Pragati Issue 26 - May2009

8/14/2019 Pragati Issue 26 - May2009

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ISSN 0973-8460

DEALING WITH A RISING NEIGHBOURTALIBANISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

BLACK MONEY AND TAX HAVENSHUMAN RIGHTS FRAUDUNDERSTANDING ENERGY WARS


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Contents

PERSPECTIVE2 Missing: a strategic outlookThe need to restructure intellectual institutionsRaja Karthikeya Gundu

3 Chasing the black money Why lower taxes and campaign nance reform are nec-essaryHarsh Gupta

5 Tampering with evidenceThe unfortunate case against Teesta SetalvadRohit Pradhan

FILTER7 Essential readings of the month

Ravi Gopalan

IN DEPTH8 Cracks in party-army unity?

The gap between the CCP and PLA appears to be widen-ingD S Rajan

10 Showing unhappinessOn a controversial new book on realism and nationalism

David Bandurski

ROUNDUP14 Dealing with the rising power next door

Comments on two recent developments in India-ChinarelationsNitin Pai

16 Taliban at the gatePakistanis are outraged, but the military holds the key

Ahsan Butt

19 Middle-class saviour

The inevitable defeat of the Taliban Mosharraf Zaidi

22 Waiting for true federationBaloch nationalism is not entirely incongruent with theidea of PakistanUmair Ahmed Muhajir

BOOKS25 It was always about oil, dear!

Understanding conicts over energy resourcesT S Gopi Rethinaraj

PragatiThe Indian National Interest Review

No 26 | May 2009

Published by The Indian National Interest an independentcommunity of individuals committed to increasing public awarenessand education on strategic affairs, economic policy and governance.

Advisory PanelMukul G Asher

Sameer JainAmey V Laud

V Anantha NageswaranRam NarayananSameer Wagle

EditorsNitin PaiRavikiran Rao

Contributing EditorSushant K Singh

Editorial SupportPriya Kadam

AcknowledgementsEdwin Lee (Cover Photo)South Asia Analysis Group

China Media Project (Univ. of Hong Kong)

The News

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Missing: a strategic outlook The need to restructure intellectual institutionsRAJA KARTHIKEYA GUNDU

THE STRENGTH and success of a nations foreignpolicy is not merely a factor of its arsenal or itsstatecraft. It depends on the strategic outlook of its society as a whole. In recent decades, there has been a rapid decline in the quantity of strategicdebate in India and as a result, an unpardonableloss of strategic outlook. Foreign policy has be-come more and more the efdom of a few.

The apathy in the foreign policy domain iswholly at odds with economic renaissance whichhas put India on the world stage. Unfortunately,the stature that India enjoyed in the world in the1950s under Nehru, despite its levels of impover-ishment and meagre diplomatic corps, was fargreater than what we have now as one of theworlds largest economies. The reasons are inter-nal and go far deeper than governmental effort.

There is a general institutional distaste for andneglect of matters of international affairs. Beyond

Pakistan, few foreign policy issues make it to theagenda of the Parliament or that when they arediscussed, they are woefully lacking in nuance.Key initiatives in Indias foreign policy such as theLook East policy or Afghanistan policy are for-mulated in a black box in South Block. This is notas much a critique of the policies themselves as itis of the processes that go into making those poli-cies. Within the government itself, strategic com-munications is a non-existent function, with littleco-ordination between various organs of the state.As was highlighted during the arrests made in theaftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the Indian statewas barely able to bring clarity through co-ordination, much less orchestrate effective infor-mation operations against those attacking the In-dian state.

When it comes to academia, very few universi-ties in India offer international relations in theircurriculum, and barring Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-versity, there are none that are remotely compara- ble in stature with global counterparts. The inter-national relations curriculum in schools and col-

leges in general is almost entirely a history of in-ternational institutions like the non-alignedmovement, and treaties like the non-proliferationtreaty. The geopolitical realities of the post-Coldwar era are given a brush over. The social sciences

curriculum in our schools is outdated and doesnot help students understand the events happen-ing around them, be it the rise of China or be it theglobal nancial crisis. Schools simply dont en-courage the discussion of beyond-the-textbook events.

New Delhi lacks think-tanks that produce con-sidered independent insights into foreign policyin practice, and the government gives scant atten-tion to the output of those few think-tanks thatexist. Given lack of adequate private sector sup-port, most think-tanks have a parochial mandateand no one think-tank can give the governmentindependent policy advice on the entire gamut of policy challenges.

Diplomacy itself is not merely a function of thegovernment, academics or think-tanks. Indian businesses have rapidly expanded their presenceand their interests today are spread across theglobe. Yet, there is extremely inadequate collabo-ration between the businesses and the govern-ment. Most Indian businessmen doing businessabroad feel the government is incompetent inhelping them, while the government views mostof them as y-by-night proteers who care littleabout safeguarding Brand India. These tensionsensure that diplomatic bonhomie seldom trans-lates into economic benet for India. For instance,a few years ago, when Libya opened up to inter-national business, the Indian mission in Tripolistruggled to convince Indian rms to come in. The

net result: valuable oil concessions were grabbed by Western and Chinese rms before we could blink.

Few Indian students go beyond the West forstudy, and even if they wanted to, there are barely

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PRAGATI - THE INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST REVIEW 2

There is extremely inadequate collaboration

between the businesses and the governmentdespite the rapid expansion of Indias eco-nomic interests across the globe.


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any scholarships or resources from government orprivate sector to do so. The average Indian lacksan adequate understanding of foreign cultures,norms and world-views, and satellite TV andInternet have not managed to change this. Hence,in the absence of global exposure, Indians con-

tinue to be an inward-looking nation burdened byprejudice.

Thus, it is no surprise that when Indians travelabroad for the rst time in their mature years,they can be culturally inadaptable and sometimeseven mildly xenophobic.

To become a real power on the world stage, to build on the economic stature that it has achieved,India must seriously overhaul its strategic out-look. For instance, externally, the governmentshould expand its public diplomacy initiative into

one that consists of a young professional servicecorps (on the lines of the hugely successful PeaceCorps of the United States), student exchangeprograms and mass media driven programs thatpermit greater ow of ideas and culture.

The tasks internal to the nation are much moredaunting. Educational curriculum, particularly atthe school level, needs to be thoroughly revised tomirror the current global scenario, and teaching of

foreign languages should be promoted. A public-private partnership to train and culturally sensi-tise employees of Indian rms doing businessabroad (at least in some sectors vital to BrandIndia) must be started. The civil service should be reformed to permit entry of eligible profession-

als at all levels of the cadre. Government and theprivate sector must collaborate to nurture a vi- brant think-tank scene, drawing from the bestminds in the discipline. Civil servantsnot justretired onesshould be encouraged to spend ayear of their career in think-tanks and academics, both to gain fresh ideas and to impart knowledgeof practical policy-making.

In short, a reinvention of Indias role and stat-ure in the world will not come through diplomaticcoups, regional muscle-exing or wishful think-

ing. The resurrection of Indias strategic outlook can only begin with a structural reform of Indiasintellectual and academic institutions.

Raja Karthikeya Gundu is a junior fellow at the Insti-tute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown Univer-sity.

GEOECONOMICS

Chasing the black moneyWhy lower taxes and campaign nance reform are necessary HARSH GUPTA

IN THE run-up to the Lok Sabha elections,. theBharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has raised the issue of

illegal wealth in Swiss banks and other tax ha-vensastutely combining its economic andnational security planks. It has also alleged thatthe Congress-led United Progressive Alliance(UPA) government is not very keen to get thesefunds backinsinuating corruption as the reason.

Unfortunately, both partisan and non-partisanreactions have focused on the quantum of money,not the fundamental incentives involved. Yet formoney to reach the privacy-protecting banks of acountry deemed to be a tax haven, it must rst

leave the originating country. Therefore the rstresponsibility of preventing illegal transfer of funds lies with the latter, not least because thetransfer to be prevented has been deemed illegalthere.

So if the originating country cannot trace the black money in its own backyard, then it must

simplify tax laws and adopt electoral reforms totackle the root of the problem. For example, if consumption taxes like Value Added Tax (VAT) orGoods and Services Tax (GST) are emphasisedmore than complicated direct taxes, a big loopholecan be plugged. Concerns about the progressivityof taxesthe idea that those with higher incomesmust pay a higher percentage of their income astaxcan be tackled by direct transfers to the poor.Also, trade policy needs reform: to stop under-and over-invoicing of trade overall tariffs must be

reduced. Similarly, unrealistic caps on electionexpenditures by individual candidates should bescrapped because they encourage crony capital-ism and corruption.

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Also while the global economic crisis has con-verted nancial privacy from a sacrosanct value toa sacrilegious one overnight, in many circum-stances, the desire to keep nancial affairs hiddenfrom the authorities is still a reasonable one formany reasons. Avoiding over-taxation by a preda-

tory state like pre-liberalisation India, or savingfor a rainy day in an hyper-inationary countrylike Zimbabwe, or to protect human rights lest adictators witch-hunt result in the seizure of do-mestic accounts.

Moreover, we must be careful of a slipperyslope if we go about restricting the nancial sov-ereignty of small countriesif today a cartel of inuential nations can somehow force them todiscard privacy laws, then can not the very samecartel of governments also force these small coun-tries to harmonise taxes and adopt certainminimum tax rates? In fact this is the real under-current to the issue as far as the Germans, theFrench and the American Democrats are con-cerned. Faced with demographic contraction and ballooning welfare states, and unable to allow freeimmigration because of political considerations,Western leftists want to somehow prevent theirrich citizens and corporations from leaving for thegreener shares of lower taxes, instead of control-ling their own expenditures. After all, many tech-nocrats in the European Union and the United

Nations have said so openlyand the latest -nancial crisis has at least strengthened the super-cial pull of the argument that scal policies must be internationally co-ordinated.

But international tax competition is a very

healthy phenomenon, and tax harmonisation verydangerous. Tax competition forces countries tomake the spending of federal governments moreefcient. It is the efciency of spending that is im-portant, not quantitytherefore "race-to-bottom"descriptions of tax competition are wrong. If

global taxes are constrained, then the Indian statewill also be forced to become more efcient tocontinue to attract investmentand this will be a

boon for its millions of poor citizens, if not for itsstatus quo loving political elite.

Now undoubtedly, nancial privacy and taxcompetition are technically two different issues.Tax havens could theoretically dump privacy andstill stand at the vanguard of international taxcompetitionbut will future populist urges for big spending in originating countries not conven-iently demolish this nuance, once a punish-the-

haven precedent has been set? Also, if sanctionsand tariffs are allowed to be slapped against Swit-zerland because of this issue, would not "green"sanctions and tariffs against countries like Indiaalso gain legitimacy in the future?

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The difference between tax havens andother relatively low-tax and high-privacycountries like the United States is often justthe amount of power they wield.


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Then how does one get past the impasse? Thereal distinction then should be on kind of moneycoming in to these havens. There are two potentialreasons to secretly expatriate moneythe moneyin question is dirty money (connected withcrime and terrorism) or the money is legitimately

earnedbut where the earner wants to evadetaxes. These two reasons should not get conatedif we are to maintain nancial sovereignty and yetat the same time confront the very real threat of global liquidity at the disposal of terrorists.

This is a workable distinction. Financing ter-rorists anywhere in the world is a serious crime inmost countries. On the other hand, not payingtaxes in another country is not necessarily a crimein many countries. This principle of dual crimi-nality therefore outlines a basic framework for a

negotiated settlement between the tax havensand (say) other G-20 nations. Moreover, the poten-tial inltration of terrorists into the tax havens ishighly unlikelyaccording to Chris Edwards andDaniel Mitchell, authors of Global Tax Revolution [t]here are no longer any non-cooperative juris-dictions, including any tax havens, on the blacklistof the Financial Action Task Forcean interna-tional agency that monitors the ght against dirtymoney.

Moreover, getting any money back quicklyif at allis well nigh impossible. The money is indifferent havens, it has been moved around andprobably consumed. At least some individual-specic documentation of suspicion would haveto be provided. A lot of the money in these havens

is legitimate, like Mauritius-routed foreign institu-tional investment, and even if the havens all col-lectively somehow buckle who is to say that the black money from an Indian point of view wouldnow not be with some hawala dealer in Dubai in-stead of in the secretive-but-still-largely-safe-

from-terrorists Swiss accounts? Unintended con-sequences are, well, unintended and they can bevery ugly indeed.

In any case, the biggest tax haven in the worldhappens to be the United States of America. Noinformation collection takes place nor does taxa-tion of interest or capital gains income of non-resident aliens take place there. Many other coun-tries have differential tax and privacy polici-esfor their locals and for foreignerseven thosewhich ostensibly follow "territorial taxation". The

difference between tax havens and other rela-tively low-tax and high-privacy countries (like theUnited States) is often just the amount of powerthey wield.

India should be on the side of scal sover-eignty, lower taxes and tariffs, and legalisationand transparency of money in politics. If it goes beyond proximate factors and gets these basicfacets of governance right, it will not only stopwealth from leavingbut also create a lot moreright at home.

Harsh Gupta is a resident commentator on The IndianNational Interest and blogs at Swaraj(swaraj.nationalinterest.in)

HUMAN RIGHTS

Tampering with evidence

The unfortunate case against Teesta Setalvad ROHIT PRADHAN

WHO IS Teesta Setalvad? A tireless ghter for theunfortunate victims of 2002 Gujarat riots waging arelentless battle against an unsympathetic stateand the laggardly criminal justice system or apublicity hungry ideologue cynically exploitingthe riots for her personal aggrandisement? The

answer, unfortunately, depends on whom youchoose to trust.Specic allegations of coaching witnesses and

inventing tales of horric violence have been lev-elled against Ms Setalvad in a Times of India report

purportedly quoting from a yet-to-be-made-public report led by the Special InvestigationTeam (SIT) in the Supreme Court. Other mediareports, quoting Ms Setalvad and anonymous SITsources, have vehemently denied the allegationsarguing that it is a ploy to divert attention from

the real issue: justice for the victims of Gujaratriots. The SIT chief has only refused to conrm theallegations rather than out rightly rejecting them.

Whatever may be the truth the allegationsraise some troubling questions over the conduct

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of human right organisations, the national mediaand the intense politicisation of the criminal jus-tice system.

In a debate on the role of human rights organi-sations in these pages (Getting human rightsright, Pragati, No 15 | June 2008), Salil Tripathi,

responding to frequent criticism of the humanrights movement as context insensitive had ar-gued that such organisations must remain unrea-sonable otherwise the moral sharpness of theirmessageis lost. It might be reasonable and in-deed necessary to emphasise human rights. Itcould also persuasively be argued that Indianeeds more human rights activism. Yet the pursuitof a single goal disregarding all else, includingconcern for due process and fairness, is fraughtwith danger. For it relies too much on inherent

moral standing of those who have attached them-selves to the cause of human rights virtually as-suming that they are guided by no other consid-eration save for a deep belief in their cause. It isparticularly worrisome because their message isostensibly guided by a sense of moral upright-nessa claim human rights activists are quick tomake and underlies their basic advantage vis--vis the state. And because the message is so inex-tricably linked with the credibility of the messen-ger, even the slightest blemish damages the wor-thy cause of human rights. Ms Setalvads allegedimproper behaviour falls squarely in this bracketas it strengthens of the hands of her detractors,who, suspicious of Ms Setalvad and her ilk, be-come dismissive of human rights itself.

If allegations against her are even partiallytrue, then Ms Setalvads unconscionable conducthas severely damaged the cause of justice andhuman rights. Yet, many of Ms Setalvads col-leagues have jumped to her defence without bothering to wait for full facts to emerge. At leastin this particular case, the unreasonableness

seems more directed at protecting an individualrather than advancing the cause of human rights.Second, the role of media has been very disap-

pointing. It has pursued the Gujarat riots story atgreat lengthsconsidering the horrifying natureof the riots, that must be applaudedso it wassurprising that the major television news channelsand newspapers almost completely ignored theoriginal allegations against Ms Setalvad. Electionscan hardly be offered as an excuse since a subse-quent Supreme Court order against the Gujaratgovernment was widely covered in the media.Indeed, many of the media houses that had studi-ously refused comment on the allegations in theSIT report gave wide coverage to Ms Setalvadsdefence and virtually blamed the Gujarat gov-

ernment for leaking the report. Ms Setalvad is afrequent guest on many television channels, andis treated as almost a authority on Gujarat ri-otsyet, the same channels had no questions forMs Setalvad in this particular case. Neutral ob-servers can hardly be blamed for concluding that

many within the media who claim to ght for jus-tice and secularism are perhaps motivated by lesslofty considerations. The medias inuence in pol-ity is directly correlated with its credibility and itwould do well to reect on its conduct in thissorry episode.

Finally, that the investigation of Gujarat riotshave to be supervised by the apex court is trou-

bling enoughit is a strong indictment of the in-ability of the criminal justice system to act impar-tially in face of political pressurebut that eventhe highest court in the land was left advising theconcerned parties not to indulge in mudslinging isworrying. The criminal justice system rests onwitnesses telling the truth and it is for this reason

that courts take a dim view of perjury. The allega-tions against Ms Setalvad would be classied asperjury by even its most liberal denition. Thecourts magnanimous gesture of not ordering afull investigation against Ms Setalvad is mis-placed. In any case, the court could have shutdown rumour-mongering and conspiracy theo-rists by the simple expedient of ordering the re-lease of the full report. It is unfathomable why theapex court should embrace secrecy instead of en-couraging openness and transparency. After all,India deserves to know of those individuals theSIT has indicted of inciting and leading one of herworse riots.

This unfortunate episode has damaged thoseinstitutions that are essential for the well being of the Indian republic. Restoring their credibilitywould require deep introspection and admittanceof their fallibilities. If nothing else, they owe it tothe unfortunate victims of Gujarat riots who stillawait justice at the hands of Indian state.

Rohit Pradhan is a resident commentator on the IndianNational Interest and blogs at Retributions(retributions.nationalinterest.in)

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Because the message is so inextricably linked

with the credibility of the messenger, eventhe slightest blemish damages the worthycause of human rights.


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Enhance PPP capabilitiesIn an op-ed in DNA, MU-KUL ASHER welcomesthe setting up of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP)unit within the nanceministry. Further he notesthat it is essential tokeep in mind that a PPPproject incompetentlystructured and imple-mented, and with an in-appropriate mindset, canbe harmful for the coun-try as a whole. The ur-

gent challenge thereforeis not to avoid PPP but todevelop requisite compe-tencies and mindset.

Fuel supply challengesThe Energy and Re-sources Institute (TERI)scholar LEENA SRIVAS-TAVA provides an over-view of the glaring lacu-nae in the way energyissues are tackled by theIndian government. In anopinion piece in Financial Chronicle(Indias energyconundrum) she lamentsthe lack of accountabilityin energy administrationthat has led to the halvingof the capacity expansiontargets in the 11th veyear plan from the origi-nal 80GW to 40GW by2012. In addition, shecites the protractedwrangling between the

ministries on gas pricingof the Krishna-Godavari(KG) basin, causing anannualised loss of Rs30,000 crore, due to thedelay in the utilisation of 3.5 GW of capacity ingas-based power plants.

She also calls atten-tion to the lack of pro-gress on the allocation of coal blocks to the privatesector and the non-transparent allotmentprocess nalised by thecoal ministry. She pro-poses that the PMs en-ergy co-ordination com-mittee have an executive

arm to ensure account-ability and co-ordinated

action on the newlyminted integrated energypolicy.

Chinas diplomatic con-tempt of the EU

JOHN FOX and FRAN-COIS GODEMENT of the European Council onForeign Relations (ECFR)conduct a power auditof EU-China relations andclassify the 27 member

bloc into ideological free-traders, assertive indus-trialists, accommodatingmercantilists and Euro-pean followers. In a policyreport (A Power Auditof EU-China Relations)they aver that the EUscurrent China strategy of unconditional engage-ment has been renderedobsolete by the rise of the middle kingdomspower, its skilful exploita-tion of European weak-ness and its refusal tobecome a democracy.They call for rethinkingand retooling the EU-China relationship.

They call for the EUto simultaneously engageWashington and Beijingto partner them on cli-mate change, resolvingthe economic crisis, andnuclear non-proliferation

among others and also topersuade Beijing thatthere would be a cost toignoring the EU.

The authors also callfor ratication of theLisbon treaty and givingthe EU a leader chosenby peers who could thenhelp towards nudgingChina to be a betterpartner and global citizen.

Defending AustraliaIn an op-ed in The Austra-lian (Bracing for theAsian century), LowyInstitutes HUGH WHITEargues that Australia's

defence needs must bereassessed in the light of

the shifting global balanceof power and China'sascendancy.

The Rudd governmenthas to decide on eitheradvancing or regressingfrom its predecessorswhite papers ambitiousobjectives and then re-shape the Australian De-fence Force (ADF) tomatch the new set of objectives. He speculatesthat Indonesia and theSouth Pacic islandswould command someinterest although thestrategic outlook wouldbe dominated by devel-opments in the widerAsia-Pacic.

Australias decades-old operational doctrineof maritime denial wouldcontinue but that wouldrequire a redesign of forces to operate in

tougher circumstances.The balanced force in-herited from the 70swould no longer cut itand defence planningwould need to focus onadvancing specic capa-bilities. These could meanexpansion of infantrybattalions, repower andarmoured divisions, alarger submarine eetand expanded squadronsof aircraft such as jointstrike ghter for robustair combat and strikecapacity.

To achieve this, hecalls for a hike in defencespending from the cur-rent 2% of GDP to 2.5%to build a focused forceto deter military threatsin the Asian century.

Talking with the Taliban?ASHLEY TELLIS, of

the Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peacewarns that negotiatingwith the Taliban who areconvinced that military

victory is within sight wasthe worst possible ap-

proach to stabilising Af-ghanistan and that USimpatience and a desirefor an early exit couldmotivate insurgents tomaintain a hard line andoutlast the internationalcoalition.

In a Carnegie report(Reconciling with theTaliban: Towards an alter-nate grand strategy inAfghanistan), he favoursa long-term approachincluding a commitmentto build an effective Af-ghan state and that wouldensure victory andachieve US national secu-rity objectives.

He points out that theAfghan public over-whelmingly opposes theTaliban and desperatelyseeks success from West-ern military forces. Hedeclares that American

goals in Afghanistan couldbe achieved even withoutPakistani co-operation oncounter-terrorism. Hestates that the Af-Pakstrategy of the Obamaadministration was cou-rageous, and responsible,a step in the right direc-tion although incomplete.He concludes that forlasting peace in Afghani-stan, a politico-militaryvictory through effectivecounter-insurgency was aprerequisite.

Ravi Gopalan is a re-search associate withPragati.

FILTER

7 No 26 | May 2009

Essential readings of the month

RAVI GOPALAN


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CHINA

Cracks in the party-army unity?

The gap between the CCP and PLA appears to be widening D S RAJAN

IT IS not surprising that the open call given by atop Chinese military leader in Qiu Shi, the theo-retical organ of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP), on April 1st 2009 for upholding the abso-lute leadership of the CCP over the army, formaking the party ag as army ag at all timesand for the army listening to the commands of the party, Central Military Commission (CMC)and President Hu Jintao at all times, receivedinternational attention. The leader, General Li Ji-nai, a CMC member and head of the GeneralPolitical Department (GPD) of the Peoples Lib-eration Army (PLA), while giving the call, alsoadmitted that mistaken backward things like de-politicisation of the Army ( feizhengzhihua), party-army separation ( feidanghua) and nationalisationof the army ( guojiahua) have come to inuence the

armed forces, to which he demanded resoluteopposition.

Prima facie , the remarks meant an acknow-ledgement from the CCP that internal differenceson the subject persist; their implications need a

careful study considering the importance of party-army equation for the countrys politics and gov-ernance.

A deeper look would reveal that divergenceswithin the CCP on absolute leadership of theparty over the army are not new. They had origi-nated in the pre-revolution days and prevail in thepost-liberation period also, and are essentiallyresponses to the situation prevailing at each stage.Proceeding chronologically, it is worth noting therift in late 1930s, as chronicled by the party histo-rians, between two top leadersMao Zedong andZhang Guodaodue to the latters alleged ideasin favour of separating army from party. It nallyled to Zhangs exit from the CCP.

Coming to modern era, during the anti-rightist campaign of late 1950s, there were allega-

tions of monolithic military thoughts prevailingin the party with some even preferring liquida-tion of party committees in the military. In the1980s and early 1990s, there were reports on sup-port to a nationalised army, coming from advis-

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ers to the then Premier Zhao Ziyang as well assome leading organs. More evidence suggesting atest for the CCP in enforcing its control over thearmy was seen: lack of enthusiasm on the part of some PLA men in the matter of dealing with 1989Tiananmen student protests; the closure of the

PLA-led enterprises in 1998 following the thenPremier Zhu Rongjis dissatisfaction over thearmys smuggling activities; and observations of Qiao Shi, the then Chairman of the National Peo-ples Congress (NPC) Standing Committee thethat state president and CMC chief Jiang Zeminshould be answerable to the parliament.

Ever since Hu Jintao took over as Chairman of the CMC in 2004, an active propaganda phase toemphasise partys control over the army is beingseen. Hostile forces, trying to Westernise, di-

vide and depoliticise the army, have become themain target. Their attempts are being seen as animportant component of carrying out a peacefulevolution in China. Blame is also being levelled

against some factions in China for their supportto an army under the state control. Since 2005, allimportant occasions like PLA founding anniversa-ries and organs like Qiu Shi, are being used regu-larly to stress the need for partys control over thearmy. Getting highlighted in this regard are Mr

Hus statement that the PLA should obey partyand CMC command at any time and under anycircumstances and his concern over the armysstability.

The question arises as to why the theme of partys absolute control over the army is beingrepeated again and again in China? It can be saidthat the CCP always considers its control over thearmy, as the principal means to perpetuate its su-periority and protect the one-party system in thecountry. It is ofcially stated that the principle of CCPs leading the State as the ruling party gotevolved historically and also, is the requirementof current national conditions. In simple lan-guage, this would mean that the more the partyperceives potential dangers to its rule, more its

dependence on the army. Both Mao and Deng hadto rely on the army at crucial times to bring back normalcy in the countryMao in the aftermath of Cultural Revolution and Deng in the case of the1989 Tiananmen student protests.

Mr Hu faces same compulsions, experienced

by Mao and Deng. He needs the army supportunder the ofcially described new conditionsand complicated changes in national defence andmilitary building and multiple security threatsand diverse military tasks. In other words, aparty-controlled military would be crucial to MrHu in providing guarantee to the countrys stabil-ity, which he described as an overriding task in aspeech in December 2008. Factors that could affectstability and lead to social unrest would includethe impact of global nancial crisis on China, in-

creasing unemployment as a result of migration of rural workers from cities and fewer opportunitiesfor young graduates passing out of universities.

The armys backing would also be importantfor Mr Hu in dealing with separatist tendencies inTibet and Xinjiang. Also, with military rmly un-der his grip, Mr Hu may feel condent in ghtingpro-democracy movements like Charter 2008group which, among others, has demanded party-army separation. However, Mr Hus status as onlya member of Chinas collective leadership without being a core, in contrast to the supreme positionsenjoyed by his predecessors, would imply re-duced elbowroom for him in keeping the PLAfully under his grip.

Indiscipline and trends towards taking actionindependently in the PLA without consulting theparty or civil administration may also be pushingMr Hu to keep the army under the party control.The authorities are looking upon instances of slack management in the army and protests fromdemobilised soldiers with concern. The party mayalso have reasons to be unhappy over the mili-

tarys failure occasionally to keep the CCP andgovernment fully informed about its actions, forinstance, during the 2001 China-US crisis over themid-air collision between their aircraft overHainan island and the 2007 anti-satellite weapontest by China.

A doubt arises whether or not the renewedemphasis of Hu regime on the necessity for thearmy to obey the party, has something to do withfactional struggle within the party. An authorita-tive argument has given a subtle warning againstemergence of leaders like Zhang Guodao whowere right opportunists and had supportedarmy nationalisation. It has called for remember-ing such events in party history. It has in additioncautioned the CCP against repeating the mistake

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The more the CCP perceives potential dangers to its rule, more its dependence on the PLA.Both Mao and Deng had to rely on the armyat crucial times to bring back normalcy in thecountryMao in the aftermath of CulturalRevolution and Deng in the case of the 1989Tiananmen student protests.


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committed by former USSR leading to its collapse, by the way of delinking the Soviet Army from theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union. The re-marks need a close scrutiny for their hiddenmeaning, if any.

Lastly, Mr Hus underscoring the need for the

PLA to obey the party command may also need to be viewed in the context of ongoing moves inChina to bring his military writings on par withthose of his predecessorsMao, Deng and Jiang.The incorporation of his Scientic Outlook onDevelopment theory in the party constitution has been politically important. In military terms, theexhortation to the PLA now to follow Mr Husmilitary line based on Three Provides and OneRole principle alongside the military thoughts of the three mentioned above, appear signicant.

The PLA is fast becoming a professional andapolitical army, with entry into it of qualied per-sons in engineering and science and technology.Its cyber warfare and space units are beingstrengthened with specialists. Politicians have lesspresence in the PLA and the level of military rep-

resentation in top-level party units has comedown considerably. For instance, there is no PLAmember in the nine-member Politburo StandingCommittee. Gone are the Long March days, whenthe military dominated the high political posts.There is also presently a large turnover in the PLA

representation in the party gatherings, apparentlyas part of efforts to prevent emergence of strongmilitary leaders capable of challenging thepolitical leadership at some stage. The old systemof having both red and expert cadres in theparty, army and state, seems to be fast giving wayto one disconnecting the two.

In sum, the gap between the party and armyappears to be increasing day by day in practice.The question in the coming years is whether ornot a state army will emerge, replacing the pre-

sent party army model.

D S Rajan is director of the Chennai Centre for ChinaStudies. A version of this article appeared on the South

Asia Analysis Groupswebsite (southasiaanalysis.org) .

CHINA

Unhappy China, and why it cause for unhappiness

On a controversial new book on realism and nationalismDAVID BANDURSKI/CHINA MEDIA PROJECT

UNHAPPY CHINA , a now best-selling book byseveral Chinese academics arguing in Darwinianterms that China should carve out for itself a pre-eminent role in world affairs, has been the focusof much coverage outside China, and of erce debate within China.

Some Chinese scholars and journalists haveexpressed concern about Unhappy Chinas pug-nacious and even jingoistic tone. The followingare two responses to the book. The rst is an edi-torial by Nanjing professor Jing Kaixuan, whichappeared in a recent issue of Southern MetropolisDaily. The second is an interview with Shanghaischolar Xiao Gongqin, part of coverage of the book by Shanghais Xinmin Weekly.

Jing Kaixuan begins his critique of UnhappyChina against a backdrop of the myriad domesticissues with which China must contenda not-so-subtle suggestion that China has plenty of its ownconcerns, and does not need to strike a confronta-

tional tone internationally. He also invokes Hu Jintaos term boat-rocking, or zhe teng , suggest-ing the path marked by the books authors is adangerous loss of focus on the essentials.

Unhappy China is all for showJing KaixuanWHEN I rst heard about the book UnhappyChina, I thought it was probably about how laid-off workers were unhappy, or about how peasantswho had lost their land were unhappy. Maybe itwas about how college graduates searching forwork were unhappy, about how stock market in-vestors were unhappy, or about how victims of the poisonous milk powder scandal were un-happy. [This would make sense], because the ac-

tual expression of such unhappiness is a mark of the progress China has made. Instead, the booksauthors cast their sights much farther aeld forthe source of Chinas unhappiness. They talk about the collective anger of Chinese toward

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Western nations, and say that Chinese anger de-

mands the emergence of a group of heroes tolead our people to successfully control and usemore resources, ridding [the world of] of bulliesand bringing peace to good people.

No sooner do we drop our guard than we ndothers speaking once again on our behalf. But Iwonder, if this is really about an invasion by for-eign enemies, whether we shouldnt be furiousrather than merely unhappy. Relationships be-tween nations are not like romantic relationships,which might demand a bit of petulance and co-quettishness. If this [issue the authors are talkingabout] indeed amounts to an international dis-pute, it should be a matter for diplomatic negotia-tion to mutual benet, not something handledwith this sort of blufng and spitting nationalism.When I read an interview with the authors atSina.com , I found that the whole thing surged withnaked Darwinism. The world works by the lawsof the jungle, and if Western nations are insolentlyhegemonic, well then, we should behave like thattoo. China, therefore, must dene its major objec-tive as rst, to get rid of the bullies and bring

peace to good people and, second, to control moreresources than China currently has in order to bring blessings to all the people of the world.Even Hitlers old slogan about using the swordsof Germany to gain lands for the ploughs of Ger-many was dragged out and given a new facewith the Chinese term conducting business witha sword in hand.

Other than these [sentiments], I detect no other basic concepts in the authors work . . . In thewords of one of the authors, an author of ChinaCan Say No , Song Qiang: Saying no expressesthe idea that China just wants to govern itself,while unhappiness expresses the idea thatChina is able to lead the world. If you want torule this world, though, you must rst suppose

China already possesses both super powers and

lofty ambitions in a number of [strategic] areas.Clearly, the unhappy authors dont see thingsthis waythey believe China can already lead theworld, and they object to the idea of soft power.The net result is that they ring empty when theytalk about Chinas internal affairs, and they comeoff as falsely proud when they talk about foreignaffairs. Moreover, realising their ultimate goal of overthrowing the global capitalist structure wouldmean not just a qualied break with the West, but could only be accomplished through [whatthey call] the liberation of the whole world.

These authors hail from neither the left northe right. Rather, they are modern proponents of realism . . . thinking about problems only from thestandpoint of power, hoping that some day thepoliticians will offer their good graces. In the pre-Qin dynasty times, there was a school called thepolitical strategists, and unlike the Confuciansand Maoists, they subscribed to no clear valueconcepts. They spent all of their time stumping forthis or that cause, using their tongues as weapons,manoeuvring about, always changing sides,

empty of knowledge but full of tactics. But thepolitical strategists were at least able to size up thesituation and to come up with positions to argue .. . In this way, they were quite unlike our un-happy authors, who disregard all facts and alllogic and sink into their own fantasies, sayingwhat they please without presenting an argument,subjecting themselves to ts of conspiracy theory,and remaining all the time entirely amused bytheir own boat-rocking (zhe teng) . . .

I hear that the book is selling well, and that ithas caught the attention of the Western me-diaperhaps this is what they mean by a quali-ed break. Generally, I dont like to speculateabout others motivations in writing this or that book, as this is something you can never be clear

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11 No 26 | May 2009

Photo: Rickz

The world works by the laws of the jungle ,and if Western nations are insolently he-gemonic, China, therefore, must define its

major objective as first, to get rid of thebullies and bring peace to good peopleand, second, to control more resourcesthan China currently has in order to bringblessings to all the people of the world.


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about. But [Phoenix TV correspondent] LuqiuLuwei has revealed that: On the day it was pub-lished, one of the books authors told me that thiswas a kind of method of (speculation), to publisha provocative book and then bandy it about. Hav-ing written this commentary up to this point, I

confess Im beginning to feel a bit thick expos-tulating with such seriousness about [a book thatis little more than] a circus of patriotism with itseye on the bottom line.

The following is a translation of parts of an inter-view by Xinmin Weekly with Shanghai scholarXiao Gongqin

Opposing the nationalism of false prideXiaoGongqin

Xinmin Weekly: Lately, the book Unhappy China has been the source of much debate. What areyour thoughts?

Xiao Gongqin: Over the last few days Ive goneonline and checked out pages dealing with Un-happy China , and in the last few weeks the numberof pages dealing with it have surpassed two mil-lion, so clearly this book has had a substantial so-cial impact. There is no question that what theauthors of this book are promoting is a high-pitched, vainly arrogant and radical form of na-tionalism. One of the books authors, Wang Xiao-dong, has been a friend of mine for many years,and many of the liberal intellectuals singled outfor criticism in the book are also friends. Chinasintellectual culture has, it seems, already entered aperiod of diversity, and although I do not agreewith many of the views expressed in UnhappyChina , as one among many voices in this develop-ing culture, its existence, and its dialogue withdiffering viewpoints, can at least serve to catalysea clash of ideas.

What is most terrible, for any society or any

people, is homogeneity of thought. The balancingand clashing of varying voices, whether liberalismor nationalism, cultural protectionism, et cetera ,can only have a positive outcome for the enrich-ing of our peoples capacity for thought. Peopleholding different views should have an attitude of tolerance.

The publication of this book has created rip-ples, and there are many reasons why it has hadsuch an inuence, including its jarring title and itsclever commercial strategy or build up. But onereason is certain, and that is because it seeks toanswer the question of modern Chinas relation-ship with other peoples of the world.

This question tugs at peoples hearts because30 years of reform have made the Chinese people

stronger, and so after a century of shame Chinesepeople face the question of how to re-dene our-selves.

XW: One of the books authors, Song Qiang,has said that he prefers the term new patriotismto describe the popular sentiment of nationalism

[today]. What are your thoughts?Xiao Gongqin: Ive long held the view, even

before this book came out, that Chinas national-ism was marked by a reactive quality, that it wasgoaded by a sense of tragedy and shame over theChinese experience in the last century. This formof reactive nationalism could be stirred up, and soif these stimuli from the outside world vanished,this sort of nationalism would fade as well. Look,for example, at the May 8, 1999, incident [in whichthe United States bombed the Chinese embassy in

Belgrade], and the 2001 collision of a Chineseghter jet and an American spy plane. Both could be seen as examples of this reactive form of na-tionalism.

Nevertheless, the form of nationalism repre-sented in this book can no longer be dened inthese original terms. Overall speaking, the atti-

tude of Western countries toward China iswarmer now than it has been in the past, particu-

larly in the midst of the economic crisis, as theWest has looked to China...hoping for friendlycooperation, and peaceful development has al-ready become a general consensus among nations.Under this situation, the nationalism as repre-sented by Unhappy China , which persists in strik-ing this menacing tone, cannot be characterised asreactive. I believe that for some time to come thisnationalist wave as epitomised by Unhappy China will continue to exist, and foreigners will have tolearn to come to terms with this non-reactive formof Chinese nationalism.

What is the character of this new national-ism? Its crucial point is the positing by necessityof an external enemy, and this is seen by theauthors as a basic condition of Chinas existence

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Wang Xiaodong believes that, any species, if it is not challenged by its external environ-ment, will certainly degenerate. He might beactually suggesting that in order for our peo-ple to grow strong, China must, lacking se-lective pressures, go and search for selec-tive pressures.


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and development. One of the authors, WangXiaodong holds precisely this. He believes that,any species, if it is not challenged by its externalenvironment, will certainly degenerate. He ndsa root for this new nationalism in social biology.He believes also that China has at present no se-

lective pressures, so everyone believes thatthings are ne, and that its OK to muddle along,and this makes degeneration unavoidable. Par-ticularly interesting is this line: America too facesthis problem, and so it actively goes in search of enemies. Im not sure, but it seems Brother Xiao-dong is actually suggesting that in order for ourpeople to grow strong, China must, lacking selec-tive pressures, go and search for selective pres-sures.

I think the logic here can be summed up like

this: If external pressures are the necessary condi-tion of the development and existence of a people,if they then lack pressures, they must as a matterof course manufacture these pressures. If this isthe argument, then it is both fearsome and dan-gerous. I really, really hope this is not what theauthors mean, but what of the angry youth whoare more radical than they are? They can certainlyseize upon this logic . . . It is in this theoreticallogic of nationalism that I see something frightful

and dangerous. It does not lie too far, in fact, from bullying racism and jingoism.

More than ten years ago, Xiaodong appliedhimself to promoting nationalism, and I dontquestion his academic earnestness, but if a thinkernds himself invested in a theory fraught with

danger, and this framework of thought once againdrags into peril a people who have only justemerged from a century of pain and who have theopportunity to thrive, that is poor timing.

Perhaps the authors will think Ive made mycase too strongly, that this is not what they intend,that they only want to urge the Chinese peoplenot to grow idle. But what is crucial to realize isthat this form of nationalism is by its own logic aPandoras box that will release monsters that can-not be put back.

David Bandurksi is the editor of the China Media Project (cmp.hku.hk) a think tank at the University of HongKong. This article previously appeared at the websiteof the China Media Project , and reprinted with permis-sion here.

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13 No 26 | May 2009

Coming soon. A new look The Indian National Interest

Watch out for our revamped website at http://nationalinterest.in


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CHINA POLICY

Dealing with the rising power next door

Comments on two recent developments in India-China relationsNITIN PAI

Living with the disputeTHIS TIME it is at the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Last month, Financial Times reported thatChina had used procedure to delay the approvalof ADBs new multi-year nancing plan for India.Because a small part of it, around $60 million, isfor ood management, water supply and sanita-tion in Arunachal Pradesh (read disputed terri-tory of South Tibet in Chinese). This twisted theusual knickers: some commentators pointing outthat Chinas upstream damming of the waters of the Brahmaputra is one reason contributing toArunachal Pradeshs need for the water manage-ment project. Thanks to the Lok Sabha elections,the politicians knickers remain untwisted. Butwhat should you make of it?

First, its important to recognise that Chinasactions are both pro forma and theatre. It is to be

expected that China will signal the existence of the territorial dispute at every opportunity. Aslong as the border issue is not fully and nallysettled, China will hold on to its position thatparts of Arunachal Pradesh are really Chinese ter-ritories illegally occupied by India. So registeringa protest pro forma is part of the routine. Not pro-testing would have been unusual: and Indiawould see it as a concession. Just why wouldChina concede anything just like that?

At the ADB while it postponed a board meet-

ing that was to have approved the nancingpackage for India, it is highly unlikely that it willgo to the extent of completely sabotaging it (ex-pect the plan to be approved at the next meeting).To wreck it would be too direct, too brazen a sig-nal that it puts politics before economics at multi-lateral fora. It cant afford that at a time when theG-8 is making way for the G-20 and increasingChinas clout in global economic governance.

It is unclear if Chinas neurotic reaction to theword Arunachal Pradesh was due to its ADBdelegation playing safe, or indeed a well-considered position approved by the higherauthorities in Beijing. If it is the latter, then itstands to reason that India, and the rest of theworld, must recogniseand respondto the poli-

ticisation of multilateral institutions like the ADB.Second, for its part, the ADB must realise that

it is, in the end, a bank. And a bank that bases itslending policy on the basis on non-prudentialconsiderationsnot least with its largest and bestcustomeris asking for trouble. This is somethingthat the ADBs governors must keep in mind attheir future meetings.

Finally, there is the question why the Indiangovernment needs the ADB to borrow $3 billionfor development projects? One explanation is that

borrowing comes at relatively easier terms. Fairenough: but to the extent that such terms act ascrutches, weaken or rule out market disciplineand crowd the private sector out, such nancing isa curse in the longer term. Herein lies the trage-dythe UPA government not only frittered awayve years of unprecedented opportunity, but ac-

tually crippled Indias public nances. If it hadnot done so, India would be less reliant on multi-lateral loansand better resist unfriendly actionslike the one by China.

Stop blaming China for Indias lapsesQuite often, alarm and indignation comes from asense of entitlement. Surely, the argument goes,Indias size and geographical location entitles it toa pre-eminent maritime status in the IndianOcean, so how dare China intrude and construct astring of pearls around India?

To be sure, the emergence of China as a re-gional maritime power is the big story of ourtimes. Over the past two decades, China has me-thodically developed basing arrangements (the

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The ADB must realise that it is after all a bank.And a bank that bases its lending policy onthe basis on non-prudential considera-

tionsnot least with its largest and best cus-tomeris asking for trouble.


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string of pearls), invested in a submarine eetdesigned to counter the US Navys aircraft carriergroups and, is now working on a surface eet (in-cluding six aircraft carriers) whose purpose is toproject power. This worries Indian strategists, be-cause some of Chinas accretion of power will

come at Indias expense. While China certainlyseeks to contain the expansion of Indian power,the object of its grand strategy is to counter theUnited States. And it is getting there: not bymatching renminbi-for-dollar and getting into anarms race, but largely by methodically developingcapabilities that exploit United States weak points.

So at a time when China seeks to play in thesame league as the superpower of the day, it is to be expected that it will try to extract advanta-

geous positions in the Indian Ocean region at In-dias expense. The big scandal is not that China issecuring bases in Indias neighbourhood by shor-ing up nasty regimes and abetting their outra-geous policies; but rather, India does not evenshow any sign of doing what is necessary to pro-tect its interests.

So Home Minister P Chidambaram criticisedChina for shing in troubled waters by backingthe Sri Lankan government to the hilt in its waragainst the LTTE. So what else does Mr Chidam- baram expect it to do? If the UPA governmentcouldnt nd the resolve to shape a bold Sri Lankapolicy that would promote Indias interests, whyshould he hold it against China for doing so?Similarly, if the UPA government found itself im-mobilised over its Nepal policy, why shouldChina be blamed for promoting what it sees as itsown interests? Surely, the likes of Pranab Mukher- jee and A K Anthony didnt think that Chinashould be held to the statements they made aboutthere being enough space in Asia for two powersto rise simultaneously? (Even as Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh and Mr Chidambaram didgruesome damage to the pace at which Indiacould rise in the rst place).

Lets face it: unless the next governmentre-gardless of whether it is the UPA, NDA or aGhastly Numbered Front that comes to pow-errmly resolves to ensure that Indias strategicfrontiers are not rolled inwards, strategic con-tainment is assured. Those who take recourse tofatalism and declare that coalition politics doesntallow an assertive foreign policy, especially in In-dias neighbourhood, better not express indigna-tion when they spot a Chinese aircraft carriergroup a few hundred nautical miles from Kochi orMumbai. Actually, coalition politics has been of-fered as an excuse for gross mismanagement of

neighbourhood policybut other than during theelection season, coalition partners limit their for-eign policy demands largely to rhetoric. It standsto reason, therefore, that a central governmentthat cant stand up to pressure from its coalitionpartners cant stand up to pressure from Beijing.

Nitin Pai is editor of Pragati and blogs at The Acorn(acorn.nationalinterest.in)

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Metamorphoses Srikant Jakilinki


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PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

Taliban at the gate

Pakistanis are outraged, but the military holds the key AHSAN BUTT

THE INCREASING concerninternationally, re-gionally, and nationallydirected at Pakistansinternal stability is well-founded. The threat fromthe Taliban and their various local surrogates isgrowing, not abating, and there seems to be littlethat state institutions can do about it. These con-cerns raise important questions. How did Paki-stan get here? Why has it been unable to stemTaliban advancement in settled territory? And,most importantly, what is required for Pakistan toescape this existential crisis?

There have been three basic components of thegrowing Taliban problem: the political, the mili-tary, and the geopolitical.

The political problem has centred on a lack of willingness of Pakistan's political elite, as well aswide swathes of the public, to clearly and une-quivocally identify the Taliban as a force to be op-posed. This is for a number of reasons. First, therampant anti-Americanism that runs through thecountry has made it easy for the Taliban to beconceived of as the lesser of two evilsthe enemyof my enemy, if you will. Second, given the failureof Pakistan's traditional governing structures toactually deal with the problems of the averagePakistani, there has been a growing sympathy tothe idea of "Islamic democracy", whereby the stateis run on religious principles, if not religious lawsper se. Since everything else has failed, the logic

goes, why not give this a try? By this logic, what istruly problematic for many Pakistanis are themethods, and not the overarching goals, of theTaliban. Third, the Taliban are often looked uponas the "second-movers" in this war, whereby theymerely responded to the aggression showed bythe United States in Afghanistan and by formerPresident Pervez Musharraf in Waziristan. Not-withstanding the empirical questionability of eachof these claims, they make for a rm foundation of countenancing the Taliban, if not outrightly sup-porting them.

The military problem is rooted in the fact thatPakistan's armed forces are not terribly well-equipped to ghting wars, especially counter-insurgency wars against a primarily Pashtun en-

emy. Pakistan's military has lost every war it haslaunched or, at the very least, it has not won anyof them. More to the point, the military is nottrained to ght counterinsurgency wars on itsown soil. On the contrary, it is trained to ght theIndian military across the plains of Punjab. Fi-nally, given that the Pashtuns are the second-largest contingent in terms of ethnicity in thePakistan militarytheir membership in thearmed forces easily outpaces their share of thetotal populationthe questions of morale andwillingness amongst the troops are serious ones,

keeping in mind that the Taliban is primarily aPashtun movement. More generally, militarieswhich have been excessively involved in a coun-try's politics are sometimes unable to performtheir primary role due to their adopted powerpositions; the erosion of Argentina's military inthe 1970s and 1980s is a good example.

Finally, the geopolitical problem centres ontwo key actors: the United States and India. Withrespect to the U.S., the Pakistani military estab-lishment functions on the assumption that theAmericans will leave the region, that they will doso inevitably, and that they will do so soon. Thisassumption is born out of the partnership in the1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan, when atthe conclusion of the conict, the U.S. left Pakistan

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Image: Al Jazeera


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all alone in dealing with a porous border withAfghanistan, not to mention legions of armed andunemployed ghters who were convinced theywere waging war on Allahs behalf. American his-tory in the region, then, guides the belief that theirstay this time will be brief too.

What this expectation of an American exit doesis ensure that the entire military establishment inPakistan may not wholeheartedly be behind theconict against all elements of the Taliban, even if orders from above argue against such thinking.Why ght them today when they could come inhandy tomorrow, once the Americans have left?This strategic rationale is exacerbated by the per-ception of encirclement driven by India's closerelationship to the Karzai government, and thegrowing strategic partnership between the two in

the region.Finally, America's actions them-selveswhether they be the drone attacks brought upon by the Bush-Musharraf partnership,and expanded considerably by the Obama-

Zardari pairing, or the promise of an even greaterground force by Obama in neighbouring Afghani-stan -- are effectively pushing the Taliban east,closer and closer to the heart of Pakistan.

These factors in conjunction have meant that

the Taliban, far from being on the run, are spread-ing their tentacles further and further into the set-tled areas of Pakistan. Having moved in to Swat atthe end of last year, and easily winning control of the picturesque valley, they have now spread intoneighbouring districts. The Taliban now effec-tively administer important areas within onehundred miles of Islamabad, the federal capital.They have made inroads into Punjab, the coun-try's most populous and politically importantprovince. And they are treading water in Karachi,the country's business, commercial, and nancialhub, its port city, and its most (read: only) multi-ethnic city, where a substantial Pashtun popula-tion resides, which would allow them ease in re-maining undetected.

These developments should be wholly troubling for average Pakistanis. First and foremost,they mean the prospect of local customs and lead-ership literally being done away with. Second, business and "usual" economic activity grinds to ahalt under the Taliban; the only template we have,

that of Afghanistan in the 1990s, does not hold agreat deal of promise on this front. Third, womencan expect to be subjected to even greater viola-tions of basic human rights than they currentlyare deprived of in Pakistan. Fourth, all social andcultural freedoms, such as those of speech, art,religion, will be a thing of the past. The well-circulated video of a teenage girl being ogged inpublic for a crime that only a member of theTaliban would be able to explain is a fair harbin-ger of what the rest of Pakistan should expect un-

der Taliban rule. Unfortunately, such assessmentsare generally reached only when the Taliban actu-ally move into ones neighbourhood. Until themanifestation of a direct threat, it seems, Paki-stanis have been largely content to look the otherway.

Until now. In response to the trend of increas-ing Taliban inuence, there are small but substan-tive encouraging signs that Pakistan and its publicmay nally be waking up to the threat. Coveragein the local media has lately been almost exclu-sively focused on the Taliban's bold ventures intoPakistan's territory, and their challenge to the writof the state. Important gures, such as FazlurRehman, the leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami(JUI-F), a religious party with a historical footholdin the areas currently overrun by the Taliban, andNawaz Sharif, the country's most popular politi-cian, a centre-right gure who has hitherto shownlittle inclination to speak against the Taliban, have begun to publicly speak of the dangers that Paki-stan faces. Both General Kayani and the PrimeMinister have warned that the Taliban will not be

allowed to indenitely challenge the state.More importantly, the tide of public opinionmay nally be turning, from equivocation to out-rage. The rst salvo in the public opinion warsmay well have been the attack on the visiting SriLankan cricketers in March. Cricket was and is theone thing that unites this deeply divided country,and the Sri Lankans were the only internationalteam that braved to tour amidst the spectre of se-curity threats. Their targeting was an affront to allPakistanis. The infamous girl-being-ogged fol-lowed soon after, which was in turn followed bygreater Taliban incisions in Pakistani territory.And one has not even mentioned the as-yet un-yielding campaign of violence against Pakistanicivilians and security forces. Given these events in

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The tide of public opinion may nally beturning against the Taliban, from equivoca-

tion to outrage. The first salvo in the publicopinion wars may well have been the attackon the visiting Sri Lankan cricketers in March.


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the last eight weeks, it would not be surprising tond people more cognisant of the Taliban threat.

Despite these purported changes, however, themilitaryas always in Pakistanholds the key.Even though the leadership of the military has been unequivocal about security policy in the

country, the message appears to not have seepeddown to all actors involved. This must change.Simply put, there can be no more coddling of Taliban elements for geostrategic reasons. Indiaceased to be a threat to Pakistan on May 28, 1998.Even if India is friendly with Afghanistan, andeven if some members of Pakistan's military es-tablishment perceive encirclement, care must betaken to carefully evaluate the real threat, or lack thereof, that India poses to Pakistan's existentialsecurity. This is not 1914, and Pakistan is not

Germany. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal guaranteesthat India cannot overrun Pakistan, with or with-out an alliance with Afghanistan. The nuclearguarantee, unfortunately, does not extend to theprospect of the Taliban overrunning Pakistan. Themilitary establishment must decide which even-tuality is more likely.

Of course, this still ignores the very real possibility that even if Pakistan's military is willing totackle the Taliban, it is not able to. This may well be the scariest possibility of all. Those who havelong warned about the dangers of the Taliban andthe ostrich-like attitude of the media and the gen-eral public such as this writer have generallydirected their ire at those elements that constrainthe military by not providing political cover forthe war. Such a position is correct insofar as it as-sumes that public opinion and the vacillatingpolitical leadership is holding the military back.But it elides the possibility that the military sim-ply cannot do the job. Recall that from 2004 to2006, the military under Musharraf went into Wa-ziristan and came out with its tail between its legs,

having lost more than a thousand soldiers with-out winning any substantial political concessions.What makes us so sure that Swat, Malakand, and if it comes to it Punjab will be so different?

Whether the answer to that question is as troubling as it could be is something we must discoverfor ourselves. Pakistanis of all stripes -- from themedia to the public, from the political leadershipto the military -- must unite in the face of thisthreat. It is time for action, not words. Though no

options, whether they be military, diplomatic, oreconomic, should ever be taken off the table in awar, it is clear that concessions and negotiationsdo not work the Taliban. They are not reliablepartners, and they have made a habit of renegingon every single agreement they have made with

the government, whether it be Musharraf's orZardari's. Pakistans security apparatus mustmake place for greater (and smarter) force at this juncture, and Pakistans government must ensurethat the damage to innocents is minimized asthose actions are taken including safe passagefor locals, and temporary housing and care forinternally displaced persons. Such sacrices re-quire unity before all else, and fortunately, theTaliban may just have done the hard job for us byoverplaying their hand in recent weeks. It is now

up to the institutions of the state -- the civilians in

parliament, and the men entrusted to protect ourterritorial integrity -- to do their job, and savePakistanis from this madness.

At the signing of the declaration of Americanindependence, Benjamin Franklin told the at-tendees present that we must all hang together, ormost assuredly we shall all hang separately. Thatadvice would serve Pakistanis innitely betterthan any amount of cash notes that bear Frank-

lins likeness. This is Pakistans war, and it must be fought and won for and by Pakistanis. Anyfudging of that fact, and any abdication of owner-ship of this conict, would have consequences toodire to contemplate.

Ahsan Butt is a doctoral student at the political sci-ence department of the University of Chicago andblogs at Five Rupees(verupees.blogspot.com)

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From 2004 to 2006, the military underGeneral Musharraf went into Waziristan andcame out with its tail between its legs, havinglost more than a thousand soldiers withoutwinning any substantial political concessions.What makes us so sure that Swat, Malakand,andif it comes to itPunjab will be so differ-ent?


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PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

Middle-class saviour

The inevitable defeat of the TalibanMOSHARRAF ZAIDI

THE YOUNG lust that infuriates the fascist Flint-stones of Malakand is only the beginning of thelove chronicles that will extinguish the little em- ber that they mistake for a raging re. That littleember is disenchantment with the state in thiscountry. Unfortunately for these comedic miscar-riages of reality there is only one raging re inPakistan. It is the re of Pakistans urban middleclass. Sure there are randomly distributed fascistmullahs in the cities too, and many of them havetaken the choreography of Su Mohammed toheart. But if it was so easy to convert the madras-sahs of this country into the nodes of a bloody

fascist Flintstone revolution, it would have al-ready happened.

The real love affair that the Taliban and theirilk should be scared of is the incandescent passionwith which Pakistanis, religious and irreligious,love their big, bulking behemoth of a country.March 15 may be a long and distant memory inthe newspapers, but its markings on the DNA of Pakistan are still fresh. The scars that it has left arestill raw, and the traditional elite in this countryhave not forgotten the humiliation of that day.Both the feudal politicians and the wannabe-feudal military leaders in this country grosslymis-underestimated (a Bushism all too appropri-ate for this Pakistan) the size and heat of themovement to restore the judiciary. The Taliban,

the TNSM and the Lal Masjid Brigades repeat themistakes made by the traditional elite for goodreason. Their DNA is imprinted with the MadeBy The Traditional Elite of Pakistan label. It isseductive to be blinded by ideological opportun-ism, paralysed by romance for family dynasties orconstrained by linguistic or ethnic politics. Butsuch seduction should not alter a clear reading of how Pakistan got to where it is. Irrational publicdiscourse under the cloak of religion in Pakistandid not appear from the sky. It has been carefullycultivated by the traditional elite of Paki-stanmilitary and political both.

Controlling the mosques with their left hands,and the triggers of civilian and military guns withtheir rightthe traditional elites' kneeling beforethe Swat Flintstones should not be such a shocker.The demands for the Nizam-e-Adl regulation met

with nary a whimper of resistance from theseelite, because they would much rather continuemilking the people, rather than delivering realchange. If ceding some space to the faux wrath of a perverted distributive justice agenda is the wayto get the immediate problem off its back, so be it.It is a lot easier than to actually respond to theincreasingly urgent calls for reform and renewalin Pakistans increasingly globalised cities.

The MQM, for all its deep rooted failures andtortuous history, understands the urban agenda

better than any political party in the country. ItsDNA, despite its ethnic roots, has been forged inKarachi, a dingy, dirty, unmanageable and glori-ous city of more than 16 million. Despite the clearand obvious threats that a free judiciary poses tothe MQM, the party chose not to allow anotherMay 12 to transpire this March, as the lawyersmade their nal push for the restoration of theChief Justice. They did this because they under-stood that the lawyers movement itself, was adeeply urban phenomenon.

Its urban character is also why the MQM hasspoken loudly and proudly against the ridiculoushanding over of Pakistani sovereignty to theTNSM. Best of all, MQMs depth of relationshipwith urban sentiment is evident in the starkly dif-

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19 No 26 | May 2009

Photo: Omar Ayaz


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ferent rhetoric that it chooses in engaging with theissues, as compared to Pakistans Gucci and Pradaliberals. By convening a conference of religiousscholars to essentially blacken and stain the dealwith the TNSM, the MQM did not bow to funda-mentalists. It simply embraced the Muslim reali-

ties of Pakistans middle class, without cedingthat reality to a bunch of deeply delusional mul-lahs.

Of course, no self-respecting secular, progres-sive Pakistani liberal would be caught dead atsuch a convention. And thats the whole pointabout the difference between legitimate andmainstream politics, and the kind of cheese andcracker liberals that want to bury religion alto-gether in South Asia. Good luck. The MQM getscities, its inhabitants, and gets their inextricable

link to faith and is therefore a serious powerplayer in this country. The liberals are a loud butpolitically sterile mini-minority. As much as thelawyers movement was an a-religious movement,it was not amoral. Most Pakistanis, including theEnglish-speaking, Priyanka-gawking, bank-employed and city-dwelling, still draw their pri-mary moral inspiration from Islam.

Drawing inspiration from a work of art, and being able to identify the key messages of thepiece of course, are two different things. Sincehanding over the mosque to the least equippeddemographic in Muslim South Asia at Sir SyedAhmed Khans request, the ashrafs of Hind-o-Pak-o-Bangla have essentially abdicated theirfaith to a rudderless clergy. The engine that sus-tains this clergy's ownership of the mosque andmadrassah, is a mutually reinforcing and su-premely condent ignorance of Islam. The clergykeeps preaching whatever self-fullling ignoranthatred that will make it relevant and keep it cur-rent. Meanwhile, keenly aware of his or her ownignorance, the ashraf will keep running further

and further from the mosque, calling anyone whodoesnt sign-up for New Age Susm on the back of guitars and hashish, a backward mullah.

The results of this car wreck of the Momineenare manifest from Kabul to Dhaka. But it is politi-cally radioactive material. No one wants to touchit. India and Bangladesh can continue to get awaywith the twisted and mangled Islam that is SouthAsias legacy, maybe. But the endorsement of thisequation by international and national organisa-tions that were looking to win a Cold War in Af-ghanistan and Pakistan have now borne somevery poisonous fruit.

The detoxication of Islam in Pakistanandthat is where the challenge is now most urgentisnot going to happen because drunken Facebook

status updates say it should. Taking the ght tothe clergy and its agents of irrationality and intol-erance with music, dance and poetry is self-defeating. The language of Muslim religious dis-course is not punctuated by raagas. Unsurpris-ingly, it drips with Islamic symbolism. Modern

Pakistan needs to stop being to be shy of engagingthe clergy with those same symbols. Indeed, it isthe uncontested monopolisation of those symbolsthat has enabled the current rot. When up againsta rational discourse that takes pains to respect,rather than reject some basic elements of faith,more often than not the mullahs will lose the ar-gument. Ignorance has a very short shelf life, es-pecially in the face of knowledge, and moral clar-ity.

Simply put, there are more Hakim Saids (the

Hamdard family patriarch) in Pakistans Muslimhistory than there are Su Mohammads. That factis inescapable, and its implications are irresistible.Fought properly, there is only one outcome in the battle for the soul of Pakistanvictory for thepeace-loving masses, and defeat for the restorm-fanning agents of irrationality.

Of course, the MQM represents a deeply com-promised ag-bearer for the political ght againstthe Taliban. Despite a much-reformed partyagenda, the ethnic afliation of its top leadershipis an issue that has consistently kept it from grow-ing beyond urban Sindh. Moreover, rather ironi-cally, its political choices since 1999 have put it

directly at odds with urban Punjab. Ultimately,however, the alliance between urban Sindh andurban Punjab is a natural and inevitable one. Thisinevitability was all too visible to President Asif Ali Zardari, and it is what inspired the unnaturalalliance between the PPP and the MQMtwoparties that were at opposite ends of the violenceand mayhem of May 12. Despite the federalist benets of the PPP-MQM alliance, and the dan-gers of a rural Sindh that has no allies in either thePunjab or in Karachi, this political expedience isnot a sustainable arrangement in the long run.

Of course, the challenge in the Punjab is thePML (N)s ability to continue to be a vessel for thearticulation of urban Pakistans political ethos.Taking on the mullah without abdicating its cen-

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Modern Pakistan needs to stop being to be shyof engaging the clergy with Islamic symbolism.

Indeed, it is the uncontested monopolisation of those symbols that has enabled the current rot.


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trist Muslim identity is a critical challenge for thePML (N). Traditionally, it has been assumed thatthe natural role of taking on the mullah belongs tothe PPP. Todays PPP, lacking the brilliance of aBhutto as its eld marshall, is hurting. It is unableto seamlessly integrate the feudal tendencies of its

electoral strength with the urbane (not urban)sensibilities of its somewhat exceptional cadre of highly qualied advisors. The growing wisdomand alacrity of the Prime Minister notwithstand-ing, the PPP will take at least a generation to growinto a viable force in Pakistans new urban fron-tier. Until then, compromise with the most unpal-atable negotiating-table partners is all the partycan do, to stay alive. This is doubly true for theANP, which has been unfairly burdened with the blame for the Swat deal. In fact, the ANP has done

what every party other than the MQM would do

in the same situation. Without a military that iswilling to take the battleeld heat, political partieshave no choice but to nd compromise solutionsto intractable problems.

None of the realpolitik of the day however,alters the bottomline truth about Pakistan in 2009.There is a big set of unresolved issues aroundwhich violent extremists are able to construct arationale for their murderous campaign for power.The resonance and appeal of these issues is unde-niable. The bloodshed at the Lal Masjid in 2007,

the covert sexual revolution that has taken placeon the back of Bollywoods ever-growing hormo-nal range, and a massive telecom boom, and thecollateral damage of drone attacks all have seriousplay in mainstream Pakistan.

But these issues are not the sole informants of Pakistaniatto use Adil Najams phraseology.They are among a larger galaxy of issues. Proof of this is in the political performance of the right-wing, even as recently as the February 18, 2008

elections. Despite the bread and butter nature of these issues in urban and rural Pakistan, the relig-ious right failed to win back the gifts handed to it by the deeply awed elections of 2002. The keyquestion is not whether the religious right in Paki-stan can mobilise meaningful numbers to actual-

ise its vision for a strait-jacketed and irrationalPakistan. They cannot. Even though these issuesare shared across a broad spectrum, the religiousright is tone-deaf, and politically irrelevant. And if the JUI and JI and their cohorts cant win thestreet, the Taliban dont have a chance.

The key question therefore is not about thepopulism of the Taliban, the TNSM, or any violentextremists in Pakistan. It is whether PakistaniMuslims will remain hostage to their sense of re-ligious inferiority to the mullah. In fear of violat-

ing the precepts of a faith to which most Paki-stanis are still deeply committed, will the peoplegive mullahs like Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid carte blanche to destroy this country? The MQMsulema conference may cause all kinds of squirm-ing, but it answers the question unequivocally. Nothey will not.

The biggest roadblock between the Taliban andthe rest of the world is Pakistans middle class. Itsinvestment in a discourse around the faith that itadheres to, and its urgent and uncompromisingappetite for structural reform of the Pakistanistate are inevitable. And it is the inevitability of the Pakistani middle classs engagement with se-rious issues in Pakistan that ultimately will be therewall that will hold. Violent extremists can ogthe odd alleged straying couple, but they cannotog 172 million Pakistanis, or the 30 million of them that are cityfolk now. The Taliban cannotwin this war. That is why theyre so angry all thetime.

Mosharraf Zaidi advises governments, donors andNGOs on public policy. His website is atmosharrafzaidi.com. An earlier version of this articleappeared in The News on April 21, 2009.

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21 No 26 | May 2009

The biggest roadblock between the Taliban andthe rest of the world is Pakistans middle class.Its investment in a discourse around the faiththat it adheres to, and its urgent and uncom-promising appetite for structural reform of thePakistani state are inevitable.


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BALOCHISTAN

Waiting for true federation

Baloch nationalism is not entirely incongruent with the idea of PakistanUMAIR AHMED MUHAJIR

IT HAS been apparent for some time now (at leastsince the killing of Baloch leader Nawab AftabAhmed Bugti in August 2006 by the Pakistaniarmy) that Balochistan might well end up as Paki-stan's biggest challenge. Not in terms of security,narrowly-dened, but in terms of the challenge itposes to the idea of Pakistan, and to the demo-cratic aspirations of that countrys people. Whatshould be no less apparent are the implications of the troubles in Balochistan for both India and theUnited States, and the region as a whole.

Most Pakistanis are too young to remem- beror too remote fromthe mass killings andrapes of Bengalis (by the Pakistani army, thoughalso by other Bengalis, most notably the Jamaat-e-Islami) in 1971. Pakistanis have hitherto tended toapproach issues of secession primarily throughthe prism of Kashmir, and the challenge that

state's secessionist movement poses to Indian de-mocracy and the claims of its national ideology.But Balochistan underscores many of the sameissues (although the movement in Balochistan,animated as it appears to be by concerns with re-source exploitation by outsiders, and culturalalienation from the mainstream, is more analo-gous to some of Indias North-Eastern insurgen-cies than to Kashmir), but has not gotten the atten-tion it deserves. This is true within Pakistan, inpart due to the tendency of the urban Pakistani

middle classes to lump together all the tribals outthere as savages who only understand the lan-guage of force. On this view, tribals are peoplewho may only be engaged anthropologically as itwereand this is so whether one extols them asnatural warriors, or dismisses them as incapableof being anything other than what the stereotypeof the hot-headed, backward subject of a tradi-tional tribal code condemns them to be. There isthus not much need to draw distinctions betweentribals, to differentiate the Baloch from the farmore numerous and politically signicantPashtuns.

Internationally too, the tendency is to ignoreBalochistan in favour of its neighbouring Pashtun-areas. The inclination is to view the province as

little more than the borderland between Afghani-stan, Iran, and Pakistan. It is a view that acknowl-edges the provinces strategic importance, butdoes not engage with the political aspirations of those for whom it is home.

Pragati Issue 26 - May2009

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