The IR VIEWS by Harveer Sinh

8/10/2019 The IR VIEWS by Harveer Sinh

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IR VIEWS for

UPSC-MAINInternationalAffairs, Relations

and Extra-MaritalsAlmost Everything You were searching for in last 2 years of your UPSCpreparation related to IR. It is not a book. It is a talking document..lol..

compiled each day to answer all predictable questions :-)

2014

Compiled by: HARVEER SINH

[email protected]

10/14/2014


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The IR VIEWS by HARVEER SINH http://iastoss.in/

CONTENT

Sl. No. Topics Page No.

(DIY)

PART-A : IR Basics

01 Terminology and IR Theories

02 Indias Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future03 International Institutions and Groupings (Do It Yourself)PART-B : India and The World

04 Indias relations with NeighborsA.

Afghanistan

B.

PakistanC.

MaldivesD.NepalE.

BhutanF. BangladeshG.

Sri LankaH. China

05 Indias Look East Policy and ASEAN06 The Arc of Democracy: India-Japan-Australia-USA and Korea

07 India and Middle East08 India-Central Asia-Russia09 India- Europe10 India- Africa11 India- Latin America


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This Document is compiled from many sources. Google, facebook and

twitter helped me in reaching to the source websites. Many websites like

bbc, stratfor, vox, caspeanreport, the Hindu, Indian Express and some

blogs are the major source of my knowledge and content. COPYRIGHT is

theirs and COPYWRONG is mine.

These are not my VIEWS, certainly not your VIEWS, These are THEIR

VIEWS.

Suggestions, Thanks and Gali-Gloches are Welcome.

Regards- Harveer Sinh https://twitter.com/iastoss

If you wish to contribute something for fellow aspirants or fellow teachers,

do mail me at

[email protected]


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01: International Relations: TERMS

ACTOR: Any entity which plays an identifiable role in international relations may be

termed an actor. The Secretary-General of the UN, Human Rights Organizations, Anystate can be termed as actors.

ALLIANCE: An agreement between two or more states to work together on mutual

security issues. States enter into such cooperative security arrangements in order to

protect themselves against a common (or perceived) threat. By pooling their resources

and acting in concert, the alliance partners believe that they can improve their overall

power position within the international system and their security relative to states

outside the alliance

ANARCHY: Its literal meaning is absence of government but it is often used as a

synonym for disorder, disarray, confusion or chaos. Formally, it is the lack of a central

authority.

ASEAN:Association of South East Asian Nations.

AUTHORITY:Person or institution which legitimizes acts or commands; as such it

must be differentiated from power which indicates capacity rather than right. It is the

lack of a common and accepted authority which is said to distinguish international

from domestic politics and law.

AUTONOMY:Degree of freedom, rather than absolute. Now a days, it is used in

ethno-nationalism and cultural-nationalism.

BALANCE OF POWER

A deliberate attempt to prevent predominance or possession of power or exercise of

power or the pattern of interaction between states tends to limit or curb the quest for

hegemony and results in general equilibrium

According to Hedley Bull, BOP fulfilled three positive functions in the modern

statesystem:

1.

It has prevented the system from being transformed by conquest into a

universal empire.

2.

Local balances of power have served to protect the independence of states in

particular areas from absorption by a preponderant power.3.

It has provided the conditions in which other institutions on which the

international order depends might develop, e.g. diplomacy, war, international

law, international bodies.

A simple balance involving two states (a bipolar system) is likely to be more unstable

than a complex balance (a multipolar system).

This is because a sudden technological change which dramatically increases the power

of one of the poles (e.g. the success of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957 and its perception in

the United States) can, unless immediately corrected, destroy the equilibrium.

Multipolar systems, because of the possibility of shifting combinations, can more

readily cope with these occurrences. Indeed, flexibility of alignment and diplomatic


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mobility are important characteristics; under such a system states must be able to

change sides regardless of ideological affinity (the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 is a

classic example). The corollary is also true; states must be willing to abandon an

erstwhile ally when conditions change. A further point to note is that the system,

because it involves constant calculation of power and interest, is likely to produce aninternational hierarchy where states are categorized into at least three divisions: great

powers middle powers and small powers.

BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOUR POLICIES: Governments sometimes pursue

policies at the expense of other states that they believe will be in their own countrys

short-term national interest. However, if other countries follow their example, such

beggar-thy-neighbour policies can be self-defeating. A good analogy is crowd

behaviour in sports. If your view of the action is blocked by the person sitting in front

of you, it is in your interest to stand up and get a better view, even if by so doing you

prevent those behind you from seeing what is going on. However, if everyone stands

up then the situation is no better than it would have been if they had remained seated,

only now it is more uncomfortable

BIPOLAR: A concept associated particularly with the Cold War period when the

structure of the international political system was imagined to revolve around two

poles (blocks) - the Soviet Union and the United States. The world was dominated by

the interests and perceptions of the two superpowers.

BUFFER STATE: small or weak states which exist on the borders of powerful states

and which, from the security standpoint of the latter, serve as intermediate cushions

or crush zones. They serve as an insurance against direct and, more importantly,surprise hostilities between great powers.

CAPABILITY: A term used in the analysis of power. both tangible and intangible

attributes (such as morale, diplomatic skill) are recognized as relevant in determining

capability.

CIVIL WAR: Civil war is protracted internal violence aimed at securing control of

the political and legal apparatus of a state. The role of third parties, external to the

territory of the state, can be crucial in determining the outcome of civil wars. Most

obviously third parties can provide assistance to incumbents or insurgents in a variety

of ways. UN has failed to develop sufficient efficacy in its own instruments to prevent

intervention in civil wars by third parties.

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: hypothesis propounded by Samuel Huntington. the

fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or

primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source

of conflict will be cultural. It would be based on based on ethnic and religious

allegiances.

COLD WAR: A period in international history (beginning soon after the end of the

Second World War and ending in the early 1990s), as well as a description of the

overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during that period.

It was an intense struggle for power between the superpowers. The word war impliestension, armed conflict, and a zero-sum relationship between the superpowers. The


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word cold refers to the presence of factors that allegedly restrained the confrontation

and prevented a hot war.

DE-FACTO/DE-JURE: De facto normally refers to provisional recognition that a

particular government exercises factual sovereignty, whereas de jure implies

recognition of both factual and legal sovereignty. The de facto implies doubt eitherabout the long term viability of a regime or else of its legitimacy; de jure implies

complete diplomatic acceptance of the new state or government.

DETERRENCE: In its simplest form, deterrence consists of the following threat,

intended to dissuade a state from aggression: Do not attack me because if you do,

something unacceptably horrible will happen to you. In other words, deterrence is a

form of persuasion in military strategy. To convey such a threat, the deterrer must

decide what constitutes an attack, and must then decide what level of response would

be adequate to deter it. This in turn depends on the deterrers estimation of the

adversarys intentions and the values it places on them. For deterrence to succeed, the

threat must also be credible. Not only must the potential aggressor believe that the

costs of an attack would be higher than its benefits, but also that there is a significant

likelihood that such costs would indeed be incurred.

ENCLAVE: Territory of one state surrounded by the territory of another like

Bangladeshi enclaves in India.

EQUALITY OF STATES: One of the primary values of the modern international

state-system is the sovereign equality of states.

It is enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which asserts that the

Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its

Members.

The condition of sovereign equality means that an actor can claim the

privileges, opportunities and diplomatic status that derive from statehood.

The constant intrusion, or potential intrusion, of power renders meaningless

any conception of equality between members of the international community.

ETHNIC CLEANSING: the systematic, deliberate and often brutal forced removal of

members of one or more ethnic groups from territory claimed by another ethnic group.

In theory, it can be distinguished from genocide, which is the deliberate and

systematic extermination of a national or racial group, but in practice the two

are often indistinguishable.

Ethnic cleansing is regarded as a species of postmodern war where conflict

between states has been replaced by conflict between rival militias, factions

and other informal ethnic groupings.

The victims are overwhelmingly civilians who are often slaughtered without

mercy by their former neighbours and compatriots.

Recent examples besides Bosnia, include Liberia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sierra

Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Haiti, Cambodia, Zaire etc.

ETHNOCENTRISM: This is the tendency to see one's own group, culture, nation in

positive terms and, conversely, other groups in negative terms

EXTRATERRITORIALITY


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A vital aspect of diplomacy which refers to the exercise of legal jurisdiction by a

'sender' state within a 'received' state's territory.

In modern usage it is bound up with diplomatic immunity. However, extraterritoriality

has not been mutual or reciprocal (Devyanis case).

State insist that its own expatriates be subject to their home-based legal system and notthat of the locale in which they were placed.

Apart from diplomats, it is common practice in alliance systems for the armed forces

of one state which are present in the territory of another to enjoy the privileges of

extraterritoriality

FAILED NATION-STATES

The withering away of central government, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the

unchecked spread of disease and the growing pervasiveness of war.

The end of the Cold War led rival powers not to extend economic/military assistance

to former client regimes which are now unable to survive unaided.

Examples of failed state are Examples are Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan

FEMINISM: The study of and movement for women not as objects but as subjects of

knowledge. Until the 1980s, the role of gender (i.e. the relationship between sex and

power) in the theory and practice of international relations was generally ignored.

Today, this is no longer the case as a number of feminist thinkers have turned their

critical sights on a field that has traditionally been gender-blind. Over the last decade,

feminism has emerged as a key critical perspective within the study of international

relations.

GREAT POWERS: For five centuries, the worlds most powerful states thePortuguese, Spanish, and Italians in the sixteenth century; the Swedes and the Danes in

the seventeenth century; the British, French, and Germans in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries; and, finally, the Americans and the Russians in the twentieth

century have assumed the mantle of great powers. Great powers, as the words

suggest, are the most influential states in the international system at any one time.

HEGEMONY: primacy or leadership by a state possessing sufficient capability to

fulfil this role. Other states in the system would thereafter have to define their

relationship with the hegemon mostly complying with the Hegemon state.

INTERNAL COLONIALISM: underdevelopment within a state or region as a resultof unequal exchange between the periphery and the core. in the UK for example,

internal colonialism refers to the relationship between England (the core) and the

Celtic fringes, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. In India also, this concept is applicable.

IRREDENTISM: regions which had cultural and ethnic ties with the parent state but

which lay outside the physical control of the state waiting to be redeemed. It

characterizes policies which seek to alter the status quo in a particular territory on the

basis of nationalistic or ethnic criteria.


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LIBERALISM

The liberal theory of international relations contains a number of propositions, are the

following:

1.Peace can best be secured through the spread of democratic institutions on a

world-wide basis.

2.The national interest and the international interest would be one and the same.

Because 'war does not pay'.

3. If disputes continue to occur, these would be settled by established judicial

procedures, since the rule of law is just as applicable to states as it is to

individuals.

4.Collective security would replace notions of self-help.

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC):

Conflicts where the commitment of capabilities is finite and limited. The term is usedwith third World, drug control and anti-terrorist measures.

Typically the kinds of forces required for intervention in low intensity conflicts are

held to be highly mobile, functionally specific units with perhaps a commitment to

self-reliance beyond the conventional norm.

MERCANTALISM: It is an economic philosophy that believes that economic

management should be part of the states pursuit of its national interests defined in

terms of wealth, power, and prestige.

MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD):A relationship between two

states in which each can destroy the others society even after absorbing an all-outattack (or first strike) by the other state. In short, each state has an invulnerable

second-strike capability.

NATION: notion which refers to a social collectivity, the members of which share

some or all of the following: a sense of common identity, a history, a language, ethnic

or racial origins, religion, a common economic life, a geographical location and a

political base.

NATION-STATE: the centralized state claiming exclusive and monopolistic

authority within a defined territorial area.

NON-INTERVENTION

Rights associated with independence and sovereignty logically implied corresponding

duties of non-intervention. Thus, the claim to exclusive domestic jurisdiction

represented by the principle of cuius rego eius religio extended to its corollary

freedom from external interference.

While non-intervention is now widely regarded as a rule which states ought to adhere

to, it is often thought to be more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

Indeed, many scholars have noted that in the post-1945 period intervention appears

not only to be endemic in international relations (to the extent that it can be regarded

as 'structural' in character), but may even be coterminous with it. That is, if all states


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complied all the time with the requirements of non-intervention, international politics

as we know it would disappear. In this way, modern debates centre not around the

existence of the rule, but rather the nature and scope of exceptions.

PLURALISM: It is a theory of inter-state and intra-state both. Intra-state it is a

political systems where power is shared among a plurality of competing parties andinterest groups. In inter-state understanding it is preference for a multi-actor model

where the centrism is being opposed.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY: The main focus of preventive diplomacy is to

identify and respond to brewing conflicts in order to prevent the outbreak of violence.

QUASI-STATE: ex-colonial states of Asia, Africa and Oceania, which through the

process of decolonization have achieved 'juridical' statehood but lack many of the

attributes of 'empirical' statehood. They possess all the trappings and formal qualities

of sovereign independent statehood in particular the rights and responsibilities

stemming from full membership of the international community but are deficient

in 'the political will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human

rights or to provide socio-economic welfare'.

RATIONALITY: It is utility maximization leading to the efficient utilization. Thus

minimizing losses and maximizing gains is called rational.

REALISM: since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile

environment the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of

foreign policy. The national interest therefore is defined in terms of power, to the

virtual exclusion of other factors such as the promotion of ideological values or of

moral principles.

RECOGNITION: It is way for conferring legitimacy to a state. international lawtends to view community acquiescence and empirical reality as proper guidelines for

conferring recognition. But it must be emphasized that the whole process is highly

political. the non-recognized state has no obligations at all under international law.

For example the refusal of the Arab world to recognize Israel could entail Israel not

being bound by international rules covering, say, aggression or the laws of warfare.

REGIONALISM: Regionalism is to region what nationalism is to nation. A complex

of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrates the individual and collective minds

of people(s) upon what they perceive as 'their' region. Regionalism within states is

thus a very broad-based set of ideas and aspirations which may see much or little

conflict between the concept of region and the concept of centre.

ROGUE STATE: A state that regularly violates international standards of acceptable

behaviour. Over the last decade Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea have

all been given this highly pejorative label. It evokes images of a state that is outwardly

aggressive, a threat to international peace, highly repressive, xenophobic, and

arrogant, and which has no regard for the norms of international society.

SECESSION: the mirror image of irredentism, the term refers to the political

expression of separation by the inhabitants of a region from some pre-existing state

structure. Secessionist sentiments may therefore be seen as indicative of the rejection

of some of the most basic ground rules of the state-system in favour of nationalismthat owes more to ideas about kinship and ethnicity. Like Bangladesh and Yugoslavia.


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It is mostly the outcome of a civil war. Since secession represents such a powerful

centrifugal challenge to state-centrism, secessionist tendencies and factions will be

resisted by political authorities at the centre.

SECURITY

A term which denotes the absence of threats to scarce values. Historically security hasbeen seen as a core value and ultimate goal of state behaviour. This position was oftenlatent and assumed rather than manifest and stated.

`How much security is enough?' becomes a relevant question in todays world Traditionally analyses of security in a foreign policy context concentrated on the

military dimension. Here threats implicit in war and near violent conflict situationsraised acute national security questions for political leaderships. Strategies of'balancing' or 'band-waggoning', of ally-seeking and coalition-building, of arms racingand defence spending were the common currency of classical security policy making.The end of the Cold War has allowed for a burgeoning of the security agenda toinclude ideas about economic and ecological/environmental security to set alongsidethe more familiar military.

Economic security is essentially a 'supply-side' problem in IR, which is whymercantilism sets so much store by self-sufficiency. If the control of the supply ofgoods and services falls into hostile hands or if the price for the supply of the same isset by a hostile actor with monopoly control then the economic security of therecipient is potentially under threat.

Environmental security concerns are truly transnational. Strategies based upon narrow

state-centric views are ultimately self-defeating in environmental policy making.

If assumptions can be made about common security as an alternative to state-centric

versions of security then it might be possible to go even further and see the security

concept becoming part of the agenda for global governance to consider. SECURITY DILEMMA: the security dilemma arises for the situation that states find

themselves in. By striving to increase their on security - by following policies that

enhance their military capabilities - states inadvertently make others feel less secure.

As a result of this behaviour a vicious circle or spiral of security-insecurity arises to

which there is no permanent and lasting solution. if war is costly and cooperation

beneficial there will be strong incentives to overcome the dilemma by following

policies that ameliorate rather than exacerbate relations between putative adversaries.

SELF-DETERMINATION:The right or aspiration of a group, which considers

itself to have a separate and distinct identity, to govern itself and to determine thepolitical and legal status of the territory it occupies. Thus, in the political sense it

refers both to a process and to an idea. Closely identified with nationalism and

liberalism it is probably best understood as a theory of the relationship between nation

and state which finds its fullest expression in the concept of the democratic nation-

state. In a general sense, then, political self- determination refers to the right of

peoples to determine their own destiny in their own way.

SOVEREIGNTY


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Often regarded as the enabling concept of international relations whereby states assert

not only ultimate authority within a distinct territorial entity but also assert

membership of the international community.

The doctrine of sovereignty implies a double claim: autonomy in foreign policy and

exclusive competence in internal affairs.

Paradoxically, therefore, the doctrine of state sovereignty necessarily leads to the

concept of international anarchy: the idea of a supreme authority within the state

logically leads to a denial of the existence of a supra-sovereign above the state.

Sovereign states are judges in their own cause have an absolute right to go to war topursue their conceived interests and can treat those who fall within their domesticjurisdiction in their own way. However, in practice the denial of a supra-sovereignauthority beyond the state has never meant that sovereign states are free to do as they

please.

The history of the modern states system (which is to say the history of statesovereignty) from the seventeenth century onwards has been a conscious attempt tomove away from the apparent rigidity of the early formulation of the doctrine whileretaining its more useful characteristics, especially the idea of formal equality which itimplies

Increasing interdependence, the reciprocal nature of international law andmembership of international organizations have thus led to the acceptance of thedoctrine of 'divided sovereignty' where supremacy is qualified either through consentor auto limitation.

The UN Charter, for example, is an implicit recognition of this (Article 2 para. 1recognizes the `sovereign equality' of member states yet exhorts them to settle theirdisputes by 'peaceful means').

STATE: It has a legal personality and as such in international law possesses certainrights and duties. States must possess the following qualifications: a permanent

population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining effectivecontrol over its territory and of conducting international relations with other states.

TRACKS OF DIPLOMACY

Traditionally, the term "diplomacy" referred to interaction between nation-states.More recently, however, scholars have delineated several levels of diplomacy. Tracks1,2,3 multitrack etc.

Track 1 diplomacy: Official discussions typically involving high-level political and

military leaders and focusing on cease-fires, peace talks, and treaties and otheragreements.

Track 2 diplomacy: Unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed atbuilding relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the officialprocess. Track 2 activities typically involve influential academic, religious, and NGOleaders and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-rankingofficials. Some analysts use the term track 1.5 to denote a situation in which officialand non-official actors work together to resolve conflicts.

Track 3 diplomacy: People-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals andprivate groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostilecommunities and involving awareness raising and empowerment within thesecommunities. Normally focused at the grassroots level, this type of diplomacy ofteninvolves organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and

political and legal advocacy for marginalized people and communities.


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ZERO-SUM: A term derived from game theory. It refers to the fact that thenumerical value of the pay-offs add up to zero. It is therefore held to represent inmathematical terms a situation of pure conflict where a gain to one party is a loss tothe other.

Students of conflict analysis will often use it to characterize a particular perception

held by participants of the nature of their conflict. Conflict resolution may be mademore difficult if this type of perception appears to be influential and deeply held.

Different Export Control Regimes

Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG)

Missile Technology

Control Regime

(MTCR)

Australia Group Wassenaar

Arrangement.

# It is concerned withreducing nuclear

proliferation.

# It controls theexport and re-transferof materials that may

be applicable tonuclearweapon development#It improvessafeguards and

protection on existingmaterials.

# It is an informaland voluntary

partnership between

34 countries.# It preventsthe proliferation ofmissile and unmanned aerial vehicletechnology capableof carrying a 500 kg

payload at least300 km.

#It identifies thoseexports which needto be controlled so

as not to contributeto the spreadof chemical and

biological weapons.# It works on 2

principles1> No Undercut2>Catch All

# Export Controls forConventional Arms andDual-Use Goods and

Technologies.>#41 participating states#Every six monthsmember countriesexchange information ondeliveries of conventionalarms to non-Wassenaarmembers

If you wish to contribute

something for fellow aspirants

or fellow teachers, do mail me

at

[email protected] m


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Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy.[W]e have not produced any

constructive economic scheme or economic policy so farWhen we do so, that will govern

our foreign policy more than all the speeches in this house. Jawaharlal Nehru

India accounted for a quarter of the worlds economic wealth once and It call for

regaining that rightful position.

Post 1947, ensuring economic development as per Indias needed requiredindependent decision making, something which couldnt be achieved by becoming asubordinate state to one of the two superpowers during the Cold War.

For a nation that had labored under colonial rule for the better part of two centuries,preserving its strategic autonomy was its foremost priority.

The policy of non-alignment adopted post independence was motivated by nationalinterest and not due to a moralistic hangover of the non-violent Indian freedomstruggle as is commonly assumed.

The end of the Cold War resulting in a steady transition to an increasingly multi-polarworld however resulted in non-aligned nations losing the bargaining power they had

previously possessed.

A reactive foreign policy in the 1990s gave way to increased Indian engagement withthe global economy marking the end of an era wherein the Indian economy wascharacterized by its sub 4% Hindu rate of growth.

The 1990s along with abandoning the state centric model, marked the beginning ofan era of coalition politics in India.

The BJP government that came to power in 1999 conducted the Pokhran II testsmaking India a nuclear power.

While the 1990s marked the beginning of explosive economic growth India nevermanaged to articulate a coherent foreign policy outlook. Arijit Mazumdar identifiesthe transition to a multi party system characterized by coalition governments as a

prime cause for this phenomenon.

NEHRUS SPEECH on AIR

Promotion of International peace at all cost

Protection of our people (PIO)

Territorial Integrity.

Freedom of dependent nations and people. (Decolonization )

Elimination of Racial Discrimination

PRINCIPLES OF INDIAS FOREIGN POLICY

Non Alignment (Strategi Autonomy)

Faith in peaceful co-existence.

Faith in UN

02 Indias Foreign Policy: Past,

Present and Future


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Support for Disarmament

Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy

Independent relations with commonwealth.

Full participation in multilateral fora.

Leads to PANCHSHEEL.

Panchsheel

These set of principles to govern relations between states.

Their first formal codification in treaty form was in an agreement between China and

India in 1954.

These are

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2. Mutual non-aggression.

3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

4.

Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit.5. Peaceful co-existence.

Objectives of Indias Foreign Policy

Settle and secure international borders. Broader bilateral intercourse can onlybe achieved when geographic boundaries are beyond doubt.

Maintain regional peace and stability through the projection of Indian power.Ensure peaceful settlement of the disputes.

India can help ensure stability of the littoral Indian Ocean region in generaland South Asia in particular.

Secure unhindered access to international markets on the most favorableterms.

Develop deeper and broader economic relations with countries that supply fuel

and military hardware. Cultivate and engage political constituencies that can influence policies of

foreign governments in Indias favour. Protect and credibly demonstrate the intention to protect at all costs the

lives and well-being of Indian citizens living abroad. Not to forgivegovernments, organizations or individuals who harm Indians.

Participate in multilateral and bilateral military co-operation relationships.Secure visiting and basing rights at geostrategic locations in the region.

Develop capabilities and contingency plans to provide relief and rehabilitation

in the region in the event of natural or man-made disasters. Attract talented individuals from across the world to visit, stay, work, study,

teach or live in India. Project the Indian model as an example for other countries to emulate.

NAM 2.0

The document is an idea to identify the basic principles that should guide India's

foreign and strategic policy over next decade.


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The core philosophy of the document is that - success of India's own internal

development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global

opportunities in order to maximize our choicesthereby enlarging our domestic

options to the benefit of all Indians.

The report points out that in a situation where the world is no longer bifurcatedbetween two dominant powers, nonalignment today will require managing

complicated coalitions and opportunities in an environment that is not structurally

settled.

Report deals with India's approach towards the 'Asian theatre,' the international order,

hard-power, internal security, non-conventional security issues like energy and

nuclear options, the knowledge and information foundations of power as well as the

state and democracy.

NAM Summit

The 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held from 26 to 31 August 2012

in Tehran, Iran. Held after 3 years.

NAM would focus on nuclear disarmament, human rights and regional issues.

The organisation consists of 120 member states, including the non-UN member state

of Palestine, and 21 other observer countries.

Role Played by NAM

o It is still of high symbolic significance.

o It is a new experiment in the world order.

o

Till early 1990s, when the former Soviet Union fell apart, the organization

cultivated true autonomy for the third world. .

o The emphasis that the movement puts on the principle of cooperation among

nations are:

Continued support for peace;

Regular emphasis on the importance of disarmament;

Insistence on the nations right to self-determination;

Emphasis on the need for structural changes in the united nations and

its many organs, especially the security council, in order to encourage

optimal participation of the international community in internationalprocesses related to the fate of humanity;

Insistence on the adoption and implementation of multilateral policies

as well as strong focus and unanimity on such issues as human rights

and cultural pluralism are major fortes of the movement.

The biggest weakness facing this great movement is heterogeneity of its member

states as well as their goals and policies.

India and Disarmament


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1948, India called for limiting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only

and the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments.

India was the first country to call to an end to all nuclear testing in 1954.

In 1978, India proposed negotiations for an international convention that would

prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

1982: India Called for a "nuclear freeze" - i.e. prohibition on the production of fissile

material for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons, and related delivery

systems.

1988: Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-weapon free and Non-Violent World

Order proposed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Third Special Session on

Disarmament of the General Assembly in June 1988.

The heart of the Action Plan was the elimination of all nuclear weapons, in three

stages by 2010 and placed emphasis on nuclear disarmament that is global, universal

and non-discriminatory in nature.

The essential features of this Action Plan were:

o First, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating

nuclear weapons in stages, by the year 2010 at the latest.

o Second, all nuclear weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear

disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process.

o Third, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must

be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal.

o changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world

free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a

Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations.

India exercised an unparalleled restraint in not weaponizing its nuclear capability. It is

relevant to recall, that during this period, when we voluntarily and totally desisted

from testing, over 35,000 nuclear weapons were developed through a series of tests by

states possessing nuclear weapons.

India was obliged to stand apart on the CTBT in 1996 after having been actively

engaged in the negotiations for two and a half years precisely because the issues of

non-proliferation, global disarmament and India's concerns about her security and

strategic autonomy were ignored.

India's continued commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is clear

from the voluntary measures announced by India after undertaking a limited series of

underground nuclear tests in 1998.

India remains committed to converting its voluntary moratorium into de jure

obligation accordance with our long held positions disarmament.

India has declared that it will maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrent and will

not engage in an arms race. India has declared a no-first-use doctrine.

We are willing to strengthen this commitment by undertaking bilateral agreements as

well as by engaging in discussions for a global no-first-use agreement.

India believes that a global no-first-use agreement would be the first step towards the

delegitimization of nuclear weapons.


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India has also called for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to ban and eliminate nuclear

weapons just as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC) have banned the other two categories of weapons of

destruction.

India has an impeccable record on non-proliferation which is ensured through astringent and effective system of export controls.

Global recognition of this record was evident in the near complete lack of opposition

to opening of international civil nuclear cooperation with India in 2008.

India believes that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT has only

served to legitimize nuclear arsenals of the NPT states possessing nuclear weapons

into perpetuity, thus posing a major obstacle to the goal of global nuclear

disarmament. India welcomes the recent efforts by some heavily armed nuclear states

to take steps in good faith for nuclear disarmament with the aim of eventually

fulfilling obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Indias Iron Curtain Policy

In the last two decades India has stealthily straddled its interests in the Indian Ocean

Rim, which includes the islands of Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles and Madagascar

and the rim states of South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique by very deft moves in

foreign policy, economic sops like the double taxation exemption with Mauritius, and

military inroads.

This is the classical strategy of gaining influence by conjoining economic perks and

power, with military diplomacy called Showing the Flag, so well perfected by larger

maritime naval powers in the past. The Indian Navy has transferred offshore naval

patrol vessels, provided staff and training, and refit facilities and most importantly

provided naval hydrographic support to the island nations of the IOR, which steps

have left strategic imprints on the recipients.

For example, Indian Navy moved in a Leander pretending it needed repairs, and

concurrently flew in armed personnel to Victoria from Mumbai, to help ward off a

coup against President Albert Rene of the Seychelles.

In 1998 the Indian Navys INS Godavari berthed at Maldives, and Army troops flewin by IL-76s in Op Cactus and staved off a coup.

The Indian Navy possesses a sophisticated hydrographic cadre, with eight wellequipped survey ships , numerous survey craft, a large world class electronic chart

production facility in Dehradun and a hydrographic school at Goa which trains severalforeign naval and civilian personnel. Much funding for the Navys survey ships has

been contributed by the Ministry of Shipping, which allows easier induction of latestequipment, and a swifter procurement route than the cumbersome MODs DPP-08,which is still to prove its efficacy. China views Indias hydrographic activities asstrategic inroads in to the Indian Ocean.

Indias maritime military strategy and the Navys 2004 maritime doctrine, both issued

by the Indian Navy are very clear that it is the Indian Navys responsibility to ensure


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stability in the IOR, which irks the Chinese as they view the Indian Ocean as their lifeline for trade and energy

India has developed a special relationship with Mauritius, which is a fulcrum islandstate because of its strong Indian diaspora. India has instituted a favourable taxationtreaty that makes it Indias largest offshore investor. The Indian Navy set up the

Mauritius Coast Guard in the 70s, and has provided ships and personnel, andMauritius has close security coordination with Indias CIA, the R&AW.

Chinese and Pakistan activities in the IOR are closely monitored by Indiasintelligence and India has forestalled Chinese expansionist moves to lease islands inthe Seychelles.

India has signed an MOU to provide piracy patrols to Mozambique. It was alsoreported that India has established a listening post in Madagascar in 2007.

Development Partnership Administration (DPA)

Development Partnership Administration (DPA), the agency is designed to

streamline and make more transparent India's growing foreign aid program, which has

expanded from almost nothing a decade ago to a sizable outlay targeting more than 60

developing countries.

The DPA will have around $15 billionto spend over the next five years.

It will be headed byMinistry of External Affairs' (MEA) additional secretary and

will bring under one umbrella all agencies involved with foreign aid and development

projects within the foreign ministry.

India's foreign aid program has made major donations to Sri Lanka, Myanmar and

Afghanistan, signaling that along with helping its neighbors New Delhi (like Washington andBeijing) views economic aid as an important foreign policy tool.

Putting Things Straight

The mere induction of a new regime (government) does not result in dramatic

changes in the broad outlines of Indias foreign policy.

The nature of conflicts may change with technological innovation, especially in

cyberspace.

Defining national interest is not as easy as it might seem. National polls are notconducted to define a countrys national interest. Politicians find a huge grey area

here and project almost all interests as he national interests.

A broad consensus can be built over years on the essential parameters of such interest. India desires a secure and stable regional environment. Continued economic growth to

uplift the Indian masses out of misery. In reality, countries do not always act in their national interest. It is no countrys

interest, for example, to have difficult relations with neighbours, but many countriesdo, either because they want to dominate them or are insensitive to their concerns.Smaller countries too overplay their hand and provoke their bigger and strongerneighbours.

The enlightened interest of any country is undermined by tensions, conflicts and wars.Yet, many countries willfully pursue policies that threaten peace.


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If pride makes individuals obstinate and unwilling to compromise, nations too sufferfrom the loss of face syndrome.

There is the issue of national power and national interest. A powerful country willexpand the scope of its national interest in tune with its ambitions and the reach of its

power. A weaker country will interpret its national interest more narrowly so as to

avoid unnecessary problems. Globalization and interdependence has also changed notions of national interest

because countries know they do not have a free hand and have to give and take muchmore than before.

In some cases, like the European Union, national interest has been submerged in

many ways within a larger community interest. Even sovereignty has been pooled insome key areas.

National interest is a fluid and uncertain concept. A big challenge for India istherefore to be able to define its national interest with discernment, realism,objectivity and foresight.

This is not easy as the backdrop against which analysis and choices are made keeps

changing. A broad national consensus on what constitutes national interest isimportant.

The international scene has changed a great deal in the last two decades or so. India

has needed to adjust its foreign policy accordingly. During the Cold War Indiaconsidered the Soviet Union a reliable strategic partner, even though the termstrategic partner was not used then.

With a world divided into two blocs, Indias compass was nonalignment, with itspolitical empathies more with the eastern bloc whose rhetoric was more friendlytowards the third world.

Indias relations with the western bloc were problematic because of the wests non-proliferation injunctions, pro-Pakistani policies and economic philosophy.

The nature of our relations with US has been altered in the last few years. Our policieshave become convergent in many ways. Improved relations with US has given Indiamore room for manoeuvre regionally and internationally. Strategically, we are being

pulled towards US. This means that our relations with US allies have become bettertoo, as, for example, with Japan, South Korea and Australia.

Simultaneously, our relations with Russia have lost the centrality of the past. Even asIndias economic growth is changing its global profile, our economic ties with Russiahave relatively shrunk.

Yet Russia is important for the balance of our foreign policy. A weak Russia is notgood for the global system. In fact, the space vacated by Russia has been filled by

China. US political lobbies still see Russia as a geopolitical threat. India can do little to boost Russia, except by maintaining the regularity of summitmeetings, nurturing the traditionally close defence ties that assure non-disruption ofsupplies at critical moments as well as access to sensitive technologies, and partneringit in political groupings such as the Russia-India-China dialogue and the BRICSwhere the west is absent.

The challenge for India to expand its economic ties with Russia. Energy cooperationprovides an opportunity so far insufficiently exploited.

India and Russia share the agenda of multipolarity, respect for sovereignty, non-

interference in the internal affairs of countries, geo-political abuse of the human rightsissues, regime change policies, the proclivity to use military means to find solutions to

highly complex issues.


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This agenda puts India at cross purposes with many policies of the west. Thechallenge for India is to maintain the basics of its position but avoid a direct clashwith the west over these issues.

Yet, in terms of markets, investment needs- especially to develop our poorinfrastructure, access to modern technologies in health, energy, agriculture, industry,

building a knowledge economy, participating in global supply chains etc, India needsare much better served by the west. Our people to people relations with the west arestrong.

In fact, the needs of Indias growing economy are such that we cannot avoid doingbusiness even with an adversary like China. Not surprisingly, China has thereforeemerged as Indias biggest trade partner in goods.

The challenge for India is to successfully play on all geo-political chess boards andoptimize what it can extract from others for its own development. This means Indiashould preserve it independence of judgment and action as much as possible even as itconducts itself as a good and reliable partner where partnerships have been formed.

US rhetoric about its relationship with India being a defining one in the 21st century

is heady. India-US relations have certainly achieved a degree of balance and maturity,with rapid expansion of bilateral and multilateral engagement. Contentious issues

between them have receded into the background. The US robustly affirms its strategic partnership with India, presenting India with the

challenge of leveraging its new strategic ties with that country while maintaining itsstrategic autonomy.

It has to be borne in mind, however, that in maintaining its global supremacy, but withdeclining means, US needs to co-opt partners outside the Euro-Atlantic bloc, andIndia stands out as an obvious one because of its size, human resources, expandingeconomic base, reasonable military strength and democratic polity.

Even with regard to its new policy of rebalancing towards Asia, intended withoutbeing openly stated to put constraints on Chinas ambitions, US sees India as alynchpin. The assumption is that India alone is big enough in Asia to counter Chinaand that India has concerns about Chinas rise for its own security, given outstanding

border differences and Chinese policies in Indias neighbourhood. It is in this spirit that India has strategic partnerships with a variety of countries. The

idea is to develop the basis of long term relationships to mutual advantage, create trustand avoid any policy that hurts the legitimate interests of the other partner.

US has interests spread all over the world by virtue of it being a global power. Itcannot expect India to support its policies everywhere. US would want to fit India inthe global architecture of its policies. India has no such global architecture in which it

wants to fit US. It cannot easily fit US even into the regional architecture of itspolicies, whether this relates to Pakistan, Chinas territorial claims on India, the postDalai Lama phase in Tibet, Iran etc.

The challenge for Indias foreign policy in the years ahead is to be courted by all andto succumb to no one. Even if India cannot lead, it must not be led.

India has, in fact, shown great resilience, despite its economic and military weakness,to try and stand on its own feet strategically in international affairs. Even bigEuropean powers, which have in the past ruled many parts of the world, do not havestrategic autonomy today despite the collapse of Soviet Union and communism as anideology. They willingly subordinate themselves to US.

By choosing strategic self-reliance India has to cope with challenges largely on its

own. This requires that India avoid getting into situations it cannot handle, in themain, on its own. It does not have allies to shore up its positions.


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The west has never supported India so far on issues of core concern to it, whetherpolitical, military or technological. It has now removed certain technologicaldisabilities on India but far from fully.

The developing countries havent supported India either on Pakistan, China or nuclearrelated issues.

This explains why Indian foreign policy tends to be cautious and reticent in takingpartisan positions on highly divisive issues.

There are pressures on India to be more forthright, not sit on the fence, be willing toincur costs in upholding the international order and not be a free-loader. India willhave to resist such pressures in the years ahead, because many of these arise from theaggressive, dominating habits that the west has not been able to shed, which drives itsefforts to shape the world according to its values which it considers universal.

Indias challenge is not to be simply co-opted into the existing international order thatis controlled by the west. It must find its due place in it in its own right and be in a

position to change the rules rather than simply adhere to existing ones. The reform of international institutions is therefore very important and Indias

discourse on this is legitimate. India should have a greater say in these institutions.Getting a permanent seat in the Security Council will remain a challenge as resistanceto this will not go away soon.

Self-esteem and confidence are reflected in Indias claim to a permanent seat. India isnot begging; it is claiming. India should pursue this quest, if only to remind that theexisting international institutions that uphold the present world order are no longerrepresentative of the international community.

We have to carefully weigh the China factor in seeking redistribution of power at theglobal level. The gap between India and China has grown so big that in any re-ordering of the world order China can gain more. With Chinas world view, its senseof itself, its historical grievances and its territorially expansionist policies, India,which has serious differences with China, cannot be comfortable with a more

powerful China within the international system. China has become too powerful economically and financially and too integrated with

the global economy to be contained in the way the Soviet Union was and the wayRussia is still being pressured by the west. US pivot towards Asia is not intended toactively confront China; it is to caution it against any adventurism.

US-China relationship is much more intensive than the US-India relationship. Weshould not pay much attention to the democracy rhetoric. China becoming moredemocratic is no guarantee against a more muscled Chinese foreign policy.

US and its democratic allies have muscled foreign policies too, as they are using force

in many parts of the world at great human cost. Political and moral justification formilitary action can always be found, with globally powerful media helping torationalize such action.

Democracy is no insurance against the use of military means to achieve national ends.

Nationalism can be a powerful driver in foreign policy. A more democratic butnationalist China will not be any less of a problem for others.

Unfortunately, China has made it clear that it does not intend to solve the border issuewith India; it says it wants it to remain dormant and leave it to the next generation toresolve it. But then, as we have seen in the latest maps on Chinese passports, China isestablishing its claims in insidious ways. These actions reveal the longer-term strategyChina has in mind.

It is clear Tibet is not reconciled to Chinas rule. Dalai Lamas succession can revivetensions between India and China. India has to make sure Bhutan does not yield to


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Chinas blandishments. Chinas rising profile in Sri Lanka and Nepal is a cause ofconcern. The China-Pakistan axis remains a grave problem.

India has to develop its economic and military muscle to counter the China threat.There is no other way. This is a big challenge for us ahead, even as engage China asothers do.

India cannot risk a confrontation with China; its strategy should be to dissuade Chinafrom taking the risk of confronting India with visible and independent strategicstrength.

India has to find the right balance between engaging China and hedging against it.

Some would say that a critical foreign policy challenge confronting India is themaintenance of friendly ties with its neighbours. India, it is claimed, cannot rise to its

potential if it is embroiled in conflicts or tensions with its neighbours. India hassupposedly failed in this regard.

Having good relations with neighbours is not a unilateral exercise; it is a reciprocalone. If India should have good relations with its neighbours, then it is equallyincumbent on the neighbours to have good relations with India. No one can argue that

Indias conduct alone is deficient. India should, of course, try to do its best to win over the neighbours, but if the

neighbours see it in their interest to balance a much larger India by drawing inexternal powers, and prevent their national identities from being overwhelmed byIndias civilisational and cultural pull by emphasing differences with India andstoking anti-Indian national sentiments, there is little India can do. This challenge willnot go away.

The argument that India as the bigger country should be more generous with itsneighbours is fallacious. Big countries like China and US do not believe in the meritsof this approach. Vietnam and Cuba come to mind.

Indias economic growth will be of key importance for tying our neighbourseconomically to the Indian market. It will be important to give stakes to a crosssection of people in our neighbouring countries in various sectors our economy. Inthis context the strengthening of SAARC should be a priority.

Our improved relations with US has excluded one external factor that in the pastcomplicated our relations with our neighbours. China, however, remains a problem inthis regard.

Pakistan remains a perennial problem. While some aspects of our relations with thatcountry are improving, as for example, in the trade area, larger questions about therise of Islamic radicalism there and fears that Pakistan could become a failing state are

being debated.

There is little that India can do help Pakistan fight its own internal demons. India is, infact, the reason why these demons exist in the first place. Unless Pakistan radicallychanges its attitude to India, ceases to whip up religious sentiments against us thatfeed the jihadi groups, the problem of radicalism in Pakistan cannot be successfullycontrolled.

India should continue to encourage more economic and people to people ties withPakistan, but should also be clear-sighted about the serious obstacles in normalizingrelations with that country.

We should shed the belief that concessions will make Pakistan more amenable.

India does not need to re-assure Pakistan about its intentions or make Pakistan trustus. The reverse is needed: it is Pakistan that needs to make the requisite effort to

convince India that it has abandoned the use of terrorism as state policy.


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Do we have a stake in Pakistans survival as a united country, or should we encouragethe break-up of the country? So long as Pakistan is adversarial, we have no stakes inPakistans territorial integrity. It would be ironical for India to be supportive ofPakistans geographical health when it wants a slice away a part of Indian territory.

We should not, however, actively seek to de-stabilize Pakistan, as managing a

fragmented Pakistan would raise its own problems. On the other hand, a broken up Pakistan loses value for the Chinese. Even a

chronically unstable Pakistan loses value. It is unlikely that the Chinese will want torescue Pakistan with economic largesse. In that context, disarray in Pakistan is notunhelpful to us.

Obversely, we cannot have a viable Central Asia and even Afghan policy if Pakistanremains unstable. If this whole region is to be integrated economically, with energyand trade connectivities, the geo-political key is in Pakistans hands.

US is backing the project to link Central Asia with South Asia, with TAPIsymbolizing this vision, but USs ability today to bend Pakistan to its will hassuffered erosion.

Stability in Afghanistan and containment of the Taliban threat there in a regionalcontext is another challenge that will acquire sharper contours post 2014.

The west is looking for a compromise with the Taliban, believing it can live with an

Islamized Afghanistan so long as it is not anti-west. We have therefore a multifold challenge in Afghanistan, of retaining our presence and

influence in that country, creating internal support for us there that can be used tocounter the Taliban and the revival of radical forces there that can threaten oursecurity directly with Pakistani support.

Lack of direct access to Afghanistan exposes the lack of a credible Indian policytowards Central Asia. We have to galvanize Iran to cooperate with us for analternative access to Afghanistan trough Chabahar.

The Iranian nuclear issue has serious implications for India should there be recourseby the west to military action against that country. The de-stabilization of the Gulfregion which will occur as a result would be very costly for India, as India has hugeenergy, manpower and financial interests in the region. India would have to steer clearof the rising Shia-Sunni conflict in the Muslim world.

Indias Look East policy is now facing new challenges with the erstwhile equationbetween China and East and Southeast Asia disturbed by Chinas muscle-flexing inthe South China sea.

India has concerns about the freedom of passage through international waters, butotherwise Indias priorities concerns are in the Indian Ocean area. However, for geo-

political reasons, India would need to come closer to those countries targeted byChinese claims, though without getting directly embroiled in the territorial disputes.

In the Indian Ocean area, India should try to maintain its dominant status as a littoralstate as much as possible, knowing however that at some stage Chinese presence inthese waters will increase, as is portended by Chinas active search for port facilitiesin this area.

Indias declared openness to cooperation with China on maritime issues should bebased on the legitimacy of not only Chinas presence in the Indian Ocean but alsoIndias maritime presence close to Chinas shores.

India would need to give priority to its relations with Myanmar, now that the latterwants to loosen the Chinese grip over the country. Myanmar is of key importance to

create east-west connectivity in this region from which India can benefit greatly. Our


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challenge is to implement our infrastructure projects in Myanmar without inordinatedelays.

As part of our Look East policy, keeping the Chinese dimension in view and bilateralbenefits that can accrue to us, India would need to boost its relations with Japan,including mobilizing Japans clout in the ADB to finance the east-west corridors in

Asia. Our increasing strategic engagement with Japan is a welcome move. Beyond all these challenges, there are those of energy, food security and of climate

change. The energy issue is not one of foreign policy alone, but it has a strong external

dimension for us because of our huge dependence on energy imports. Our diplomacy will need to facilitate investment in hydrocarbon fields abroad as part

of our energy security drive, besides working for avoidance of conflict in areas whichare our biggest source of oil and gas. We have a shared interest with US in this but US

policies in the Gulf region, driven by the Israeli and Iranian factors, are not in linewith our interests as they keep the area on the boil.

Energy, of course, is one area where technology can achieve such breakthroughs as

can change the global energy scenario. Climate change issues, in which energy use and environmental concerns intersect with

issues of competitivity and market openings for western technologies, will become asource of increasing external pressure on India in the years ahead.

The water issue in South Asia-Tibet region looms ahead. Apart from counteringPakistans cynical manipulation of the water issue to sustain its negative posturestowards India, securing Chinese cooperation in transparent handling of the Tibetandimension will be a challenge.

In the competition for access to natural resources, China is already far ahead of Indiabecause of greater financial resources at its disposal and its ability to organize acoordinated national effort to that end which our system does not permit.

A new Indian approach that goes beyond relying on the private sector to makeeconomically rational decisions from their perspective would be needed, but thatimplies a different way of economic governance.

At the end of it all, the internal and the external cannot be compartmentalized in anycountry. Success or failure at home will mean success or failure abroad.

The economy is the building block of a successful foreign policy, as requiredresources then become available to erect defenses at home and to pursue interestsabroad.

While it may not be a foreign policy issue per se, the establishment of an indigenousdefence manufacturing base is vital for acting independently on the world stage. No

country that cannot independently defend itself can reach big power status. Our external dependence on arms and technology supplies limits the options availableto our foreign policy.

In conclusion, it can be said that India faces unique geo-political challenges that willremain in the years ahead.

It has two strategically hostile neighbours, China and Pakistan. Both are strategicpartners against India. China has transferred nuclear and missile technology toPakistan to neutralize India strategically.

Both have claims on India territory. India is the only country of magnitude and

importance in the world whose borders are contested, with a Line of Control in J&Kwith Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China.


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The challenge for India is to engage with both constructively and yet be prepared toconfront them if necessary. India needs to avoid a two-front situation but it cannotmake any undue concessions to either adversary.

India cannot expect backing from external powers on its border differences withChina and Pakistan. In fact US is responsible for drawing the LOC in J&K from

NJ9842 to the Karakoram Pass arbitrarily. We should demand redress and a return tolegality on this issue from US.

US supports Chinas territorial integrity but has not extended such support to Indiasterritorial integrity. We should engage US on this point as a strategic partner.

India gets better understanding on the terrorism issue it is faced with, but the west is

unable and unwilling to sanction Pakistan adequately because it needs Pakistan forensuring an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan, besides the need to engagePakistan as a major Islamic and nuclear-armed country.

This explains why despite the wests willingness to use military means to combatproliferation elsewhere, Pakistans rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal is beingcountenanced, adding to threats to Indias security. The signs of revival of the agenda

to limit proliferation in South Asia, excluding the Chinese factor, have to be scotchedby us.

The political turmoil in the Arab world, remains a big challenge for our energy

security. The disturbance of the existing balance between Shias and Sunnis in our

neighbourhood can have negative repercussions for us, even internally. We have toremain watchful of these developments in the years ahead.

Upgrading the military infrastructure in the north quickly and accelerating our navalstrength in the Indian Ocean are challenges ahead.

The priority of priorities is to improve governance at home because the strength of ourexternal limbs depends on the strength and depth of our roots in the ground.

If there is any truth in the dictum that more things change the more they remain thesame, then it would seem that the future foreign policy challenges for India willremain the same in a different form: protection of our independence and sovereignty,friendship with all and enmity with none and a peaceful environment in which we caneconomically grow and meet our internal challenges.

If you wish to contribute something for

fellow aspirants or fellow teachers, do mailme at [email protected] m


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04: Indias relations with Neighbors

4A: Afghanistan, The Graveyard of Empires

USAs Departure

The US President has argued that battlefield successes since 2009 along with killingof the Al-Qaeda top leadership have enabled this long war to come to a responsibleend. But, in reality the war will not end in 2014, the state would be attacked.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can probably sustain the presentsituation, but only as long as the U.S. Congress pays the multibillion-dollar annual

bills needed to keep them fighting. The war will thus become a contest in stamina between US Congress and/or world

community and the Taliban. Shrinking of ANSF would lead to Afghanistan

plunging to chaos again.

Two Alternatives:o Get serious about negotiations with the Taliban. The US administration has

pursued such talks for over two years.o The other defensible approach is outright withdrawal.

The ANSFs best units should be capable of modest offensive actions to clear Talibanstrongholds; although the Taliban will probably not march into Kabul after coalitioncombat troops leave, because some of the troops would stay back and regional playersare keen to see peace in war torn country.

The United States will contribute some $4$6 billion annually to the ANSF, theamount required to support the ANSF will surely exceed this for a long time. And

unlike Israel, which enjoys powerful political support in Washington, there is nonatural constituency for Afghan military aid in American politics.

A compromise with the Talibanwould be a bitter pill to swallow, but at this point, itwould sacrifice less than the alternatives.

But, The Taliban are not serious about the negotiations. In late 2011, they assassinatedBurhanuddin Rabbani, the head of Afghan President Hamid Karzais High PeaceCouncil and the Kabul official charged with moving the talks forward.

Since the Taliban can wait out the United States and win outright, why should theymake concessions?

Bringing together multiple Taliban factions, their Pakistani patrons, the Karzaiadministration, the governments of the United States and its allies, and intermediariessuch as Qatar will simply prove too complex. Thus the situation on ground inAfghanistan is going to remain CHAOTIC and perplexed.

Afghans are famously nationalist, and the Afghan-Pakistani rivalry runs deep; exileacross the border surely grates on the Afghan Taliban. Perhaps more important, theylive under the constant threat of assassination by U.S. drones or commando raids.

The Taliban would have to renounce violence, break with al Qaeda, disarm, and

accept something along the lines of todays Afghan constitution. Which seemsnowhere near to plausible.

Pakistan would have to give up its blue-sky ambitionsfor an Afghan puppet stateunder Taliban domination, but it would gain a stable border and enough influence via

its Taliban proxies to prevent any Afghan-Indian axis that could threaten it. Thatwould be dangerous for India.


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And the United States, for its part, would have to accept the Taliban as a legalpolitical actor, with an extra-democratic guarantee of positions and influence, and theprobable forfeiture of any significant base structure for conducting counterterroristoperations from Afghan soil.

The Taliban are not popular in Afghanistan; that is why they will accept a deal only if

it guarantees them a certain level of representation in the government.

The US paid heed to its objection to the Talibans Doha office flag and the Pakistaniprime minister sent his envoy to Kabul to appease the Afghan president. Thus thecurrent afghan government is not spineless.

The scenarios possible after 2014

o First, The Pakistani Taliban lay down arms and live happily ever after. This isleast likely.

o Second, the recently established state and security institutions in Afghanistan,with the support of regional and international stakeholders (Read India andother neighbors), put up fierce resistance against the Taliban onslaught. In that

case, there will be a stalemate between the Taliban and the rest of Afghanistanso the terrorism will grow.

o The third scenario, reconciliation process. The challenges include the processof reconciliation, reconstruction and state building and the establishment ofsustainable political institutions in Afghanistan.

The sprawling militant network in Pakistan might find it a good opportunity to

unleash immense terror on the state and society if second scenario prevails. (AfghanTaliban de-linking from Al Qaeda).

Some districts of Khyber Pashtun (KP) earlier occupied by the Pakistani Taliban andlater taken back by the military might see the resurgence of the militant network.

If the reconciliation process among the Afghans (internally) and among the states inthe region and international stakeholders is initiated simultaneously and is in syncwith the reconstruction process and the political institutionalization of Afghanistan,all stakeholders might emerge victorious.

This can only happen when all parties to the conflict make efforts at finding a sharedinterest in the solution. This cannot be achieved as long as all parties wish to show theother as the vanquished.

Indias Options

Apart from the US, Afghanistan is the only country where India has such a hugediplomatic presence -- four Consulates (Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif andJalalabad), apart from an embassy in the capital Kabul. It is a high priority area forIndia.

The Taliban-ISI nexus had proven to be the biggest headache for the government ofIndia during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, culminating in Indian Airlines IC 814 hijackon Christmas Eve in 1999. So simply, keep the Taliban away.

No other country enjoys as much popularity among the masses in Afghanistan as

India does. A Gallup poll, conducted in 2010, proved this. It found that Afghansprefer India's leadership over that of the US and China, with 50 percent expressingapproval, the most positive rating of India for any other surveyed Asia-Pacific

country. Indias stake in Afghanistan are high.


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The following scenarios appear to be in foresight:

Scenario 1: A new Afghan president is chosen in 2014 through a relatively free and

fair election process. The Afghan security forces would thwart the Talibaninsurgency.

Scenario 2: The presidential candidates accusing of widespread malpractice and fraudcan undermine the power and legitimacy of the new president. (By the time you readthis document, Afghans will have new president.

o Afghan society could fracture along ethnic and tribal lines with regionalpowers supporting their proxies.

o With Afghanistan divided into various spheres of influence, India would beconstrained to choose sides not just among the present regime and other

political groups, but also among the warlords and regional commanders.o This would be a case of high risk involvement with diminishing returns, with

little guarantee of securing India's interest in the long term.

Scenario 3: power-sharing arrangemento This would gradually lead to instability and fragmentation, with anti-Taliban

political forces, women and civil society groups opposing such deals, leadingthe country to a 1990s-type civil war situation.

o In case of the precipitous withdrawal of international forces, the danger of acomplete Taliban takeover is also highly probable. This is possibly the worstcase scenario. India will have little option but to wind-down its operations,strengthen its homeland security measures and increase vigilance along theIndia-Pakistan border.

Scenario 4: A political dispensation backed by Pakistan or headed by a pro-Pakistanpersonality like Muhammad Umar Daudzai type assumes power.

o

This could also lead to a surge of influence and area domination by thePeshawar Shura or the Haqqani network.

o New Delhi will have to recalibrate its mode of engagement by extendingsupport and building linkages among tribal networks, refugees, and nomadicgroups in the bordering areas of Afghanistan-Pakistan.

The near to medium-term projects could include training of the Afghan NationalSecurity Forces (ANSF), particularly its officer corps, the police, paramilitary, and theair force, and also helping to build the justice sector.

In the long term, security sector reform and building sound civil-military relationswould remain critical in preventing the disintegration or loss of civil control of the

army.

The transition in the political sector is more challenging. There is an immediate needfor India to push for a national dialogue in Afghanistan which addresses the concernsof the impending election and reconciliation process.

In addition to broad based engagement with the other political groups, New Delhineeds to work on strengthening the electoral reform process.

On the economic sector, in the near and medium term, India could help establishsmall and medium enterprises, alternate livelihood programs and revive the Afghanindigenous economic base.

Indias aid and assistance programmes involving high-visibility infrastructure projectshave created national assets for Afghanistan, shaping Indias image and generating a

measure of gratitude.


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However, an enduring Indian influence would remain linked to New Delhi designingand helping implement development programmes to address poverty, illiteracy andsystemic administrative dysfunction.

Afghanistan would be the test case of New Delhis major power aspirations in theregion.

Indias Presence in Afghanistan

Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sealed astrategic partnership which will include help from New Delhi to train Afghan securityforces as international troops prepare to head home in 2014.

India has thus far funneled developmental aid worth 3.2 billion dollars in Afghanistan.Besides, India has also invested about 11 billion dollars in Afghanistan in various

projects so far.

India is involved in projects including roads, power lines and the construction of theAfghan parliament.

India is Afghanistan's sixth-largest aid donor, giving about six times more than anestimated $330 million given by Pakistan.

In mid-2014, India has agreed to pay for military equipment sourced from Russia toAfghanistan. The equipment will include artillery, helicopters, tanks, and armoredvehicles. India will also pay to repair old Soviet hardware left behind after theRussian withdrawal in 1989.

India offered to rebuild the Afghan national airline Ariana, donating Airbus aircraftdespite a shortage in its own fleet.

It also trained pilots, donated 600 buses, provided experts who have restoredtelecommunication networks in at least 11 provinces.

Construction of a road that connects Delaram in western Afghanistan with Zaranjon Afghanistan's border with Iranis done with the assistsance of India.

India is also rebuilding a road linking Kandahar with Spin Boldak, on the Pakistaniborder.

India is viewed favourably by most Afghans, many of whom, on the other hand,regard Pakistan with suspicion.

Pakistan alleges Indias involvement in Baloch insurgencywhereas India denies it. India does not have any troops on the ground in Afghanistan. But there are more than

500 men from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and the Border Roads Organizationproviding security for Indians involved in the construction of roads, as well as forconsulates.

India also trains a small number of officers from the Afghan National Army atdefense institutions in India.

Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI)

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) signed the operationalagreement pertaining to the $7.6 billion TAPI gas pipeline project. This is also knownas Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline.

The 1,735-kilometre-long pipeline, starting from the Yolotan-Osman gas field inTurkmenistan,will supply Pakistan and India with 1.327 billion cubic feet per day(BCFPD) of gas while Afghanistan will get 500 mmcfd.

Countries involved in the TAPI pipeline project have agreed to establish a companyfor execution of the proposed project.


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Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been appointed as legal-technical consultant,and it is identifying a company which will drive the project. The company will befrom in a neutral country.

Frances energy firm Totalhas evinced interest in steering the gas pipeline project(The Hindu).

A protocol has also been inked in which the parties fixed the decision on the need toprepare founding documents and the registration of the TAPI Ltd.

Estimated cost of the pipeline project is reported at $7.6 billion. It has the potential to be transformative for the future of the entire region. The

pipeline project is a true multinational effort and, if realised, can serve as an importantexample of the benefits of greater regional economic connectivity.

Afghanistan- Pakistan Hydropolitik

Afghanistan wants to build 12 dams on Kabul river system that connects with Indus

system. Afghanistan is upper riparian state. The Pak concerns are that India allegedlycooperating with the Afghangovernment to implement those plans.

According to PAK, it will increaseIndias influence over Afghanistanwhile at the same time decreasePakistans water supply.

From 1999 to 2010, Pakistan has beenin open disagreement with India overthe Baglihar Dam located on the

Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir(Discussed in India-PaK sectionsomewhere else in the document).

In August 2013, two months afterNawaz Sharif took power in Pakistan,the ministers of finance fromAfghanistan and Pakistan signed anagreement to build a 1,200 megawatthydropower project on the KunarRiver at a cost of US$2.7 billion. Itwas a surprise.

Pakistan secured funding from theWorld Bank for the Dasu hydropowerproject,The 4,320 megawatt project islocated on the Indus river which was objected by the National Security Council ofAfghanistan.

The World Bank approved US$588.4 million funding for the Dasu dam. The government of Afghanistan decided to follow the same resource capture strategy

that allowed it to build the Salma and Kamal Khan dams in river basins shared withIran. But Afghanistan has only succeeded in building two minor projects on the KabulRiver (Shah-wa-Aros and Machalghoo) funded by the government and with notransboundary repercussions.

Overall, the past decade may well have been a wasted opportunity for Afghanistanstransboundary water resources development in the Kabul-Indus basin.


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It is not be too late to engage in meaningful and constructive dialogue to make projects suchas Kunar move forward, particularly considering the potential for benefit sharing, includingflood control, sediment control and hydropower.

Quickread: Afghanistan

What will the post-2014 Afghanistan look like? Most short-term scenarios forAfghanistan predict instability and even civil war.

The foreign forces are leaving Afghanistan without having stabilised it. Whenthey leave Afghanistan by 2014, their interest in the country will also decline.

This will open up the field for the return of the Taliban. The prospects ofnational reconciliation are not bright.

The US will retain some troops even after 2014, these troops will perform ageo-strategic rolefor the US.

India, which has contributed significantly to Afghanistans reconstruction, willface the question of whether to continue with these programmes if and wh

The IR VIEWS by Harveer Sinh

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