The Spy Who Never Came Back - Harold Weisbergjfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg Subject Index...
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The Spy Who Never Came Back rAmdctr;edfront] lorlly;mning book by HENRHURT (i()( )1\ II( )Ni
Transcript of The Spy Who Never Came Back - Harold Weisbergjfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg Subject Index...
The Spy Who Never Came Back
rAmdctr;edfront] lorlly;mning book by
HENRHURT
(i()( )1\ II( )Ni
SH
AW
N
Th
e Sp
y W
ho
Never
Cam
e Back
BY
HE
NR
Y H
UR
T
When U
S. intelligence of-
ficials asked Nicholas Shadrin
to become a spy, he refused.
A form
er Soviet naval captain w
ho had defected six years before, he w
as now happily
married, an A
merican citizen w
ho had earned a master's
degree in engineering and was w
orking on his Ph.D
. in international affairs.
For close to a year, he continued to refuse requests that he
become a double agent. O
nly when his friend, A
dm. R
ufus
Taylor, form
er director of Naval Intelligence, began to exert
pressure—"tw
isted his arm," in the w
ords of one FBI agent—
did Shadrin agree to undertake the assignm
ent.
For years, S
hadrin played the nerve-racking role, in the
belief that he was serving this country as a double agent. B
ut he
was m
uch more than a double agent. H
e was actually a paw
n
in a chess game of espionage that w
as far more dangerous than
he could have imagined.
Then, one night in 1975, he suddenly disappeared. H
is
friends, his wife, w
ere frantic. Could A
dmiral T
aylor help? A
close associate of 25 years telephoned Taylor. "N
ick who?" the
admiral replied. "S
hadrin? I never heard of him."
196
HE
VIS
IT T
O V
IEN
NA
WaS
a welco
me d
iversio
n fo
r N
icholas and Ew
a Shadrin.
Nicholas
They
were o
n th
eir way
to
Austria, fo
r a long-p
lanned
Christm
as skiing vacation. A m
onth
prio
r to th
eir dep
arture N
ick h
ad
men
tioned
to E
wa (p
ronounced
Eva) th
at he w
ould
com
bin
e their
vacatio
n w
ith a b
usin
ess appoin
t-
ment in V
ienna. She w
as delighted. S
mall an
d en
ergetic, w
ith o
live
skin
and in
tense d
ark ey
es, Dr.
Blanka E
wa S
hadrin had established a successful private dental practice
in the Virginia suburbs near W
ash-
ington, D.C
. Nicholas G
eorge Shad-
rin, h
er husb
and, w
as a wid
ely
acclaimed lecturer at the N
aval War
College, as w
ell as a former analyst
and co
nsu
ltant fo
r the O
ffice of
Naval Intelligence. W
ith a Ph.D
. in
international affairs and a master's
degree in engineering, Shadrin w
as
emplo
yed
by th
e Defen
se Intelli-
gence Agency (D
IA), w
here he was
consid
ered am
ong th
e best in
his
field. More than six feet, tw
o inches
tall, he p
ossessed
a com
man
din
g
charm and presence that invariably
won him
acceptance in almost any
milieu
. His co
mpan
y an
d co
unsel
were so
ught b
y so
me o
f the m
ost
importan
t peo
ple in
Wash
ingto
n's
military and intelligence com
munity.
Seventeen years earlier, w
hen fate
first intertw
ined
the liv
es of N
ick
and Ew
a, he had been Capt. N
ikolai
Fedorovich A
rtamonov, the young-
est comm
anding officer of a destroy-
er in Soviet naval history. In 1958, at
the age of 3o, during a tour of duty in Poland, he m
et a lovely girl named
Ew
a Gora, w
ho was 21 and in her
last year of medical school. T
hey fell
wildly in love. In June 1959 they fled across the
Baltic S
ea in a sm
all launch
and
sought asylum in S
weden. T
heir dar-
ing escap
e from
com
munism
was
heralded around the world. A
year
later Nick
and E
wa w
ere married
and living in the United S
tates. It w
as around 3 p.m. on D
ecem-
ber 1
8, 1
975, w
hen
the S
had
rins
checked into Vienna's H
otel Bristol,
across th
e street from
the V
ienna
Opera H
ouse. After a show
er and a
light lu
nch
, Nick
explain
ed to
his
wife that he w
ould leave at 5 p.m. for
a business appointment that w
ould
include dinner. His m
eeting was to
be with the sam
e person he had seen
on earlier occasions when they had
traveled abroad. Nick said the m
an
was a R
ussian who had been w
ork-
ing for the United States for 25 years.
Shadrin told E
wa he w
as to meet his
friend o
n th
e steps o
f the V
otiv
-
kirche, a large church in clear sight
of the US
. consulate. T
hat was all N
ick Shadrin told his
wife. A
gregarious, ebullient man,
Shad
rin w
as inten
sely p
rivate in
oth
er respects. It d
id n
ot o
ccur to
Ew
a to question him about his w
ork.
She assum
ed the meetings he had in
foreign cities were som
ehow related
to his work for the D
IA.
When N
ick left, Ew
a went out to
stroll the snowy streets of V
ienna.
She retu
rned
about 6
:2o p
.m.; 3
0
minutes later her telephone rang. It
was A
nn Martin, a w
oman E
wa had
'97 "S
HA
DR
IN: T
HE
SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K," C
OP
YR
IGH
T T
1981 S
y T
HE
RE
AD
ER
'S D
IGE
ST
AS
SO
CIA
TIO
N. IN
C..
WIL
L B
E P
UB
LIS
HE
D B
Y R
EA
DE
R'S
DIG
ES
T P
RE
SS
, 1221 A
VE
. OF
TH
E A
ME
RIC
AS
. NE
W T
OR
R. N
.Y. 1
0020.
PH
OT
O. P
AG
E 1
95. W
ILLIA
M S
ON
NT
AG
SHA
DR
IN: T
HE
. SPY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
met in W
ashington ten days earlier. Jam
es Wooten, one of N
ick's clos-est friends, had brought A
nn Martin
to the Shadrin hom
e on Decem
ber 8 specifically for her to m
eet Ew
a. Miss
Martin
had
som
ethin
g to
do w
ith
Nick
's upco
min
g V
ienna m
eeting,
Ew
a was told. E
wa w
as fond of Jim
Wooten
, but sh
e had
found M
iss M
artin to be remote, even cold.
That night ih V
ienna, Ann M
artin said
that sh
e was at th
e Imp
erial H
otel, five minutes aw
ay. She w
ant-ed
to co
me to
Ew
a's hotel ro
om
im
mediately and w
ait there for Nick.
"Of course," replied E
wa, thinking
that perhaps Miss M
artin would un-
bend a hit in a one-on-one setting. A
nn
Martin
was n
early six
feet tall, v
ery th
in, w
ith straig
ht b
row
n
hair. She w
ore no makeup and had
little to say. Ew
a soon saw that any
hope she had for warm
ing up Miss
Martin
was silly
, and sh
e was re-
lieved when N
ick finally came back
after to:3o, in obvious good spirits. A
fter he greeted them, M
iss Martin
got out a pen and pad and motioned
toward the bathroom
. Nick sm
iled at E
wa an
d w
ent in
to th
e bath
room
w
ith Miss M
artin, where, behind the
closed door, they talked in muffled
voices fo
r ten m
inutes. S
oon after-
ward the w
oman left.
Ew
a kn
ew th
at this trip
was th
e m
ost im
po
rtant N
ick h
ad ev
er un
-dertak
en. H
e had
told
her p
rior to
their trip that if everything cam
e off w
ell, he could expect important ad-
vances in his professional life. "N
ick was jubilant," says E
wa. "I
hav
e nev
er seen h
im h
app
ier. His
198
meetin
g m
ust h
ave b
een trem
en-
dously successful."
Waiting for N
ick T
HE
NE
XT
MO
RN
ING
Nick indicat-
ed that the whole day w
as theirs. He
had
one m
ore m
eeting w
ith th
e R
ussian
, bu
t that w
ou
ld n
ot tak
e place until tom
orrow, S
aturday. And
on Sunday they w
ould be off to Mrs.
The S
hadrins spent Friday shop-
ping. But at som
e point toward the
end
of th
e even
ing
, Ew
a beg
an to
notice that N
ick had become increas-
ing
ly p
reoccu
pied
. Befo
re bed
he
took a Valium
pill. Ew
a had never know
n him to seem
this tense. T
he next day they shopped again, but in the afternoon N
ick rested. He
men
tioned
several tim
es that h
e needed to be com
pletely relaxed. At
6 p.m. he got up and dressed.
After slip
pin
g o
n h
is jacket, h
e h
and
ed E
wa a card
. "Th
is is the
number to call if anything happens,"
he said. The num
ber would put her
in touch with A
nn Martin.
That night, E
wa w
ent to the op-era, an
d w
hen
she retu
rned
to th
e hotel, she settled dow
n to read. She
told
herself th
at she w
ou
ld w
ait until 1:3o a.m
. before calling Ann
Martin. T
he d
eadlin
e was q
uick
ly u
po
n
her. Ew
a reached for the telephone. T
here w
as no an
swer. A
deep
and
frightening chill swept through her.
At 1:55 she tried again. T
his time
Ann M
artin answered.
"Have you tried to call before?"
the wom
an asked. These w
ere her first w
ords. Ew
a said she had. Miss
If you're looking to save energy in your laundry room
, you don't have to go so far as w
ashing clothes by hand. B
ut you may w
ant to think about saving your sm
all loads until you have a full one. B
ecause both your washing m
achine and dryer use the sam
e amount of energy
whatever you put in them
. So if even only a third of your norm
al w
ashes are small ones, you can save quite
a bit of money over a year by com
bining them
into full ones. T
hat's just one of the things Atlantic
Richfield is suggesting people do.T
here are lots of others.
The im
portant thing is that if everyone picked at least one thing,and stuck to it, our country w
ould save a load of energy and m
oney. It m
ay sound like a small idea,because
it's so simple. B
ut we think it can pay som
e pretty big dividends.
For all of us.
SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E S
PY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
A AT ITS BEST
Light. Smooth. Im
ported Canadian M
ist. The w
hisky thee becominglonerica's favorite C
anadian.
Martin explained that she had been
having dinner with friends and had
just returned. "N
ick h
as no
t com
e back
," said
Ew
a. T
here w
as a mo
men
t's silence,
and then Ann M
artin said, "It's late, but there's no reason to w
orry. Call
me w
hen he comes in."
For the next 31/2 hours, E
wa w
ait-ed. W
hat had been a joyful Christm
as holid
ay w
as turn
ing in
to a n
ight-
mare. E
ach time she heard the eleva-
tor, she would hold her breath and
listen, h
op
ing
it wo
uld
stop
at her
floor and the footsteps would com
e her w
ay. They never did.
Fin
ally, at 5
:3o a.m
., Ew
a tele-phoned
Miss M
artin ag
ain. "N
ick
hasn't come yet," she said. M
atter-of-factly
, Miss M
artin said
that th
ere w
as still noth
ing to
worry
about.
How
ever, she would "cable W
ash-ington" w
ith the information.
As d
aylig
ht b
roke, A
nn M
artin
arrived. She assured E
wa that N
ick w
ould
pro
bab
ly retu
rn at an
y m
o-
men
t. Mean
while, sh
e said, th
e A
merican
emb
assy w
as check
ing
w
ith all hospitals and the police in case there had been an accident.
Ann M
artin was in and out for the
next two days. T
here was no new
s fro
m th
e check
of h
osp
itals and
police. S
he told Ew
a to be patient, that the U
.S. governm
ent was w
ork-ing for a resolution. N
ever over the day
s they
were to
geth
er did
she
mak
e a sing
le gestu
re of w
armth
, except to offer a curious condolence: "D
on't worry, you'll get used to it."
Th
rou
gh
tears Ew
a loo
ked
up
at 200
Miss M
artin's impassive face. It w
as a m
oment she w
ould never forget. T
uesd
ay m
orn
ing A
nn M
artin
suggested
that E
wa b
ook p
assage
on Wednesday to W
ashington, via F
rankfurt. An engaging older gen-
tleman from
the midw
estern United
States h
ad b
een d
ispatch
ed fro
m
Washington to escort her hom
e, she ex
plain
ed. H
is nam
e was B
ruce.
She g
ave E
wa th
e impressio
n sh
e w
ould find Bruce a com
forting trav-el com
panion. B
ut th
e cold
aloofn
ess of A
nn
Martin w
as quickly surpassed by the alm
ost sullen taciturnity of the non-descript m
an called Bruce. O
n the flight to F
rankfurt he and Ew
a did not sit together. T
hey did sit together on the long flight from
Frankfurt to
Washington, but never once did they
hav
e a substan
tive co
nversatio
n.
Bru
ce spen
t his tim
e readin
g an
d
staring ahead, while E
wa sat quietly,
trying to suppress her tears. A
bout 1
:3o p
.m. o
n C
hristm
as E
ve they arrived at Dulles Interna-
tional Airport and w
ere met by Jim
W
ooten. On the drive from
the air-port to
the S
hadrin
s' hom
e in
M
cLean, V
a., Wooten and E
wa sat in
the back talking quietly. Bruce sat
in fro
nt.
Wooten
explain
ed th
at the g
ov-
ernment's w
orking theory on Nick's
disappearance was that he had been
kidnapped by the Soviets. H
e told E
wa that the strongest possible steps
were being taken to bring about his
pro
mpt retu
rn. S
ecretary o
f State
Henry K
issinger had agreed to see A
natoly Dobrynin, the S
oviet am-
IMP
OR
I ED
By F
T;P
IRIT
TIT
LT
D N
Y,N
Y. C
AN
AD
IAN
WH
ISK
Y- A
OLU
ND
50 P
FT
CH
I : t 19
79
BO
OK
SE
CT
ION
S
HA
DR
IN: T
HE
SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K
bassa
dor to
the U
nite
d S
tate
s, the
next day. W
oote
n to
ld E
wa g
ently
that
som
e re
solu
tion
mu
st be
fou
nd
ur-
ge
ntly b
eca
use
he
be
lieve
d it like
ly th
e S
ovie
ts w
ou
ld e
xe
cu
te N
ick
with
in 4
8 h
ours. H
e re
min
ded h
er
that th
e S
ovie
ts had p
lace
d N
ick under a death sentence follow
ing his defection 16 years earlier.
As th
e ca
r neare
d th
e S
hadrin
hom
e, W
oote
n to
ld E
wa it w
as e
x-tre
me
ly imp
orta
nt th
at sh
e te
ll no
o
ne
wh
at h
ad
ha
pp
en
ed
. Th
e o
nly
hope in
gettin
g N
ick back w
as in
m
akin
g su
re n
oth
ing le
ake
d to
the
pre
ss. An
y pu
blish
ed
acco
unt co
uld
hopelessly tangle negotiations.
But w
hat ca
n I te
ll our frie
nds?
" asked E
wa.
"Tell them
you were ill and had to
com
e h
om
e e
arly," W
oote
n sa
id.
"Te
ll the
m th
at N
ick staye
d o
n to
ski."
It was a
cocke
yed e
xpla
natio
n,
Ew
a thought, but at least it suggest-ed that W
ooten and the government
seemed optim
istic about an early end to
the crisis. In
the h
ouse
, Woote
n
contin
ued. "S
ince y
ou'll fin
d o
ut
who w
e are soon enough," he said, "I m
ight a
s w
ell te
ll you n
ow
." He
expla
ined th
at th
e s
trange m
an
named B
ruce was actually an officer
with
the C
IA. (Y
ears
late
r, Ew
a
would learn that his nam
e was B
ruce S
olie
.) Woote
n id
entifie
d h
imse
lf as
an a
gent w
ith th
e F
BI.
"But w
hat w
as g
oin
g o
n in
Vie
n-
na?" crie
d E
wa.
Wo
ote
n w
ou
ld sa
y on
ly tha
t Nick
was w
orking honorably for his coun- 202
February
try, that his work w
as in the highest tra
ditio
n o
f patrio
tism.
A S
eries of M
eeting
s
TH
E N
EX
T S
EV
EN
DA
YS
w
ere as te
rrible
as a
ny E
wa S
hadrin
would
eve
r'know
. She w
as a
lone w
ith th
e
nu
mb
ing
be
lief th
at h
er h
usb
an
d
had been kidnapped by the Soviets.
In u
tter d
esp
air, s
he
fina
lly te
le-
phoned W
illiam
and M
ary L
ouise
H
ow
e fo
r con
sola
tion
an
d h
elp
. F
rom the S
hadrins' earliest days in th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s, the
Ho
we
s ha
d
opened their handsome W
ashington hom
e to them. A
s a senior electronics analyst for the O
ffice of Naval Intel-
lige
nce
(0m
), Bill H
ow
e w
as o
ne
of
the first to
debrie
f Shadrin
in 1
959.
Afte
r on
e o
f his e
arly se
ssion
s with
S
hadrin, he had told his colleagues: "If he is a typical S
oviet navy captain, the U
nited States is in deep trouble."
Fortunately S
hadrin was not typical;
he w
as p
erh
aps th
e b
est d
estro
yer
cap
tain
in th
e S
ovie
t na
vy. A
frien
dsh
ip h
ad d
eve
loped th
at
span
ned
t6 ye
ars. T
he
re w
ere
fre-
qu
en
t visits to e
ach
oth
er's h
om
es,
and the two couples even took trips
togeth
er. N
ick taught th
e H
ow
es'
son to
hunt a
nd fish
. Ew
a w
as th
e
How
es' dentist. When N
ick encoun-te
red
a sn
arl in
be
com
ing
a citize
n,
Mary L
ouise
How
e m
ove
d q
uickly
to h
ave
a frie
nd a
nd n
eig
hbor w
ho
was a
US
. Senato
r alle
viate
the
difficu
lty. E
wa's trem
ulous voice on the tele-phone th
at N
ew
Year's D
ay, 1
976,
insta
ntly
ale
rted
the
Ho
we
s th
at
something w
as terribly wrong. T
hey
19
81
listened in
.asto
nish
ment to
Ew
a's
story. B
ill How
e, who had spent 25 years
in va
rious a
reas o
f the in
tellig
ence
busin
ess, w
as a
ble
to m
ake
more
se
nse
out o
f the clu
es th
an E
wa
could. His counsel w
as to bring into th
e fo
ld o
f con
fide
nce
Ro
be
rt an
d
He
len
Ku
pp
erm
an
, mu
tua
l frien
ds
of the Shadrins' and the H
owes' w
ho had e
xcelle
nt co
nnectio
ns a
t the
State D
epartment.
At th
e tim
e o
f Shadrin
's disa
p-
pearance, Robert - K
upperm
an w
as
chie
f scien
tist for th
e A
rms C
on
trol
and D
isarm
am
ent A
gency. H
ele
n
Kupperm
an was an attorney for the
National A
eronautics and Space A
d-m
inis
tratio
n. T
he
y h
ad
me
t the
S
hadrins about eight years earlier. K
up
pe
rma
n w
as re
pe
ate
dly im
-pressed w
ith Shadrin's distinguished
connections. He recalls, for instance,
tha
t Sh
ad
rin in
trod
uce
d h
im to
A
dm
. Sta
nsfie
ld T
urn
er, w
ho la
ter
became director of the C
IA. K
upper-m
an a
lso w
as a
ware
of S
hadrin
's clo
se a
ssocia
tion w
ith A
dm
. Rufu
s T
aylor, who in the late '6os held the
second-highest positions at the CIA
and D
irk. K
up
pe
rma
n b
eg
an
callin
g p
er-
sonal friends in sensitive positions at th
e S
tate
Departm
ent. B
ut e
ven
those frie
nds w
ould
not te
ll him
a
nyth
ing
spe
cific. On
e d
id e
xpre
ss h
orro
r ove
r "the
go
vern
me
nts p
lac-
ing a
n A
meric
an c
itizen in
such
extre
me je
opard
y." Anoth
er to
ld
Ku
pp
erm
an
the
situa
tion
wa
s no
ne
of h
is busin
ess, a
ddin
g th
at "it is
a sad and hopeless case."
On January 6, at the urging of the
Ho
we
s an
d th
e K
up
pe
rma
ns, E
wa
te
lephoned W
oote
n. S
he to
ld h
im
that he must give her a better idea of
what N
ick h
ad b
een d
oin
g if h
e
expected her to continue putting off people w
ho were asking repeatedly
wh
en
Nick w
ou
ld b
e b
ack.
Th
at e
ven
ing
, pro
mp
tly at n
ine
, W
ooten arrived at the Kupperm
ans•' hom
e. B
ill and M
ary L
ouise
How
e
were there along w
ith Ew
a. They sat
aro
und th
e d
inin
g-ro
om
table
. W
oo
ten
told
the
ga
the
ring
tha
t during the sum
mer of 1966 S
hadrin h
ad
be
en
ap
pro
ach
ed
by a
So
viet
inte
llige
nce
ag
en
t in d
ow
nto
wn
W
ash
ingto
n. T
he a
gent p
ropose
d
that Shadrin go to w
ork as a spy for th
e S
ovie
t Un
ion
. Sh
ad
rin h
ad
sta
lled th
e a
gent a
nd re
porte
d th
e
approach to the FB
I. Im
mediately, an opportunity w
as seen to exploit the situation. T
he FB
I pro
pose
d th
at S
hadrin
pla
y alo
ng
with
the
So
viets.
According to the other five people
at th
e m
eetin
g th
at n
ight, W
oote
n
sta
ted
tha
t fot "c
lose
to a
ye
ar"
Sh
ad
rin re
fuse
d th
e F
BI's re
qu
est.
Fin
ally
, Woote
n s
aid
, Shadrin
's
friend and mentor A
dm. R
ufus Tay-
lor "twisted his arm
" and persuaded him
to co-operate. Nick's role w
as to pass C
IA-doctored inform
ation about the U
.S. N
avy to the Soviets.
Ove
r and o
ver, th
e sa
me q
ues-
tion a
rose
: how
could
som
eone a
s intelligent as N
ick Shadrin ever have
consented to become involved in a
dangero
us co
unte
rinte
lligence
op-
eration? The answ
er was alw
ays the 20
Read w
hy Com
plete,with
its unique cleansing system,
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Run your tongue over your
dentures. If they don't feel really sm
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Com
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ay tough stains—plus
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can't touch. A
nd because Com
plete actu-ally polishes your dentures sm
oother, they feel cleaner, and stay cleaner longer, too.
Try C
omplete. A
nd feel the sm
ooth ,fresh difference it makes.
You can feel how w
ell it deans.
February
same: patriotism
and Rufus T
aylor. T
he five listeners were even m
ore in
credulo
us as W
ooten
describ
ed
how
Shad
rin h
ad b
een sen
t out o
f th
e cou
ntry
in th
e early '7
os o
n
missions to m
eet with the S
oviets. To
exp
erienced
min
ds lik
e tho
se of
Kupperm
an and How
e, the extreme
dan
ger o
f the b
asic operatio
n w
as m
agnified hundreds of times by al-
lowing S
hadrin to meet w
ith Soviet
agen
ts ou
tside o
f the co
un
try. H
e w
as, after all, living under a Soviet
death sentence. The slightest indica-
tion Shadrin w
as playing the Soviets
for fools could be his downfall.
Shadrin's first m
eeting with S
ovi-et agents outside of the country took place on a trip to M
ontreal in 1971, W
ooten said. Indeed, Ew
a recalled a "business m
eeting" Nick had during
their v
acation
in C
anad
a. Wo
oten
said that S
hadrin again met w
ith the S
oviets in Vienna in 1972. O
n that trip N
ick was aw
ay from the S
had-rin
s' ho
tel ov
ernig
ht, so
that th
e S
oviets had time to train him
in the use of sophisticated espionage equip-m
ent. A
gain
, Ew
a remem
bered
a "business m
eeting." A
few days after the gathering at
the K
up
perm
ans' h
ou
se, Wo
oten
dropped by to see E
wa. H
e brought another FB
I agen
t alon
g w
ith h
im.
Wooten
told
Ew
a that fo
llow
ing
Nick's m
eeting with the S
oviets in 1972, so
me esp
ionag
e equip
men
t had been sent by diplom
atic pouch to the S
oviet embassy in W
ashing-ton and had then been turned over to
Nick
by h
is K
GB
contact. T
he
FBI
thought it b
est to rem
ove th
e
1981
equipment now
that Nick w
as gone. E
wa readily agreed, though she
could not imagine w
hat could be in th
e house th
at she d
id n
ot k
now
ab
out. W
ooten
strode to
Nick
's study, reached unerringly for a par- ticu
lar book an
d flip
ped
it open
. E
wa saw
that the inside of the book w
as hollowed out, creating a cavity
where som
ething could be hidden. T
hen
Wooten
told
Ew
a that
somew
here in the attic there was a
radio
transm
itter. Listen
ing
to h
is d
escriptio
n, E
wa felt certain
she
would have noticed som
ething that size, but she had not. S
till, she took the m
en to the attic, but they could find nothing. T
hen Ew
a happened to
pick
up a b
ox o
f thin
gs sto
red
there th
at belo
nged
to o
ne o
f her
friend
s. Ben
eath th
at was a card
-board box w
hich Wooten instantly
recognized as containing the trans-m
itter. Wooten and his assistant car-
ried it downstairs and loaded it into
the trunk of Wooten's car.
A W
arning
BA
CK
IN
1959, soon after th
eir d
ramatic escap
e to S
wed
en, N
ick
and Ew
a were taken under the w
ing of an officer of the R
oyal Sw
edish N
avy, Cm
dr. Sven R
ydstrom, w
ho spoke excellent R
ussian and English.
Then
came so
me th
ree week
s of
interrogation by Sw
edish naval and intelligence officials. R
ydstrom in-
form
ed th
em th
at his g
overn
men
t w
ould do its best to accomm
odate them
in Sw
eden. How
ever, he ex-plained, because of its proxim
ity to S
oviet-controlled countries, Sw
eden
CA
N Y
OU
R IA
N I IIK
I .S
PA
SS
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NG
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OR
E C
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tubs Toiletry Products, Box 1336, C
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oupon will not be
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hen presented by outside agencies. brokers or others w
ho are not retail distributors of our m
erchandise or specifically authorized by us to present coupons for redem
ption or when abused. prohibited, taxed or
otherwise restricted. N
ontransferable. Good only on item
specified above. Invoice covering purchase of sufficient stock to cover coupons presented for redem
ption must be
shown on request. C
ustomer m
ost pay any sales tax. Cash
value 1/20 or I cent. Coupon Expires D
ecember 31.1981.
23900 1
02247
204
205
SH.1D
RIN
: TH
E SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K
All You N
eed is B
ayerA spirin
.
MOUNT SI:HELENS APTierS
DEMOCRATSAFGHAV REPUBLICANS *3
* It is the m
ost corn-
plete, up-to-date Alm
anac m
oney can buy because it's the O
NL
Y A
lmanac that covers the
FU
LL
year of 1980. * It has special FO
CU
S articles that d
etail major even
ts of the year. * It is d
ivided
into forty
main
sections b
y alph
abet for easy referen
ce. * It high
-lights im
portant events of the year in each section. * It is 1980 C
OM
PL
ET
E in w
ords and pictures. SEN
D F
OR
IT!
SE
ND
NO
MO
NE
Y N
OW
! Sen
d yo
ur n
ame an
d ad
dress to
R
eader's Digest, D
ept. OS
7549-C, P
leasantville, N.Y
. 10570. W
e will b
ill you
later for $4.98 p
lus file p
ost-
age an
d ap
plicab
le state tax, If any. (P
rice and
po
st-age subject to change w
ithout notice. Order subject to
acceptance and credit approval by Reader's D
igest.) 112eadat
was a d
ifficult p
lace to relo
cate defecto
rs. Englan
d w
ould
also b
e recep
tive—
an o
ptio
n th
e Sw
edes
would expedite if the couple w
ished. It w
as Ew
a wh
o p
rop
osed
that
they
go
to th
e Un
ited S
tates, bu
t R
yd
strom
had
grav
e reservatio
ns.
"Th
e Am
ericans w
ill use y
ou
and
abandon you," he w
arned, according to E
wa. D
espite this cautionary note, E
wa approached the A
merican em
-bassy, and they w
ere granted politi-cal asylum
. T
he embassy m
ade arrangements
to fly
the co
up
le to F
rank
furt first.
There, U
.S. intelligence people took
them
to a h
ouse o
n th
e outsk
irts of th
e c
ity, w
here
their d
ays
were filled
with
interv
iews an
d
interrogations. B
oth
Nick
and E
wa w
ere giv
en
polygraph tests, and there were long,
seemingly pointless interview
s with
psychiatrists. After three w
eeks, they w
ere info
rmed
that th
ey h
ad b
een
cleared fo
r transfer to
the U
nited
S
tates. They arrived in W
ashington on A
ugust 22
, 1959, and were taken
to a "safe" house in Virginia.
TH
E D
EF
EC
TIO
N
of N
iko
lai Arta-
monov coincided w
ith a crucial peri-od in the developm
ent of the Soviet
navy—a period w
hen U.S
. Naval in-
telligence analysts were m
ore inter-ested
than
ever in
learnin
g S
ov
iet techniques and intentions. W
hile the U
nited States m
aintained a strong N
aval superiority, there was no ques-
tion
that th
e So
viets w
ere gain
ing
broadly and rapidly.
Fro
m th
e start the C
IA seem
s to have had little active interest in A
rta-m
onov. Spies have an insatiable hun-
ger for documents, and A
rtamonov
had
bro
ught n
ot a sh
red o
f pap
er w
ith h
im. W
hat h
e did
brin
g, o
f course, w
as a vast store of knowledge
about the Soviet navy. B
ut that alone seem
s not to have been sufficient for th
e CIA
to w
ant to
dev
elop A
rta-m
onov in
to o
ne o
f its ow
n re
-sources—
as it did with a num
ber of the im
portant defectors from S
oviet intelligence services.
And A
rtamonov seem
s to h
ave
had little interest in dealing with the
CIA
. More th
an sim
ply
hav
ing n
o
back
gro
un
d in
So
viet in
telligen
ce operatio
ns, A
rtamonov ap
pears to
have scorned the K
GB
officers he had k
no
wn
. Ind
eed, h
e rather clearly
thought the skills of his intelligence counterparts—
Am
erican or Soviet—
were crude com
pared with those of
highy trained military m
en. S
till, it was up to the C
IA to pass
judgment on the subject of A
rtamo-
nov's authenticity as a defector, his bona fides. T
he Soviets had becom
e increasingly skilled at sending out phony defectors w
ho, if accepted, could do enorm
ous damage.
The guards assigned to the safe
house were, in N
ick's eyes, not much
different from S
oviet security per-so
nn
el. Th
ey seem
ed slo
pp
y an
d
spent much of their tim
e watching
television. S
hadrin's toleration point for in-com
petence was exceedingly low
, an
d fin
ally, o
ne n
ight, h
e had
had
enough. H
e woke up in the m
iddle of th
e nig
ht an
d tip
toed
dow
n th
e 207
You get m
ore for your m
oney w
ith the R
eader% D
igest 1981 A
lmanac
and Yearbook!
"A
n m
eet to any p
enes w
ho w
ean to slay w
ell-!p
lowm
en In
fhb
sosapileated
world
. Th
e Into,.
madam
Is am to A
nd and wars to read."
—Seance B
arry M. G
oldwater
BaY
fr Just100% n &
wh
at do
ctors
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d m
ost.
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nd aspirin is doctors' num
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Read and follow
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s.
SH
AD
RIN
TH
E S
PY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
steps. H
e fo
und th
ree o
f the
CIA
g
uard
s sou
nd
asleep at th
eir po
sts. C
arefully
he rem
oved
the b
ullets
from
each m
an's w
eapon. T
he n
ext
mo
rnin
g, after elicitin
g a few
corn
-m
ents fro
m th
e gu
ards ab
ou
t their
vig
ilant n
igh
t, Nick
gav
e back
the
amm
un
ition
.
Extrao
rdin
ary C
on
tributio
n
AB
OU
T T
EN
DA
YS
after Sh
adrin
's arrival, L
t. Cm
dr. Thom
as L. D
wyer
of th
e Office o
f Nav
al Intellig
ence
was n
otified
that h
e cou
ld b
egin
the
lon
g-term
deb
riefing
. Bill H
ow
e is p
ositiv
e that S
had
rin's b
ona fid
es had
been
accepted
by th
e CIA
at the
time th
ey tu
rned
him
ov
er to th
e O
NI. "T
here is n
o w
ay th
ey w
ould
expose senior analytical personnel to h
im if th
ey h
ad an
y q
uestio
ns," h
e says.
Shadrin w
as elated when told that
he w
ou
ld b
e meetin
g a N
avy m
an,
and fro
m th
e first mom
ent, D
wyer
and h
e go
ralong sp
lendid
ly. "It w
as as if th
ere were n
o lan
gu
age b
arrier w
ith T
om
Dw
yer," say
s Ew
a. "He
was so
gracio
us, so
friendly
, such
a gen
tleman
." W
ith h
is intro
ductio
n to
Dw
yer,
Shadrin began nine m
onths of steady d
ebriefin
g b
y th
e O
NI. T
he sco
pe
of S
had
rin's in
form
ation w
as stun-
ning—ranging from
technical aspects of m
issiles and co
mm
unicatio
n sy
s-tem
s to strateg
ic and tactical th
ink-
ing
of S
oviet m
ilitary lead
ers. At a
time w
hen
the S
ov
iet Un
ion
was
officially
den
igratin
g th
e impor-
tance of developing a global navy, in reality
, Shad
rin ex
plain
ed, it w
as 208
carefully
con
structin
g ju
st such
a cap
acity. S
had
rin also
con
tribu
ted
details about a secret Soviet decision
in February 1955 to adopt a doctrine
of surprise nuclear attack against the U
nited
States.
Th
e a
rea o
f Sh
ad
rin's g
reate
st im
med
iate con
tribu
tion
con
cerned
S
ov
iet anti-su
bm
arine tactics. "H
e co
uld
tell us h
ow
So
viet d
estroy
ers w
ere
go
ing
to re
act to
ou
r best
sub
marin
es," says D
wy
er. "Th
e in-
form
ation w
as invalu
able."
In fa
ct, in
the sp
ring
of 1
96
0,
Sh
adrin
wen
t to N
orfo
lk, V
a., for
anti-submarine m
aneuvers. The idea
was to let S
hadrin conduct simulated
warfa
re a
gain
st a so
phistic
ate
d
Am
eric
an
nu
cle
ar su
b. N
ot o
nly
w
ou
ld th
e officers ab
oard
the d
e-stroyer benefit from
seeing the way a
skilled
Soviet co
mm
ander h
ad b
een
trained
to resp
ond, b
ut th
e crew o
f th
e su
bm
arin
e w
ou
ld le
arn
from
observing his tactical finesse.
Nick
Shad
rin—
Cap
t. Nik
olai A
r-tam
onov again for a few hours—
took over the destroyer. N
ot long into the exercise, he had the subm
arine in the positio
n h
e wan
ted it. T
wo h
undred
feet b
elow
, the su
b ro
lled erratically
as sh
e spun an
d sp
ed fro
m th
e de-
stroyer. W
ith alm
ost in
stant p
reci- sio
n, S
had
rin's d
estroyer p
ush
ed
thro
ugh th
e w
ate
rs, keepin
g its
po
sition
on
the su
bm
arin
e. T
he
Am
erican N
avy
men
were d
eeply
im
pressed. F
or N
ick, it w
as child
's play
," say
s To
m D
wy
er. "He to
ld m
e the
sub w
as a fat, slow
-movin
g targ
et." A
t the e
nd o
f nin
e m
onth
s the
"A 20-MIN
UTE C
ALL A
NYW
HER
E IN TH
E CO
UN
TRY
WILL C
OST M
E ON
LY $3.33? WH
AT'S TH
E CA
TCH
?"
NiI C
atd
1 N
a b
idd
en
C,AS YMI Can
telephone v
isit with
out o
f state fam
ily and friend:: for 20 inimites foi $;i 33m
r le,s That includes tax
Ju
,t bc sure to dial direct when ram
s are lowest
K.
That's any tim
e Saturday incl S
unday t di 5mr, if you
avieo of ,e,. .+00
Tw
enty
min
utes isim
t an ex
amp
le An
d i
0,12.: 0 4
016;1
;, e
.- prefer. ;In
v n
ight after li ill 8
in th
e morn
ing
$3 :i3 is for the maxim
um di,tance. so
V'5
0
many of your calls m
ind rust li, s
, O
ti ros
440
00°̀
eto
4 4
,64Ok e
T
he chart 174.1(1W
gives you cte
ri;461,
many m
ore city to city prices 64 6.4
0;0
' I lav
e a nu
, visit.
0
,,00 9L,,,ss°,0 4
t. s'Oskte
e 0.1,c"I'te
0-1 0'e -,,6 10
s° 0'1.3%
44 00
5° v
s°
6 01 0
, 0
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ell S
ystem
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l
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SE
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F
ebruary 0
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K
consensus among O
NI officials w
as that S
hadrin's contribution had been extraordinary. M
any senior analysts felt it w
as importan
t to b
ring h
im
into the ON
I in an official capacity, so that the U
nited States could continue
to benefit from his know
ledge. B
ut the ON
I had never hired a So-
viet defector, and there was som
e op-position to such a m
ove. In the end T
om
Dw
yer an
d B
ill How
e were
able to dispel these doubts, and Shad-
rin to
ok
a po
st in th
e Tran
slation
U
nit, although he was on call by the
various intelligence agencies of the g
ov
ernm
ent th
at mig
ht fin
d h
im
useful. W
ith a lump-sum
payment from
the C
IA for his m
onths of consulting services, S
hadrin made a dow
n pay-m
ent on a small house in A
rlington, V
a. An
d at last h
e and
Ew
a were
married. N
ick was pleased w
ith his job, and E
wa w
as planning to return to
den
tal scho
ol so
that sh
e cou
ld
practice d
entistry
in th
e Un
ited
States.
Of all th
ose w
ho
adm
ired N
ick
Sh
adrin
, no
on
e felt mo
re stron
gly
about him
than did Tom
Dw
yer. But
on
e thin
g w
orried
Dw
yer a g
rcat deal. F
or most of his career D
wyer
had
wo
rked
in N
aval in
telligen
ce. B
ut he had also known som
e of the people involved in C
IA counterintel-
ligence. He knew
something about
their instincts, their values, and the so
rts of situ
ation
s they
mig
ht b
e tem
pted to exploit. D
wyer felt that N
ick Shadrin w
as id
eally su
ited fo
r use in
a cou
nter-
intelligence operation. He knew
that 21
0
the C
IA
could
play
on S
had
rin's
fierce anti-Soviet attitudes, as w
ell as his p
atriotism
tow
ard th
e United
S
tates, in co
nv
incin
g h
im to
wo
rk
against the Soviets.
Brin
gin
g h
is thoughts in
to th
e open, D
wyer told S
hadrin to resist an
y su
ch o
vertu
re, no
matter h
ow
n
ob
le the u
ltimate g
oal m
igh
t ap-
pear. S
ov
iet cou
nterin
telligen
ce agents w
ere also highly skilled, he said
. Ev
en m
ore serio
us, D
wy
er w
arned, was his feeling that the C
IA
counterintelligence officers would
not necessarily have Shadrin's w
el-fare forem
ost in their minds.
Shadrin accepted D
wyer's w
arn-ing gravely, pensively.
The C
autious Spy
IN D
ECEMBER 1961, a S
oviet defec-tor nam
ed Anatoli M
. Golitsin ar-
rived in the United States. A
t the time
of his defection, he was a m
ajor in the K
GB
department that specialized in
clandestine activities abroad. His rev-
elations about Soviet penetration of
Western intelligence services w
ere to have thundering reverberations.
Golitsin's tales of penetration in
the French governm
ent were so seri-
ous that some of President C
harles de G
aulle's top advisers fell under suspi-cio
n. P
. L. T
hyrau
d d
e Vosjo
li, a high-ranking F
rench intelligence of-fic
er, la
ter a
sserte
d th
at G
olit-
sin ex
hib
ited "an
intricate g
rasp
of th
e inner w
ork
ings o
f Fren
ch
intelligence." G
olitsin
's leads to
uch
ed o
ther
countries. Kim
Phil by, the celebrated Soviet spy in B
ritish intelligence, was
1981 S
HA
DR
IN: T
HE
SP
Y W
H
exposed with his help. Inform
ation supplied by G
olitsin also contributed to the dow
nfall of Stig E
ric Wcnner-
strom, the Soviet spy w
hose treachery scandalized S
weden.
Golitsin also provided leads to a
high-level penetration of U.S
. intelli-gence. B
ut his leads were not suffi-
cient to bring about the exposure of any A
merican intelligence personnel.
Golitsin's living conditions w
ere alm
ost extravagant. He and his w
ife h
ad b
een g
iven
a fine h
ou
se in
Virg
inia. T
he
CIA
fu
rnish
ed h
im
with
a car and
a chau
ffeur. M
rs. G
olitsin had a maid.
Bu
t the
CIA
seem
ed u
nab
le to
offer him security. Intensely para-
no
id, G
olitsin
acqu
ired tw
o fierce
Germ
an shepherds that were often
at his side. Surely G
olitsin's tension w
as heightened by his wondering if
in fact h
e was d
ealing w
ith secret
Soviet agents operating in the C
IA.
Nor, at first, did the C
IA seem
able to
giv
e him
a friend. F
ortu
itously
, N
ick Shadrin had been feeling the
same tug for com
panionship with a
native Russian. T
he CIA
orchestrated th
e intro
ductio
n in
early O
Cto
ber
1962. F
rom the initial m
eeting the two
men got along w
ell. They shared a
love for long conversations, based on their intricate know
ledge of politics and history. A
nd both men had an
interest, fo
r differen
t reasons, in
G
erman shepherds.
Shad
rin an
d G
olitsin
did
not
know that they also shared a bond as
Soviet defectors in w
hom C
IA coun-
terintelligence chief James A
ngleton had faith. Few
Soviet defectors had
ever w
on th
e trust o
f the ev
er- cautious A
ngleton. If S
hadrin was provoked over the
man
ner o
f the C
IA in dealing w
ith him
, he soon realized his complaints
were triv
ial. Leg
itimately
or n
ot,
Golitsin w
as developing a towering
resentment against the C
IA. H
e was
angry with their people, their m
eth-ods, w
hat he perceived to be their procedural inefficiency. In spite of exceedingly elaborate security m
eas-ures, he believed that at any m
oment
he could be plucked off the streets by the K
GB
. W
hat worried him
as much as his
personal protection was the C
IA's fail-
ure to get other intelligence agencies to follow
his leads. And the A
gency had m
ade no progress in rooting out its ow
n penetration by the Soviets
that Golitsin had pointed to.
(Nearly
20 y
ears later, Golitsin
recalled to R
eader's Digest that dur-
ing one of his final meetings w
ith S
had
rin, h
e warn
ed h
im th
at he
should order Ew
a to make no m
ore telep
ho
ne calls to
her p
arents in
P
olan
d. T
he im
plicatio
n w
as that
such calls would facilitate the S
ovi-ets' efforts to locate the S
hadrins and th
at indeed
these calls m
ay h
ave
played a role in Nick's dow
nfall.) F
inally, Golitsin told S
hadrin he co
uld
take n
o m
ore. H
e said h
e believed he w
ould be safer and hap-pier in E
ngland, and made plans to
leave in February 1963.
Golitsin
knew
how
much
the
Shadrins adm
ired his lovely home,
and insisted on selling it to them for a
211
SHA
DR
IN: T
HE
SPY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
price far b
elow
the m
arket v
alue.
Nick felt this w
ould be an improper
gift, and stoutly declined. Later, after
Sh
adrin
also refu
sed to
accept an
expensive color-T
V set, E
wa found it
one morning sitting on the doorstep.
Bu
t the m
ost lastin
g g
ift from
G
olitsin
was o
ne o
f the G
erman
shepherds w
hich served as a guard. S
had
rin w
as delig
hted
to h
ave th
e dog
and
imm
ediately
nam
ed it
Dzh
ulb
ars, after a Russian
dog
roughly comparable to L
assie in the U
nited States. Q
uickly, the dog be-cam
e kn
ow
n as Ju
lik. H
e wo
uld
rem
ain one of Shadrin's closest com
-panions for the next 13 years.
Som
etime after this, N
ick present-ed E
wa w
ith a snub-nosed, .38-cali-ber S
mith and W
esson and told her alw
ays to
carry it w
hen
she to
ok
Julik
walk
ing. H
e said h
e wan
ted
her to have the gun for her protec-tion as w
ell as to protect Julik in case he w
as attacked
by a larg
er dog.
When he took the dog out, S
hadrin occasionally—
in Ew
a s presence—strapped on a holster that housed his h
eavy
9-m
m. W
alther au
tom
atic. N
ick once explained to her that he, to
o, w
orried
about Ju
lik's b
eing
attacked.
Grow
ing Frustration
ON
E. O
F T
HE
GR
EA
TE
ST
professional p
leasures in
Nick
Sh
adrin
's first years at the O
ffice of Naval Intelli-
gence was his association w
ith Vice
Adm
iral Rufus L
. Taylor.
"I cou
ld n
ot tell y
ou
just w
hen
th
eir friendsh
ip started
,' says o
ne
Nav
al officer w
ith secu
rity clear-
212
ances, w
ho w
ork
ed acro
ss the h
all from
Nick's office. "B
ut I do know
that during those early years Taylor,
who w
as then in charge of the Intelli-gence D
ivision, would be in there for
an h
our at a tim
e talkin
g to
Nick
." T
he Naval officer, w
ho greatly ad-m
ired Shadrin, w
as constantly aware
of th
e thin
gs h
e wish
ed h
e cou
ld
discu
ss with
Nick
bu
t held
back
because S
hadrin did not have a secu-rity
clearance. H
e remem
bers th
at R
ufus Taylor had no such com
punc-tion. "It w
as quite routine for them
to be talking about classified Naval
intelligence,' he says. D
urin
g th
e early '6
os, S
had
rin's
valu
e to th
e Un
ited S
tates rang
ed
far beyond his consulting duties at the O
NI. H
e addressed mem
bers of the Joint C
hiefs of Staff about S
oviet naval strategy and capabilities. H
e briefed the com
manders at A
tlantic F
leet head
qu
arters and
on
several
occasions flew to H
awaii, w
here he gav
e briefin
gs at th
e Pacific F
leet headquarters.
More im
portant to Shadrin w
ere his frequent invitations to lecture at the N
aval War C
ollege. He delivered
his first lecture there on October 27,
i96
1. T
his an
d o
ther ap
pearan
ces w
on Shadrin glow
ing "Dear N
ick" letters o
f than
ks fro
m A
dm
. Stan
-field T
urner, who later becam
e presi-dent of the C
ollege. D
urin
g th
e first half o
f the '6
os
Shadrin's life w
as enriched by many
new
experien
ces and asso
ciations,
endearin
g frien
dsh
ips, an
d m
uch
huntin
g an
d fish
ing. B
ut slo
wly
S
hadrin's friends began to sense his
AD
VE
RT
ISE
ME
NT
Do you
kn
ow
w
hat you
r ab
ou
t b
od
y
kn
ow
s vitam
in C
? C
ut your arm. B
um your hand. B
reak a leg. N
one of these will heal properly w
ithout adequate vitam
in C along w
ith other essential nutrients. Nor w
ill severe bruises or w
ounds heal properly.
Sore throat. Earache. H
igh fever. A
ll can begin with an infection that overw
helms your
body's natural defenses. Vitam
in C, along w
ith other essential nutrients,optim
izes your body's natural capacity to resist illness and helps keep
your tissues healthy.
Up tight or up in sm
oke. W
ith both acute stress and heavy cigarette smoking, the
plasma levels of vitam
in C in your blood m
ay be lowered.
So, you could be robbing your body of this essential vitam
in without even know
ing it.
Up your iron.
Vitam
in C increases your body's ability to absorb iron
from food w
hen they are taken together. Iron is the m
ost comm
on deficiency in the diet, and may be related
to a loss of energy.. T
here are many reasons w
hy your body needs an adequate intake of vitam
in C. Y
et your body doesn't m
ake it. Vitam
in C m
ust come from
food or vitamin
supplements. So, eat a balanced diet. Y
ou can also look for fortified foods w
hen you shop or take a supplement
containing vitamin C
every day just to be sure. V
itamin C
omm
unications, Hoffm
ann-La R
oche Inc., N
utley, N.J. 07110
Vitam
ins. Something you can do for your health.
RCD 3276
BO
OK
SEC
TIO
N
gro
win
g fru
stration o
ver th
e pro
-fessional lim
itations he faced with-
out a secu
rity clearan
ce. With
the
passage of time—
and his distancing from
the Soviet navy—
Shadrin's po-
tential as an analyst was increasingly
stunted
. His sto
re of k
now
ledge
could
not b
e replen
ished
with
the
fresh classified information that w
as b
eing
gath
ered o
n S
ov
iet nav
al technology.
On one occasion W
illiam H
owe
raised the issue with R
ufus Taylor,
who agreed to try to get a clearance
for Shadrin. T
he response was nega-
tive. N
o p
ruden
t security
agen
cy
cou
ld affo
rd to
risk th
e min
uscu
le ch
ance th
at Shad
rin w
as really a
Soviet agent.
In spite of his frustrations, Shadrin
gave outward signs that he continued
to en
joy h
is work
. He to
ok g
reat pride in E
wa's accom
plishments. S
he had quickly m
astered her dental pro-g
ram; h
er lang
uag
e skills ev
en ex
-ceeded his ow
n, and she was readily
com
patib
le with
her A
merican
pa-
tients and friends. B
ut S
had
rin d
id sp
eak to
his
friend
s abo
ut E
wa's su
ccess com
-pared w
ith his own. S
he was earning
more m
oney than he and had estab-lished herself in a life-long career. It deeply concerned N
ick that his own
professional life was strikingly less
successful. S
hadrin was w
orking at the ON
! under a five-year contract, expiring in
1965. H
e was th
e only
defecto
r ever to w
ork as a consultant for the O
NI,
and h
ad b
een co
nsisten
tly
praised for his exceptional contribu- 214
February
lions. B
ut h
is contract w
as not
renewed.
By this tim
e, the DIA
had
been
established and m
any functions of the O
NI w
ere being taken over by the new
agency. A job had been offered
to S
had
rin at th
e D
IA, b
ut it w
as in a departm
ent Shadrin felt w
as a catch-all for m
aladjusted defectors. S
had
rin w
as insu
lted. N
either h
e n
or h
is friend
s con
sidered
he w
as in
the sa
me le
ague w
ith o
ther
defectors. T
hen word cam
e that he had been given an extension of six m
onths on his
ON
I co
ntract. T
his w
as good
news, but he knew
there would be
no extension beyond that. A
fter the en
d o
f the ex
tensio
n,
Shadrin brooded for another three
months before taking the job w
ith the D
IA. It w
as less of a humiliation
than
failing
to d
raw a salary
. He
reported
for w
ork
in M
arch 1
966.
No doubt S
hadrin was gratified that
Adm
iral Taylor him
self had agreed to accept a job at the D
IA.
But T
aylor stayed there only brief-ly before accepting the second-high-est p
ositio
n in
the
CIA
. T
aylor's departure from
the DIA
must have
been
a great d
isappoin
tmen
t to
Shadrin.
Mysteries
EA
RL
Y O
NE
MO
RN
ING
in the spring o
f 19
66
the telep
ho
ne ran
g in
the
Wash
ing
ton
ho
me o
f Rich
ard M
. H
elms, w
ho had recently been ap-p
oin
ted d
irector o
f the C
IA. T
he
caller, wh
o cam
e to b
e kn
ow
n as
Igor, described himself as an officer
1981 SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K
of th
e KG
B. Ig
or w
as goin
g to
be in
work
ed to
get h
im to
confess h
is
Wash
ing
ton
for o
nly
a few m
ore d
up
licity.*
m
onths, and he wanted H
elms to be
Thus it m
ust have been with spe-
aware o
f his d
esire to w
ork
for th
e cial urg
ency
that S
olie an
d T
urn
er U
nited States. F
ive hours later Igor reported to their superiors that Igor
and US
. intelligence officers, includ- had brought persuasive information
ing the CIA
's Bru
ce Solie, m
et at a which
certified th
at Nosen
ko w
as
safe house in
the W
ashin
gto
n area. n
ot a provocateur—
but, in fact, Was
In subsequent meetings they w
ere just who he claim
ed to be. In view of
joined by Bert T
urner of the S
oviet Counter-
intelligence Section of
the FB
I. T
he d
iversity
and
dep
th o
f Igor's in
for-
mation seem
ed extraor-din
ary, su
pportin
g h
is claim
that h
e held
a hig
h p
ositio
n w
ithin
th
e K
GB
w
hic
h a
s-tounded his A
merican
handlers in view of his
relatively
yo
un
g ag
e. H
e even
repo
rted o
n
current, sensitive activi- ties involving U
.S. in-
telligen
ce officers in
E
uro
pe, in
form
ation
that w
ould
not reach
C
IA
headquarte
rs th
rough n
orm
al chan
-nels for w
eeks. E
mbed
ded
in th
e blizzard
of in
- the reig
nin
g d
istrust o
f Nosen
ko at
formation w
as a clear message con- that tim
e, Igor's certification of No-
cerning Yuri N
osenko, a Soviet w
ho senko's bona fides might have been
had
defected
to th
e United
States in
expected
to set clan
gin
g th
e bells
early 1964 and who also claim
ed to of suspicion.
have been a KG
B officer. F
rom the
Perh
aps it d
id, b
ut ap
paren
tly
time N
osen
ko reach
ed A
merican
so
il, he h
ad fallen
under serio
us
suspicion. In fact Nosenko w
as even now
in detention while C
IA officers
Ew
a Shadrin at her home in M
cLean, V
a., in July 1977
• For a full account of the Nosenko case, see
Legend: The S
ecret World of Lee H
arvey Ouvaid, by
Edw
ard lay Epstein, R
eader's Digest. M
arch and
Ap
ril '78. 215
SH
,4D
RIN
: TH
E S
PY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
Igor's total package—if not entirely
convincing—w
as at least so intrigu-ing that few
were w
illing to discredit Ig
or ju
st becau
se of h
is messag
e ab
out N
osen
ko. M
oreo
ver, it ap
-pears that Igor w
on some pow
erful support to N
osenko's side, for only a few
months later a m
ajor directive w
ent out from H
elms to resolve the
Nosenko question. B
y early summ
er of 1966, with his
credib
ility at a crescen
do
, Igo
r dro
pped
his m
ost in
triguin
g n
ews.
He w
as, he said, in line to rise to one of the highest positions in the KGB—possibly becom
ing the head of the KGB's counterintelligence activities in the U
nited States.
Ho
wev
er, Igo
r exp
lained
, there
was a requirem
ent that had to be met
befo
re he co
uld
assum
e the n
ew
position. There w
as a Soviet defector
livin
g in
the U
nited
States w
hom
R
ussia regarded as extremely im
por-tant. In fact, the KGB had given Igor the assignm
ent of recruiting the de-fecto
r and
had
mad
e his p
rom
ised
new
job co
ntin
gen
t upon th
e suc-
cessful co
mpletio
n o
f this assig
n-
men
t. The d
efector's n
ame, said
Igor, w
as Nikolai A
rtamonov, now
know
n as Nicholas S
hadrin. (T
hough Igor's telephone call to R
ichard Helm
s may have opened a
new phase in his relationship w
ith the C
IA, it appears possible that he
had
been
dealin
g u
nder ex
tremely
covert conditions w
ith certain offi-cers of the counterintelligence staff since about M
arch 1964. One of his
bo
ldest su
gg
estion
s, accord
ing
to
one account, was a proposal that the
216
CIA assist him in recruiting A
natoli G
olitsin to redefect to Soviet ranks.
Igo
r exp
lained
that th
is wo
uld
do
m
uch to hasten his rise in the KGB. G
olitsin was considered too w
ise to be induced to play such a dangerous gam
e, but there is at least one report that the A
mericans countered Igor's
request with an offer to provide him
w
ith S
had
rin. A
round th
is time—
coincidentally or otherwise—
Shadrin
had the first hints that he was to be
turn
ed o
ut o
f his jo
b w
ith th
e ON
I. F
or close to a year, Shadrin resisted
furiously before accepting the job he so hated at the D
IA. It w
as only a few
weeks after S
hadrin finally went to
work at the DIA that Igor placed his
telephone call to Helm
s.) T
he Soviet U
nion, Igor informed
the A
merican
s, kn
ew th
at Sh
adrin
w
as miserab
le in h
is new
job
and
believ
ed th
at he sh
ould
be rip
e for
redefection. Igor himself, how
ever, w
as not so confident. Shadrin's ha-
tred o
f the S
ov
iet regim
e was to
o
great. B
ut, Ig
or su
gg
ested, th
e re-cru
itmen
t mig
ht b
e feasible w
ith a
little help
from
the FBI
and CIA. C
ould they arrange to have Shadrin
redefect, even as a ploy? If Shadrin
would just pretend to redefect, that
would be all Igor needed. M
ysteries hang like cobwebs over
wh
at hap
pen
ed n
ext, b
ut a sin
gle
certainty
emerg
es: a decisio
n w
as reached by the U
nited States to assist
Igor in
the recruitment of S
hadrin. M
oreover, Shadrin w
ould not even be tru
sted to
know
that Ig
or su
p-
po
sedly
was actin
g in
the u
ltimar'
interests of the United S
tates, to say
CV
O
FtesooniOl.9asstou 0" cer,etotesP3cn3N
ceeri 010‘ce.°°‘k
\Polled e)43ef‘ence eee,c1V
P1/4\1;
""*3
4C
sett% 06°.‘e5ikkosiout
tc 0
100
c000kil_aroiltose:o cat:kol e:ou ue a e
caco. cante
..sierdl‘cncjI4s "
wan
t to Jea l- k(ao g
7 OV
99.f° elAek
ec
20 PxiA
t CIO
VS' EV
-14 see523.5000
s ,fx. BOC1'3€2.5690
1.1
1
yoo OR
M .
218 B
OO
K
no
thin
g o
f Igo
r's special m
ission
. It a
pp
ears th
at a
n in
gen
iou
s schem
e was devised to prevent S
had-rin
from
mak
ing an
outrig
ht re-
jection o
f the first S
oviet o
vertu
re —
wh
ile at the sam
e time m
akin
g
certain th
at he d
id n
ot k
no
w th
at th
e whole p
loy w
as bein
g m
aster-m
inded by the CIA
and FB
I. Appar-
ently he was inform
ed that there had been a sharp increase in the S
oviets' su
rveillan
ce of th
e build
ing
wh
ich
housed the DIA
offices. Shadrin w
as told that, w
hile a number of defec-
tors worked there, he w
as the only one w
ith sufficient stature to interest the S
oviets—thus the S
oviets might
make an approach to him
. If so, he sh
ou
ld av
oid
an o
utrig
ht rejectio
n
and report the approach to the FB
I. S
hadrin must have felt that som
e- SEC
TIO
N
h.b
ruary
one had been particularly prescient w
hen
, a few d
ays later, in
the late
summ
er of 1966, he was approached
by
Igo
r in a p
ub
lic place in
the
Washington area. S
hadrin reported the contact to the F
BI, w
hich suggest-ed that he play along.
Shadrin balked. T
his was precise-
ly the sort of dangerous counterintel-ligence operation T
om D
wyer had
warn
ed h
im to
avoid
. Only
when
A
dmiral T
aylor, Shadrin's respected
colleague, urged him to undertake
the assignment, did he consent.
A central question is w
hether US
. intelligence officials believed that Igor's overture w
as legitimate—
that he w
as not another in the series of su
spected
So
viet p
rov
ocatio
ns. A
burn
ing b
elief in Ig
or's b
ona fid
es w
ou
ld so
mew
hat m
itigate th
e ac-
1981 SH
AD
R1N
: TH
E S
PY
WH
countability of those men w
ho took custody of S
hadrin's future. B
ut James A
ngleton has told Ew
a S
had
rin's atto
rney
, Rich
ard C
opa-
ken, that he concluded that Igor was
a false defecto
r.* R
ichard
Helm
s distances him
self from the question
by explaining that he turned the case over to subordinates and is not sure w
hat happened after that. William
B
ranigan
, a top
FB
I counterintelli-gence offi cia
l who w
as in
on th
e
operation from the start, looks quiz-
zical when he says, "W
ho's Igor?"
*In a confidential meeting after S
hadrin . s disap-pearance, A
ngleton also told Copaken that from
the beginning the F
BI considered Igor a bona fide
Am
erican agent, thus explaining the FB
I's willing-
ness to take risks with S
hadrin to promote such an
important source. H
owever, neither A
ngleton nor C
opaken would confirm
or deny any aspect of this m
eeting.
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
219
William
Colby, a form
er CIA direc-to
r, says flatly
, "I don't recall th
e nam
e Igor at all." Bert T
urner and B
ruce Solie refuse to com
ment.
Only the passage of tim
e would
show w
hether Igor was acting under
control of Moscow
, or on his own and
in the interest of the United States. In
either case, Nicholas S
hadrin had not even a hint of the truth: that Igor—an
d p
erhap
s all of th
e K
GB
—k
new
that Shadrin w
as only pretending to b
e wo
rkin
g fo
r them
, that h
e had
- been duped and put to w
ork by the highest intelligence officials in the U
nited States.
Waiting for Igor
AS
IN E
VE
RY
TH
ING
regarding her h
usb
and
's wo
rk, E
wa h
ad o
nly
a v
agu
e no
tion
of w
hat w
as go
ing
AD
VE
RT
ISE
ME
NT
Helps Shrink Sw
elling O
f Hem
orrhoidal Tissues
Due T
o Inflamm
ation. R
elieves Pain A
nd Itch... G
ives prompt tem
porary relief in many cases
from hem
orrhoidal pain and itch W
hen hemorrhoidal tissues sw
ell, become
inflamed—
it can be very painful for the su
fferer. Bu
t doctors h
ave foun
d a re-
markably successful m
edication which is
so effective that it actu
ally help
s shrin
k
swelling of such tissues. A
nd it does more.
In many cases, it also gives prom
pt relief for h
ours from
the p
ain an
d itch
ing in
hem
orrhoidal tissues. T
his medication is obtainable w
ithout a prescription under th
e nam
e—P
repara-
tion H
O. T
ests by lead
ing d
octors on
hundreds of patients in New
York, W
ash-ington, D
.C. and at a large m
edical center verified P
reparation H gave sim
ilar suc-cessful results in m
any cases. W
hen
you con
sider P
reparation
H
offers so many benefits—
it's no wonder
millions of sufferers buy it each year. T
here's no other formula like P
repara-tion H
. Ointm
ent and suppositories. Use
only as directed.
AD
VE
RT
ISEM
EN
T
Now
... for control of bronchial asthm
a attacks during high-risk
colds and Wu season
Th
is winter, m
any who suffer from
bronchial asthm
a face a high risk of frequent attacks. A
mild cold, flu, or w
inter weather alone can
trigger an attack. D
on't be caught without P
rimatene for relief.
Prim
atene Mist is the fastest type relief know
n for sudden attacks. H
elps stop the attack, restores free breathing in as fast as 15 seconds. A
nd Prim
atene Tablets help keep attacks from
com
ing back for hours with the asthm
a relievers d
octors rescribe m
ost. Get P
rimaten
e toda .
Prim
atene ®
Mist helps stop attacks in seconds, P
rimatene T
ablets helps keep attacks from
coming back for hours.
Without Prim
ates. With Prim
atene
Prim
atene opens clogged breath- in
g tub
es, relaxes spasm
s. You
b
reathe freel . U
se as directed
.
1981 SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K
on. S
he d
oes recall th
at in th
e late '6os she becam
e aware of receiving
frequen
t telephone calls fro
m a
man nam
ed John Funkhouser, w
ho, though she did not know
it, was an
expert on Soviet naval affairs for the
CIA
. After exchanging pleasantries
with
Ew
a, Fu
nk
ho
user w
ou
ld ask
, "Is N
ick around?" He alw
ays called in
the ev
enin
g an
d fo
r on
ly th
e briefest of chats. F
unkhouser, who
concedes he lunched frequently with
Nick, has told E
wa that his associ-
atio
n w
ith S
had
rin w
as p
ure
ly
friendly, but several former C
IA offi-
cers have suggested that he was m
ost lik
ely
the c
onduit fo
r the
CIA
-approved inform
ation being passed on to the S
oviets. A
no
ther v
oice E
wa learn
ed to
know
was Jim
Wooten's. L
ike Funk-
houser, he telephoned Shadrin only
at home in the evening, and, as w
ith F
unkhouser, Ew
a did not meet him
face to face for m
any years. D
uring their first ten years in the U
nited States, the S
hadrins restricted th
eir travel p
rimarily
to th
eir new
country. B
ut in 1969 they made a 17-
day
Euro
pean
tour. P
erhap
s Nick
w
as so confident that he was duping
the Soviets that he no longer feared
reprisals. Also, form
er counterintel-ligence specialists confirm
that it is not uncom
mon for the S
oviets, after a p
eriod
of p
rolo
ng
ed co
ntact, to
su
gg
est that th
e sub
ject meet w
ith
them outside the U
nited States. S
uch a m
eeting
con
firms in
the S
ov
iets' m
inds the validity of their agent. (On
the 1969 trip, however, E
wa argues
con
vin
cing
ly th
at Nick
was n
ever
22
0
away
from
her lo
ng
eno
ug
h fo
r a m
eeting.) Follow
ing this came the
two know
n meetings, first in C
anada in 1971, then in V
ienna in 1972 when
he wasgone from
his hotel overnight. O
f course th
e majo
r reason fo
r sending S
hadrin into the espionage w
ars was to
enh
ance Ig
or's rise
through the ranks of the KG
B. S
ever-al m
on
ths after S
had
rin's recru
it-m
ent as a double agent, Igor's tour of duty in the U
nited States ended. T
his w
as followed by a long silence in the
CIA
's co
un
terintellig
ence o
ffice, bro
ken
only
in th
e early '7
os b
y a
cable fro
m Ig
or, tran
smitted
from
southern F
rance, indicating that he w
as trying to keep in touch. It was a
sign of life. But if A
ngleton's assess-m
ent of Igor was correct, then little
valid information w
as being gleaned from
the KG
B officer. Indeed, given
Angleton's position as counterintelli-
gence chief, his complete distrust of
Igor would have clouded the C
IA's
genuine acceptance of anything he provided.
Th
is was slim
pay
-back
for th
e years S
hadrin had invested as a dou-ble agent. Y
et after the clandestine delivery of the radio transm
itter—a
sop
histicated
piece o
f equ
ipm
ent
never before seen by the FBI—
Shad-rin
's han
dlers w
ere enco
urag
ed to
consider the operation secure. B
ut th
e transm
itter, accord
ing to
Jim
Wo
ote
n, w
as n
ev
er u
sed
. Tw
o
months after its delivery, S
hadrin's contact w
ith the Soviets m
ysteriously stopped.
Nearly tw
o years passed—until the
summ
er of 1974—before the S
oviets
made their reconnection. T
he phone rang; E
wa answ
ered—and the caller
hung up. This happened four or five
times w
ithin
3o m
inutes. F
inally
E
wa asked N
ick to take the next call if one cam
e. The phone rang. N
ick answ
ered. "H
is face sud
den
ly w
as very
strange as he listened," E
wa recalls.
"He responded in m
onosyllables." N
ick explained later that the caller w
as a Russian
emig
re, in n
eed o
f help
, who w
anted
to m
eet him
on
Lorcom
Lane in A
rlington, not far fro
m th
e Sh
adrin
s' ho
me. F
or rea-
son
s she is n
ot clear ab
ou
t, Ew
a begged him
not to go. Instead Nick
called Jim W
ooten and John Funk-
houser. Neither w
as at home. F
inally he reached a third person E
wa w
as not fam
iliar with. S
he did not hear the conversation, but N
ick decided not to m
ake the rendezvous. Much
later, Wooten explained to E
wa that
the caller was from
the KG
B.
In D
ecemb
er the S
oviets ag
ain
made contact—
this time by a cryptic
letter mailed from
Oxon H
ill, Md.
Intrig
ued
by th
e unfam
iliar return
address, E
wa opened and read w
hat she believes to be the first of these m
essages. It contained puzzling in-quiries into S
hadrin's health, coup-led w
ith phrases in Russian. W
hen a second letter arrived, w
hich Ew
a did not read, she asked N
ick about it. He
would not give her an answ
er. W
hile these events were occur-
ring, wrenching changes w
ere tak-ing place at the C
IA that w
ould have a fu
ndam
ental b
earing o
n th
e case involving S
hadrin and Igor. Helm
s had
resign
ed in
19
73
, soo
n to
be
replaced by William
Colby. U
nder the new
regime, the prevailing w
is-dom
was that operations such as the
one involving Shadrin and Igor w
ere convoluted schem
es of dubious val-u
e—u
nless, o
f cou
rse, An
gleto
n's
assum
ptio
n o
f Igor's falsity
had
sm
othered genuine operational op-portu
nities. In
his au
tobio
grap
hy,
Honorable M
en, Colby com
ments on
his review of the m
aze of counter-intelligence activities that flourished
- under Angleton's autocratic rule:
"I spent several long sessions do-in
g m
y b
est to fo
llow
his to
rtuo
us
theo
ries about th
e long arm
of a
po
werfu
l and
wily
K
GB
at w
ork
sending its false defectors to influ-ence and underm
ine Am
erican poli-cy. I confess that I couldn't absorb it, possibly because I did not have the requisite grasp of this labyrinthine subject, possibly because A
ngleton's explanations w
ere impossible to fol-
low, or possibly because the evidence
just didn't add up to his conclusions. A
t the same tim
e I looked in vain for som
e tangible results and found little or none. I did not suspect A
ngleton and his staff of engaging in im
proper activities. I just could not figure out w
hat they were doing at all."
On D
ecember 20, 1974, about the
time that S
hadrin was receiving the
letters from
Ox
on
Hill, A
ng
leton
retired at the request of C
olby. His
closest associates soon followed. Sud-
denly, the long era of Angletonian
do
min
ance w
as ov
er; the A
gen
cy
was rid of the cunning spym
aster and his "tortuous theories.' A
lmost im
- 221
BO
OK
SE
CT
ION
F
ebruary
AD
VE
RT
ISE
ME
NT
HO
W T
O ST
AR
T
MA
RIN
AT
ING
AT
4:00 P.M.
AN
D SE
RV
E D
INN
ER
A
T 6:00 P.M.
I've discovered an easy, natural way to get
the same deep-dow
n flavor and tenderness I expect from
overnight marinating in just an hour.
BY
jEA
NN
ET
TE
FR
AN
K
SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E S
PY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
If y
ou're lik
e me y
ou p
robab
ly
have a tried-and-true recipe for m
eat marinade. T
he one I've al-w
ays used calls for all day or even overnight m
arinating. A
nd I thought if I cut short the m
arinating time, I w
ould give up a lot of flavor and tenderness.
But m
y mind w
as really changed at a friend's dinner party. T
hat night w
e were served a w
onderful mari-
nated round steak. I loved it and so did everyone else.
So I w
as amazed to discover that
the meat had m
arinated for only an hour.
My friend then told m
e she al-w
ays ad
ded
Adolp
h's M
eat Ten
-derizer to her favorite m
arinade. A
nd
this n
ot o
nly
mean
t she
could get as much delicious flavor as
when she m
arinated all night, but the m
eat was also juicier and m
ore
tender after it was cooked.
Well, I've used A
dolph's for years to tenderize various cuts of beef. So I know
how easy it is to use, how
well
it works and that it w
orks naturally, too. B
ecause its tenderizing ingre-dient com
es from the sim
ple, ordi-nary papaya m
elon. So I started adding A
dolph's every tim
e I made m
y own m
arinade (us-ing I capful to every cup of liquid) and then m
arinating as I usually do. B
ut just for an hour. S
ince I had such tasty results, I think you should try it too. A
fter all, if y
ou d
on't ag
ree, the A
dolp
h's
company w
ill refund your money.
Just send the cap to the address on the jar.
Bu
t I thin
k y
ou
'll find
that
Adolph's w
ill make your favorite
meat m
arinade work better and a
whole lot faster for you.
med
iately w
ork
was b
egun th
at w
ould
, in th
e w
ord
s of o
ne o
f C
olb
y's to
p o
peratio
ns o
fficers, "bring counterintelligence back into the A
gency." A
lready, there was increasing rec-
ognition of the legitimacy of S
oviet defector Y
uri Nosenko. H
elms, of
course, had lifted the initial restraint on N
osen
ko. H
ow
ever, th
at clear-an
ce had
been
only
enough to
get
Nosenko settled into A
merican life
as any other defector might 'be han-
dled. This, according to later state-
ments by H
elms, did not m
ean the C
IA considered N
osenko bona fide—o
nly
that it w
anted
to b
e rid o
f a seem
ingly intractable problem. B
ut this lukew
arm acceptance w
as not satisfactory to m
en like Bruce S
olie and others w
ho had become advo-
cates of Nosenko—
in part, no doubt, because of their belief in Igor's m
es-sage regarding N
osenko. G
oing much further than H
elms
ever en
visio
ned
, these ad
vocates
readdressed themselves to the N
o-senko case. A
lmost incredibly, they
and o
thers m
anag
ed to
brin
g N
o-
senko into the bosom of the A
gency as a highly paid regular consultant and lecturer on current S
oviet intelli-gence m
atters and personnel. Such a
drastic reversal in the Agency's poli-
cy constituted a flagrant repudiation o
f the n
early u
niv
ersal susp
icion
s held by the respected veterans w
ho had handled the N
osenko case just a few
years earlier. T
hen, with N
osenko's enthusias-tic acceptance established, the new
regim
e could turn to the resurrection
and genuine acceptance of Igor, who
had certified Noscnko. U
nder the old reign, C
IA counterintelligence offi-
cers had doubted Igor as seriously as they had N
osenko—though the Igor
case was a m
uch more closely held
secret. But w
ith the old guard gone and N
osenko exuberantly embraced,
it was tim
e to bring Igor back. S
om
etime in
19
75
Sh
adrin
was
ord
ered to
requ
est a meetin
g w
ith
his top contacts in Moscow
. It was
fortu
itous th
at the S
oviets th
em-
selves had so recently evinced fresh interest in a
reconnection with S
had- rin. D
espite the messages from
Oxon
Hill, som
e older hands might have
counseled that Shadrin's still-unex-
plain
ed b
reak in
contact w
ith th
e S
oviets w
as an u
rgen
t reason fo
r suprem
e caution. But caution w
as not a guiding light.
Finally, w
ord was relayed circu-
itously from M
oscow—
in a letter from
Oxon H
ill—that S
hadrin's top K
GB
contacts were w
illing to see him
again. Shadrin proposed S
pain as a m
eeting site, but the K
GB
rejected this and suggested H
elsinki. After
consultation with his A
merican han-
dlers, Shadrin dem
urred. Helsinki
was too dangerous. F
or reasons that rem
ain utterly baffling, Shadrin w
as ordered to counter-propose that the m
eeting
take p
lace in V
ienn
a, de-
scribed by one former C
IA officer as
"a snake pit of Soviet spies."
Th
e KG
B quickly accepted.
A Q
uestio
n o
f Su
rveilla
nce
IN E
AR
LY
DE
CE
MB
ER
1975, to
p
counterintelligence officers of the 223
Jeannette Frank is the author of The Modern M
eat Cookbook.
SH
.4DR
IN: T
HE
SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E R
AC
K
HOW TO BUY A 400 ACRE
DAIRY FARM IN M
ANHATTAN. C
IA
and F
BI g
athered
in a secret
meetin
g to
discu
ss Shad
rin's im
-pending rendezvous in V
ienna. The
highest C
IA
officer p
resent w
as G
eorge T. K
alaris, who had replaced
Angleton as chief of counterintelli-
gence. Accom
panying Kalaris from
his staff w
ere Leonard M
cCoy and
Cynthia H
ausmann, w
ho would be-
come know
n to Ew
a as Ann M
artin. B
ruce S
olie o
f the C
IA's O
ffice of S
ecurity was also there, along w
ith Jam
es Wo
oten
, William
Bran
igan
and others from
the FB
I. V
arious accounts of this meeting
are in sharp dispute about whether
there w
as discu
ssion
on
the ad
vis-
ability of providing surveillance for S
hadrin's contacts with the S
oviets in V
ienna. It was K
alaris who told the
gathering that the CIA
believed Igor w
ould make an appearance in V
ien-na. K
alaris also said that Bruce S
olie w
ould
be d
ispatch
ed to
Vien
na to
deal w
ith Igor since he had previous-ly
met h
im. C
ynth
ia Hau
sman
n
would
be sen
t to d
ebrief S
had
rin
after his meetings.
Late o
n o
ne b
itterly co
ld after-
noon a couple of weeks before they
were leaving for V
ienna, Nick m
o-tioned to E
wa that he w
anted her to step
into
the k
itchen
. His g
estures
were m
emorable to E
wa because on
rare occasio
ns N
ick w
ou
ld sh
ow
signs, such as this, of suspecting that their house w
as bugged. In the kitchen, N
ick whispered to
Ew
a that he wanted to go for a w
alk. O
utsid
e, he to
ld E
wa so
meth
ing
very im
portant had come up in his
work that w
ould make an enorm
ous 224
differen
ce in h
is pro
fessional life.
Crucial to this w
ere some business
meetin
gs set u
p in
Vien
na d
urin
g
their v
acation. N
ick d
id n
ot o
ffer specific details about his new
hori-zons, but he did say that at last, after 16 years, he w
as to get his security clearance. E
wa w
as ecstatic. A
t 9
:30
a.m
. on
Decem
ber 1
7,
Miss H
ausm
ann m
et with
the C
IA
station ch
ief in V
ienna. A
t som
e poin
t the statio
n ch
ief asked
her if
surveillance would be required for
the S
had
rin m
eeting. M
iss Hau
s-m
ann replied that it was thought in
Washington not to be necessary. F
ive years after Shadrin's disap-
pearanCe, a controversy continues to
simm
er over the question of surveil-lance. E
wa S
hadrin and her attorney, R
ichard Copaken, insist that the V
i-enna station w
as prepared to provide su
rveillan
ce un
til Miss H
ausm
ann
called it off. A
ccording to Copaken,
Miss H
ausm
ann h
as stated to
him
that the F
BI told her it did not w
ant surveillance. B
ut other sources indi-cate th
at the q
uestio
n w
as no
t an
explicit p
oin
t on th
e agen
da at th
e D
ecember m
eeting between the C
IA
and FB
I. O
ne so
urce at th
e meetin
g h
as stated
that p
ossib
ly th
e C
IA
said so
meth
ing
such
as, "Yo
u are n
ot
goin
g to
require su
rveillan
ce, are you?" In response, the F
BI m
en may
have indicated that they would not.
More than anything else, it appears
that the CIA
and FB
I failed to under-stand each other. T
hat, in any case, is the m
ost charitable explanation. S
had
rin's first m
eeting
, on
De-
Just b
ecause th
ere are no d
airy farm
s in M
anhattan
, doesn
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TO C
ATC
H A
KILLER
Like a shark patrolling a crow
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as gone. His victim
s:
Young w
omen, m
ost of whom
he had raped,
strangled and bludgeoned. How
he was finally
caught is one of the most fascinating stories in
Am
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special feature.
THE
MIR
AC
LE O
F ED
DIE
RO
BIN
SO
N
His w
orld was one of darkness, silence and pain.
Then came the roll of thunder—
and a bolt of lightning that changed his life.
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BO
OK
SEC
TIO
N
R.bruary
cember 1
8, w
as with
two v
eteran
Soviet diplom
ats, both of whom
he had m
et before. Mikhail K
uryshev had been attached to the S
oviet em-
bassy
in V
ienna d
urin
g S
had
rin's
1972 meeting there. T
he second So-
viet, Oleg A
lexeyevich Kozlov, had
been assigned to the Soviet em
bassy in W
ashington from 1968 until 1972.
He had been one of S
hadrin's Soviet
handlers. W
hatev
er transp
ired at th
e first m
eeting, it m
ade S
had
rin h
appy.
326
Ew
a Shad
rin h
as testified to
his
exuberance when he returned to the
hotel ro
om
that n
ight w
here M
iss H
ausm
ann d
ebriefed
him
. He d
id
relate to Miss H
ausmann that he had
been informed he had been prom
ot-ed to the rank of colonel in the K
GB
.
How
ever, after Miss H
ausmann left,
Shad
rin to
ld E
wa th
at he d
id n
ot
report his most im
portant informa-
tion to her—that he w
ould save this to tell Jim
Wooten.
Tw
o days later, when N
ick said
farewell to his w
ife for perhaps the last tim
e of their lives, Miss H
aus-m
ann attended a dinner party at the
home of a C
IA officer assisting in the
support for the Shadrin m
eetings—a
man
with
whom
Miss H
ausm
ann
had served at earlier posts. Accord-
ing to Miss H
ausmann, the dinner
party
lasted u
ntil
12:30 a.m
., at
which tim
e her host drove her back to a safe house. B
ut the host has a different story. A
ccording to an ac-count later provided to C
opaken by th
e Vien
na statio
n, th
e host states
that he left to drive Miss H
ausmann
home at m
idnight. In either case, she sh
ould
hav
e been
back
at the safe
house no later than 1 a.m.—
and as
early as 12:3o. B
ut Miss H
ausmann did not an-
swer the phone w
hen Ew
a Shadrin
made her first frantic call at 1:35 a.m
. A
t 1:55 a.m., w
hen Ew
a made her
second call, Miss H
ausmann's initial
qu
estion
—ev
en b
efore b
eing
told
S
had
rin h
ad n
ot retu
rned
—w
as w
hether Ew
a had tried to telephone earlier. W
hen
Ew
a said y
es, Miss
Hausm
ann stated only that she had been
attendin
g a d
inner p
arty. In
su
bseq
uen
t interv
iews w
ith E
wa
Shadrin's attorney, M
iss Hausm
ann has declined to explain her w
here-abouts for the disputed m
inutes—stating only that she w
ent directly fro
m th
e din
ner p
arty to
the safe
house. It is possible that the discrepancy
is academic, since apparently M
iss H
ausmann still did nothing. F
inally, the deputy chief of station raised the
alarm at C
IA headquarters at to a.m
. on Decem
ber 21, more than eight
hours after Ew
a Shadrin m
ade her first futile phone call. Im
mediately
cables began to go back and forth w
ith d
etails, questio
ns, su
ggested
answ
ers. T
heories flourish about what hap-
pened to Shadrin. M
ost are predicat-ed
on h
is bein
g k
idnap
ped
. Oth
er theories suggest that S
hadrin was a
KG
B agent all along—
that his defec-tion in 1959 w
as one of the Soviets'
best-handled provocations. Another
theo
ry p
resum
es that S
had
rin b
e-cam
e desperately disillusioned with
his professional life and took off on his ow
n for parts unknown to estab-
lish another life. T
he m
ost w
idely
accepted
of
these—one held w
ith apparent sin-
cerity by the FBI, C
IA and high gov-
ernment officials—
is that the K
GB
kid
nap
ped
him
and sp
irited h
im
back
to th
e Soviet U
nio
n. P
ropo-
nen
ts of th
is theo
ry p
ostu
late it w
ould serve the Soviet U
nion well if
the KG
B could trium
phantly exhibit S
hadrin to its personnel, proving it co
uld
reach in
to th
e heart o
f US
. intelligence and retrieve a defector.
There also w
as a feeling that some
resolution was im
minent, w
hether it be a parading of a broken S
hadrin befo
re the w
orld
to d
enounce th
e W
est, or simply leaking w
ord that he had been executed. In no case w
as a
resounding silence expected.
Messag
e F
rom
Mo
sco
w
WH
EN
EW
A R
ET
UR
NE
D 1
0 W
ash-ington, Jim
Wooten explained that
Secretary of S
tate Henry K
issinger 227
1981
SHA
DR
IN: T
HE
SPY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
RA
CK
SH.9D
RIN
.• TH
E SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E B
AC
K
was at that m
oment in W
ashington prep
aring to
speak
priv
ately w
ith
Soviet A
mbassad
or A
nato
ly D
o-
bry
nin
about S
had
rin's retu
rn. B
ut
Kissinger did not get around to talk-
ing to
Dobry
nin
until Jan
uary
5.
Dobrynin denied any know
ledge of S
hadrin. By then E
wa had confided
in William
and Mary L
ouise How
e, and the follow
ing evening there was
the m
eeting w
ith th
e How
es and
Wooten at the hom
e of Robert and
Helen K
upperman.
Quietly, the H
owes and the K
up-perm
ans began contacting everyone they knew
in government, including
those who could help get a hearing
in the White H
ouse. B
ut n
o p
lan w
as forth
com
ing
from P
resident Gerald F
ord's staff. It also w
as clear the CIA
was not in
any h
urry
to fo
rmulate a strateg
y.
Oth
er officials, w
hile sy
mpath
etic, obviously w
ere getting nowhere. A
puzzled E
wa S
hadrin began to real-ize th
at noth
ing h
ad b
een d
one.
Fin
ally, o
n F
ebru
ary so
, 1976,
after consu
ltation w
ith th
e How
es and the K
uppermans, E
wa S
hadrin co
nclu
ded
that h
er husb
and h
ad
been abandoned by the US
. govern-
ment. R
eluctantly, she retained the services of R
ichard Copaken, a part-
ner in
the W
ashin
gto
n law
firm o
f C
ovington and Burling.
While th
e How
es and th
e Kup-
permans provided critical m
oral sup- port, Jim
Wooten w
as the bedrock of E
wa S
hadrin's faith that Nick w
ould be returned safely. B
ut his loyalty to
her w
as view
ed d
ifferently
by h
is ow
n su
perio
rs. The first sto
rm
228
clouds were spotted around F
ebru-ary 1, w
hen he informed E
wa that
Kissin
ger, w
ho b
y th
en h
ad m
ade
several unsuccessful inquiries to the S
oviets, had written a letter to the FB
I
in which he indicated that one of its
agents had undercut Mrs. S
hadrin's faith
in K
issinger's effo
rts. That
agent, clearly, was W
ooten. Wooten
told Ew
a that he remained com
mit-
ted to helping her, but he added that he hoped he w
ould not have to retire early.
On F
ebru
ary 1
7, E
wa S
had
rin
asked Wooten to brief C
opaken on N
ick's disappearance. Wooten read-
ily agreed. F
or one hour the attorney ques-tioned W
ooten about various aspects of the case. T
he FBI m
an was helpful.
Tow
ard th
e end o
f the m
eeting
Copaken asked W
ooten how long it
took the FBI to convince S
hadrin to w
ork
as a double ag
ent. "O
h, I
suppose a couple of days," Wooten
replied. "B
ut, Jim," E
wa said, "you told us
at our meeting at the K
uppermans'
that it took close to a year to persuade N
ick and that Rufus T
aylor got him
to d
o it."
"Ew
a," said Jim W
ooten evenly, "I did not tell you these things."
Tw
elve d
ays later, o
n F
ebru
ary
29, Jam
es Wooten abruptly retired
from the F
BI. H
e was 52 years old.
Ew
a was beginning to grasp the
magnitude of the troubles she faced.
One o
f the first o
rders o
f busin
ess w
as to get in touch with A
dm. R
ufus
Taylor to learn m
ore about the role he p
layed
in recru
iting h
is friend
SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E S
PY
WH
Shadrin into the double operation.
William
How
e had known T
aylor for som
e 25 years, and he was w
ell aw
are of th
e close asso
ciation b
e-tw
een Taylor and S
hadrin. H
owe called T
aylor, by then re-tired, to ask him
about his old friend
Nick S
hadrin. "Nick w
ho? "Adm
iral T
aylo
r said to
How
e. "Shad
rin? I
never heard of him."
Incredulous, How
e insisted that it w
as impossible that T
aylor could not rem
ember S
hadrin. Finally T
aylor conceded that he had know
n Shad-
rin, but vehemently denied he had
had anything to do with recruiting
him.
Already, telephone calls w
ere go-in
g o
ut fro
m th
e govern
men
t to
peo
ple w
ho h
ad k
now
n S
had
rin.
Col. B
ernard
Weltm
an, S
had
rin's
boss at the DIA
and a great admirer,
was to
ld, "S
tay aw
ay fro
m E
wa
Shadrin." A
nother associate at the
DIA
telephoned a number of people
and told them never to discuss the
case with anyone.
Copak
en an
d E
wa tried
every
avenue. W
ith the unofficial assist-ance of the S
tate Departm
ent, Copa-
ken attempted to set up exchanges of
Soviet spies held by the United States
or allies for Shadrin. N
one succeed-ed, either because the U
nited States
would not co-operate, or the S
oviet U
nio
n d
id n
ot h
ave S
had
rin, o
r chose to deny having him
.*
• To this day C
opaken vigorously asserts that
Secre
tary o
f Sta
te K
issinger a
nd W
hite
House
officials purposefully undermined C
opaken's ef-
forts to
effe
ct a su
ccessfu
l exch
ange. In
um
.
Kissinger described C
opaken's charges as "an irre-
sponsible distortion: .
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
RA
CK
Finally, on D
ecember 3, 1976—
nearly one year after Shadrin's dis-
appearance—P
resident Ford sent a
letter to Soviet party leader L
eonid B
rezhnev, asking for assistance in having S
hadrin returned to his wife.
Brezhnev replied that records had
been consulted in Moscow
and he
could report that Shadrin had never arrived at the V
otivkirche for his sec-ond m
eeting with the Soviets.
Copaken w
as stunned. It was one
thing for the Soviets to convey this
- info
rmatio
n in
form
ally. B
ut h
ow
could B
rezhnev speak with such con-
fidence? How
could he know that
there was no surveillance by the C
IA
of the meeting? W
hat minion in the
KG
B w
ould dare risk responsibility for advice to B
rezhnev that might
later be th
e basis fo
r pollu
ting h
is ch
annel o
f trust to
the U
.S. P
resi-dent—
especially when there w
ere so m
any other things that could have
been said? T
hese questions—all basically un-
answerable—
contributed to the grim
susp
icions th
at were b
egin
nin
g to
concern E
wa S
hadrin and her attor-ney. W
as it possible, they wondered,
that the United S
tates—even at the
hig
hest lev
els—knew
much
more
about Shadrin's disappearance than
was being adm
itted? The suspicion
fed the already growing feeling that
maybe the enem
y was in W
ashing-ton instead of M
oscow—
that it some-
how
served
US
. intellig
ence p
ur-
poses to
abort S
had
rin's seco
nd
meeting w
ith the Soviets.
Or, of course, the K
GB
could have
picked up Shadrin on his w
ay to the 231
GE
T T
HA
T
LA
VO
RIS
C
LE
AN
-JU
ST
-LE
F
TH
E-D
EN
TIS
T
FE
EL
ING
E
ven th
e le
adin
g m
outh
w
ca
n't c
lea
n y
ou
r bre
ath
bette
r than L
avoris
.' It's
the
nu
mb
er o
ne
sin
gle
mouth
wash fo
rm
use
d b
y d
en
tists
.
mouthw
ash/gargle PICK YOUR PICK-ME-UP
OL
A
OR V
IVA
RIN
If you're like m
ost people, you enjoy a cup of good, hot coffee or an ice cold cola. T
hey taste
gre
at,
and g
ive y
ou th
e lift y
ou w
ant.
But if, a
s the d
ay w
ears o
n, yo
u
som
etim
es fin
d y
ours
elf h
avin
g
co
ffee
or c
ola
just fo
r the
lift, yo
u
really
should
know
about V
ivarin
.
Viv
arin
is th
e
ge
ntle
pick-m
e-u
p.
The a
ctiv
e in
gre
die
nt th
at m
akes
Viv
arin
so e
ffectiv
e is
the c
affe
ine o
f tw
o cu
ps o
f coffe
e ( o
r about six g
lasse
s of co
la) in
one e
asy to
take
table
t. N
ext tim
e y
ou w
ant a
lift, pic
k
Viv
arin
. It co
nvenie
nt, in
expensiv
e
and it re
ally
work
s.
Read label for directions.
SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E S
PY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
BA
CK
F
ebruary
meeting. P
erhaps that was w
hy the K
GB
co
uld
so co
nfid
ently
advise
Brezh
nev
to rep
ly as h
e had
. But
whatever w
as behind the message, it
was com
pelling evidence that Shad-
rin never reached the meeting site.
The S
tonew
all
PA
RT O
F THE
FRU
STR
ATIO
N fo
r CO
-pak
en an
d th
e agony fo
r Ew
a was
the continuing confusion over just w
hat Nick's role had been. D
uring the first days, w
hen Ew
a was in the
han
ds o
f Miss H
ausm
ann, sh
e be-
lieved
Nick
had
been
an in
no
cent
Am
erican citizen
snatch
ed o
ff the
streets by his former S
oviet masters.
Tw
o m
onth
s later, when
Copa-
ken
entered
the case, th
ere was a
general -acknowledgm
ent of what
Jim W
ooten had first told Ew
a—that
Nick
was p
erform
ing a p
atriotic
duty for the United S
tates by serving the
FB
I and C
IA as a d
ouble ag
ent
working against the S
oviets. But just
wh
at Nick
was su
pp
osed
to h
ave
been doing as a double agent was far
from clear.
Then
, in th
e sprin
g o
f 1978, a
writer w
ho had spent several years conducting research on the subject of possible S
oviet penetration of the C
IA telephoned C
opaken. The w
rit-er's research
had
taken
him
to a
number of form
er intelligence and counterintelligence officers. O
ne of his sources m
entioned the Shadrin
case, almost as an aside, and said that
the secret key to it all might be the
presence in 1966 of a Soviet agent
named Igor.
The w
riter had
heard
about th
e
/98/
Shadrin case and knew
that Richard
Copaken w
as the attorney helping E
wa S
hadrin. He w
ent to Copaken
and told him about the existence of
Igor and the role he had played in the recru
itmen
t of S
had
rin. C
opak
en
was electrified. It w
as the overlay that could m
ake all of the patterns fit. H
e beseeched the writer to tell
him
his so
urce. T
he w
riter would
o
nly
agree to
try to
con
vin
ce the
source to talk to Copaken.
A few
days later Copaken and the
source met in a private hom
e in the W
ashington area, where they spent
several hours discussing Igor.* O
n April I, 1978, C
opaken called E
wa S
had
rin. H
e told
her th
at it appeared they w
ere the victims of a
staggerin
g d
eceptio
n b
y th
e US
. governm
ent—that there w
as new evi-
dence that Nick S
hadrin had been com
promised w
ith the Soviets from
the first m
oment he agreed to w
ork as a double agent. N
ick Shadrin had
not been approached out of the blue by the Soviets; he had been set up for the
KG
B by the A
mericans, slow
ly ripened, and then sent to V
ienna for the final plucking by the S
oviets. E
very latent suspicion and hostil-ity E
wa S
hadrin had for bureaucrats and governm
ent officials came to the
surface. She felt she had been a fool
to b
elieve an
yth
ing to
ld to
her b
y
Geo
rge B
ush
, form
er head
of th
e C
IA, his successor S
tansfield Turner,
FB
I director Clarence K
elley, Henry
Kissin
ger, W
hite H
ouse o
fficials
*C
opak
en h
as refused
to co
nfirm
or d
eny th
e
sequen
ce of ev
ents, b
ut R
eader's D
igest h
as con-
firmed
this w
ith its o
wn so
urces.
23
3
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E Y
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R LE
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A S
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CIA
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O.
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UG
UST
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WIT
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eprints available from
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Channel O
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ff T
een-Agers
Strategic Minerals: T
he Invisible War
C
an Nicotine H
elp Smokers Q
uit?
If I Were Starting M
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gain
Is Our Jury System
Working?
H
ow A
rtificial Light A
ffects Your H
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1981 B
OO
K SE
CT
ION
F
ebruary S
HA
DR
IN T
HE
SP
Y W
HO
NE
VE
R C
AM
E R
AC
K
23 4
William
G. H
ylan
d an
d Z
big
niew
B
rzezinski, James W
ooten, George
Kalaris. O
ne of the first people Ew
a called after learn
ing ab
out Ig
or w
as Jim
Wo
oten
at his retirem
ent h
om
e in
Arizo
na. "W
e hav
e learned
abo
ut
the S
oviet ag
ent w
ho ask
ed fo
r N
ick," she said. Wooten's initial re-
action was one of apparent befuddle-
men
t. Cau
tiou
sly, W
oo
ten tried
to
lead Ew
a to reveal additional infor-m
ation. When E
wa asked if W
ooten k
new
abo
ut th
e So
viet ag
ent, h
e replied, "If I w
ere aware, I could not
comm
ent." How
ever, within a few
m
inu
tes Wo
oten
had
clearly co
n-
firmed E
wa's inform
ation. F
rom
the start W
ooten
was in
-tensely interested in finding out how
E
wa S
hadrin had learned about Igor.
Wooten
indicated
to E
wa th
at the
emerg
ence o
f such
info
rmatio
n
could bring about the death of one of th
e mo
st valu
able ag
ents w
ork
ing
for A
merican intelligence.
Later, W
ooten told Ew
a he was
sure that the source of her informa-
tion must be Jam
es Angleton, w
ho had doubted Igor. E
wa said that she
did not believe it was A
ngleton and did not know
the source. A
few d
ays after h
e learned
of
Igor's role, Copaken advised the Jus-
tice and S
tate dep
artmen
ts of h
is inform
ation, which, if true, show
ed w
ithout q
uestio
n th
at he an
d E
wa
Shad
rin h
ad b
een d
eceived
by th
e highest officials in the U
nited States.
On A
pril 19, 1978, Copaken w
as called
to th
e Justice D
epartm
ent,
where he w
as informed that a deci-
sion had been reached to make no
further attempt to assist E
wa S
had-rin
and
to d
ecline an
y in
qu
iries about Igor. H
enceforth, the FBI and
CIA
directors—
both of whom
had offered full co-operation to E
wa in
the past—w
ould no longer see her or her attorney.
On M
ay 24, 1978, as a last resort, C
op
aken
turn
ed to
the S
enate In
- tellig
ence C
om
mittee. In
a letter req
uestin
g a fo
rmal in
vestig
ation
, C
opaken told the comm
ittee: "The
callous disregard for her feelings that has been exhibited by the U
S. gov-
ernm
ent is n
ot in
keep
ing
with
its responsibility to the fam
ily of a man
who served it so valiantly for so m
any years."
Nearly
three m
on
ths later, th
e com
mittee's chairm
an, Birch B
ayh, responded by thanking C
opaken for his interest and advising him
that the com
mittee "has been w
orking on the S
hadrin case for over a year and will
con
tinu
e to d
o so
as a part o
f its oversig
ht d
uties." T
o E
wa th
is re- sponse w
as the final evidence of an uncarin
g, self-p
rotectiv
e and u
n-
truthful bureaucracy. A
lso that spring, Copaken w
rote to P
resident Jimm
y Carter, asking
him
to m
eet with
Mrs. S
had
rin.
Carter refu
sed, b
ut in
structed
the
Intelligence Oversight B
oard (IOB
) to review
the case. O
n April 16, 1979, C
opaken re-ceiv
ed a
lette
r from
Robert L
. K
euch, Deputy A
ssistant Attorney
General of the U
nited States. K
euch review
ed the scope of various gov-ern
men
t investig
ations in
to w
hat happened to S
hadrin and then noted that the lots investigation alone took "m
ore th
an fiv
e mo
nth
s and
in-
volved both the detailed review of
large n
um
bers o
f docu
men
ts and
files of, an
d th
e interv
iews w
ith,
more than 8o w
itnesses. None of the
investigations disclosed evidence of any hostile action against M
r. Shad-
rin by the U.S. governm
ent, any of its agencies or agents."
Ew
a Shadrin had
not expected anything m
uch different. She then
asked if she could see the IOB
report. H
er request was rejected. E
wa had
no
mo
re reason
to b
elieve in
this
investigation than to believe in the in
tegrity
of th
e countless o
fficials w
ho had deceived her. A
s for K
euch
's letter itself, it failed to address crucial points such as the governm
ent's use of Shadrin
in th
e Ig
or o
pera
tion
, wh
ich
am
ounted to gross malfeasance to-
ward an A
merican citizen.
Copaken believes it w
as impossi-
ble for the lOB
to find that there was
no wrongdoing. If, in fact, the Soviets
did abduct Shadrin, then the w
rong-d
oin
g is o
bv
iou
s—th
e lack o
f any
surveillance, the disappearance of M
iss Hausm
ann for an hour, the fact th
at she w
as not at th
e emerg
ency
n
um
ber an
d d
id n
ot im
med
iately
notify Washington. S
omehow
, some-
thing very wrong w
as done; other-w
ise Shadrin w
ould not have been lost.
An O
pen Book
IN
TH
E S
PR
ING
OF
1978, with all
hope of government help gone, C
o- 235
RO
OK
SE
CT
ION
F
ebruary 1981
SH
AD
RIN
: TH
E S
PY
WH
O N
EV
ER
CA
ME
RA
CK
pa
ken
ha
d b
eg
un
effo
rts to a
cqu
ire
info
rma
tion
un
de
r the
Fre
ed
om
of
Info
rmatio
n A
ct. The g
ove
rnm
ent
initially responded that it would take
many m
onth
s to p
ull to
geth
er th
e
Shadrin files even to review
them for
possible release under the law.
A year later, R
eader's Digest be-
cam
e in
tere
sted in
the ca
se a
nd
launch
ed a
suit a
gain
st the g
ove
rn-
ment seeking access to the S
hadrin file
s, a
lso c
iting th
e F
reedom
of
Information A
ct. The m
agazine's at- to
rne
ys rem
inded th
e g
ove
rnm
ent
that the 10B had conducted a detailed
revie
w o
f "larg
e n
um
bers o
f docu
-m
ents
and file
s" o
n th
e S
hadrin
case—
and that the government obvi-
ously already had all of the material
at hand. Y
et m
onth
s passe
d w
ith th
e C
IA
seemingly unable to process any of
its volu
min
ou
s files o
n th
e S
ha
drin
m
atter. At one point Judge R
obert J. W
ard
said
in a
ton
e o
f am
aze
me
nt:
"How
does o
ur in
tellig
ence
agency
work? N
o wonder w
e have problems
overseas. You have so m
any files by the tim
e you find them, the situation
ha
s com
e to
fruitio
n. H
as th
e b
u-
reaucra
cy gotte
n so
monum
enta
l th
at b
efo
re th
e e
lephant ca
n m
ove
, the crisis is upon us?"
In th
e e
nd
, the
go
vern
me
nt p
ro-
duced n
oth
ing b
ut h
undre
ds o
f new
spaper clippings from the files of
the
CIA
an
d F
BI—
plu
s hu
nd
red
s of
pages of documents in w
hich almost
every single letter oftype—even dates—
had been blacked out. A
s a la
st reco
urse
, atto
rneys fo
r R
eader's Digest requested that judge
236
Ward
revie
w a
gove
rnm
ent-p
re-
pare
d su
mm
ary o
f the d
ocu
ments
which
the C
IA h
ad re
fuse
d to
pro
-duce. T
he CIA
maintained that even
this index could not be considered in o
pe
n co
urt. W
ith g
rea
t relu
ctan
ce,
Judge W
ard
agre
ed to
revie
w th
e
ind
ex in cam
era. O
n A
ug
ust zo
, 198o, a
sole
mn
Jud
ge
Wa
rd ca
lled
in a
ttorn
eys fo
r this m
agazine and the government.
He stated that in review
ing the sum-
ma
ries o
f classifie
d d
ocu
me
nts, h
e
had made one assum
ption: the gov-ernm
ent's summ
aries are "accurate and fa
ir." Judge W
ard
rendere
d h
is ju
dgm
ent th
at re
lease
of th
e d
ocu
-m
ents d
escrib
ed in
the su
mm
arie
s w
ould
"serio
usly co
mpro
mise
our
fore
ign
inte
llige
nce
-ga
the
ring
op
er-
atio
ns a
nd
certa
in a
spe
cts of o
ur
fore
ign re
latio
ns."
He then added: "If it w
ere ancient histo
ry from
a clo
sed b
ook, I w
ould
h
ave
no
pro
ble
m w
ith th
e m
atte
r; but it is n
ot, a
nd th
at is w
here
my
problem lies, and that is even though
many of the events occurred a num
-ber of years ago. B
ut I would regard
the book as still being open, and that is w
ha
t trou
ble
s me
."
TH
E F
AT
E of N
ick Shadrin m
ay never be kn
ow
n. T
he m
ost like
ly source
fo
r an e
ventu
al a
nsw
er is so
me fu
-ture defector from
the KG
B—
unless, of course, E
wa S
hadrin is correct in her sta
unch
belie
f that th
ere
are
U
.S. o
fficials w
ho h
ave
know
n a
ll along exactly w
hat happened to her husband.
Wh
ile th
e C
IA re
fuse
s to d
iscuss
the S
hadrin
case
, its positio
n o
n
Agency responsibility for defectors is
clear. Robert W
. Gam
bino, the direc- to
r of th
e C
IA's O
ffice o
f Se
curity,
made th
e fo
llow
ing sta
tem
ent to
a
Congre
ssional co
mm
ittee in
1979:
"The A
gency assumes an aw
esome
responsibility when it takes under its
win
g a
ny d
efe
ctor. If b
od
ily ha
rm
were
to co
me to
a d
efe
ctor in
ad-
eq
ua
tely p
rote
cted
by o
ur se
curity
officers, there would be a devastating
imp
act o
n a
ll po
ten
tial d
efe
ctors."
Tw
o fo
rmer d
irecto
rs of C
entra
l In
tellig
ence, in
com
mentin
g to
R
eader's Digest, agree that S
hadrin's loss affects the clim
ate for defection. S
ays R
icha
rd H
elm
s: "Th
e w
orst
fea
ture
of th
e ca
se w
as p
erm
itting
S
hadrin to travel to a city in Europe
where
the K
GB
could
contro
l the
environment. P
otential Russian de-
fectors would understand a double-
agent operation, so I would have to
say that the loss of Shadrin is discour-
agin
g m
ostly in
the se
nse
of fa
ulty
trad
ecra
ft on
the
Am
erica
ns' p
art."
Willia
m C
olb
y, who w
as d
irecto
r of C
entral Intelligence at the time of
Shadrin's disappearance, declares,
"The h
andlin
g in
Vie
nn
a w
as ce
r-ta
inly d
eficie
nt—
esp
ecia
lly the a
b-
sence
of a
ny co
unte
rsurve
illance
m
easures." And he expressed con-
cern that Shadrin's loss w
ould create "psychological disincentives to S
ovi-ets considering defection."
Co
lby a
dd
ed
: "In th
e c
lose
d
world of S
oviet society and especially th
e K
GB
, it is very m
uch
in th
eir
inte
rest to
indica
te th
at d
efe
ction
leads to
frustra
tion, p
unish
ment o
r degradation, and we know
that they actively prom
ote such impressions.
Whether the S
oviets internally por- tray S
hadrin's disappearance as a re
sult o
f their o
wn a
ction, w
hich
I doubt, or as the inevitable fate of one w
ho leaves their service, does not m
ake a great difference. The effect
of either on potential Soviet defec-
tors is certainly depressing." P
erhaps the most disturbing as-
pe
ct of th
e sto
ry, five ye
ars a
fter
Shadrin has vanished, is the cryptic
Com
ment b
y Judge W
ard
that th
e
case remains an open book, that it
ap
pe
ars
to h
ave
"on
go
ing
rel-
evance." Authoritative observers in-
terpret this as an indication that Igor continues to be regarded as a bona fid
e a
gent w
orkin
g in
the K
GB
for
the United S
tates. T
ho
se w
ho
do
ub
t Igo
r's cred
en
-tia
ls are
appalle
d b
y this p
rosp
ect.
Th
ey re
ga
rd Ig
or a
s on
e o
f a n
um
-b
er o
f fals
e d
efe
cto
rs, in
clu
din
g
No
sen
ko, w
ho
ha
ve se
du
ced
an
d
confu
sed se
nsitive
ele
ments o
f our
intelligence services for more than 15
years. E
ven if Ig
or h
ad b
een a
true
defe
ctor, so
me p
oin
t out, th
e n
ew
s stories that began to appear in 1978, te
lling o
f his a
ppro
ach
to th
e C
IA,
would
have
seale
d h
is fate
in M
os-
cow. If he w
ere still dealing with the
CIA
or the FB
I, his every move w
ould he controlled by the K
GB
. Yet, others
be
lieve
tha
t Igo
r is a tru
e d
efe
ctor,
who has escaped K
GB
detection, pro-vid
ed
us w
ith va
lua
ble
info
rma
tion
on a continuing basis, and serves to this day as a spy for the U
nited States.
In the absence of any solution, one 237
SHADRIN: THE SPY WHO NEVER CAME BACK
dreadful question must remain: did a situation develop on December 18-2o, 1975, that presented our intel-ligence officials with a terrible dilemma, one that demanded the decision either to lose Igor or to sacrifice Shadrin?
"That is not something that mat-ters to me," says Ewa Shadrin. "If Nick had been a spy—if they had told him the truth about the danger that he was in—perhaps it would be dif-ferent. But if they killed Nick, or let Nick be kidnapped or killed to save Igor, there is no reason good enough to justify it."
In the end, there is only one certainty: Ewa Shadrin has been the victim of one of the greatest decep-tions the American government has ever perpetrated on one of its citi-zens. The calculated lies reach all the way to the top of the government.
She is convinced that, in truth, no effort was ever made to find out about her husband. That is why President Ford, in a meeting with her, stared at her sullenly, silently. It is why President Carter refused to see her at all.
Of all her tribulations, Ewa Shad-rin faced nothing quite so cruel as the realization that some of Nick's best friends had been in the van-guard of the deception. It was the spring of 1978, when she first learned about Igor, that the horrible reality began to seep into her brain. Over the telephone, she found herself crying, screaming at Jim Wooten:
'But i fyou knew about Igor, how could you not tell Nick?"
"If Nick had known the truth," replied Wooten calmly, "he could never have played his role."
Cta
Signs of Life SIGN posted at a London airport: "There jst isnt engh spce on the pster
to xpin all the finand srvces Ntnl Wstmster Bnk can ofr yr bznes." —Tourist Talk
IN FRONT OF A RESTAURANT: "Our executive chef is the wizard of aahs."
—Contributed by Dolly A. Wiltiey
OUTSIDE A GYM in Pawtucket, R.I.: "Closed on Sundays to Let the Soul Catch Up With the Body." —Fanny Fanny World
AT A SKI RESORT: "Beware—Icicles Are Eavesdroppers." —Mrs. Thomas Bohen in Catholic Digest
ON A BAR in New York City: "The Opinions of the Political Savants Seated at the Bar Are Not Necessarily Those of the Bartender."
—Norton Mockridge, United Feature Syndicate
238
