Social Media Uprising in

the Chinese-speaking

World

Editor:

Ip Iam-Chong is a senior teaching fellow in the Department of Cultural Studies at

Lingnan University and editor and co-founder of inmediahk.net.

Authors:

Chang Teck-Peng is Editor-in-Chief of independent Chinese news portal Merdeka

Review (merdekareview.com).

Hu Yong is an associate professor at Peking University's School of Journalism and

Communication.

Ip Iam-Chong

Lam Oi-Wan is editor and co-founder of inmediahk.net and Northeast Asia Editor for

Global Voices Online (globalvoicesonline.org).

Liu Shih-Ding is an associate professor in the Department of Communication at

University of Macau.

Jack Qiu Linchuan is an assistant professor in the Department of Journalism and

Communication at Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Portnoy Zheng is a media activist, executive committee member of media watchdog

group Campaign for Media Reform, and director of Project Lingua with Global

Voices Online (globalvoicesonline.org).

Acknowledgement

Social Media Uprising in Chinese-speaking World is the result of a project

coordinated by Hong Kong In-Media, a registered association in Hong Kong and a

non-commercial entity. The organization supports the development of independent

media in Hong Kong and the Chinese-speaking world through direct sponsorship,

education and research. Currently, it finances the operation of www.inmediahk.net

and www.interlocals.net. The revenue generated from this book will be allocated for

future researches and publications.

Copyrights

English web version first published in September 2011

By Hong Kong In-Media

9F 365 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong

Some rights reserved under Creative Commons:

Non-commercial and Share Alike

Another Chinese printed version of this book has been published in July 2011

By UP publication in Hong Kong

Contents

Preface ........................................................................................................................... 7

Editor's Note ................................................................................................................ 10

China: The Internet and Grassroots Mobilization ........................................................ 16

Hong Kong: A New Page for Affective Mobilization ................................................. 25

Macao: Post-colonial Struggle against the Conservative Political Culture ................. 29

Taiwan: Beyond Blue-Green Antagonism ................................................................... 35

Malaysia: The Flame of Reformasi on the Internet ..................................................... 39

Preface

Jack Qiu Linchuan

Social media has become an integral part of our lives, personal or public, for good or

for bad, in the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world. Yet, most books dealing

with social media and its sociopolitical dimensions tend to be written by authors

based in western societies, writing from western perspectives: Howard Rheingold,

Cass Sunstein, Clay Shirky, Evgeny Morozov. They publish great work, but what

about Asian experiences with social media and mobilization? Are western writings

sufficient in describing and explaining what is going on in the Asian Pacific?

This book addresses the first question in an unprecedented manner. It gives a clear

answer to the second question, which is, no. By putting together rich materials from

Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and mainland China, this book, the first of its

kind, shows not only how Asian experiences are collectively unique. The book

succeeds in demonstrating how the convergence of recent Web 2.0 technologies with

existing social causes takes shape in the particular contexts of each society, in

drawing from specific local and regional repertoires of political culture, energizing

ongoing civil society movements and responding to urgent needs for action from the

bottom up. In so doing, grassroots mobilization facilitated by social media is

redefining the trajectories of history, both in the region and on a broader level.

Globally speaking, netizens in the Asia-Pacific region have been vanguards in the

evolution of Internet-based social mobilization. Long before the Twitter Revolution of

2009, the flames of the 1998 Reformasi movement swept across Malaysia and beyond

to support Anwar Ibrahim after his dismissal from office. Before Mubarak lost

power in 2011, protesters in The Philippines, equipped with mobile phones and SMS,

brought down the Estrada presidency in 2001. Two decades before Obama joined

Twitter, activists across Southeast Asia were using mailing lists to join the 1989

Tiananmen pro-democracy movement.

The Asian story began to unfold years before Julian Assange became a household

name in the West; when WikiLeaks first appeared in 2006, it claimed that overseas

Chinese dissidents were the most prominent among its founders and that “our primary

interests are oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet bloc, sub-Saharan Africa

and the Middle East, but we also expect to be of assistance to those in the West”

(AFP).

Measured in Internet time, Web-based mobilization in Asia has more than a long

history. In recent years, it has also become very popular and extremely colorful along

with the spread of social media. Newer platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and

YouTube, are more influential in other parts of the world than is often understood.

Older platforms have developed uniquely Asian characteristics as a result of language

differences, such as campus BBSes in Taiwan, Cantonese-language Internet radio in

Hong Kong, or online forums in Macao. Further still, there are the peculiar species of

social media in the dark shadows behind China’s “Great Firewall” such as Sina

Weibo, Renren, and Youku, which, respectively, are imitations of Twitter, Facebook

and YouTube, but in technical aspects are designed to try and minimize use of their

platforms in political mobilization.

Despite their idiosyncrasies, and despite attempts of political suppression and

commercial marginalization, social media as analyzed in all chapters of this volume

have stood out as new platforms of mobilization. Drawing on existing resources of

social movements in each society, the particular causes in social networking service

(SNS) mobilization vary from the protection of landmarks to environmental

movements to freedom of speech, from labor politics to gender equality, to the

exposure of official corruption. The multiplicity of these causes and their sustained

growth, in both number and strength, signify the coming of a new era in which

traditional authorities and their mass-mediated communication channels can no longer

dominate discussions of public policy and the shaping of collective memory,

especially among disenfranchised social groups such as youth, migrants, ethnic

minorities, and dissidents of every kind.

But how effective is the power of social media not only in the spontaneous

mobilization of netizens, but also in organizing them democratically to enable

sustained social change? Does citizen journalism really offer a solution to the lack of

reasoned responses in online deliberation? What about “regime change”? Is that

feasible, or even desirable, in these Asian societies?

Authors in this edited volume are all leading experts in their respective fields,

individuals who have observed and, in many cases, participated in social media-based

mobilization in their own territories and larger social movements in the Asian Pacific.

They offer accounts that are richly descriptive yet ideologically open, historically

optimistic yet empirically cautious. After all, their analyses focus on alternative

modes of mobilization that are by, for, and of the grassroots of society; approaches to

participation in society which differ fundamentally from institutionalized party

politics dictated by senior politicians or sponsored by business elites.

The greatest benefit this volume brings is that it allows readers to first appreciate the

singularity of each society and key incidents of mobilization in it, and then compare

them across space and across time, not only with each other but also with parallel

developments in other world regions. This is a truly exciting task that is long overdue.

I am, therefore, most delighted to see the publication of this excellent volume, which

should be of interest to anyone who would wishes to learn about social media and the

democratic future of Asia, and of the entire human race. Enjoy!

Editor's Note

Ip Iam-Chong (Translated by Lee Chi-Leung)

The title of this book might evoke associations with social movement, radical action

or even revolution; contemporary society's concern with social mobilization and its

proliferation of related topics stem from, however paradoxically, the relative stability

in postwar societies and world politics. In other words, our concern with why and how

people are “moved” into action arises precisely from the fact that we have entered an

era wherein mass mobilization has been diminished.

Whereas past revolutionaries saw people's uprisings amidst the political upheavals of

19th century Europe as historically inevitable, conservatives were disinclined to study

the human agency in these movements as they were busy with discrediting and

keeping down political opposition and class struggles. As the 20th century unfolded,

the world was still caught up in the massive war mobilizations of WWI and WWII,

when “social mobilization” was considered not so much an issue but rather normal.

The social science discipline in the postwar West also began to take interest in “social

mobilization" during the height of the Cold War between the 1950-1960s. The

relatively stable social condition of the time allowed for retrospection on German

fascism and a distant look into the political campaigns of communist counterparts on

the other end of the Cold War. Westerners, who regarded themselves as free,

democratic, rational and sober, were curious and at the same time fearful of those

strange faces, wondering why they could have plunged into irrational collective

behaviors, which was less of an issue for countries with extensive military and

political mobilizations in postwar times. We are also familiar with the Maoist era in

mainland China during which political campaigns defined everyday life through

continuous mobilization led by a self-proclaimed revolutionary regime. “Social

mobilization” was not considered a problem. When Mao Zedong said, “To rebel is

justified”, it was those who did not rebel that became the problem.

The sense of stability in the postwar West had its material basis in prosperity, yet it

was also enticed with delicate political absorption, social control and disciplinary

measures. In more concrete terms, the mainstay of western modernity had been a

coordination of the free, democratic order with a range of professional, intricate

knowledge-power mechanisms from education, social work, to psychological

counseling and treatment of mental illness. The counterculture, antiwar movements,

student riots and new social movements that came about in 1960-1970s thus shocked

the West by large. This explains the quest for theoretical accounts of youth

engagement with radicalism in both thinking and praxis—as manifested in their

lashing out at institutions, their inventive forms of organizational rationalities, and

their distrust of elitist politics and social governance, as well as the cultural and

economic rule of capitalism. In other words, radicalism found its successors in

neo-anarchism, European communism and autonomism, even though traditional leftist

revolutionary rhetoric and theories had been subsiding or marginalized. At the same

time, related research such as that into the sociology of social movements also

emerged in British and American mainstream academia.

Compared with the West, interest in social mobilization in the communist world is

more often tied with political and value judgments. Although totalitarian measures of

terror and political mobilization in Soviet East Europe had waned with the death of

Stalin, an oppressive sociopolitical order without ideological appeal was perpetuated

by technocrats under the unitary rule of the Communist Party. With the close of

WWII, resistance movements swept across Eastern Europe, posing threats to the

Soviet and Warsaw Pact structures, which gradually culminated as the intellectual

movements and resistance movements of the 1970s. For instance, Vaclav Havel

initiated the Charter 77 petition in Czechoslovakia, and in Poland, Adam Michnik was

actively engaged in Solidarity (Independent Self-governing Trade Union "Solidarity").

At the time, people and civil society began exploring forms of post-totalitarianism

resistance and self-protection to check state power, conjuring a “self-limiting

movement”, not one aimed at overthrowing regimes. These efforts paved the way to

the widespread post-1989 political turbulence and eventually brought down the Soviet

Union and communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The series of historical events have

prompted an interest in the long-term effects of social mobilization.

With the death of Mao Zedong and the fall of Gang of Four, China witnessed a

general disillusionment with revolutionary ideology. Deng Xiaoping, who headed

intellectuals, rusticated youth and technocrats formerly victimized in political

campaigns of Maoist era, gradually rebuilt the political and societal order of Reform

and Opening. That order, however, was a contested one. The Beijing Spring period

between the end of 1970s and early 1980s, and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy

movement not only exposed the oppressive tyranny of the Chinese Communist

dictatorship, but also the fragility of the Reform and Opening order. The 1989

crackdown halted the decade-long discussions of democratic political reform and

transitions from across sectors, within and without institutions. The emerging civil

society, non-violent resistance and “rights-defending movement” were subsequently

forced to exist either without any institutional affiliation, underground or overseas.

Yet, capitalist development driven by state power has escalated into the 1990s and

delivered a “flourishing age” packaged by the Chinese Communist Party under the

political engineering project of Xiaokang Society. A new CCP-controlled political

and economic power bloc was also formed. Although there have been numerous

regional confrontations (or the so-called “mass incidents”), economic and social life

in China appears similar to or even more stable than that of any other capitalist

countries under the self-promoted image of the “China Model”.

Concern with social mobilization and related discussions, albeit different in approach,

could be read as a form of self-reflective mediation which calls into question the

stable order in which we live. From a traditional Marxist perspective, the problem of

social mobilization may displace revolutionary discourses of class struggle; in terms

of questioning and subverting the “usual state of affairs” in everyday life, it

nevertheless enables proliferation of previously unknown collective energy and

subjects which are more inclusive and varied in political nature. The new problems

may not bring about hope for revolution or provide a concrete road map, but they do

address two important aspects of remaking a society's “usual state of affairs”: Firstly,

the emergence of new social movements or political organizations—or, more

precisely, new rationalities and action logic—as seen in new social movements under

western capitalism and resistant civil society organizations under post-totalitarianism;

secondly, an onset of new political struggles which revisit or even reproduce the

power relations governing the society's “usual state of affairs”.

We could therefore examine Internet mobilization in a similar vein. “Social

mobilization” could be regarded as a phenomenon particular to the second half of

20th century; it is also a lexicon for an understanding of mass politics. In retrospect,

the term seems to have continuity with some characteristics and trends brought on by

the advent of the Internet and new media, particularly social media which have

emerged in recent years such as Facebook and Twitter. The relationship between

oppositional politics and the Internet became a focal point for media activism between

the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Internet has been further conflated and even

merged with the concept of “social mobilization” in recent media coverage of the

“Jasmine Revolution” in North Africa this year. Certainly, however, the relationship

between the two cannot be so quickly generalized, and the idea of this book originated

precisely with this contention. We have invited scholars and commentators from East

Asia and Southeast Asia regions surrounding Hong Kong for concrete analyses and

discussions of the complicated relationship between social media and social

mobilization in recent years. Although the task demands a composite analysis of

historical contexts for each of the cases, here are some of my general observations on

social mobilization and social media.

1. Interactions through social media can easily assemble a collective voice, creating

temporary virtual community and even non-organizational collective action in which

participants share their anger and sense of pleasure, or undergo what Ip Iam-Chong

and Lam Oi-Wan called “emotive explosion” in their article “Hong Kong: New Page

for Affective Mobilization”. In terms of social mobilization costs, social media

drastically lower the threshold for participation in social actions, as well as change the

structure of incentives. Based on the rationale of economics and freedom in the

postwar West, social movement researchers in the West had postulated the “free rider”

problem intrinsic in social mobilization as early as the 1970s. Since objectives in

social movements are public in nature, individuals who quest for gains tend to rely on

others' participation rather than their own. In this regard, the functional role of social

movement organizations is to overcome the problem of “free riding”. Multiple

selective incentives are to be created through organizational work so that participants

can gain exclusive satisfaction from the organization and their participation. Then

follows the question of whether social media are creating adequate selective

incentives. If so, the importance of social movement organizations in social

mobilization might actually decline, and yet this implies a host of other problems.

Even in social mobilizations which have been exceptionally rigorous and can at times

trigger explosive political consequences (e.g., officials stepping down or termination

of certain policies), the energy is not easy to channel into oppositional political

processes, including innovation of citizen and political organizations, as well as

policy and institutional reforms.

The Taiwanese experience as reported by Portnoy Zheng seems to provide us with

similar insights. In recent years, Taiwan has seen new topics of debate predominated

neither by the Blue nor Green camp (KMT and DPP). Social mobilizations initiated

by netizens without organizational affiliations have become more organized and

increasing in number. Certainly, there is a long way to go for a new political force to

form, and the scale of Taiwan's Blue/Green camp-predominated political landscape

has yet to be recreated. However, in examining how selective incentives in these

social mobilizations are linked and interacted (whether these mobilizations are made

via the Internet or not), or how different social action rationalities are linked, will

show us new directions for reflections on the matter.

2. Social mobilization may not guarantee any revolutionary or reform agenda to come,

but will, however, enter into certain political process. As Chang Teck-peng points out,

Malaysia's Internet-driven Reformasi originated with the reformist movement of 1998.

The movement might have subsided, but many activists have since taken part in

Internet media and formed a strong oppositional public domain online, which effected

significant change in the general election of 2008, with the opposition gaining

unprecedented success. As most writers observed, public opinion and mobilizations

on the net have not replaced social or political campaigns and organizations. Internet

mobilization, whether in the form of opposition media or social media networks, at

least maintains the public's political enthusiasm, or, in the terminology of social

movement studies, the awareness and effective involvement of political opportunities.

This is observable in the case studies of mainland China, Macao and Hong Kong.

In Hu Yong’s words, since 1989, the Chinese Communist Party has cracked down not

only on political opposition, but all civil organizations and forms of protest culture

have been wiped out as well. It was only with the rise of the Internet that freedom of

assembly (in more or less a virtual sense) has been partly realized, reviving protest

culture in China. In Macao, public opinion and mobilization online may not bring

substantial political and social reform, but have broken down and through the political

apathy which has continued from the time of colonial rule. In the case of Hong Kong,

we see an explosion of strong nativist sentiment which is becoming a collective force

for a new round of democratic movements.

The goal of this book is not to uncritically praise or romanticize “social mobilization”,

as political practice is as diverse as it is varied in political stances. In the broadest

sense, it is part of democratic struggle. Democracy here has long exceeded the

framework and institutional arrangement of formal democracy; it questions and

negotiates with the “usual state” of life and its implicit power relations. The basic aim

of this book is to capture the social dynamic as such.

Lastly, we would like to express our gratitude for Comite Catholique contre la Famin

et pourle Development (CCFD), an association based in France, for its continual

support of Hong Kong In-Media's study and translation projects related to

independent media development in the Chinese-speaking world. These publications

help us to reconsider the interaction between politics and new media, and facilitate

dialogue surrounding the development of civil society in different regions. Most of

the photographs which appear in this book were gathered through interpersonal

networks of inmediahk.net and were inserted by the editor at the later stage of

production. We would like to thank our friends in civil and independent media from

across Asia for their contribution.

China: The Internet and Grassroots Mobilization

Hu Yong (Translated by Yeung Wai-Ling)

Introduction

Social mobilization, as a concept in sociology, involves commitments and actions that

motivate members of a society to participate in order to bring about social changes.

These changes can be formal, leading to a change in law, or they can be informal,

resulting in an altered set of social norms. In contrast to social movements, social

mobilization is intermittent and transient by nature. As an integral part of a social

movement, however, social mobilization helps build a sense of solidarity, identity and

public awareness in support of a specific cause or set of causes. Social mobilization

can be legitimized by a political institution, including a government. It can also be

used to challenge the moral integrity of the authority and political legitimacy of an

institution. In short, social mobilization provides a means for a social movement to

achieve its goals. The mere presence of some forms of social mobilization is not

sufficient proof of the existence of a social movement; however, no social movement

can exist without some visible forms of social mobilization.

What is a social movement? It describes a purposeful, organized and institutionalized

collective action that has yet to be turned into a ritual. Charles Tilly defines a social

movement as a series of contentious performances, displays and activities through

which ordinary people make a collective claim (Tilly: 2004). Sidney Tarrow considers

a social movement as “a collective challenge launched with a common purpose and

on the foundation of social solidarity. It manifests itself as constant interactions

among elites, dissidents and the authority”. The targets of the challenge can be the

elites, the authority, other groups or even a cultural code. It involves actions such as

“establishing an organization, clarifying a concept, contacting and mobilizing

supporters, as well as promoting self-development and the construction of collective

identity among members” (Tarrow: 1994). Gary T. Marx and Doug McAdam describe

a social movement as a form of organized political activity launched by a less

influential group that is unable to pursue its goals through “appropriate political

channels” (Marx: 1994).

A social movement is a group action undertaken collectively by individuals or groups

who share a common purpose of promoting certain ideas or resisting some opposition

forces. Tom Postmes and Suzanne Brunsting use the “mode of participation” and the

“intensity of the action” as indicators for defining group actions (Postmes: 2002:

290-301).

In terms of the mode of participation, group actions can be classified as either

“individual” or “collective”, depending on the number of participants. The former (an

individual action) usually involves an individual taking action to demonstrate his/her

disobedience. In China, the most common ways for individuals to express civil

disobedience are petition visits and letters of complaint. The accumulative effects of

individuals’ pleas for justice can often lead to large-scale actions. The latter (a

collective action) involves a direct appeal to the general public to encourage mass

demonstration and collective petitioning. The Weng’an (Note 1) mass protest and the

riot at Tonghua Steel (Note 2) are two of the best examples.

In terms of intensity, group actions can be “persuasive” or “antagonistic”. Persuasive

group actions, which include collecting signatures, lobbying and petitioning, aim to

convince others to accept certain viewpoints. Antagonistic group actions, on the

contrary, involve the adoption of more extreme measures such as demonstrations,

blockades and subversion, in direct confrontation with one’s opponents.

These two indicators allow social mobilization to be defined in terms of four

behavioral patterns:

- Individual persuasive actions (writing letters of complaint)

- Individual antagonistic actions (self-immolation)

- Collective persuasive actions (petitioning)

- Collective antagonistic actions (strikes and riots)

The Internet can act both as initiator and supporter for each of these four behavioral

patterns. For example, the Internet can be used to initiate such persuasive actions as

online signatures, lobbies, petitions and acts of disobedience (these actions can be

both individual and collective). It can also be used to encourage the public to launch

boycotts or even cyber-attacks. In real-life group actions, however, the Internet often

only plays a supporting role. It is generally used to disseminate information, to

mobilize mass participation and, subsequently, to intensify the pressure which group

actions can exert on society. Take Twitter as an example. Many people gave credit to

Twitter for initiating group actions during the 2009 Iranian presidential election. In

reality, however, Twitter played little more than a supporting role. The decision of

Iran’s reformist leaders to call for a demonstration was communicated to their

supporters through a variety of channels. There was no evidence to show that

demonstrators in Iran organized their demonstrations primarily through Twitter.

Twitter, as a public platform, does not make for a very effective means of action

planning because governments such as the one in Iran can easily access an organizer’s

“tweets”. In situations such as Iran in 2009, the Internet was just one of many

communication tools used in mobilization.

This paper intends to illustrate how Chinese people make use of both initiator and

supporter functions of the Internet to engage in persuasive and antagonistic actions,

both individually and collectively.

Social mobilization prior to the age of the Internet

The Communist Party of China (CPC) is famous for its ability to engage in social

mobilization. The Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) prior to 1949 was, in a

sense, only an elitist political organization; it had failed to extend its organization and

its influence to 85% of the population in rural farming villages. This was in stark

contrast to the CPC, which managed to extend its power as a political party to the vast

majority of grassroots members of rural communities, while at the same time it

carried out one of the most extensive political mobilization campaigns seen in recent

history.

From the time the CPC came to power in 1949 through until 1976, China continued to

sustain a political system based on traditional social infrastructure wherein the state

and the family merged into a single unit, leaving very little room for public space.

This political system, Leninist at the core, ensured that principles upheld by the

community were put into action in everyday life. At that time, the Party was the only

mechanism for social mobilization and the entire country would act on orders from

the Party and the government. The existence of public space under the “iron plate”

was out of the question. Civil society groups were completely absent. Individuals,

who had lost their right to free speech, became so powerless that they were unable to

organize themselves into autonomous social groups.

(The existence of public space under the “iron plate” was out of the question.)

The “iron plate” was gradually lifted after the introduction of the Reform and Open

Door Policy. This new policy made it possible for independent space to exist. Sun

Liping and others believed that China, both as a country and a society, had

experienced some forms of structural deconstruction; these changes had manifested

themselves in three areas: 1) the scope in which the Party and government exercised

control had been reduced. This change had affected the everyday lives of the general

public; 2) even in fields in which government control had prevailed, the intensity of

such control was weakening and control mechanisms had changed. In other words, the

strict control over the processes in which acts were performed had been replaced by a

more subtle control over matters of principles; 3) the method of control had become

increasingly standardized. These gradual steps towards standardization had replaced

the arbitrary exercise of power. Consequently, unscrupulous and extreme measures

were curbed.

Economic reforms which were founded on a market economy and diversified property

rights were directly responsible for the development of a relatively autonomous

society. This development also manifested in three areas: 1) society became a

relatively independent source of resources and opportunities; hence, individuals

became visibly less reliant on the state; 2) relatively independent social forces such as

the country’s entrepreneurs, sole proprietors and intellectuals, had emerged. Their

participation in economic and social lives at the community level became increasingly

noticeable; 3) civil societies became stronger and better organized. Intermediary

organizations such as trade unions, chambers of commerce, recreational and sports

associations, academic societies and associations, foundations, friendship groups and

clubs under various names began to appear (Sun: 1994).

These changes indicate that social mobilization is no longer monopolized by the Party

and the government. However, tight Party control over a prolonged period in the past

has considerably weakened Chinese society’s ability to mobilize and organize itself.

Some meaningful and spontaneous social organizations have emerged, but it is

inevitable that they continue to rely on connections and other resources from within

the Party. Meanwhile, there is continuous pressure from the Party to restrict the

growth of these organizations, originating in the Party’s fear that it will lose grip on a

society that is becoming increasingly diverse.

Let us take the labor unions as an example. Article 35 of the Constitution of the

People’s Republic of China ensures that Chinese nationals have freedom of

association. However, the freedom to form labor unions is not subject to legal

protection in China (Note 3). In fact, most spontaneously formed organizations which

have mushroomed throughout the country exist in a grey area, in an awkward position

that makes them neither legal nor illegal (Liu: 2004). According to China’s

“Registration of Social Organizations Ordinance”, an application to form an

organization shall be reviewed and approved by the government unit in charge of its

line of business and it shall be registered in accordance with terms stipulated in the

Ordinance. The registration authority can ban and confiscate properties from those

who form an organization without permission, those who conduct activities for

unregistered organizations and those who continue to carry out activities on behalf of

an organization after its registration has been revoked. If criminal activities are

detected, those who take part will be investigated for criminal responsibilities. If no

criminal activities are committed, those involved will be dealt administrative penalties.

Based on this Ordinance, the vast majority of nongovernmental organizations in

existence in China today ought to be banned and punished.

Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China also gives Chinese

nationals the right to join a procession to demonstrate. Journalist Li Datong recalled

instructions conveyed from Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in the mid 1980s, which

said, “we have to learn to govern in the midst of small to medium-scale disturbances”,

and “we have to be accustomed to govern in situations when there are mass

demonstrations and protests”. It is indeed an important conceptual change for the

second generation of Chinese political leaders to accept people’s right to protest and

to treat it as a social norm (Li: 2004). However, the “Legislation on Demonstrations

and Protests” adopted by the National People’s Congress in October 1989 was

practically “a legislation to ban demonstrations and protests”. It put an end not only to

street demonstrations but also to a culture of protest. Article 7 of the legislation

stipulates that “those who intend to stage a gathering, a demonstration and a protest

must lodge an application with relevant authorities and seek their approval in

accordance with this Legislation”. This move to impose a government approval

system on “gatherings, demonstrations and protests” has practically outlawed any

demonstration or gathering that is not approved by authorities in charge of public

security. Dissidents in China realize that all efforts to seek approval for staging a

protest will inevitably be futile.

It is only with the dawn of the Internet age that freedom of association can now be

partially achieved, and a culture of protest has also begun to show signs of revival.

With that, the rise of the Internet in China has been met with increasing control.

Nevertheless, the partially achieved freedom of association and the revived culture of

protest will continue to grow and to have an impact on many aspects of Chinese

society.

(Charter 08 is a call for constitutional reform by more than 300 Chinese Intellectuals.

This photo is taken by Ip Iam Chong)

The resistance of individuals

Many researchers tend to look at an increase in conflicts and protests as a by-product

of reforms in contemporary China. According to Frances Piven and Richard Cloward,

protests “do not appear in normal times. They appear in a period when large-scale

changes undermine political stability” (Piven: 1978: 386). This is not the case with

mass protests in China. The main reason, according to Cai Yongshun, is that

widespread socioeconomic changes and reform initiatives have become a threat to the

interests of a very large number of people (Cai: 2010). The condition has further

deteriorated since the 1990s. As Sun Liping puts it, some “important turning points

and reverse situations” (Sun: 2004: 78) have occurred since then. Consequently,

social conflicts and protests in China have taken on an upward trend in terms of

number, size and intensity. Some researchers have identified “the use of advanced

electronic technology as the most obvious new feature. It improves communications

among protesters. It also allows protesters to broadcast news about their predicament

to supporters with the help of the mass media and the international community.” It

generates new social relations, new ties and new common interests among people and

helps improve mobilization capacity of their social movements (Perry 2008).

The use of advanced electronic technology is closely associated to the process of

digitization in China. In just five years from 2005 to 2009, Internet coverage in China

has increased by more than two-fold. Mobile phone coverage has also doubled.

CNNIC pointed out in its “27th Report on the Development of the Internet” that the

number of netizens in China had reached 457 million by December 2010. In the same

year, mobile phone users in China had exceeded 800 million, while mobile Internet

users exceeded 300 million. These strong growth figures help open up a new space for

group actions and social mobilization.

(CNNIC pointed out in its “27th Report on the Development of the Internet” that the

number of netizens in China had reached 457 million by December 2010. )

Some researchers in the West have adopted a broad and more general classification

for social movements and collective actions which occur after the introduction of

Economic Reform and Open Door Policies in China. They are labeled “dissident

resistance” and “ordinary resistance” respectively (Pei: 2003: 45). Those who

participate in the former are intellectuals from both inside and outside of the Party

system. They intend to achieve some political objectives through the act of resistance.

Participants in the latter, however, are mainly members of the general public who

have recourse to specific issues that affect their own interests. The number of cases of

ordinary resistance has increased rapidly since the 1990s. The resistance of

individuals described in this section belongs to the latter category.

(Petitioners visit Beijing to voice out their grievances. Photo from Canyu.org)

[China chapter preview ends here]

Hong Kong: A New Page for Affective Mobilization

Lam Oi-Wan, Ip Iam-Chong (Translated by Lee Chi-Leung)

Foreword: Social movement and media

Since the 1970s, the main agency of social movements and civil society in Hong

Kong has been nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the intervention of social

workers. The more radical actions of social workers were influenced by Saul

Alinsky, with resident and neighbor groups actively organizing and integrating with

the social workers in community development. The anti-eviction movement of the

rooftop squatters in the early 1990s exemplifies the trend at the time. Social workers

with experience in community development would actively involve themselves in the

community, informing residents about predicaments they faced, organizing them for

acts or resistance through group sharing and discussion. However, the Establishment

was able to put pressure on social work organizations through budget cuts for

community development projects and demands for greater professionalization.

Gradually, the majority of social workers were co-opted by the Establishment, and

their aims shifted toward dissolving social conflicts. At the same time, many social

actions have been evolved into some sort of ritualistic “polite politics” (Ho, 2000).

There are numerous NGOs in Hong Kong, yet the majorities are social welfare,

poverty relief or professional organizations that are nonpolitical in nature. It is

estimated that the number of social movement organizations which are more

politically inclined - those which actively intervene in political and social issues, and

mobilize anti-Establishment voices - is limited at around three hundred. Most of these

are small in scale and short of social resources. They usually focus on their own

organizational matters and specific issues within their scope. On occasions when

certain cross-sector public issues draw their concern, they will form coalitions to issue

a position paper on the issue(s) and take collective action. In September 2002, the

Civil Human Rights Front was established specifically for the organizational work

involved with the annual 1 July rally. The coalition is comprised of over fifty member

groups, all of which are social movement groups and political parties working on

democracy, human rights and social justice issues. By coordinating the limited

resources and optimizing work share among member groups, the organizational

approach facilitates resource mobilization for the annual rally.

(The Civil Human Rights Front was established specifically for the organizational

work of the annual 1 July rally. Photo taken from CHRF’s Facebook account.)

The 1990s also witnessed the emergence in Hong Kong of new social movement

agendas in the field of gender and sexuality politics, human rights and environmental

protection. These campaigns emphasize identification with certain values and rely to a

larger degree on actions which attract the attention of mainstream media that allows

them to appeal for public support. For instance, in March 1994, a series of mobilized

actions and interactions with the Legislation in support of lawmaker Christine Loh's

“New Territories Land (Exemption) Ordinance” brought the question of women’s

rights in the New Territories into public view. At the same time, media activism has

taken root locallyl. Greater numbers of social organizations have learned how to

prepare news releases, feeding reporters with related information and planning media

strategy for their campaigns. Contentious activism was largely replaced by a form of

media public relations.

Interaction between civil society and the mainstream media as such has a considerable

effect. Despite the fact that over 70% of news sources comes from institutional

channels, there are numerous newspapers and magazines in print for a small place like

Hong Kong. Their positioning in the opinion market along with professional

guidelines of balanced coverage ensure that positions from different organizations are

represented. Reporters sometimes even invite representatives of NGOs to comment on

current affairs. For instance, most newspapers will ask the Hong Kong Confederation

of Trade Unions (HKCTU) to respond to labor policy. There are, however,

commentators who have pointed out that civil society organizations like these are

restricted in many ways. Namely, they tend to be depoliticized and focused only on

their own agenda, incapable of consolidating as a political force which could bring

changes to public policies.（Lam and Tong 2007; Ma 2009）

At the same time, interaction between civil society and media has long been a subject

of debate within social movements. There have been many rallies which have ended

with physical confrontations outside the Liaison Office of the Central People's

Government in the Hong Kong SAR since 1989, and tension has always been present

among student movement activists—between those who opt for the “showbiz”

approach and those who endorse the “movement subject” approach. As mainstream

commercial media has become increasingly self-censored after the 1 July rally of

2004, social movement participants began to reflect upon their relation with the

mainstream media. Many activists questioned the “showbiz” approach, considering it

self-restrictive, as it renders participants passive. The anti-WTO mobilization in 2005,

provided young activists an opportunity to experiment with the “direct action”

approach. The subsequent emergence of Internet mobilization was in a certain way

related to these discussions and reflections (Choy Chi-Keung, 2006; Lui Tai-Lok,

2010; Ip Lam-Chong, 2010; Chan Hau-Man, 2010; Chan King-Fai, 2010).

(Since the anti-WTO mobilization in 2005, young activists have begun to take up the

“direct action” approach. Photo taken by Ip Iam-Chong)

The rise of Internet mobilization (Note 1)

In Hong Kong, discussion of public issues on the Internet came about as early as

1998-1999. The major platform at the time was the BBSes, spaces where users would

share news information and discuss current affairs. The actual integration of online

discussions with social action began with the 1 July rally of 2003. A survey conducted

on that day showed that 53.5% of participants considered Internet mobilization an

important factor for their participation. Although the figure was lower than of those

who considered the influence of newspapers, TV or radio stations as important (over

60%), it was higher than that of political parties (43.9%) and even more so in

comparison with affiliated organizations (34.3%) (Joseph Chan Man, Chung Ting-Yiu,

2003).

[Hong Kong chapter preview ends here]

Macao: Post-colonial Struggle against the Conservative Political

Culture

Liu Shih-Ding (Translated by Florence Lo)

Foreword: Social movement and media (Note 1)

Since its return to China in 1999, the Macao SAR has undergone dramatic changes in

its social, political and economic landscapes (Liu, 2008). With the opening up and fast

market expansion of the gambling industry, as well as the rapid formation of a

consumer society brought along by a growing number of tourists from mainland

China, the Internet has been gradually incorporated into a new political and business

culture. The role it plays is now of increasing importance. The process of Macao’s

integration into the circuits of global capital has created much social tension and

numerous problems. Unable to express the diverse demands of social interests or to

monitor government policy through mainstream media, conventional associations and

unions or the Legislative Council, people are turning to online media to express their

discontents and initiate social campaigns. In a political environment in which

institutional channels for public grievances are seriously clogged, the Internet

certainly has strengthened people’s capacity for communication and mobilization.

Hence, netizens, particularly those from the city’s younger generation, have opened a

crack in the longstanding conservative political culture of Macao.

The function of online forums

To understand the importance of the Internet in Macao’s public arena, we need to take

into consideration its special colonial context and cultural background. The social and

political environment of Macao is known to center on stability and harmony,

especially after the 12-3 incident in 1966 (Liu, 2008). Within this context,

associations which arose toward the end of the Portugese colonial period, assembling

the strength of Chinese nationals, play a crucial role. These were mainly business

organizations and worker, teacher and student unions which provided services to the

Chinese, and consulted with the government on behalf of Chinese interests. In the

name of patriotism and a love for Macao, they formed a broad-based, cross-class

alliance which came to control significant social terrain and resources within the civil

society. There had been no strong social organization or large-scale social

mobilization that can compete with the abovementioned conventional associations

and unions prior to the handover of Macao in 1999. After the handover, under a

political context which emphasized stability, the conventional associations and unions

cooperated closely with the government to cater to government policies and positions.

In return, they were given resources, capital subsidies and social status by the

government. Although these associations tried to actively maintain distance from the

government during every election period, with some candidates even criticizing

government stances, the overall relationship was still more cooperative than

confrontational. Certain more influential members from these associations were even

elected to the positions of Executive Councilor, Legislative Councilor, and members

of various advisory committees. In times when the government faced challenges and

pressure from the public, they play a supportive role in resolving conflict. However,

such a role has been questioned and criticized throughout the process of urban

transformation in recent years. The associations lack the independence and autonomy

required to check and balance government policy and behavior. In recent years, a

series of spontaneous social movements and street protests have emerged in Macao.

They are the result of a situation in which conventional association have gradually

lost their social appeal, and are now out of touch with diverse social needs.

Macao's media ecology turned pro-Beijing following the riots in December 1966.

Journalists since then have rarely confronted the Beijing government (Ricardo Reis da

Camoes Tam and Lo Koon-cheung, 1996). As one veteran media practitioner pointed

out, based on observations during the process of interacting with the government,

"Macao’s media usually have a rational and moderate approach, in many cases, they

are not critical" and even seem to be excessively self-regulated (Deng Zuji, 2003:115).

In Macao, where Chinese-language daily news media receive government subsidies

(Lin Chang, 2003), some commentators point out that "their positions and statements

are too conservative and moderate, and often fail to fulfill the supervisory role of

monitoring the government or to expose and criticize social problems [...], especially

in major social events related to the government or to the interests of the casinos; as a

result, Macao’s print media are lacking solid credibility"(Ricardo Reis da Camões

Tam, 2003). The Macao Radio and Television Corporation (TDM), for example, is

one of the city’s main sources of public access to local news and information;

however, studies indicate that TDM news reports "are required to positively support

the “Consensus Project” which strengthens nationalism and development in the

post-colonial era"(Liu Shi-ding and Lei Hao-wan, 2008), thereby ruling out the public

discussion or monitoring function that a democratic society needs.

It is in such an environment, with closed political space and public communication

blocked that the Internet can offer netizens in Macao greater power for

communication, dialog and action. With the growth and popularization of the Internet,

there are more Internet users making use of online forums to express opposition views

and opinions in Macao. People forward and post news and information from different

sources. They even mobilize collective protests and actions through online forums.

The "Internet use in Macao: The annual survey statistical report 2009" shows that the

main channel through which Internet users comment is still discussion forums, which

26.7% of users prefer. In contrast, the ratio of people who express opinions through

traditional media (newspapers, radio, TV) sits at just 7.3%.

(2009 survey result on different channels for expression of public opinion in Macao.

Data from macaointernetproject.net)

From the perspective of democracy theory, when the environment for public opinion

is clogged, the Internet provides a legitimate alternative space through which to

spread information which differs from - or even questions - the "official public

sphere" (Jakubowicz, 1991). It uses a perspective different from the official version to

define political identity, shape public discussions, and to interpret particular social

events. Online communication is quietly changing the means of production and flow

of news making in conventional news media. Not long ago, there were netizens

uploading videos of an abuse case concerning a female student. The event was first

exposed through online forums before mainstream media were drawn to report it

extensively. Some online forums have "breaking news" zones, in which users are

invited to share accounts and images of events they experience in person. In this sense,

online communication in Macao has expanded the arena for reflection and

information exchange that is often restricted under the hegemony of mainstream

media (Downing, 2001: 44).

Internet access has been available in Macao since 1995. Prior to that, a number of

computer-savvy people set up electronic bulletin board systems (BBS), making use of

email messages to communicate online. Later, the Macao government granted Internet

Service Provider licenses to CTM, MacauWeb and Unitel (Note 2). The number of

Internet users in Macao has increased every year, and the city’s Internet penetration

rate reached 70% in 2009.

(Data from macaointernetproject.net)

Cheong Weng Hin (2009), in his 2008 survey, indicated that Internet usage among

young people under the age of 18 had reached 94%, while the 18-24 age group had a

rate of 99%, and the 36-40-year-old age demographic also had an Internet usage rate

of over 70%. When classified by occupation, the groups with the highest Internet

usage rates were students, people in management positions, professional white-collar

workers and civil servants. Each of these groups had a rate of Internet usage of over

80%. Among them, 80% of people had at least a high school education level. Also,

usage of laptop computers and mobile phones was shown to be growing in proportion

each year.

(Trend in the use of tools for going online. Data from macaointernetproject.net)

The online activities of Internet users are very diverse; "use of search engines" and

reading "online news" reached levels of 82% and 81% respectively, while over 50%

of respondents went online for "video website (YouTube)", "instant messaging",

"browsing blogs" and "social networking service (Facebook)". MSN Messenger is the

main instant messaging service used by young people in Macao, and Windows Live

(formerly MSN) Spaces and Xanga are their top personal blog platforms of choice. In

the past, citizens of Macao would use coffee shops, fast food restaurants and other

public venues as space to express their own views on current affairs, and now the

Internet has gradually become the new default space for social criticism. Online

public forums, personal blogs and recently popularized social networking sites have

become alternate media for users to follow up on social issues, protest, and even

initiate action.

(Survey on online activities. Data from macaointernetproject.net)

While younger Internet users in Macao prefer using blogs, Facebook and YouTube,

they are mostly used for personal entertainment and social communication purposes.

Online forums and discussion boards are the main channel for discussing current

affairs, and they are one of the main channels by which to express dissatisfaction

(Note 3). The above chart shows results from a survey conducted in 2009 in which

44% of Internet users had browsed or commented on online forums that year. The

rapid expansion of gambling beginning in 2006 has intensified social conflicts such as

corruption among officials, weak local employment, soaring property prices and the

problem of acute poverty. The pro government mainstream media, which rely on the

support from gambling industry, have failed to provide adequate channels for people

to express their views. Such a backdrop has gradually made online public forums a

platform for people to express their views and to share information on all sorts of

issues. These forums bear little resemblance to mainstream media. They report issues

and information which mainstream media exclude, unconfirmed stories, news from

Hong Kong (for example, news from the "Apple Daily" or "Ming Pao" newspapers),

and news from local media which exist beyond the pro government spectrum,

including "Jornal Informacao ", "Chinese Daily", "Cheng Pou" and "The Public

Daily". Netizens also share their own photographs on forums. Major online public

discussions in Macao take place on forums such as "cyberctm" (Very Dynamic),

"Qoos" (the Macao interactive community) and "orchidbbs" (Orchid) and other major

sites (Note 4). The power to influence official decisions through Web forums belongs

to the “weak public sphere”, as labeled by Fraser (1992), but one should not overlook

the multifaceted values, interests and experiences expressed through these informal

platforms. Criticism of mainstream media coverage, alternative political views, satire,

gossip, slander, and video creations full of an experimental spirit are all found and

circulated throughout these forums. Occasionally, online forums are also used to

mobilize street protests.

[Macao Chapter preview ends here]

Taiwan: Beyond Blue-Green Antagonism

Portnoy Zheng (Translated by Tse Fuk-Ying)

Foreword

Effective communication channels are essential to all sorts of social mobilization. The

form of mobilization changes in accordance with the different type of media used.

From public speeches, newspapers, magazines, underground radio, cable television, to

online connections today, social movements in Taiwan have become more closely

knitted with media. Nevertheless, it was not until the burst of the Internet bubble in

2000, in which numerous Internet service providers closed down, that the Internet saw

massive penetration into the lives of people in Taiwan, followed by integration with

other platforms such as television, mobile phones and different electronic appliances.

The lowering price of computer hardware increased the availability of personal

computers, broadband services and Internet access through mobile phones. Active

Internet users developed effective collective actions with the help of the Internet.

According to a survey by the Institute for Information Industry subsidiary Focus on

Internet News and Data (FIND), as of September 2010, the number of broadband

users in Taiwan had reached nearly five million, and the number of frequent Internet

users rested at around 10.74 million. In another survey of the use of media and

Internet in Taiwan, released in December 2010, by InsightXplorer Limited, it was

found that 61.2% of the population above the age of ten uses the Internet frequently.

Furthermore, thanks to the popularity of smartphones, according to a 3Q 2010 report

from the National Communication Commission, of 27.93 million registered mobile

phone users in Taiwan (the average person in Taiwan owns 1.2 mobile phone

accounts), 19.12 million can access the Internet using their phone.

After Ma Ying-jeou was elected President in 2008, the presidency's performance in

handling the financial crisis and the Morakot disaster was disappointing, and

contributed to the revitalization of social movements in Taiwan. The new generation

of Internet users, well-equipped with Internet skills, instinctively incorporated Web

applications with social movements, a reason for the rapid growth in social media and

online mobilization in Taiwan in 2009 and 2010.

Context

(On 28 February 1947, the Kuomingtang government crackdown on democracy

movement in Taiwan and started its 38-year rule under martial law. Historical photo

of the 228 incident.)

Modern progressive social movements in Taiwan began to evolve during the Japanese

colonial era. In the 1920s, Chiang Wei-shui, Jian Ji and other members of the

anti-Japanese unarmed colonial resistance movement, promoted democracy and

human rights, as well as organizing peasant and labor movements through gatherings,

lectures, publications and translation of influential essays. After the Kuomintang fled

to Taiwan in 1949 and its 38-year rule under martial law, freedoms of both speech and

thought were strictly suppressed. Yet, suppression led to even stronger resistance,

manifested through democratization, feminist movements and labor, aboriginal and

environmental movements. With the end of martial law in the 1980s, the involvement

of these movements in numerous incidents, from the 19 May Green Action, the Wild

Lily student movement, the anti-DuPont incident in Lugang, the 20 May peasant

movement, the strike against Yuandong Chemical Fibre, the anti-child prostitute

movement, the Shell-less Snails protest, and the Return My Lands movement, shaped

later development of social movements in Taiwan. Unfortunately, demands by civil

society for democracy, openness, freedom and equality were gradually adopted by the

neoliberal camp. Media in Taiwan, which had just regained autonomy from the party,

government and the army, could only survive by following the market-oriented logic

of the capitalist system.

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the

presidency. Regardless of people's expectation of reforms within the establishment,

the DDP disappointed them with its deviation from social movements and later

corruption among party members. Starting with another political transition which

began in 2008, the capitalist-oriented Kuomintang (KMT) regained authority with the

help of Ma Ying-jeou’s personal charisma, and continued its developmental agenda of

globalization.

Therefore, in spite of the seemingly blue-green antagonism in Taiwanese politics,

both the KMT and DDP suppressed minority groups and disregarded fundamental

human rights. During the DDP rule, the fight to preserve the Losheng Sanatorium was

basically mobilized online, and it represented the rise of social forces against injustice

outside the blue-green cleavage.

Social activists in Taiwan have long sought effective communication channels,

although freedom of speech today, with low quality and lacking publicness, remains a

challenge. Not only veteran organizers utilize the Internet as a tool for mobilization,

many “atypical” social movements were also pushed forward by amateur activists

using the Internet. Chen Shun-Hsiao (2010), associate professor at Fu Jen Catholic

University, conceptualized the situation as that of a “civic communication system”,

meaning that communication is no longer dominated by mainstream media, but shared

between mainstream media and this civic communication system. In Taiwan, the civic

communication system consists of BBSes, independent online media and personal

media. Personal media refers to social media applied by individuals, such as Twitter,

Plurk and Facebook.

(Chen Shun Hsiao’s conceptualization of “the civic communication system” in 2010)

In the past ten years, new services on the Internet have begun to compete with one

another for users’ attention. After rounds of evolution, on one hand, BBSes and online

forums with a long history are still supported by loyal users. On the other hand, email

groups, blogs, and video-sharing websites satisfy users of different needs due their

convenience, when at the same time microblogs and social networking sites redefined

social media with their updated functions and user-friendliness. A brief introduction

of the current situation and significance of various social media in Taiwan is as

follows.

BBSes and online forums

BBSes, especially PTT, have been the most frequently used social media among

university students in Taiwan. BBSes, it could be argued, are also mass media, as a

single BBS allows a maximum of 150,000 users to be online simultaneously. Despite

lacking Web functions, the BBS medium nonetheless facilitates interaction fairly well

through continuous updates and improvement. There are even pseudo-BBS platforms

with Web interfaces, allowing users to enjoy the convenience of the Web as well.

Numerous cybercultures in Taiwan are derived from individual BBSes. Among those,

“all-in-one packages”, individual articles which summarise certain complex issues,

are indispensable for most social issues promoted online. Whenever issues become

complicated to the extent that newcomers can no longer follow, there are always users

volunteering to compile these packages, with their counterparts supplementing the

packages through replies, forwarded threads or updated versions of the “package”.

Online forums are also popular in Taiwan. Similar to BBSes, online forums with

massive numbers of registered users like Mobile01 and Gamer.com.tw are also

important distribution centre of online news. Many small forums cater to the needs of

groups with specific interests, spreading news with a particular focus.

[Taiwan Chapter preview ends here]

Malaysia: The Flame of Reformasi on the Internet

Chang Teck Peng (Translated by Cheung Choi-Wan)

Foreword: Reformasi from the street to the Internet

The social movement of Malaysia has a heroic history which can be traced back to the

anticolonial struggles of the 1940s. Malaysia won its independence from Britain in

1957. Since then and throughout the 1960s, the left wing trade union movement has

been very active. After the May 13th Incident, the racial conflict which began on 13

May, 1969, the government toughened the Sedition Act of 1948 which had originally

been used against the Malaysian communists and left wing trade unions. According to

official reports, the May 13 Incident resulted in the death of 200 persons, while the

death toll was close to a thousand according to unofficial estimates. In spite of the

toughening of the law, the birth of the student movement in the late 1960s and its

growth into the 1970s created an impressive social force. Students left their campuses

to support farmers and impoverished people in squatter areas and demanded that the

government solve social problems. However, the labor and student movements

declined after the government amended the Trade Unions Act of 1959 and the

Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971 to increase control over trade unions

and keep university students from taking part in political activities.

Even with these social movements on the wane, there were still various social

movements underway throughout the 1980s. Aside from the movement for Chinese

education and the movement for equal rights for all races, which were dominated by

Chinese community, campaigns such as the “Anti-OSA (Official Secrets Act)

movement” led by Aliran Kesedaran Negara (Aliran), a civil rights group, and the

campaign led by environmental groups against building dumping sites for radioactive

waste in Malaysia, were successful in mobilizing support from the affected

communities and enjoyed some success. The 1980s was a turbulent period in the

history of Malaysia. Mahathir Mohamad enjoyed only a short “honeymoon” period

after being sworn in as the country’s fourth Prime Minister. After a series of political

crisis and financial scandals, he became the “populist under siege” (Khoo, 1995:

209-230) and nearly lost his post amid fierce party struggles. On 26 October, 1987,

Mahathir, then concurrently in charge of the Ministry of Home Affairs, strengthened

his power by launching the Operasi Lallang which resulted in the detention of 106

social activists, members of the parliament and state assemblies, environmentalists

and church workers, followed by the revocation of publication permits of three

newspapers. For civil society, it was a period of white terror followed by a metaphoric

low tide for the social movement which lasted for a decade.

(The Operasi Lallang in 1987 had resulted in the detention of 106 social activists,

members of the parliament and state assemblies, environmentalists and church

workers, followed by the revocation of publication permits of three newspapers.)

The Asian financial crisis was not only a blow to Malaysia’s overall economy, it also

led to internal strife among leaders in the ruling regime, all of whom struggled for

resources to bail out their own crony capitalists. In 1998, Mahathir Mohamad,

Malaysia’s strongman prime minister and Anwar Ibrahim, then deputy Prime Minister,

differed on how to deal with the financial crisis. They also differed on whether the

government should use public resources to bail out the shipping company owned by

Mahathir’s eldest son. Anwar, who was also Minister of Finance and Mahathir’s

designated successor, was sacked from government on 2 September, 1998, and

expelled from the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) two days

later. Two weeks after that, Anwar was arrested on charges of sodomy and corruption.

Before his arrest, Anwar had successfully mobilized the colossal reform movement,

Reformasi. The movement had not only taken to the street, it had also used the

Internet as one of its principal means for speaking out.

In the first few months of the reform movement, Reformasi websites sprung up like

mushrooms. There were quickly more than fifty Reformasi websites and many more

with no strong party affiliation (Rodan, 2004: 153). By 2004, there were as many as

191 Reformasi websites which could be categorized into content-based (150), news

(8), forums (16), electronic discussion groups (6) or interactive technical support (9)

(Tan, 2010: 96). These websites looked similar to blogs and became very popular.

Most of them were anonymous, but they had at least three major impacts: First, in

breaking the blockade by mainstream media on news about Anwar and Reformasi,

and becoming the source of information for the public on their opinions of Anwar and

updates on his situation. Second, in disclosing information the government sought to

keep secret, reporting corruption incidents involving government officials and even

posting classified documents. Third, in mobilizing the public and reporting in details

on street demonstrations (Chang, 2009). In addition to websites, people were also

using email to disseminate information about rallies, an important means at that time

to break the information blockade imposed by traditional media. Compared with

printed leaflets and large-scale mobilization, the use of email was much more

cost-effective. Moreover, emails could reach target groups much more quickly.

(Online poster in support of Anwar’s Reformasi.)

As Reformasi and street rallies receded, so did websites for the movement begin

disappearing from the Internet, one after the other. Although these websites were

short-lived, they were the origin of Malaysia’s cyberactivism and the “forerunners” of

online journalism which emerged much later. In short, the Reformasi movement was

not only the turning point for the reawakening of the social movement which had been

silenced in the decade after Operasi Lallang, it was also an important starting point for

the independent online media movement. People became aware of the extent to which

mainstream media, controlled by the ruling regime, distorted news and blocked

information about Reformasi. They also became aware of the important role the

Internet could play as means to break the blockade on public opinion (Chang, 2002,

2004, 2009; Brown, 2005).

The form of Internet media has been changing rapidly and has evolved into various

forms of social media which reflect the concerns of individuals. In spite of this

development, any discussion on the social and political role played by Internet media,

such as mass mobilization, has to be placed in the historical context of Reformasi.

Only then will one be able to have a full picture of the development of Internet media

in Malaysia. In this article, I will trace the trajectory of Reformasi as I explain the role

Internet media—from anonymous Web pages to the now popular social media—has

been playing in mass mobilization. I will also draw upon recent empirical cases to

discuss and analyze the strength and limitations of social media for mass mobilization.

Finally, I will argue that in spite of its potential for breaking news blockades and

enabling access to undistorted and unfiltered news, we should not exaggerate the

Internet’s potential in mass mobilization and in bringing about change.

Mass mobilization: From anonymous websites to social media

As a whole, the development of cyberactivism and mass mobilization in Malaysia has

followed a path as described below: First anonymous websites emerged during the

period of Reformasi. Then, online news media which produced news exclusively for

Internet audiences appeared and rivaled traditional media. Many opposition parties

and NGOs also set up their own websites and a large number of blogs owned by

individuals and organizations also sprang up (some organizations own both websites

and blogs). At the same time, NGOs and social activists also made use of websites

such as PetitionOnline for signature campaigns to link up with like-minded people

nationwide. Since 2009, there has been a shift to Facebook.

(Steven Gan, a human right reporter in Malaysia co-founded Malaysiakini in 1999)

Having played their historical role, Reformasi websites gradually disappeared from

the scene. Cyberactivism then took the form of news websites which challenged the

state’s control over news media. The establishment of Malaysiakini in 1999 was the

watershed in this development. It was the first of its kind, Malaysiakini stood out

especially among English news media, since traditional English news media at that

point was both monotonous and known to be the mouthpiece of the ruling regime. In

the next decade, many English news websites which produced news exclusively for

Internet audiences were launched and rivaled Malaysiakini. However, today,

Malaysiakini still leads the Malaysian online journalism. Competition between these

news websites was at its most fierce before and after the national election on 8 March,

2008. One of these news websites, Agenda Daily, was set up as early as 2001. Other

English news websites established before and after the national election in 2008

include The Nut Graph, which claims to provide in-depth reports on politics and

popular culture, Malaysia Insider, which soon won its leading position by being the

first website to disclose power struggles within the ruling regime and to publish inside

stories on government policymaking. Another news website was Malaysian Mirror,

which, it has been claimed, is supported behind the scenes by Ong Tee Keat,

ex-president of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA).

[Malaysia Chapter preview ends here]