The Battle of Singapore, the Massacre of Chinese and … · in Malaya were passing intelligence to...

The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 28 | Number 4 | Article ID 3187 | Jul 13, 2009

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The Battle of Singapore, the Massacre of Chinese andUnderstanding of the Issue in Postwar Japan

Hayashi Hirofumi

The Battle of Singapore, theMassacre of Chinese andUnderstanding of the Issue inPostwar Japan

Hayashi Hirofumi

Shortly after British forces surrenderedin Singapore on 15 February 1942, theJapanese military began operationKakyou Shukusei [a] or Dai Kenshou [b],known in the Chinese community ofSingapore as the Sook Ching ("Purge")[c], in which many local Chinese weremassacred.[1] Although the killings havebeen investigated extensively by scholarsin Malaysia and Singapore, this articledraws on Japanese sources to examinethe events.

Chinese inspected by Kempeitai

following the capture of Singapore

The first point to be considered is whythe massacre took place, and the secondis how the massacre has been presentedin postwar Japan. Although even ex-Kempeitai officers involved haveadmitted that the killings were inhumaneand unlawful, little attention has beenpaid to the episode in Japan. While therehas been valuable research carried outon the Japanese military administrationof Malaya and Singapore, no detailedJapanese study of the killing hasappeared. Moreover, while the SingaporeMassacre is well known to scholars,similar killings in the Malay Peninsulaonly came to the attention of theJapanese public in the late 1980s after Idiscovered documents relating to theJapanese military units involved.

Why did the Japanese MilitaryMassacre Chinese in Singapore?

On the night of 17 February 1942, Maj.Gen. Kawamura Saburo, an infantrybrigade commander, was placed incharge of Japan’s Singapore Garrison.The next morning, he appeared at ArmyHeadquarters and was ordered by 25thArmy commander, Lt. Gen. YamashitaTomoyuki, to carry out mopping-upoperations. He received further detailed

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instructions from the chief of staff, Lt.Gen. Suzuki Sosaku, and Lt. Colonel TsujiMasanobu. Kawamura then consultedwith the Kempeitai commander, Lt. Col.Oishi Masayuki. The plan to purge theChinese population was drawn up in thecourse of these meetings. Under thisscheme, Chinese males between the agesof 18 and 50 were ordered to report tomass screening centers. Those deemedanti-Japanese were detained, loaded ontolorries, and taken away to the coast or toother isolated places where they weremachine-gunned and bayoneted todeath.[2] My survey of officialdocuments of the Japanese militaryrevealed two sources that specified thenumber massacred. One is Kawamura’sdiary that shows the figure as 5,000.[3] The other is an issue of the IntelligenceRecord of the 25th Army (No.62, dated28 May 1942) prepared by the staffsection of the 25th Army.[4] This secretrecord states that the number missing asa result of bombing and the purge was11,110. This second record is importantbecause it was drawn up as a secretdocument shortly after the purge tookplace. However, it includes both bombingand purge casualties and offers no basisfor the figure.

In Singapore it is generally believed thatthe number killed in this event was about50,000.[5] However, on the basis ofmaterials available in Japan, Singapore,and the UK, I find no basis for this figure.Although I can not present exact figures,my estimation is that a minimum of 5000died; I can offer no figure for themaximum. The issue of numbers remains

unsettled.

The mass screening was carried outmainly by Kempeitai personnel between21 and 23 February in urban areas, andby the Imperial Guard Division at the endof February in suburban districts. Mostaccounts of the killings include a mapthat shows the island divided into foursections, and explain that the ImperialGuards, the 5th Division, and the 18thDivision carried out the mass screeningin suburban districts.[6] However, on 21February, the 25th Army ordered boththe 5th and 18th Divisions to move intothe Malay Peninsula to carry outmopping-up operations.[7] The orderassigned the Imperial Guard Division toconduct a mass screening of non-urbanareas of Singapore, with the 5th and the18th Divisions responsible for the rest ofthe Malay Peninsula. According to wardiaries and documents relating to thesetwo divisions, neither played a role in themass screening in Singapore. The 1947British war crimes trial in Singapore[8]prosecuted the commander of theImperial Guard Division, Lt. Gen.Nishimura Takuma, on charges related tothe Singapore Massacre, but not thecommanders of the 5th or 18th Divisions.This version of events is correct, and theconventional mapping of the massacre isincorrect.

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Kempeitai headquarters: the oldYMCA Building

It is important to note that the purge wasplanned before Japanese troops landed inSingapore. The military governmentsection of the 25th Army had alreadydrawn up a plan entitled,"Implementation Guidline forManipulating Overseas Chinese" on oraround 28 December 1941.[9] Thisguideline stated that anyone who failedto obey or cooperate with the occupationauthorities should be eliminated. It isclear that the headquarters of the 25thArmy had decided on a harsh policytoward the Chinese population ofSingapore and Malaya from thebeginning of the war. According to OnishiSatoru,[10] the Kempeitai officer incharge of the Jalan Besar screeningcentre, Kempeitai commander OishiMasayuki was instructed by the chief ofstaff, Suzuki Sosaku, at Keluang, Johor,to prepare for a purge following thecapture of Singapore. Although the exactdate of this instruction is not known, theArmy headquarters was stationed inKeluang from 28 January to 4 February

1942.

Rebuttal of the Defense

Let us consider the justification ordefense for the actions of the Japanesearmy presented by some Japanese writersand researchers. One of the major pointsis that the Chinese volunteer forces, suchas the Dalforce, the Singapore OverseasChinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army,fought fiercely and caused heavyJapanese casualties. This is supposed tohave inflamed Japanese anger and led toreprisals against local Chinese.[11] About600 personnel from among the 1,250-strong Dalforce volunteers were sent tothe front. Some 30 per cent of Dalforcepersonnel either died in action or werekilled during the subsequent Purge.[12]It is generally said in Singapore that theDalforce personnel fought fiercely.[13]Whatever their bravery, however, theirrole seems exaggerated in Singaporeaccounts. The volunteers of Dalforcewere equipped only with outdatedweapons. Japanese military historiesmake no reference to Chinese volunteersduring the battle of Singapore, andreport that the opposition put up byBritish forces was weaker than expected.The greatest threat to the Japanese wasartillery bombardment.[14]

During the war crimes trial of 1947, noJapanese claimed that losses suffered byJapanese forces at the hand of Chinesevolunteers contributed to the massacre.As noted above, the 25th Army hadplanned the mass purge even before thebattle of Singapore. This sequence ofevents clearly rebuts the claims.

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A second point raised is that the Chinesein Malaya were passing intelligence tothe British and that Chinese guerrillaswere engaged in subversive activitiesagainst Japanese forces during theMalayan campaign, for example byflashing signals to British airplanes. TheKempeitai of the 25th Army was on thealert for such activities during theMalayan campaign, but made only twoarrests. Kempeitai officer Onishi Satorusaid in his memoirs that they had beenunable to find any evidence of the use offlash signals and that it wastechnologically impossible. Thus, this lineof argument is refuted by a militaryofficer who was directly involved in theevents.[15]

A third explanation offered for themassacre is that anti-Japanese Chinesewere preparing for an armedinsurrection, and that law and order wasdeteriorating in Singapore. They claimthat a purge was necessary to restorepublic order, and this point was raised atthe war crimes trial in Singapore.[16]One piece of evidence cited by thedefense during the trial was an entry inKawamura’s personal diary for 19February that purportedly said lootingstill continued in the city. The sameevidence was presented to the Tokyo WarCrimes Trial. However, the diary actuallysays that order in the city wasimproving.[17] The extract used duringthe trials was prepared by a Japanesearmy task force set up to counter chargesmade during war crimes trials by theAllied forces. Clearly the evidence wasmanipulated.

Otani Keijiro, a Kempeitai lieutenantcolonel in charge of public security inSingapore from the beginning of March1942, also rejected this line of defense,severely criticizing Japanese atrocities inSingapore.[18] Onishi stated that he hadnot expected hostile Chinese to begin ananti-Japanese campaign, at least not inthe short term, since public security inSingapore was improving.[19]

The fourth argument is that staff officerTsuji Masanobu was the mastermindbehind the massacre, and that hepersonally planned and carried it out. Although Tsuji was a key figure in theseevents, I believe that researchers haveoverestimated his role. At the time of thewar crimes trials, Tsuji had not beenarrested. As soon as the war ended, heescaped from Thailand to China, wherehe came under the protection of theKuomintang government, havingcooperated with them in fighting thecommunists. He later secretly returned toJapan in May 1948 where he wasprotected by the US military, namely G2of GHQ.[20] In this situation, the defensecounsel of the war crimes trial of 1947attempted to pin all responsibility onTsuji, who could not be prosecuted. Thispoint will be discussed in more detailbelow.

Let us now examine the reasons why theJapanese in Singapore committed suchatrocities. I limit the discussion tointernal factors of Japanese military andsociety.

First, it should be noted that theJapanese occupation of Singapore began

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a decade after the start of Japan’s war ofaggression against China. After theManchurian Incident in 1931, Japaninvaded and occupied Manchuria, settingup the puppet state of “Manchukuo” in1932. The Japanese army faced a stronganti-Japanese campaign and public orderremained unstable. The militaryresponded by conducting frequentpunitive operations against anti-Japaneseguerrillas and their supporters. Undernormal circumstances, those arrested inthese operations should have beenapprehended and brought to trial forpunishment. However, Japan forcedManchukuo to enact a law in September1932 that granted authority to armyofficers, both Japanese and Manchurian,as well as police officers, to execute anti-Japanese activists on the spot withouttrial. This method of execution, whichdenied judicial due process to Chinesecaptives, was usually called GenjuShobun (Harsh Disposal) or GenchiShobun (Disposal on the Spot) by theJapanese military.[21] With this law inplace, the Japanese military and militarypolice killed suspects without trial orinvestigation. Those killed were not onlyguerrillas but also civilians, includingchildren, women, and the aged. Suchinhumane methods were legalized inManchuria. From 1937, Genju Shobunwas applied regularly throughout theChina-Japan War., with civilians deniedthe right of trial and Chinese soldiersdenied prisoner of war status[22]

Yamashita Tomoyuki, the 25th Armycommander who directed the invasion ofMalaya, played an important role in the

evolution of Genju Shobun. As chief ofstaff of the North China Area Army in1938-1939, he formulated an operationalplan for mopping-up in northern Chinathat drew on the Genju Shobunexperience, having earlier been stationedin Manchuria as Supreme Adviser to theMilitary Government Section ofManchukuo.[23] At the time, the Chinesecommunists had a number of base areasin northern China. In 1940, followingYamashita’s transfer, intensive cleanupoperations called San guang zhengce(Kill All, Loot All, Burn All; J. Sankoseisaku) were launched involvingunbridled terror during which numerouspeople in contested areas weremassacred or driven from their villages.Yamashita was the link that connectedJapanese atrocities in Manchuria andNorth China with those in Singapore. [24]

During the final phase of the war,Yamashita was appointed commander ofthe 14th Area Army in the Philippines,where he surrendered to US forces at theend of the war. While he had experiencedtrouble with anti-Japanese guerillas in thePhilippines, he commented to the deputychief of staff that his policy of dealingharshly with the local population inSingapore had made the local populationthere become docile.[25]

The army order that began the purge inSingapore and Malaya was issued to theSingapore Garrison Commander,Kawamura by Army CommanderYamashita. When Kawamura presentedYamashita a report on the operations of23 February, Yamashita expressed hisappreciation for Kawamura’s efforts and

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instructed him to continue the purge asnecessary.[26] Yamashita was not apuppet of Tsuji but an active instigator ofthe Singapore Massacre.

A third important point is that theheadquarters of the 25th Army includedother hardliners aside from Tsuji andYamashita. A notable example was thedeputy chief of the military governmentof Singapore and Malaya, Col. WatanabeWataru.[27] He was the mastermindbehind the forcible donation of $50million and the “ImplementationGuidance for Manipulating OverseasChinese”, which set out the fatalconsequences of non-compliance. Hisearlier career included time spent aschief of a secret military agency in bothBeijing and Harbin. He delivered aspeech at the Army Academy in 1941advocating strong pressure against thosewho "bent their knees" to the British andthereby betrayed East Asia. The lesson hederived from his experience in China wasthat Japan should deal harshly with theChinese population from the outset. As aresult, the Chinese in Singapore wereregarded as anti-Japanese even beforethe Japanese military landed.

In this and other senses, Japaneseaggression in Southeast Asia was anextension of the Sino-Japanese War.

Fourth, among Japanese military officersand men there was a culture of prejudicetoward the Chinese and other Asianpeople. These attitudes had deepenedfollowing the Sino-Japanese War of1894-95 and were embedded within theJapanese population as a whole by the

1930s.

A final consideration is the issue of“preventive killing”. In Japan, preventivearrest was legalised in 1941 through arevision of Chian Iji Ho [Public OrderLaw], which allowed communists andothers holding dangerous thoughts to bearrested and held in custody even if nocrime had been committed. A number ofdetainees were tortured to death by thepolice, notably the Tokko special politicalpolice. The Singapore Massacre bears aclose parallel to this method ofpreventive arrest and summaryexecution.

Clearly, then, the Singapore Massacrewas not the conduct of a few evil people,but was consistent with approacheshoned and applied in the course of a longperiod of Japanese aggression againstChina and subsequently applied to otherAsian countries. To sum up the pointsdeveloped above, the Japanese military,in particular the 25th Army, made use ofthe purge to remove prospective anti-Japanese elements and to threaten localChinese and others in order to swiftlyimpose military administration. However, Japanese violence proved counterproductive. Strong anti-Japanese feelingswere ignited in the local population andnot a few younger people joined anti-Japanese movements. The result was thatJapanese forces never succeeded inresolving these difficulties in the yearsprior to defeat in 1945.

Narratives of the Singapore Massacrein Postwar Japan

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The Campaign to Undermine the WarCrimes Trials in the 1950s

Although the Singapore Massacregenerated scant interest among theJapanese people in the postwar era, therehas been some discussion of the incident.Singapore Garrison CommanderKawamura Saburo published hisreminiscences in 1952, at a time whenJapan was recovering itsindependence.[28] This book contains hisdiaries, personal letters, and othermaterials. In one letter to his family, heexpressed condolences to the victims ofSingapore and prayed for the repose oftheir souls. The foreword to the book waswritten by Tsuji, who had escapedpunishment after the war. For his part,Tsuji showed no regrets and offered noapology to the victims.

During the 1950s, the Japanesegovernment, members of parliament, andprivate organisations waged a nationwidecampaign for the release of war criminalsheld in custody at Sugamo Prison inTokyo.[29] Both conservatives andprogressives took part in the campaign,arguing that minor war criminals werevictims of the war, not true criminals. AJapanese government committee was incharge of recommending the parole andrelease of war criminals to the AlliedNations. The committee’srecommendations are still closed to thepublic in Japan, but can be read in thenational archives of the UK and USA.

As an example of the committee’srecommendations, in 1952 the Britishgovernment was asked to consider parole

for Onishi Satoru, who took part in theSingapore Massacre as a Kempeitaiofficer and was sentenced to lifeimprisonment by a British war crimestrial.[30] The recommendation says thatthe figure of 5,000 victims of theSingapore Massacre was untrue and thathis war crimes trial had been an act ofreprisal. Although this recommendationwas not approved by the Britishgovernment, it reflects the Japanesegovernment’s refusal to admit that massmurder had occurred in Singapore.[31]Among many Japanese, the war crimestrials were, and still are, regarded as amockery of justice, or victor’s justice.

Japanese Response to Accusations bySingaporeans in the 1960s

Beginning in 1962, numerous humanremains dating from the Occupation werefound in various locations aroundSingapore. Prolonged discussionsbetween the Singaporean and Japanesegovernments relating to these deaths ledto a settlement in 1967. This wasreported in the Japanese press, but onlyas minor news. For example, the NihonKeizai Shimbun quoted a Japanese officialinvolved in the negotiations as sayingthat no executions by shooting occurredin Malaysia.[32] The Asahi Shimbunreported that it was hardly conceivablethat the Japanese military committedatrocities in Indonesia and Thailand.[33]Another Asahi report criticized theChinese Chamber of Commerce inSingapore for stoking hatred bypropagating stories of barbarity by theJapanese military during the war.[34]


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Personal mementoes of Singaporeansexcavated during the 1960s and

presently exhibited in the Sun Yat-sen villa

In 2003, the Japanese Ministry of ForeignAffairs released documents relating tothe negotiations between Singapore andJapan during this period.[35] TheJapanese government had made use of areport prepared in 1946 by an armycommittee chaired by Sugita Ichiji, a staffofficer with the 25th Army. To counterwar crimes charges, the report admittedthat there had been executions, butinsisted that there were mitigatingcircumstances.[36]

The figure of 5,000 executions, accordingto a written opinion by an official at theMinistry of Justice who was in charge ofdetained war criminals, was anexaggeration: the correct figure might beabout 800. The Asahi Shimbun reportedthis number with apparent approval.[37]Additional figures come from the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, which accepted thatthe Japanese military had carried outmass killings in Singapore, but someJapanese foreign ministry documents

state that the number of victims was3,000, while others use 5,000. One ex-foreign ministry official sent a letter tothe Foreign Minister saying that Japanshould repent and apologize in allsincerity, but this attitude wasexceptional among officials.

Changi Beach, site of largescaleexecutions

During negotiations with Singapore, theJapanese government rejected demandsfor reparations but agreed to make a“gesture of atonement” by providingfunds in other ways. What the Japanesegovernment feared most was economicdamage as a result of a boycott orsabotage by the local Chinese shouldSingapore’s demands be rejected. Theagreement with Singapore was signed onthe same day as a similar agreement withMalaysia. Singapore was to receive 25million Singapore dollars as a gift andanother 25 million Singapore dollars incredit, while Malaysia was to receive 25million Malaysia dollars as a gift.[38]

To the last, the Japanese government

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refused to accept legal responsibility forthe massacre or to carry out a survey ofthe deaths. The mass media in Japan didnot examine what had happened inSingapore and Malaya during the war. Itis no exaggeration to say that theJapanese media at that time showed noinclination to confront Japan’s war crimesor war responsibility.

Publications in the 1970s

There were, however, some honestresponses in subsequent years. In 1967Professor Ienaga Saburo, famous for hishistory textbook lawsuit against theJapanese government, published a bookentitled The Pacific War that dealt withthe Singapore Massacre.[39] In 1970, themonthly journal Chugoku [China]published a feature called, “Blood Debt:Chinese Massacre in Singapore”, the firstextended treatment in Japan of theSingapore Massacre.[40] The piece wasmostly written by Professor TanakaHiroshi.

The 1970s also saw publication ofreminiscences by some of those directlyinvolved in the Massacre, and by peoplewho witnessed or heard about it,including Nihon Kempei Seishi [TheOfficial History of the JapaneseKempeitai] by the Zenkoku KenkyukaiRengokai [Joint Association of NationalKempei Veterans],[41] Kempei by OtaniKeijiro, and Hiroku Shonan KakyoShukusei Jiken [Secret Memoir ofSingapore Overseas Chinese Purification]by Onishi Satoru. Onishi Satoru was aKempeitai section commander who tookpart in the Massacre. In his book Onishi

admitted that the “purification” was aserious crime against humanity, but heclaimed that the number of victims wasactually around 1,000.[42] Otani’s bookseverely criticizes the Japanese military,denouncing the “purification” as an act oftyranny and criticizing it from a humanperspective.[43]

Although veterans’ associations usuallyjustify or deny that inhuman acts hadtaken place, the Joint Association ofNational Kempei Veterans has admittedthat the massacre was an inhumanact.[44] A few writers who were stationedor visited Singapore during the war havealso published memoirs in which theyrecord what they had heard about theSingapore Massacre.[45] On the whole,nobody denied that the Japanese purge inSingapore was an atrocity againsthumanity and historians began to payattention to the episode. However, itfailed to catch the attention of theJapanese people.

Research in the 1980s and 1990s

The situation changed in 1982, when theMinistry of Education ordered thedeletion of passages relating to Japanesewartime atrocities in Asia from schooltextbooks, and instructed textbookwriters to replace the term “aggression”with less emotive terms, such as“advance”.[46] This decision was severelycriticized both at home and abroad, and agrowing number of historians began toconduct research into Japaneseatrocities, including the NanjingMassacre.[47]

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In 1984, while the textbook controversycontinued, a bulky book called MalayanChinese Resistance to Japan 1937-1945:Selected Source Materials was publishedin Singapore. Sections of this volumewere translated into Japanese in 1986under the title Nihongun Senryoka noSingapore [Singapore under JapaneseOccupation], allowing Japanese to read intheir own language Singaporeantestimony concerning wartimeevents.[48] The main translator wasProfessor Tanaka Hiroshi, mentionedearlier as the author of a magazinearticle on the Singapore Massacre.

Another significant publication was a1987 booklet by Takashima Nobuyoshi,then a high school teacher and now aprofessor at Ryukyu University, entitledTabi Shiyo Tonan-Ajia E [Let’s travel toSoutheast Asia].[49] Based oninformation Takashima collected duringrepeated visits to Malaysia and Singaporebeginning in the early 1980s, the bookletdiscussed atrocities and provided detailsof the “Memorial to the Civilian Victimsof the Japanese Occupation” and of anexhibition of victim mementos at the SunYat-sen Villa. The volume served as aguidebook for Japanese wishing tounderstand wartime events or visit sitesof Japanese atrocities. In 1983 he beganorganising study tours to historical sitesrelated to Japanese Occupation and toplaces where massacres occurred inMalaysia and Singapore.

In 1987, I located official militarydocuments in the Library of the NationalInstitute for Defense Studies, DefenseAgency that included operational orders

and official diaries related to themassacre of Chinese in Negri Sembilanand Malacca in 1942. Newspapersthroughout Japan reported thesefindings, the first time that publicattention focused on the killings inMalaya.[50] The documents revealed thattroops from Hiroshima had been involvedin atrocities in Negri Sembilan and thisinformation came as a major shock to thepeople of Hiroshima, who had thoughtthemselves as victims of the atomic bomband had never imagined that their fathersor husbands had been involved in themassacres in Malaya.[51]

In 1988, several citizen groups jointlyinvited Chinese survivors from Malaysiato visit Japan, and staged meetings whereJapanese citizens listened to theirtestimony. A book that included thesestatements was published in 1989. [52]Also in 1988, the Negri Sembilan ChineseAssembly Hall published a book inChinese called Collected Materials ofSuffering of Chinese in Negeri Sembilanduring the Japanese Occupation, and thefollowing year Professor Takashima and Ipublished a Japanese translation of thisvolume.[53] Another source ofinformation was the history textbookused in Singapore by students in juniorhigh school, Social and Economic Historyof Modern Singapore 2, which wastranslated into Japanese in 1988. Thematerial concerning the occupationattracted the attention of Japanesereaders, particularly teachers andresearchers.[54]

As might be expected, there was abacklash to these initiatives. It was


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claimed that Japanese troops killed onlyguerrillas and their supporters, and thatthe number was much smaller thanreported. Responding to theseallegations, I published a book in 1992entitled Kakyo Gyakusatu: NihongunShihaika no Mare Hanto [ChineseMassacres: The Malay Peninsula underJapanese Occupation][55] thatsubstantiated in detail the activities ofthe Japanese military in Negri Sembilanduring March 1942, when severalthousand Chinese were massacred. Sincethen there has been no rebuttal by thosewho would not concede the massacres inMalaya apart from personal attacks andcontesting of trifling details that have noeffect on the central argument.[56]

In 1996, the Singapore Heritage Society’sbook, SYONAN: Singapore under theJapanese, 1942-1945 was translated intoJapanese.[57] This book comprehensivelyintroduced Japanese readers to the livingconditions and suffering of Singaporeansunder the Japanese occupation. Furtherinformation appeared in a book Ipublished entitled, Sabakareta SensoHanzai: Igirisu no Tainichi SenpanSaiban [Tried War Crimes; British WarCrimes Trials of Japanese]. This volumecontains an account of the SingaporeMassacre based on British, Chinese andJapanese documents.[58]

The Rightist Backlash and the SchoolTextbook Issue Since 2000

In the 1990s, some Japanese high schoolhistory textbooks began to provideinformation on the massacres inSingapore and Malaya, although they

devoted only one or two lines to theevents. More recently, chauvinisticcampaigns and sentiment have becomerampant in Japan. A number of ultra rightbooks now claim that the NanjingMassacre is a fabrication, that theJapanese military took good care ofcomfort women, and so on. Underpressure from the Ministry of Education,the Liberal Democratic Party, and otherneo-nationalists, statements in schooltextbooks about Japanese atrocities havebecome less common, and the Minister ofEducation said in 2004 that it wasdesirable that descriptions of Japaneseatrocities be dropped.[59] Moreover,teachers who explain Japaneseaggression and army atrocities are oftensubjected to criticism by local officials ormunicipal education boards.

Descriptions of the Singapore massacrein high school history textbooks areparticularly rare. According to researchin the 1990s, just 8 out of a total of 26textbooks mentioned the event.[60] Themost widely used textbook states simplythat “atrocities took place in Singaporeand elsewhere”.[61] Other textbooks saythat the Japanese army massacred tens ofthousands of overseas Chinese inSingapore and Malaya, but even thesedescriptions are limited to one or twolines, and give no details. Anyone whodared set a question about the atrocitiesfor a university entrance examinationcould expect attacks not only from right-wingers but also from MPs belonging tothe ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

The situation is similar with regard tojunior high school history textbooks. In


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the eight textbooks approved by theMinistry of Education in April 2005 foruse from 2006, descriptions of Koreanforced labor have all but disappeared, ashas the term “comfort women”. Overall,references to Japanese aggression andatrocities have been drastically reducedunder pressure from the Ministry ofEducation, the Liberal Democratic Party,and the right-leaning mass media. If thecurrent ultra-nationalistic trendcontinues, it seems likely that even thefew descriptions of the Singaporemassacre that do exist will be eliminated.

Civilian War Memorial in WarMemorial Park, Singapore

Conclusion

Work by Singaporean and otherresearchers has produced valuableinformation about the Singaporemassacre, yet it seems to me that there isroom for further research. In particular,what seems lacking is collation ofdocuments in English, Chinese, andJapanese. While Singapore citizens haveaccounts of the Massacre and thesuffering caused by the Japaneseoccupation, students in Japan are unableto imagine what happened in Singaporeand Malaya during the JapaneseOccupation. Few Japanese students haveany opportunity to learn about theOccupation, and the many Japanese whovisit Singapore each year generally areunaware of the killings or of the wartimesuffering of Singaporeans. It is difficult toredress the balance, but if Japan is toachieve full reconciliation with the peopleof Singapore and other Southeast Asiancountries and gain their trust, steps inthe right direction must be taken.

Hayashi Hirofumi is professor of politicsat Kanto-Gakuin University and the Co-Director of the Center for Research andDocumentation on Japan’s WarResponsibility. His books includeOkinawasen to Minshu (The Battle ofOkinawa and the People), Otsuki Shoten,2001 and Ianfu, Senji Seiboryoku noJittai: Chugoku, Tonan-Ajia, Taiheiyo Hen(The Comfort Women and WartimeSexual Violence: China, Southeast Asiaand the Pacific), Ryokufu Shuppan, 2000.He wrote this article for The Asia-PacificJournal.

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Recommended citation: HayashiHirofumi, “The Battle of Singapore, theMassacre of Chinese and Understandingof the Issue in Postwar Japan” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 28-4-09, July 13,2009.

See also, Hayashi Hirofumi,“Government, the Military and Businessin Japan’s Wartime Comfort WomanSystem,” The Asia-Pacific Journal.

NOTES

[a] Kakyō Shukusei (華僑粛正)

[b] Dai Kenshō (大検証)

[c] Sook Ching (肃清- Purge)

[1] The Japanese term “Shukusei” wasused by the Japanese Army at the time. Inthe Chinese community of Singapore it isusually called “Sook Ching” (mandarin“Suqing”).

[2] For details on the decision-making inthe 25th Army, see Hayashi Hirofumi,Sabakareta Sensō Hanzai [Tried WarCrimes: British War Crimes Trials ofJapanese](Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998)and ‘Shingaporu Kakyō Shukusei[Massacre of Chinese in Singapore]’Nature-People-Society: Science and theHumanities, Kantō-Gakuin University, No.40, Jan. 2006.

[3] Kawamura’s diary is preserved in the

National Archives of the UK in London.

[4] This document is preserved in theLibrary of the National Institute forDefense Studies [LNIDS], DefenseAgency, Tokyo.

[5] For example, Singapore HeritageSociety, Syonan: Singapore under theJapanese 1942-1945 (Singapore:Singapore Heritage Society, 1992),National Archives of Singapore, TheJapanese Occupation, 1942-1945(Singapore: Times, 1996), p. 72.

[6] For example, National Archives ofSingapore, The Japanese Occupation,1942-1945, p. 68.

[7] The operational order of the 25thArmy and the order of the 5th Divisiondated 21 February 1942 in LNIDS.

[8] In this trial seven officers wereprosecuted. Among them two weresentenced to death, while other five weresentenced to imprisonment for life. Thisis one of most famous war crimes trialsheld by the British in Singapore.

[9 ] “Kakyō Kōsaku J i ssh i Yōryō[ Implementa t ion Gu idance forManipulating Overseas Chinese]” inLNIDS.

[10] Onishi Satoru, Hiroku Shonan KakyoShukusei Jiken [Secret Memoir OverseasChinese Massacre in Singapore] (Tokyo:Kongo Shuppan, 1977), p. 69 and p. 78.

[11] This claim is prevalent amongresearchers in Japan. It is believed evenby those who are not right-wingers. I

http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Hirofumi/2332http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Hirofumi/2332http://japanfocus.org/-Hayashi-Hirofumi/2332file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref2file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref3file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref4file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref5file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref6file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref7file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref8file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref9file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref10file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref11

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have not clarified who put forward thisreason for first time.

[12] The Dalforce file in “British MilitaryAdministration, Chinese Affairs,1945-1946” (National Archives ofSingapore).

[13] Numerous books contain suchassertions, particularly books in Chinese.

[14] Rikujo Jieitai Kanbu Gakko [GroundStaff College, Ground Self-DefenseForce], Mare Sakusen [The MalayCampaign] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1996),pp. 240-1.

[15] Ōnishi, Hiroku Shonan KakyōShukusei Jiken, pp. 87-8.

[16] Furyo Kankei Chōsa Chuō Iinkai[Central Board of Inquiry on POWs],“Shingaporu ni okeru Kakyō ShodanJōkyō Chōsho” [Record of Investigationon the Execution of Overseas Chinese inSingapore], 23 Oct. 1945 (Reprinted inNagai Hitoshi (ed.), Sensō Hanzai ChōsaShiryō [Documents on War CrimesInvestigation] (Tokyo: Higashi Shuppan,1995).

[17] See Hayashi Hirofumi, SabakaretaSenso Hanzai, p. 224.

[18] Otani Keijiro, Kenpei [The MilitaryPolice] (Tokyo: Shin-Jinbutsu Oraisha,1973), p. 189.

[19] Ōnishi, Hiroku Shonan KakyōShukusei Jiken, p. 86.

[20] The intelligence files on Tsuji arepreserved in Boxes 457 and 458,

Personal Files of the InvestigativeRecords Repository, Record Group 319(The Army Staff), US National Archivesand Records Administration.

[21] Asada Kyoji and Kobayashi Hideo(eds.), Nihon Teikokushugi no ManshuShihai [Administration of Manchuria bythe Japanese Imperialism] (Tokyo: Jicho-Sha, 1986), p. 180.

[22] See Ōnishi, Hiroku Shonan KakyōShukusei Jiken, pp. 88-92.

[23] Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyusho Senshi-bu[Military History Department, NationalDefense College, Defense Agency],Hokushi no Chian-sen, Part 1 [SecurityOperation in North China] (Tokyo:Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1968), pp. 114-30.

[24] See Chalmers Johnson, PeasantNationalism and Communist Power. TheEmergence of Revolutionary China,1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1962), pp. 55-58; Yung-fa Chen,Making Revolution: The CommunistMovement in Eastern and Central China,1937-1945 (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1986), pp. 98-116; Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz andMark Selden, Chinese Village, SocialistState (New Haven: Yale University Press,1991), pp. 29-51.

[25] Kojima Jo, Shisetu YamashitaTomoyuki [Historical Narrat iveYamashita Tomoyuki] (Tokyo: BungeiShunjusha, 1969), p. 325. See also YukiTanaka, “Last Words of the Tiger ofMalaya, General Yamashita Tomoyuki,”The Asia-Pacific Journal, September 22,

file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref12file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref13file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref14file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref15file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref16file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref17file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref18file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref19file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref20file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref21file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref22file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref23file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref24file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Nick/Desktop/hayashi.massacre.2.clean.htm#_ednref25http://japanfocus.org/-Yuki-TANAKA/1753http://japanfocus.org/-Yuki-TANAKA/1753

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2005.

[26] Kawamura’s diary. See also Hayashi,Sabakareta Senso Hanzai, p. 220.

[27] See Akashi Yoji, “Watanabe Gunsei”[Military Administration by Watanabe], inAkashi Yoji (ed.), Nihon Senryōka noEiryo Mare Shingaporu [Malaya andS ingapore under the JapaneseOccupation, 1941-45] (Tokyo: IwanamiShoten, 2001).

[28] Kawamura Saburo, Jusan Kaidan woNoboru [Walking up Thirteen Steps ofStairs] (Tokyo: Ato Shobo, 1952).

[29] See Hayashi Hirofumi, BC-kyuSenpan Saiban [Class B & C War CrimesTrials] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005),ch. 6.

[30] FO371/105435(National Archives,UK).

[31] He was released in 1957.

[32] Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3 Nov. 1966.

[33] Asahi Shimbun, 20 Sept. 1967.


[35] These documents are open to thepublic at the Diplomatic Record Office ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[36] See footnote no.14.


[38] Hara Fujio, “Mareishia, Shingaporuno Baishō Mondai” [Reparation Problemwith Singapore and Malaysia], Sensō

Sekinin Kenkyu [The Report on Japan’sWar Responsibility], No. 10, Dec. 1995.

[39] Ienaga Saburō, Taiheiyō Sensō [ThePacific War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,1967).

[40] “Kessai: Shingaporu no ChugokujinGyakusatsu Jiken” [Blood Debt: ChineseMassacre in Singapore], in Chugoku[China], vol. 76 (Mar. 1970).

[41] Tokyo: Private Press, 1976.

[42] Ōnishi, Hiroku Shonan KakyōShukusei Jiken, pp. 93-7.

[43] Otani Keijirō, Kempei, p. 189.

[44] Zenkoku Kenyukai Rengōkai, NihonKempei Seishi, p. 979.

[45] For example, Terasaki Hiroshi,Sensō no Yokogao [Profile of the War](Tokyo: Taihei Shuppan, 1974), NakajimaKenzo, Kaisō no Bungaku [Literature ofRecollection], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Heibonsha,1977), Omata Yukio, Zoku Shinryaku[Sequel: Aggression] (Tokyo: TokumaShoten, 1982), and so on.

[46] See Rekishigaku Kenkyukai [TheHistorical Science Society of Japan],Rekishika wa naze Shinryaku nikodawaruka [Why Historians adhere toAggression] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1982).

[47] Composed of historians andjournalists, Nankin Jiken Chōsa KenkyuKai [The Society for the Study of NankingMassacre] was established in 1984. Itremains active, although the scope ofresearch has been extended to Japanese

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atrocities in China and the rest ofSoutheast Asia.

[48] Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1986.

[49] Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1987.

[50] This article was prepared by theKyodo News Service and appeared innewspapers on 8 Dec. 1987.

[51] As mentioned before, the 5thDivision conducted purges throughoutthe Malay Peninsular except Johor. Theheadquarters of the Division in peacetimewas situated in Hiroshima and soldierswere conscripted in Hiroshima andneighboring prefectures.

[52] Sensō Giseisha wo Kokoro niKizamukai [Society for Keeping WarVictims in our Heart], Nihongun noMaresia Jumin Gyakusatu [The Massacresof Malaysian Local Population by theJapanese Mil itary] (Osaka: TohoShuppan, 1989).

[53] Originally published in 1988. TheJapanese translation was as follows:Takashima Nobuyoshi & HayashiHirofumi (eds.), Maraya no Nihongun[The Japanese Army in Malaya] (Tokyo:Aoki Shoten, 1989).

[54] Ishiwata Nobuo and Masuo Keizo(eds.), Gaikoku no Kyōkasho no nakanoNihon to Nihonjin [Japan and Japanese in

a Foreign Textbook] (Tokyo: Ikkosha,1988).

[55] Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1992. Forarguments of right-wingers, see Chapter8 of this book.[56] See, for example, two articles byHata Ikuhiko in the journal Seiron,August and Oct. 1992 and ProfessorTakashima’s and my responses in thesame journal in Sept. and Nov. 1992.

[57] Tokyo: Gaifusha, 1996.

[58] Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998.

[59] See Hayashi Hirofumi, “Nihon noHaigaiteki Nashonarizumu wa Naze Taitōshitaka” [Why Japanese ChauvinisticNationalism has gained strength] inVAWW-NET Japan (ed.), Kesareta Sabaki:NHK Bangumi Kaihen to Seiji KainyuJiken [Deleted Judgment: Interpolation of the NHK TV Program and the Politicians’Intervention] (Tokyo: Gaifusha, 2005).

[60] Zenkoku Rekishi Kyōiku KenkyuKyōgikai [The National Council forHistory Education] (ed.), Nihonshi Yōgo-shu [Lexicon of the Japanese HistoryTextbook] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shoten,2000), p. 291.

[61] Shōsetsu Nihonshi [The Details ofJapanese History] (Tokyo: YamakawaShoten, 2001), p. 332.
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