Political Origin of UNSC Power

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The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of ForceAuthor(s): Erik VoetenReviewed work(s):Source: International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer, 2005), pp. 527-557Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877808 .Accessed: 19/11/2011 09:30

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The Political Origins of the UNSecurity Council's Ability toLegitimize the Use of ForceErikVoeten

Abstract Since, at least, the PersianGulf War,states have behaved "as if" it iscostly to be unsuccessful in acquiringthe legitimacy the UN Security Council con-fers on uses of force. This observationis puzzling for theories that seek the originsof modern institutional legitimacy in legalities or moral values. I argue that whengovernments and citizens look for an authorityto legitimize the use of force, theygenerally do not seek an independent udgment on the appropriatenessof an inter-vention butpolitical reassuranceaboutthe consequencesof proposedmilitaryadven-tures. Council decisions legitimize or delegitimize uses of force in the sense thatthey form widely acceptedpolitical judgmentson whetheruses of force transgressalimit that should be defended. These judgments become focal points in the collabo-ration andcoordinationdilemmas states face in enforcing limits to U.S. power whilepreserving mutuallybeneficial cooperation.In this article, I discuss the implicationsfor the Council's legitimacy and theories of international egitimacy.

In a 1966 article, Claude observed that the function of collective legitimization inglobal politics is increasingly conferred on international organizations (IOs), andthat the United Nations (UN) has become the primary custodian of this legiti-macy. Claude argued that "the world organization has come to be regarded, andused, as a dispenser of politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims,policies, and actions of states."' This assertion is even more relevant now than itwas in 1966. States, including the United States, have shown the willingness to

Earlier ersions f this articlewerepresentedtthe2003 InternationaltudiesAssociationConfer-ence,Portland,Ore.,1 March;he2003 AnnualMeetings f theAmerican oliticalScienceAssocia-tion,Philadelphia,9August;Columbia niversitynternationaloliticsSeries,NewYork, 9September2003;and heOlinInstituteorStrategic tudiesat Harvard niversity, ambridge,October 003.Ithank heparticipantsn theseseminars,heeditor, ndanonymouseferees f International rgani-zation;andI alsothankBobAxelrod,BruceCronin,MichaelDark,MonicaDuffyToft,NishaFazal,JimFearon,Martha innemore,ageFortna, tacyGoddard,Macartan umphries,anHurd,PatrickThaddeus ackson,AndrewKydd,EdwardMiller,KatiaPapagianni, itaParhad,HolgerSchmidt,Arturo otomayor,ndJoelWestraoruseful omments,uggestions,ndcorrections.susual, emain-ing errors rethesoleresponsibilityf the author.1. Claude1966,367.InternationalOrganization59, Summer2005, pp. 527-557? 2005 by The IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050198


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528 InternationalOrganization

incur significant cost in terms of time, policy compromise, and side-paymentssimply to obtain the stamp of approvalfrom the UN Security Council (SC) formilitary actions. To be sure, if the attemptto achieve a SC compromise provedunsuccessful, the United States has not shied away from using other means topursue its ends. Nevertheless, the failure to acquireSC approval s generallyper-ceived as costly, giving SC decisions considerable clout in internationalpolitics.Given its lack of enforcement capabilities, the SC's leverage resides almostentirely in the perceived legitimacy its decisions grantto forceful actions.2Gov-ernments across the globe appearmore willing to cooperate voluntarilyonce theSC has conferred ts blessing on a use of force. Why has the SC become the mostimpressive source of international egitimacy for the use of militaryforce? That itwould be so is far from obvious. Claude, for instance, thoughtof the UN GeneralAssembly (GA) as the ultimateconferrerof legitimacy.3Franckargued n his influ-ential 1990 treatise on legitimacy that if one were interested n identifyingrules inthe internationalsystem with a strong compliance pull, the provisions in the UNCharterthat grant the SC military enforcementpowers (ChapterVII) should beset aside.4Since then, these provisions have been invoked with greatregularitytolegitimize uses of force.The developmentis also puzzling from a theoreticalperspective.Most theoristsseek the origins of modern institutional legitimacy in legal or moral principles.However, the SC has been inconsistent at best in applying legal principles; itsdecision-making proceduresare not inclusive, transparent, r based on egalitarianprinciples;its decisions are frequentlyclouded by the threatof outside action; andthe moralityof its (non-) actions is widely debated.Hence, it is unlikely that theinstitutionhas the ability to appeardepoliticized, an argument hatmotivatesmostconstructivistaccounts of institutionallegitimacy in the internationalarena.5On the other hand, scholars who study the strategic aspects of internationalpolitics have largely dismissed the UN from their analyses.6This article providesa firmerbase for the role of the SC in strategic interactions.I argue that whengovernments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force,they generally do not seek an independent udgmenton the appropriateness f anintervention;rather,they want political reassuranceabout the consequences ofproposed militaryadventures.The rationaleis based on an analysis of the strate-gic dilemmasthatimpede cooperation n a unipolarworld. In the absence of cred-ible limits to power, fears of exploitation stifle cooperation. Because no singlestate can credibly check the superpower,enforcing limits on the superpower'sbehavior involves overcoming a complex coordination dilemma. A cooperativeequilibriumthat implies self-enforcing limits to the exercise of power exists butis unlikely to emerge spontaneously given thatgovernmentshave conflicting per-

2. See Barnett1997; Caron 1993; and Hurd 1999 and 2002.3. Claude1966,373.4. Franck 1990, 42.5. See especially Barnett and Finnemore 1999.6. Hoffmann 1998, 179.


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SecurityCouncil's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force 529

ceptions about what constitute legitimate actions and fundamental ransgressionsby the superpower.The SC provides a focal solution that has the characteristicsof an elite pact: an agreementamong a select set of actors that seeks to neutral-ize threats to stability by institutionalizingnonmajoritarianmechanismsfor con-flict resolution. The elite pact'sauthoritydependson the operationof a social normin which SC approvalprovides a green light for states to cooperate, whereas itsabsence triggersa coordinatedresponsethatimposes costs on violators. The obser-vance of this normallows for more cooperationand restraint han can be achievedin the absence of coordinationon the SC as the proper nstitutionaldevice. Hencethe extent to which the SC confers legitimacy on uses of force dependsnot on theperceived normativequalities of the institution,but on the extent to which actorsin international oliticsbelieve that normcomplianceproduces avorableoutcomes.The attractivenessof the elite pact accountresides partlyin its abilityto explainthe emergenceof a limited degree of governancein the international ystem with-out assuming the existence of a collective global identity that generates an ideo-logical consensus over appropriateforms of global governance. There is littleevidence that such a consensus exists. Thus accounts that require only a limitedset of a prioricommon values appearmore plausible. Furthermore, he elite pactmodel better fits the SC's institutionaldesign than alternativeaccounts and pro-vides a plausible explanationfor the suddensurge in authority ollowing the GulfWar.Finally, the model stresses that elite pacts need to be self-enforcing. Thisopens a more promisingavenue for analyzingnorm stabilitythanthe constructiv-ist assumptionthatnorms are internalized.The articleproceedswith a broadoverview of temporal luctuations n the extentto which states have historically put weight on SC decisions. The next sectionexplains why SC authoritystems from its ability to legitimize uses of force andprovides an operationaldefinition. While thereis a large literature hat asserts thatSC decisions confer legitimacy on uses of force, explanations for this phenom-enon are rarely made explicit. One of the contributionsof this article is to moreprecisely identify the variousplausibleroles of the SC in the international ystem.After discussing the four most common (thoughoften implicit) explanations,theelite pact argument s introducedmore elaborately.The conclusion discusses theimplications or theories of internationalegitimacyand the futureof SC legitimacy.

The SecurityCouncil and Its Authorityover Usesof ForceWhen states sign the UN Charter, hey pledge not to use or threaten orce "againstthe territorial ntegrity or political independence of any state, or in any mannerinconsistent with the Purposesof the United Nations."7 The Charterdelegates sig-nificantauthorityto the SC to decide whetherparticularuses of force meet these

7. UN Charter,Article 2(4).


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purposes. This delegation is necessitated by the incompleteness of any contractthat seeks to regulatethe use of force but falls shortof forbiddingit outright.TheCharterprovides some guidance by explicitly specifying two general circum-stances in which force may be exercised.First,Article 51 of the Charteraffirmsthe inherentrightof statesto use force inindividual or collective self-defense againstarmed attacks.In principle, states arenot obliged to obtain the approvalof the SC for invoking this right."However,states routinelyresort to expanded conceptions of self-defense in attemptsto jus-tify unilateraluses of force. SC resolutionsconceivably provide judgments on themerit of self-defense claims. An example is Resolution 1373, which reaffirmstherightof the United States to act forcefully in its self-defense againstterroristactiv-ities and de facto legitimized the U.S. militaryaction in Afghanistan.9This reso-lution, however, was quite exceptional. In nearly all other controversialclaims toself-defense the SC has been unable or unwilling to rule on the legitimacy of self-defense claims; instead allowing the GA to adopt highly politicized and mostlyignored resolutions about the legitimacy of uses of force.l0Second, ChapterVII of the Charterdefines a more active role for the SC in themanagementof internationalsecurity. This chapterlays out a set of proceduresthroughwhich the SC can authorizeuses of force in responseto the "existenceofany threatto the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."" Before 1990,the SC adopted only twenty-two resolutions under ChapterVII, most of whichauthorizedsanctions ratherthan uses of force.12 The two most importantexcep-tions were the Congo peacekeepingforce and the KoreanWar(1950). In the lattercase, authorizationwas possible only because of the temporaryabsence of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) to protestthe exclusion of the People'sRepublic of China from the Council. In anticipationof deadlock when the USSRwould retake its seat, the SC adopted the 1950 "Unitingfor Peace Resolution,"which allowed the GA to take responsibility in security affairs if the SC wereunable to act. It has been invoked ten times, most notably in 1956 to order theFrench and British to stop their military interventionin the Suez Canal and tocreate the UN EmergencyForce to provide a bufferbetween Egyptianand Israeliforces.

Although the UN's effectiveness and decisiveness were often limited, the UNwas actively involved in the managementof many internationalconflicts in thefirst twenty-five years of its existence. Decisions by the UN's political organscar-ried some weight, even to realists such as Hans Morgenthau,who arguedthattheUnited States should be willing to compromiseto "tokeep the United Nations in

8. See Schachter1989; and Franck 2001. Under the Charter, tates do have an obligationto notifythe SC.9. SC Resolution 1373, 28 September2001.10. Schachter 1989.11. UN Charter,Article 39.12. Bailey and Daws 1998, 271.


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existence and make it an effective instrumentof internationalgovernment." 3Between the late-1960s and 1989, however, neither the GA nor the SC exercisedmuchinfluence over when or whetherstates resorted to force, a developmentchar-acterized by Haas as evidence for "regime decay."14States, including the greatpowers, repeatedly ntervenedmilitarilywithoutconsideringUN authorizationandroutinelyignoredresolutionscondemningtheiractions. Most obviously, this holdsfor majorCold Warinterventions,such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanandthe U.S. militaryaction in Vietnam.But it also pertainsto smallerconflicts. U.S.PresidentRonaldReaganfamously claimedthat the 1983 GA resolutioncondemn-ing the United States for its intervention n Grenada"didn'tupset his breakfastatall."15"This disregardfor the authorityof the UN over uses of force continued atleast until December 1989, when the United States invaded Panamawithout con-sideringasking approvalfrom any IO. A GA resolutiondeploringthe interventionhad no discernable mpacton domestic public or elite supportfor the intervention,and neither did a SC resolutionthat the United States vetoed.16The successful cooperationbetween states in the firstPersian Gulf Warabruptlyturnedthe SC into the naturalfirst stop for coalition building.17 t is importanttoappreciatethe magnitudeof the suddenthe shift in SC activity immediatelyafteroperation Desert Storm. Between 1977 and the start of the Gulf War, the SChad adoptedonly two resolutions under ChapterVII.18Between 1990 and 1998,the Council approved 145 ChapterVII resolutions.19The number of UN com-mandedmissions thatused force beyond traditionalpeacekeepingprincipleswentfrom one (Congo) before 1990 to five thereafter.20 he numberof missions wherethe authorityto exercise force was delegated to interestedparties went from one(Korea)to twelve.21Since 1990, the SC has authorizeduses of force by coalitionsof able and willing states in Europe (for example, the formerYugoslavia),Africa(for example, SierraLeone, Somalia, the GreatLakes Region), Latin America (forexample, Haiti), Oceania (for example, East-Timor), and Asia (For example,Afghanistan).

This spurtin activity does not simply reflect a newfound harmonyin the pref-erences of the five veto powers. China and Russia frequentlyabstained from SCvotes and often accompanied their abstentions with statements of discontent.22Reaching agreement often involved difficult compromises that had a noticeable

13. Morgenthau1954, 11.14. Haas 1983.15. Cited in Luck 2002, 63.16. Luck 2002, 64.17. Baker 1995, 278.18. See SC Resolution 502, 3 April 1982; SC Resolution 598, 20 July 1987; and Bailey and Daws1998, 272.19. Bailey and Daws 1998, 271.20. Jakobsen2002.21. Ibid.22. Voeten 2001.


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impact on the implementationof operations,as exemplified most prolifically bythe Bosnia case.23 On several occasions, the United States made significant side-payments to obtain SC blessing for operations it could easily, and de facto did,execute alone or with a few allies. For instance, in exchange for consent for theU.S. intervention n Haiti,Chinaand Russia obtainedsizeable concessions, includ-ing a favorable WorldBank loan and U.S. supportfor peacekeeping in Georgia.24Thus, attainingSC approvalfor a use of force is no easy task.Governmentsoutside the United States have also placed considerableweight onSC decisions. SC authorizationwas crucial to Australia'swillingness to intervenein East-Timor.25ndia has since 1992 committedto a "pro-active" pproach owardUN peacekeepingmissions,providinggeneroustroopcontributions crosstheglobeto UN-approvedmissions while refusingto supplyto troopsfor non-UN approvedmissions.26New interpretationsof Basic Law provisions that restrictGermanmil-itaryactivity abroadhave madeexceptions for Germanparticipation n UN peace-keeping andpeacemakingmissions, as well as North AtlanticTreaty Organization(NATO) and West EuropeanUnion (WEU) operationsdirected at implementingSC resolutions.27Japanhas adopted a law that makes military contributionsofmost kinds conditional on SC authorization.28 hus even for these powerful statesthat lack permanentmembership,SC approvalhas become almost imperativeforparticipation n cooperative militaryendeavors.

The increased significance of SC authorization s also apparent n public opin-ion, both in the United States and elsewhere. There is a wealth of evidence thatAmericans consistently preferUN actions to other types of multilateral nterven-tions and even more so to unilateral initiatives. For example, in a January2003poll, the Program on InternationalPolicy Attitudes (PIPA) asked respondentswhetherthey "thinkthe UN SecurityCouncil has the right to authorizethe use ofmilitaryforce to preventa countrythat does not have nuclearweaponsfromacquir-ing them."Of all respondents,76 percentansweredaffirmativelyto this question,whereas only 48 percentbelieves the United States without UN approvalhas thisright.29What is impressive about these findings is their consistency across inter-ventions, question formats, and time.30 Public opinion outside the United Statestends to insist even more strongly on UN authorization.31This suggests that SCauthorizationmay facilitate foreign leaders to participate n militaryactions.

23. See Christopher1998.24. Malone 1998.25. Coleman 2004.26. Krishnasamy2003.27. Bundesverfassungsgericht Federal ConstitutionalCourt]90, 286, 12 July 1994.28. Law Concerning Cooperationfor United Nations Peacekeeping Operationsand Other Opera-tions (the InternationalPeace CooperationLaw) originally passed in June 1992. For other examples,see Hurd 1999.29. PIPA2003a. Poll conductedamong 1,063 Americanadults,marginof error+/-3 percent.Theorder of the questions was randomized.30. Kull 2002.31. See GermanMarshallFund and Compagniadi San Paolo 2003; and Thompson2004.


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Security Council'sAbility to Legitimize the Use of Force 533

The observationthat, since the Persian Gulf War,it has become costly to cir-cumvent the authorityof the SC is not completely underminedby the two maincases where this authorityhas been ignored:the Kosovo interventionandthe 2003Iraq intervention.The absence of SC authorizationfor the Kosovo interventionwas generally (andexplicitly) perceived as unfortunateby the U.S. administrationand even more so by its allies in the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization NATO).32NATO motivatedits actions by referringto previous SC resolutions and obtainedSC authorization or the peacekeepingmission andtransitionalauthority hatwereset up in the immediateaftermathof the militarycampaign.Similarly,the UnitedStates went to considerablelength to persuadethe SC to authorizethe Iraqinter-vention, argued repeatedly that it was implementing past SC resolutions, andreturned o the SC in the immediateaftermathof the intervention.33Moreover,theabsence of SC authorization s often used domestically in the argumentthat thelack of allies makes the war unnecessarilyexpensive. ThatNATOand the UnitedStates eventually went ahead without SC authorizationdoes demonstrate,how-ever, that the SC may raise the costs of unilateral action but cannot prevent italtogether.34As former U.S. Secretaryof Defense William Cohen said about SCauthorization or the Kosovo intervention:"It'sdesirable,not imperative." 5

LegitimacyThe previous section illustrates that since the PersianGulf War,the main states inworld politics have behaved "as if" it is costly to circumventthe authorityof theSC when deciding on uses of force. How can one explain this observationgiventhat the SC lacks independent capabilities to enforce its decisions? Several com-monplace explanationsfor IO authorityapply poorly to the SC. There are few, ifany, institutional mechanisms that allow states to create credible long-termcom-mitments to the institution, making it an unlikely candidatefor locking in poli-cies, along the lines suggested by Ikenberry.36 he tasks thatthe SC performsarenot routine anddo not requirehigh levels of specific expertiseorknowledge. Thus,delegation of decision-making authority o the SC does not result in similargainsfromspecializationthatplausiblyexplain why statesarewilling to delegateauthor-ity to IOs such as the WorldBank37and the InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).38In the absence of obvious alternativesources, the origins of the SC authorityareusuallyassumedto lie in the legitimacyit conferson forceful actions.39 Actions

32. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, 218-19.33. See also Frederking2003.34. See also Hurd2003, 205.35. See New YorkTimes,12 June 1998, Al.36. Ikenberry2001. Accordingly, Ikenberry ocuses on NATOand GATT/WTO.37. Nielson andTierney 2003.38. Martin2003.39. See Caron 1993; and Hurd 1999.


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that are perceived as legitimate are obeyed voluntarily rather than challenged.Hence, obtaining legitimacy for proposed interventionsis valuable. This clearlyimplies that legitimacy resides entirely in the subjective beliefs of actors.40 Thiscontrasts with the conception that legitimacy properlysignifies an evaluation onnormative grounds, usually derived from democratic theory. In this view, if aninstitution fails to meet a set of specified standards t is illegitimate, regardlessofhow individual actors perceive the institution. While it is importantto evaluatehow democraticprinciples ought to be extended to a global arena,41 such a nor-mative approach s unlikely to generate much insight into the question why SCdecisions confer the legitimacy they do.I define legitimacy perceptions as the beliefs of actors that the convention orsocial norm that the SC authorizesandforbidsdiscretionaryuses of force by statesagainst states should be upheld. Discretionaryuses of force are those that do notinvolve direct andundisputedself-defense againstan attack.Thus the authorityofthe SC resides in the beliefs of actors that violating this social norm is costly,undesirable,or inappropriate.This focus on perceptionsand on the social aspectof legitimacy is consistent with constructivistapproaches.42 t also fits rationalistaccounts of self-enforcing conventions and social norms.43The primaryactors are governments,who decide on uses of force and are themembers of the UN. However, because governments, especially democraticallyelected ones, rely on the supportof citizens, the perceptions of individuals alsomatter in an indirectway. In addition,it may well be that actors in the state withthe intent to use force, most often the United States in ourexamples, and actorsinother states may have different motivations for insisting on SC authorization.44

ExplanationsWhy do state actors believe that a failure to achieve SC authorization s undesir-able? What sustains these beliefs? To find convincing answers to these questionsone needs to appreciatenot only why states demandsome form of multilateralism,but also the reasons that would lead actors to rely on the SC ratherthan alterna-tives, such as the GA, regional institutions (for example, NATO), or multilateralcoalitions that are not embedded in formal IOs. Thus, pointing to a general incli-nation towardmultilateralismdoes not form a satisfactoryexplanationof the empir-ical pattern.45Besides institutional orm, a persuasiveaccountmustprovideusefulinsights aboutthe sources for temporalvariation n the authorityof the SC, includ-

40. Weber 1978.41. For example, Held 1995.42. See especially Hurd 1999.43. See Lewis 1969; andYoung 1993.44. See also Thompson 2004.45. See Ruggie 1993.


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ing its suddensurgefollowing the Gulf War.Moreover,it should give a plausibleexplanationfor how these beliefs can be sustainedgiven the behaviorof the SC.Most theoreticalaccounts arguethat the legitimacy of international nstitutionsresides in theirability to appeardepoliticized by faithfully applying a set of rules,procedures,and norms that are deemed desirableby the internationalcommuni-ty.46I discuss threevariantsof this general argument hat each stresses a differentrole for institutions:consistently applyinglegal rules, facilitatingdeliberation,andincreasingaccountabilityand fairness.Alternatively,the origins of the SC's legit-imacy may lie in beliefs thatgrantingthe SC the authority o legitimize force gen-erally lead to more desirable outcomes. The public goods explanationdiscussedbelow fits this mold, as does the elite pact account.

Legal ConsistencyMuch legal scholarshipassumes that the SC derives its ability to legitimize anddelegitimize the use of force from its capacityto formjudgments about the extentto which proposedactions fit a legal framework hat defines a system of collectivesecurity.Although the SC is explicitly a political institution rather than a court,there is a body of customaryandwritten internationalaw thatprovidesa basis fordeterminationsaboutthe legality of self-defense actions and other uses of force.47The indiscriminatorynature of legal norms potentially makes legal uses of forcemore acceptable to governmentsand citizens than actions that do not meet legalstandards.To maintain its standing as a legitimate conferrerof legal judgments,an institutionmust thus strive for consistency in its rulings and motivate devia-tions from past practicewith (developing) legal principles.This standardhas use-fully been appliedto otherbodies, such as disputeresolutionmechanisms in tradeorganizations48 ndthe EuropeanCourtof Justice (ECJ).49Thatlegal consistencyis the institutionalbehavior thatreinforces legitimacy beliefs also motivates con-cerns by legal scholars that the SC squanders ts legitimacy when it behaves inways that are inconsistent with general principlesof international aw.50Thereis, however,no empiricalevidence thatlegal consistency has been a driv-ing force behind SC decisions. Duringthe Cold War,thejudgmentsby UN bodieson the legality of self-defense actions were widely perceived as politically moti-vated and not persuasiveon the issue of lawfulness.51The SC has not developed aconsistent doctrine on this mattersince the end of the Cold War.The most note-worthy decision is the previously noted Resolution 1373, which affirms the rightof the United States to act forcefully in its self-defense against terroristactivities.The extensive scope of the resolution has led some to question its legal founda-

46. Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 708.47. See Murphy1997 for an overview.48. Kelemen 2001.49. Burley and Mattli 1993.50. See Alvarez 1995; Farer2002; Glennon 2001; and Kirgis 1995.51. Schachter1989.


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tions. As Farerputs it: "At this point, there is simply no cosmopolitan body ofrespectablelegal opinion that could be invoked to supportso broada conceptionof self-defense."52With regard to Chapter VII authorizations, the most basic determination iswhethera situationpresentsa threat o internationalpeace andsecurity.Such "Arti-cle 39 determinations"have been stretchedon multiple occasions to accommo-date immediatepolitical objectives. For example, Iraqiactions in Kurdishareasin1991, the humanitarian ragedy in Somalia in 1992, the civil war in Angola in1993, the failure to implementelection resultsin Haiti in 1994, andLibya'sunwill-ingness to surrenderts citizens accused of terrorismhave all been deemed threatsto internationalpeace.53Most importantly, herehas been no seriouseffort at moti-vating the Article 39 determinationon these resolutions. As Kirgis points out:"[I]f we are concerned aboutthe responsibleuse of power by a marginally repre-sentative nternational rganthat atpresent s not subject o recallorjudicialreview,we shouldexpectthe SecurityCouncilto be conscious of how andwhy it is expand-ing the definition.It shouldalso contemplatethe limits to be appliedto the broaderdefinition. It should, in other words, make principledArticle 39 determinations,publicly explicated, that do not set unlimitedor unintendedprecedents." 4Legal scholars have noted a variety of other difficulties considering SC deci-sions, includingthecommonpracticeto delegatetheuse of forceto individualstatesorgroupingsof states,the failureto definea greaterrole forjudicial review throughthe InternationalCourtof Justice,andthe extentto whichthe Charterobliges statesto seek peacefulresolutionsbeforeauthorizing orce.55Glennonhas concludedthatcoherent nternationalaw concerning nterventionby statesno longerexists.56 Oth-ers counterthatthe Charterdoes not impose meaningfulrestrictionson the set ofcases in which the SC can legally authorizeforceful means.57Clearly,either viewprecludes that legal consistency is the driving force behind the SC's legitimizingability.This does not meanthatlegal normsdo not affect the use of force. The normto ask for approvalfrom the SC for the use of force can itself be understoodas alegal norm.The observationthat this normis mostly obeyed even though the SCitself has shown little regardfor legal principleswarrantsan explanation.

Forumfor DeliberationA second set of scholars claim that while legal argumentsare not decisive in theSC, law plays a broaderrole in the process of justificatorydiscourse.58This view

52. Farer2002, 359.53. See SC Resolution 688, 5 April 1991; SC Resolution 794, 3 December 1992; and SC Resolu-tion 940, 31 July 1994.54. Kirgis 1995, 517. See also Gordon 1994.55. See Alvarez 1995; Glennon 2001; and Kirgis 1995.56. Glennon 1999 and 2001.57. Franck 1999.58. See Johnstone2003; and Sandholtzand Stone Sweet 2004.


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relies on thenotionthatgovernmentsgenerallyfeel compelledtojustify theiractionson something other than self-interest.This may be so because governmentsseekto acquire the supportof other governments,domestic political actors, or publicopinion. Or, it may be that governmentshave internalizedstandards or appropri-ate behavior that are embedded in international egal norms. The importanceoflaw in persuasionresides in its ability to put limits on the set of argumentsthatcan acceptably be invoked.59Moreover, professional experts (international aw-yers) help distinguish good argumentsfrom poor ones in the evaluation of truthclaims. Of course, the extent to which legal specialists can performthis functiondepends on the presence of a relatively coherent body of international aw thatregulates uses of force.

Alternatively,discourse in the SC may be guided by rules that the internationalcommunity collectively understandsto guide the process of acquiring approvalfor uses of force, even if not codified by law.60This thesis relies on the presenceof easily recognizable common values thatfacilitate the evaluationof arguments.The above view provides a promisingaccount for why states frequently appealto legal arguments,precedents, and collective security rules, even if final deci-sions often violate those rules. However, this view does not provide a plausibleexplanation for the role of the SC in this discursive process. It is widely recog-nized that the SC falls far short of Habermasianconditions for effective commu-nicative action.61There is only a shallow set of common values, participantsareunequal, and the SC relies extensively on unrecordedand informal consultationsbetweensubsets of thepermanentmembers.62U.S. Secretaryof StateColinPowell'spublic exposition of evidence for the case against Iraqwas highly unusual and ofquestionable efficacy as a persuasive effort.63More frequently,the most visibleefforts atpersuasionoccuroutsideof the institutionalcontextof the SC. SC debatesare usually recitations by representativesof statements prepared by their statedepartments.Strategicincentives further mpede deliberation.There are clear andobvious incentives for states to misrepresent heirpositions, as the stakes are clearand the relevantactors few. In short, it is hard to see how the institutionalsettingof the SC contributesto the process of justificatorydiscourse and why, if deliber-ation were so important, nstitutional reformshave not been undertakenor alter-native venues such as the GA have not grown more relevant.

AppropriateProceduresAn institution's decisions may be seen as legitimate because the institution'sdecision-makingprocess corresponds o practicedeemed desirableby membersof

59. Johnstone2003.60. Frederking2003.61. See Johnstone2003; and Risse 2000.62. See Bailey and Daws 1998; Woods 1999; andWood 1996.63. Colin Powell, "Remarks o the United Nations Security Council," New YorkCity, 5 February2003.


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the community. Beliefs about the appropriatenessof a decision-making processconstitutean importantsource of authority or domestic political institutions,par-ticularly in democracies. Citizens may attach inherentvalue to procedures thatconform to principles widely shared in a society. As a consequence, decisions ofan institution may be perceived as legitimate even if these produce outcomesdeemed undesirable.64 n a similar vein, accountability, proceduralfairness, andbroadparticipationare often seen as inherentelements of the legitimacy of IOs.65This assumptionunderlies the common argument hatthe main threatto SC legit-imacy is that the institutionis dominatedby a few countries and that its proce-dures areopaqueandunfair.66The assertion is that the SC's decisions would carrygreater legitimacy if its procedures more closely matched liberal norms, whichallegedly have become increasingly important n international ociety.67The many attemptsto reform the SC indicate that the legitimacy of the SC maybe enhanced from the perspectiveof some if its decision-makingproceduresmoreclosely correspondedto liberal principles. But one cannot plausibly explain thelegitimacy the SC does confer on uses of force from the assumptionthat govern-ments and citizens demand appropriateprocess. As outlined earlier, SC practicesets a low standard f measuredagainst any reasonable set of liberal principles.One may object that a use of force authorizedby the SC more closely approxi-mates standardsof appropriateprocedurethan unilateralactions. But if demandsfor appropriateprocedurewere strong, one would surely expect a greateruse ofmore inclusive IOs, such as a returnto the "unitingfor peace" procedurepopularin the 1950s and 1960s, perhapsunder a weighted voting system. Instead,the GAhas grown increasinglyirrelevant or legitimizing uses of force. Alternatively,onemight have expected reforms thatincrease transparencyand accountability,whichhave been moderatelysuccessful in international inancial nstitutions. Some arguethat accountabilityhas worsened in the 1990s, as the GA can no longer hold theSC accountablethroughthe budget by qualified majorityrule,68and because ofthe increasinglycommon practiceof delegatingthe authority o use force to statesand regional organizations.69It is equally implausible that the general public appreciatesthe SC for its pro-cedures. The public knows little about how the SC makes its decisions. Even inthe midst of the Iraqcontroversy,32 percent of the U.S. public claimed that theUnited States does not have the right to veto SC decisions,70 and only 16 percentcould name the five members with veto power.71 Knowledge is not much better

64. Gibson1989.65. Forexample, ee Keohane ndNye 2001;andWoods1999.66. SeeespeciallyCaron1993.67. See thediscussionn Barnett 997.68. Woods1999.69. Blokker 000.70. According to PIPA2003b, 55 percentthoughtthat the United States does have thatright.71. GermanMarshallFund and Compagniadi San Paolo 2003.


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SecurityCouncil'sAbility to Legitimize the Use of Force 539

elsewhere, with correct identificationof permanentmembers varying in a nine-country study from 5 percentin Portugalto 24 percent in Germany.72Finally and most fundamentally, here is no set of common values thatgenerateconsensus about what constitutes appropriateglobal governance. Disagreementshave become especially apparent n debates about voting rules and membershipquestions,but they have also surfaced in virtually any other areawhere meaning-ful reforms have been proposed.73 Even liberal democracies generally disagreeon if and how liberal principles ought to be extended to global governance.74Explanationsthat emphasize strongcommon values are less likely to be success-ful for a diverse global organization han for an institutionwith morehomogenousmembership.

Global Public GoodsAn alternativeview is thatthe SC helps solve collective actionproblemsthat arisein the productionof global public goods.75 Successful peacekeeping operationsreduce suffering and save lives. Globalization and the end of the Cold Warmayhave increased demands for internationalactions that produce such effects.76Inaddition,UN-authorized nterventionsmay providea measureof stabilityandsecu-rity that benefits virtually all nations. For example, the first Gulf War reinforcedthe normthat state bordersnot be changedforcibly and secured the stabilityof theglobal oil supply.77 These benefits accrue to all status quo powers and are noteasily excludable.Models of public good provision predict that poor nations will be able to freerideoff the contributions f wealthiernationsand that thepublic good will be under-providedbecause contributorsdo not take into account the spillover benefits thattheirsupportconfers to others.The SC may help alleviate underprovisionand freeriding in threeways. First, the fixed burden-sharingmechanism for peacekeepingoperationsprovides an institutionalsolution thathelps reduce risks of bargainingfailuresandlessens transaction osts.78 Second, the delegationof decision-makingauthority o a small numberof statesmay facilitate compromiseon the amount ofpublic good that ought to be produced.79Third,the SC helps states pool resourc-es.80 The existence of selective incentives induces some states to incur more thantheir requiredshare of the peacekeeping burden. For example, Kuwait paid two-

72. Ibid.73. Luck 2003.74. See Schmitz and Sikkink 2002, 521; and Slaughter1995.75. For analyses along these lines see Khanna,Sandler,andShimizu 1998;Bobrow andBoyer 1997;and Shimizu and Sandler2002.76. Jakobsen 2002.77. Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994.78. This system was put in place in 1973 by GeneralAssembly Resolution 310.79. Martin 1992, 773.80. Abbott and Snidal 1998.


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thirds of the bill for the UN Iraq-KuwaitObservationMission through voluntarycontributions.Australiaproved willing to shouldera disproportionate hare of thepeacekeepingburden n East-Timor.States are more likely to make such contribu-tions when these addto the efforts of others in a predictablemanner.The absence of enforcement mechanismsimplies that the survivalof this coop-erative solution depends on a social norm. This norm firstand foremost requiresstates to pay their share of the burden.The more states believe that this norm isfollowed, the fewer incentives they have to free ride in any particularcase. Inindividual instances, states must be willing to shouldera largershareof the bur-den than they would with a voluntarymechanism, because they believe that thebenefits from upholding the social norm (greater public good productionin thelong run) exceed the short-termbenefits of shirking.Hence, interventions autho-rized by the SC could be perceived as more legitimatein the sense thatthey signala longer-termcommitmentto global public good production.Although this argument s plausible theoretically,it fails to account for somenoticeable empirical patterns.First, the belief among rationalactors that the SCplays this role should and probably has weakened considerably since the early1990s. The much-publicized ailures in Somalia,Rwanda,and Bosnia shouldhavereduced beliefs that the SC is the appropriatemechanism for coordination thathelps solve problemsof public good production.Moreover,severalwealthy states,most notablythe United States, have failed repeatedlyto meet theirpeacekeepingassessments.As of 31 January2003, the United Stateshad $789 million in peace-keeping arrears.81Other states owe the UN $1.4 billion in payments for peace-keeping. These arrearsconstitute a sizeable portion of the total peacekeepingbudget.82Underthecollective actionmodel,the failureof statesto meet their assess-ments gives other states clear incentives to shirk.Second, the public goods rationale does not explain why states value SC autho-rizationeven when they do not use its fixed burden-sharingmechanism.Between1996 and 2000, estimated expenditureson non-UN-financed peacekeeping mis-sions have exceeded spendingon UN-financedoperationsby $11.5 billion.83 Inter-estingly, many of these non-UN-financed operations have taken place with theexplicit authorizationof the SC. For example, the mandates of the various peace-keepingandpeacemaking orcesin Bosnia,Kosovo, andAfghanistanwere all autho-rized at some point by SC resolutions,84but none of them are financedprimarilythroughthe UN system or executed by the UN.Third,the decision-makingproceduresgrantveto power to states that contrib-ute little to UN operationsand exclude some of the most significantcontributors.

81. See (http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/core/un-us-03.htm).Accessed 10 March2005.82. In the 2000-2002 period, yearly peacekeeping budgets were around$2.6 billion.83. Based on data from Shimizu and Sandler2002.84. Initial SC resolutions for respective missions were SC Resolution 1031, 15 December 1995; SCResolution 1088, 12 December 1996; SC Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999; and SC Resolution 1386, 20December 2001.


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Japanand Germanyare the second and thirdlargestcontributorsbut have no per-manentseat at the table. Chinacontributes ess than small Europeanstates suchasBelgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands,but has the right to veto any resolution.8If public good provisionwere the primeconcern,reform of these decision-makingmechanismswould be in every state's best interest.It would prevent largecontrib-utors from abandoningthe institution or refusing to pay their dues. Internationalfinancialinstitutions,such as the WorldBank and the IMF,have adoptedweightedvoting rules thatbetter fit these objectives.The value states attach to SC authorizationrests not entirely in the extent towhich it forms an institutionalsolution to free-riderproblems that lead to under-productionof public goods. However, the public good argument s not completelywithout merit. Several SC-authorizedpeacekeeping missions have helped resolveconflicts andhave contributed o the implementationof peace agreements.86More-over, a global alternative s not readily available.The elite pact rationalesuggeststhat the main function of the SC in this may be that it addressesa distributionalissue that frequentlyimpedes successful collective action.

The Security Council as an Elite PactAn alternativeperspectiveis thatthe SC is an institutional manifestationof a cen-tralcoalition of greatpowers.87This view does not proclaimthatthe SC enforcesa broadsystem of collective security,but rather hatit may serve as a useful mech-anismthatfacilitates cooperativeefforts in an anarchicworldcharacterizedby thesecuritydilemma.88Concertswere historicallydesigned to deal with situationsofmultipolaritythat followed the defeat of hegemony. However, similar incentivesfor cooperationexist in a unipolarworld characterizedby interdependence.Therearesubstantialpotentialgains fromcooperationbetween the superpowerandotherstates on economic issues such as trade and financial stability. Moreover, manygovernmentsface common security threatssuch as terrorismand states with thecapacityandintention to challenge statusquoboundariesorproducenuclearweap-ons. The main impedimentto cooperationunder the security dilemma is fear ofexploitation.89Such fears are also relevant in a unipolarworld where the super-power can use its preponderant apabilities to extract concessions, set the termsfor cooperation, and act against the interests of individual states without beingchecked by a single credible power.

85. Based on datain Shimizu and Sandler2002.86. Doyle and Sambanis 2000.87. Rosecrance 1992.88. Jervis 1985. Otherrealists believe that concerts were mostly epiphenomenal. See Downs andIida 1994.89. Jervis 1985, 69.


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In such asymmetricalsituations, credible limits to the use of force potentiallybenefitboth the superpowerand the rest of the world.90 n the absence of credibleguarantees,one observes suboptimal evels of cooperationas statespay a risk pre-mium, capturedfor instance by increased military expenditureor other actionstargetedat limiting the superpower'srelativeprimacy.Institutions,such as NATO,help increase the credibilityof security guaranteesby raising the cost of renegingfrom a commitment.However, the absence of an outside threatand strongcollec-tive identitymake such arrangementsmuch more difficult to achieve at the globallevel.Game-theoreticanalyses that treat institutionsas self-enforcing equilibriasug-gest an alternativeroute by which institutionshelp achieve betteroutcomes: theyaid in solving the coordinationdilemmaamong those actors thatfear exploitation.Potential individualchallenges are unlikely to deter a superpowerfrom engagingin transgressions.However, the prospectof a coordinatedchallenge may well per-suadethe superpower o follow restraint.For this to succeed, stateswould have toagree on a mechanismthatcredibly triggersa coordinatedresponse. For example,Greif, Milgrom,andWeingast arguethat merchantguilds duringthe late medievalperiod provideda credible threatof costly boycotts if trade centers violated mer-chants'propertyrights.91Withoutthese guilds, trade centers were unable to cred-ibly commit to not exploit individual merchantsand consequentially,merchantstraded ess than desiredby the tradecenters.As such, cooperationwith the guildsbecame self-enforcing:it was in the self-interestof all actors to abideby the coop-erative normand defend againstviolations of the norm.Therefore,breachesof thenorm came to be seen as illegitimate actions.There is, however, a complicating factor in applying this analogy to the inter-national arena.One can reasonably assume that merchantsagreed on a commondefinitionof what constituted a fundamental ransgressionby a tradecenter. Suchconsensus surely does not exist in the global arena.As the recent conflict overIraqillustrates,what some states perceive as a properuse of force, others see asan encroachment.This introducesa political componentto the problem.The stra-tegic dilemma in the international ystem thereforemoreclosely resembles thatofachieving limited governanceandrule of law in the context of ethnically,linguis-tically, and religiously heterogeneous societies, as analyzed by Weingast.92In heterogeneoussocieties, actorsusually have conflicting interestsaboutmanyaspects of governance.Weingast'smodel assumesthat each actorcan classify eachmove by the superpower93 as either a transgressionor a legitimate action. How-ever, actors do not necessarily agree on these classifications. A superpowercanexploit this by rewardinga subset of actors and infringingon the interests of the

90. Ikenberry 2001.91. Greif, Milgrom, andWeingast 1994.92. The informaldiscussion here relies on the formal analysis provided by Weingast 1997.93. Sovereign in Weingast'scase.


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Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force 543

others.Although there are many such uncooperative equilibria,in a dynamic set-ting the Pareto-optimalcooperative outcome is also an equilibrium.In this equi-librium, no transgressionsoccur and states can cooperate beneficially. However,this equilibriumentails that states agree on a mechanism that triggers a coordi-nated response against an identifiable action by the superpower.It also requiresthat states use trigger strategiesto punish one anotherfor failing to cooperatein acoordinatedchallenge. The heterogeneousactors thatoccupy the international ys-tem are unlikely to resolve their coordinationdilemma in a wholly decentralizedmanner.In accordancewith the literatureon comparativepolitics, Weingast suggests thatthe most effective manner to induce limited governance in divided societies isthroughelite pacts.94An elite pact is an agreementamong a select set of actorsthat seeks to neutralize threats to stability by institutionalizing nonmajoritarianmechanisms for conflict resolution.The SC can usefully be understoodas such apact thatfunctions as a focal point thathelps stateactorscoordinatewhat limits tothe exercise of power should be defended. If the SC authorizesa use of force, thesuperpowerand the states that cooperate should not be challenged. If, however,the United States exercises force in the absence of SC authorization,other statesshouldchallenge it and its allies, for instance,by reducing cooperationelsewhere.This equilibriumbehaviorcan be understoodas a social norm or convention. Fora convention to be successful, it needs to be self-enforcing.This means that actorsshould find it in their interest to punish unilateral defections from the pact, forexample, because they believe that deviations have the potential to steer inter-nationalsociety down a conflict-riddenpath.SC authorizationshuslegitimize usesof force in thatthey form widely accepted political judgmentsthatsignal whethera use of force transgressesa limit that shouldbe defended.This fits with the con-ventional interpretationhat legitimate power is limited power.To domestic publics this conventionperformsa signaling function.Citizens aregenerally unprepared o make accurate inferences about the likely consequencesof forceful actions. If the convention operatesas specified above, SC agreementprovides the public with a shortcut on the likely consequences of foreign adven-tures.SC authorizationndicatesthatno costly challengeswill resultfrom the action.The absenceof SC authorizationon the otherhand,signals the possibility of costlychallenges andreducedcooperation.A U.S. public thatgenerallywants the UnitedStates to be involved internationallybut is fearful of overextension95may valuesuch a signalingfunction. To foreign publics, SC approvalsignals thata particularuse of force does not constitute an abuse of power that should lead to a coordi-nated, costly response.96Clearly this conception of the SC poses fewer informa-tional demandson general publics than alternatives.Moreover,it does not rely on

94. For example, see Lijphart1969; Rustow 1970; and Tsebelis 1990.95. Holsti 2004.96. For a similarargument,see Thompson 2004.


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the assumptionthatcitizens sharecommon values about the normativequalities ofglobal governance.All citizens need to understand s thatSC authorizationmpliessome measure of consent and cooperation, whereas the absence of authorizationsignals potential challenges. The symbolic (focal point) aspect of SC approvalallows for analogies to past experiences in a way thatcooperativeefforts throughad hoc coalitions do not.More generally, the elite pact account does not depend on the existence of abroad set of common values that generates a consensus about what global gover-nance should look like. For a cooperative equilibriumto survive, it is not neces-sary that each actorbelieve that the normthat sustains the equilibrium s morallyappropriate,as long as most nonbelievers assume thatotheractors would react toviolations. This is consistent with Weber's view on why a social order is bindingon an individual level.97 It helps explain the observation that governments insiston SC authorizationsof uses of force even if they challenge the normativequali-ties of the institution.As observedearlier,powerful states such as Germany,Japan,and India, as well as many developing countries,regularlycriticize the SC for itscomposition anddecision-makingprocedures.Yet, they also insist on SC authori-zation of uses of force and in some cases even adjusttheirdomestic laws to makecooperationconditionalon SC.The elite pact account has several other interesting implications that put it atodds with the alternativeaccounts. The remainderof this section discusses threeof these: the mode of transformation, nstitutionaldesign, and the self-enforcingcharacterof the pact.

Mode of TransformationThe alternativeexplanationseither do not give a clear predictionof how a shift inthe authorityof the SC takes place or (implicitly) assume that change occurs inresponse to gradualnormative shifts towardgreaterreliance on liberal values orglobalization.98The elite pact model predicts that if a shift toward a more coop-erative equilibriumoccurs, it will be in response to a discrete event. Elite pactscannot be formed at just any time. In the most naturaluncoordinatedequilibrium,groups of actors exploit others and have no direct incentive to stop this practice.Elite pacts are therefore imposed following galvanizing events that disturb thebeliefs on which a preceding equilibriumrested.99The conclusion of majorwarsis particularly ikely to upset previously held beliefs andpayoff structures.'00

97. Weber 1978.98. See Barnett1997; and Jakobsen2002.99. Weingast 1997. See also Rustow 1970.100. This logic is also apparent n Ikenberry2001, who also stresses the importance of creatingcredible limits to the exercise of power through institutions. However, the logic that grants the SCauthority s different here than in Ikenberry.


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This is compatiblewith the empiricalrecord. Concertswere imposed followingthe defeat of a hegemon in a majorwar;a characterizationhat also fits the forma-tion of the SC in the immediate aftermathof World WarII.1O'Nevertheless, thepact was not self-enforcing and had little bearingon whateverstability there wasduringmost of the Cold War.'02The end of the Cold Warcreated uncertainty nthe perceptionsof states about new equilibriumbehavior.In such a situation it ishighly likely that the mannerby which a cooperativeresolution to the firstmajorinternationalconflict was reachedgreatly influencedbeliefs among policymakers,politiciansandcitizens aboutthe futureresolutionof conflicts,andhencethatadher-ence to the normthat the SC authorizes force helps enforce a stable (but limited)form of governance.

It is importantto emphasize that the strategicdilemma that states faced in theGulf Warmatchesthe game thatmotivatesthe elite pact account.First,therewereclear incentives for cooperation.The Iraqi conquest of Kuwait constituteda vio-lation of an internationalnorm thatnearlyall states would preferto uphold.More-over, many states had strategicinterests in the region that could be harmedby aunilateralresponse. Second, there were fears of exploitation. These were espe-cially apparent n the USSR andmotivatedits initialpreferencefor prolongedeco-nomic sanctions over multilateral ntervention.'03Such fears were also evident inChina,'04Arab states,'05 and even Europe, especially in France, where PresidentFrancois Mitterrandhad to force the resignationof his defense ministerover theissue.106Mitterrandexplained to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that SCapprovalwas necessary even if lawyers believed that the interventionwas legallyjustifiable without explicit authorization:107Fifty-fivemillion Frenchpeople arenot international awyers. We need that resolution to ensure the consequences itwill entail."108 Thus, Mitterandbelieved that his domestic audience desiredreas-surance and that SC approvalwould provide it. Finally, the U.S. motivation forseeking SC approvalhinged strongly on the acquisitionof political approvalthat

101. See Claude 1964; and Jervis 1985.102. It is beyond the scope of this paperto speculate on the reasons.A potential answer is that itspurpose, to restrain a weak defeated state (Germany),was rapidlyresolved.103. Forexample,StrobeTalbottwrote in 1991:"Inone Kremlinsession, a top officialof the DefenseMinistry predictedthat U.S. forces would "stay in the Gulf region indefinitely,"constituting a "newthreat" o Soviet security.In effect, and perhapsin intent as well, he continued, the U.S. was takingadvantageof the end of the cold warby moving its heaviest concentrationof manpowerand firepowerfrom Europeto the soft underbellyof the U.S.S.R." See TimeMagazine, 2 September1991. Availableathttp://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1101910902-157772,00.html.Accessed 18April2005.For more see Freedmanand Karsh 1993, 79.104. Fravel 1996.105. See Faksh and Faris 1993; and Lesch 1991.106. Jean-PierreChevenement,seen as the leader of a fractionof Mitterrand's ocialistParty,report-edly said that"Americancolonisation is more pleasantthan Soviet invasion, but while the latter s notlikely to happen, the former is going on every day."Guardian, 1 February1991.107. Namely throughthe previously mentionedArticle 51 procedure.108. Baker 1995, 315. Also cited in Thompson2004.


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would remove suspicions of exploitative behavior. Baker explained his logic ofgoing throughthe SC in the following way:But to my way of thinking our disagreementabout legalities was academic.As a practicalmatter,the United States had no real choice initially but to trya coalition approach n dealingwith the crisis.... The credibilityof our causewould be suspect, not just in the Arab world, but even to some in the West,including the United States.109The PersianGulf Warwas successful in thatthe firstmajorconflict afterthe ColdWar was resolved in a cooperative mannerwithout the United States overextend-ing. As I establishedearlier,there was a surgein SC activity immediatelyfollow-ing the Persian Gulf War.Whereas the United States never considered asking forSC authorization or its intervention n Panama n December 1989, such requestsbecame commonplace after the successful cooperativeeffort to remove IraqfromKuwait. The suggestion here is that this development was directly related to theexperience of the Gulf Warin the uncertainenvironmentof the end of the ColdWar ratherthanan ideationalchange that stipulatedgreatersympathyfor legal orliberal values.There is much anecdotal evidence that policymakersand politicians across theglobe were indeed at least moderately optimistic aboutthe prospects for coopera-tion through he SC in the aftermathof the Gulf War.110 hat the experiencewouldmake a big impression on policymakers is also supportedby studies of foreignpolicy decision making.For example, Khong has shown thatwar experiences thathave consensual interpretationsare likely to be uncritically,and perhapsinappro-priately,used as analogies for future decisions."' Even those who believed thatthe legitimacy of the SC was based on false perceptionsof reality usually did notargue that it was irrelevant,but rather that it was dangerous.112 The success ofcooperationalso shapedperceptionsamongthe generalpublic. In a December 1992Newsweekpoll, 87 percent agreedwith the statement:"The US should commit itstroops only as partof a United Nations operation." 13 Before 1990, questions thatsuggested a primacyfor the UN or the need for UN authorization or interventionswere not even asked to the Americanpublic."14This too suggestsa changein expec-tations about what the SC could and should do.

109. Baker1995,279.110. See, forexample, he discussionsn BennettandLepgold1993;RussettandSutterlin 991;andUrquhart991.111. Khong1992.112. See Krauthammer990/1991;andLefever1993.113. 10 percent disagreed and 3 percent answered "don'tknow."Poll executed by Gallup on 3-4December 1992.114. This statement s based on searchesfor the 1980s in the archivesIPOLL,Polling the Nations,and a collection of survey items sent by Clay Ramsay, Research Director Programon InternationalPolicy Attitudes,University of Maryland.Most questionsrelatedto the UN either asked aboutgeneralsupportor supportfor peacekeeping missions in ThirdWorld countries.


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InstitutionalDesignThe argumentadvanced here does not presumethat it was inevitable that the SCwould play the role it did in the Persian Gulf Waror that it would have risen tothe same prominencehad the Yugoslaviancrisis occurredbefore the Gulf War.115Rather,I maintainthat given that the SC functioned as it did at a time of greatuncertaintyaboutequilibriumbehavior,it is plausible thatit impressedbeliefs onstate actors that a cooperativeequilibriumcould be played with the SC as a focalsolution. Nevertheless, the institutionaldesign of the SC did make it a more via-ble candidatefor such a role than alternative nstitutions.

First,elite pactseschew majoritarian ecision makingandcommonlygrant nflu-ential actors the power to veto decisions.116This is understandablebecause thegoal of elite pacts is stability,not properprocedure.Stabilityis threatened f thosewith the power to disturb it are overruled in the decision process. Thus the GAwould be a poor coordinationdevice and indeed has been largely irrelevant insecurity affairsthroughout he 1990s.Second, the process by which compromisesin elite cartels are achieved is gen-erally secretive ratherthantransparent.Public deliberationmanifests heterogene-ity and commits actors to take stands from which it is costly to recede. For themost part, the public record of SC meetings is uninformativeabout true motiva-tions actors have as most compromises are achieved in unrecordednegotiations.Extensive public debate is uncommonandcounterproductive, s commentedon inthe section on deliberation.

Third,elite cartelsusuallyembraceprinciplesof subsidiarityor segmentalauthor-ity.117 Delegating discretion to influential actors within their own domain helpspreserve satisfactionwith the statusquo. It has become the modal option for theSC to de facto delegate the authorityto use force to regional organizations(forexample, NATO,Economic Communityof WestAfrican States) or regional pow-ers (forexample,UnitedStates,Australia).Thiscreatesseriousproblemsof account-ability and has questionablelegal foundations in the Charter." It fits, however,within the purposeof an elite pact.Althoughthe elite pact's primary ocus is to define instancesof appropriateusesof powerby the United States andhence to identifythe circumstancesunderwhichother states may legitimately cooperatewith the United States, it may also conferjudgments on the use of force by regional powers. For instance, SC approvalofAustralia's ntervention n East-Timorsignals thatthis use of force is legitimateinthatit should not triggera coordinatedresponse by other states. In the absence ofsuch an assurance,a militaryinterventionthat enhancespeace and security in theregion may be more difficult to undertake for Australia in that the risks may be

115. The latterhypotheticalis especially interestingand, in my mind, unresolved.116. Andeweg 2000.117. Ibid.118. Blokker 2000.


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less clear to the governmentand the public. In this sense, the SC may enhancetheproduction of public goods, although through a different mechanism than dis-cussed in the previous section. It provides a political judgment on whether a par-ticular use of force is sufficiently in the "public interest" such that it can besupportedratherthanchallenged.Although the SC's institutional characteristicsreflect the general propertiesofan elite pact well, one can surely think of alternativeand perhapsmore efficientdesigns to tackle the coordinationproblem. For example, it may not be obviouswhy states would rely on a formal institutionratherthan a club-based organiza-tion with less explicit decision-making procedures,such as the Groupof 7 (G-7)or the Concert of Europe.119 irst,formalinstitutionshelp solve time-inconsistencyproblems that sometimes impede mutuallybeneficial resolutions of distributionalconflicts.'20A formal SC authorization or militaryactionraises the cost for Chinaor Russia to withdraw from endorsing it because everyone knows they had theopportunityto veto the action. These costs may be lower in a club-basedorgani-zation. Second, fixed decision-making procedureshelp clarify expectations andthus reduceuncertainties hatmay impedecompromisesto distributive onflicts.121Third,the institutionalcontext of the UN facilitatesthe symbolic functionthattheSC performsfor domestic publics. Finally, negotiating an entirely new elite pactis difficult. The fact that the SC is substantivelycharged with authorizingforceand had some experience with doing so may help explain the pull toward theinstitution.

Norm StabilityConstructivists ave criticizedrationalistapproaches orbeing ontologicallyinclinedto revisionism and thereforeunable to adequatelyexplainthe persistenceof norms,since self-interested actors do not value the norms themselves, just the benefitsdirectly accruingfrom them.122nstead,constructivists ypically assumethatactorsinternalizesocial norms. The conceptof internalizations borrowed rom the devel-opmentalandsocial psychology literature,where it is used to characterize he pro-cess by which humans absorbnormsand values present n their social environmentto develop standards or appropriatebehavior.Once these standardsare internal-ized, actors do not reevaluate adherenceto them when choosing between alterna-tive courses of action. There are both good theoretical and empirical reasons tosuspect that internalization s not a prominentsource of normstability in the caseunderinvestigation. Theoretically,it is not at all obvious how the internalization

119. For an argument hat decisions in international inance are increasinglymade in closed clubs;see Drezner2003.120. Weingastand Marshall 1988.121. See GarrettandWeingast 1993; and Morrow 1994.122. See Hurd 1999, 387; and Wendt 1999.


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conceptextends to stateactors,especially when these aremakingdecisions regard-ing behavior than can hardlybe described as habitual:the use of military force.Empirically, hereareexamples aplentywhere state actorsconsciously andexplic-itly evaluatedthe trade-offbetween the legitimacy benefitsof the SC and the costsof compromise necessary to obtain those benefits.'23This suggests a differentthoughtprocess than internalizationwould.That internalization s unlikely does imply that norm stability is a concern. Inthe elite pactmodel, a stablenormreflectsa self-enforcingequilibrium.This indeedrequiresthat governmentsmust find that their expected utility of abiding by thenormexceeds theirutilityfromactingotherwise.Whether he norm s self-enforcingdependsat least partlyon the behavior of the institutionitself. If the SC conformsto the expectationsof actorsregarding ts function,the legitimacybeliefs on whichits authority s based arereinforced.If, however, the SC defies those expectations,these beliefs areundermined. f the behaviorof the SC reinforcesthe social norm,more actors in more situationsperceive it to be in their interest to adhereto it. Ifthe behavior of the SC undermines the social norm, fewer actors in fewer situa-tions supportit. This self-underminingprocess can reach a critical level at whichthe equilibriumis no longer self-enforcing and institutionalchange should fol-low.124 This point is consistent with the common assumptionthatregimes weakenwhen actual practice is inconsistent with the rules and norms that constitute theregime.125Behavior associated with the SC reinforces the social norm if it contributestokeepingU.S. powerin check while avoiding costly challengesandmaintainingben-eficial forms of global cooperation.It underminesthe social norm if it either failsto provideanadequatecheck on U.S. powerorleads to costly challenges.Inobserv-ing a SC authorization or the use of force, one shouldnot observemeaningfulchal-lenges to the United Statesby otherstates.If importantstateswould retaliate evenafter the United States obtains SC authorization,the United States may be lessinclined to follow the social norm in futureinstances. In addition,the decision toauthorizeforce cannotmerely be a rubberstamp.If those states thatare delegatedthe responsibilities to constrainU.S. power give too much leeway, SC decisionslose theirutility to otherstates.This implies thatto maintainthe equilibrium t willsometimes be necessary for permanentmembersto defend the interests of impor-tant states not represented n the Council.126 f they would fail to do so, the socialnormwould be of little use to these states andthey might challenge it.Besides the Persian Gulf War,other reinforcing examples include the Haitianand Somalian invasions, and the various resolutions on Bosnia. These cases may

123. For example, Voeten2001.124. Greif and Laitin2004. Legitimacy beliefs can be understoodas "quasi-parameters." hese areparameters hatcan graduallybe alteredby the implications of the institution,but a marginalchangewill not necessarily cause behaviorassociated with the institutionto change.125. Krasner1982.126. On the practiceof informalconsultations,see Hurd 1997.


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not have been resolved in a mannerthat is satisfactory from a moral, legal, orefficiency standpoint,but they did not resultin an overextensionof U.S. power orin costly challenges against its power, despite disagreementsbetween states overthe propercourses of action.If the United States uses force in the absence of SC agreement,one should seecountermeasures hat are costly to the United States. If states fail to react, morepeople within the United States will believe thata lack of SC authorizationcarriesno serious consequences and thus fewer believe that the social norm should beadheredto. To other states, the utility of the SC as an institutionto limit power isdiminished if the United States can engage in unpunishedtransgressions.More-over, states shouldseek to punishotherstatesthatcooperatewith the United Statesin the absence of SC authorization.The Kosovo interventionpresentsthe firstimportantdeviationfromthe norm.127The decision by the United Statesand its NATO allies to interveneforcefully with-out SC authorizationdid elicit protestfrom various sources, but it did not triggeran extensive coordinatedresponse.Therewere two circumstancesthatmodify theweakening implicationsfor the SC somewhat,thoughnot entirely.First,the actionwas executed by NATO,which implied some checks to U.S. power. Of course, ifgoing throughNATO would establish itself as an easier and risk-free alternativestrategy the social norm that grants the SC authority is undermined. Second,althoughthere was no explicit SC authorization o use force, there were two pre-vious resolutions that at least implied a forceful response.128 More importantly,the SC adoptednew resolutions that definedan extensive role for the UN once thefightingended.129The United States andits allies were willing to delegate author-ity to the UN in implementing their victory, thus alleviating fears of overexten-sion somewhat. Nevertheless, the Kosovo episode should at least have had theconsequence that fewer people in fewer situationsbelieve thatthe absence of SCauthorization or an intervention carriesgreat costs.The decision by the Bush administrationn 2003 to invade Iraqin the absenceof SC authorizationpresents a more serious challenge. A large numberof coun-tries clearly perceived the U.S.-led interventionas a transgressionof acceptablelimits to U.S. power. Failureto generatea coordinatedresponse should seriouslyweaken the legitimacy of the SC. It leads U.S. decision makers to perceive thatthe benefit of SC authorizationor future nterventionss minor.Moreover, t shouldreduce the belief among states that the SC can provide a credible check on U.S.power, perhaps inducing these states to resort to othermeans.

127. Thereareat leasttwo caseswhereSC authorizationasambiguous:he1991enforcementfno-flyzonesin Iraqandthe 1998bombingn Iraqby the UnitedStatesandtheUK.The20 August1998bombingsn Sudan ndAfghanistannresponseotheterroristttacks nU.S.embassiesnTan-zaniaandKenyawerenotauthorized.heactionwasmotivateds anactof self-defense nd imitednscope. Responses included variousdenunciationsby states andorganizationssuch as the ArabLeague,which stressedthe absence of UN authorization.See Al-AhramWeeklyOnline, 27 August 1998, issue392. Available at (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/392/foc6.htm). Accessed 10 March 2005.128. See SC Resolution 1199, 23 September1998; and SC Resolution 1203, 24 October 1998.129. In particular, ee SC Resolution 1239, 14 May 1999; and SC Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.


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The early evidence is that challenging behavior is moderate.Pape has referredto it as "soft balancing,"meaning that it relies on recalcitrancein internationalinstitutions, he use of economic leverage, anddiplomaticeffortsto frustrateAmer-ican intentions.130The leaders of several Europeancountries strongly opposed tothe military action announced their intentions to increase military spending,strengthenmilitary cooperation within Europe, and strengthenmilitary ties withChina.131 Several states, most notably India and Japan,have made troop contri-butions conditional on SC resolutions. There is also some evidence that stateswho perceived the U.S. action as a transgressionsought to "punish"states thatcooperated in the absence of SC authorization.For instance, French PresidentJacques Chirac said the East Europeanleaders who signed letters of supportforthe U.S. position on Iraqhad "missed an opportunityto shut up," adding that he"felt they acted frivolously because entryinto the EuropeanUnion implies a min-imum of understanding or the others." 32 These actions should reinforce beliefsthatthereare some costs associated with actingandcooperatingwithoutSC autho-rization. While it is too early to draw more definitive conclusions, the actionsshouldalso reinforce beliefs that,at least in the shortrun,the costs from disobey-ing the norm are not prohibitively large.

ConclusionsThe ability of the SC to successfully restrain he United States is at the heart of itsaptitudeto play a legitimizing role in internationalpolitics. In this conception, alegitimate exercise of power abides by certain accepted limits. SC authorizationsignals the observance of these limits, which are defined not by legal, moral, orefficiency standards,butby an undemocraticpolitical processthatseeks to achievecompromise among elite actors. It is importantto understand hat although therole of the SC depends entirely on the configurationof state interests, this factdoes not make the institutionepiphenomenal.There are many potentialequilibriaandconvergenceon aparticular semicooperative)equilibriumhas important mpli-cations. This is true even if the restraint on the exercise of power is limited toraising the cost of unilateralism.Theoretically,this conception of legitimacy correspondsbest to those classicalrealists who did not considerpower and legitimacy to be antithetical,but comple-mentary.133 egitimacy,these theoristsargued,helps convertpower into authority.Authorityis a much cheaper regulatorydevice than the constantexercise of coer-cion. Therefore,attemptsto legitimize power are a persistentfeature of political

130. Boston Globe, 23 April 2003, H1.131. JointDeclarationMeeting of the Heads of State and Governmentof Germany,France,Luxem-bourg and Belgium on EuropeanDefense, Brussels, 29 April 2003.132. InternationalHerald Tribune,19 February2003, 3.133. On the UN see: Claude 1964, 1966; and Morgenthau1954, 10-11. Unfortunately,contempo-raryRealists have mostly ignored legitimacy. See Barnett1997, 529.


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life, even in the anarchicalglobal arena.However, these realists had little faith inlegalities or moral values as the sourcefor legitimacy.Instead,the process of legit-imationprimarily nvolves the acquisitionof political judgments about the properway in which the exercise of power ought to be limited.As Claude wrote in 1966:"[T]heprocess of legitimization is ultimatelya political phenomenon,a crystalli-zation of judgmentthatmay be influencedbut is unlikely to be wholly determinedby legal norms and moralprinciples."134This statementcontrastssharplywith theview that IOs derive their legitimacy precisely from their ability to appear depo-liticized. One way of reconciling these views is that the latter focuses mostly onthe role of IOs as bureaucraciesor courts, whereas the first stresses theirpoliticalarenarole. The UN encompassesboth roles, but the ability of the SC to legitimizethe use of force stems from its functionas a political meeting place. This politicalarenafunction of IOs has hitherto received too little attentionin the theoreticalliterature.The implications of this argumentdiffer in importantways from alternativeaccounts.The common claimamongscholarsof internationalaw that the SC threat-ens to lose its legitimacy if it adopts resolutions that do not fit a broaderlegalframeworkdepends strongly on the (usually implicit) assumptionthat its legiti-macy dependsprimarilyon its ability to fulfill the role of legal adjudicator.This isthe premise of Glennon's argumentthat the SC was a "grandattemptto subjectthe use of force to the rule of law,"which has "fallenvictim to geopolitical forcestoo strong for a legalist institution to withstand." 35If the SC's legitimacy doesnot critically dependon its functioningas a guardianof a legal system, as I arguehere, the legal consistency of SC resolutions should not per se be of great conse-quence to the legitimacy of the institution.136Others claim that the gravest threatto the legitimacy of the SC is that a fewcountries dominate it and that its proceduresare opaqueand unfair.137If demandfor properprocedureswere the motivatingfactor behindthe SC's authority, ecre-tive backroom deals among the great powers would be considered illegitimate.Such deals are part of the elite pact account of legitimacy. This does not implythatactors view the proceduralaspects of elite politics as desirableper se, but thatthese are useful to the higher purposeof stability.This situationsuggests that suc-cessful reformsto make the SC moretransparentmay actuallyhave adverseeffectsin that powerful states may flee the forum.138 In the public goods rationale, thelegitimacy of the SC dependscriticallyon preventingfree ridingandeffectivenessin producing global public goods. This is not necessarily the primaryconcern inthe elite-pact rationale,althoughthe properfunctioningof the elite pact increases

134. Claude 1966, 369.135. Glennon 2003, 16.136. Slaughter 2003; and Hurd 2003 make similar arguments in response to Glennon.137. Caron 1993.138. Drezner2003 argues that reforms in the IMF have had such an effect. For a proposalof pro-cedural reform that takes such incentives into account, see Buchanan and Keohane 2004.


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public good productionin comparisonto uncooperativeequilibria.Nevertheless,the failures of the SC in Rwanda and other places and the failure of the UnitedStates to meet its peacekeepingburdenmay have diminishedesteem for the insti-tution,but these failuresappear o have had little effect on the belief that the SC isthe properauthority o legitimize force.The conclusion from this study shouldnot be that states arenot concernedwithlegal andmoralprinciplesor global public goods, but thatthe existing andpersis-tent belief thatthe SC is the most desirableinstitutionto approvethe use of forcecannot be explained persuasively from the assumptionthat states do. Legitimacythatrelies on the effectiveness of an institutionto resolve a particulardilemma isoften thoughtto be inherentlyunstable.For example, it dependson outcomes thatcould be caused by a multitude of factors, notjust the decisions of the institution.I agree that if the SC's legitimacy were based on a convergence of opinions on itsnormativeproperties,its legitimacy would be more stable than it is today. How-ever, such agreementdoes not exist and is unlikely to emerge in the near future.The collective legitimationfunction of the UN helps shape statebehaviorbecausestate officials have made it important by their actions and statements.139Thoseactions and statementscould also underminethe Council's legitimacy.

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