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8/13/2019 The French Experience in Algeria The Character of the Fighting and the Political Consequences 1954-1962 -Connor
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The French Experience in Algeria
The Character of the Fighting and the Political Consequences
1954-1962
Connor McNultyGraduando em Histria e Filosofia
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaigne-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
The intent of the paper is to provide a brief overview of the Algerian War and thecollapse of the French position. This paper looks from a military and a socialviewpoint, and argues that the French colonization of Algeria was based on the
notion that Algeria was more than merely a colony and instead was culturallyintegral to France. The Second World War faced the French with such atrocitythat the continental citizens became more mindful of individual liberties andatrocities committed during war, while the French militarys loss of Indochina in1954 conveyed the lesson that increased brutality was needed to win acounterinsurgency campaign. The French military applied the lessons ofIndochina to Algeria and the clash of values almost caused a civil war. De Gaulletook over the Parisian government and over the next few years he suppressed themilitary and abandoned Algeria, and in the process forced the French to redefinethemselves as intolerant of torture and culturally separate from Algeria.Key Words: France, Algeria, Terrorism, Radical Islam, Insurgency,Counterinsurgency
Resumo
A inteno do trabalho oferecer uma breve abordagem da Guerra da Arglia edo colapso da posio francesa. O artigo parte de um ponto de vista militar esocial, e argumenta que a colonizao francesa da Arglia baseou-se na noo deque a Arglia era mais do que uma mera colnia sendo, ao invs disso,culturalmente integrada Frana. A Segunda Guerra Mundial imps aosfranceses atrocidades tais que os cidados continentais se tornaram maisconscientes das liberdades individuais e das atrocidades cometidas durante umaguerra, enquanto a perda militar francesa da Indochina em 1954 trouxe a lio deque uma brutalidade crescente era necessria para vencer uma campanha decontra-insurreio. Os militares franceses aplicaram as lies da Indochina naArglia e o conflito de valores quase causou uma guerra civil. De Gaulle tomou o
governo parisiense e pelos prximos anos suprimiu o exrcito e abandonou aArglia, e no processo forou os franceses a se auto-redefinirem comointolerantes tortura e culturalmente separados da Arglia.Palavras-chave: Frana, Arglia, Terrorismo, Radicalismo Islmico, Contra-insurgncia.
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The French obsession with Algeria from the time of its conquest to the vian Accords
created a political climate that could not change without fundamentally redefining the French
identity. The Algerians struggle for independence was through and through a political struggle,
with (epitomizing Clausewitzian ideals) the actual violence serving as an expression of theirpolitical agenda. The challenge faced by the FLN was to unite the Arab population against the
French and create an Algerian government with the FLN leaders as the only legitimate powers
and this was accomplished by the terrorist campaigns between 1954 and 1962. The failures of
the French can be summarized as a consistent misreading of the arising situations, from the mass
arrests that radicalized much of the population in the initial phase of the struggle to the
assumption that Algerian independence was part of a larger communist expansion than a
nationalist movement. These misconceptions combined with the almost fanatical attachment to
Algeria tore France apart by forcing her to compromise her liberal values with her attachment to
North Africa.1 It appears now that there is little that the French could have done to retain their
original (pre-1954) hold on their colony, but the evacuation of Algeria mandated that France
move away from certain values of the Fourth Republic. The violence in Algeria and the political
struggle in Paris forced the Fifth Republic to establish new values and allow for a France without
colonies.
The French colonization of Algeria originated from Charles Xs desire to avenge an insult
from the Dey of Algeria against the French Consul.2 The fact that it took three years for the
French to retaliate combined with the constant investment indicated that Charles was probably
interested in using, to paraphrase Alistair Horne, gloireas a distraction from the torrid abuses
and shortcomings of his regime. After the fall of Algiers, the struggle carried on, irrespective of
the collapse of Charles Xs regime. The steady flow of colonists and the continued military
operations in the war started by a reviled monarch indicates that colonization was politically
convenient, with the newly formed second republic declaring it an integral part of France. 1
Questions over what exactly was Algerian caused problems for all potential revolutionaries.The non-Pied Noir population was not ethnically unified, and the problem of bringing them
together beyond the fact that they were not French was handled uniquely by the revolutionaries in
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1This came both from the powerful Pied Noirlobby and members of the military who felt that making concessionsin Algeria would dishonor the fallen.2 Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, Liberty, Equality and Colony, accessed on 7.30.2008 fromhttp://mondediplo.com/2001/06/11torture2
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the 1950s and will be addressed later in this paper. Ferhat Abbas gained fame for saying before
the revolution, I will not die for the Algerian nation as it does not exist. 3 The offspring of the
colonists strongly identified with French ideals and French history without ever knowing
mainland France. This resulting population, while proudly self-identifying as French, only knewAlgeria as their home.
With this in mind, it is no surprise that the strongest lobby for la Algrie Francaise4came
from the African-born Europeans. This population, the Pied Noir, in addition to their increasing
size, enjoyed a considerable sway over the French government. Unfortunately, this left the
Muslim population, the Algerians, to be marginalized. Horne notes that the major reform
efforts proposed by Paris for the Algerians were, in fact, torpedoed by the Pied Noir. Horne
specifically cites both a measure to provide increased liberties to Algerians who had served in the
First World War and the Blum-Viollette Bill, which offered citizenship to an unprecedented
(albeit still far from being in any way representative) number of Algerians. Both of these bills
were stillborn (to use Hornes term) because of the Pied Noir lobby.5 The French perception of
the Algerians was mired in racism. French author Pierre Nora satirically describes a courtroom
where a man is testifying, stating that five witnesses were present to a crime, Two men and three
Arabs.6 This revealing comment represented an attitude not only possessed by the Pied Noir,
but also by the continental French, and, ultimately, served as an unspoken foundation for the
militarys understanding of the conflict.
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The Stif rising in 1945 served only to further divide the Arab resistance, but the opening
of the Algerian war on All Saints Day (November 1 st), 1954. Ben Bella and the rest of the
CRUA (Comit Revolutionnaire dUnit Algrienne) were empowered by the French humiliation
at Dien Bien Phu, that same year. The fact that a major colonial power had been undeniably
defeated in a pitched battle by the colonized people served both to empower the subjugated and
to insult the French in such a way that their pride would blind their strategic judgment. The
character of the struggle that emerged in Algeria was a significant break from both the positionalwarfare of the early half of the century and of previous guerilla strikes. While the attack on All
3Alistair Horne,A Savage War of Peace (New York: 2006) Pg. 404-It is important to note that Abbas did eventuallythrow his allegiance in with the FLN.4The author wishes to note that this term was used heavily in Hornes A Savage War of Peaceand will be used inthis paper to refer to the concept of a French-controlled Algeria.5Horne,p.36-37.6Horne,p.55.
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Saints Day in 1954 hit police and military barracks, it achieved little tactical success and failed
to cause significant disruption.7 The FLN (Front de Libration Nationale) realized true success
not by striking at the French military, but instead at civilian targets, including both Pied Noirand
Muslims who they saw as aiding the French. The French failures in this situation were theirattribution of the struggle to foreign agitation. The notion of foreign agitation would be recurrent
throughout the Algerian war. It was widely believed by the French that Egypt was the nexus of
the resistance and this was buttressed by the seizure of the ship Athos that was carrying guns from
Egypt to Algeria in 1956. The appeal to the Communist nations later sowed the fear that the FLN
was a communist front.8 A serious error in judgment on the part of the French was the principle
of collective responsibility and the mass reprisals that it entailed. Horne claims this was forced
upon then-Governor General Jacques Soustelle by the military (the first step in a long series of
instances where the military tail would wag the dog). The effect of collective responsibility is
that in launching mass arrests and failing to limit the violence of the French soldiers, the Algerian
community was driven further away from the French and, in Hornes words, the army would
regard almost every Muslim as a potential killer.9
The strength of the FLN came from its ability to survive and from the polarizing effect
that it had on the populations. As previously noted, they increased their membership by drawing
the French into overreacting and further alienating the already divided population, the FLN
increased its offensive by using terror to enact social and cultural change. For example, the FLN
sought to boycott the Pied Noir tobacco and spirits industry, so they banned Muslims from
consuming any of these products under the penalty of mutilation or death. Additionally, they
established their own media outlet, including the illicit radio station Voix de Algrie which
allowed the FLN to spread their message to a much wider audience (allowing them, in Hornes
words, to become a mass movement)10. In addition to spreading their message, the FLN struck
at what they saw as representative of French culture. The French education system became a
target, with schools burned and teachers terrorized. To replace these, the FLN created its ownschools (and hospitals and other social services). Inside these new institutions, FLN supporters
reinterpreted history so as to portray the French as ignorant and violent and the Algerians as
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7Horne,p.104.8Horne, p.158, 463.9Horne,p.102, 112-115, 136.10Horne,p.112, 133.
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advanced and unified. The results were that young Muslims were taught a visceral hatred for the
French colonists, further isolating the two communities.11
In Paris, the idea that Algeria could be separated from France had not entered anyones
mind; however the demographics were such that if everyone in Algeria were enfranchised, theMuslim Algerians would soon dominate the elections. After a series of successes at the ballot for
the Algerian Muslims in the municipal elections of 1947, The French began to manipulate the
election outcomes in 1948 and by 1951 (in Larkins words), the elections to the Algerian
Assembly and the French National Assembly were effectively stage-managed.12 By the year
1954, however, the Laniel administration collapsed in a vote of no confidence following the
defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Pierre Mends France was elected with the expectation that he would
bring an end to the struggle in Vietnam (which he did successfully, allowing the USA to replace
the French). Unfortunately, the downfall of Mends France came from his treatment of Algeria,
specifically in the policies of the comparatively liberal governor-general Soustelle.13
Soustelles objective in French Algeria was to import the liberal values that had taken
hold on the continent and extend them to the native Algerians. To assist with this task, he
employed Germaine Tillion and Vincent Monteil, two famous reformers who were to assist with
studying the Algerian condition.14 Under Soustelle, successful inquiries into the Algerian plight
were accomplished, and Soustelle advocated the idea of integrationthe first major push for
reform since the Blum-Viollette bill. Under this vision, all of the occupants of Algeria would be
afforded equal rights.15 As previously noted, the FLN saw itself as the only legitimate power in
Algeria and to allow this kind of inclusion into French society could only rob them of their
support. The Pied Noir, seeing themselves as part of Algeria (and in no way inclined to threaten
what they had, much less even think about leaving) were especially sensitive to the fears
mentioned by Larkin, as the expanding Algerian population, if permitted to vote, would be in a
perfect position to retaliate for all the historical injustices. With the combined sentiments of the
Pied Noir and those leading the FLN, it is no surprise that Soustelle came under fire from everydirection. The mounting pressure to deal with terrorism led Soustelle to implement shortsighted
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11Horne, p.403.12Maurice Larkin, France Since the Popular Front(Oxford: 1988) p.226-228.13Larkin, p.237-241, 245-246.14Horne, p.109-110.15Horne, p.107-109.
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maneuvers in haste, such as the collective reprisals mentioned earlier. Soustelles reign of
ineffective liberalization and short-sighted offensives happened to contain two major victories for
the FLN: first the issue of the uprisings being discussed, which Soustelle described as being more
helpful than a convoy of arms. The second victory for the FLN was the Phillipsville massacre(August 20th, 1955), which killed 37 men women and children and left thirteen injured and
provoked reprisals by Pied Noir vigilantes (arguably paving the way for increasingly radical
organizations that would come to threaten the stability of the French government).16 Under
Soustelle, the divisions between the Pied Noirand the Muslim community became greater, and
the strife only grew worse. The additional failings of peace overtures served as the nails in the
coffin and Soustelle left Algeria in the beginning of February 1956.17
The rise of Guy Mollet after the fall of Eduard Fare (who succeeded Mends France) saw
a further radicalization of the Pied Noir, with the emergence of the ultras and the emergence of
vigilante organizations, often times led by World War II veterans who felt that they were entitled
to some sort of recognition for their service, and that they were being betrayed by liberals in Paris
and by Soustelle. A notable characteristic of these groups was that they felt that they had little
faith in the French government and had little objection to use violence to express their outrage,
notably illustrated by the firing of a bazooka into the offices of the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, General Salan. The quote of a Pied Noir demonstrator illuminates the mindset of
the hardline and its decision to resort to violence:
The FLN has taught us that violence is profitable for Muslims. We are going toorganize violence by Europeans and prove that it too is profitable.18
The FLN strategy fell into place like clockwork in a watch. The terror inflicted on the
Muslim community had destroyed European-Muslim relations that bred paranoia and mutual
suspicion. The increasingly visible bombings and massacres underscored European vulnerability,
which then generated impatience with each successive administration (Laniel, Mends France,
and Faure had fallen; Mollet would fall because of the Battle of Algiers). In addition to the
aforementioned ultras and vigilante groups, the army began to show increased autonomy,
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16Horne, p.118-124.17Horne, p.127, 181-182.18Horne, p.148-151.
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The Battle of Algiers opened as a reprisal against the French executions of Algerian
prisoners. It was intended to be the largest offensive to date and the aim was to break the French
will to fight by causing a disproportionate number of civilian casualties:
Announcing that for every guillotined member of the FLN a hundred French would bekilled indiscriminantlySaadi Yacef (whohad taken over the Algiers network) wastold to kill any European between the ages of eighteen and fifty four
The immediate impact of this open season tactic was the shooting of 49 Europeans over
a three day span (June 21-24, 1956), which was met with a powerful bomb that killed 70
Muslims, placed by the precursor organizations to the OAS (Organisation Arme Secrte) which
would eventually become one of the biggest threats to French security towards the end of the
war.21 The end of the year saw increased murders and terror bombings by the FLN. The
bombings themselves now were often carried out by women as part of a change in strategy where
people would be targeted in the bombings instead of property. Violent mob reprisals against
innocent Muslims increased in addition to the selective targeting by vigilante groups One of the
more famous reprisals occurred after the assassination of the Mayor of Algeria and subsequent
bombing of the cemetery during his funeral. The mob attacked men and women indiscriminately
and left 4 dead and 50 injured.22
The month of January 1957 saw General Jacques Massu arrive in Algeria, to accompany
the new chief of staff of the paratroopers, Colonel Yves Godard. With the arrival of these
generals, the greatest tactical offensive against the Algerians would be opened (with the notable
exception of the response to the January 28thstrike, which resulted in the pillage of Muslim shops
and businesses all across the country, which itself only increased participation in the general
strike).23
The frequency and the intensity were rapidly increasing, and Godard faced enormous
pressure to halt the bombings. Godard determined that the only way to stop the bombing wouldbe to by capturing the leaders and destroying the network inside Algiers. To this end, he stated,
Intelligence is Capitol. Given this, then, Godard and Massu made a Faustian bargain in their
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21Horne, p.183-184.22Horne, p.185-187.23Horne, p.188-192.
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decision to permit torture in their interrogation centers. The issue of torture opened a deep
wound in the French conscience, recalling the injustices perpetrated by the Nazis. The ethical
considerations came back to hurt France, by seriously damaging its image as a liberal and
humanitarian state and by the profound psychological damage that it had on its own soldiers. Thestrategic considerations also became relevant, for the news of torture being used on prisoners in
cold blood both angered the Muslim community and the international community for its violation
of the Geneva convention. It is true that by the fall of 1957, the bombings and attacks had
stopped and the FLN could no longer fight within the cities, but the cost was irreparable damage
to the French image and its soldiers humanity.24
The last few months of 1957 saw the leaders of the Algiers network dead or imprisoned
and the FLN abandoning Algeria with its tail between its legs. The extensive penetration of the
terror networks by French informants, the information extracted by Godards interrogation
centers and the disruption of Muslim communities by the forced relocation of entire villages25
made it impossible for the FLN to wage terror campaigns the way it had before inside of Algeria,
so the remaining leadership (now plagued with internal divisions) sought refuge in neighboring
Tunisia, with the city of Tunis serving as its base of operations.26 Tactically, times had never
been better for the French military, but the abuses by Godards paras came to the international
light, bringing the FLN attention from the UN and then-senator John F. Kennedy. The outcry
against the French abuses also enabled the FLN to expand its operations into France where it
extorted money from Algerians living in France. The emergence of a new anti-war movement
also led some extreme left-wing extremists to provide clandestine support for the FLN, the most
famous of these being Francis Jeanson who helped the FLN smuggle its funds out of France and
into Swiss banks where it could be laundered. Amidst the negative popular opinion, the Mollet
government collapsed, leaving France without government for twenty-two days.27
Having driven the FLN across the Tunisian border, the French erected a highly secure
border fence (electrically charged, supported by troops, mines and helicopter support, extendingfrom the sea to deep into the Sahara) to contain the FLN. This fence was subject to almost
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24Horne, p.198-199, 204-206, 219.25This forced relocation, much like the torture, would eventually prove itself a strategic cost.26Horne, p.212, 217-221, 223- The French never understood how serious the divisions were, but the FLN found itnecessary to assassinate Ramdane Abane, one of their top leaders, to preserve unity. Horne,p.228-229.27Horne, p.234, 237-238, 243-246.
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perpetual attack from the FLN soldiers, however it proved to be an effective killing field, forcing
the FLN to waste essential manpower in staging pitched battles against the French border forces,
which were acquiring aircraft from the US and using new tactics to detect and kill the rebels. A
noticeable example came at the position of Souk-Arhas, where 820 men launched an all outscramble to cross the line and reinforce FLN forces already inside Algeria. While significant
numbers breached the line, at least 620 rebels were captured or killed by the French, who large
transport helicopters to rapidly move soldiers to points of conflict. The Morice line by itself was
serving its purpose effectively, however the army was growing increasingly comfortable with its
autonomy and, in February of 1958, launched a raid into Sakiet, a village on the Tunisian side of
the border without seeking permission of the civilian government.28
This cross-border incident was the next step in a quick succession of events that ruined
the armys confidence in the Fourth Republic. The army saw a large number of FLN casualties
and had seized a great number of weapons and saw concerns over the border violation as a sign
of an ineffective government. In Paris, the incident caused pressure to mount from England and
Britain and the Galliard government (which replaced Mollet) fell in a vote of confidence backed
by both the center and the Communist Party. The final straw that broke the armys tolerance of
the Parisian government was when the FLN decided in May to execute three French soldiers it
had captured a year previously.29 These executions were not particularly well received by the
European population, and the rumor of an upcoming mass riot encouraged governor-general
Lacoste to flee Algeria. The absence of leadership both in Paris and in Algeria created a vacuum,
and in the midst of a demonstration that turned into the ransacking of the vacant governor-
generals office, the army opted to create a Committee of Public Safety that would hold Algeria
together until some semblance of order could be restored.30
The ensuing confusion left people appealing for a great unifying power, and the first
choice was Charles De Gaulle, the man who had rebuilt France after the end of World War II. De
Gaulle was a safe choice as he was a national hero who could appeal both to the citizenry ofFrance and the increasingly agitated military. And in a sort of Father-knows-best manner, De
Gaulle accepted the personal invitation to take the reigns of the turbulent nation, on the condition
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28Horne, p.263-267.29Horne,p.267-270.30Horne, p.283, 285-287.
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he be given an absolute free hand in the running of the country for the next six months. During
these machinations, the Army had taken over Corsica, and the paratroops were making plans to
land in France and seize Paris, with the promise of support from the Second Armored Task Force.
The objectives of this putsch, codenamed Rsurrection was to completely shut down thegovernment and paralyze the assembly while the army installed De Gaulle. Fortunately, the
assembly capitulated and formally permitted De Gaulle to establish a new government.31
Undoubtedly the most painful position De Gaulle found himself in was that he came to be
seen as the one who would provide a magic cure-all solution to the woes in Algeria. He was
everyones hero and as such he was expected by the many different factions with opposing
interests to fight for their own specific objective. With the expectation that he would please
everyone, it was a miracle that he was able to please anyone. Most importantly, De Gaulle
realized that the status quo in Algeria was not sustainable, and that peace would come at a price
to France. This upset the army for two reasons: first, the operations in Algiers had been
successful and the FLN had been driven across the Morice line. Why would they back down
now? Secondly, because of Rsurrection, the Army felt that De Gaulle was their man, and
believed that it was the threat ofRssurectionthat put him into power.32
It was, in fact, precisely because of the unprecedented level of autonomy displayed by the
army in the taking of Corsica and threatening Paris that De Gaulle had to reform the army. To
prevent another Rssurection, over 1,500 officers in Algeria had either been reassigned to bases
within France or Germany or forcibly retired, and the Committee of Public Safety was disbanded
by October of 1958. It was at this same time when De Gaulle extended an olive branch to the
FLN, the Paix au Braves, which was met with a new wave of bombings (some of which would
now happen in mainland France) and a categorical rejection of all peace overtures except total
French withdrawal. Additionally, the National Assembly feared that this would signal to the
continental population that the French were on the run, while the Pied Noir ultras saw this as
De Gaulle stabbing them in the back while the army saw this as a military setback.33
De Gaulle had placed General Maurice Challe in charge of the offensive, under whom
tactical success was achieve, including improved use of helicopters for rapid response situations
225
31Horne, p.293-298.32Horne, p.546.33Horne, p.306-309, 317.
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and increased participation of Muslims in the harkis. The cost of this was worsening conditions
for villagers outside the cities who found themselves in ever-worsening displacement camps.
The greatest frustration to the French army, according to Horne, is the simple fact that no matter
what the French did, they could never completely break the FLN. By the sheer fact of its survivalit defied Challes efforts and laughed at the peace offerings extended by De Gaulle, taking these
to be a sign of a weakening of the French will to fight.34
The position of the Algerian Muslims having been solidified, the toll of the violence
committed against the Pied Noirsoon served to harden and radicalize the European population.
The continued offensives and peace overtures (bringing terms like self-determination and
others vaguely reminiscent of long deceased reform measures) portrayed the French to the FLN
as floundering and pursuing an easy way out of the conflict. De Gaulles peace overtures were
often searching for a certain moderate element to end the war favorably for the French. This was
not to be, for any moderate movement existing in Algeria was either killed or cowed into
submission by the FLN or driven to the extreme by the draconian reprisals and moral
transgressions performed by the French forces. The proven strength of the FLN had been its
survivability, and even after Challes offensive, defeating the French had become a waiting game.
To the Pied Noir ultras, the French overtures for peace became another cog in a vast
mechanism unintentionally built by the threefold combination of the FLN attacks, the Armys
inability to crush the FLN, and De Gaulles apparent desire to sell out the European population of
Algeria to the Muslims.
The first terrifying demonstration of this rage came in the form of the uprising during
called the Barricades Week, instigated by Jo Ortiz, the leader of the newly-established FNF
(Front National Franais). The continued presence of FLN attacks had driven Pied Noir
civilians to align themselves with Ortizs faction, as had the French colonels who believed that
1960 would see France separate itself from Algeria.35 With the new Fifth Republic, De Gaulle
was in a ripe position to modernize France, however Algeria and those who fought to keep theFrench mired in it. Bernard Tricot recalls De Gaulle as an innovator and a military man at heart,
and describes Algeria as an archaic war and wrote that
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34Horne,p.333-335, 338, 348.35Horne, p.349-353.
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It [Algeria] was all very distasteful to him. What he really desired to do was tomodernize the French army and bring it into the atomic era, and this was alwaysimpeded by Algeria.36
If one treats the army as a metaphor for France as a social and political actor, then theconservative factions led by Ortiz and the colonels were the beginning of a series of death
thrashes of the old France. While Ortiz and the FNF did seize national attention with the general
strike that they incited, their support from the military failed to materialize (quite arguably due to
De Gaulles personal appeal that all soldiers retain their allegiance).37 Tragically, the French
military would not show the same restraint in the future.
The summer of 1960 saw another attempt at peace with the negotiations at Melun. These
were both brief and heartbreaking for De Gaulle, for the FLN representatives spent their time
arguing that the imprisoned Ben Bella should be present and that more high-ranking officials
should be present for the discussions. After reiterating the firmness of the FLNs position and
categorically rejecting any sort of compromise, De Gaulle disbanded the talks on June 29th,
1960.38 The failure of the peace further polarized the French electorate, with the continental left
(although none were actually members of the Communist Party) producing the Manifesto of the
121, which incited French conscripts to desert, while General Salan (now retired) declared total
war against De Gaulle and named himself leader of the Algrie Francaise movement. So
completely disgusted by De Gaulles rule, he returned covertly to Algeria with retired General
Edmond Jouhaud. Increased discussions of the possibility of an Algerian Republic caused
Marshall Juin, one of De Gaulles closest friends, publicly accused De Gaulle of abandoning the
Pied Noir, brought the resignation of Governor-General Delouviers Secretary-General Andr
Jacomet, and caused the Governor-General himself to be attacked by demonstrators on Armistice
Day. Eventually, there arose a plot to incite a revolution (to take place in December, 1960, upon
De Gaulles arrival), loosely coordinated between elements of the military and the ultra Pied
Noir, with the separate objectives of hardening the French policy towards the Algerians andkilling De Gaulle held respectively.39
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36Horne, p.381.37Horne, p.369-371.38Horne, p.394-395.39Horne, p.418-423, 427.
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The uprising failed completely. The ultras were rebuffed and the civil leadership in
Algeria was purged. The sting of this humiliation only angered the generals further and
encouraged them to attempt again with greater planning. Within the Pied Noir, a new
organization that would persist beyond the Generals Putsch and well into the vian AccordsThe Organization Arme Secrte (OAS).40 Having both been split off from the Muslim
community long ago, and further isolated from the continent sinceRsurrectionand the rising in
December, it can be argued that a split was emerging between the army and the Pied Noir.
Challe declared upon the Generals seizing power:
I am in Algiers, together with Generals Zeller and Jouhad, in order to keep our solemnpromise, the promise of the Army to hold Algeria, so that our dead will not have died
for nothing.41
While these men led the uprising, they could not totally control their armies. The
disenchanted lower ranking soldiers began to express their outrage towards their officers, and
fuel was added to this fire in what Horne describes as another victory of the transistors where
De Gaulle broadcasted via radio orders that the soldiers had a duty to halt the rebellion at all
costs. In doing so, De Gaulle found a line that Challe would have to cross if he wished to insure
that the dead will not have died for nothing. The prospect of having to order his soldiers to fire
on their comrades-in-arms sickened him, and it was Challe who persuaded the Generals to stand
down, and it was Challe who personally accepted total responsibility for the actions of The
Generals. In this decision, the military could no longer oppose De Gaulles peace overtures.42
Where the OAS broke from the military was that it was an inherently predacious
organization. The OASs primary tactic was terror and chaos, and it took on a form somewhat
like a film negative of the FLN. Horne writes:
By and large, the Pied Noirs were led to believe and trust in the OAS as anorganization protecting their interests, just as the FLN had fought so successfully forMuslim interests43
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40Horne, p.432-434, 440.41Horne, p.450 -Salan had been in Spain in exile since the previous uprising, but he would soon join the other threegenerals.42Horne, p.457-459.43Horne, p.488.
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Unlike the four generals, the OAS had no objection to targeting other French or even Pied
Noirwho they saw as too liberal. Their tactics involved mass bombings, professional assassins
known as killers. 44 There attacks mirrored in many ways the policies of the FLN in theopening of the war, as they sought to antagonize the Muslims into launching a blind
counterattack, which would force a French response and destroy the ongoing peace talks at
vian.45 A practical consideration of their strategy reveals gaping flaws and illuminates the
failure of the OAS. As noted earlier, the FLN gained its strength by its ability to survive. The
struggle fought by the FLN had a certain inevitability about it, where it appears that so long as
their movement survived, they would win. The OAS on the other hand was attempting to reverse
French policy being enacted during the height of their activity. They were fighting against time.
Another major flaw in their strategy was declaring their strategy would be to implement total
chaos and prevent the French government from being able to enact their own policies. The
killings and bombings of before had served to attract everyones ire, however the targeting of
government workers put them into direct conflict with the army, which had initially been slightly
sympathetic to the conservative movement. The final sick and tragic irony was that the
environment of terror created by the OAS had surpassed the level of angering the Pied Noirat
those providing their security, and instead prompted the beginnings a mass exodus that would end
with 1.38 million Europeans departing for France and tens of thousands leaving for other
countries.46
Decolonization is our interest and, therefore, our policy. Why should we remaincaught up in colonizations that are costly, bloody and without end, when our owncountry needs to be renewed from the bottom up?47
In a four-year span, France came undone. The violence, the struggle and the moral
compromises made left the continental French enraged and the Algerian French without faith intheir leaders. In a sort of soul-searching manner, France, under De Gaulle, had to determine what
it would fight for. By the close of the Battle of Algiers, the French army had demonstrated that it
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44Horne, p.486-488.45Horne,p.508.46Horne, p.516, 528-529, 533.47Horne, p.444.
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could, on a tactical level, fight against the FLN, however this fighting had created a permanent
rift between the Muslim and European communities, and as such, had the fighting continued,
France would have to devote all of its attention to a permanently alienated and disenfranchised
community dwelling within its borders, as well as live with a backslide off the moral highground. De Gaulles decision to disentangle himself from Algeria was a concession to the values
of the continent; that France could not be defined by its colonies and that it could not remain
odious in the eyes of the international community or its own citizens. The conscious, albeit
protracted, effort to seek peace with the Algerian resistance at any cost was an immense sacrifice
to those who had never known the continent and to those whose comrades had sacrificed their
lives to continue holding north Africa. Additionally, it was a defeat, in the sense that the FLN
achieved quite handily its political agenda through the use of violence and by surviving French
suppression. The task of accepting this defeat required both the acceptance by the military that
the fallen would not be dignified through the perpetuation of struggle. Unfortunately, the
ultras of the Pied Noir had so hardened their side, that the almostDeus ex Machinasolution of
the mass exodus was the only solution to the problem of the French Algerians. After another four
years, France was well again.
It was a victory march. That may seem curious, but it was really symbolic, because in these last
days it represented a great victory over ourselves Christian Fouchet.48
Artigo recebido em 28/12/2008 e aprovado em 20/02/2009.
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48Horne, p.534.
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