion a train of events which would seriouslyincrease the chances of nuclear war. The advantagesof conquering eastern Turkey are, from the Sovietstandpoint, obscure and probably not worth much, ifany, increase in risks. Northern Norway and Thracehave strategic importance, but for this very reasonthe risks incurred by an invasion in these areaswould be even higher.

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IV. Warsaw Pact Reactions to AlternativeNATO Postures and Strategies

This section discusses the possible reactionsof Soviet military planners to various assumptionsabout US and NATO force structures and strategiesand postulates the ways the USSR might alter itsmilitary forces in response to NATO changes.

Factors Bearing on Soviet Planning for Theater Forces*

A number of factors shape Soviet planning ofWarsaw Pact theater forces, which are an integratedset of strategic and general purpose forces.

-- Pact forces as a whole are intended to becapable of defending the area againstNATO forces.

-- They are also intended to bring to a favor-able conclusion, if possible, any militaryconflict which may occur.

-- Soviet forces in particular are also intendedto maintain the Soviet political hold on theother states in the alliance.

-- By virtue of the military threat which theypose, these forces are intended to supportthe expansion of Soviet political influencein Western Europe.

-- Economic constraints limit the size of Soviettheater forces opposite NATO, which mustcompete for resources not only with civilianneeds, but with other military requirementssuch as strategic forces and the buildup inthe Far East.

*Because the USSR is dominant in the Warsaw Pact,overall Pact planning is discussed in terms of Sovietcalculations and decisions.

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s ,

-- Soviet policy toward these forces has longbeen marked by prudence, caution, andbureaucratic resistance to change.

The military factors are discussed at lengthin Parts I and II of this report. This sectionconsiders the other factors in Soviet militaryplanning.

The Political Factor

The pressure exerted on Western Europe by theweight of Warsaw Pact forces is a gross pressure.Defense ministries in the NATO countries are con-cerned with particular aspects of Warsaw Pact capa-bilities and vulnerabilities, but these have noreal effect on the overall political pressure whichthese forces exert in Western Europe by virtue, notonly of their size, but of the reminders furnishedby periodic exercises. With hundreds of strategicnuclear missiles deployed against them, WesternEuropeans are not likely to become more or lessresistant to Soviet demands in response to changesin such matters as ground force equipment or reorgani-zations of divisional structure on the enemy side.

On the other hand, the Soviets do have the optionof making large-scale unilateral withdrawals in theirforces in Eastern Europe as part of a vigorous effortto promote detente. This tactic might commend itselfto Moscow on the grounds that it would undermine thesense of threat which holds NATO together, encouragecuts in West European defense budgets, and promotelarge-scale US withdrawals in turn. The USSR wouldrecognize that, in the event of a crisis, it wouldenjoy an advantage in returning forces, to the area.

There are a number of disadvantages, however, tothe USSR in such a move. Several of them, such asconcern for stability in Eastern Europe and inertiaand vested interests within the Soviet bureaucracy,are discussed below. In addition, it is uncharac-teristic of Soviet policy to make a major concessionwhich could not be reversed without some cost, inhopes of precipitating a greater concession from the

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opponent. The Soviet tendency is to hold what onehas and demand what the enemy has. For these reasons,the USSR is not likely to make unilateral withdrawalson any significant scale. If they did adopt thiskind of tactic, it would most likely be. on a smallscale, as in 1964 when they made token reductionsin the GSFG.

The Imperial Factor

What the Soviets might regard as their militaryrequirement for preserving their position in EasternEurope has never been determined, apart from the re-quirements posed by the confrontation with NATO.Soviet rule in Eastern Europe in the Seventies islikely to become harder rather than easier as nationalself-confidence and national discontents both grow.If this does not happen, however, and if East-Westrelations develop in a way which diminishes the re-quirement for forward deployments against NATO, theUSSR might believe that it could maintain the poli-tical integrity of the Warsaw Pact in peacetime withforces significantly less than the current levels inEastern Europe.*

The Bureaucratic Factor

The Soviet Union is a highly bureaucratizedstructure, and those who wish to advance within itfind it best to practice caution, prudence, andadherence to formalized procedures rather thaninitiative and imagination. The military is notexempt from this tradition, particularly in thefield of theater forces, where the changeover of

*Some notion of what the Soviets might consider inthis vein can be gotten from historical data. TheUSSR in earlier years used to propose reductions offoreign forces in Germany by one-third. More recently,the Soviets tolerated a temporary drawdown from theGSFG during the CzechosZovak crisis. Eight divisionswere dispatched to Czechoslovakia, but some four otherswere brought in as replacements.

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generations since World War II has been slower thanin other industrialized countries. This factorsuggests that substantial changes in force planningare not easy to coordinate through the Soviet bureau-cracy and that the Soviet defense establishment isnot well suited to quick reactions to external changes.

The Economic Factor

It is clear that the Soviet economy has been ex-periencing increasing difficulties in recent years.It is also clear that the present leadership is evenless willing than Khrushchev was to deny militaryrequests for expenditures. In fact, this is amongthe factors contributing to the USSR's current eco-nomic problems.

Estimates of total Soviet spending on defenseand space show a 25 percent rise in the last fiveyears--from 17.6 billion rubles in 1965 to over 22billion 1970.* Expenditures for the general purposeforces, the largest major force element in moneyterms, have been rising more slowly, increasing 7percent in the same period to about 6 billion rublesin 1970. Soviet general purpose forces oppositeNATO now account for roughly two-thirds of totalgeneral purpose force spending. This share is de-clining slowly as the buildup in the Far East pro-ceeds.

Increased resources for general purpose forceswill be made available by the overall growth of theeconomy, and possibly by savings derived from astrategic arms control agreement as well. On theother hand, the civilian economy will be a majorclaimant for higher allocations and, even withinthe general purpose forces, those facing Chinawill continue to compete with those facing NATO.

*This includes all outlays for personnel and otheroperating costs; investment for all hardware andfacilities; military research, development, testing,and evaluation; and all space programs.

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Under present circumstances, the Soviets probablyplan for no more than a continued gradual rise inspending for the forces facing NATO.

The foregoing discussion indicates that thesize and structure of NATO forces are, for Sovietplanners, only one element in a rather complexequation. By the same token, any changes on theNATO side will be only one factor in Soviet con-sideration of possible changes in the size andstructure of the Warsaw Pact. The following sec-tions discuss the ways and extent to which the USSRmight alter these forces in response to NATO changesand how such NATO changes might affect Soviet con-siderations about the actual use of military force.

Reactions to Alternative US and NATO Force Structuresand Strategies

Continuation of Present Situation

There is little reliable evidence about Sovietpolicy decisions for the future of Warsaw Pact forces,and current problems concerning China- and -East Europeanreliability add to the-uncertainties. There are no in-dications, however, -that major changes in doctrine orstrength are impending. If they perceive substantiallythe same threat from NATO as before, the Sovietswould be expected to continue the major trends ofrecent years--stability in the overall size of forcesfacing NATO, coupled with improvement of both conven-tional and nuclear capabilities. Given probablecontinued constraints on large expenditure increasesin this area, equipment programs are likely to proceedat the deliberate pace of recent years. For example:

-- About one-third of the Soviets' ground forcesand two-thirds of their tactical air forces werereequipped during the past ten years.

-- Increases in the equipment levels have occurredthrough organizational changes in recent yearsand have included a 50-percent increase in con-ventional artillery pieces and multiple rocketlaunchers and a one-third increase in nuclear-capable tactical rockets in the Soviet divisionsin East Germany and in a few divisions in theUSSR.

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-- Logistic capabilities have been propor-tionally increased to the extent that thepreviously established supply rate can bemaintained for the expanded artillery force.

The Soviets will probably continue their equip-ment modernization over the next decade. The in-creases in atillery and multiple rocket launcherswill probably be extended to all first-line divisionsin the USSR, and the logistic needs generated bythese increases can be expected to be met throughreequipment df transportation units. Although someSoviet divisions will receive a new infantry combatvehicle, they probably will not completely meet theirrequirements in APCs. In addition, a fighter withsignificantly improved ground attack capabilitieswill probably be added to the tactical air inventory.Soviet tactical aviation will decrease in numbersover the next ten years, although its capabilitieswill improve |as new equipment is acquired.

A Small Cut in US Forces - . -**---

In the case of a reduction of US forces inEurope on the order of 10 percent, the Soviets prob-ably would not believe that the situation had changedsufficiently to require them to alter their ownforce planning. Out of prudence, they would beprone to credit Western statements about maintainingthe efficiendly of the force and about capabilitiesfor rapid reinforcement from the US mainland.

A Larger Cut

A greater decrease in US deployments in Europe--on the order of one-third--would have more signifi-cance for Soviet planners. The Soviets would seea diminution in NATO capabilities, the more so ifthe reduction were not accompanied by substantialimprovements in US capabilities for return to thetheater. Their reaction would also be influenced,however, accdrding to whether West Germany alsoreduced its forces.

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The USSR would perceive in this situation twodifferent opportunities--to substantially enhancethe relative military position of the Warsaw Pact,or to make some reduction in their own militaryeffort.

Some analysts believe that they would choosethe former course, maintaining or even increasingthe pace of their modernization program with theintention of gaining a military advantage whichwould be useful in peacetime as well as importantin wartime.

Other analysts believe that, in this circum-stance of a diminished NATO threat, competingmilitary and civilian priorities would lead theSoviets to level off or even reduce their expen-ditures on Central Region forces.

All agree that, if the Soviets chose thislatter course, they would be concerned that earlyor large withdrawals would arouse unhealthy expec-tations and aspirations in Eastern Europe, andthat Moscow would therefore proceed in a cautious,step-by-step fashion. Ultimately, Warsaw Pactwithdrawals accomplished in this manner would prob-ably be less than proportional to the US withdrawals.

Nuclear Strategy

The Soviets would probably see in any of thedeeper cuts an implicit reversal in NATO's strategicthinking--that is, a veering away from conventionaloptions and toward greater and earlier reliance onnuclear weapons. This would be true even in thecase of a relatively small (125,000 men) US groundforce which was explicitly designed to improve con-ventional capabilities. It would be most clearlyperceived in the case of a very small US ground force(50,000 men, for example) whose function would belargely custody of nuclear weapons.

Renuclearization of NATO strategy should notmaterially affect Soviet force structure. Sovietforces are now structured in accordance with a

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stategic doctrine that assumes nuclear war in thetheater. It would reduce the requirements Moscownow perceives for improving the capabilities of itsforces for sustained nonnuclear combat.

NATO Time Norms

Adjustment in the 90-day norm for NATO capa-bilities for conventional operations probably wouldnot mean much to the Soviets. In conjunction withother changes, the Soviets might see it as additionalevidence of renuclearization of NATO strategy. Assuch, it would carry the implication for Sovietforce planning discussed in the preceding paragraph.

Soviet Attitude Toward Use of Force Under AlternativeUS and NATO Force Structures an Strategies

The Soviet attitude toward the various militarycontingencies is discussed in Part III of this reportin the light, not of present NATO deployments, butof the alternative US and NATO force structures andstrategies hypothesized in the report of WorkingGroup 1.

It is concluded that, considering the forcestructures and strategies alone, these alternativeswould not substantially alter the Soviet belief thatmilitary adventures against or all-out attack uponNATO is a highly dangerous course of action. Evenwith doubts about the will of the US to use thestrategic power which would be occasioned by reduc-tions down to a level of, for example, 100',000 menin Europe, the Soviets would still be required toreckon with a substantial chance of nuclear retali-ation. Thus deliberate initiation of war in Europewould remain an unattractive course of action.

An extremely important factor in the Soviets'calculations is their estimate of US willingnessto meet the risks and costs of fulfilling US com-mitments in extreme cases. In estimating this will-ingness, the Soviets will view US deployments in

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Europe -and -stated NATO strategy as only one factor--and not the largest--in the total equation. Theywill also draw inferences from the general US stance,the attitudes and moods which led to adoption of thealternative posture, and the degree to which US

- conduct lends substance to its formal commitments.If the US and NATO force structure and strategiesremain unchanged, but US behavior convinces theSoviets that the US has in fact become unwillingto stand by its commitments when put to the test,they would conclude that the risks associated withany given course of aggressive action had declined.Conversely, a US and NATO posture which had signifi-cantly reduced military capability would not producesuch a change in Soviet policy if Moscow believedthat the US remained willing to meet the risks andcosts of fulfilling its commitments.

In conclusion, Soviet military response toalternative US and NATO force structures and

strategies is less a function of these structuresand strategies than of broader Soviet judgmentsderived from overall US behavior, in which US de-ployment in Europe is but one factor.

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V. Statistical Annex

This section contains the following tables onWarsaw Pact force strengths:

Page1. Distribution of Soviet Ground

Divisions, by Location and Type . . . . . 79

2. Estimated Numbers of Soviet TacticalAircraft in Operational Units, byLocation and Type, and Projectionsfor 1970 and 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . .. 80

3. Estimated Numbers of Soviet TacticalAircraft in Operational Units, byMission and Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

4. Estimated Numbers of Soviet Ships andSubmarines in Western Fleets, byType and Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

5. Estimated Strength and Readiness ofEast European Ground Divisions . . . . . 83

6. Estimated Numbers of Operational EastEuropean Combat Aircraft, by Locationand Type, and Projections for 1970and 1971 . .. -. ... . . . . . . . . . . 84

7. Estimated Number of East EuropeanNaval Vessels, by Type and Location . . . 85

8. Warsaw Pact Naval Aircraft, by Typeand Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

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Page9. Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces

Available for Early Commitment inCentral Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

10. Estimated Mobilization and ReinforcementCapability of Warsaw Pact ForcesOpposite NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

11. Soviet Strategic Attack ForcesOpposite NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

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Table 1

Distribution of Soviet Ground Divisions, by Location and Type

Category I Category II Category III Develoing TotalArea MRD TK ABN Total MRD TK Total MRD TX Total MRD TK Total MRD TK ABN Total

East Germany. .. 10 10 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 20Poland. ..... . 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2Hungary.. .. . 2 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 4Czechoslovakia. 3 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 5Baltic MD. . . 0 1(1) 1 2(1) 3 2 5 1-3 0 1-3 0 0 0 4-6 3 1 8-10Belorussian MD. 1(1) 0 1 2(1) 1 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 1 11Carpathian MD . 2(2) 2(2) 0 4(4) 5 1 6 1 0-1 1-2 0 0 0 8 3-4 0 11-12Kiyev MD ...- 0 0 0 0 3 7 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 -10Moscow MD .... 0 0 1 1 2 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 6Odessa MD .. 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 0 6Leningrad MD 2(2) 0 1 3(2) 2 1 3 4 0 4 0 0 0 8 1 1 10North Caucasus MD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5-6 0 5-6 0 0 0 5-6 0 0 5-6Transcaucasus MD. 1(1) 1(1) 1 3(2) 7 0 7 2 0 2 0 0 0 10 1 1 12

1Ural MD . .... 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 3Volga MD. ... . 0 0 0, 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 3Turkestan MD. .. 1(1) 0 1 2(1) 5 1 6 2 0 2 3 0 3 11 1 1 13Siberian MD 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 3Trans-Baikal MD . 1 4 0 5 1 0 1 2 0 2 0-1 0 0-1 4-5 4 0 8-9Par East MD ... 3 2 1 6 4 1 5 1-2 0 1-2 2-3 1 3-4 10-12 4 1 15-17Mongolia. ... . 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 2

Totals. . . . . 27(7) 26(4) 7 60(11) 37 26 63 27-31 0-1 27-32 6-8 1 7-9 97-103 53-54 7 157-164

Note: Category headings represent levels of combat readiness, described on pages 29 and 30. Abbreviations for types ofdivisions are as follows: motorized rifle (MRD); tank (TX); and airborne (ABN). Numbers in parentheses represent Category Idivisions which require some mobilization. The status of divisions in the Turkestan, Siberian, Trans-Baikal, and Par Eastmilitary districts and in Mongolia along the Sino-Soviet border is uncertain; the figures shown above may understate theircombat strength.

Table 2

Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical Aircraft in Operational Units, by Location and Type,and Projections for 1970 and 1971

MIG-21 YAK-27/28MIG-17 MIG-19 Fishbed YAK-28p SU-7 IL-28 YAK-28 Mangrove,Fresco Farmer -D/Ff/B- Pirebar Fitter -Beagle Brewer, .8, C... Brewer..D 4 Total

East Germany. . . . . 87 12 333 23 157 66 -- 48 726Poland. ... ... .. 82 -- 123 -- 37 10 -- 30 282

Hungary . . . . . -- -- 127 -- 37 52 12 -- 228

Czechoslovakia. . . -- -- 86 -- -- -- -- - 86

Baltic MD . . . . . . 49 -- 90 -- -- 40 96 275

Belorussian MD. . . . 99 12 74 -- 37 32 - -- 254

Carpathian MD . . . . 89 37 74 -- 37 32 32 32 333Moscow MD .. . . .. -- -- 74 -- 37 -- -- 32 143-

O Leningrad MD. . . . . 37 -- 16 -- 37 44 -- -- 134Kiyev MD . . . . . . - - 74 74Odessa MD . . . 12 -- 111 -- 37 25 -- - 32 217Transcaucasus MD. . . -- -- 111 -- 37 32 32 -- 212

Turkestan MD. . . . . 90 -- 90 -- -- 20 -- 200

Far East MD . . . 37 -- 130 -- 37 32 -- -- 236

Trans-Baikal MD . . . 222 -- . 16 -- -- 65 -- 8 311

October 1969 804 61 1,529 23 490 450 172 182 3,711

Mid-1970 825-775 25-0 1,550-1,650 0-25 475-500 450-425 150-200 175-225 3,650-3,800 b-Mid-1971 800-725 -0- 1,550-1,700 0-25 475-500 425-390 150-200 200-250 3,600-3,800

Note: Excluded are some 1,000-1,100 older model aircraft in reserve, and an additional 1,500 combat-type aircraft intraining establishments. There are also some 200-300 older model aircraft collocated with tactical units. The ma.orityof these may be operationally assigned to TAP ground attack unite.

a. Brewer D is used for reconnaissance only, and has no combat capability. For this reason it is included with the

YAK-i? Mangrove totals rather than with the Brewer B and C light bomber variants of the YAK-28.

b. This total includes an allowance for 0-20 Poxbat which may enter inventory in 1977.

Table 3

Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical Aircraft in Operational Units,By Mission and Type

Mission Total MIG-17 MIG-19 MIG-21 SU-7 YAK-28p IL-28 YAK-28 YAK-27/28

Air defense. . . . . . 1,619 151 61 1,384 -- 23 -- -- --Ground attack. . . . . 1,095 605 -- -- 490- - -

Light bomber . . . . . 389 -- -- -- -- -- 217 172 --Reconnaissance andreconnaissance strike 608 48 -- 145 -- -- 233 -- 182

Total. . . . . . . . 3,711 804 61 1,529 490 23 450 172 182

iI

Table 4

Estimated Numbers of Soviet Ships and SubmarinesIn Western Fleets, by Type and Fleet

Type Northern Baltic Black Sea

Cruise missile submarinesNuclear (6-8 launchers). . . .. 14 0 0Diesel (most with 4 launchers) 13 2 5

Ballistic missile submarinesNuclear. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 0 0Diesel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 0 1

Attack submarinesNuclear. . . ........ 20 0 0Long-range diesel. . . . . ... 34 8 0Medium-range diesel. . . . . . . 50 21 27Short-range diesel . . . . . . . 0 6 5

UnknownA class. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0

Total. . . . . . . . . . . 165 37 38

Operational surface shipsSAM/SSM light cruisers ..... 3 2 2SAM light cruisers . . . . . . . 0 0 1Helicopter ships . . . . . . . . 0 0 2SSM destroyers . . . . . . . . . 0 2 4SAM destroyers . . . . . . . . . 5 4 12Cruisers . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 3Destroyers . . . . . . ..... 7 8 14Escorts . . . . . . . . .... 30 28 26 a

Total. . . . . . . . . . . .. 46 48 64

Reserve surface shipsCruisers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 4Escorts . . . . . . . . . . . ..1 4 3

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 12 8

a. Includes three in the Caspian Sea.

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Table 5

Estimated Strength and Readiness ofEast European Ground Divisions

Readily LowTotal Available Strength

Strength Divisions MRD TK ABN ASLT MRD TK

East Germany. . . . 90,000 6 4 2 -- -- -- --Poland... . . .. 200,000 15 5 5 1 1 3 --Czechoslovakia. . . 154,000 10 4 3 -- -- 1 2Hungary . . . . . . 90,000 6 3 1 -- -- 1 1Romania . . . . . . 170,000 9 5 2 -- -- 2 --Bulgaria . . . . . 113,000 13* 5 5 -- -- 3 0

Total . . . . . . 817,000 59 26 18 1 1 10 3

These totals count five Bulgarian tank brigades and three trainingunits as divisions. The tank brigades are about one-third the sizeof a Soviet tank division..

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Table 6

Estimated Numbers of Operational East European Combat Aircraft, By Location and Type,and Projections for 1970 and 1971

MIG-21 MIG-21Fishbed Su-7 Fishbed MIG-19 MIG-17 IL-28

D/F Fitter C/E Farmer Fresco Beagle Total

Bulgaria.. . . .. 25 -- 15 75 180 10 305Czechoslovakia. . . 115 85 50 70 210 25 555East Germany. . . . 205 -- 40 10 50 -- 305Hungary. . . . . . 45 -- 60 10 30 -. - -- -- -145Poland. . . . . . . 165 20 20 15 605 60 885Romania . . . . . . 70 -- 40 20 135 10 275

October 1969. . . . 625 105 225 200 1,210 105 2,470Mid-1970. . . . . . *630-725 120-150 210-220 160-190 1,075-1,200 95-100 2,290-2,585Mid-1971. . . . . . 675-775 120-175 190-210 130-150 1,000-1,100 80-90 2,195-2,500

Table 7

Estimated Number of East European NavalVessels, by Type and Location

Baltic Sea Black SeaEast

Germany Poland Bulgaria Romania

Destroyer types . . . . . . 3 3 2 --Submarines . . . . . -- 5 2 --Guided missile patrol boats 12 12 -- 5Motor torpedo boats . . . . 66 28 8 13Submarine chasers . . . . . 26 8(18)a 8 3Miscellaneous patrol boats 59 -- (28)a -- 3Fleet minesweepers . . . 19 24 2 4Small minesweepers . . . . 37 35 18 28Amphibious ships . . . . . 6 22 -- --Amphibious craft . . . . . 12 23 11 8

Total . . . . . . . . .. 240 160(46) 51 64

a. Figures in parentheses are augmenting coast guardunits, which now operate in close coordination with thePolish Navy.

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sCRET,

Table 8

Warsaw Pact Naval Aircraft, by Type and Location

Soviet PolishNorthern Baltic Black Sea NavalFleet Fleet Fleet Aviation

Missile and bomber forceTU-16 Badger . . . . . . 107 78, 80 --

Reconnaissance andmiscellaneous aircraftTU-95 Bear . . . . . . . 26 - -- --TU-22 Blinder. . . . . . -- 31 31 --TU-16 Badger . . . . . . 24 5 24 --IL-28 Beagle . . . . . . -- 60 10 52MI-4 Hound . . . . . . . 6 -- -- --

ASW aircraftIL-? May . . . . . . . . 15 -- -- --

BE-12 Mail . . . . . . . 16 -- 26 --BE-6 Madge . . . . . . . 10 8 5 --KA-25 Hormone. . . . . . 8 -- 47 --MI-4 Hound . . . . . . . 30 25 40 --

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Table 9

Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces AvailableFor Early Commitment in Central Europe

Estimated Wartime Strength- AircraftCurrently Armies Ground AttackAvailable Combined Tactical and Reconnais- AirForces Arms Tank Air Divisions Men Tanks sance a Defense b

GSFG and East German Army . . . . 5 2 1 26 405,000 6,500 400 640Czechoslovak Front . . . . . . . 3 -- 1 12 c 180,000 3,000 260 300Carpathian Front d . . . . . . . 2-3 1 1 15 230,000 3,400 210 200C0 Polish Front . ......... 3 -- 1 15 e 215,000 2,800 260 620Northern Group of Forces in Poland -- -- 1 2 35,000 600 170 110Belorussian Front . . . . . . . . 1 2 1 11 f 165,000 2,800 150 110Baltic MD - - - - -- - - - - - . 1 -- 1 5 f 60,000_ 1,000. . 200. . 70

Total . . .- . - .. . . . . . 15-16 5 7 86 1,290,000 20,100 1,650 2,050

a. Includes fughter-bombers, light bombers, and aircraft wnt a reconnaissance mission.b. Fighters having a primary mission of air defense which are in Soviet tactical air armies would probably operateprimarily in support of Soviet ground forces. Air defense units of the East European members of the Warsaw Pastare responsible primarily for air defense of national territory, but would probably also fly missions in supportof battlefield operations.

C. Table 5 shows 10 Czech divisions. Evidence provided by a high-leveL defector indicates that the Czechs plan tofield two additional divisions in wartime.d. Includes the Central Group of Forces of Czechoslovakia, which approcimates a field army.e. Includes an airborne division and an amphibious assault division.f. Includes airborne division centrally controlled by Moscow.

Table 10

Estimated Mobilization and Reinforcement CapabilityOf Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO

Region andForce M M+5 a M+10 b M+21 c

North dArmies 0 1 1 1Divisions 1 3 3 3Men 10,000 40,000 40,000 40,000Tanks 185 555 555 555Aircraft 134 134 134 134Tube artillery 48 324 324 324Multiple rocketlaunchers 12 36 36 36 -

Heavy mortars(over 82mm) 45 135 135 135

Frog launchers 3 9 9 9Scud launchers 0 18-27 18-27 18-27

South eArmies 0 3 4 4Divisions f 10 13 17 17Men 57,500 96,000 169,000 169,000Tanks 1,260 1,560 2,425 2,425Aircraft 300 517 517 517Tube artillery 340 687 970 970Multiple rocketlaunchers 90 126 174 174

Heavy mortars(over 82mm) 200 308 480 480

Frog launchers 20-30 20-30 32-42 32-42Scud launchers 0 18-27 42-63-- -42-63 -

East gArmies h 0 1 3 3Divisions 2 9 9 9Men 18,000 98,000 113,000 113,000Tanks 495 1,790 1,790 1,790Aircraft 212 212 212 212Tube artillery 84 474 582 582Multiple rocketlaunchers 24 108 108 108

Heavy mortars(over 82mm) 60 375 375 375

Frog launchers 6 27 27 27Scud launchers 0 12-18 18-27 18-27

Central iArmies h 10 14 21 21(25)Divisions 38 58 85 86(112),Men 506,000 768,000 1,209,000 1,290,000(1,465,000)Tanks 9,155 13,980 20,100 20,100(27,400)Aircraft 1,672 2,707 3,700 3,700(3,777)

Tube Artillery 2,796 4,188 5,670 6,156(7,434fMultiple rocketlaunchers 648 932 1,256 1,256(1,580)

Heavy mortars(over 82mm) 1,059 1,416 2,211 2,211(2,886)

Frog launchers 143 223 331 331(422)Scud launchers 87 114 153-168 171-195(204-240)

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Tabulation Notes to Table 10

Note: There are five Soviet airborne divisions in the regionsconfronting NATO. These divisions are directly subordinateto the Defense Ministry and are not counted in this tabulation.

a. Approximate end of first phase of reinforcement, i.e. whenforward forces are in area of operations and deployable.

b. Approximate end of next significant reinforcement phase,i.e. when one or more additional ground or air armiesare mobilized and generally in operations area.

c. Approximate end of main Warsaw Pact reinforcement phase,i.e. when additional fronts in their entirety aregenerally in the intended area of operations and thespecial and strategic reserves are in place.

d. These forces include units of the Leningrad MilitaryDistrict in and near northern Norway.

e. These forces include Bulgarian forces and troops fromthe Odessa Military District.

f. These totals count five Bulgarian tank brigades andthree training units as divisions. The tank brigadesare about one-third the size of a Soviet tank division.

g. The forces in this region are all presently locatedin the Transcaucasus Military District.

h. These totals include a corps headquarters. Corps donot represent an intermediate echelon between divi-sion and army headquarters; in most cases they func-tion as small army headquarters.

i. These forces include Soviet forces in East Germany,Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Carpathian, Belorussian,and Ba~tic military districts. Also included are theCzechoslovak and Polish national forces (except theairborne and assault landing divisions). Totals inparentheses include the contingency and strategic reserveforces--the Hungarian national forces and the SovietSouthern Group of Forces in Hungary and the armies fromthe Kiyev and Moscow MDs. Soviet forces in Hungary andthe Hungarians could also be used to reinforce againstthe Southern Region. The aircraft totals exclude 465Polish aircraft assigned to national air defense. Theall-weather interceptors in the Hungarian Air Force--55aircraft--are also excluded.

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Table 11

Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Opposite NATO a

Missile ForceNumber of

Land-based ballistic missiles LaunchersIntermediate range ballisticmissiles (SS-5) 80

Medium range ballisticmissiles (SS-4) 510

Variable range ballisticmissiles (SS-ll) b 40

Total land-based launchers 630

Ballistic missile submarines (diesel)G Class (14) c 42Z Conversion (2) 4

Total sea-based launchers 46

Bomber ForceAircraft

Medium bombers of Long Range AviationTU-22 Blinder 175TU-16 Badger 420

Total bomber force 595

a. Includes all elements of the Soviet Strategic at-tack forces which are considered to be intended pri-marily for peripheral operations, and which are nor-mally based within striking distance of Western Europe.Some of these forces also are capable of strikesagainst North America, but this is not believed to betheir primary mission. All data are approximate.

b. Recently, the Soviets deployed a variable rangeballistic missile, which is believed to be basicallythe SS-11 ICBM. The SS-11 has been fired at rangesas short as 500 nautical miles and is capable ofranges up to 5,500 nautical miles.

c. Two of these G class submarines are undergoingmodification and are not active.

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