Political Economy of Immigration Policy:

Lecture 6

Gordon H. Hanson UCSD and NBER

Introduction

What we’ve done so far Scale, selection and sorting in international migration Labor markets impacts of emigration and immigration Public finances and international labor flows Illegal migration

Final lecture Political economy of immigration policy Why do receiving countries restrict labor inflows?

Immigration Policy Regimes

Governance of immigration policy

Regulation of entry By quantity (quota on visas) or price (entry fee) By ex ante or ex post selection criterion

Scope of residency rights Broad (path to citizenship) or narrow (temporary admission)

Immigration policy regimes

Legal immigration Combination of quantity regulation (quotas), ex ante selection

criteria (family, skills, asylees), broad residency rights

Illegal immigrants Combination of price regulation (implicit entry fee), ex post

criterion (behavior), minimal residency rights

Political Economy of Immigration Policy Why do countries restrict labor inflows?

Protect income of median voter or specific factors Benhabib, de Melo et al Facchini and Willmann, Scheve & Slaughter, Hanson &

Spilimbergo, Mayda, Facchini and Mayda

Address distortions due to welfare state Wellisch & Walz, Sinn et al, Boeri and Brücker, Facchini & Mayda,

Hanson, Scheve & Slaughter Scholten & Thum, Razin & Sadka, Poutvaara

Preserve cultural or ethnic homogeneity Huntington, Dustmann and Preston

Design of Immigration Policy Regimes Actual policy regimes have at least three dimensions

(1) entry regulation, (2) selection criterion, (3) scope of residency rights

Basic tensions in policy design

National welfare gain from free immigration vs. loss in income of favored groups (focus of literature to date)

Providing incentive to assimilate versus obtaining information on the “desirability” of an immigrant

Do bilateral migration treaties address these issues?

Why are poor consigned to illegal migration? Whom do rich countries admit as legal immigrants?

Where do rich countries govern entry through quantity regulation, ex ante selection, broad rights?

Use for immigrants whose type (eg, skill, family) is observable Ex ante screen + broad rights = strong incentive to assimilate

Whom do rich countries admit as illegal immigrants?

Where do rich countries govern entry thru price regulation, ex post selection, & narrow residency rts?

Use where type (eg, motivation) is unobservable Mix of entry price, ex post screen, narrow rights selects

desirable types (but reduces incentive to assimilate) Narrow rights also lower fiscal cost, softening opposition

Trade versus immigration policy Many countries appear to have adopted relatively liberal

trade policies but relatively illiberal immigration policies

This pattern is replicated in public opinion data with support for liberal trade policies being stronger than support for liberal immigration

Why does freer immigration seem to be less politically palatable that freer trade?

Some Answers

Non-economic concerns such as attitudes toward foreign cultures and minority groups are more influential for immigration than trade

Pat Buchanan, Samuel Huntington (2005)

Economic concerns about immigration and trade differ and may favor trade over immigration as a strategy for international economic integration

Foreign-born share of the US population is rising

10.3

13.5 13.9 14.211.6

10.3 9.7 9.6

14.1

19.8

35.2

13.6%

14.7%

13.2%

11.6%

8.8%

6.9%

5.4%4.7%

6.2%

7.9%

12.1%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2005

-1%

1%

3%

5%

7%

9%

11%

13%

15%

Year

Mil

lio

ns

Pe

rce

nt

of

Po

pu

lati

on

Immigrants in the US, Number and Share of Population

30%

26%

17% 17%

10%8%

32%31%

20%

10%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Less than highschool

High school Some college Bachelors degree Grad. or Prof.Degree

Immigrants Natives

Education levels of US immigrants, natives

Concerns about immigration

In the US, immigrants are concentrated at the extremes of the skill distribution

Strongly over-represented among the least educated Moderately over-represented among the most educated

Economic consequences of immigration: Changes relative supplies of labor Expands US tax base, increases demands on public services Expands cross-border flows of ideas, capital, trade

Are consequences of immigration reflected in individual attitudes toward immigration policy?

The argument

In the absence of distortionary tax and spending policies, free immigration and free trade would often be supported by similar groups thanks to similar labor-market effects

Either tends to depress relative wages for low-skilled US natives Borjas, Freeman & Katz (1997), Feenstra & Hanson (1999), Scheve

& Slaughter (2001), Borjas (2003), Mayda (2004), Card (2005)

However, government policies that redistribute income alter the distributional consequences (and so the politics) of globalization

Immigrants pay taxes, use public services, and vote – imports do none of these things

The net fiscal impact of immigration appears negative (at least in short run), especially in high-immigration states and for high-income citizens who pay most of the tax bill for public services to immigrants

Smith et al. (1997) $200 net transfer per HH in US, $1200 in CA

Smaller fiscal effects are expected as a result of international trade

Views on fiscal consequences of immigration "California's addiction to 'cheap' illegal alien labor is bankrupting the state and posing

huge burdens on the state's middle class tax base." Dan Stein, Federation for American Immigration Reform

“It uses tax dollars to provide illegal workers with educational services, medical care, and unemployment compensation for those that are injured on the job. They are a drain on the taxpayers of Canyon County, the state of Idaho, and the US in general.“Robert Vasquez, Commissioner of Canyon County, Idaho

"The bottom line is that businesses are benefiting from the cheap illegal labor. They're making extra profits and they're shifting the whole benefits package over on to the taxpayer.“ Rick Oltman, Yuma County, Arizona

“Federal immigration policies should ensure that new immigrants do not become a

public charge to federal, state, or local governments.” National Governor’s Association

A tale of two governors

In the 1990s, California and Texas both had Republican governors Governors Bush and Wilson were fiscal conservatives

and rising stars within the national Republican party Both supported NAFTA and free trade, but took very

different approaches toward immigration Bush courted the Latino vote (even campaigning in

Spanish) and tried to appear pro-immigration

Wilson endorsed Proposition 187, a ballot measure to deny access of illegal immigrants to public services in California (later blocked by the courts)

A tale of two governors

What accounts for these different approaches toward immigration? California provides generous public benefits to

immigrants financed by progressive income taxes

This may have given high-income voters in the state an incentive to join the anti-immigration coalition

Texas provides meager public benefits financed by a regressive state sales tax This may have made high-income voters in the state more

pro-immigrant and created political space to attract socially conservative Latino immigrants to the Republican party

A simple model of policy preferences Let V(p, Ii) be indirect utility received by individual i, as a

function of commodity prices, p, and after-tax income, Ii

Consider change in indirect utility due to immigration:

Expressed in monetary terms this is:

Immigration changes commodity prices (1st term), pre-tax income (2nd term), and net fiscal transfer (3rd term)

iiii g)t1(yI

MM

I

I

VM

M

p

p

VV i

ii

MM

ty

M

gM)t1(

M

yM

M

p

I/V

p/V

I/V

V ii

ii

i

ii

i

Welfare effects of immigration Let V(p, yi) be indirect utility received by individual i, as a

function of commodity prices, p, and income, yi

Change in aggregate welfare due to change in low skilled labor supply of dL is (where αi is share of group i in the pop. for two groups, skilled (H) and unskilled (L))

If marginal utility of income (λλ) ) is constant across people

where

ii

i i

yV VpdW dL

p L y L

L Hy ydW L H dL

L L

( V / p )( p / L )dL

Welfare effects of immigration

Change in welfare as share of GNP (Y) is

where is the elasticity of income for factor type i w.r.t. the supply of low skilled labor, θi is the share of factor i in GNP, and M is inflow of L

y is post-tax income, given by

where wi is the pre-tax wage for group i, ti is the tax rate for group i and gi are gov’t transfers for group i

L LL H HL

dW M M

Y L H

iL i i( y / L )( L / y )

1i i i iy w t g

Welfare effects of immigration

How does post tax income respond to immigration?

Elasticity of post tax income w.r.t. supply of factor i is

where ρv,I is share of income type v for factor i and ηv,iL is the elasticity of income type v w.r.t. the supply of low skilled labor for factor i

We expect:

ηw,LL < 0, ηw,HL > 0 (immigration of L raises wH and lowers wL) ηt,LL > 0, ηt,HL > 0 (immigration of L raises tax rates) ηg,LL < 0, ηg,HL > 0 (immigration of L lowers gov’t transfers)

1iL w,i w,iL i t ,i t ,iL g ,i g ,iL( t )

Estimating equation

Assume pre-tax income and the net fiscal transfer are linear functions of individual characteristics

(where X is defined such that β>0)

Assume ∂β/∂M=θ, in which case we expect: With low-skilled immigration: ∂yi/∂M=Xiθ+∂εi/∂M > 0 for high-skilled labor

∂yi/∂M=Xiθ+∂εi/∂M < 0 for low-skilled labor

Assume ∂γ/∂M=λ λ will vary across US states according to their spending and

tax policies and the size of their immigrant populations

iii Xy iiiii Xytg

Estimating equation

Putting this together, we obtain

Preferences on immigration policy depend on individual characteristics, state characteristics, and their interactions (use categorical variables to allow for non-linearities)

All else equal, Overall, the low-skilled will be more opposed to immigration (than

the high-skilled) and their opposition will be stronger in states with larger immigrant populations

The opposition of the high-skilled to immigration will be stronger in states that (a) make larger fiscal transfers to immigrants, or (b) have more-skilled immigrant populations

Policies that weaken redistribution will also weaken high-skilled opposition to immigration

iiiii4i3ii2i10i X)FiscalExp(1X)m(Im1XZ)FiscalExp(1)m(Im1V̂

Identification

Empirical estimation

We estimate the correlation between opposition to immigration (or trade) and schooling and how this varies with size of state immigrant population, skill mix of state immigrant population, and state fiscal exposure to immigration

Given controls for state fixed effects, our focus is on how slope coefficient on schooling varies across states – identification is based on cross-state variation in how opposition to immigration responds to schooling (and whether this is conditional on the fiscal regime of the state)

Identification Estimation issues (and partial corrections)

Endogeneity of state of residence, state welfare policies Issue is possible correlation between unobserved determinants of

individual attitudes toward immigration and size of state immigrant population (or nature of state welfare policies)

Would likely cause us to understate cross-state variation in opposition to immigration (since those more opposed to immigration or to generous welfare policies would be more likely to settle in low-immigration, low-welfare states)

Over sample period, few individuals change states and ranking of states in terms of welfare generosity to immigrants is stable – issue may be ameliorated by controlling for state fixed effects

Measurement error in preferences (Bertrand & Mullainathan) Issue is that measurement error in stated preferences may be

correlated with individual characteristics (eg, education) Exploit information on other opinions (including those seemingly

irrelevant to immigration) to absorb idiosyncratic error terms

Data

Examine public opinion across US states, for which there there is variation in fiscal costs of immigration

Define US states as tax jurisdiction (states set income, sales, and property taxes, provide many public benefits)

Sources National Election Studies Surveys, 1992 and 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Census of

Governments, CPS

Immigrants are geographically concentrated

Share of State Population in Immigrant Headed Households

Imm

igra

nt S

har

e 2

000

Immigrant Share 19900 .1 .2 .3 .4

0

.1

.2

.3

.4

Ohio

Florida

MassachuArizona

District

WyomingIndiana

Texas

Maryland

North Da

New Hamp

Arkansas

Illinois

KentuckySouth Da

Hawaii

New York

West Vir

Michigan

Delaware

Colorado

Mississi

North CaNebraska

Georgia

Tennesse

Washingt

Wisconsi

Utah

Rhode isConnecti

Californ

New Jers

Missouri

Virginia

KansasMinnesot

Alabama

IdahoAlaska

Nevada

Maine

New MexiOregon

Montana

Vermont

Pennsylv

South CaOklahomaLouisianIowa

But recent immigrants follow job growth

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of ColumbiaFlorida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

KansasKentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts Michigan

Minnesota

MississippiMissouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

1

2

3

Imm

Po

p S

hare

20

00

/ Im

m P

op S

hare

19

90

(log

sca

le)

.8 1 1.2 1.4Native Employment 2000 / Native Employment 1990 (log scale)

Growth in Immigrant Population and Native Employment, 1990-2000

Fiscal costs of immigration vary by state

1990

Imm

HH

s o

n W

elfa

re /

Na

tive

HH

s

Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

Connecti

Nevada

IdahoK ansasUtah

North Ca

ColoradoMichigan

A rkansasIowa

Tennesse

Mary landOregon

K entucky

Rhode is

GeorgiaA labamaOhio

Massachu

Ill inois

S outh CaNew Hamp

W est V irW yoming

P ennsylv

Louisian

New Mexi

New Y ork

Delaware

Distric t

V irginia

New Jers

NebraskaMiss issi

A laska

Californ

Florida

Haw aii

Oklahoma

W isconsi

North Da

W ashingt

V ermontMissouri

Minnesot

Indiana

A rizona

Montana

Maine

S outh Da

Texas

2000

Imm

HH

s o

n W

elfa

re /

Na

tive

HH

s

Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4

0

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

Oregon

K ansas

New Y ork

A rkansas

Texas

North DaV ermont

Colorado

Haw aii

GeorgiaNebraska

K entuckyNorth CaW yoming

NevadaIll inois

New Jers

OklahomaMissouriIdaho

Rhode is

S outh Ca

Distric t

Iowa

Californ

Utah

S outh DaNew Hamp

A labamaIndiana

P ennsylv

FloridaMassachu

W ashingt

A laska

V irginiaLouisian

Minnesot

New Mexi

Maine

Delaware

OhioW est V ir

Connecti

MichiganW isconsi

MontanaMiss issiTennesse

Mary land

A rizona

1990

Imm

Sc

ho

ol A

ge

Po

p /

Na

tive

HH

s

Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4

0

.05

.1

.15

Connecti

Nevada

IdahoK ansasUtah

North Ca

ColoradoMichigan

A rkansasIowaTennesse

Mary landOregon

K entucky

Rhode is

GeorgiaA labama

Ohio

MassachuIll inois

S outh CaNew Hamp

W est V irW yoming

P ennsylvLouisian

New Mexi

New Y ork

DelawareDistric tV irginia

New Jers

NebraskaMiss issi

A laska

Californ

Florida

Haw aii

OklahomaW isconsiNorth Da

W ashingt

V ermontMissouriMinnesotIndiana

A rizona

MontanaMaine

S outh Da

Texas

2000

Imm

Sc

ho

ol A

ge

Po

p /

Na

tive

HH

s

Immigrant HHs / Native HHs0 .1 .2 .3 .4

0

.05

.1

.15

Oregon

K ansas

New Y ork

A rkansas

Texas

North DaV ermont

Colorado

Haw aii

Georgia

Nebraska

K entucky

North CaW yoming

Nevada

Ill inois

New Jers

OklahomaMissouri

Idaho

Rhode is

S outh Ca

Distric t

Iowa

Californ

Utah

S outh DaNew Hamp

A labamaIndianaP ennsylv

Florida

Massachu

W ashingt

A laskaV irginia

Louisian

Minnesot

New Mexi

Maine

Delaware

OhioW est V ir

Connecti

MichiganW isconsiMontanaMiss issiTennesse

Mary land

A rizona

Since 1996, immigrant-native differences in welfare use have declined for all categories except Medicaid

Difference in Immigrant and Native Welfare Participation Rates

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Year

(Per

cen

t of

Im

mig

rant

Hou

seho

lds

Rec

eivi

ng A

ssis

tanc

e)

- (P

erce

nt o

f N

ativ

e H

ouse

hold

s R

ecei

ving

Ass

ista

nce)

Any Type of Assistance

Any Type of Cash Benefit

Medicaid

Food Stamps

Differences remain in welfare uptake across US states (% of households receiving assistance by type)

A. Overall Welfare Participation Rates B. Cash Program Participation Rates

  Welfare Generosity of State Welfare Generosity of State

  Less More Less More Less More Less More

  Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants

1994 16.7 13.9 22.8 25.2 7.7 7.6 8.2 14.3

1998 13.9 12.6 16.9 21.9 5.7 6.0 5.6 10.5

2002 16.0 13.7 20.7 25.5 4.9 4.9 3.4 8.3

C. Medicaid Participation Rates D. Food Stamp Participation Rates

  Welfare Generosity of State Welfare Generosity of State

  Less More Less More Less More Less More

  Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants

1994 14.1 12.4 18.6 23.6 9.6 7.3 14.2 13.6

1998 12.2 11.6 15.4 20.7 6.4 5.2 5.7 9.1

2002 14.5 12.8 19.4 24.7 6.3 4.6 5.8 6.8

Percent of school children with immigrant mothers, 2000

School-Age Pop.(5-17 years)

Young Children(0-4 years)

1. California 43.3 45.02. New York 27.1 27.63. Florida 28.1 22.14. Texas 22.0 23.15. New Jersey 22.1 21.46. Illinois 15.2 18.07. Massachusetts 17.1 12.78. Arizona 23.1 29.9

Entire Country 16.3 17.6

Expenditures and revenues by foreign-born and native households in California (1996)

CaliforniaForeign-Born Native

Expenditures Local 6,208 5,290 Of which K12 education 1,581 768 State 4,973 2,510 Of which K12 education 2,496 1,212 Federal 13,326 13,625Revenues Local 5,377 5,573 State 2,341 3,405 Federal 10,644 16,347Fiscal Balance Local -831 283 State -2,632 895 Federal -2,682 2,722

State generosity in welfare benefits

           

  4 IL MO, NE CA, MA, MD, ME, RI

WA

3 FL OR CT, MN, NJ, NY, PA, WI

HI

Public Assistance Availability to

Immigrants

2 DC, DE, KY, MT, NV, NC, TN, VA, WY

AK, AZ, CO, GA, IA, KA, NM, ND, UT

MI NH

  1 AL, AR, ID, LA, MS, OH,

TX, WV

IN, OK, SC, SD

   

    1 2 3 4

    Public Assistance Generosity

Ranking of US states in terms of generosity toward immigrants is stable over time

Share of Households Receiving Cash Assistance, 1990

Shar

e of

Imm

igra

nts

on W

elfa

re

Share of Natives on Welfare0 .05 .1 .15

0

.05

.1

.15

Iowa

Oklahoma

Kansas

Tennesse

North Da

Californ

Kentucky

South Da

Massachu

Colorado

Alaska

Connecti

MarylandNew Hamp

VermontDelaware

LouisianOhio

Hawaii

Nevada

New Jers

Wisconsi

Wyoming

West Vir

Michigan

New York

Florida

Alabama

New Mexi

District

North Ca

IndianaMontana

Washingt

Georgia

MaineArizona

Nebraska

Virginia Arkansas

Illinois

Pennsylv

Texas

Rhode is

South Ca

Minnesot

Utah

Mississi

Missouri

Oregon

Idaho

Share of Households Receiving Cash Assistance, 2000

Shar

e of

Imm

igra

nts

on W

elfa

re

Share of Natives on Welfare0 .05 .1 .15

0

.05

.1

.15

Wyoming

Massachu

South Ca

MississiMontana

Nebraska

Alaska

Florida

South Da

Utah IllinoisIowa

Minnesot

Wisconsi

Arizona

Maryland

Ohio

New Hamp

Georgia

Idaho

Louisian

Kansas

Maine

District

Texas

Tennesse

Connecti

Californ

West VirNew JersNorth Da

Oklahoma

Alabama

Kentucky

New York

North Ca

Indiana

ArkansasNevada

PennsylvHawaii

New Mexi

OregonVermont

Washingt

Colorado

Virginia

Rhode is

MissouriMichigan

Delaware

Data Measuring fiscal exposure to immigration (start with 4

categories per measure, test down to 2)

Immigration fiscal exposure measures: Fiscal Exposure 1: Equal to 1 if state welfare spending per native

is above ‘90 national mean and if high-immigration state (immigration population share is above ‘90 national mean), 0 o/w

Fiscal Exposure 2: Equal to 1 if ratio of state immigrant HHs on welfare to number of native HHs above ‘90 national mean, 0 o/w

Other fiscal exposure measures (for trade policy analysis): Fiscal Exposure 3: Equal to 1 if state welfare spending per native

is above ‘90 national mean Fiscal Exposure 4: Equal to 1 if state welfare spending as share of

state GDP is above ‘90 national mean

Interactions with schooling (No High School, High School, Some College, College) or income quartile

High immigration and generous welfare states High immigration states

1992: AZ, CA, CT, FL, IL, MA, NJ, NY, TX 2000: ‘92 states plus CO, DC, MD, NV, NM, OR, VA, WA

States with high immigrant uptake of welfare 1992: CA, CT, FL, MA, NJ, NY 2000: ’92 states plus WA

States with high welfare spending Per native household

1992: CA, CT, NH, IL, LA, MD, MA, MI, MN, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN, WA, WV, WI 2000: CA, CT, DC, IL, KY, ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OR,

PA, SC, TN, WA, WV

As share of state GDP 1992: AZ, AK, CA, CT, LA, MA, MI, MN, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN, WV, WI 2000: AL, AK, CA, IA, KY, LA, ME, MA, MN, MS, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, PA,

SC, TN, WV

Data

NES immigration policy question

“Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the US to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?”

Immigration Opinion is coded a 1 for those individuals favoring immigration be decreased a little or a lot and 0 for those individuals favoring immigration be maintained or increased.

Data

NES trade policy question

“Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?”

Trade Opinion is coded a 1 for those individuals favoring protection and 0 for those opposing it

Native support for decreased immigration by education and fiscal exposure to immigrants, 2000

Fiscal Exposure MeasureFiscal

ExposureNo High School

High School

Some College

College Grad

Fiscal Exposure 1 Low 0.537 0.571 0.507 0.362

High 0.625 0.558 0.461 0.420

Fiscal Exposure 2 Low 0.498 0.572 0.516 0.361

  High 0.658 0.557 0.464 0.435

Native support for trade restrictions by education and fiscal exposure to immigrants, 2000

Fiscal Exposure MeasureFiscal

ExposureNo High School

High School

Some College

College Grad

Fiscal Exposure 1 Low 0.748 0.719 0.590 0.383

High 0.662 0.674 0.560 0.418

Fiscal Exposure 2 Low 0.728 0.719 0.606 0.392

  High 0.707 0.674 0.548 0.397

Probit results on native opposition to immigration Estimation

Sample is native respondents

Regressors: Dummies for schooling category alone and interacted with size of

state immigrant population, state fiscal exposure to immigration

Other controls: gender, quadratic in age, race, ethnicity, state unemployment rate, state dummy variables, year dummy variable

Additional controls: Isolationist sentiment, union membership, public sector employment, partisanship, ideology

Standard errors clustered by state

Table 2 Fiscal Exposure 1 Fiscal Exposure 2

High School 0.182 0.168 0.211 0.206

(0.101) (0.107) (0.095) (0.103)

Some College 0.047 0.027 0.102 0.092

(0.097) (0.098) (0.100) (0.104)

College -0.347 -0.356 -0.298 -0.295

(0.119) (0.130) (0.116) (0.127)

No High School * Immigration 0.445 0.474 0.365 0.667

(0.141) (0.173) (0.257) (0.270)

High School * Immigration -0.016 0.034 -0.012 0.248

(0.117) (0.136) (0.122) (0.140)

Some College * Immigration -0.098 -0.033 -0.143 0.116

(0.094) (0.097) (0.088) (0.151)

College * Immigration -0.078 -0.016 -0.183 0.043

(0.111) (0.128) (0.115) (0.165)

No High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.090 0.246 0.102 0.189

(0.200) (0.169) (0.264) (0.259)

High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.008 0.303 -0.011 0.144

(0.141) (0.130) (0.137) (0.136)

Some College * Fiscal Exposure -0.036 0.237 -0.003 0.138

(0.089) (0.109) (0.082) (0.110)

College * Fiscal Exposure 0.219 0.490 0.347 0.526

(0.118) (0.145) (0.127) (0.117)

State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes

Impact of education on attitude toward immigration (Facchini & Mayda, 2006)

Impact of income on attitude toward immigration (Facchini & Mayda, 2006)

Trade policy preferencesFiscal Exposure Measure

Table 5 1 2 3 4

High School -0.111 -0.020 -0.074 -0.033

(0.121) (0.123) (0.151) (0.161)

Some College -0.390 -0.267 -0.268 -0.263

(0.133) (0.146) (0.138) (0.143)

College -0.971 -0.849 -0.908 -0.946

(0.132) (0.128) (0.163) (0.143)

No High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.367 0.232 0.004 0.245

(0.264) (0.360) (0.306) (0.275)

High School * Fiscal Exposure -0.228 0.132 -0.021 0.160

(0.132) (0.196) (0.238) (0.189)

Some College * Fiscal Exposure -0.221 0.111 -0.173 0.064

(0.148) (0.188) (0.236) (0.179)

College * Fiscal Exposure -0.046 0.223 0.045 0.376

(0.161) (0.193) (0.259) (0.164)

Additional results

Results are robust to:

Including interactions between education and skill mix of state-immigrant population (measured continuously or discretely)

Including state share of Latinos in immigrant population, individual attitudes toward minorities, other individual opinions

Substituting schooling with reported income, measured by quartile

Dropping individual high-immigration states (CA, NY, FL, TX, IL, NJ)

Dropping those who self identify as very conservative or very liberal

Using continuous measures of immigrant population, fiscal exposure

Re-estimating using ordered probit instead of bivariate probit

Summary

Puzzle of why we tend to see free trade but restrictionist immigration policy is usually posed as if their distributional politics are the same

While this may be true before taxes, transfers, it is unlikely to be true after taxes, transfers

The distributional consequences and thus politics of immigration and trade appear to differ