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France's role in Rwanda and external military intervention: A doublediscreditingMel McNultya

a Lecturer in French, The Nottingham Trent University,

To cite this Article McNulty, Mel(1997) 'France's role in Rwanda and external military intervention: A double discrediting',International Peacekeeping, 4: 3, 24 — 44To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13533319708413677URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319708413677

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France's Role in Rwanda and ExternalMilitary Intervention: A Double Discrediting

MEL McNULTY

To understand current conflict in the African Great Lakes region, it is necessary toconsider the international response to the Rwandan civil war which preceded it, andfrom which it springs. Recognition of the failure of this response in its most explicitform - foreign and particularly French military intervention - does not preclude otherforms of analysis, but does suggest that ethnicity alone is inadequate to explain thecontinuation of war. It will be argued in this article that France's Rwandaninterventions, far from presenting a 'very positive balance sheet' as official Frenchdiscourse still maintains, have been a primary cause of the prolongation and extensionof conflict in the region; and the failure of these interventions, while discreditingFrance's role in particular, has also brought the validity of foreign military interventionin general (humanitarian or otherwise) into question.

Any attempt to understand the failure of the international response to thecrisis since 1990 in the African Great Lakes region must first identify andthen separate the factors which created the conflict from those whichsustained it. Analysis of the former often overshadows the latter, to theextent that the prolongation of a war is explained away in the same terms asits origins. Such an approach may result in a failure to focus sufficientattention on the unilateral support role or active participation of a powerfulexternal actor (which may not have been apparent when the conflict began),and a subsequent failure to expose the paradox whereby that same actor isexpected to participate in peacemaking between the principal warringparties. The Rwandan civil war of 1990-94 demonstrates that external (thatis, extra-regional) support for one belligerent was a major contributoryfactor to the prolongation and exacerbation of the conflict, particularlywhen it became apparent that that belligerent believed the external supportto be open-ended and unconditional.

Direct comparisons with the Bosnian conflict are unhelpful in thiscontext; despite obvious external involvement in provoking and supplyingthe combatants, it cannot be said that any foreign (that is, non-regional)power was a direct unilateral participant, with troops on the ground. The

Mel McNulty is lecturer in French at the Nottingham Trent University.

International Peacekeeping, Vol.4, No.3, Autumn 1997, pp.24-44PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Downloaded By: [University of Plymouth Library] At: 13:24 21 January 2011

FRANCE, RWANDA AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 25

Rwandan war is generally perceived in the same terms - as an ethnicconflict sustained by a purely internal or regional dynamic - and this hasbeen used to explain away the severity and durability of the conflict as dueentirely to local factors. These interpretations generally blame eitherethnicity or 'Anglo-Saxon'/anglophone irredentism. The former suggestsspecifically that the post-revolutionary administrations in Uganda andRwanda, and the rebellion in Zaire, are a mirror image or recreation of thesectarian regimes they replaced (or seek to replace); while the latter warnsof an American-led conspiracy which seeks to annex valuable chunks of'francophone' Africa and establish a Ugandan-led Tutsi-Hima hegemonyfrom Kampala to Kinshasa.

In contrast, it will argued here that the Rwandan war demands analysisas an intrastate conflict greatly exacerbated by the direct and sustainedparticipation of a powerful external actor, not only through its support forone belligerent, but also through its own role as a combatant. The inabilityof international organizations to respond effectively to the Rwandan crisis,even when faced with the UN Charter's singular imperative demanding theprevention of genocide, can thereby be explained by a particular failure (orreluctance) to identify this external role, without which the conflict inRwanda could have been briefer, less bloody and less destabilizing for theentire region. It is intended, therefore, to consider first the role of thisexternal actor - France - as the most powerful force in the equation, inresponse to the more current interpretations above.

Before the outbreak of the current Great Lakes crisis, its origins - in thecolonial legacy of division and partition, and in the Belgian-sponsoredcreation in Rwanda of a sectarian, one-party regime which depended for itssurvival on the exclusion or elimination of its opponents — have beenextensively (if not always usefully) documented.1 It is not intended,therefore, to reinterpret the sources of conflict in the region, but instead toconsider its longevity (over seven years) in the light of overt externalinvolvement until 1994. Suffice to say that characterization of the crisis asethnically driven has been used, both wittingly and unwittingly, todownplay or conceal the colonial legacy suggested above, and the centralityof the role of external (that is, extra-African) forces in fuelling, sustainingand prolonging the conflict. Accordingly, Western media coverage typicallydescribes recent events exclusively in terms of an ethnic or even 'tribal'conflict.

A countervailing analysis is possible. Although the societies of the GreatLakes were distinguished by separate castes in pre-colonial days, the currentsegregation into separate 'ethnicities' is a product of the colonial era, usedeffectively to divide and rule Rwanda's population. The country's 8 millioninhabitants pre-1994 are categorized typically as Hutu (84 per cent), Tutsi (15


26 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

per cent) and Twa (1 per cent). Rwandan independence in 1962 was achievedon the colonialists' terms, through the Belgian-sponsored overthrow andexiling of those favoured (but, by 1959, anticolonial-minded) Tutsis whopreviously had administered on the colonialists' behalf. The accession topower of the hitherto downtrodden Hutu majority only reinforced sectariandivisions, to the extent that citizens' ethnic group continued to appear on theircompulsory identity card. This practice greatly facilitated the work of thegenocidal militias, that sought to eliminate Rwanda's remaining Tutsis as aninherently disloyal national minority, along with opposition Hutus and indeedthose of any ethnicity who opposed them.

Such a rejection of ethnocentric and Eurocentric interpretationsdemands a plausible alternative; this attempt to frame such an alternativewill proceed by arguing, first, that in order to establish a context for thecrisis - the Rwandan civil war and its spillover into Zaire - it will benecessary to consider it neither as ethnic/tribal conflict nor as anglophoneplot, but as one product of the failure of foreign, especially French, militaryintervention in Rwanda in 1990-94; and second, that French interventions- Operations Noroit, Amaryllis, and Turquoise - do not present 'a verypositive balance sheet', as French official discourse still maintains.2 Theirlegacy has instead been a prolongation of the Rwandan civil war from 1990to 1993, a militarization and radicalization of a sectarian regime whichallowed it room for the preparation and implementation of genocide,followed by an extension of the Rwandan war to eastern Zaire, and thesubsequent escalation of that war.

Thereafter, we will consider the validity of French claims to have reworkedthe motives and practice of its intervention strategy in keeping with post-ColdWar trends and demands for humanitarian intervention; and to ask why, ifFrance's first military-humanitarian intervention (Operation Turquoise) wassuch a success, did France hesitate and demand a cloak of international supportwhen faced, in eastern Zaire in late 1996, with an apparent recreation of the1990 intervention stimulus (a perceived 'invasion' of a friendly, francophonestate by an army of hostile neighbouring anglophones).

In identifying France as a key player in sustaining the conflict, it is notintended to suggest that France lit the fuse in Rwanda or built the powder-keg, but that it provided the powder, and increased supplies without quibbleand with seeming disregard for the obvious shortening of the fuse. Thesubsequent disingenuous attempt by France to assume the mantle ofWestern humanitarian action- the new White Man's Burden - in Rwanda in1994 has resulted, it will be argued, in a double discrediting: of France, themost prolific intervenor in post-colonial Africa and the external power mostdeeply implicated in the Great Lakes crisis; and of external militaryintervention itself as an appropriate response to inter-African conflict.



In conclusion, it is questionable whether an external response to conflictin the region could ever be appropriate or disinterested, particularly in thelight of an apparent shift in diplomatic and academic discourse, during 1996and early 1997, away from the 'right' or even 'duty' to intervene, to thevalidity of a non-intervention response. This shift is arguably attributable tothe failure of earlier, interventionary responses; the resultant absence of acredible, disinterested intervenor; and a new regional assertiveness which,in reaction to external ineffectiveness and self-interest, has seized theinitiative for preventive or punitive action, and by pre-empting a foreignresponse while applying the West's own realpolitik tactics, has transformedthe political and strategic map of eastern and central Africa.

External Intervention, and the French Role in Rwanda

There is a significant literature in both English and French on interventionwhich, for these purposes, may be taken to be synonymous with militaryintervention, although many analysts include 'unarmed and pacific' activity— by mediators or NGOs — in a broader definition of intervention. Indeed,all interstate relations may be considered interventionary. However, thecontroversy surrounding foreign and particularly French intervention in theGreat Lakes region arises principally from its military aspects, includingarms supplies, training and the role of advisers, as well as direct interventionby French troops.

Analysis of military intervention typically begins with a discussion ofthe international legal constraints ('the non-intervention norm'), and thecorresponding derogations from this norm, legitimizing circumstanceswhich could constitute a code of permissibility of intervention.3 The articlesof this unofficial and often subjectively-interpreted code most often invokedby France allow intervention in response to an explicit, wilful invitation bythe legitimate government of a state and intervention in situations in whichan existing treaty permits it.

However, these fig-leaves barely conceal the inherently interventionarynature of much of Franco-African relations. It is important to note, first, thatthe 'legitimate governments' of France's African sphere of influence arelargely French creations. There was no real decolonization of sub-Saharanfrancophone Africa; there was instead a limited concession of autonomy toFrench-fostered elites, and the institutionalization of patron-clientrelationships, whereby the patron's influence hinged on the client's survival,while the client's survival often depended on the patron's protection.Independence was conceded, but only to subdivisions of the former Frenchcolonial blocs — small, artificial and weak. Control was retained of thesenew states' economies, currency, and of their foreign and defence policy, by



means of the Plan raisonnable, which 'made clear that the establishment ofAfrican national armies and the reorganization of France's overseas defencewere inseparable. In fact, the Plan was drawn up without any consultationwith the emerging states of Africa'.4 Belgium's former colonial territories -Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire - were incorporated into the Franco-Africanfamily in the mid-1970s on the understanding that, secured in power withFrench support, their governments would be equally compliant. (As will bediscussed below, the failure in France to develop different responses tocrises in these ex-Belgian territories became a major cause of thesubsequent French debacle in Rwanda).

Second, the key legal safeguard for the former colonizer and its newly-elevated proteges was provided by French-drafted military agreementswhich 'form the cornerstone of France's military edifice in Africa andprovide the legal basis for one of Africa's most extensive and lastingsecurity alliances with a foreign power.'5 The number and extent of theseagreements meant that the states of francophone Africa (the former coloniesof France and Belgium) would be linked militarily to a major ex-colonialpower in a unique bilateral axis far surpassing any comparable north-southmilitary pact. The agreements take two basic forms: defence treaties (ofwhich eight have been signed), and military technical assistance accords (ofwhich there are 26, including eight which operate in tandem with defencetreaties). The former are concerned with French military power in Africa,the latter with the French army's creation of and ongoing support for thearmies of its African allies.

It is useful, then, to consider Joyner's second derogation from the non-intervention norm in this light:

Under certain conditions, acts of intervention may be granted throughtreaty arrangements made by one state with another state. Some stateshave, in fact, concluded special bilateral treaties of 'friendship andcooperation' specifying the possibility of intervention by the protectorstate in certain discretionary circumstances. Under these special,bilaterally negotiated conditions, the acceptability of treaty rightsclearly is viewed in international law as a legitimate exception to thenorm of non-intervention. The precondition here, of course, is that thetreaty must still be in force and duly respected by both governmentsat the time an intervention occurs.'

To this precondition could be added, with reference to the Great Lakesregion, that if there is to be intervention, the treaty must allow for directmilitary support on the ground for the state's armed forces. Post hocamendments to any existing treaty do not make earlier interventionsretrospectively legal. It will be useful to consider here the backdrop provided



by French treaties and interventions in Rwanda and Zaire to the currentsituation in the region.

The presidency of Valery Giscard d'Estaing ('Giscard the African',whose perceived love for Africa sprang not least from his luxurious safariholidays there), saw the signing of cooperation agreements in terms of aid,trade and cultural exchanges which marked the formal expansion ofFrance's African sphere from its own former colonies to include Belgian ex-colonial territories - Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire - which were perceived inFrance as francophone and hence as natural inclusions in the Franco-African 'family'.

While on safari in 1975 at the invitation of Zairean president MobutuSese Seko (by 1997 Africa's longest-serving dictator), Giscard became azealous convert to the possibilities - economic, political andmilitary-strategic - presented by resources-rich Zaire, Africa's largestfrancophone state. French companies were contracted for a number ofprestigious infrastructure projects - of little benefit to the people of Zaire,and a major contributory factor to a national debt of some US$8 billion - inexchange for guaranteed French protection for what was now termed afriendly African country ('un pays ami de la France'). Accordingly,Mobutu's regime was saved with French help on two separate occasions. In1977, Giscard provided 11 transport aircraft to fly Moroccan troops toprotect the Zairean regime, following the rout of Mobutu's army, against aninvasion from Angola by Zairean dissidents (swiftly labelled 'communists').The following year, the French Foreign Legion intervened directly atKolwezi to put down a secessionist rebellion in Shaba province. The 1978intervention was classed 'humanitarian' — in the guise of protecting Frenchnationals and property - and legitimized as France's duty under the terms ofFranco-Zairean military cooperation, although the treaty specifying theseterms (the military technical assistance accord of 1974) would only bepublished later that year, to help refute parliamentary criticism of the conductof the Shaba operations. France was already by this stage the principal armssupplier to Zaire, and had provided Mobutu's armed forces with hardwareincluding Mirage fighter aircraft, helicopters and transport planes.

On safari again in 1975, this time in the Akagera National Park in north-eastern Rwanda at the invitation of the Rwandan president-general JuvenalHabyarimana (who had taken power in a military coup two yearspreviously), Giscard agreed to formalize Franco-Rwandan militarycooperation in a military technical assistance accord. The Franco-Rwandanaccord would be the twenty-second such document, and entailed an initiallymodest annual transfer of arms and military equipment from France toRwanda worth about FF4m (£0.5m) per year. With regard to the deploymentof French troops in the country, the accord states: 'The government of the



French republic places at the disposal of the government of the Rwandeserepublic the French military personnel whose services are required for theorganization and instruction of the Rwandese national police'.

Following the electoral demise in 1981 of Giscard (who accepted angenerous gift of diamonds from the Central African Emperor Bokassa), anddespite pre-election Socialist Party rhetoric which spoke of the end of neo-colonial spheres of influence, French African policy under FrancoisMitterrand was characterized by seamless continuity with that of hisconservative predecessors. When the Rwandan war broke out in 1990, theFranco-Rwandan treaty of 1975 was invoked as legitimization for Frenchintervention - again, ostensibly, to protect its nationals - on the side of theHabyarimana regime. However, when it became apparent that thisoperation, codenamed Norott ('Northwest wind'), required the long-termsupport of Habyarimana's weak and disorganized army, the accord wasamended on 26 August 1992 to include the 'Rwandese armed forces' aseligible for French assistance. Uniquely, both sections of this treaty areclassified, and do not appear alongside similar accords published in theJournal officiel.1

Before suggesting that this involvement far exceeded the terms even ofFrance's own 1975 accord, it may be useful here to outline a theoreticalmodel to help explain France's open ended political and militarycommitment in Rwanda, and the implications for its subsequent claims(when the genocidal regime faced defeat in 1994) to have humanitarianmotives. Reiterating the premise that intervention is a ubiquitous socialphenomenon, Richard Little offered (in 1975) a number of definitions andformulae to identify intervention, defined as dictatorial and coerciveinterference in the affairs of another state:

An interventionary situation exists when an actor responds to anintervention stimulus. The stimulus emerges when conflict developsbetween the units in a bifurcated actor, creating a potential for systemtransformation. Maintaining a relationship with one side of abifurcated actor constitutes an intervention response; maintaining arelationship with both sides of a bifurcated actor constitutes a non-intervention response.8

Given the Franco-Rwandan patron-client relationship, France feltobliged to respond when Rwanda's exiles, organized and equipped in theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), launched their attack on the Habyarimanaregime from across the Ugandan border: 'When there is a high level ofinteraction between two states, the decision-makers in one must respond tothe emergence of civil war in the other'.9 The outcome of this response, it isargued, will be the restoration of the original system, that is, the former



pattern of dyadic interaction, or a transformation of the relationship with thesecond actor's (here, France's) commitment shifting to the side of thebifurcated actor which challenged the original system. In this case, France'sresponse was mechanical: a restoration of the original system even at theprice of a direct intervention. This mechanical response should be seen inthe context suggested above, of Franco-African relations since 1960. TheFrench commitment to one side of a bifurcated actor (that is, the French-fostered or favoured ruling elite) was an integral part of the state's creationand/or survival; this excludes the notion of the second actor's choicebetween intervention and non-intervention. Because of France'sinterpersonal 'networks' and treaty-ratified support for the internal statusquo in the states of its African sphere, its permanent bases and its peerlesspower projection capacity on the continent, Franco-African relations areinherently interventionary. This applies even in cases when France hasoccasionally withheld support for a client (in Congo-Brazzaville 1963 orNiger 1974) where an intervention might have been expected, therebyshifting its patronage to the internal opposition. Interestingly, thejustification for these non-actions was that intervention would exceed theterms of a military technical assistance accord, but with a clear subtextemphasizing the lack of credibility, and hence expendability, of the deposedleader.

This dynamic of French militarism in Africa applied continually from1960 to 1994 until it reached its nadir in Rwanda. Once alerted to trouble inits African backyard, France always intervened; it had done so more than 30times since 1960; and in 1990, the outbreak of civil war in Rwanda led tothe activation of the same traditional, mechanical interventionary responseto a perceived intervention stimulus. Some motives for these interventionswere common to all Western powers which maintained an overseas sphereof influence: credibility (here, in the eyes of France's other African clientsoften dependent for survival on French backing); domino theory (the fear,partly justified, that the overthrow of a French-backed regime - and thefailure of French intervention to protect it - would threaten neighbouringpro-French leaders, both by example and by a direct overspill of conflict);security of guaranteed markets and contracts; and often overlappingpersonal and financial interests. Others, notably the concepts of grandeur,and francophonie are unique to France.10

The Discrediting of France

Why did France fail in Rwanda? Its first direct military intervention there,Operation Noroit( 1990-93), was justified as 'intervention by invitation', tohonour a treaty obligation to an ally. However, the operation soon exceeded



the terms even of France's own military assistance accord with theHabyarimana regime. French troops were deployed in the capital Kigaliinitially to evacuate French citizens, but remained for three years. Duringthis time, apart from assisting through arming and training the exponentialgrowth of the Rwandan army (Forces Armies Rwandaises [FAR], whichgrew from 5,200-strong in 1990 to 35,000 in 1993), they maintained avisible presence in the city - manning checkpoints and carrying out jointpatrols with the FAR, and played a less visible support role at the front -commanding artillery bombardments and, on at least one occasion,conducting a bombardment (at Byumba, far from where there were anyFrench citizens to protect, in October 1990).11 The role of militaryintelligence and special services is unclear, but Captain Paul Barril'saccount, discussed later, of French personnel attacking the RPF fromhelicopters does not sound implausible.

The second intervention, Operation Amaryllis (April 1994), was justifiedby the need to evacuate French and other European nationals following theassassination of Habyarimana and the collapse of civil order. This briefoperation resulted from the failure both of Operation Noroit to transform theFAR into a force capable of independently defeating the RPF, and of theArusha peace process (officially backed by the French government, if not byall in the military) to force the Habyarimana regime to compromise. Theevacuation of the French embassy and all French nationals (while theembassy's local staff, facing death at the hands of the genocidal militias, wereabandoned) seemed to represent an attempt to distance France from thegenocide (both literally and politically), and the apparent abandonment of anunsustainable client. However, the simultaneous evacuation by the Frencharmy of that client's inner circle (the akazu) and of the genocide's principalideologues, has left the French authorities open to charges of attempting tocover up both the extent of three years of military cooperation, andresponsibility for Habyarimana's assassination.

The lesson of Operations Noroit and Amaryllis seems to be that, despite aconsiderable investment of military hardware and political credibility, and theinvolvement of French troops on the ground, the Habyarimana regime shouldhave been identified earlier as a political and military lost cause. The RPFvictory in 1994 represented, it should be emphasized, the first ever defeat of aFrench-armed, trained and sponsored army and administration in sub-SaharanAfrica. The five factors needed to quantify this failure, and identify the role ofthis external actor in exacerbating the conflict, will now be discussed.

Misinterpretation of the Causes of Conflict

As suggested above, France responded mechanically to a perceivedintervention stimulus as it would have done faced with secessionists in Chad



or an army mutiny in the Central African Republic. Gerard Prunier claimsto have been present when Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, appointed by hisfather in 1982 to head the presidential Africa Unit attached to the Elysee,took a call from Habyarimana on 2 October 1990. The quoted reactionencapsulates 30 years of mechanical French responses to African crises:'Jean-Christophe Mitterrand...gave a bland and reassuring answer toPresident Habyarimana, adding with a wink: "We are going to send him afew boys, old man Habyarimana. We are going to bail him out. In any case,the whole thing will be over in two or three months'".12 The outbreak of civilwar was characterized in much of the French media as an invasion offriendly, francophone Rwanda by hostile anglophone Uganda, withdeliberate undertones of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The RPF werelabelled 'Khmers noirs'. Little attention was paid to the Habyarimanaregime's repeated denial of the 'right to return' for Rwanda's refugeeswhich was the RPF's principal demand.

Misinterpretation of Rwanda's Uniqueness

Unlike the bulk of the states which constitute France's African sphere ofinfluence, Rwanda is not a former French colony, and is only nominallyfrancophone. France's response betrayed a misunderstanding of the historicaldynamic of the Rwandan conflict: a single party government based onnepotism, clan loyalty, sectarianism and exclusion; and opposition to thatregime composed primarily of highly motivated, educated and organizedrefugees, funded by a prosperous diaspora, led by militarily accomplishedcommanders, and enjoying at least tacit support from a neighbouring state.

Automatic Support for One Side of a Bifurcated Actor

The mechanical response to Habyarimana's request for help was buttressedwith textbook but in every respect unsustainable justification ('limitedintervention, to protect French nationals, at request of a democraticgovernment, against foreign invasion and within the legal terms of amilitary technical assistance agreement'). Operation Noroit was launchedwithout specific operational guidelines or a time limit, and with quagmirepotential, that is, the involvement of ground troops, even in front-linecombat, in a guerilla war in a mountainous tropical country, all of whichdirectly contradicted the trend of the West's post-Cold War interventions.

Failure to Apply France's Own Criteria on the Conditionality of Aid

France failed to apply the conditionality criteria which President Mitterrandhimself had announced at the 1990 Franco-African summit at La Baule,which linked the continuation of bilateral aid, including military assistance,to progress by aid recipients towards democratization. These criteria,



however, failed to address the case of states where there was no consentover the natural electorate or the democratic unit, and where political power,as with that monopolized by Habyarimana since 1973, was dependent onthe permanent disenfranchizement of refugees. That is, Habyarimana couldcount on the at least tacit support of the majority of Rwanda's population,because he had excluded, killed or exiled any who might oppose him.

Failure to Recognize Second Bifurcation

French-sponsored militarization of Rwandan society made its rulersintransigent. The failure to make continued support, especially military,conditional on human rights or anti-sectarian criteria, scuppered the Arushapeace process. (The terms of the Arusha accord, agreed by all parties inAugust 1993, included the right to return of Rwandan exiles, power-sharingin a multi-party transitional government, the stationing of RPF troops inKigali, and the withdrawal of foreign forces.) The maintenance of Frenchsupport for the regime despite Habyarimana's subsequent dismissal of theArusha accord as 'a scrap of paper', convinced the regime's extremists thatFrench support would always be forthcoming. Christopher Clapham hasidentified this phenomenon - radicalization of extremist regimes throughexternal backing - in an analysis of African international relations:

[A]n apparently inexhaustible supply of arms and aid from an all-powerful external patron encouraged rulers to suppose that their ownhegemonic ambitions were ultimately unstoppable, and that theycould therefore proceed with the establishment of a monopoly statewhich need take no account of internal opposition or the indigenouscharacteristics of the societies which they governed....Ultimately, itwas not the imported armaments which conferred power on thegovernment, but the indigenous people who had to use them. Whenthey failed, it failed.13

This belief in continued, unconditional French support was sustained by back-channel messages from Paris, particularly from military figures within theMission militaire de cooperation who had both professional and personalinterests in defending the regime and their proteges in the FAR. Suchunaccountability points to a larger failure of democratic checks and balancescharacteristic of French African policy, which is conducted by different andoften competing centres of power in Paris - the Prime Minister, the Ministriesof Cooperation, Foreign Affairs, and Defence - but is decided primarily bythe President, and his unelected Africa Unit. Indeed de Gaulle, returned topower in 1958 when France faced civil war over a decolonization crisis (inAlgeria), ensured that the Fifth Republic presidency would retain principalcontrol over African affairs as surely as it did over nuclear policy,



membership of alliances, use of the regular army abroad and much of foreignpolicy generally; these were to be the President's 'reserved domains'(domaines reserves), largely exempt from parliamentary control or scrutiny.Bearing this factor in mind, along with parallel diplomacy, personal networks,arms transfers through third parties and other shady deals, France's seeminglyunquestioning and unquestioned support for the Rwandan regime, while thelatter busily prepared a genocidal final solution to its political and militarycrisis, seems less surprising.

Despite the diplomatic and military debacle that Rwanda represents forFrench African policy, evidence suggests that French military strategists donot follow the same agenda of official justification for the Rwandanoperations. Paul Barril, a French military adviser in Rwanda and formerhead of the French police 'intervention group', gives an enthusiasticdescription of the role of France's special military services:

France's official special services blocked in '90 the attack by the RPFterrorists and Uganda, a DGSE [Direction generate de la Securiteexterieure, French military intelligence] job. A remarkable job whichwas a source of great pride in this first phase of the war. There wereheroes on the French side who will never be known, extraordinarystories of guys who took crazy initiatives, who went out and blastedall around them with just a few helicopters and a few guns. There ismaterial for a book on the heroism of the Secret Services in Rwanda,against Uganda and the RPF...which explains their hatred for France.14

Similarly, the characteristically gung-ho militaria fanzine Raids Magazinesuggests that: 'Francophonie has lost a battle, but not the war....[I]n RwandaFrance, without participating, was present at the seizure of power by theRPF, a rebellion which it had actively combatted from 1990 to 1993'.15

The difference of perception between the military and the politicianssuggested here goes a long way to explain the failure of France's attemptedassumption of the humanitarian mantle when the collapse of the crumbling,discredited regime it had backed became inevitable. Reflecting this, a recentarticle on post-Cold War interventions suggests that Realist values have notbeen replaced by the apparent shift to humanitarian motives; instead,'humanitarian intervention' may merely 'serve as a mirror of global politicsas they really exist' .16

The Discrediting of External Military Intervention

The end of the Cold War brought about an apparent conceptual shift withregard to intervention within the 'New World Order', based on a changingnotion of sovereignty as it applies to people, and not just to territory and



borders kept inviolate by frozen superpower bipolarity. New debatesprovoked by the transformed international environment have focused on theconcept of humanitarian intervention, heralded by the US 1992 interventionin Somalia, Operation Restore Hope. With the suggested erosion of thestatist model, apparent humanitarian and idealist aims - albeit tempered byrealities of new global rivalries - also moved intervention centre stage inInternational Relations debates. Richard Little stated in 1996 that: 'Whetheror not to intervene in civil wars seems to me to raise one of the mostimportant issues confronting the contemporary international community'.17

But is it plausible to argue that Idealism has come true and humanitarianintervention is motivated, in the mediatized West, by concern for humanrights in states perceived as repressive? Theorists have long argued thathumanitarian concern should be a motivation in international affairs; TerryNardin suggested that states ought to adopt a presumption againstintervention in the affairs of another state, but adds the important caveat (asdo Walzer and Joyner) that, under certain circumstances this presumptionmay be overridden in order to further human rights.18 Could it be possiblethat this pious hope has been realized?

Even if the superpowers underwent a Damascene conversion in 1989, noconceptual shift was apparent in French interventionary practice until 1994,which arguably marked a watershed for French African policy, followingthe first failure of its old-style intervention on the continent. France'ssubsequent conversion to the humanitarian intervention agenda seems allthe more implausible given the apparent reversion to type of Frenchinterventions elsewhere since Rwanda (the Comoros 1995, the CentralAfrican Republic 1995-96). Practice did not change during this period, butthe 1994 invocation of humanitarianism marked a shift in discourse, notleast because it had rarely been felt necessary hitherto to offer publicjustification for interventions in Africa. Consideration of legitimization istherefore key to any assessment of the validity and effectiveness of Frenchattempts to invoke humanitarianism, on the international and particularlythe US model, to justify interventions driven by a specifically French set ofmotives.

Attempts by theorists to extrapolate forcible, that is, militaryintervention justified as 'humanitarian', from straightforward, powerpolitics military intervention, hint at the ambiguity inherent in France'sassumption of humanitarianism for one intervention (new-stylelegitimization), and its continuation of traditional justifications (evacuatingcitizens, fulfilling treaty obligations, responding to an explicit invitation)for interventions elsewhere (old-style legitimization). Ramsbotham pointsto this in his 1994 contention that:



To count as humanitarian intervention, forcible military action mustcome under the framework principles for humanitarian intervention asa whole. If this does not happen, forcible humanitarian intervention isnot distinguished from forcible non-humanitarian intervention, andmilitary actions are not integrated into the wider enterprises of whichthey should be part.19

Double Discrediting: Humanitarian Intervention by a CompromisedBelligerent

Before the start of the Rwandan genocide, Philippe Guillot wrote that'France is trying to take the lead in humanitarian affairs....The [1993] changeof government has not modified France's humanitarian concern, but aid isnow delivered without reference to humanitarian intervention' .20 Thisrepresented an attempt by the French state to wrest control of its overseascrisis relief policy from NGOs, most notably Medecins sans frontieres(MSF) and Medecins du monde (MDM), which had often been critical of thegovernment and hostile to the military. Unique among its European partners,France under Mitterrand boasted a Minister for Humanitarian Action, a postoriginally occupied by MSF co-founder Bernard Kouchner, who had insertedthe concept of a 'right to interfere' Adroit d'ingerence'), interpreted in someNGO circles as a 'duty to interfere', into French public discourse.

Playing to this constituency and a media-fuelled public clamour foraction as the Rwanda genocide neared completion in mid-1994, PresidentMitterrand declared on 18 June that:

France was ready, without waiting for the arrival of a United Nationsforce, to send along with any of its European or African partners whowished, a humanitarian protection force designed to assure the safetyof those civilian populations which have escaped extermination. Thisis being prepared. It is now a matter of hours and days...I repeat: everyhour counts.21

We are fortunate to have an account of the preparations for thisintervention, codenamed Operation Turquoise, from Gerard Prunier, aspecialist on East Africa called on to advise Defence Minister FrancoisLeotard in June 1994. Prunier tells how the French troops' point of entryfrom Zaire into Rwanda was determined partly by the need, nearly threemonths after the genocide started, for there still to be massacres to end andpopulations to protect in keeping with their UN mandate:

The first draft of the intervention plan....was entirely based on thesupposition that the French troops would enter the country through



Gisenyi [in north-western Rwanda]....Since the official purpose of themission was humanitarian, there was precious little to do at that levelin Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. As a local Hutu trader was laterto remark to a French journalist, 'We never had many Tutsi here andwe killed them all at the beginning without much of a fuss.' TheFrench forces would find absolutely no-one left alive to be paraded infront of TV cameras as a justification for the intervention.22

It was subsequently agreed the French would enter Rwanda from the south-west (at Cyangugu); indeed they crossed the border from Bukavu in Zairebefore their UN mandate had been approved. This happened on 21 June1994, when the UN Security Council (by ten votes, including France and theRwandan ancien regime, but with five abstentions) passed the French-drafted Resolution 929, the stated goals of which were to end the massacres,to protect populations in the areas still controlled by the Rwandangovernment army (FAR), and to hand over to UNAMIRII (United NationsAssistance Mission in Rwanda) after two months. Placed within the scopeof UN Charter Chapter VII, the mandate allowed the use of force to defendtroops and protect refugees, but ruled out any interpositionary role. It wasalso intended to be a French-led multinational force, with the gradualincorporation of troops from a number of African states.

However, the operation's credibility was in trouble from the outset. Thereinsertion of the French military into a conflict which it had done much tofuel, and where it had close professional and personal relationships with oneside, seemed like folly in many African eyes. The Organization of AfricanUnity opposed the intervention, on the basis that one of the conflict'sprincipal combatants, the RPF, was understandably opposed to it. Given theextent of French support for the Habyarimana regime and now for thegenocidal Sindikubwabo 'interim government', France of all countriesseemed least qualified to organize any supposed 'peacekeeping' or'humanitarian' intervention. There was an awareness of this fact in Paris,particularly now that responsibility for France's response to the Rwandancrisis had for the first time been removed from the exclusive control of thePresidency. Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, a would-be presidentialcandidate, announced to the National Assembly the conditions which he feltshould apply to any further French intervention in Rwanda. It should havea UN mandate, a strictly limited duration, French forces should not advancedeep into Rwanda, the operation should be strictly humanitarian with noexclusively military component, and it should be multinational, with theinvolvement of allied troops so that France would not be acting alone.

Of these conditions, only the first two can be said to have been observed,under the French-drafted terms of UN Resolution 929. The degree of



support from France's African allies seems to have been in proportion to thefrancophilia of those countries' administrations; Senegal and Chad sent 243and 130 men, respectively, Congo and Niger about 40, and Mauritania justfour doctors and six nurses. On the ground, the problem was not so muchSomalia-style mission creep, but the peculiarities of French militaryexperience and expectations in Africa, and the remarkable situationwhereby troops of a UN-mandated humanitarian force had, less than a yearpreviously, been occasional but direct participants in the conflict. Manysoldiers interpreted their Turquoise brief to imply a rearguard action insupport of their beleaguered Rwandan allies, to allow them to retreat ingood order and regroup. There was a widespread belief among bothRwandan and French troops that Paris would never allow the 'Anglo-Saxon' RPF to take control. Many French troops half-expected to be sentinto combat against the RPF, as indeed happened from 3 July when theFrench army and the now victorious RPF clashed; on one occasion the RPFcaptured 18 French troops, but released them without fuss the same day."

The 'Safe Humanitarian Zone'

But most damaging for any hope of peace and reconciliation in Rwanda,and most threatening to the stability of the entire region, was the SafeHumanitarian Zone (SHZ). The establishment of the SHZ was a deliberateattempt to legitimize this, the most controversial aspect of the Operation, bylinking it in the public mind with the UN-imposed 'no-fly zone' in northernIraq, while at the same time bracketing the RPF 'Khmers noirs' withSaddam Hussein. It was not part of the UN mandate under Resolution 929,and although advertised as protection for refugees fleeing the RPF advance,its principal effect was to provide a secure retreat for the FAR and theperpetrators of the genocide, military, militia and civilian. Frenchcommanders announced that the RPF, already in charge in Kigali, would notbe allowed to enter the SHZ, an area of some 70 square kilometres withinRwandan territory, and would be excluded by force.

This threat of force was clear evidence that Operation Turquoise wasexceeding its UN mandate, which specifically prohibited an 'interpositionalforce'. On the other hand, French commanders stated that because of themandate's limitations, they had no power to make any arrests within theFrench-controlled SHZ, even of individuals clearly identified as warcriminals by journalists and NGOs. Nor, it was stated, had they any businesspreventing looting, or dismantling an FM transmitter broadcasting pro-genocide propaganda from within the Zone, and encouraging the refugees,and the population of neighbouring Burundi, to pursue the elimination of allthe ex-regime's opponents to its logical conclusion.



By late August 1994, with the RPF in control in the rest of Rwanda andthe massacres stopped, nearly two million people fled or were driven out,under the command of the FAR and the militias, to the soon-to-be cholera-infested refugee camps at Goma and Bukavu. On 22 August, observing theletter of Resolution 929, Operation Turquoise was wound up, and theFrench handed over to a reluctant, ill-defined and soon superfluousUNAMIR II, little-respected following the precipitate retreat of itspredecessor (UNAMIR I) as the genocide began.

In the light of the above, Turquoise fails to meet contemporary criteriafor humanitarian intervention, typically defined as 'the use of armed forceby one state against another to protect the nationals of the latter from acts oromissions of their own government which shock the conscience ofmankind'.24 If intended as a humanitarian response to genocide, Turquoise,organized with apparent urgency, came three months too late, occurringonly when the genocide was all but completed; on at least one occasion (atBisisero), French troops failed to rescue or protect, within the SafeHumanitarian Zone, a community threatened by genocide and subsequentlykilled. Elite combat troops and heavy military equipment were deployed,more suited, by the French army's own admission, to a textbook 'restorationof client' intervention. And Mobutu's Zaire, rather than (anglophone)Tanzania or (RPF-sympathetic) Burundi, was used as the French base. (TwoFrench emissaries had earlier cleared the ground by flying to Zaire toobtain, in exchange for 'a good suitcaseful of dollars and a new politicalvirginity' for Mobutu, the right to use the east Zairean airports at Goma,Bukavu and Kisangani for French planes.) In sum, Operation Turquoiseacted as a smokescreen for earlier French military involvement; the creationof vast refugee camps in eastern Zaire under the command of the ex-FARand militias served as a bridgehead for attempts to destabilize and reinvadepost-war Rwanda, and created a safe haven for the genocidists beyond thereach of the war crimes and genocide trials in Kigali and Arusha.

Conclusion

Can external intervention ever be disinterested and genuinely humanitarian?The root problem, as the US discovered in Somalia, is that intervenors areasked (or claim) to intervene non-politically (which is what humanitarianintervention implies) in intensely political arenas. However, no matter whattheir intentions, they are interpreted as partisan; delivering aid is seen toprolong the fighting, transporting refugees is said to further ethniccleansing, protection of threatened minorities to promote secession. Thiscrisis of credibility and legitimization caused by post-Cold War efforts toreclassify military intervention as 'forcible humanitarian intervention' is



central to France's current problems in Africa. The prolonged civil war andgenocide in Rwanda were due in no small part to French involvement, asintervention exacerbated a crisis which necessitated further interventions,latterly characterized as humanitarian.

Michael Walzer wrote with great prescience in 1980 that:

clear examples of what is called 'humanitarian intervention' are veryrare. Indeed, I have not found any, but only mixed cases where thehumanitarian motive is one among several. States don't send theirsoldiers into other states, it seems, only in order to save lives. Thelives of foreigners don't weigh that heavily in the scales of domesticdecision-making.25

Accepting this Realist and apparently unchanging situation, Walzer nonethe less leaves us with a pertinent moral formula to which to aspire: 'Peoplewho initiate massacres lose their right to participate in the normal (even inthe normally violent) processes of self-determination. Their military defeatis morally necessary'.26

Similarly, Croft and Treacher cite 'cosmopolitanists, or neo-Kantians,[who] have argued that the military force of states should be used in orderto save the lives of people, rather than advance the interests of the nation'.They agree with Walzer that: 'Often, military intervention, driven by othermotives, has been "dressed-up" as humanitarian concern. Hence, the reliefof physical suffering has been used as the pretext for the militaryintervention in one state by the forces of another as the latter pursues its owninterests'.27 (However, covert operations in Zaire indicate that modernmilitary intervention is not necessarily the preserve of states, but that non-state actors such as arms dealers and mercenaries may be crucial insustaining or destroying a regime through their direct intervention.)

Significantly for the entire region, the use by France in 1990 and againin 1994 of bases in eastern Zaire for its Rwandan interventions entailed therehabilitation of Mobutu, for several years previously an embarrassingpersona non grata in Paris. By November 1994, Mobutu could even attendthe Franco-African summit at Biarritz, from which the new, RPF-ledRwandan government was excluded. Attacks by the ex-Rwandan army andmilitias on the rwandophone populations of eastern Zaire (theBanyamulenge) in late 1996, accompanied by Mobutu's revocation of thosepopulations' Zairean citizenship, sparked the rebellion which, with France'sinterventionary hands tied post-Turquoise, poses an obvious threat to theother dominoes of France's shrinking African sphere.

However, as has become apparent since late 1996, any further extra-African intervention in the Great Lakes region, particularly if French-initiated or with French participation, could only be partisan and hence



ineffective in a presumed humanitarian role. Significantly, as the Zaireanwar approached its turning point - the capture of Kisangani in March 1997by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire —French foreign minister Herve de Charette accused Uganda of interveningdirectly to support Kabila's forces, described as

Zairean rebels seeking to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko, aParis ally. But de Charette indicated that France, which has beenpressing for United Nations intervention to stop hostilities in a movewhich could save Mobutu's crumbling authority, would not intervenealone in Zaire.28

This begs the obvious question, why not? The French army is reluctant toconcede that its Rwandan interventions were anything other than successful,textbook military operations which fulfilled their stated purposes and savedlives. Admiral Jacques Lanxade, head of the French joint chiefs of staff in1994, wrote of Turquoise in the February 1995 issue of the semi-officialmonthly Defense /rationale:

Decided and launched in a complex and dramatic crisis situation,given urgent priority, this difficult and far-flung operation todaypresents a very positive balance sheet. Analysis of this operationshould allow us to identify and strengthen, for the future, anoperational concept adapted to actions with a humanitarian goal.29

But does apparent French inaction (although support for, or instigation of,covert operations may be taken as read), suggest that the self-styledgendarme of Africa accepts the existence of a no-go area - the entire GreatLakes region - and the failure and resultant inapplicability of aninterventionary response, both old-style (Noroit) and new-style(Turquoise)! Official French thinking seems to have realized that therecould be no repetition of UN Security Council Resolution 929 whichsanctioned Turquoise. If this is the case, Rwanda marks a turning-point, anda fundamental shift in the regional balance of power, with a rolling back ofAfrica's largest neo-colonial sphere of influence.

Given this interpretation, the 'double discrediting' thesis can be arguedby way of conclusion. French military interventions in Rwanda in 1990-94,and subsequent military support for the ex-FAR and militias, havediscredited France in the Great Lakes region; and the legacy of Frenchmilitary intervention in Rwanda outlined here has similarly discreditedforeign (that is, non-African) military intervention, and undermined thepost-Cold War model of 'forcible humanitarian' or 'military-humanitarian'intervention.30

This parallel discrediting in the Great Lakes region of both the old and



new models of Western interventionary response demands a reassessment ofthe appropriateness and validity of Western military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, and lends urgency to the search for regional responses toconflict and humanitarian crises. It may also herald both the demise inAfrica of the New World Order (where its presumed benefits were leastapparent), and the possible dawning of an age of New Western Humility.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper to the British International StudiesAssociation annual conference at Durham University, 18 December 1996.

NOTES

1. Among the more useful accounts are Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression:Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda (1860-1960), New York: Columbia University Press,1988; and Dixon Kamukama, The Rwanda conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications,Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1993. Notable among ethnocentric interpretations isFerdinand Nahimana, Le Rwanda: émergence d'un État, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993.Nahimana, a former rector of the National University of Rwanda, became a leadingideologue of 'Hutu power' and co-founder of the pro-genocide Radio-Television Libre desMille Collines.

2. Admiral Jacques Lanxade, 'L'opération Turquoise', Défense nationale, Feb. 1995, p.7.3. Christopher C. Joyner, 'International Law', in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Intervention into the

1990s: US Foreign Policy in the Third World, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992.4. John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p.146.5. Alain Rouvez, Disconsolate Empires: French, British and Belgian Military Involvement

in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham/New York/London: University Press ofAmerica, 1994, p.101.

6. Joyner (n.3 above), p.236.7. Unpublished in either the Journal officiel (Paris), or the Defence Ministry's Bulletin officiel

des armées, a copy of the Franco-Rwandan military technical assistance accord of 1975, withits 1992 amendment, was passed to the author by a French journalist, who recovered his copyfrom the Rwandan Defence Ministry in July 1994.

8. Richard Little, Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars, London: Martin Robertson,1975, p.8.

9. Ibid., 'Introduction', p.x.10. Francophonie is defined as defence of the French language and the areas where it is spoken.

Considered part of the French-speaking world in Eurocentric analyses, Rwanda and Burundi,uniquely in post-colonial Africa, share a pre-colonial national language(Kinyarwanda/Kirundi). Although French has been an official language of Rwanda sinceindependence, only about 8 per cent of the population speaks French, as a second language.

11. Testimony of Col. Marcel Gatsinzi, ex-FAR officer now assimilated into the ArméePatriotique Rwandaise, in an interview with the author, Kigali, Oct. 1996.

12. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, London: Hurst, 1995, p.100.13. Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 156.14. Capt. Paul Barril, former head of the GIGN (Croupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie

nationale), and currently director of the 'private security firm' SECRETS (Société d'études,de conception et de réalisation d'équipements techniques et de sécurité), one of fiveconstituent companies of Groupe Barril Sécurité, interviewed in Playboy (Paris), Dec. 1994.


4 4 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

15. Raids Magazine (Paris), No.101, Oct. 1994, p.32, a militaria fanzine similar to Soldier ofFortune. It cannot be said to reflect an official French military point of view; but itscelebration of the combat role of French forces in Rwanda, and criticism of the perceivedloss of the Rwandan war, may not be unrepresentative of military thinking.

16. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 'Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda andSomalia Compared', International Political Science Review, Vol.18, No.1, Jan. 1997.

17. Richard Little, 'External Involvement in Civil Wars: The Intervention Paradox', inaugurallecture, University of Bristol, 9 Feb. 1996.

18. Quoted in S. Caney, 'Human Rights and the Rights of States: Terry Nardin onNonintervention', International Political Science Review, Vol.18, No.1, Jan. 1997.

19. O. Ramsbotham, 'Towards an Ethical Framework for Humanitarian Intervention', paperpresented at BISA annual conference, University of York, Dec. 1994, p.1.

20. Philippe Guillot, 'France, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention', InternationalPeacekeeping, Vol.1, No.1, spring 1994, p.40.

21. François Mitterrand, speech to UNESCO 18 June 1994, Paris: Présidence de la république:service de presse.

22. Prunier (n.12 above), p.284.23. Testimony of Denis Polisi (RPF General Secretary), and Maj.-Gen. Paul Kagame (Rwandan

Vice-president and Defence Minister), in interviews with the author, Kigali, Nov. 1996.24. Judy A. Gallant, 'Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A

Reappraisal in Light of a Changing World Order', American University Journal ofInternational Law, Vol.7, No.2, 1992, pp.881-920, cited in Bruce D. Jones, '"Interventionwithout Borders": Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94', Millennium, Vol.24,No.2, 1995, pp.225-49.

25. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, London: Penguin, 1980, p.101.26. Ibid., p.106.27. Stuart Croft and Adrian Treacher, 'Aspects of Intervention in the South', in Andrew M.

Dorman and Thomas G. Otte (eds), Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy toHumanitarian Intervention, Aldershot: Dartmouth Press, 1995, p.137.

28. The Monitor (Kampala), 7 Mar. 1997.29. See n.2 above.30. This is already apparent in International Relations thinking. Richard Little suggested in early

1996 that 'States not only have a right to settle internal disputes without externalintervention, but non-intervention also seems to be the most prudent strategy for externalactors to follow' ( n.17 above).


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