This article was downloaded by: [UQ Library]On: 10 November 2014, At: 11:51Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

National IdentitiesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnid20

Urban Protest andthe Discourse ofPopular Nationalism inPostrevolutionary Mexico:The Case of the VeracruzRent StrikeAndrew Grant Wood aa History Department , University of TulsaPublished online: 18 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: Andrew Grant Wood (2000) Urban Protest and the Discourseof Popular Nationalism in Postrevolutionary Mexico: The Case of the VeracruzRent Strike, National Identities, 2:3, 265-276, DOI: 10.1080/713687698

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713687698

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

National Identities, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2000

Urban Protest and the Discourse of PopularNationalism in Postrevolutionary Mexico:The Case of the Veracruz Rent Strike

ANDREW GRANT WOOD, History Department, University of Tulsa

Abstract After the revolution of 1910± 17 many Mexicans forged new identities, notions of

citizenship and conceptions of social justice. As an example of the way in which this process

took shape in urban areas, this essay examines how rent protesters during a housing strike in

the port of Veracruz used anti-foreign rhetoric as an effective means to mobilise nearly 75 per

cent of the local population. Comparing the discourse of the tenants with the available property

records, the author argues that charges of foreign `monopoly’ were overly generalised. Neverthe-

less, in detailing speci® c aspects of the housing situation the author is able to identify certain

elements in the portÐ namely those responsible for the administration of tenementsÐ against

which tenant claims were well substantiated. From this it can be seen how militants constructed

a powerful set of charges that not only identi® ed a common enemy against which strikers could

rally, but also helped to articulate their own brand of locally based popular nationalism.

A new era has begun for our fatherland. We have reconquered our rights as citizens

and the Mexican is no longer the pariah who sadly carries the chains of tyranny. He

is the proud citizen who exercises his political rights.

Mexican President Francisco Madero, 1911.1

Beginning in early 1922 house-renters (inquilinos) launched what would become acity-wide strike in the Mexican port town of Veracruz. Conceived as a popular ® ght forsocial justice, militants like anarchist tailor Hero n Proal who lead the protest oftenframed their cause for housing reform as a struggle for local self-determination.Bringing an end to oppression in urban areas, many believed, could only be achievedby breaking the `suffocating grip’ of resident non-Mexican property owners andcommercial elites. Following this logic, collective action on the part of tenants oftentargeted Spanish and Cuban landlords who, many believed, enjoyed monopolisticcontrol over the rental housing market and lived off the `misery of their renters.’

The tenant protest took place during a critical juncture in Mexican history followingalmost 10 years of civil war. In the early 1920s, elites sought to rebuild the country’ seconomy and transform Mexico into a fully modern nation. Inspired by the progressiverhetoric of the revolution, various popular groups both in rural and urban areasincreasingly petitioned government of® cials for reforms. As a result, ordinary citizensand revolutionary elites regularly engaged in intense political negotiations thatÐ as wasthe case with the tenant protestÐ sometimes turned violent.

ISSN 1460-8944 print/ISSN 1469-9907 online/00/030265-12 Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/14608940020000808

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

266 A. G. Wood

As the movement gained momentum in the spring of 1922, renters developed adynamic repertoire made up of public demonstrations, direct actions and collaborationwith other popular organisations throughout the state. Despite an attempt by federaltroops to repress the Veracruz protest on the night of 5± 6 July 1922, statewideorganising continued until the administration of President Plutarco El õÂ as Calleseventually managed to bring militant renters under control in early 1927.2

In considering the history of one of Latin America’s earliest urban social movementsof the twentieth century, this essay examines claims made by striking tenants as a wayto understand the larger popular political awakening taking shape in Mexico during the1920s. As has been thought to be the case with peasants during the nineteenth century,the history of the Veracruz tenant movement suggests that urban dwellers after therevolution forged their own ideological perspective which recognised various abstractnotions of nationhood but continued to draw deeply from local tradition. In whatfollows, I discuss how tenant strikers in Veracruz made effective use of local patriotictradition and longstanding prejudice toward Spaniards (antigachupinismo) while alsoappropriating elements of elite-based economic nationalism suspicious of alien `mon-opoly’ and encroaching `foreign control’ . In their blaming Spanish and Cuban land-lords and property managers for high rents, poor housing conditions and `exploitationof the Veracruz people,’ I argue that renters developed a hybrid popular nationalismthat proved effective in mobilising Veracruz residents (portenÄ os) in the struggle forhousing reform.3 Looking back, the origins of the housing crisis took shape during thelate nineteenth century as Mexico’ s export economy sparked rapid urbanisation.

Urbanisation and Revolution in Veracruz

Beginning in the 1870s, railroad construction and an expanding export economyhelped stimulate urban growth in the city of Veracruz (located in the state of the samename). As thousands of migrants (both from inside Mexico and overseas) came to theport between 1880 and 1930, the population went from approximately 10 000 to nearly70 000.4 To accommodate rapid increases, property owners subdivided existing struc-tures and city lots. These actions led to the creation of the patio de vecindadÐ a onestorytenement where residents rented small rooms located around a shared courtyard withbasic bathing and cooking facilities.5 Soon, however, developers found they could notkeep pace with the demand for popular housing. As a result, overcrowding, lack ofwater, ventilation, provisions for sewage and a host of other social and environmentalproblems began to plague residents.6

Attempting to combat deteriorating housing conditions in poorer areas of the city,municipal of® cials established new sanitation codes. In the state capital of Jalapa,legislators added to local efforts by passing laws that identi® ed popular housing sites as`foci of infection,’ and required landlords to provide for basic sewage and sanitation.Unfortunately, these early attempts at urban reform were cut short by the outbreak ofrevolution in 1910.

In April 1914, growing US concern with events in Mexico led to the invasion andseven-month occupation of the port of Veracruz.7 Whatever the larger political objec-tive, military action undertaken in the siege left the city in shambles. After the initialoffensive, nearly 200 Mexicans lay dead in the streets while approximately 300 sufferedinjuries. Twenty-four hours after the invasion, a force of approximately 6000 NorthAmericans had set up camp and started to impose their will throughout the city.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

The Veracruz Rent Strike 267

Shocked and disgusted, many veracruzanos decided to remain indoors and refused tocooperate with the gringos.

Mexican resistance notwithstanding, the North Americans set out to sanitise theport. In what must have been a macabre display, they ® rst collected the corpses of deadMexicans, doused them in petroleum and lit the assemblage a® re. Following this,military of® cials and Red Cross representatives began co-ordinating public healthefforts. As the Marines saw it, there existed an urgent need to rectify problems thatwere the result of accumulated waste, inadequate drainage, and constant infestation byinsects. In carrying out the sanitary campaign, however, the seemingly arrogant,sometimes jingoistic attitude of the North Americans stimulated intense resentment onthe part of many Mexicans even after their departure in November 1914.

In the wake of the occupation residents honoured local heroes who had given theirlives in defence of the city. Meantime, politicians changed street names in the port andthroughout the state to honour the victims. Despite these and other commemorations,anti-Americanism in Veracruz after the invasion proved to be short-lived as the Yankeeevacuation gave way to a nearly one-year encampment by Constitutionalist forces underthe leadership of Venustiano Carranza.

As the patriarch of the revolution, Carranza’s rhetoric calling for Mexican economicself-determination resonated with portenÄ os whose ® rst hand experience with Yankeeaggression had recently been added to other more distant local memories of foreigninvasions by the Spanish in 1825, the French in 1838 and the North Americans in1847. Commemorating the city as a site `four times heroic’ (cuatro veces heroica) in itsresistance to alien attack, portenÄ o pride ran high as Carranza fanned the ® res of localpatriotism.

With the Constitutionalist occupation also came a new wave of migrants to the portthat quickly ® lled hotels, guesthouses and already crowded rental housing. Witnessinga substantial increase in the demand for shelter, property owners wasted no time inraising rents. Higher prices not only for housing but most consumer goods com-pounded ® nancial woes that had been brewing for some time as the destruction ofagricultural lands and transport networks during the ® rst years of the revolutioncontributed to food shortages and sharply increased the cost of living throughout muchof the country. During the darkest days of the revolution, countless small businessesacross the nation were forced to close up shop while managers of larger industrial sitesreduced production and cut jobs. Subsequently, in¯ ation and unemployment con-tributed to growing economic confusion. In this tumultuous time, thousands turned tocharity, counterfeiting or simply took to begging in the streets in order to survive.

The civil war and economic crisis that gripped much of the nation in 1915± 16inspired some in Veracruz to step up local philanthropic relief efforts. The Junta

Filantro pica de Socorros, for example, purchased foodstuffs and resold them at cost whilethe Junta de Bene® cencia Pu blica Ð funded in large measure by well-to-do members ofthe port’ s Spanish communityÐ expanded its services and established a new programfor widows and orphans. Yet while residents accepted handouts from locally basedcharities they showed a patriotic determination in turning away assistance offered bythe American Red Cross.

At a public demonstration organised by Veracruz labour unions in July 1915, anumber of signs and banners carried messages that expressed a strong sense of nationalpride and clear rejection of gringo aid. One sign read `there is no hunger here, only asocial revolution that demands justice!’ while another declared `we know how to work,and will never beg for anything!’ 8 Refusal to accept American assistance articulated one

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

268 A. G. Wood

form of nationalist sentiment that could be easily expressed in public. At the same time,a potent resentment towards resident Spaniards also sat just below the popular politicalsurface.

Considering anti-foreign feeling in Mexico a few years earlier, a US diplomaticof® cial offered this observation regarding the difference between anti-American andanti-Spanish feeling in Mexico:

There is a marked difference between the antagonism directed against theAmerican and the hostility shown toward the Spaniard. The hostility to theSpaniard is not expressed in newspapers, public writings, clubs nor in publicplaces; it is unwritten, because the classes which harbor it have no medium ofpublic expression.9

As suggested, Hispanophobia remained something unwritten and a sentiment morelikely to be expressed in various informal ways by the popular classes in their day to dayactivities.10

In exploring the reason for these `unwritten’ antagonisms it is important to considerthe fact that many Spaniards had regular contact with Mexicans because of the fact thatthey were particularly active as retailers (especially grocers), pawnbrokers, moneylen-ders, restaurant owners and landlords.11 While not as `visible’ an ethnic group asChinese residents, working- and middle-class Spaniards nevertheless were oftenthought to be easily identi® able in local communities because of the occupational rolesthey tended to ® ll.

In Veracruz, well to do Spaniards were also visible for different reasons because manybelonged to local business clubs like the Casino EspanÄ ol, charity organisations such asthe Bene® ciencia EspanÄ ola, and local `high society’ groups. When economic conditionsturned for the worse during and immediately after the revolution, Spanish retailers aswell as their more af¯ uent countrymen would be looked upon by Mexicans withgrowing suspicion.

Popular Political Awakenings: The Veracruz Tenant Movement

With the establishment of the 1917 Constitution, ordinary Mexicans increasinglyidenti® ed themselves as citizens possessing certain inalienable rights. Viewing the newrevolutionary state as a powerful agency capable of mediating con¯ ict, Mexicansincreasingly petitioned local, state and national of® cials for solutions to various socialproblems. Throughout the 1920s, government agents received hundreds of requests forfood, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities. In the state of Veracruz thisawakening of the Mexican citizenry was also aided by the election of progressiveVeracruz governor Adalberto Tejeda in late 1920. After early indications from Tejedathat labour, peasant and other forms of popular organising would be tolerated to anextent never before seen in the state, residents soon began to organise demonstrations,marches, and other grassroots mobilisations to voice grievances and articulate populardemands. In the port, one of the most dynamic campaigns came shortly after themayoral inauguration of Worker Party candidate Rafael `El Negro’ Garc õÂ a.

Elected in late 1921, the administration of Rafael Garc õÂ a ushered in a new post-revolutionary age in Veracruz City politics. Taking the stage in the port’ s PrincipalTheatre on the afternoon of 1 January 1922, hundreds packed inside the building sawthe mayor hold the Mexican ¯ ag, receive the keys to the city and proclaim the `victoryof the working people of Veracruz.’ In his speech, Garc õÂ a called on portenÄ os to stand up

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

The Veracruz Rent Strike 269

for their rights as patriotic citizens. `The mockery of former administrations haspassed,’ he announced, `and now we are charged with the spirit of the revolution tocombat problems the city has struggled with for so long.’ Championing the victory ofthe port’ s popular classes, Garc õÂ a proudly asserted that t̀he people, too many timesdeceived by those who claim to represent them, have now demonstrated their powerwith incomparable force.’ Amidst a sea of colourful banners, the new mayor proudlyconcluded that `veracruzanos are not a conquered people.’ 12

Following in the wake of Garc õ a’ s address, Veracruz residents soon founded theRevolutionary Syndicate of Tenants (Sindicato Revolucio nario de Inquilinos) headed bylocal militant Hero n Proal in early March 1922. Encouraged by revolutionary discoursetaking shape at a number of levels, the mobilisation quickly grew by the end of Marchto include nearly 40 000 residents. Shortly thereafter, tenant organising had also spreadto popular neighbourhoods in several other urban areas throughout the state includingOrizaba (as well as the nearby towns of Rio Blanco, Santa Rosa and Nogales),Co rdoba, Soledad de Doblado, Minat õ tlan, Puerto Me xico (Coatzalcoalcos), TierraBlanca, Tuxpan and the capital, Jalapa. Elsewhere in Mexico, tenants formed associa-tions in working class neighbourhoods scattered throughout Mexico City, Guadalajara,Puebla, San Luis Potosõ , Mazatla n, Monterrey, Tampico, Torreo n, Durango, Aguas-calientes and Ciudad Jua rez. Regularly parading through the streets of Veracruz, avariety of women who worked as laundresses, cooks, maids and market vendors as wellas men who laboured as cigar makers, barbers, electricians, stevedores, railwaymen anda host of other jobs shouted slogans of `pro-Communism’ and `anarchism’ all the whilehanging red and black ¯ ags in their wake. Calling attention to high rents and substan-dard housing conditions, strikers targeted landlords, rent collectors, police and politi-cians with their anarchist direct-action techniques.

Interestingly, it was not the more powerful North American and English mining, oil,utility and larger real estate ® rms in the region who were subject to what might bethought of as anti-imperialist attack on the part of rent protesters. Instead, Cuban andSpanish shopkeepers, landlords and tenement managers most often fell prey to militantaggression. This type of xenophobic harassment was particularly noticeable whenhousing activists referred to individuals who they thought to be `Spanish’ as gachupõÂ n

(often regardless of whether they were ® rst generation Spaniards or not) while reservinga variety of disparaging and derogatory terms for Cubans they disliked. In almost everycase, antagonistic expressions from renters blamed `foreigners’ for their local economic,and more speci® cally, housing troubles.13

In an interview several years after the strike, a former member of the RevolutionarySyndicate of Tenants named Macario Lo pez declared that protesters saw themselves as® ghting against an alien power elite in the city and suggested that `foreigners heldVeracruz in their hands: businesses; bakeries and everything was their property.’ Usingthe logic of economic nationalism, Lo pez said `the Mexicans had smaller establish-ments and could do almost nothing because the foreigners controlled the city govern-ment.’ Developing this further he said `foreigners had the best jobs and made bettermoney ¼ basically, they monopolised everything.’ 14 Lo pez, of course, was not alone inexpressing his resentment of foreigners in Veracruz. In his account of the strike, tenantleader Arturo Bolio Trejo also argued that a small, largely foreign group possessed the`public wealth in the port.’ 15 Labelled by tenants as `bourgeois’ and `gachupõ n’ foreign-ers were believed to have formed a r̀uthless oligarchy’ in the city who, according to oneresident, `never thought twice about improving their own fortunes at the expense of thepeople of Veracruz.’ 16

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

270 A. G. Wood

Consistent with tenant rhetoric, academics writing about the history of Veracruz havetaken many of the above claims about foreigners `monopolising’ the local economy atface value. Several years ago, for example, sociologist Manuel Castells wrote that theport’s `local elite was largely formed by foreigners who maintained a colonial pattern ofbehaviour and took ® nancial advantage of the urban misery.’ 17 In his analysis, Veracruzrepresented a `dependent city (whose) ¼ dominant social dynamics basically relied onsocio-political forces that (were) largely external to the institutional framework of theirnation-state.’ 18 Others have made similar assumptions, based on second-hand infor-mation, in their claims that the city’s Spanish community (colonia espanÄ ola) `controlledall the port’s commercial activities.’ Yet while Veracruz certainly did play host to asizeable Spanish population, characterising the port simply as a dependent city monop-olised by a foreign elite is an assertion that fails to distinguish between rhetoric and thehistorical record.

Although the political economy of Veracruz was indeed subject to powerful inter-national interests, my research suggests that it is a mistake to characterise the city’ seconomy as, `dependent’ and existing somehow `outside’ the institutional framework ofMexico. Similarly, accepting the premise that `Spaniards controlled everything’ followstoo closely from sources tied to the economic nationalism of revolutionary elites inMexico City. Uncomfortable with these characterisations, I wanted to ® nd out fromlocal sources if foreignersÐ particularly SpaniardsÐ really `controlled’ the Veracruzeconomy? In contrast to claims either by protesters at the time or by historians after thefact, my hypothesis was that intense competition for local resources and economicstatus drove portenÄ os to blame Spaniards and other resident foreigners for theirproblems. Rather than actually constituting a monopoly, it might have been more thecase that a group of highly visible foreigners served as convenient targets for Mexicanfrustration as well as an opportunity for citizens to articulate their newfound popularpolitical assertiveness after the revolution.19

On the Question of Foreign `Monopoly’

The tenant rhetoric claiming Spanish domination in the local economy correlates to thefact that the state of Veracruz hosted a signi® cant number of Spaniards when comparedto other areas in the new Mexican republic. Looking at the number of Spaniards inrelation to the total state population, census reports before the revolution indicate apercentage of 0.29 in 1895 and 0.32 in 1900 and 0.47 in 1910.20 More to the point,the port of Veracruz hosted the second highest percentage of Spaniards per capita afterMexico City.21 From the 1900 census that enumerated the number of foreigners in themunicipality of Veracruz, we know that the port hosted a total of 2958 f̀oreigners’ withapproximately 1591 of these being identi® ed as Spaniards. Thus with a city populationof 29 164 Spaniards accounted for about 5.5 per cent of the total at that time.22

The census material for 1910 and 1921 enumerated data on foreigners only at thestate level; there one sees that Spaniards equalled 3134 out of a total population of981 030 in 1910 and 4184 out of 1 159 935 in 1921. In 1921, Spaniards accounted fornearly 41 per cent of all foreigners. Meanwhile, North Americans amounted to about8.5 per cent, Chinese 8 per cent, Syrians 6 per cent and Cubans 5 per cent, withItalians, French, English, Germans, Japanese and `Turks’ each representing less than 5per cent. Finally, tracking the number of Spaniards in the state of Veracruz over a35-year period one ® nds that their numbers rose from 2760 in 1895 to 3134 in 1900and 5329 in 1910. During and immediately after the revolution Spanish presence in the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

The Veracruz Rent Strike 271

state dipped to 4184 in 1921 and increased again to 6397 by 1930.23 Assuming frommaterial gathered in 1900 that a good many people of Spanish origin continued to livein the port, I estimate that the number of Spaniards hovered somewhere around 5 percent of the total city population.

In order to investigate claims about f̀oreigners monopolising’ the housing market, Isurveyed local notarial records (Registro Publico de la Propiedad de Veracruz) from 1902and 1930 by searching for non-Mexicans, tenement owners/administrators and variousexchange patterns. Reviewing transactions that included not only outright selling andbuying of property, but also inheritance, loans, embargoes, rental contracts and otherassorted items of interest, I was able to identify a number of important Mexicaninvestors as well as con® rm signi® cant Spanish and Cuban activity in the city’ s housingmarket. Sorting the total number of transactions (n 5 3734), I found that Mexicansappeared to be responsible for approximately 40 per cent of all documented propertyexchanges (with individuals being counted each time they made a transaction) between1902 and 1930. Following this, I calculated that Spaniards were involved in about 35per cent, Cubans 4 per cent and other foreigners (i.e. Argentines, English, NorthAmericans) less than 1 per cent. Re¯ ecting a certain degree of imprecision both in theoriginal data collection as well as various limitations in my own research, the nationalidentity of a little more than 20 per cent of all transactors was left undetermined. Ofcourse, the imperfect nature of this source material meant that any number of propertytransactions could go unrecorded.

Yet despite the many dif® culties in assembling a representative report on theVeracruz housing market for the period between 1902 and 1930, I found it fairlyreasonable to claim that while Mexicans were involved in the largest number ofproperty transactions, Spaniards nevertheless appear to have invested a serious amountof time, energy and money in the Veracruz housing market. Spanish activity, in otherwords, constituted a disproportionate in¯ uence when ® gured against their numericalstanding in the city population. Returning to the main question under consideration,this disproportionality no doubt helped to provide legitimacy for the claim on the partof rent protesters that Spaniards `basically monopolised everything.’

In addition to noting the overall Spanish presence in the housing market, it is alsoimportant to consider who owned the various tenements where tenants went on strike.Searching for patio owners, I compiled a list of 130 individuals and again found thatMexicans constituted the most signi® cant national group. Mexican nationals repre-sented about 80 per cent of reported ownership in this category, but the Spanish sharecame to approximately 14.5 per cent, while Cuban ownership accounted for theremaining 5.5 per cent. While the breakdown of patio ownership suggests that Mexicanowners were largely responsible for tenant complaints about poor housing conditionsand high rents, the most interesting evidence that corroborates striker rhetoric is thedegree to which non-Mexicans were involved in local patio administration.

In this category, presumed `foreign’ managers who collected rents, arranged forevictions and oversaw all other housing affairs apparently did corner the market andthus provided reasonable evidence from which tenants could make their claims.Moreover, my review suggests that it was the prominence of a few individuals (bothresident non-Mexican and a recently nationalised Spaniard) that clearly gave residentsthe impression that a small, alien elite controlled rental housing. More precise thanover-generalised claims made about the city’ s economy, documentary source materialseemed to suggest that it was more the practices of a handful of tenement managersrather than an imagined `foreign elite’ that provided strikers the real evidence they

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

272 A. G. Wood

needed to mobilise renters. In this, one can identify three individuals who representedthe most egregious `enemies’ of the Veracruz renting public.

Public Enemies: Administrators Jose Garcõ a Suero and the Cangas Brothers

Of the tenement administrators identi® ed, one manager named Jose Garc õ a Sueroaccounted for nearly 32 per cent of the sample while various Mexicans amounted toapproximately 26 per cent, Cubans 14 per cent, Spaniards 7 per cent, with a little morethan 20 per cent left indeterminate. Garc õ a Suero was a Spaniard who had become aMexican citizen in 1921. After Garc õ a Suero, Cubans Manuel Cangas and his brotherAntonio represented the most active managers of properties, while other importantadministrators included Spaniard Francisco Ruiz Murillo as well as Mexicans Ramo nB. Marquez and Jose Antonio Cano. Yet aside from estimating the sheer degree towhich each of these individuals were active in patio management in Veracruz, under-standing how rent strikers developed their passionate dislike for these middlemenÐparticularly Garcõ a Suero and the Cangas brothersÐ can be seen more clearly from afew of the many complaints made against them.

Probably not coincidentally, problems with Garc õÂ a Suero’s allegedly abrasive styleand domination of tenement management show up in the historical record about thesame time he decided to become a Mexican citizen. In June 1921, for example, rentersat the patio San Ulpiano complained to Governor Tejeda that GarcõÂ a Suero `manageda large number of dilapidated properties.’ `This Spaniard,’ tenants charged, `hasalready caused great pain to many here in the port.’ 24 The fact that GarcõÂ a Suero hadbecome or was in the process of becoming a citizen in 1921 apparently did little toimprove his reputation among local residents. Still, to them he was a `gachupõÂ n.’

On 2 July 1921 Veracruz mayor Salvador Campa informed Governor Tejeda aboutnot only Garc õÂ a Suero but also two other men who owned a number of run downtenements and managed several othersÐ Cubans Manuel and Antonio Cangas. In hiscommunication, Campa informed the governor that many of the patios overseen by theCangas `were in deplorable condition’ and added `when these individuals make eventhe slightest repair they feel justi® ed to raise the rent each time.’ 25 Hoping the governorwould intervene, the mayor indicated that he had issued several warnings but theabuses continued. Responding to requests from both residents and municipal of® cials,Tejeda initiated legal action against Garc õÂ a Suero and the Cangas brothers during thesummer and fall of 1921.26

At the same time, complaints about these administrators surfaced in the port’s dailynewspaper El Dictamen as reports about the Cangas brothers evicting tenants can beseen beginning in early February 1922. Then, shortly after the tenant strike began, thetwo Cuban brothers became citywide symbols of `landlord tyranny’ as the battle cry`death to the Cangas’ was heard at public demonstrations staged by renters. In fact, atone of the ® rst open-air meetings held by striking tenants in early March 1922, rentersidenti® ed the Cangas brothers as the two most notorious landlords in the city.

After gathering at their usual spot in Jua rez Park, the assembled crowd took their red¯ ags and banners and marched to the of® ces of the Cangas brothers on the corner ofPalma and 1 de Mayo streets. Outside the building protesters expressed their hatred forthe two men as they shouted `death to the Cangas, down with the bourgeoisie, deathto the exploiters of the people’ while shooting off ® recrackers all around the building.27

Soon after the demonstration, the city council took action by naming a commission toinvestigate the condition of patios throughout the city. In contacting landlords in

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

The Veracruz Rent Strike 273

violation of sanitary codes, municipal agents required property owners to make im-mediate improvements or face the threat of stiff ® nes. Circulating throughout the city,inspectors visited a handful of patios owned and/or operated by the Cangas brothers.Finding a number of violations, of® cials issued citations and insisted that repairs beginimmediately.28 Subsequently, mayor GarcõÂ a made a public statement declaring thatwhile the city council would not necessarily intervene to end the rent strike, they woulduse their full authority to `alleviate the situation of those living in ® lthy shacks andespecially patios owned by the Cangas.’ 29 With this kind of public pro® le, it was easyfor striking tenants to identify the Cangas brothers as `enemies of the people’ andoccasionally use them as examples to promote more general stereotypes about foreign-ers in the port. Out of several actions against both foreign and `uncooperative’ Mexicanlandlords, property administrators and other assorted residents carried out by bothlarge groups as well as small, roving bands of militant renters, an episode one summerevening in 1923 illustrates how local resentment led to the realisation of a kind of `mob’violence in which protesters expressed strong anti-foreign feelings toward landlordsthey identi® ed as `gachupõÂ n.’

In mid-July 1923, protesters staged assaults on several guesthouses including twonamed Santo Domingo and El Cosmopo lita where, they claimed, Spanish landlordslived off the misery of their tenants. In this action, some 70 people armed with sticks,clubs, rocks, knives and a few guns ® rst approached the Santo Domingo, property ofa long time resident named Jesus CastanÄ o n. Before long they had the place surrounded.With red banners, the crowd stopped traf® c by forming a semicircle in Aquiles Serda nStreet. Then they sent a commission inside to talk with the owner. Under the pretenceof l̀iberating’ the building, militants demanded the room keys from CastanÄ o n. Con-fronting him they declared `our intention is to take over this posada in order to ® ndlodging for some of our companÄ eros and to unionise those who are already living here!’Outside, those assembled in the street began shouting `houses, we want houses androoms!’ Facing pressure both from inside and out, the proprietor resisted brie¯ y bytrying to reason with the tenants but soon gave in to their demands. Having of® ciallyseized the guesthouse, strikers quickly found their way upstairs, shouted out the newsof their triumph, and then hung banners from the balcony while supporters below shotoff ® recrackers in celebration. By then the crowd gathered in the street had grown tonearly 100 men and women.

The next target of militant collective action was just down the street at guesthouse ElCosmopo lita owned by Spaniard Bernardo Francisco Prida. As at the Santo Domingo,renters again claimed that this pensio n’ s owner was a `gachupõ n’ who took unfairadvantage of local residents. Yet by the time the crowd had made their way to theguesthouse, they had attracted the attention of the police. Determined to ® nd a wayinside, several individuals soon tangled with the authorities. In the meà le e that ensued,some of the protesters managed to slip by the police line and began breaking bottles,glasses, light ® xtures, furniture and windows. Entering through a back entrance, agroup of angry women hunted down the wife and children of the owner and chasedthem out into the street. Another contingent tried to start a ® re to destroy the structurebefore lawmen intervened. Eventually able to gain control over the situation, policemanaged to break up the crowd but not before considerable damage had been done.After the assault, much of the building’ s ground ¯ oor lay in ruins while the owner ofthe Cosmopo lita and his family had been badly beaten. Not to be kept away byauthorities for long, a group of tenants brie¯ y returned to the scene later that evening,and shouted `gachupõ n’ and `viva Proal’ from the street.30

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

274 A. G. Wood

Probably one of the more dramatic examples of anti-foreign action initiated bytenants during the strike, this incident hints at a considerable reservoir of resentmentfelt toward non-MexicansÐ and especially SpaniardsÐ in the port. And whileprotesters’ ideological commitment to combat all forms of landlord pro® teering helpedinform similar although much less frequent expressions of hostility toward Mexicanlandlords, it seems clear that accusing `Spanish’ guesthouse owners of being `foreignexploiters’ proved especially effective in mobilising certain elements of the city’ spopulation.

Foreigners as Effective Targets

The general pattern which emerges after considering the discourse of popular protest isthat tenants made effective use of information regarding speci® c local relationshipsbetween tenants and patio administrators in order to fashion a popular politicalmessage. From property records it seems clear that Mexicans rather than foreignersaccounted for the largest percentage of property owners in Veracruz. Nevertheless,foreigners, as charged by tenant protesters, did enjoy a disproportionate hold overrental properties when compared to their numerical standing in the city population.Involved in approximately 35 per cent of all transactions but constituting certainly nomore than 10 per cent of the city population, the Spanish share in the overall urbanproperty market was indeed impressive. While they did not constitute an `oligarchy’ asmany have assumed, Spanish in¯ uence in the port’ s political economy was signi® cantenough to render the very popular impression that t̀hey controlled everything.’

More precisely, when the administration of working class housing is considered, itappears as if two or three non-Mexicans clearly dominated. With recently naturalisedSpaniard Jose Garc õ a Suero managing several of the city’ s patios in an apparentlybrusque and unfriendly manner, there is more than ample evidence to support claimsagainst him by residents. Similarly, the fact that the Cangas brothers were well knownas highly irresponsible owners often in violation of sanitary codes made them primesuspects for those eager to put faces on local landlord abuses. Given both the numberof patios managed as well as an apparently well deserved reputation as unscrupuloustypes, it is fairly obvious why tenants felt justi® ed portraying these three individuals as`oligarchic tyrants.’

In an era when political leaders in Mexico City promoted an of® cial ideology ofpostrevolutionary nationalism, striking tenants in Veracruz can also be seen appropriat-ing elite discourse and combining it with other local `nationalist’ traditions. Clearlydistinct from elites, the tenants’ hybrid forms of `popular’ nationalism effectively mixedpatriotism, xenophobia and more recently disseminated notions of national self-deter-mination.31 Adapted for practical use, popular nationalist charges against non-Mexican`exploitation’ by housing activists carried tremendous political currency. In an era whenof® cial nationalism was being disseminated `from above’ and combining with patriotic,xenophobic and other local cultural traditions, the fact that renters tended to underes-timate the idea that a diverse group of Mexican landlords were also responsible for theexcessive rents, deplorable conditions and unfair treatment against which theyprotested made little difference. For grassroots militants this kind of information wasnot as useful as was identifying both generalised and, in some cases, speci® c `foreign’elements against which they could direct their frustration and rally against as `publicenemies.’

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

The Veracruz Rent Strike 275

Conclusion: Popular Nationalism a la Veracruzana

With the revolution of 1910± 20 Mexico was swept up in a tumultuous process of rapidsocial and political change. Once the ® ghting had died down, new conceptions ofcitizenship took hold as government of® cials encouraged ordinary Mexicans to identifywith of® cial ideas regarding r̀ights’ and related social justice issues. Building on yearsof local and regional isolation, political elites gave voiceÐ however intentionally orunintentionallyÐ to not one but many different `imaginary communities’ across Mex-ico. As seen in the case of the Veracruz tenant movement, a number of different`nationalisms’ emerged as militants could be seen expressing a passionate blend ofrevolutionary enthusiasm in ways driven by local micro-economic, social and culturalconcerns. While dif® cult to pin down, the many various expressions of `popularnationalism’ in Veracruz during the early 1920s articulated a local mixing of patriotismand xenophobia with elements of elite-driven `of® cial’ nationalism thrown in as alegitimating veneer. In the end, this tension between various `high’ and l̀ow’ national-ism’s actually re¯ ected a much larger political negotiation taking place between popularand elite groups throughout postrevolutionary society as Mexicans struggled to de® nethe course and character of the new nation.

Correspondence: Andrew Grant Wood, History Department, University of Tulsa, 600 S.College, Tulsa, OK 74104, USA.

Notes

1. Francisco I. Madero, speech published in Nueva Era, 1 November 1911. Quoted in Henry C.Schmidt, The Roots of Lo Mexicano: Self and Society in Mexican Thought, 1900± 1934 (CollegeStation TX: Texas A & M Press, 1978), p. 71.

2. For detailed coverage of the strike see Andrew Grant Wood, Revolution in the Street: Women,

workers and Urban Protest in Veracruz, 1870± 1927 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books Inc., In press).3. In part my discussion of nationalism follows Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re¯ ections

on The Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso Press, 1983) and Alan Knight, `Peasantsinto Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation,’ Estudios Mexicanos/Mexican

Studies, 10/1, Winter 1994, pp. 135± 161 and Alan Knight, `The Political Economy of Revolution-ary Mexico’ , in Christopher Abel and Colin M. Lewis (eds), Latin American Economic Imperialism

and the State: The Political Economy of the External Connection from Independence to the Present

(London: The Athlone Press, 1985), pp. 288± 317.4. More precisely, various census takers registered the population in Veracruz in 1878 at 10 000 and

67801 in 1930. Keith Davies, `Tendencias demogra ® cas urbanas durante el siglo XIX en Me xico’ ,Historia Mexicana, 21/3, JanuaryÐ March 1972, National Census 1921, 1930.

5. Property owners also attempted to meet demand by constructing housing at the rear or side ofsettled lots (viviendas) or by adding on between established buildings (accesor õÂ as).

6. For comparisons between housing in Mexico and other countries see for example John Burnett,A Social History of Housing, 1815± 1985 (London and New York: Methuen, 1978, Nicholas Bullockand James Read, The Movement for Housing Reform in Germany and France, 1840± 1914 (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), M. J. Daunton (ed.) Housing the Workers, 1850± 1914:

A Comparative Perspective (London and New York: Leicester University Press, 1990).7. On the invasion and occupation see Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor Woodrow Wilson and The

Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962) and Leonardo Pasquel,La invasio n de Veracruz en 1914 (Mexico City: Editorial Citalte petl, 1976).

8. Berta Ulloa, Veracruz: Capital de la Nacio n (Mexico City: Colegio de Me xico, 1986), p. 99.9. Consul Bonney to US State Department, San Luis Potos õ , 28 May 1913. Quoted in Alan Knight,

USÐ Mexican Relations, 1910± 1940, An Interpretation (San Diego: Center for USÐ MexicanStudies, 1987), p. 62.

10. For earlier discussion of Mexican nationalism see Frederick C. Turner, The Dynamic of Mexican

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

276 A. G. Wood

Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968) and Robert Freeman Smith,The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916± 1932 (Chicago, University ofChicago Press, 1972). While offering valuable insight into the history and politics of Mexicannationalism, too often these earlier works have engaged in what Alan Knight calls [̀a] search [for]odd persecuted gringo [while] pick[ing] their unseeing way through piles of Spanish and Chinesecorpses.’ Knight, `Peasants into Patriots,’ p. 152.

11. Turner, p. 206, Knight, USÐ Mexican Relations, p. 63.12. El Dictamen, Veracruz, Veracruz, 2 January 1922.13. On the use of the term gachup õÂ n see Knight, `Peasants into Patriots,’ p. 147, note 11.14. Quoted in Octavio Garc õÂ a Mundo, El movimiento inquilinario de Veracruz, 1922 (Mexico City:

Sepsetentas, Secretarõ a de Educacio n Pu blica, 1976), p. 26.15. Arturo Bolio Trejo, Rebel õ on de Mujeres: Version Historica de la Revolucio n Inquilinaria de Veracruz

(Veracruz: Editorial `Kada,’ 1959), p. 121.16. Ibid.17. Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements,

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), p. 44.18. Ibid., p. 38.19. For an earlier discussion of economic competition and resulting prejudice see Turner, pp. 205±

208.20. Direccio n General de Estadistica, Estadisticas sociales del Por® riato: 1877± 1910 (Mexico City:

Talleres Gra® cos de la Nacion, 1956), p. 199.21. Clara E. Lida, `El per® l de una inmigracio n: 1921± 1939,’ in Clara E. Lida (ed), Una inmirgacio n

privilegiada: Comerciantes empresarios y profesionales espanÄ oles en Me xico el los siglos xix y xx (Madrid:Alianza Ame rica, 1994), p. 37.

22. Direccio n General de Estadõ stica, Censo General, 1900.23. National Census 1910, 1921/1930. Curiously, Lida reports 4173 Spaniards in the state for 1921

and 3317 for 1930, p. 39.24. Vecinos of patio San Ulpiano to Governor Tejeda, 18 June 1921. Archivo General del Estado de

Veracruz (hereafter AGEV), gobernacio n, uncatalogued box.25. Ibid.26. AGEV, gobernacio n, 1922.27. El Dictamen, 13 March 1922.28. Veracruz City Council, 30 March 1922.29. El Dictamen, 1 April 1922, Veracruz City Council, 3 April 1922.30. El Dictamen, 11 July 1923.31. For a discussion on Mexican nationalism and its various `subspecies’ see Knight, `Peasants into

Patriots.’

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

11:

51 1

0 N

ovem

ber

2014