Planning Guide for Area Business Continuity ~ Area BCM ... · The stakeholders of this plan (a...

Planning Guide for Area Business Continuity

~ Area BCM Toolkits ~

Version 2

Supplemental Volume Tools for Area BCM

March 2015

AHA CENTRE Japan International Cooperation Agency

OYO International Corporation

Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc. CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd.

Tool 1:Area BCPs Prepared for the Pilot Areas

Area Business Continuity Plan (Area BCP), Version 2,

Karawang and Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia


Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila, The Philippines.


Hai Phong, Viet Nam

Area BCP ver.2 Bekasi & Karawang, Indonesia-

i

Area Business Continuity Plan（Area BCP）

Version 2

－Karawang and Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia－

November2014

Local Planning and Development Agency,

Province of West Java

○This plan (version 2) was promoted by local Planning and Development Agency,Province

of West Java, and was formulated with the participation of local government, public sectors

and private sectors in Bekasi and Karawang under the cooperation of JICA Study Team.

○The stakeholdersin Bekasi and Karawang will be expected to continue the activities of Area

BCM, and revise this plan.

Planning Guide for Area Business Continuity ~ Area BCM Tool Kits ~ Ver.2 Tool 1

ii

Contents 1 Purpose of the Plan ---------------------- 1

1.1 Introduction to the Version 2 ---------------------- 1

1.2 Purpose of the Plan ---------------------- 1

2 Scope of the Plan ---------------------- 3

2.1 Organization ---------------------- 3

2.2 Area ---------------------- 4

2.3 Hazard ---------------------- 4

2.4 Formulation Process and Version Management ---------------------- 4

3 Understanding of the Area ---------------------- 6

3.1 Stakeholders of the Area ---------------------- 6

3.2 Structure of the Local industry ---------------------- 9

3.3Infrastructures in the Area ---------------------- 10

3.4 Disaster Risks that threaten the Local Industry ---------------------- 12

4 Impact Analysis of the Area ---------------------- 16

4.1 Impact to the Area by Disaster ---------------------- 16

4.2 Concerns of the Industry Continuity ---------------------- 20

5 Strategies for Industry Continuity ---------------------- 22

5.1 Policy of Industry Continuity ---------------------- 22

5.2 Role of the Stakeholders ---------------------- 23

6 Improvement Activities for Capability of Industry Continuity ---------------------- 25

6.1Category of Improvement Measures ---------------------- 25

6.2 Progress Management of Improvement Measures ---------------------- 26

7 Implementation of the Plan ---------------------- 32

7.1Area BCM ---------------------- 32

7.2System of Implementing Area BCM ---------------------- 33

7.3Exercising and Reviewing ---------------------- 34

7.4Maintaining and Improving ---------------------- 36

7.5Reporting ---------------------- 36

7.6 Issues and Items for Improvement ---------------------- 36

7.7 Next Steps (Proposed) ---------------------- 38

8 Definitions of Terms ---------------------- 39

Appendix A Activity of Workshop (Version 2) ---------------------- 40

Appendix B List of Stakeholders (Version 2) ---------------------- 41

Appendix C Activities, Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders ---------------------- 43

Area BCP ver.2 Karawang and Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia-

1

1 Purpose of the Plan 1.1 Introduction to the Version 2

This Version 2 is an updated version of the Version 1 rewritten of the JICA study team to

reflect the discussion in the WS by the stakeholders. The activities to update the Version 1 is

shown in Table 1-1 and described further bellow.

Table 1-2 Activities for Preparation of an Updated Plan (Version 2)

Activity Details Method Output

Studying and Improvement of the Plan (Version 1) by the Members

Members study and improve contents of the plan (Version 1) within their organization

Discussions within the organization of members

Activity Report

Reviewing the Plan

Update the plan by the leader, members and supporters from outputs of the study of the members

A workshop (Workshop 4)

Updated Plan (Version 2)

○Studying and Improvement of the Plan (Version 1) by the Members

・Each member confirms and/or modifies contents of the current Area BCP (Version 1)

through discussions within an organization attended by executives and key staffs of related

sections/departments.

・Items to be confirmed and/or modified include impacts to the area, strategies for business

continuity, actions for business continuity, roles and responsibilities of the member, related

plans, documents and others owned by the member, responsible person for Area BCM, and

his/her contact details.

・Each member summarizes outputs from the discussions and prepares an activity report.

○Reviewing the Plan

・The input from the members and supporters are compiled to produce this draft of

Version 2, to be reviewed in the Workshop 4 to produce the Version 2.

1.2 Purpose of the Plan1

1 The purpose of the plan (version 2) was rewritten from the version 1 draft, which was rewritten of the JICA study team to reflect the discussion in the WS by the stakeholders.


2

The Purpose of this Area business continuity plan (Area BCP)is that for the sustainable

development of Bekasi and Karawang area,the continuity or rapid recovery of industry

function should be achieved in emergency such as natural disasters that affect the entire area.

Area business continuity is realized in that local government and Infrastructure operators,

industrial parks, companies in the area willpromote their own BCM or disaster reduction

measures with cooperation.

This plan shows the important information to be shared among stakeholders, the roles of

stakeholders,the strategy and contents of activity for Area business continuity, and

thecontinual operation of this plan.


3

2 Scope of the Plan

2.1 Organization

The stakeholders of this plan (a leader, members and supporters) are described in the

following description. The role of the stakeholders is further shown in Chapter 7.

2.1.1 Leader

A leadershall be responsible to promote Area BCM. A leader shall demonstrate leadership

with respect to Area BCM and manage to formulate and maintain Area BCP.

・Local Planning and Development Agency,Province of West Java（BAPEDA）

2.1.2 Members

Membersshallparticipate in Area BCM to formulate Area BCP. Members shallprovide

information necessary for Area BCMand promote disaster management measures and BCP of

their own organization.

・Local Governments and Local Offices of National Government, Operators of Infrastructure and Lifeline,

Industrial Parks, Private Enterprises

2.1.3 Supporters

Supportersshall support Area BCM implemented by a leader and members. As examples of

the support, supportersshallencourage institutional or advise technically, including risk

assessment.

・National Government, Governmental Research Institutions, Universities and Others


4

2.2 Area

This plan is directed to the following areas.

・Industrial agglomerated area in Bekasi Regency, Bekasi city and Karawang Regency

・Area that facilities of infrastructure and lifeline are distributedto be utilized by the industry

Fig.2-1 The area of this plan

2.3 Hazard

This plan is directed to anticipate the following multi-hazard.

・Natural disasters (earthquake and tsunami disaster, storm, flood, volcanic disaster)

2.4 Formulation Process and Version Management

This plan will be revised as appropriate though the activity of Area BCM by the

stakeholders. The process to formulate the version - 1 and 2 is as following. After version

2,the process to revise will be appended here.

・ The version 1 of the planwas undertaken as JICA project. With the support of

JICA,preparation meetings (Jun 2013-August 2013, two times)and workshops (December

2013-May 2014, three times)2 were held, and the stakeholders discussed on Area business

continuity. This plan was formulated to compile theseefforts.

2 The activity of WS is shown in Appendix A.


5

This draft version 2 of the plan was a revision of the version 1, incorporating all the

comments and input from the working group members captured from a series of meetings

and interviews with the working group members during the period of June-October 2014.


6

3 Understanding of the Area This Chapter describes stakeholders who participate in Area BCM of the Area, and

industrial environment and disaster risks of the Area to be considered in Area BCM.

3.1 Stakeholders of the Area

Stakeholders who participate in Area BCM include local governments, operators of

infrastructure and lifelines, industrial parks, private enterprises, national government,

governmental research institutions, universities and others.

The stakeholders are divided intothree categories, i.e.: leader, members and supporters of

Area BCM.

・Stakeholders of the Bekasi and Karawang Area, and their roles and responsibilities are

listed in Table 3.1. Local governments that are concerned with Bekasi and Karawang Area

are Bekasi Regency, Karawang Regency, Kota Bekasi and the Province of West Java who

administer the aforementioned three administrations.

・The stakeholders in the table are those who attended workshops for formulation of the first

version of Area BCP.

・A composition of the stakeholders can be modified by such as inviting other essential

organizations.

・A list of the stakeholders is provided in Appendix B.


7

Table3-1 Stakeholders of the Bekasi and Karawang Area

Category Organization Role

Leader ・BAPPEDA

(Local Planning and

Development Agency),

the Province of West Java

Promote and manage Area BCM

Formulate and maintain Area BCP

In charge of studies, disaster risk assessment,

workshops / seminars and others necessary

for implementing Area BCM system

Conduct inventory of programs and

activities of Area BCM

Develop a budget to support the Area BCM

program

Planning disaster evacuation routes,

evacuation shelter, emergency response,

recovery of flood area, disaster mitigation

for Area BCP

Promote the projects on flood control and

land use planning for the flood resilient city

Provides helpful information for Area BCM

(e.g. risk assessment, disaster warning

information)

Members ・Local Governments

・Local Offices of National

Government

・Operators of Infrastructure

and Lifeline

・Industrial Parks

・Private Enterprises

・Participate in Area BCM

・Formulate Area BCP ・Attendance of workshops and others

・Provide information and documentsnecessary

for Area BCM

・Formulate, update and promote disaster

management measures and BCP of her own

organization

Input from BappedaKarawang District

Develop Disaster Management Plan

(RPB) Karawang and will integrate ABCPlan

into RPB

Develop a Local Action Plan for

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR Plan)

Karawang District and will integrate

ABCPlan into DRR Plan

Will integrate the RPB and DRR Plan into

local development planning (RPJMD)


8

Helps BAPPEDA West Java Province BCP

and BCM in the district of Karawang

Get involved in the implementation of disaster

management in the area (e.g. become a

member of the Water Resources Management

Coordination Team (TKPSDA)

CitarumBestari)

Integrating disaster aspect in the preparation of

Spatial Planning

Input from Local Disaster Management Agency

(BPBD) Karawang District

Based on local regulation in 2014, BPBD

Karawang District is established

As director and implementing disaster

management in the area

Responsible for the implementation of disaster

management in the area

Develop Guidelines for Disaster Management

Supporters ・National Government,

・Governmental Research

Institutions

・Universities

・Others

・Support Area BCM implemented by a leader

and members ・Provide information, knowledge and technical

advices necessary for Area BCM ・Provide services such as study and disaster risk

assessment necessary for Area BCM ・Promote Area BCM in the national level

・Formulation of systems for Area BCM


9

3.2 Structure of the Local industry3

In this area, an industrial agglomerated is located.The characteristic of the industry

agglomerated area is as follows.

・In Bekasi and Karawang, many industrial parks are located along Jakarta-Cikampek toll

road.

・In these industrial park, many large assembly plants are located and operating,such as

automobiles and electrical machinery plants, which include also foreign capital.

・There are large scale employment and production in these industrial parks.hence local

economy is largely dependent on industrial parks.

・Transport of industrial parks is almost dependent on Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road and

Tamjung Priok port.

Fig.3-1 Structure of local industry

3 Appropriateand useful information shall be updated or added. (For example: the amount, items and countries of trade)


10

3.3 Infrastructure in the Area

■Traffic Infrastructure

The industrial parks in Bekasi and Karawang area are located along the Jakarta - Cikampek

toll road which is connected to the Jakarta Ring Road. The Jakarta - Cikampek toll road is the

major transport facility connecting Bekasi and Karawang area with Jakarta. The National

Route No.1 also connects this area with Jakarta.

Tanjung Priok Port is the major harbor that the industrial parks in Bekasi and Karawang

area are using. The nearest airports are Soekarno-Hatta Airport and Halim Perdanakusuma

Airport in Jakarta.

■Lifeline Facilities

The major electric power plant servicing to Bekasi and Karawang area is the Muara Tawar

Power Plant at the coast of Tarumajaya subdistrict in Bekasi regency. Many electric

substations are located along Jakarta - Cikampek toll road. The industrial water is taken from

the irrigation canal (Tarum Barat which tke water from Jatiluhur Dam) that supply water to

Jakarta..

The main infrastructure and facilities are presented in Table 3-2. It is to be noted that in

addition to the organizations shown in the Table, the central ministries such as Ministry of

Public Works, Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources

should be are the main policy makers related to the main infrastructure and facilities.

Table3-2 Summary of main infrastructure facilities

Facilities Summary Management

Jakarta - Cikampek Toll

Road

Jakarta to Cikampek

Length: 73km PT Jasa Marga Tbk

National Route No.1

West to East highway in Java Island

along north shore

Merak to Ketapang

Length: 1,316km

Directorate General of

Highway, Ministry of

Public Works

Tamjung Priok Port

Terminal: 7

Container berth: 14

Gantry crane: 31

PT Pelabuhan

Indonesia II

Soekarno-Hatta Airport Runway: 3600m x 2

Passenger Terminal: 3 PT Angkasa Pura II

Halim Perdanakusuma

Airport Runway: 3000m x 1 PT Angkasa Pura II

Muara Tawar Thermal Generation Capacity: 920MW PT Pembangkitan Jawa


11

Power Plant Bali

Jatiluhur Dam Reservoir Capacity: 3 billion m3 PT Perum Jasa Tirta II

Tarum Barat 82m3/sec PT Perum Jasa Tirta II

Fig.3-2 Infrastructure facilities in the area


12

3.4 Disaster Risks that threaten the Local Industry

The once in 100 to 200 years probability is considered for the natural hazards affecting

Karawang Regency, Bekasi Regency, and Kota Bekasiin the estimation of the situation of

catastrophe. The smaller but more frequent disasters are requested to be studied in the future.

Among the several natural hazards, flood gives the largest impact to the local industries in

Bekasi and Karawang area in the period of 100 to 200 years. Earthquake is the second but the

impact by tsunami is much smaller. The effect by volcanic eruption is smaller than flood and

earthquake. The disaster risk by the flood is considered in this plan for the above reason.

(Referred Databases: EM-DAT4, PRCC5, GLIDEnumber6, NOAA7, Dartmouth8)

The distribution of inundation area by the flood that is supposed to occur once in 200 years

is shown in Figure3-4. The blue color in the figure means the inundation depth. The

maximum depth is larger than 4 meters. The duration of inundation is supposed to continue

more than 2 weeks. The disaster risks to the local industries in Bekasi and Karawang area by

this flood are shown in Table3-3.

Fig.3-3 Comparison of the natural disaster risk to the local industry

The disaster risks are evaluated by the number of dead people and amount of loss

based on the existing disaster database.

4 OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, http://www.emdat.be/ 5 Pacific Rim Coordination Center Disaster Data, http://data.pacificrimnetwork.org/ 6 GLobal IDEntifier Number, http://www.glidenumber.net/ 7 National Ocean and Atmosphere Administration, National Geophysical Data Center, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/hazards.shtml 8 Dartmouth Flood Observatory, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/Archives/

Large

Small

Low High(1/200 - 1/100)

Probability

Dis

aste

rR

isk

by

Nat

ura

l Haz

ard

s


13

Fig.3-4 Distribution of the inundation depth by the flood

Fig.3-5 Distribution of the inundation duration by the flood

Table3-3 Disaster scenario by the flood for Karawang area

This map is intended to be used for disaster scenario creation. This map is not the forecast of the future hazard.

[Analytical condition] Software: IFAS for Runoff analysis and iRIC for Inundation analysis, Rainfall data:

3B42RT 3hours interval data are enlarged to the scale of ground-based rainfall data., Elevation data: GTOPO 30,

ASTER GDEM, Grid size: 200m, Boundary condition: Five hydrographs calculated with runoff model are given as

upper boundary conditions. Assume that Jatiluhur dam is filled and runoff inflow from catchment is released with

no control., Return period: 200 years.



3B42RT 3hours interval data are enlarged to the scale of ground-based rainfall data., Elevation data: GTOPO 30,

ASTER GDEM, Grid size: 200m, Boundary condition: Five hydrographs calculated with runoff model are given as

upper boundary conditions. Assume that Jatiluhur dam is filled and runoff inflow from catchment is released with

no control., Return period: 200 years.


14

Category Disaster Risks in Karawan

Buildings in

Industrial Park

・Industrial agglomerated area is not inundated.

Lifeline Facilities Substation and Water treatment plant in and next to Industrial Parks are not

damaged.

Substation in Karawang City is inundated over 2m.

・Some of base stations of telephone/ mobile phone stop their operation because of

the shortage of electric power.

Traffic Infrastructures Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road is closed more than 2 weeks.

・Highway 1 is closed in Karawang City more than 2 weeks.

Workers of Industrial

Park

Karawang City and surrounding area is inundated more than 2 weeks.

Many employee will be absent because of the inundation of their houses.

・The traffic condition becomes worse and come late for factory.

Table3-3b Disaster scenario by the flood for Bekasi

Category Disaster Risks in Bekasi

Buildings in

Industrial Park

Industrial agglomerated area is not inundated, but

many other locations outside the industrial area are flooded

Lifeline Facilities Electrical substation and water treatment plants in and near the Industrial zone

are not damaged.

Electrical substations in Bekasi City are inundated by more than 50 cm - 100

cm.

Some fixed stations (base station) phone / cell phone ceased operations due to

power shortage.

Traffic Infrastructures The toll road Jakarta-Cikampek (Bekasi) is not closed

The national road in Bekasi is not closed.

Many inundated areason provincial roads and city streets in Bekasi City

(Medan Satria industrial area, North Bekasi, West Bekasi, Bantargebang),

closed for 1 week


Park

Bekasi and its surrounding areas are inundated for more than 1 week

Many employees fail to show up at work because their house is inundated

Access to the industrial area is inundated by flood, vehicles havedifficultes to

pass the flooded area

Traffic condition become worst and causes employees’ delay to to work

As the industrial agglomerated areas are strongly connected to Jakarta by means of transportation

infrastructures and lifelines, the disaster risks to the local industries in Bekasi and Karawang area if

Jakarta is inundated by the flood are shown in Table3-4.


15

Table3-4 Disaster scenario in case of inundation in Jakarta

Category Disaster Risks

Lifeline Facilities ・Muara Tawar thermal power plant is damaged and electric power supply to

Jakarta and West Java is limited.

Traffic Infrastructures ・The access road to Tanjung Priok Port will be totally blocked by inundation in

Jakarta.


16

4 Impact Analysis of the Area

4.1 Impact to the Area by Disaster

4.1.1 Impact to Critical Resources

To continue the local industry in disaster, the facilities in industrial parks must be available

and the employeescan work. In addition, the services of transportation infrastructure and

lifelinemust be available.

In the assumed disaster, the impact of these critical resources is estimated as follows.

・In the assumed flood in Bekasi and Karawang, it is estimated that buildings in the industrial

parks, the power supplied to the industrial parks and the portnear Jakarta (Tanjung Priok)

supporting the industrial parks would not be damaged most.

・It is estimated that the toll road to be used by the industrial parks would not be available for

2 weeks by flooding, and the transport function will be greatly reduced by traffic jam.

・It is estimated that many employees of companies in the industrial park could not be

attendance for 2 weeks due to inundation of their houses and commuter roads, and

thereafter employees who have lost their houses in the flood could not be attendance.

・As a result,it is estimated thatalmost companies in the industrial park would be forced to

stop theiroperations for two weeks, and thereafter the decreases in productionswould

continue.

Fig.4-1 Recovery of Critical Resources for Industrial Parks Estimated in Assumed Flood9

9 This figure shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team. This is not the information elaborate, but useful to understand the impact by the disaster. Though Area BCM, this figure will be expected to revise continually.

Ra

te o

f O

per

ati

on

Days after Flood

Toll Road

0%

50%

100%

7 14 30 90

Building in Industry Parks

Employee

Port (Container terminal)Electric Power

Factories

?


17

4.1.2 Impact to the Local Society and Industry

In the assumed flood, the following impact is estimated to local society and industry in the

area. It is an important issuefor the area to reduce the risk of the assumed flood.

・In the assumed flood in Bekasi and Karawang, it is estimated that a wide range of the city

would be inundated for two weeks.

・In this flood, it is estimated that many people would be affected, there are casualties and

evacuees due to the lost of their houses, andmany facilities to support the society and

industry would be damaged.

・Due to the affected people and damage of facilities, it is estimated that the security would

be worse, and shutdown of production, loss of employment and bankruptcy of companies

would be caused. As a result, thelocal economywould be led to decline.

Fig.4-2 Flow of impact to local society and industry by flood

Flood

Industry Resourcesare damaged

Factory Operations are stopped

Economydecline

Companies go bankrupt

Employee are laid off

Peopleare damaged

Security is worsened

①The city is inundated more than 2 weeks.

②How many employeecan work?

③When can electric power, road, port,・・・ be used?

⑤How many people will be unemployed?

⑥How many factorieswill be closed?


18

Table4-1 Impact to the area (in the assumed flood)10

Category Item Content

Assumed disaster ・River flood (About once in 200 years*1)

Direct damage ・A wide range of the city would be inundated for two

weeks.*1

Outline of impact ・Almost productions of local industry would be shut down for

2 weeks*1 and thereafter low level of productions would be

continued.

・Many people would be casualties, evacuees or unemployed,

so local society would be confused.

Society Population ・Many affected people (Ex: evacuees50-100 thousand）*2,

casualties

・Infection、Mental stress（especially children）

Security ・Security worsen, Slum

・Degradation of public service due to evacuees (Ex:railway）

Community ・Discrete family

Other ・Tax revenue decrease

Industry Production ・Significant reduction in production (Ex:10%, 50%, 70%）*2

・Shutdown of production (Ex:：for 1 month in 50% of

companies*2）

Company ・Many bankruptcy including small companies (Ex:75%,

80%）*2

Investment ・Reduction of investment (Ex:25%）*2

・New investment to zero*2

Employment ・Many unemployment

*1：Simulation results under the limited information by JICA Study Team

*2：Examples of impact amountshown in discussion of the WS by stakeholders

Note:On the other hand, the effect of positive aspects is also expected in disaster, such as an

actively help each other in the community and an investment demand to recover the

damaged facilities.

10 This table shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team. This is not the information elaborate, but useful to understand the impact by the disaster. Though Area BCM, this table will be expected to revise continually.


19

4.1.3 Other Residual Risk

In addition to the assumed disaster, the residual risk may be described as following.

・The all transport of industrial parks are dependent to Tanjung Priok portnear Jakarta. If a

flood would occur in around Jakarta, theport would not be available and the production of

industrial parks would be stopped completely.

・As a more severe disaster than the assumed rivers flood, the collapse of Jatiluhur Dam

would give catastrophic impact to society and industry of Bekasi and Karawang.

Table4-2 Impact to the Area (Residual Risk) Part1

Item Contents

Assumed disaster ・Flood in around Jakarta

Direct damage ・Tanjung Priok port would not be available

Outline of impact ・The production of industrial parks in Bekasi and Karawang

would be stopped completely

Table4-3 Impact to the Area (Residual Risk) Part2

Item Contents

Assumed disaster ・The Jatiluhur dam break

・Break of Curug weir supplying Tarum Barat canal

Direct damage ・Sudden inundation in many areas of the city, heavy casualties.

・Loss of raw water for industry

Outline of impact ・The people and industry in Bekasi and Karawang area will

be greatly affected


20

4.2 Concerns of the Industry Continuity

4.2.1 Concerns on Assumed Disaster

Among resources on the local industry, the critical resources are bottlenecks that would be

damaged greatly in disaster and could not be taken alternatives.

In the assumed disaster, the following issues will become the bottlenecks for industry

continuity in the area.11

・In Bekasi and Karawang , there is a high risk of flood. In the assumed flood, a wide range of the city would

be inundated for two weeks.

・The most critical concern is the reduction of transport function of Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road.

・The critical concern is the worsening of living condition of people, including employees.

・The other critical concern is the restriction of fixed-line phone and mobile phone due to power failure.

Table4-4 Bottlenecks for industry continuity in the assumed flood

Category Bottleneck Impact to industry

Most

critical

concern

the reduction of

transport function

of

Jakarta-Cikampek

Toll Road

・The transport of industrial parks is almost dependent

on Jakarta-Cikampek Toll Road and Tamjung Priok

port. This toll road would not be available for 2 weeks

by flooding and the traffic jam on this road would be

continued for a long period. As a result, most of the

companies in the industrial parks would be forced to

stop or reduce their operations.

Critical

concern

the worsening of

living condition of

people, including

employees

・Many employees could not come to work due to

inundation of their houses or outage of lifeline, until

their living condition would be recovered. Some

evacuees would stay in road or other public facilities,

and then the local industry would suffer trouble in

operations. After the inundation for 2 weeks, the

evacuated living of people might be prolonged until

the recovery of living condition would be finished.

the reduction of

communication

function

(fixed-line phone

and mobile phone)

・In industrial activity, mobile phone and

fixed-line telephone is used frequently. In the assumed flood, these communication services would be limited due to outage of power those facilities would be inundated.

11 In consideration of magnitude of the impact to industry continuity, the bottlenecks were classified as "the most critical concern" and " the critical concern ".


21

4.2.2 Concerns on Other Residual Risk

In addition to the assumed disaster, the concerns on other disasters that would give a large

impact to the industry continuity may be mentioned as following.

・The critical concern is the reduction of transport function of Tanjung Priok Port.

Table4-5 Bottlenecks for industry continuity on other residual risk


Critical

concern

the reduction of

transport function

of Tanjung Priok

Port

・The transport of industrial parks is almost dependent

on Tanjung Priok port. Then most of the companies

in the industrial parks would be forced to stop or

reduce their operations.


22

5 Strategies for the Industry Continuity

5.1 Policy of Industry Continuity

The policy of the industry continuity in the area is as following.

Table5-1 policy of the industry continuity

・In the assumed flood, the production activities in the industrial agglomerations could be

continued or recovered at an early stage, and the scale of production and employment

would be kept as large as before the disaster.

・To achieve the above, the living condition of people and the service of infrastructure and

life line would be recovered at an early stage with a big effort.

・For other residual risks, the risk shall be estimated accurately and some practical

activities will be operated to reduce the risk.


23

5.2 Role of the Stakeholders

According to the policy, all stakeholders shall act work to pay each role in Area BCM.

Tabele5-2 Role of Stakeholders in Area BCM

Stakeholder Role

Local

Government

・To promote the flood control project and the land use planning for the

strong city to flood

・To promote measures of response and recover in disaster (ex: Disaster

warning system, Instruction and accommodation of evacuation,

Restoring the inundation area, Relief of victims)

・To provide useful information for Area BCM (ex: Risk assessment,

Alerting information）

・To promote their own BCM

Infrastructure

operator



Recovery objective）

・To recover without delay to restart of the industrial park

To assess disaster impact to road infrastructure, bridges and water

channels

To conduct emergency response for the road infrastructure, bridges

and water canals

To develop emergency response plan which details can not be known

in advance, planning block grant on call budget

Note :

When the affected infrastructure are those beyond the authority of local

governments (district or city) , there are impediments to decisions

as bureaucratic procedures need to be followed to obtain approvals

on then type of response, which will take some time.

Lifeline operator ・To promote their own BCM



・To recover without delay to restart of the industrial park

Industrial park ・To promote their own BCM and strengthen their own facilities

・To provide useful information for Area BCM (ex: Activity of their

own BCM)

・To coordinate among BCM of companies in the industrial park

Company ・To promote their own BCM and strengthen their own facilities


24

(in industrial

park)


own BCM)

・To keep the employment after the disaster


25

6 Improvement Activities for Capability of Industry Continuity

6.1 Category of Improvement Measures

Through Area BCM, the improvement measures to resolve the bottleneck are studied and

extracted, and stakeholders practice these measures and manage the progress.

・ The measures for industry continuity are categorized into Prevention, Mitigation,

Preparedness, Response.

・As for the progress, most of the proposed measures are now in the stage of idea. Through

Area BCM, the stage will step up, Idea→Concept→Implement→Achieved.

Table6-1 Category of Improvement Measures

Category Content

Prevention The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related

disasters.

Mitigation The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and

related disasters.

Preparedness The knowledge and capacities developed by organizations and

individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the

impacts of hazard.

Response The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or

immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health

impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of

the people affected.

Recovery The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities,

livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities,

including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.

Reference: The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat

(UNISDR) Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009)

Table6-2 Stage of Improvement Measures

Stage Content

Idea Just an idea of stakeholders.

Concept The official conceptual plan is agreed by administrator.

Implement The budget is ensured and the schedule is planned.

Achieved The measure is achieved.


26

6.2 Progress Management of Improvement Measures

The proposed measures as following are expected to be practiced by the stakeholders.

Through Area BCM, as appropriate, the progress of the measures will update and new

proposed measures will be added in this table.

Table6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity12 1/3

Severity Bottleneck Stakeholder Category Proposed measures Stage

Most

critical

concern

(Assumed

disaster)

the

reduction

of transport

function of

Jakarta -

Cikampek

Toll Road

Central / Local

Government

Prevention To promote flood control

projects. (ex: River

improvement, revitalization

of lakes and ponds, flood

control basin,

normalization and

maintenance of drainage,

pumping facilities, tree

planting, information

system)

Idea

Projects to support flood

control (normalization of

rivers, drainage and

irrigation channels ,

construction of ponds and

polders and retaining

basins), The DED for

these projects are available

and some are budgeted in

2014)

Implementation

Central / Local

Government,

Administrator

of Road / Port /

Air port

Mitigation To develop a new port and

a new airport at different

regions of Jakarta, and to

develop a road leading to

the port.

(Redundant traffic

function)

Concept

12 This table (1st version) shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team and the discussion results of WS by the stakeholders.


27

Administrator

of Road

Mitigation To promote expansion of

toll road, development of

bypass road and inundation

prevention measures such

as raising road and building

integrated inter-zone road

system

Idea

FS and DED for bypass

ring roads West Karawang

and East Karawang is

currently developed by

Bappeda and Road and

Water Agency

Implementation

Administrator

of Road

Response

To carry out pumping

measures of inundation and

traffic control in disaster.

Idea

Road and Water Agency

provides 400 water level

observers and 60 road

inspectors spread in

Karawang District

coordinated by the Local

Technical Unit, prepared to

conduct flood emergency

response

Achieved


28

Table6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity 2/3


Critical

concern

(Assumed

disaster)

the worsening of

living condition

of people,

including

employees

Central / Local

Government


projects such as dams,

Citarum and Cibeet rivers

normalization

Idea

Local Government Prevention To promote land use plan

in consideration for flood

(ex: Upland relocation of

the city)

Idea

Control building site

coefficient and green site

coefficient for each

building permit

Idea

Local budget flood

control projects

Idea

Request support from

central and provincial

government for flood

control projects

Idea

Continuous infrastructure

maintenance

Idea

Expansion of green space Concept

Polder/retention pond for

large scale residential

areas (minimum 10 ha)

Concept

Mitigation Build access

infrastructure from

employees residential

areas to industrial areas to

reduce obstacle for the

workers’ access

Idea

Normalization of

drainage and sewerage

channels and building

higher and stronger dikes

to be used as alternative

Idea


29

roads

Response To strengthen response

measures (ex: Evacuation

order, Medical care,

shelter for victims, Relief

supplies, Pumping

system)

Other measures :

Provision of

emergency response

materials (gabions

and san bags)

Emergency

construction

Post-disaster

permanent

construction

Field technical team

Idea

Recovery To strengthen recovery

measures(ex: Relief for

victims), post-disaster

permanent reconstruction

of infrastructure

Idea

Industrial park,

Company

Mitigation To build dormitory for

employees near

industrial parks

Idea

Recovery To carry out early recover

and to keep employment

Idea

the reduction of

communication

function

(fixed-line

phone and

mobile phone)

Central / Local

Government


projects.

Idea

Mitigation Developing Fiber Optic

Network special for

industrial parks

Concept

Power operator Mitigation To promote flood

mitigation measures(ex:

raising of power

facilities)

Idea


30

Recovery To proceed with the early

restoration of power

facilities flooded

Idea

Tele-communication

operator

Mitigation To promote measures for

service continuity in

power failure (ex:

Emergency generator)

Idea

Company Mitigation To prepare other means

of communication (ex:

satellite phone)

Idea


31

Table6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity 3/3


Critical

concern

(Other

Residual

Risk)

the reduction of

transport

function of

Tamjung Priok

Port

Central / Local

Government,

Administrator

of Road / Port

Mitigation To develop new portsat other

locations outside of Jakarta,

and to develop roads leading

to the ports.

(Redundant traffic function)

Note :

Currently the development of

new port in Karawang District,

initiated by JICA, is still under

discussion, and feared to be

cancelled due to resistance

from PT PERTAMINA

(Persero).

Concept

Planning Guide for Area Business Continuity ~ Area BCM Tool Kits ~ Ver.2 Supplement 1

32

7 Implementation of the Plan

7.1 Area BCM

The Plan is implemented by following Area BCM System.

•Understanding the Area

•Determining Area BCM Strategy

•Formulate Area BCP

•Exercising and Reviewing

•Maintaining and Improving

Fig.7-1 Area BCM System

Effective implementation of Area BCM requires active participation of stakeholders of the

area, and a continuous approach and endeavor of the stakeholders of the area. Identify

stakeholders and establish a system for promoting and implementing Area BCM are important.

Private and public coordination is also essential.

Understanding of the area can be deepened and the strategy of Area BCM can be improved

by a continuous approach for the Area BCM process.

A management process that helps to manage the risk of continuity/early recovery of businesses of an area in an emergency such as natural disasters that affect the entire area.

Follow the process of ISO22301 = Societal security - Business continuity management systems - Requirements

Area BCMCycle

Understanding

the Area

Developing Area BCP(Plan)

DeterminingArea BCMStrategy

Maintaining and

Improving

Exercising and

Reviewing


33

7.2 System of Implementing Area BCM

Area BCM is promoted and implemented by the following system.

•Roles and responsibilities of the leader, members and supporters are described in Table 3-1.

Fig.7-2 System of Implementation of Area BCM

Area BCMCycle

Understanding

the Area


Determining

Area BCMStrategy

Maintaining and

Improving

Exercising and

Reviewing

Promote and Implement Area BCM for an Area

Support Area BCMPromoted and Implementedby Leader and Members

• Provide information and services necessary for Formulating Area BCP, Exercising /Reviewing and Maintaining/improving

• Promote Area BCM at the National Level

Leader

Members

Supporters


34

7.3 Exercising and Reviewing

Through exercising and reviewing, effective implementation of Area BCM system is

validated, and the plan is confirmed that it is kept up to date. Activities of exercising and

reviewing are studying and improvement of the plan by the members, reviewing the plan,

formulating a plan for another natural disaster scenario, study lessons from natural disasters

occurred in the area and surroundings, and promotion and awareness rising.

Table7-1 Activities of Exercising and Reviewing


Studying Conformity and Integrity with Disaster Management Plan and/or BCP of Members

Members study conformity and integrity of Area BCP with their disaster management measures and/or BCP.

Highlight issues and propose improvement of Area BCM/Area BCP

Formulate and/or revise their disaster management measures and BCP by members


Table-top exercises by using a scenario of the Area BCP

Activity Report

Study Lessons from Natural Disasters Occurred in the Area and Surroundings

Study lessons from natural disasters occurred in the area and surroundings

Field Survey, Interview, and Questionnaires

Lesson Learned Report

Promotion and Awareness Rising

Utilize discussions within a member for improving the plan as dissemination and awareness rising activity; targeting executives and key staffs of related sections/department.

Disseminate and promote Area BCM/BCP to other parties of local and national levels

Discussions within the organization of a member

Trainings Seminars

Activity Report

○Studying Conformity and Integrity with Disaster management Measures and/or BCP of

Members

・The members study conformity and integrity of Area BCP with their disaster management

measures and/or BCP through discussions within their organizations. Executives and key

staffs of related sections/departments are required to attend the meetings for discussion.

Table-top exercises by using a scenario of the Area BCP can be useful.

・Items to be discussed and commented include impacts to the area, strategies for business

continuation, actions for business continuity, roles and responsibilities of the member,

related plans, documents and others owned by the member, responsible person for Area

BCM, and his/her contact details.


35

・The members summarize outcomes of the discussions, including issues and proposal for

improvements of Area BCM/Area BCP, in an activity report.

・The members can also revise and/or formulate their own disaster management measures

and BCP from the outcomes of the discussions.

○Study Lessons from Natural Disasters Occurred in the Area and Surroundings

・If natural hazards occur within the target area and its surroundings, a lesson learned report

is prepared by conducting a field survey and/or interviews and questionnaires. The report

includes outline of the hazard, outline of the damages, responses of the members, issues to

consider and lessons.

・The lessons learned will be used to improve a plan of the next version.

○Promotion and Awareness Rising

・The discussions for conformity and integrity by the members should utilize as opportunities

to disseminate and rise awareness of Area BCM/Area BCP to executives and key staffs of

related sections/departments. If necessary, training programs are planned and

implemented.

・Dissemination and promotion of Area BCM/Area BCP are planned and implemented for

other parties of local and national levels.

・Outputs are recorded in an activity report.


36

7.4 Maintaining and Improving

After putting Area BCM system in place, the plan is required to keep up to date in order to

follow the changing conditions. A maintenance program is prepared that ensure the plans

are up to date.

•if there are any changes of a composition of stakeholders

•if the target area of the plan is changed

•if a new natural disaster risk (s) emerged

•following lessons learned from exercising and reviewing

•following lessons learned from natural disasters in the area and other locations

•other necessary occasions

For updating the plan, if necessary, activities such as studies and risk assessments in

“Understanding the Area” and “Determining Area BCM Strategy” of Area BCM System are

carried out. An updated plan or a newly formed plan is prepared through workshops

organized by the leader and attended by the members and supporters.

During a course of updating the plan, processes and effectiveness of Area BCM system are

reviewed. Outputs are summarized in a review report of Area BCM.

The leader validates and approves the updated plan after receiving advices from experts and

discussions by the working group.

7.5 Reporting

Outputs from exercising/reviewing and maintaining/improving are summarized in the

following reports and plans.

•Activity report

•Lesson learned report

•Updated plan

•Plan for new risk

•Review report of Area BCM

•Maintenance program

7.6 Issues and Items for Improvement

To be filled after discussions at the 4th workshop, related to the following issues

1. Description of roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in more detail n the Area

BCP document, so that each stakeholders can understand their roles more

clearly.


37

2. Implementation plan and SOP (STandar Operating Procedure) in the Area BCP, to

clarify the action of each stakeholders.


38

7.7 Next Steps (Proposed)

2015〜

Strengthen coordination and communication among stakeholders within working group

members

Raising awareness &commitment of stakeholders & WG members through meeting,

workshops and seminars

Discussion with national stakeholders (BAPPENAS, BNPB) to obtain support

2016

Initiate 2nd cycle of ABCM to produce ABCP (v.3) for new conditions, with the support

from BAPPENAS and JICA

Strengthen coordination & communication of WG members and stakeholders


39

8 Definitions of Terms (Draft)

Term Definition Ref.

Business

Continuity

Management

(BCM)

Holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an

organization and the impacts to business operations those threats, if realized,

might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational

resilience with the capability of an effective response that safeguards the

interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating

activities

*1

Business

Continuity Plan

(BCP)

Documented procedures that guide organizations to respond, recover, resume,

and restore to a pre-defined level of operation following disruption

NOTE: Typically this covers resources, services and activities required to

ensure the continuity of critical business functions.

*1

Area Business

Continuity

Management

(Area BCM)

A management process that helps to manage the risk of continuity/early

recovery of businesses of an area in emergency such as natural disasters that

affect the entire area.

*3

Area Business

Continuity Plan

(Area BCP)

A documented set of procedures and information intended to promote

continuity/early recovery of businesses of an area in emergency such as

natural disasters that affect the entire area.

*3

Hazard A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may

cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of

livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental

damage.

*2

Disaster Risk The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and

services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some

specified future time period.

*2

[Reference]

*1: ISO22301、Societal security - Business continuity management systems- Requirements (2012)

*2:UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009)

*3: Original in this plan


40

Appendix A Activity of Workshop (version 2)

Item Date Location Number of

participants

Theme

1st WS 17December,

2013

Bandung 37 ・The policy of Area BCP

・Significant hazards for business

continuity of each organization

・Serious problems for business


2nd WS 6 March,

2014

Karawang 57 ・Impacts on the local society and

Industries by Disaster

・Bottlenecks for Industry

Continuity

・Measures for Industry

Continuity

3rd WS 22 May, 2014 Bekasi 43 ・Area BCP version 1(draft)

・Next step of Area BCM

4th WS 20 Nov, 2014 Bandung 43 ・Reviewed Area BCP version 1

・Roles and Responsibilities

・Next cycle of Area BCM


41

Appendix B List of Stakeholders (2nd-version)

○Leader

BAPPEDA (Local Planning and Development Agency),Province of West Java

○Members (Local Governments and Local Offices of National Government)

BBWS (Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai) Citarum (Citarum River Basin Management Unit),

Ministry of Public Works

BPBD (Local Disaster Management Agency),Province of West Java

DISHUB (Department of Transportation),Province of West Java

POLDA (Regional Police),Province of West Java

BPLHD (Natural Environment Management Agency),Province of West Java

KODAM III/SLW, (Indonesian National Armed Force-West Java Territorial)

BAPPEDA (Local Planning and Development Agency),Bekasi Regency

BPBD (Local Disaster Management Agency),Bekasi Regency

BPLHD (Natural Environment Management Agency),Bekasi Regency

Diskominfo (Transportation, Communication & Infomatic Agency),Bekasi Regency

Kesbanglinmas (Agency of National Unity, Politics & Civil Protection),Bekasi Regency

Dinas Kebakaran (Fire Brigade Agency),Bekasi Regency

BAPPEDA (Local Planning and Development Agency),Karawang Regency

BPBD (Local Disaster Management Agency),Karawang Regency

BPLHD (Natural Environment Management Agency),Karawang Regency

Dishubkominfo (Transportation, Communication & Infomatic Agency),Karawang Regency

Dinas Bina Marga & Pengairan (Department of Road and Irrigation), Karawang Regency

Dinas Perindustrian ,Perdagangan, Pertambangan dan Energy ( Industry, Trade, Mineral and

Energy Agency),Karawang Regency

Kesbanglinpol (Agency of National Unity, Politics &Politic),Karawang Regency

Dinas Sosial dan Penanggulangan Bencana (Social Affaire and Disaster Management

Agency),Karawang Regency

Dishub (Transportation Agency),Kota Bekasi

Disbimarta (Road and Water Agency),Kota Bekasi

○Members (Operators of Infrastructure and Lifeline) PT. Jasa Marga PT. Kereta Api Indonesia(Train Operating Company) PDAM Bekashi Regency(District Water Company) PDAM Tirta Tarum Karawang(District Water Company) PT Telkom PT Telkom Bekasi PT Telkom Karawang


42

Perum Jasa Tirta(Management of Jatiluhur Dam) ○Members (Industrial Parks) PT Maligi KIIC MM2100 Industrial Park PT KBN ○Members (Private Enterprises) Sharp Electronics Indonesia PT. Toyota PT. TMMIN PT. Jotun Indonesia PT. HM Sampoerna PT Lookman Djaya(Transportation Company) ○Supporters (National Government, Governmental Research Institutions, Universities and Others) BNPB Ministry of Home Affairs Ministry of Industry Ministry of Cooperation & Small-Medium Enterprises Ministry of Research and Technology Bandung Institute of Technology Coordinating Ministry of Economic AffairsMinistry of Public Work Ministry of BUMN National Planning Agency (Bappenas) Ministry of Transportation ○Others The Indonesian Employers Association (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia) Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri) Kabar Gapura (local newspaper) Universities

43

Appendix C Activities, Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders

Organization Roles and Responsibilities Related Plans, Documents and Others Owned by Organization (Availability and How to Obtain)

Leader BAPPEDA (Local Planning and Development Agency), Province of West Java

1. Role and responsibility of West Java province in ABCP should refer to the local regulation of West Java Province No. 2 Year 2010 concerning the implementation of disaster management and adjusted with the main task and role of each institution;

2. Disaster management implementation consists of pre-disaster, emergecy, recovery, and post-disaster stages (Article 13). Bappeda West Java Province can play its role in the pre-disaster stage through disaaster mitigation efforts and in the post-disaster. Meanwhile, in emergency response and recovery, the role of Local Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) West Java Province is more important.

3. In pre-disaster, Bappeda West Java Province can take part in: (Article 15) a. Disaster management planning, which covers:

1) Disaster risk reduction; 2) Integration of disaster management into development plan; 3) Disaster risk analysis; 4) Implementation and law enforcement of regional spatial plan.

b. Disaster mitigation measures to reduce the disaster risk and impact to the community who lives in disaster prone areas, are conducted through: (Article 30 point 2) 1) Planning and implementation of disaster risk analysis-based regional spatial

plan; 2) Development regulation, infrastructure provision and site plan.

4. West Java Province has developed the Master Plan of Disaster Management in 2008 that contains the disaster risk analysis in West Java.

5. Provincial Spatial Plan (RTRWP) of West Java 2009-2029 has implement the disaster mitigation principle. In RTRWP West Java Province, the disaster prone area that are landslide prone area, tidal wave prone area, flood prone area and geological disaster prone area, is designated as protected area (the area that is designated to have main function to protect the natural environment sustainability, which covers the natural and artifical resources, as well as historical and cultural value of community, for sustainable development issue).

6. In RTRWP West Java Province, Karawang District and Bekasi District is mentioned as flood prone area. The zoning direction for the flood prone area is designated by considering: a. The determination of flood plain boundary; b. The use of flood plain for green open space and controlling low density

development for public facilities; c. The regulation concerning prohibition of activities for public facilities; and d. Controlling settlement in flood prone area.

7. Related to the local development planning, in local mid-term development plan

1. Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Provinsi Jawa Barat 2009-2029 (2009-2029 West Java Provincial Spatial Plan)

2. Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah Provinsi Jawa Barat 2013-2018 (2013-2018 West Java Mid-term Development Plan)

3. Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah 2013 (2013 West Java Government Work Plan) 4. Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Jawa Barat No. 2 Tahun 2010 tentang Penyelenggaraan

Penanggulangan Bencana (West Java Provincial Regulation No.2 Year 2010 on Implementation of disaster Management)

5. Rencana Induk Penanggulangan Bencana Provinsi Jawa Barat (West Java Province Disaster Management Masterplan)

6. Rencana Aksi Daerah Penurunan Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca Provinsi Jawa Barat (West Java Provincial Action Plan on Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emmision)

7. Kajian-kajian (Studies) on West Java Province Metropolitan Development Management for Metropolitan Bodebek-Karpur

The above documents can be downloaded from http://www.bappeda.jabarprov.go.id or requested at the Physical Division of Bappeda west Java Province Jl. Ir. H. Juanda No. 287 Bandung

44

(RPJMD) of West Java Province Year 2013-2018, one of strategic issue of West Java Province development is the rapidity and accuracy of disaster management and community adaptation toward disaster. The disaster issue has also been integrated into the mission number four, i.e. to realize the comfortable West Java and sustainable development of strategic infrastructure, with one of the objective is to increase the carrying capacity and capacity of environment as well as quality of disaster management.

8. Development programs that are related to the disaster issue are: 1) Program of natural disaster management and community protection with the objective of the availability of emergency response aid, the facilitation of solving problems for conflict and social disaster, and the increasing of community/volunteer participation in disaster management; 2) Program of Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation, with the objective of increasing the mitigation effort of climate change through the decreasing of greenhouse gas emission in agriculture, forestry, energy, transportation, industry, waste and garbage, and the increasing of community resilience toward the impact of climate change.

9. In post-disaster stage, the role of Bappeda West Java Province is determining the priority of rehabilitation of public structure and infrastructure to fulfill the needs of : transportation, continuity of economic activity, and social cultural activities, which consist of the improvement of infrastructure, social and public facilities. (Article 65).

Members (Local Governments and Local Offices of National Government)BPBD (Local Disaster Management Agency), Province of West Java

1. The roles and responsibility of BPBD West Java Province are contained in the Local Regulation of West Java Province N0. 2 Year 2010 concerning The Implementation of Disaster Management;

2. The basic tasks of BPBD are: to determine the guideline and direction, standardization and standard procedure; to develop and to determine as well as to manage the system of disaster data and information; to control the collection and distribution of money and goods; to be accountable on the use of budget both from local budget (ABPD) or other legal resources; and to report the implementation of disaster management (Article 8 Point 1)

3. Functions of BPBD are the formulation and the determination of disaster management and refugee management policy by acting quickly, accurately, effectively, and efficiently; and coordination of disaster management implementation as planned, integrated, and comprehensive. (Article 8 point 2)

4. The role of BPBD is in all stages of disaster management, i.e. in pre-disaster, emergency response, recovery, and post-disaster.

5. In disaster mitigation effort, BPBD can take part in the development of disaster information, data base, and disaster map, which covers: (Article 30 point 3) a. The area of district/city, sub-district, and village; b. Number of population in district/city, sub-district, and village; c. Number of community houses, government building, market, schools,

1. Disaster Map of West Java Province2. Disaster Data and Information of West Java Province 3. Document of Disaster Management Plan Those documents can be downloaded from http://bpbd.jabarprov.go.id or go directly to the BPBD West Java Office at Jalan Soekarno-Hatta No. 629 Bandung 40268

45

community health service, hospital, religious/worship facilities, public facilities, and social facilities;

d. Type of disasters that frequently or recurrently occur; e. Disaster prone area and disaster risk; f. The coverage area of disaster prone area; g. Evacuation place; h. Evacuation route; i. Human resources.

6. Disaster information system, data base and disaster map is needed for: (Article 30 point 4) a. Develop the policy, strategy and plan for disaster management action; b. Identify, observe the hazard, vulnerability, and the capacity to deal with disaster; c. Provide the protection to the community in disaster prone area; d. Develop the early warning system; e. Understand the hazard, disaster risk, and the impact of disaster; and

7. Implement the disaster-adapted development and prepare the community to live in harmony with the hazard.

DISHUB (Department of Transportation), Province of West Java

1. Formulating the objective of technical policy of traffic operational and engineering management and maintenance

2. Business plan activity of International Airport Kertajati West Java. 3. Activity of traffic facilites development in West Java. 4. Activity of operational management and supervision of transportation facilites and

infrastructure

-

POLDA (Regional Police), Province of West Java

Community protection, including in disaster situation, through: 1. Preparedness training for community to face the disaster 2. Emergency response during disaster

-

BPLHD (Natural Environment Management Agency), Province of West Java

1. Increasing the recovery and conservation of water, air, forest, and land resources 2. Reducing the disaster risk 3. Increasing the function and the area of protection forest

Publication documents can be seen at and downloaded fromhttp://www.bplhdjabar.go.id The documents available such as: The program of institution Strategic issues of environment in West Java Province

KODAM III/SLW, SOPS (Indonesian National Armed Force)

1. Helping in preparing the temporary shelter, 2. Helping in recovery of public facilities and infrastructure 3. Supporting the security in disaster area 4. Supporting communication during disaster

-

BAPPEDA(Local Planning and Development Agency), Bekasi Regency

1. Develop a Disaster Management Plan (RPB) and integrate the ABC Plan into RPB of Bekasi District;

2. Will integrate DRR and Local Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction into medium-term development plan (RPJMD);

3. Help BAPPEDA West Java Province to promote BCP and BCM in the Bekasi District;

4. Get involved in the implementation of disaster management in the area;

1. Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah (RPJMD) Kabupaten Bekasi Tahun 2012 - 2017

2. Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Bekasi Nomor 3 Tahun 2010Tentang Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah(RPJPD) Kabupaten Bekasi Tahun 2005 – 2025

Can be accessed at http://www.rkpdkabbekasi.com

46

5. Integrating disaster aspects in the preparation of spatial planning. Or requested at the office:Komplek Perkantoran Pemerintah Kabupaten Bekasi Cikarang pusat

BPBD (Local Disaster Management Agency), Bekasi Regency

1. Develop Regent’s Regulation concerning the implementation of emergency response2. Develop Regent’s Regulation concerning direct aid to the affected people. 3. Develop disaster risk map 4. Socialization of disaster mitigation to the PRIVATE SECTOR 5. Socialization of local regulation No.2/Year 2012 6. Establish the Committee of the local parliament on the management of man-made

disaster 7. Develop the Guideline on Disaster Management Plan 8. Develop the disaster contingency plan

Disaster information Can be accessed in http://bpbd.bekasikab.go.id Or to the office: Komplek Perkantoran Pemerintah Kabupaten Bekasi Cikarang pusat

BPLHD(Natural Environment Management Agency), Bekasi Regency


Diskominfo (Transportation, Communication & Informatics Agency),Bekasi Regency

1. Conduct research and assessment of telecommunication system in disaster prone area. It is important in pre-disaster situation, emergency situation and rehabilitation and reconstruction;

2. Responsible for recovery and prevent better communication system in an area where disaster occurs

Kesbanglinmas (Agency of National Unity, Politics & Civil Protection), Bekasi Regency

1. The role of Kesbangpollinmas in industry is related to the worker, in the permitting process for worker.

2. Handling the conflict, in particular when industry will acquire land, it helps with security issues together with the POLICE. Include also labor dispute and conflict resolution between the company and surrounding community.

3. In disaster, Kesbangpollinmas (SATLAK) has human resources that can help during disaster (emergency situation)

4. Provide needed relief aids to displaced persons through community organizations.

Dinas Pertamanan, Kebersihan dan Pemadam Kebakaran (Park, Cleaning, and Fire Brigade Agency),Bekasi Regency

1. Implement the prevention activity toward fire or natural disaster 2. Implement the activity of fire or natural disaster management; 3. Coordinate with other organization both government and private sector 4. Supervise and control the building that is prone to fire

-

Dishub (Transportation Agency) Bekasi Regency



BAPPEDA(Local 1. Develop a Disaster Management Plan (RPB) and integrate the ABCPlan into RPB of 1. Local Regulation (Perda) Karawang District Number 2 Year 2013, Concerning

47

Planning and Development Agency), Karawang Regency

Karawang District; 2. Develop a Local Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction of Karawang District in

collaboration with Local Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) Karawang District and integrate ABCPlan into DRR plan;

3. Will integrate DRR and Local Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction into medium-term development plan (RPJMD);

4. Help BAPPEDA West Java Province to promote BCP and BCM in the Karawang District;

5. Get involved in the implementation of disaster management in the area (e.g. become a member of the Water Resources Management Coordination Team (TKSPDA)CitarumBestari);

6. Integrating disaster aspects in the preparation of spatial planning.

Regional Spatial Plan of Karawang District Year 2011-2031; 2. Local Regulation (Perda) Karawang District Number 8 Year 2011, concerning

Mid-term Local Development Plan (RPJM) of Karawang District Year 2011-2015 3. Local Regulation (Perda) Karawang District Number 2 Year 2010, concerning

Long-term Local Development Plan (RPJP) of Karawang District Year 2005-2025

Planning documents are available in soft copy and hard copy (official documentation) When soft copy of the planning document is needed, the contact is BAPPEDA Karawang, Jl. A. Yani No. 1 Karawang, Prov. West Java

BPBD(Local Disaster Management Agency), Karawang Regency

1. In 2014 a discussion on local regulation on the establishment of BPBD ofKarawang District was held;

2. BPBD’s role is to direct and implement disaster management in the area; 3. Responsible for the implementation of disaster management in the area; 4. Develop Guidelines for Disaster Management 5. Since the responsibe official and the implementing staff in BPBD KarawangDistrict

have not been sworn,all the responsibility and authority for disaster management is still under Social and Disaster Management Agency of Karawang District for a while

BPLHD (Natural Environment Management Agency), Karawang Regency


Dishubkominfo (Transportation, Communication & Infomatic Agency), Karawang Regency



Dinas Bina Marga & Pengairan (Department of Road and Irrigation), Karawang Regency

Post disaster recovery that is related to infrastructure road, bridge, and water channel Database on Road, Bridge and Water Canals in Karawang Regency and also spots that are prone to damage due to disaster To have the document, you can contact the contact address

Dinas Perindustrian & Perdagangan (Department of Industry and Trade), Karawang Regency

1. Regulation of technical operational activity in Industry, Trade, Mining and Energy, and consumer protection,

2. Implementation of government program in. 3. Implementation of service in Industry, Trade, Mining and Energy.

Number of industry in Karawang Regency The data can be accessed in the office.

48

Dinas Sosial dan Penanggulangan Bencana (Social Affaire and Disaster Management Agency),Karawang Regency

1. During disaster, we, as SATLAK, are responsible to the implementation of emergency response, logistic aid, evacuation, and rehabilitation and reconstruction

2. Pre-disaster, Social and Disaster Managaement Agency conduct a socialication and training regarding disaster issue

3. Disaster prone area mapping (based on field experience within 5 latest years). 4. In ABCP for industry, social agency is not directly involved 5. Contingency plan, collaboration between social and disaster management agency and

health agency of Karawang District, is manifested in conducting the disaster training.

Kesbanglinmas (Agency of National Unity, Politics & Civil Protection), Karawang Regency

Currently, it is not related directly to disaster as disaster affair is now under the Social Agency. The obligation of KESBANGPOLLINMAS is to maintain and create a condusive atmosphere in the Karawang District and deal with the issue of ideology, politic, economic, social, cultural, defense, and security. In terms of economics is to improve the living standard of the people in Karawang District. Together with vertical agency team in dealing with the ideology, politic, economic, social, cultural, defense, and security, KESBANGPOLLINMAS conduct: 1) handling the security issues, and 2) develop local community intelligence. In industrial areas, the task is to control the security and economic turmoil such as labor conflict. In the event of disaster, KESBANGPOLLINMAS participates in the security safeguards to avoid riot and theft. KESBANGPOLLINMAS also directs Social Agency to carry out its duties. KESBANGPOLLINMAS will also encourage the relevant agencies. , such as when a disaster occurs, and there is damage in the industrial area, KESBANGPOLLINMAS will encourage companies to immediately repair the damage to reduce employee laid off or extended work stoppage..

BAPPEDA (Local Planning and Development Agency), Bekasi City

1. Inventory of programs and activities of Area BCM 2. Develop a budget to support the Area BCM program 3. Planning for a disaster evacuation route, evacuation shelter, emergency response,

recovery of flood area, disaster mitigation for Area BCP 4. Responsible to conduct study, disaster risk assessment, workshops / seminars, and

other matters necessary for the implementation of the Area BCM system 5. Promote projects for flood management and land use planning for flood resilient city6. Provides helpful information for Area BCM (e.g. risk assessment, disaster warning

information)

1. Regional spatial plan (RTRW) 2. Detailed spatial plan (RDTR), which contains therein evacuation route, disaster

evacuation shelter, plan locations of the folder / retention ponds as flood control, point depot location of Firefighters

3. Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 4. Disaster Risk Impact Analysis 5. Document of the feasibility study, DED of construction of retention pond / water

folder 6. Drainage Master Plan for the City (BAPPEDA, Public Work and Water Agency) 7. Master plan of Fire Fighting System (Building Agency) 8. DED of construction of retention pond / water folder (Public Work and Water Agency)

Disbub (Transportation Agency), Kota Bekasi

1. Formulating the objective of technical policy of traffic operational and engineering management and maintenance

2. Activity of traffic facilites development in Bekasi City. 3. Activity of operational management and supervision of transportation facilites and

infrastructure

Disbimarta (Road and Water Agency),Kota Bekasi

1. Post disaster recovery that is related to infrastructure road, bridge, and drainage 2. Supervise and control the drainage to manage the flood

Database Road, Bridge and Drainage in Bekasi City To obtain the documents, you can contact the contact address

49

Members (Operators of Infrastructure and Lifeline) PT PLN (Persero) Distribution West Java and Banten

1. Secure the electricity network in disaster area to avid victims due to electricity 2. Provide temporary infrastructure of electricity

-

PT. Jasa Marga 1. Accelerating Toll Road Development 2. Providing an Efficient and Reliable Toll Road 3. Improving Efficiency in Distribution of Goods and Services 4. Provide aid during emergency response

Annual report of PT. Jasa Marga Information regarding toll road and traffic of toll road Information can be accessed at http://www.jasamarga.com/

PT. Kereta Api Indonesia (Train Operating Company)

1. Inventory the disaster prone route 2. Provide aid during emergency response

Annual report of PT. KAIIt is can be accessed in http:///www.kereta-api.co.id

PDAM Bekasi Regency (District Water Company)

1. The water company does not serve the industry as they have their own water treatment plant (WTP).

2. Water company is serving the needs of the population, mostly industrial company employees

PDAM Bekasi City (District Water Company)

1. Serve approximately 35.000 customers spread in north Bekasi, Medan Satria and West Bekasi. The rest of Bekasi Citystill is served by PDAM Bhagasasi, Bekasi Regency.

2. Patriot Water Company is not serving the industry due to the limitation of electric power and unstable raw water.

PDAM Tirta Tarum Karawang (District Water Company)

1. Implement the clean water provision and also the infrastructure to serve the people of Karawang Regency

Information on facilities of PDAM It can be accessed in website: http://tirtatarum.com or go direct to the office

PT Telekom Div West Java Region

1. Provide humanitarian aid for disaster refugee. 2. Provide telecommunication infrastructure for community

PT Telkom Bekasi 1. Provide humanitarian aid for disaster refugee. 2. Provide telecommunication infrastructure for community

PT Telkom Karawang 1. Provide humanitarian aid for disaster refugee. 2. Provide telecommunication infrastructure for community

PT. Perum Jasa Tirta (PJT) II (Management of Jatiluhur Dam)

1. Exploitation and Maintenance of water and electricity facilities; 2. Provision of water, water and electricity resources; 3. Management of watershed, such as protection, development, and the use of water and

water resources 4. Rehabilitation of electricity infrastructure 5. Provision of disaster emergency aid

Dam Break Analysis The Data can be accessed in the office at: Jatiluhur, Purwakarta West Java, or Jl. Lengkong Besar, Bandung, West Java

50

BBWS CITARUM 1. Water resources management that covers the conservation and use of water resources and controlling the water damage in Citarum Basin

2. The implementation of water resources operational and maintenance in Citarum Basin

Document of Management Pattern of Water Resources in The Citarum Basin

Members (Industrial Parks)PT. Maligi Permata Industrial Estate (KIIC)

- Emergency response procedureTo have the document please contact the contact address

MM2100 Industrial Park

- -

PT. KBN Members (Private Enterprises)Sharp Electronics Indonesia

Gives aid during emergency situation as part of social response -

PT. Toyota (TMMIN) Flood Risk Management at TMMIN: Preventive (Division in charge: EAD, GAD, PAD, PED, HRD) Monitoring (Division in charge: GAD, PAD) Risk Event Management (Division in charge: GAD, PAD, HRD) Note: - EAD : External Affairs Division - GAD: General Affairs Division - HRD: Human Resources Division - PAD: Plant Administration Division - PED: Plant Engineering Division

Documents: Organization Structure Rescue Support Mapping (Contour, Residences, etc) Contacts List System & Procedure (before, when, after) Production arrangment Man Power arrangement Station (posko) Logistics (meals, medicines, water, etc) Supply Procedure Health Station Management Transportation Management Note: They don’t clarify yet which documents could be shared to external.

PT. HM Sampoerna Disaster management is one social responsibility of PT. HM Sampoerna. Such as establishment of emergency response team (SAR) that equipped by rubber boat, ambulance, fire truck, electricity generator, mobile medical center, public kitchen and clean water distillation

-

Lookman Djaya (Transportation Company)

- -

PT. Jotun Indonesia - - Members (Association)APINDO 1. In line with the capacity and the authority of organization, DPP APINDO West Java

give fully appreaciation to the implementation of Arean BCM. 2. Continue the information regarding the implementation of Area BCM to the members. 3. Developing the Area BCM gradually.

1. Data of member of APINDO in West Java. 2. Data of Chairman Board of City/Regency (DPK) of APINDO in West Java. 3. Routine (coordination) meeting APINDO in West Java.

51

Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri – KADIN) WEST JAVA PROVINCE

1. Linking the government (the policy maker) to private parties (implementer) 2. Giving inputs to the government in order to make a regulations that related on

industry, include to give input about safety, disaster, and development of industrial area permit

3. Input to the police, demonstration should be handled by police department of city level, not only from police department of DKI, to reduce sweeping activity by demonstrator that not from its region.

-

Supporters (National Government, Governmental Research Institutions, Universities and Others) BNPB 1. Give the guideline and direction to disaster management that contains disaster

prevention, emergency response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in a fair and equitable;

2. Determination the standard and the needs of disaster management implementation based on law regulation;

3. Providing information of disaster management activity to the community. 4. Reporting the implementation of disaster management to the president once a month

in normal situation and every time during emergency.

Disaster information Disaster map You can access the web: http://bnpb.go.id

Ministry of Industry Ministry of Cooperation & Small-Medium Enterprises

Ministry of Research and Technology

Bandung Institute of Technology

1. To play significant roles in delivering safer community and stakeholders who are aware, responsive and able to overcome potential natural and man-made disaster,

2. To enhance fundamental and applied research activities, which are able to anticipate, respond to and mitigate the disaster risk,

3. To promote fundamental and applied research results that can strengthen the policy development in disaster management in order to achieve sustainable development,

4. To support the formation of disaster mitigation expert-communities in Indonesia through education

Document research of disaster risk assessment Document research of disaster mitigation The documents and information can be seen in the website http://ppmb.itb.ac.id

Area BCP ver.2 Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila, The Philippines-

i

Area-Business Continuity Plan（Area BCP）

(Version 2)

－Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila, The Philippines－

November 2014

PEZA, OCD, DILG, MMDA and NEDA

○This plan (version 2) is promoted by PEZA, OCD, DILG, MMDA and NEDA was

formulated with the participation of local governments, national government agencies, and

private sectors in Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila under the guidance and cooperation of

JICA Study Team.

○The stakeholders in Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila are expected to continue with the

activities of Area BCM and revise this plan spontaneously.


ii

Contents 1 Purpose of the Plan ------------------------------ 1

2 Scope of the Plan ------------------------------ 2

2.1 Organization ------------------------------ 2

2.2 Area ------------------------------ 4

2.3 Hazard ------------------------------ 4

2.4 Formulation Process and Version Management ------------------------------ 5

3 Understanding of the Area ------------------------------ 6

3.1 Stakeholders of the Area ------------------------------ 6

3.2 Structure of the Local industry ------------------------------ 9

3.3 Infrastructures in the Area ------------------------------ 10

3.4 Disaster Risks that threaten the Local Industry ------------------------------ 12

4 Impact Analysis of the Area ------------------------------ 15

4.1 Impact to the Area by Disaster ------------------------------ 15

4.2 Concerns of the Industry Continuity ------------------------------ 17

5 Strategies for Industry Continuity ------------------------------ 19

5.1 Policy of Industry Continuity ------------------------------ 19

5.2 Role of the Stakeholders ------------------------------ 20

6 Improvement Activities for Capability of Industry

Continuity

------------------------------ 22

6.1 Category of Improvement Measures ----------------------------- 22

6.2 Progress Management of Improvement Measures ----------------------------- 23

7 Implementation of the Plan ------------------------------ 25

7.1 Area BCM ------------------------------ 25

7.2 System of Implementing Area BCM ------------------------------ 26

7.3 Exercising and Reviewing ------------------------------ 27

7.4 Maintaining and Improving ------------------------------ 28

7.5 Reporting ------------------------------ 29

7.6 Issues and Items for Improvement ------------------------------ 29

7.7 Next Steps (Proposed) ------------------------------ 30

8 Definitions of Terms ------------------------------ 32

Appendix A Activity of Workshop (version 2) ------------------------------ 33

Appendix B List of Stakeholders (version 2) ------------------------------ 34


1

1 Purpose of the Plan13

The Purpose of this Area-business continuity plan (Area BCP) is to sustain the

development in the Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila area, the continuity or rapid recovery of

industry function immediately after an emergency such as disasters caused by natural

phenomena that affected the entire area.

Area-BusinessContinuity shallbe realized through the 1) promotion and sustained practice

of Business Continuity Planning (BCP) within each private enterprises, 2) cooperation and

close coordination among the local and national government organizations operating within

these areas, Infrastructure Operators (Energy, Power, and Water and Transport, Roads and

Highways, IndustrialParks Administrators (government and private), and the 3) deliberate

implementation of disaster reduction and mitigation measures, disaster awareness and

preparedness activities, contingency planning and enhancement of emergency response

programs of all identified takeholders, including the communities.

This plan shows the important information to be shared among stakeholders, the roles of

stakeholders, the strategy and contents of activities for Area-Business Continuity, and the

continual operationalization of this plan.

13 The purpose of the plan (1st- version) was rewritten from the draft of the JICA study team to reflect the discussion in the WS by the stakeholders.


2

2 Scope of the Plan

2.1 Organization

The stakeholders of this plan shalll be comprised of Lead and Co-Lead Members and

Support Organizations. Each stakeholder organization shall be represented by a focal person

with their respective alternate. The specific roles and tasks of these stakeholders are shown in

Chapter 7. A Secretariat shall be established by the Lead and Co-Lead organizations to

support the partnership and conduct follow-through activities. The composition shall be

agreed upon by PEZA, OCD, NEDA and MMDA.

2.1.1 Leader

The Lead and Co-Lead Organizations or Agencies shall be responsible for the promotion

of the Area BCM Framework in areas in the Philippines where there are presence of

agglomerated industrial complexes. They shall exercise stewardship or oversight over the

formulation, development, and continuing review, revision, maintenance and implementation

or exercises of Area BCM Plans in these areas

In the case of the Philippines, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) shall

embrace the lead role in ABCM Program and act as the Lead entity. Co-Lead Organizations

are the Office of Civil Defense (pursuant to its mandated functions under RA 10121 and

being the execuroty arm of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

or NDRRMC), the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and in the case of

Metro Manila – the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). The National

Economic Development Authority (NEDA) being the Lead Economic Development agency in

the different Administrative Regions of the Philippines can also serve Co-Leader.

The Leader shall initiate identification of Industrial Agglomerated Areas or Economic

Zones where an Area BCM Plan should be established and formulated. The Co-Leader

organizations shall assist in mobilizing other stakeholders like local government units,

national government agencies involved with disaster risk reduction, and the private sector to

actively participate in relevant ABCM planning and activities. This functional arrangement

takes cognizance of certain limitations of the Leader organization in terms of authority

beyond the economic zones and leverage and influence over other entitites whose

participation, involvement, and commitment to ABCM is very crucial. The Co-Leaders were

chosen on the basis of their powers and mandates under existing Philippine Laws to facilitate

the formulation of ABCM Plans in selected Areas.


3

2.1.2 Members

The Members shall actively participate in Area BCM formulation in each Industrial

Agglomerated Area and may be chosen among the dominant organizations or agencies

operating in the locality. Members shall provide information necessary for Area BCM Plan

and promote disaster risk reduction, mitigation, preparedness and emergency response

enhancement measures and BCP practice itself within their repective organizations. Local

Government Units (Province, Cities and Towns, or Barangays) shall normally be engaged in

the preparation of ABCM together with the National Government Agencies (NGAs), Lifeline

(Power and Energy, Water, Comunications, Transportation, Road and Highways)

Organizations, and the Private Sector or Business including concerned Economic Parks

Adminitrators, present in each area to be covered.

2.1.3 Support Organizations

Support Organizations shall provide technical advice and expertise to the Working

Organization tasked to promote, formulate, and implement Area BCM in a particularly

selected agglomerated industrial area (Cavite Economic Zone, Laguna Industrial Park and

Economic Zone in outhern Metro Manila) most especially in term of Natural Hazards

identification and Impact and Risk Assessment.

For this purpose, the following agencies shall primarily comprise the Supporting

Organizations for the ABCM Plan for Cavite, Laguna an outhern Metro Manila:

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), Department of

Science and Technology (DOST)

Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Department of Environment Natural

Resources (DENR), and

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration

(PAGASA), DOT

Academic, Research and other Technical Personalities and Institutions may be tapped for

specific concerns on recommendation of above-mentioned agencies.


4

2.2 Area

This plan shall cover the following areas.

・Industrial agglomerated area in the Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila. Spcifically the

peripheries of Cavite Economic Zone, Laguna Industrial Park, and the Special Economic

Zones located at the southern part of Metro Manila such as those within the Cities of

Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, and Paranaque.

・Areas where the production facilities of infrastructure and lifeline companies or

organizations are located or distribute their proucts and services for utilization of

industries operating in the areas mentioned above.


2.3 Hazards

This plan initially, considers only the following Hazards that may be brought about

by Nature and cause a Disaster::Primary – Earthquake

Plans for Secondary hazards like Tunami, Flood, and Volcanic Eruption and other

hydro-meteorological hazards shall be considered separately and covered by other

ABCM Plans and activities in the future.


5

Other hazards induced by human activities shall, likewise, be covered by separate plans

applying the ABCM Planning Framework and as agreed upon by the stakeholders.

2.4 Formulation Process and Version Management

This plan will will undergo continuing improvement and shall be revised as appropriate by

the stakeholders following the activities prescribed by the Area BCM Planning Framework.

This Version (No. 2) shall be appended to the Version 1 and form part of the Demonstration

Process of the Pilot Component of the enhancement of the AHA Center (ASEAN

Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management) with the help of

the Government of Japan under the AHA-JICA “Natural Disaster Risk Assessment and

Formulation of Area Business Continuity Management Plan for the Industrial Agglomerated

Areas in the ASEAN Region” Project.

・Initially, these plan verions (1 and 2) were products of said JICA project. The JICA Study

Team undertook the preparation of meetings (Jun 2013-August 2013, two times) and

guided the workshops (December 2013-November 2014, four times) 14 that were held

during which the Working Group Members from the Stakeholder organizations were

oriented to the Concept of ABCM and the Planning Process. The ideas generated through

the stakeholders’ discussions an interaction with the JICA Study Team were compiled to

arrive at these ABCM Plan Versions.

Henceforth, the resulting ABCM Plan Version after the conclusion of the Project may be

adopted for local implementation and testing in the Provinces of Cavite an Laguna (specifically

at the CEZ and LIP Areas) and Metro Manila, as aplicable. Appropriate documents such as

Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs), Resolutions, or Circulars shall be prepared by the

concerned stakeholders to ratify or demonstrate adoption of this ABCM Plan.



6

3 Understanding of the Area

This Chapter describes stakeholders who participated in the formulation of the Area BCM

Plan for Cavite, Laguna, and Southern Part of Metro Manila where the industrial

environment exists and the identified disaster risks threatens. The economic infrastructure and

the disaster risks were both considered in the planning process.


Stakeholders who participated in Area BCM Planning included local government units

from provinces that have territorial and political jurisdiction where the industrial zones are

situated , operators of infrastructure and lifelines, industrial parks, private enterprises, national

government agencies, governmental research institutions, universities and others.

The stakeholders were grouped in accordance with their roles as Lead (or Co-Lead),

Members and Supporters of Area BCM. In some instances, a particular agency or

organization may take up dual or multiple roles because of their mandate or capacity.

・ Stakeholders of the Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila Area, and their roles and

responsibilities are listed in Table 3-1. Local governments in the Area are Cavite Province,

Laguna Province, National Capital Region (NCR), and cities and municipalities in the

Provinces and NCR.

・The stakeholders in the table are those who attended workshops for the formulation of the

first version of Area BCP.

・ A composition of the stakeholders may be modified by inviting other essential

organizations that may be identified in the future like the Petroleum Industry.



7

Table3-1 Stakeholders of the Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila Area


Leader PEZA as Lead Agency being

the primary government

regulatory body for

Economic Zones

OCD as Co-Lead in its

capacity as DRRMC prime

mover

NEDA as Co-Lead being the

initiator of regional economic

planning activities

DILG as Co-Lead also and

has administrative power

over LGUs

MMDA as Co-Lead, in the

case of Metro Manila being

the coordinating body for

Metro Manila

Initiate ABCM Planning activities and mobilize

relevant stakeholders.

Promote BCP among Private Enterprises and

manage Area BCM for wider area coverage

Oversee the Formulation and Updating of Area

BCPs/M (Encourage and support review and

updating of Plans)

Initiate through collaborative effort or direct

conduct of studies, disaster risk assessments,

planning workshops, awareness seminars and

other activities necessary for implementation of

Area BCM and its component systems

Lead in the establishment or formulation of the

Incident Command System (ICS) or Protocols that

would be adopted during actual emergencies.

Provide or identify possible resources to support

ABCM activities.

Members Provinces of Cavite and

Laguna

Regional Offices of

National Government

Agencies in Region IV-A and

Metro Manila (as applicable)

CAVITEX,SLEX

DPWH (IVA & NCR)

PPA & MIAA

MERALCO & NGCP

MWSS, LWUA, MWC, &

MWSI, PLDT, SMART &

GLOBE

DOE & PIP(Operators of

Infrastructure and Lifeline)

Industrial Parks (CEZ & LIP

Private Enterprises

PCCI Representative

Participate in the Area BCM Activities or

Programs

Formulate Area BCP Attend workshops and others planning activities

Provide information and documents necessary for

Area BCM

Formulate, update and promote disaster reduction

and management measures and BCP in their

respective organization

Institute and integrate disaster-resistant designs

into infra projects.

Formulate detailed immediate recovery/restoration

plan for lifelines

Supporters PHIVOLCS (DOST) Support Area BCM Activities Provide information, knowledge and technical


8

MGB (DENR)

PAGASA (DOST)

(Other Relevant National

Government

Research Institutions,

Academic Bodies such as ・

Universities and other

Resource Persons

advices necessary for Area BCM to the concerned stakeholders

Provide services such as study and disaster risk assessment necessary for Area BCM

Promote Area BCM at the national level

Provide Technical Advice in the Formulation of

systems needed for Area BCM


9

3.2 Structure of the Local industry15

In these areas, agglomerated industrial complexes are located. The characteristics of the

economic environemtn are as follows:

・In the Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila Areas, many industrial parks are located along

South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) /Skyway and other major roads. (PEZA/LGUs

concerned may be able to provide list or numbers)

・In these industrial parks, many large production plants are located and operation such as

electronics and fabricated metal are financed by foreign capital. . The Cavite Economic

Zone (CEZ) has 408 locator companies while the Laguna Techno Park (LIP) has 266

locator companies, The estimated combined revenues from export of these areas alone is

US$ 8.5 Billion.16

・Employment and production of these industrial parks is a large-scale. Therefore, the Local

economy is largely dependent on these industrial parks. CEZ has a direct employment of

69,814 while LIP companies employ another 100, 981. CEZ and LIP has an indirect

employment of 418,884 and 605,886, respectively.17

・Transport of people, services and goods of industrial parks is almost dependent on Manila

ports, Cavite Expressway (CAVITEX), South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) /Skyway, and

the other major roads which leads to them. (DPWH, SLEX, CAVITEX, and PPA may be

able to provide some more specific data in addition to those provided by the JICA Study

Team in Table 3.2)

Note: Additional Data or Relevant Information can be appended as supporting tables for the

Plan.

15 Appropriate, any useful informations shall be to update or add. (For example: the amount, items and countries of trade) 16 PEZA DDG Justo Porfirio Ll. Yusingco, 28 November 2014, ABCM Workshop at Crimson Hotel 17 Yusingco, 28 November 2014


10

3.3 Infrastructures in the Area

■Traffic Infrastructures

Province of Cavite is connected to Metro Manila by the Cavite Expressway (CAVITEX)

passing along the Coast of Manila Bay. The Province of Laguna is connected to Metro

Manila via the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) /Skyway running along Laguna Lake.

Manila Port is the major harbor that the industrial parks in Cavite and Laguna area are

preominantly using. Batangas Port in the south is another major harbor in this area. The

nearest airport is Ninoy Aquino Airport in Metro Manila with some smaller airports in Cavite

and the Province of Batangas but are dedicated for military use .


There are many electric power plants that use thermal, hydro, geothermal in this area. Many

substations are located near the industrial parks. The ground water is pumped up in the site of

park and supplied as industrial water in many industrial parks.



Cavite Expressway

(CAVITEX)

Parañaque to Kawit

Length: 14km

Public Estates Authority Tollway

Corporation (PEATC)

South Luzon Expressway

(SLEX) /Skyway

Makati to Santo Tomas, Batangas

Length: 60km

Skyway Operation and Maintenance

Corporation,

Manila Toll Expressway Systems,

Inc.

Manila Port

(North) 9 piers

(South) 5 Piers

(Manila International Container

Terminal) 5 Berths, 10 Container

cranes

Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)

(North) Manila North Harbor Port

Inc.

(South) Asian Terminals Inc.

(Manila International Container

Terminal) Manila International

Container Terminal Services Inc.

Batangas Port 1 Berth, 2 Gantry Cranes Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)

Asian Terminals Inc.

Ninoy Aquino Airport Runway: 3,700m x 1, 2,300m x 1

Passenger Terminal: 4

Manila International Airport

Authority (MIAA)

Electric Power Plant MERALCO Private Company


11

Fig.3-１ Infrastructure facilities in the area


12

3.4 Disaster Risks that Threaten the Local Industry

The once in 100 to 200 years probability was considered for the natural hazards to estimate

the possible extent of the imagined catastrophe. The smaller but more frequent disasters can

be studied in the future with DOST’s PHIVOLCS and PAGASA and MGB (DENR)

providing the expertise and technical support.

Among the several natural hazards, earthquake gives the largest impact to the local

industries in Cavite and Laguna area in the period of 100 to 200 years. Flood is the second.

The disaster risk by tsunami may be large but the probability is lower than earthquake and

flood. The effect by volcanic eruption is smaller than earthquake and flood. The disaster risk

posed by the earthquake is considered in this plan for the above reasons. (Referred Databases:

EM-DAT18, PRCC19, GLIDEnumber20, NOAA21, Dartmouth22)

The distribution of seismic intensity that is supposed to be experienced once in 200 years is

shown in Fig.3-3. The seismic intensity in most of Cavite and Laguna area is MMI 8 (lower 8

in PHIVOLCS intensity scale). Along the Manila Bay, from Metro Manila to Cavite and

Taguig, Pasig, Marikina city in Metro Manila may suffer MMI 9 (upper 8 in PHIVOLCS

intensity scale). The liquefaction phenomena may occur due to the strong ground motion in

several places and cause damage to the facilities during the earthquake. The distribution of

liquefaction potential by this type of earthquake motion is shown in Fig.3-4. The Manila Bay

area from Manila Port to Cavite and Taguig city show high probability of liquefaction. The

disaster risks to the local industries in Cavite and Laguna area by this earthquake motion and

liquefaction are shown in Table3-3.

18 OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, http://www.emdat.be/ 19 Pacific Rim Coordination Center Disaster Data, http://data.pacificrimnetwork.org/ 20 GLobal IDEntifier Number, http://www.glidenumber.net/ 21 National Ocean and Atmosphere Administration, National Geophysical Data Center, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/hazards.shtml 22 Dartmouth Flood Observatory, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/Archives/


13

Fig.3-2 Comparison of the natural disaster risks to the local industry. The disaster risks are

calculated on the basis of the number of dead people and amount of loss based on the existing

disaster database.

Fig.3-3 Distribution of seismic intensity Fig.3-4 Distribution of liquefaction

probability

Large

Small

Low High(1/200 - 1/100)

Probability

Dis

aste

rR

isk

by

Na

tura

l Haz

ard

s

This map is intended to be used for

disaster scenario creation. This map is

not the forecast of the future hazard. [Analytical condition] Probabilistic

Seismic Hazard Analysis, Software:

EZ-FRISK, Earthquake source model:

GSHAP, EZ-FRISK, Ground

classification and amplification: NEHRP,

Ground Data: Digital geological data by

IGP, Conversion from PGA to MMI:

Trifunac and Brady (1975), Return

period: 200 years.

This map is intended to be used for disaster scenario creation. This map

is not the forecast of the future hazard. [Analytical condition] Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis,

Software: EZ-FRISK, Earthquake source model: GSHAP, EZ-FRISK,

Ground classification and amplification: NEHRP, Ground Data: Digital

geological data by IGP, Conversion from PGA to MMI: Trifunac and

Brady (1975), Return period: 200 years.


14

Table 3-3 Earthquake Disaster Scenario


Buildings in Industrial

Park

10% of the buildings suffer Moderate damage. Repair is necessary.

Some of ceiling panels and illuminator fall down and parts rack may topple.

Non- anchored machines may move.

Transformers may topple.

Lifeline Facilities Electric Power Substations stop their operation for 1 week. The capacity recovers

to 50% in 1 month after and takes 3 months for full recovery.

Communication Landlines and mobile phones become congested because of the

shortage of electric power.

Wells and Water Tanks Stop the operation for several days. The capacity recovers

to 50% in 1 week and takes 1 month for full recovery.

Traffic Infrastructures Expressway between Manila and Cavite is closed for 2 weeks because of the

liquefaction. After temporary restoration work, limited traffic will become

possible.

Traffic capacity of the Expressway between Manila and Laguna is limited in

some sections. It takes 1 week to 50% recovery and takes 2 weeks for full

recovery.

Most piers of Manila Port are unusable for several months because of the

liquefaction. Several piers will become usable after temporary restoration work.

In Container terminal, gantry cranes are severely damaged. It will take half year

to recover 50% of the capacity of cargo handling.


Park

Some of the employees will be absent because 10% of their houses are heavily

damaged and 20% suffered moderate structural damage.

The traffic condition becomes worse causing them to come late to the factory.


15


4.1 Impact to the Area by a Disaster


For the local industry to continue its operations during or immediately after disasters, the

facilities in industrial parks must be available so that the employees can work. In addition, the

services of transportation infrastructure and lifeline (power and water) must also be available.

In the assumed disaster, the estimated impact of these critical resources is shown in

Table3-3 and Fig.4-1.

It is estimated that almost all companies in the industrial park would be forced to stop their

operations for a few weeks or even a few months because of the power failure, the reduction

of water supply and transport function of major roads, and the loss of employees’ houses or

even injury or death of company staff. Thereafter, a decrease in productions may be expected

to continue especially if the recovery of Manila port will entail a few months. The reduction

of the port capacity becomes a serious bottleneck.

Fig.4-1 Recovery of Critical Resources for Industrial Parks Estimated in Assumed Earthquake23

23 This figure shows the simulation results under the limited information obtained by the JICA study team. This information is not elaborate, but useful for understanding the impact of the disaster. Through Area BCM, this figure is expected to be revised continually.

Ra

te o

f O

pe

rati

on

Days after Earthquake

Expressway(Laguna ‐MM)

0%

50%

100

7 14 30 90

Building


16

4.1.2 Impact to the Local Communities and the Industry

Based on the Earthquake Disaster Scenario presented in the earlier section, the following

impacts are anticpated to affect the local communities and the industries in the area. These are

important issues to be considered and addressed in BCM Planning for the area in order to

reduce the level of risks from the assumed earthquake strength.

・Many buildings would be destroyed or damaged in a wide range of the areas of Cavite, Laguna, and

Metro Manila..

・Many people can die, get injured, rendered homeless, and lose their livelihood sources due to damage

of workplaces.

・Due to the death and injury of people and destruction of facilities, it is anticipated that the security

would be worse, and the shutdown of production plus the loss of employees would cause the closure

or bankruptcy of companies. As a result, the local economy would decline.

Table4-1 Impact to the area (in the assumed Earthquake)24


Assumed disaster ・Earthquake (About once in 200 years *1)

Direct damage ・Many buildings would be damaged in a wide range of the area. (heavy

damage=10%, moderate structure damage=20%).*1

・10% of the buildings in industrial park suffer Moderate damage.

Consequential Impact ・Productions of almost all local industries would be shut down for a few

weeks – a few months *1 and thereafter low level of productions would

continue.

・Many people would be casualties, become refugees or unemployed, thus,

severely affect many communities to the point of widespread confusion.

Society Population ・Many affected people (Ex: many evacuees）*2, casualties

・Diseases, Infections、Mental stress（especially children）

Security ・Peace an Order and Security worsen especially in blighted areas

Community ・Displaced families.


Industry Production ・Significant reduction in production (Ex:30%, 50% of companies）*2

・Shutdown of production (Ex: 5%, 30% of companies）*2

Company ・Many closure or bankruptcy including small companies

24 This table shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team. This is not the information elaborate, but useful to understand the impact by the disaster. Though Area-BCM, this table will be expected to revise continually.


17

Investment ・Reduction of investment


Employment ・ Higher unemployment rate


*2：Examples of impact amount shown in discussion of the WS by stakeholders

Note: On the other hand, the effect of positive aspects is also expected in disaster, such as an

actively help each other in the community and an investment demand to recover the damaged

facilities.

4.2 Concerns for the Industry Continuity

Bottlenecks for the Industry Continuity are the critical resources that are heavily damaged

and could not immediately be replaced or restored.

In the disaster scenario formulated for this Plan, the following issues can become the

bottlenecks for industry continuity in the area.25

・In the Cavite, Laguna and Metro Manila Area, there is a high risk of earthquake damage. In

the scenario , many buildings are expected to be damaged in a wide range of the area.

・The most critical concern is the reduction of transport function of major roads and Manila

port, the power failure, and the reduction of water supply/sewage function.

・Another critical concern is the worsening of the living condition of people including

employees, and the breakdown of communications (landline /mobile phones) due to power

failure not to mention the security, peace, and order concerns.


Table4-2

Bottlenecks for

industry continuity

in the assumed

EarthquakeCategory

Bottleneck Impact to industry

Most critical concern the reduction of

transport function

of major roads

・The transport of industrial parks is greatly dependent

on Manila port, Cavite Expressway (CAVITEX),

South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) /Skyway, and the

other major roads which leads to them. These roads

would not be available for 1 – 2 weeks due to

liquefaction and the traffic jam on this road can

continue over a long period. As a result, many


18

companies in the industrial parks would be forced to


the reduction of

transport function

of Manila port

・The transport of industrial parks is greatly dependent

on Manila port. It would not be available for a few

months due to liquefaction and many companies in

the industrial parks would be forced to stop or reduce

their operations.

the power failure ・All companies need electric power to continue their

business function. The power failure can occur for 1

week - 3 months and the companies which do not

have any emergency generator or enough fuel would

cease production. Almost all companies in the

industrial parks would be forced to stop or reduce

their operations.

the reduction of

water supply/

sewage function

・Most companies need water supply/ sewage in their

business operations.. The reduction of water

supply/sewage function for 1 month will cause most

companies in the industrial parks to stop or reduce

their operations.

Critical concern the worsening

living condition of

people, including

employees

・Until their houses are repaired or lifelines are restored,

many employees could not be attend work Some

employees would even stay on the road or other

public facilities These can greatly affect the operation

of the factories.

the reduction of

communications

function

(fixed-line phone

and mobile phone)

・In industrial activity, mobile phone and fixed-line

telephone is used frequently. In the assumed

earthquake, these communication services would be

limited due to the power failure.


19



The policy of the industry continuity in the area are the following.

Table 5-1 Policy to Ensure Industry Continuity

・Under the formulated earthquake disaster scenario, the production activities in the

industrial agglomerated areas should continue and recover immediately and the scale

and level of production and employment prior to the disaster event should be achieved

within the least time possible.

・To achieve the above, there should be a concerted efforts within and around the

agglomerated industrial areas in Cavite, Laguna, and Metro Manila to protect the lives,

machineries and facilities, and vital infrastructures against the effects of very strong

earthquakes. All mechanisms should be put in place to ensure safety of people through

disaster prevention and preparedness programs, continued social and business functions

through contingency planning, drills and evaluation of emergency plans, and structural

mitigation measures, and instituting early recovery schemes including redundancy

options for lifeline infrastructures and services.


20


Consistent with the ABCM Plan Policy Statement for the Agglomerated Industrial Areas in

Cavite, Laguna, and Metro Manila, all stakeholders shall perform their repective roles as

enmerated in the following Table.

Tabele5-2 Role of Stakeholders in Area BCM

Stakeholder Role

Local and

National

Government

Units/Agencies

Enhance their respective emergency response capacities to address

the needs of communities and enterprises.

Undertake extensive hazards and disaster awareness campaigns and

disaster preparedness programs especially at the community level.

Enhance Disaster Communications and Informatiom Systems

Provide useful information for Area BCM Plan Formulation (ex:

Hazard maps, Risk assessment

Develop, rehearse, and Improve their Contingency Plans

Allocate resources for DRRM Programs

Promote BCP Practice to private establishments in their territorial

jurisdiction

Strictly enforce building regulations, safety codes, land use and

zoning regulations

Cooperate towards the update of the ABCM Plan

Others

Infrastructure

Operators

Develop their own BCPlan and Cooperate towards the Development

of ABCM in identified and agreed upon areas

Provide useful information for Area BCM (ex: Risk assessment,


recover operation within the least possible time

Institute and Integrate in their Infrastructure Designs Earthquake

Resistive Technologies

Assist in the overall early recovery measure within selected ABCM

Area

Lifeline

Operators

Adopt and Promote BCP Practice and support ABCM Activities

Contribute useful information for Area BCM (ex: Risk assessment,


Institute Early Recovery Measures in their Sector and provide

Establish redundancy options for their services and products

Industrial park Strengthen their own facilities an establish redundant systems for


21

Administrators their operations

Adopt and promote BCP Practice among their respective Locator

Companies and Actively Participate in ABCM Activities

Provide useful information for Area BCM (ex: Activity of their own

BCM)

Cooperate, Support and coordinate with locator companies in the

industrial park regarding ABCM

Company

(in industrial

park)

Formulate, Adopt, Rehearse and Improve their own BCP and

promote BCP Practice to other companies

Strengthen their own facilities

Contribute information for Area BCM and support or participate in

ABCM Activities (ex: Activity of their own BCM)

Put up redundancy systems for their operations

Promote Disaster Preparedness among their employees and their

immediate family members


22



The improvement measures to resolve the anticipated bottlenecks in continuity of

operations during disasters should be carefully analyzed and studied. Once these are done, it

is imperative for stakeholders to implement and practice these measures and monitor the

progress of such endeavor.

For guidance and purpoe of this Plan, the following process shall be adopted initially:

・The measures for industry continuity shall be categorized into Prevention, Mitigation,



Area BCM, the stage will be scaled-up , Idea → Concept → Implement → Achieved.

Table 6-1 Category of Improvement Measures

Category Context

Prevention The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related

disasters.

Mitigation The reduction, lessening or limiting of the adverse impacts of hazards

and related disasters.


individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the

impacts of hazard.

Response The provision of emergency services and humanitarian assistance

during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce

health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence

needs of the people affected.

Recovery The restoration and improvement where appropriate, of facilities,

livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities,

including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors after the impact of the

hazard or a disaster.




23

Table 6-2 Stages of Improvement Measures

Stage Content




Achieved The measure is achieved


The following proposed measures are expected to be practiced by the stakeholders.

Through Area BCM Process andas appropriate, the progress of the measures shall be updated

and new proposed measures will be added in this table.

Table 6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity26 1/2


Most

critical

concern

(Disaster

Scenario

)

the reduction

of transport

function of

major roads

Administrator of

Road

(CAVITEX,SLEX,

DPWH)

Mitigation Implement measures such as the

reinforcement of major roads and

expansion of major roads/

development of bypass road

Idea

Administrator of

Road (CAVITEX,

SLEX, DPWH,

LGU, MMDA)

Recovery Institute early restoration of damaged

roads, and to carry out a traffic control

Idea

Local Government

+ Administrator of

Road

Mitigation/

Recovery

Designate priority roads, reinforce

them in normal time, and restore them

in disaster with a high priority

Idea

the reduction

of transport

function of

Manila port

Administrator of

Port


reinforcement of major facilities

Idea

Local Government

+ Administrator of

Port (PPA, DOTC)

Mitigation Designate Batangas port or Subic port

as the alternative port, and promote the

installation and the use expansion in

normal time

Administrator of

Port + other

stakeholders

Response Formulate a Port-BCP in advance and

achieve a quick recovery of transport

function during a disaster.

Idea

the power

failure

Power operator

(MERALCO)

Mitigation Promote the measures such as the

reinforcement of substations and other

Idea

26 This table (1st version) shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team and the discussion results of WS by the stakeholders.


24


major facilities

Recovery Restore as early as possible damaged

facilities

Idea

Company (Eco

Zones/Parks

Locators)

Mitigation Procure emergency generator and fuel Idea

the reduction

of water

supply/

sewage

function

water supply/

sewage operator


reinforcement of major facilities

Idea

Recovery Immediately restore damaged

facilities

Idea

Company Mitigation Prepare the alternative means like

underground water or a water wagon.

Table 6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity 2/2


Critical

concern

(Assumed

disaster)

the worsening

of living

condition of

people,

including

employees

Local Government Response Strengthen response measures

(ex: Evacuation order, Medical

care, shelter for victims, Relief

supplies)

Idea

Recovery Strengthen recovery measures

(ex: Relief for victims)

Idea

Industrial park,

Company

Mitigation Build a dormitory for employees

near industrial parks

Idea

Recovery Carry out early recovery and

retain employment

Idea

the reduction of

communication

function

(fixed-line

phone and

mobile phone)

Tele-communication

operator

Mitigation Implement measures for service

continuity during power failure

(ex: Emergency generator and

fuel)

Idea

Company Mitigation Promote acquisition of alternative

means of communication (ex:

satellite phone)

Idea


25

7 Implementation of the Plan (Plan Implementation Process)

7.1 Area BCM

The Plan Formulation and Implementatio shall follow the Area BCM System, Process or

Cycle:






Figure 7-1 Area BCM System

Effective implementation of Area BCM requires active participation of stakeholders of the

area, and a continuous approach and endeavor of the stakeholders of the area. Identifying

key stakeholders and establishing a system for promoting and implementing Area BCM are

important. Private and public coordination is also essential.

Understanding of the Area can be further deepened and the strategy of Area BCM can be

improved through a continuous approach following the Area BCM process.



Area BCMCycle

Understanding

the Area



Maintaining and

Improving

Exercising and

Reviewing


26


Area BCM is promoted and implemented under the following system framework.


Figure 7-2 System of Implementation of Area BCM

Area BCMCycle

Understanding

the Area


Determining

Area BCMStrategy

Maintaining and

Improving

Exercising and

Reviewing





Leader

Members

Supporters


27


Through regular exercises and continuing review, the effective implementation of Area

BCM system is validated. The plan is the confirmed (adopted) and kept up to date.

Activities of exercising and reviewing, likewise involve 1) studying and improvement of the

plan by the members, 2) reviewing the plan, 3) formulating a plan for another natural disaster

scenario, 4) studying lessons from natural disasters that have occurred in the past in the area

and surroundings, and 5) promotion or iemination and awareness rising.









Activity Report









Trainings Seminars

Activity Report


Members








28













○Promotion and Awareness Raising


to disseminate and raise awareness of Area BCM/Area BCP to executives and key staffs of


implemented.





After putting Area BCM system in place, the plan is required to be kept up to date in order

to follow the changing conditions. A maintenance program is prepared that ensure the plans

are up to date.

if there are any changes of a composition of stakeholders

if the target area of the plan is changed

if a new natural disaster risk (s) emerged

following lessons learned from exercising and reviewing

following lessons learned from natural disasters in the area and other locations

other necessary occasions

For updating the plan, if necessary, activities such as studies and risk assessments are again

obtained to determine new upates. A maintenance program is Area BCM Strategizing where

the Area BCM System (Processes) are carried out. An updated plan or a newly formed plan


29

is prepared through workshops organized by the leader and attended by the members and

supporters and follows the template of the previous workshops.

During the course of updating the plan, processes and effectiveness of Area BCM system

are reviewed. Outputs are summarized in a review report of Area BCM.

The leader validates and approves the updated plan after receiving advice from experts and

discussions inputs by the working group.

7.5 Reporting



Activity report

Lesson learned report

Updated plan

Plan for new risk

Review report of Area BCM

Maintenance program


Establishing the appropriate organization to sustain Area BCM activities and following it

framework, system, and processes may be a valid concern among the stakeholders. It is

therefore, essential to identify and build a consnsus as to which organization(s) should

logically lead, participate, and support the promotion, formulation and adoption of Area

Business Continuity Management in the Agglomerate Industrial Areas.

Logically, the proposed organization should take into consideration legal mandates,

capacity (administrative and technical), and degree of influence or leverage over the other

organizations.

Institutionalization is the right direction to sustain ABCM. To address the attendant

challenges of institutionalizing, extensive capacity-building should take place.

It will be through the latter that the degree of success of promoting ABCM and its overall

benefits can be realized.


30

7.7 Next Steps (Proposed)

〜2014

•The leader prepare an updated plan (Version 2).






Activity Report

Reviewing the Plan


A workshop Updated Plan (Version 2)






continuity, actions for business continuity, roles and responsibilities of the member,





・The leader holds a workshop with the members and supporters, reviews the plan (Version

1) by using the outputs from the study of the members, and prepares an updated plan

(Version 2).

For 2015, PEZA (together with the other Lead Organizations [OCD, MMDA, and NEDA])

shall initiate activities towards the improvement of this ABCM Version 2 and the work

towards the adoption of the Cavite, Laguna, and Southern Metro Manila ABCM Plan.

・

PEZA outlined the following activities or strategies (as part of role) that it intends to

undertake consistent with this ABCM Plan:Mobilize Locator Companies in CEZ and

LTI


31

1. Mobilization of Locator Companies

2. Orientation and Training Workshops on BCP

3. Design and Planning Workshops for Each Company to formulate its own BCP

4. Orientation and Training Workshops on ABCP/M

5. Design and Planning Workshops to Formulate ABCP at the Economic Zone

Level

6. Design and Planning Workshops to Formulate ABC/M for

CALABARZON-Wide (Regional Level and Metro Ports)

Expand ABCM Planning Activities to other Economic Zones in CALABARZON

Expand ABCP/M Planning to Mactan (Cebu) Economic Zone amd Visayas Economic

Zones (Note: Mactan Economic Zone has 193 Locator Companies directly employing

61,014 and has an estimated Export Revenue of US$ 1.4 Billion)

Replicate ABCP/M Planning Practice to Baguio City Economic Zone and Northern

Luzon Economic Zone

e leader formulate a plan for an expanded Area, covering CALABARZON (Region IV-A)

and National Capital Region (NCR).

・During the course of the formulating the plan, review a process and effectiveness of Area

BCM system.


32



Business

Continuity

Management

(BCM)






activities

*1

Business

Continuity Plan

(BCP)





*1

Area Business

Continuity

Management

(Area BCM)




*3

Area Business

Continuity Plan

(Area BCP)




*3




damage.

*2




*2

[Reference]

*1: ISO22301、Societal security - Business continuity management systems - Requirements (2012)

*2: UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009)



33



participants

Theme

1st WS 3 December,

2013

Manila 55 ・The policy of Area-BCP





2nd WS 20 February,

2014

Manila 66 ・Impacts on the local society and



Continuity


Continuity

3rd WS 27 May, 2014 Manila 56 ・Area-BCP 1st-version (draft)


4th WS 28 November

2014

Manila 61 Review of the 2nd Version as

edited with inputs from WS3

Presentation of Next Steps for

the ABCM Activities in Cavite,

Laguna, and Southern Metro

Manila by selected stakeholders

from PEZA, Private Locator

Company, and Lifeline Service

Provider

Update and Revise


34

Appendix B List of Stakeholders (version 2) ○Leader

Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) – Lead

Office of Civil Defense (OCD) – Co-Lead for Areas outside Metro Manila

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority – for the National Capital Region (NCR)

Department of Interior and Local Government – for LGU involvement

NEDA (National Economic Development Authority), Region IV-A

○Members (Local Governments and Local Offices of National Government)Cavite

Provincial Government

Office of Public Safety, Province of Laguna

Fire Marshal, Province of Laguna

Provincial Disaster Risk Management Office

Santa Rosa city Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Office

LLDA (Laguna Lake Development Authority)

OCD (Office of Civil Defense), Region IV-A

OCD (Office of Civil Defense), National Capital Region

PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authority), Region IV-A

DILG (Department of Interior and Local Government), National Capital Region

DPWH (Department of Public Works and Highways), Region IV-A

○Members (Operators of Infrastructure and Lifeline)

PPA (Philippine Ports Authority)

Skyway

CAVITEX (Cavite Express Way)

Local Water Utilities Administration

Maynilad Water Services, Inc.

Manila Water Company, Inc.

MERALCO (Manila Electric Company)

National Grid Corporation of the Philippines TRANSCO

○Members (Industrial Parks)

PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authority) – Cavite Economic Zone

PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authority) – Laguna Techno Park

Laguna Techno Park


35

○Members (Private Enterprises)

Terumo Corp (Philippines)

Yazaki-Torres Manufacturing, Incorporated

Nippon Express Phils Corp.

ROHM Electronics Phils, Incorporated

Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Laguna Chamber of Commerce and Industry

○Supporters (National Government, Governmental Research Institutions, Universities

and Others)

OCD (Office of Civil defense)

PEZA (Philippines Economic Zone Authority)

DOE (Department of Energy)

DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communication)

DOST (Department of Science and Technology)

DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development)

PHIVOLCS (Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology)

PAGASA (Philippines Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration)

MGB (Mines and Geosciences Bureau) ○Others


36

TABLE B1 List of Working Group Members Focal Persons of Cavite, Laguna and Southern Metro Manila Area ABCP/M

Organization Responsibilities Available Docs and How to Obtain

Leader and Co-Leader/s PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authority)

Lead Initiatives and Promotion of ABCM Activities in Areas where Ecozones are Located; Provide Support

Appropriate Data on Ecozones and Locators

OCD (Office of Civil Defense)

Support and Promote ABCM Activities through Mobilization of DRRM organizations

DRRM Plans, Policies and Protocols, Guidelines

DILG (Department of Interior and Local Government)

Promote and Support ABCM through Mobilization of LGUs

DRRM Protocols and Guidelines, Policies

MMDA (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Promote and Support ABCM among Metro Manila LGUs

DRRM Plans

NEDA (National Economic Development Authority)

Promote and Support Integration of ABCM in Regional Economic Planning among RDCCs

Social and Economic Data; Policies and Plans

Members (Local Government and National Agencies)Cavite Provincial Government

Support and Promote ABCM in Cavite DRRM Plans and Policies; Socio- Economic Data

Laguna Provincial Government

Support and Promote ABCM in Laguna DRRM Plans and Policies; Socio- Economic Data

Sta. Rosa City Government

Actively Participate in ABCM in the City DRRM Plans and Policies

LLDA (Laguna Lake Development Authority)

Support and Promote ABCM covered by the Authority

Appropriate Plans and Data

OCD Region IV-A Support and Promote ABCM integration among DRRM entities in Region IV-A

DRRM Plan and Policies; appropriate data

OCD National Capital Region

Support and Promote ABCM integration in DRRM among key role players in Metro Manila

Relevant DRRM Plans and Policies; appropriate

DPWH RIV-A (Department of Public Works and Highways)

Strengthen Road Infra through design and construction and plan early repair and restoration measures of vital thoroughfares

Infra Plans and Data

DOE (Department of Energy)

Ensure continuity of power and energy supplies through policies and plans; mobilize Energy Sector to support ABCM in identified areas

Energy Plans Plans and Policies; Contingen- cy Plans if available

DOTC (Department of Transportation and Communications)

Oversee DOTC-attached Agencies’ ABCM functions to ensure transport service continuity and early restoration; Support and Promote ABCM Activities and its integration into transport function

Transport Plans, Policies and data; con- tangency measures

PPA (Philippine Ports Authority)

Actively participate in ABCM and ensure strengthening of Port Infrastructures as well as its early restoration right after a damaging hazard strikes

Plans and Policies; relevant Contingency measures

Members (Private Sector or GOCC) Skyway Toll Corp. Strengthen South Luzon Toll System,

Ensure continued operation and early repair or restoration, promote and actively participate in ABCM

BCP Plan and contingency measures; relevant data as needed


37

CAVITEX Ensure strength of Cavite Expressway against destruction of strong earthquakes and institute early repair and restoration of it function after the hazard struck actively participate and promote ABCM

Appropriate Plans and Policies; other data such as as-built plans

LWUA (Local Water Utilities Administration)

Actively participate and Promote ABCM among Water Districts to ensure early restoration of water supply to areas they cover

Relevant Data as available

MWSI (Maynilad Water Services, Inc.)

Actively participate and Promote ABCM; Ensure continuity of water supply in their respective concessionaire area; share knowledge and information on BCP Practice

Emergency Preparedeness Plans; BCP and other data through written request

MWC (Manila Water Company)

BCP and other relevant data on request

MERALCO (Manila Electric Company)

Participate and Promote ABCM; Plan for implementing immediate restoration of power in their concessionaire area; share knowledge and practice on BCP

Un-restricted data as available

SMART Communications

Actively participate in ABCM activities; ensure continuity of telecom function for their subscribers

Un-restricted data but no BCP yet for RIV-A

PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company)

Participate and Promote ABCM; ensure continuity or early restoration of landline communications

Un-restricted data if available

TRANSCO (National Transmission Corporation)

Participate in ABCM and its Promotion; ensure continuity of power transmission

PEZA-CEZ (Cavite) Support and Actively Promote and Participate in ABCM among the Locator Companies in their respective Areas of Jurisdictions

Zone Profile and other relevant data PEZA-LTI (Laguna)

TERUMO Promote BCP Practice within Company and share knowledge with co-locators; Actively participate in ABCM

Non-sensitive data; BCP as available YAZAKI-TORRES

NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILS) Logistics ROHM ELECTRONICS (PHILS), INC PCCI (Phil. Chambers of Commerce and Industries)

Participate and Promote BC and ABCM Practice among Private Companies most especially for SMEs nation-wide specifically for those catering to Companies in Agglomerated Industrial Areas

Relevant Data if available

LCCI (Laguna Chamber of Commerce and Industry) PHIVOLCS Actively Support, Participate and Promote

ABCM through technical inputs on various types of hazards (hydro-meteo, seismic, geologic)

Hazards and Risks Maps, Assessments, Studies PAGASA

MGB

Area BCP ver.2 Hai Phong, Viet Nam

i

Area-Business Continuity Plan（Area BCP）

Version 2

－Haiphong, Viet Nam－

December 2014

Hai Phong People’s Committee

○This plan was promoted by Hai Phong People’s Committee, and was formulated by JICA

Study Team with the participation of the local government and the private sector in Hai

Phong.

○The stakeholders in Hai Phong are expected to continue Area BCM activities and revise

this plan.


ii

Contents 1 Purpose of the Plan ------------------------------ 1

2 Scope of the Plan ------------------------------ 2

2.1 Organization ------------------------------ 2

2.2 Area ------------------------------ 3

2.3 Hazard ------------------------------ 3

2.4 Formulation Process and Version Management ------------------------------ 3

3 Understanding of the Area ------------------------------ 4

3.1 Stakeholders of the Area ------------------------------ 4

3.2 Structure of the Local industry ------------------------------ 6

3.3 Infrastructures in the Area ------------------------------ 7

3.4 Disaster Risks that threaten the Local Industry ------------------------------ 9

4 Impact Analysis of the Area ------------------------------ 12

4.1 Impact to the Area by Disaster ------------------------------ 12

4.2 Concernsofthe Industry Continuity ------------------------------ 14

5 Strategies for Industry Continuity ------------------------------ 16

5.1 Policy of Industry Continuity ------------------------------ 16

5.2 Role of the Stakeholders ------------------------------ 17

6 Improvement Activities for Capability of Industry

Continuity

------------------------------ 18

6.1 Category of Improvement Measures ----------------------------- 18

6.2 Progress Management of Improvement Measures ----------------------------- 19

7 Implementation of the Plan ------------------------------ 22

7.1 Area BCM ------------------------------ 22

7.2 System of Implementing Area BCM ------------------------------ 23

7.3 Exercising and Reviewing ------------------------------ 24

7.4 Maintaining and Improving ------------------------------ 26

7.5 Reporting ------------------------------ 26

7.6 Issues and Items for Improvement ------------------------------ 26

7.7 Next Steps (Proposed) ------------------------------ 27

8 Definitions of Terms ------------------------------ 28

Appendix A Activity of Workshop (version 2) ------------------------------ 29

Appendix B List of Stakeholders (version 2) ------------------------------ 30


1

1 Purpose of the Plan27 The Purpose of this Area-business continuity plan (Area BCP)is that for the sustainable

development of Hai Phongarea,the continuity or rapid recovery of industry function should be

achieved in emergency such as natural disasters that affect the entire area.

Area-business continuity is discussed based on the assumptions that local government,

lifeline utility operators, investors and authoties of industrial zones (industrial infrastructure

operators), tenant companies in industrial zones in the area will promote their own BCM or

take disaster reduction measures under the cooperation of stakeholders.

This plan shows the important information to be share among stakeholders, the roles of

stakeholders,the strategy and contents of activity for Area-business continuity, and the

continual operation of this plan.

27 The purpose of the plan (version 2) was rewritten from the draft of the JICA study team to reflect the discussion in the WS by the stakeholders.


2

2 Scope of the Plan

2.1 Organization

The stakeholders of this plan (aleader, members and supporters) are as follows. The role of

stakeholders is shown in Chapter 7.

2.1.1 Line authority/ Lead role player

The line authority shall be responsible for promoting Area BCM. They shall take the lead

role in Area BCM and Area BCP formulation and maintenance.

・Hai Phong People’s Committee/ Hai Phong Steering Committee for Natural Disaster Prevention and

Search and Rescue

・Dyke and Flood & Storm Control Department, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development

(DARD)/ Standing Office of the Hai Phong Steering Committee for Natural Disaster Prevention and

Search and Rescue

2.1.2Members

Membersshallparticipate in Area BCM to formulate Area BCP. Members shallprovide

information necessary for Area BCMand promote disaster management measures and BCP of

their own organization.

・Local governments, departments and agencies of the city governments, and local offices of the central

government’s agencies, lifeline utility companies, industrial parks (industrial infrastructure companies),

tenant companies of industrial zones, private enterprises.

2.1.3 Supporters

Supportersshall support Area BCM implemented by a leader and members. As examples of

the support, supporters shallencourage institutional or advise technically, including risk

assessment.

・National Government, Governmental Research Institutions, Universities and Others


3

2.2 Area

This plan is directed to the following areas.

・Industrial agglomerated area in Hai Phong City

・Area that facilities of infrastructure and lifeline are distributed to utilize for industrial

production

Industrial Agglomerated

Area

Hai Phong


2.3 Hazard

This plan is directed to a multi-hazard following.

・Natural disasters such as typhoon, inundation, storm surge, earthquake, tsunami and other

natural disasters, and fire and explosion which affect on people’s lives and cause

production stagnation.

2.4 Formulation process and improvement

This plan will be revised and supplemented though Area BCM activities of stakeholders.

The process to formulate version 1 is described below. After the –version 2, the improvement

process will continue.

・This plan (2nd-edition) was undertaken as JICA project. With the support of JICA,

preparation meetings (Jun 2013-August 2013, two times) and workshops (December

2013-June2014, three times) 28 were held, and the stakeholders discussed on

Area-business continuity. This plan was formulated to compile theseefforts.



4

3 Understanding of the Area

This Chapter describes stakeholders who participate in Area BCM of the Area, and the

infrastructure and disaster risks of the Area shall be evaluated in Area BCM.


Stakeholders who participate in Area BCM include local government’s departments and

agencies, local offices of the central government’s agencies, lifeline utility companies,

industrial zones (industrial park infrastructure companies), tenant companies of industrial

zones, private enterprises, research institues, universities and other organizations.

Stakeholders include line authorities/ lead role players, members and supporting agencies.

・Stakeholders of the Hai Phong Area, and their roles and responsibilities are listed in Table

3-1. The lead role player of Hai Phong Area is Hai Phong People’s Committee and the

Dyke and Flood & Storm Control Department under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural

Development）would act as a secretariat.

・The stakeholders in the table are those who attended workshops for formulation of the first

version of Area BCP.

・A composition of the stakeholders can be modified by such as inviting other essential

organizations.



5

Table3-1 Stakeholders of the Hai Phong Area


Line

authority/

lead role

player

・Hai Phong People’s

Committee

・Dyke and Flood & Storm

Control Department,

Department of Agriculture

and Rural Development

・Promote and manage Area BCM

・Formulate and maintain Area BCP

・In charge of studies, disaster risk assessment,

workshops / seminars and others necessary for

implementing Area BCM system

・The Dyke and Flood & Storm Control

Department acts as a secretariat of the leader

Members ・Local Government;

departments and agencies of

local government

・Local offices of the central

government’s agencies

・Lifeline utility companies

・Industrial parks (industrial

park infrastructure

companies)

・Private enterprises, tenant

companies in industrial

zones

・Participate in Area BCM

・Formulate Area BCP

・Attendance of workshops and others

・Provide information and documents necessary

for Area BCM

・Formulate, update and promote disaster

management measures and BCP of her own

organization

Supporting

agencies

・The central government

and relevant ministries and

authorities

・Research Institutes

・Universities

・Other organizations

・Support Area BCM implemented by a leader

and members

・Provide information, knowledge and technical advices necessary for Area BCM

・Provide services such as study and disaster risk assessment necessary for Area BCM

・Promote Area BCM in the national level

・Formulation of systems for Area BCM


6

3.2 Structure of the local industry

There is an industrial agglomerated area in Hai Phong City. Its characteristics are as

follows:

・Many industrial zones are located along highway 5, highway 10, and other major roads

which leads to the highways, many industrial zones situated nearby and along the coast.

・In these industrial zones, many large production plants are located and operationsuch as

machinery and device financed by foreign capital partially (FDI).

・Employment and production of these industrial zones is a large-scale. Then Local economy

is largely dependent on industrial zones.

・Transport of industrial zones is almost dependent on Hai Phng port, highway 5, highway 10,

and the other major roads which leads to them.

Cargoes of which the destination is the Northern area are all transported through those

highways.


7

3.3Infrastructures in the Area

■Traffic Infrastructures

Highway No. 5 is the most important road connecting Hai Phong to Hanoi. Highway No.

10 is also important that runs north to south in Hai Phong city. The expressway from Hanoi to

Hai Phong is under construction and will be completed in 2015.

Hai Phong Port is the river port locates at the mouth of Red River, in the downstream of

Cam river and composed by several terminals along the river. Hai Phong Port is the important

harbor not only for Hai Phong city but for northern Vietnam. Cat Bi Airport locates in Hai

Phong city but, at present, it serves regular domestic flights and irregular international flights

only (new runways and passenger stations are being built to make it become an international

airport).

Additionally, there are waterways and some other inter-regional traffic systems which also

affect on Hai Phong.


There are three major power plants in this area. Hai Phong thermal plant is in the city and

two are in northern suburbs. Three 220kV transformer stations and 25 110kV transformer

stations are in operation in the city. Water is supplied through 7 water purification plants.



Highway No.5 Hanoi to Hai Phong

Length: 102km

Directorate for Roads of

Vietnam, Ministry of Transport

Highway No.19

North suburb of Hai Phong City

to Ninh Binh City

Length: 157km

Directorate for Roads of


The system of Hai

Phong sea ports

37 sea port operators with 42

berths locating from Dinh Vu

to Cau Kien, Pha Rung and Song

Gia

Vietnam National Maritime

Bureau, Ministry of Transport

Cat Bi Airport Runway: 2,400m x 1

3050 x 50 m

Airports Corporation of


Thermal Power Plant Hai Phong Thermal Power Plant

Designed capacity: 300MW x 4

Hai Phong Thermal Power Joint

Stock Company


8

9x6.2MW for Nomura Industrial

Zone only

Nomura Industrial Zone

Transformer stations

110 KV stations

39 intermediary stations and

3528 dispatching stations

Hai Phong Power Company,

Nothern Electricity

Transmission Company

Fresh water treatment

plant

Hai Phong Water Supply

Company

Fig.3-１ Infrastructure facilities in the area


9

3.4 Disaster Risks that threaten the local industry

The once in 100 to 200 years probability is considered for the natural hazards to work out

the scenarios of possible disasters. The smaller but more frequent disasters are requested to be

studied in the future.

Among the several natural hazards, typhoons, storm surge and inundation (inland flood) by

typhoon give the largest impact to the local industries in Hai Phong city with the frequency of

once every 100 to 200 years. The disaster risk by earthquake and tsunami is smaller. The

disaster risk by the storm surge and inundation by typhoon is considered in this plan for the

above reason. (Referred Databases: EM-DAT30, PRCC31, GLIDEnumber32, NOAA33,

Dartmouth34)

The inundation depth by the storm surge that is supposed to occur due to the typhoon that

may come once every 200 years is shown in Fig.3-3. The coastal area in Hai Phong city may

be inundated by sea water widely. The inundation depth by the flood due to the heavy rain

during the typhoon attack is shown in Fig.3-4. The many places in Hai Phong is inundated by

heavy rain fall up to 1m and continue for several days. The disaster risks to the local

industries in Hai Phong by storm surge and flood are shown inTable3-3.

Large

Small

Low High(1/200 - 1/100)

Probability

Dis

aste

rRis

k b

y N

atu

ral H

azar

ds

30

OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, http://www.emdat.be/ 31

Pacific Rim Coordination Center Disaster Data, http://data.pacificrimnetwork.org/ 32

GLobalIDEntifier Number, http://www.glidenumber.net/ 33

National Ocean and Atmosphere Administration, National Geophysical Data Center, http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/hazards.shtml 34

Dartmouth Flood Observatory, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/Archives/


10

Fig.3-2 Comparison of the natural disaster risks to the local industry. The disaster risks are

evaluated by the number of dead people and amount of loss based on the existing disaster

database.

Fig.3-3 Distribution of the inundation depth by the storm surge

Fig.3-4 Distribution of the inundation depth by the flood



3B42RT 3hours interval data are enlarged to the scale of ground-based rainfall data.,Elevation data: GTOPO 30,

ASTER GDEM, Grid size: 200m, Boundary condition: Five hydrographs calculated with runoff model are given

as upper boundary conditions. Assume that Jatiluhur dam is filled and runoff inflow from catchment is released

with no control.,Return period: 200 years.

This map is intended to be used for

disaster scenario creation. This map is

not the forecast of the future hazard.

[Analytical condition] Typhoon

model: Myers’s formula (1954), Storm

surge model: Princeton Ocean Model

(POM), Typhoon best track data:

Japan Meteorological Agency, Tidal

data: Observed at HonDau station,

Bathymetry data: GEBCO_08,

Elevation data: ASTER GDEM, Grid

size: 18”, 6”, 2”, Stochastic Typhoon

track: South to north direct to

HaiPhong based on T1223, Inundation

evaluation: Peak time of storm surge is

assumed to agree with high tide,

Inundation area is evaluated based on

the difference of tide level (+ mean

high water spring) and elevation of the

ground by DEM., Return period: 200

years.

This map is intended to

be used for disaster

scenario creation. This

map is not the forecast of

the future hazard. [Analytical condition]

Software: MIKE-21 for

Inland flooding analysis,

Rainfall data: Annual

maximum daily rainfall at

Phu Lien station,

Elevation data: ASTER

GDEM, Grid size: 500m,

Boundary condition:

Rainfall is given to

protected area

(564.7mm/day), Return

period: 200 years.


11

Table3-3 Disaster scenario by the flood


Facilities in

industrial zone

Buildings of factories in industrial zones along the coast suffer

inundation by storm surge.

Lifeline facilities Hai Phong Power Plant is inundated with 0.5 ～ 1m depth. Electric

power to Hai Phong is limited.

The 220kV transformer station in Dinh Vu is severely damaged by

seawater.

The 110kV transformer station near the coast suffer damage by

seawater.

Electric power supply to Hai Phong area is limited.

Some of base stations of telephone/ mobile phone stop their operation

because of the shortage of electric power.

The supply of fresh water to the City is limited because the fresh

water treatment plants are seriously flooded.

Traffic

Infrastructures

Highway 5 to Ports will be closed for several days.

Some of the roads in the city will be closed for several days.

Dinh Vu Port will be affected by storm surge. Cargo handling

equipment is damaged by seawater.

Container yard in Hai Phong, especially in Dinh Vu area will stop it’s

operation.

Other ports will stop serving or be overloaded and the time for

loading and unloading will be longer.

Damages caused by the flooding at the warehouse systems.

Workers of

Industrial Park

Some of employee will be absent because of the inundation of their

houses.

The traffic condition becomes worse and come late for factory.


12


4.1 Impact to the Area by Disaster


To continue the local industry in disaster, the facilities in industrial zones must be available

and the employeescan work. In addition, the services of transportation infrastructure and

lifeline must be available.

In the assumed disaster, the estimatedimpact of these critical resources is shownin

Table3-3.

4.1.2 Impact to the Local Society and Industry

In the assumed flood, the following impact is estimated to local society and industry in the

area. It is an important issue for the area to reduce the risk of the assumed flood.

・In the assumed storm surge/flood in Hai Phong City, it is estimated that a wide range of the city would be

inundated for a few days.

・In this flood, it is estimated that many people would be casualties and evacuees to lost their houses,

andmany facilities to support the society and industry would be damaged.

・Due to the damage of people and facilities, it is estimated that the security would be worse, and shutdown

of production, loss of employment and bankruptcy of companies would be caused. As a result, thelocal

economywould be led to decline.


13

Table4-1 Impact to the area (in the assumed Storm surge/Flood)35


Assumed disaster ・Storm surge/Flood by Typhoon (About once in 200 years*1)

Direct damage ・A wide range of the city would be inundated for a few days.*1

Outline of impact ・Almost productions of local industry would be shut down for a

few days*1 and thereafter low level of productions would be

continued.

・Many people would be casualties, evacuees or unemployed, so

local society would be confused.

Society Population ・Many affected people (Ex: many evacuees)*2, casualties

・Infection, epidemic diseases, mental stress（especially children,

pregnants and old persons）

Security ・Security worsen, Slum

Community ・Discrete family


Industry Production ・Significant reduction in production (Ex:10%, 50%）*2

・Shutdown of production (Ex: 60-70% of companies*2）

Company ・Many bankruptcy including small companies

Investment ・Reduction of investment


Employment ・Many unemployment


*2：Examples of impact amount shown in discussion of the WS by stakeholders

Note: On the other hand, the effect of positive aspects is also expected in disaster, such as

an actively help each other in the community and an investment demand to recover the

damaged facilities.

35 This table shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team. This is not the information elaborate, but useful to understand the impact by the disaster. Though Area-BCM, this table will be expected to revise continually.


14

4.2 Concerns of the Industry Continuity

Among resources on the local industry, the critical resources are bottlenecks that would be

damaged greatly in disaster and could not be taken alternatives.

In the assumed disaster, the following issues will become the bottlenecks for industry

continuity in the area.36

・In Hai Phong city, there is a high risk of flood. In the assumed flood, a wide range of the city

would be inundated for a few days.

・The most critical concern is the reduction of transport function of major roads and the

system of Hai Phong ports, the power failure, and the reduction of water supply/sewage

function.

・The critical concern is the worsening of living condition of peopleincluding employees, and

the restriction of fixed-line phone/mobile phone due to power failure.

Table4-2 Bottlenecks for industry continuity in the assumed typhoons, storm surge/flood


Most

critical

concern

the reduction of

transport function

of major roads

・The transport of industrial zones is greatly dependent on Hai

Phong port, highway 5, highway 10, and the other major

roads which leads to those industrial zones. These roads

would not be available for a few days by inundation and the

traffic jam on this road would be continued for a long

period. As a result, many companies in the industrial zones

would be forced to stop or reduce their operations.

the reduction of

transport function

of Hai Phong port

・The transport of industrial zones is greatly dependent on Hai

Phong port. It would not be available for a few days by

inundation or damages of facilities and infrastructure of the

port; many companies in the industrial zones would be

forced to stop or reduce their operations.

thepower failure ・All companies need electric power in their business

continuation. The power failure occurred in the companies

which don’t have any emergency generator or enough fuel,

and almost all companies in the industrial zoneswould be

forced to stop or reduce theiroperations.

the reduction of

water supply/

・Most companies need water supply/ sewagein their business

continuation. The reduction of water supply/ sewage



15


sewage function function causes most companies in the industrial zones to


Critical

concern

the worsening of

living condition of

people, including

employees

・Many employees could not be attendance due to inundation

of their houses or outage of lifeline, until their living

condition would be recovered. Some evacuees would stay

in road or other public facilities, and then the local industry

would suffer trouble in operations. After the inundation for

a few weeks, the evacuated living of people might be

prolonged until the recovery of living condition would be

finished.

the reduction of

communication

function

(fixed-line phone

and mobile phone)

・In industrial activity, mobile phone and fixed-line telephone

is used frequently. In the assumed flood, these

communication services would be limited due to outage of

power those facilities would be inundated.


16



The policy of the industry continuity in the area is as following.

Table 5-1 Policy of the industry continuity

・In the assumed flood, the production activities in the industrial agglomerations could be

continued or recovered at an early stage, and the scale of production and employment

would be kept as before the disaster.

・To achieve the above, the living conditions of people and infrastructure and life line

services would be recovered as soon as possible (in time) with big efforts of all

stakeholders and the entire society.


17


According to the policy, all stakeholders shall act work to pay each role in Area BCM.

Table 5-2 Role of Stakeholders in Area BCM

Stakeholder Role

Local

Government

・To promote the flood control project and the land use planning for the

strong city to flood

・To promote measures of active prevention, timely response and quick

recovery of natural disaster consequencies (e.g.: Disaster warning

system, instruction and accommodation of evacuation, restoring the

inundation area, relief of victims and preparation of resources)

・To provide useful information for Area BCM (ex: risk assessment,

warning and information on natural disasters）


Infrastructure

operator


・To provide useful information for Area BCM (e.g.: risk assessment,

recovery objective）

・To quickly recovery the infrastructure which is damaged or has to

stop servicing due to natural disasters to reduce effects on activities

of industrial zones.

Lifeline facility

operator


・To provide useful information for Area BCM (e.g.: risk assessment,

recovery objective）

・To quickly recovery (resume) the necessary services to ensure the

operation of industrial zones.

Industrial zone

(industrial zone

infrastructure

company)

・To promote their own BCM and strengthen their own facilities


own BCM)

・To coordinate among BCM of companies in the industrial park

Tenant company

(in industrial

zone)

・To promote their own BCM; strengthen their own facilities and

capabilities of prevention, response and recovery of natural disaster

consequences.

・To provide useful information for Area BCM (e.g.: Activity of their

own BCM)

・To ensure employment after disasters


18



Through Area BCM, the improvement measures to resolve the bottleneck are studied and

extracted, and stakeholders practice these measures and manage the progress.

・ The measures for industry continuity are categorized into Prevention, Mitigation,



Area BCM, the stage will step up, Idea→Concept→Implement→Achieved.

Table 6-1 Category of Improvement Measures

Category Content

Prevention The absolute avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related

disasters.

Mitigation The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and

related disasters.


individuals to forecast, warn, respond and recover natural disasters’

consequences efficiently.

Budgets; establishment and training on response plans. To organize

professional training for a number of core staff working in disaster

prevention and to implement business continuity plans in key

agencies;

Enhance implementation capacity of disaster management activities

for business owners and government officials at all levels; ensure

100% of government personnel directly engaged in disaster

management, 100% of the managers providing infrastructure services,

and the majority of business owners to be trained on disaster

management.

Set early warning systems about natural disaster effectively.

Make hazards map and vulnerability status as well as guidelines of the

basic steps of preparation, response and recovery in disaster areas in

each industrial zone.

Response The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or

immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health


19

impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of

the people affected.

Equip with facilities to serve disaster response (cars, rescue boats and

other means)

Install equipment, information systems, warning signals and

information directing the disaster response and prevention

Recovery The restoration, improvement and upgrading of facilities, livelihoods

and living conditions of natural disaster-affected communities,

including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.



Table6-2 Stage of Improvement Measures

Stage Content




Achieved The measure is achieved


The proposed measures as following are expected to be practiced by the stakeholders.

Through Area BCM, as appropriate, the progress of the measures will update and new

proposed measures will be added in this table.


20

Table 6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity37 1/2


Most

critical

concern (Assumed

disaster)

the reduction

of transport

function of

major roads

(natural

roads)

Central / Local

Government Prevention To promote flood control projects. (ex:

River improvement, flood control,

pumping facilities, tree planting,

information system)

Improvement of dikes and sea

embankment

Idea

Administrator of

roads, sewage

companies

Mitigation To promote expansion of major roads,

development of bypass road and

inundation measures such as raising

road.

To apply appropriate solutions to

coordinate road traffic and maritime

transportation.

Idea

Administrator of

Road Response To carry out pumping measures of

inundation and traffic control in disaster.

Idea

the reduction

of transport

function of

Hai Phong

port

Administrator of

Port Mitigation To promote inundation measures.

(ex: Water proof or raising of major

electrical devices or facilities)

Idea

Administrator of

Port + other

stakeholders

Response To formulate a Port-BCP in advance and

achieve a quick recovery of transport

function in disaster.

Idea

the power

failure Central / Local

Government Prevention To promote flood control projects. Idea

Power operator Mitigation To promote flood measures (ex: raising

of power facilities) Idea

Recovery To proceed with the early restoration of

inundated power facilities Idea

Company Mitigation To prepare an emergency generator and

fuel Idea

the reduction

of water

supply/

sewage

function

Central / Local


water supply/

sewage operator

Mitigation To promote flood measures (ex: raising

of major devices or facilities) Idea

Recovery To proceed with the early restoration of

inundated major devices or facilities Idea

Company Mitigation To prepare the alternative means like

underground water or a water wagon.

37 This table (1st edition) shows the simulation results under the limited information by the JICA study team and the discussion results of WS by the stakeholders.


21

Table 6-3 Proposed Measures for Industry Continuity 2/2


Critical

concern (Assumed

disaster)

the worsening

of living

condition of

people,

including

employees

Central / Local

Government Prevention To promote innundation control

projects. Idea

Local Government Prevention To promote land use plan in

consideration for flood (ex: Upland relocation of the city)

Idea

Response To strengthen response measures

(ex: Evacuation order, Medical

care, shelter for victims, Relief

supplies, Pumping system)

Idea

Recovery To strengthen recovery

measures(ex: Relief forvictims) Idea

Industrial park, Company

Mitigation To build a dormitory for

employees near industrial zones

Idea

Recovery To carry out early recover and to

keep employment Idea

the reduction of

communication

function (fixed-line

phone and

mobile phone)

Central / Local


Tele-communication

operator Mitigation To promote measures for service

continuity in power failure (ex:

Emergency generator and fuel)

Idea

Company Mitigation To prepare alternative means of

communication (ex: satellite

phone)

Idea


22

7 Implementation of the Plan

7.1 Area BCM

The Plan is implemented by following Area BCM System.








Area BCMCycle

Understandingthe Area



Maintaining andImproving

Exercising and Reviewing

Figure 7-1 Area BCM System

Effective implementation of Area BCM requires active participation of stakeholders and a

continuous approach and endeavor of the stakeholders of the area. Identify stakeholders and

establish a system for promoting and implementing Area BCM are important. Private and

public coordination is also essential.

Understanding of the area can be deepened and the strategy of Area BCM can be improved

by a continuous approach for the Area BCM process.


23


Area BCM is promoted and implemented by the following system.


Area BCMCycle

Understandingthe Area



Maintaining and

Improving

Exercising andReviewing





Leader

Members

Supporters

Figure 7-2 System of Implementation of Area BCM

The activities of disaster management are to be informed to concerned people and

public through the Internet, mass media and billboards, posters, leaflets ...

Maintaining the annual report, review and supplementation of Area Business

Continuity Plan


24


Through exercising and reviewing, effective implementation of Area BCM system is

validated, and the plan is confirmed that it is kept up to date. Activities of exercising and

reviewing are studying and improvement of the plan by the members, reviewing the plan,

formulating a plan for another natural disaster scenario, study lessons from natural disasters

occurred in the area and surroundings, and promotion and awareness rising.









Activity Report









Trainings Seminars

Activity Report


Members








25













○Promotion and Awareness Rising


to disseminate and rise awareness of Area BCM/Area BCP to executives and key staffs of


implemented.





26


After putting Area BCM system in place, the plan is required to keep up to date in order to

follow the changing conditions. A maintenance program is prepared that ensure the plans

are up to date.

•if there are any changes of a composition of stakeholders

•if the target area of the plan is changed

•if a new natural disaster risk (s) emerged

•following lessons learned from exercising and reviewing

•following lessons learned from natural disasters in the area and other locations

•other necessary occasions

For updating the plan, if necessary, activities such as studies and risk assessments in

“Understanding the Area” and “Determining Area BCM Strategy” of Area BCM System are

carried out. An updated plan or a newly formed plan is prepared through workshops

organized by the leader and attended by the members and supporters.

During a course of updating the plan, processes and effectiveness of Area BCM system are

reviewed. Outputs are summarized in a review report of Area BCM.

The leader validates and approves the updated plan after receiving advices from experts and

discussions by the working group.

7.5Reporting



•Activity report

•Lesson learned report

•Updated plan

•Plan for new risk

•Review report of Area BCM

•Maintenance program


(To be filled after discussions at the 3rd workshop.)


27

7.7Next Steps (Proposed)

〜2014

•The leader prepare an updated plan (Version 2).






Activity Report

Reviewing the Plan


A workshop Updated Plan (Version 2)






continuity, actions for business continuity, roles and responsibilities of the member,





・The leader holds a workshop with the members and supporters, reviews the plan (Version

1) by using the outputs from the study of the members, and prepares an updated plan

(Version 2).

2015〜

・The leader updates the plan (Version 2) with supports of the members and supporters.

・Through activities of promotion and awareness rising, collect information and opinions from a wider range

of stakeholders, and prepare a more tangible plan. A natural hazard of different levels of impact may be

used for the plan.

・If necessary, the leader carries out activities such as studies and risk assessments for formulating the plan.

・During the course of the formulating the plan, review a process and effectiveness of Area BCM system.


28



Business

Continuity

Management

(BCM)






activities

*1

Business

Continuity Plan

(BCP)





*1

Area Business

Continuity

Management

(Area BCM)




*3

Area Business

Continuity Plan

(Area BCP)




*3




damage.

*2




*2

[Reference]

*1: ISO22301、Societal security - Business continuity management systems- Requirements (2012)

*2: UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009)



29



participants

Theme

1st WS 11December,

2013

Hai Phong 48 ・The policy of Area-BCP





2nd WS 27 February,

2014

Hai Phong 51 ・Impacts on the local society and



Continuity


Continuity

3rd WS 3June, 2014 Hai Phong 48 ・Area-BCP version 1(draft)


4th WS 3 December,

2014

Hai Phong 49 ・Reviewed Area BCP version 1

・Roles and Responsibilities

・Next cycle of Area BCM


30

Appendix B List of Stakeholders (version 2)

○Line authorities/ lead role players

Hai Phong People’s Committee

Dyke and Flood & Storm Control Department, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD)

○Members (related departments and agencies of the local government of Hai Phong)

Hai Phong Economic Zone Management Board

Industry and Trade Department

Information and Communication Department

Planning and Investment Department

Natural Resources and Environment Department

Department of Construction

Department of Transportation

Fire Fighter of Hai Phong

Management Board of Hai Phong Industrial Zone Infrastructure Project

Hai Phong Port Authority

Hai Phong Office of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry

○Members (Infrastructure and Lifeline Utility Companies)

Hai Phong Port Limited Liability Company

Cat Bi Air Port

Hai Phong Power One Member Limited Company

Hai Phong Water Supply Company

○Members (Industrial zones)

Nomura Hai Phong Industrial Zone

Nam Cau Kien Industrial Zone

Dinh Vu Industrial Zone

Do Son Industrial Zone

○Members (Private enterprises)

Yazaki HP VN Co., Ltd.

Tohoku Pioneer Co., Ltd.

Toyota GoseiHaiPhong Co., Ltd.

PVTEX


31

Dai Duong Building Ship Joint Stock Company

VIJA Group

○Supporting agencies (Central government’s agencies, research institutes, universities

and other organizations)

DMC (Disaster Management Centre), MARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development)

VAST (Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology)

Geoenvironmental and Technical Institute

Space Technology Institute

Hydro-Meteorological Forecasting (NCHMF)

Hanoi University of Science, Vietnam National University

Asia Foundation

○ Other organizations

Hai Phong Radio and Television

HaiPhong Security Newspaper

HaiPhong Newspaper

HaiPhong Electricity Newspaper


32

Table B-1 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders of the Hai Phong Area

Stakeholders Roles and Responsibilities Related Plans, Documents and Others Owned by Stakeholder

(Availability and How to Obtain)

Leader

Hai Phong People’s Committee Leading the drafting and implementing

Dyke and Flood & Storm Control Department, Agricultural and Rural Development Department

A secretariat of owner

Members (Local Governments and Local Offices of National Government)

Hai Phong Economic Zone Management Board

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding industrial zone

Industry and Trade Department Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding industrial planning

Management Board of the Project for Infrastructure Construction of Industrial Zone of Hai Phong

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding zone infrastructure

Information and Communication Department

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding information and communication

Planning and Investment Department

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding investment planning

Natural Resources and Environment Department

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding environment protection

Department of Construction Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding construction planning and standards

Department of Transportation Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding transport planning and development

Fire Station Fire fighting

Members (Operators of Infrastructure and Lifeline)

Hai Phong Port Authority Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding maritime management

Hai Phong Port Holding Limited Liabilities Company

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding provision of port services


33

Cat Bi Air Port Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding provision of air services

Hai Phong Electric One Member Limited Company

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding provision of power services

Hai Phong Water Supply Company

Contributing to drafting and implementing, especially regarding provision of water supply services

Members (Industrial Parks)

Nomura Haiphong Industrial Zone

Nam Cau Kien Industrial Zone

Dinh Vu Industrial Zone

Do Son Industrial Zone

Members (Private Enterprises)

Yazaki HP VN Co., Ltd.

Tohoku Pioneer Co., Ltd.

Toyota Gosei Hai Phong Co., Ltd.

PVTEX

Dai Duong Building Ship Joint Stock Company

VIJA Group

VCCI Hai Phong

Supporters (National Government, Governmental Research Institutions, Universities and Others)

DMC (Disaster Management Council), MARD (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development)

VAST (Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology)

Geoenvironmental and Technical Institute

Space Technology Institute

Hydro-Meteorological Forecasting (NCHMF)

Hanoi University of Science, Vietnam National University

Others


34

Hai Phong Radio and Television

Hai Phong Security Newspaper

Hai Phong Newspaper (Hai Phong Portal)

Hai Phong Electric Newspaper

Asia Foundation

Tool 2 :Methodologies of Hazard Assessment

/ Used for the Pilot Study

Contents Methodology for Earthquake Hazard Assessment 1 Methodology for Tsunami Hazard Assessment 14 Methodology for Flood Hazard Assessment 35 Methodology for Hazard Assessment of Storm Surge 47


1

Methodology for Earthquake Hazard Assessment

The basic procedure of earthquake hazard assessment is shown in Figure-1. The precise of each item is

stated below.

Figure-1 Basic Procedure of Earthquake Hazard Assessment

[Step 1] Collection and Analysis of Existing Information

1) Past Earthquake Disaster

2) Existing Research

3) Earthquake Catalogue

5) Infrastructure Facilities

6) Natural Conditions

7) Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis Method

8) Selection of Software for Analysis

9)-1 Source Model

11) Amplification Analysis of Surface Ground

<Earthquake Related Information> <Social & Natural Information>

12) Expression of the Results

9) Input Data Preparation

9)-2 Attenuation Model

[Step 2] Setting of Hazard Probability

[Step 3] Analysis and Evaluation

10) Calculation of Baserock Motion

4) Active Faults


2

[Step 1] Collection and Analysis of Existing Information

The earthquake related information such as the seismic intensity distribution and the disaster records

by past earthquakes are collected. The social and natural condition such as the industrial facilities that

the industrial agglomerated area is relying on and the geological information of the site are also

collected.

<Earthquake Related Information>

1) Past Earthquake Disaster Records

The seismic intensity distribution data and the disaster records by the past experienced earthquakes in

the study area are collected from the following organizations. The frequency and the extent of

earthquake disaster can be understood by the analysis of the year of occurrence, earthquake magnitude,

seismic intensity distribution and damage distribution.

- National agency for disaster management

- Local government agency for disaster management

- University and Public research institute

- International research institute

ex.) CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster): EM-DAT, International

Disaster Database, http://www.emdat.be/database

2) Existing Research and Study

The existing research and study results of the earthquake hazards in the area are collected from the

following organizations. The paleo seismic study, deterministic seismic hazard map for a scenario

earthquake, probabilistic seismic hazard map and the ground amplification study of the earthquake

motion are the main fields of collection.

- University and Public research institute

- International research institute and Project

ex.) GSHAP (Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program),

http://www.seismo.ethz.ch/static/gshap/

3) Earthquake Catalogue

Earthquake catalogue is the list of past occurred earthquakes including the origin, depth,

year/month/day/time of occurrence, seismic magnitude and so on. Plenty of catalogues with various

contents and extents are produced and compiled by many researchers and research institutes in the

world. As the earthquake catalogue is one of the bases of earthquake hazard analysis, the catalogue

which cover longer period is preferable. The catalogue should include the earthquakes occurred within

some hundred kilometers from the study area.

4) Active Faults

Active fault is the fault which may generate the earthquakes in the future. The data about the active


3

fault such as the location, length and activity are the necessary for earthquake hazard assessment. The

governmental institutes regarding the geology and the geological department of the university study

the active faults and prepare the active fault maps in many countries.

<Social & Natural Information>

5) Infrastructure Facilities

The distribution of the infrastructure facilities that industrial agglomerated area is relying is studied.

The following transportation facilities and the lifeline facilities are the main target.

- Transportation Facilities: Roads, Railroads, Ports, Airports

- Lifeline Facilities: Electricity, Water Supply, Sewage, Communication

The actual region to assess the earthquake hazard is decided based on the distribution of infrastructure

facilities. As the infrastructure facilities spread widely outside of industrial agglomerated area, the

region of hazard analysis does not remain in the industrial agglomerated area in general.

6) Natural Condition

The topography maps or DEM are collected as the basic information of the study area.

Also, the geological, geomorphological and land use maps are collected to assess the amplification of

the earthquake motion by the subsurface grounds. These maps are usually prepared by the public

geological institutes and universities.

[Step 2] Setting of Hazard Probability

The methodology of seismic hazard assessment is roughly divided into deterministic methodology and

probabilistic methodology. By the deterministic methodology, earthquake ground motion is calculated

if the specific earthquake source fault has been activated. The earthquake ground motion distribution

by the future possible earthquake can be calculated precisely, but to estimate when the calculated

earthquake ground motion will be realized is difficult because it is impossible to predict the future

earthquake by current technology. By the probabilistic method, the expected earthquake ground

motion within a certain period at the study point is calculated considering all the earthquake sources

around the study point reflecting the possibility of each sources. Therefore, the earthquake motion

distribution by probabilistic method is not the estimation of the earthquake motion distribution by

future probable earthquake but the ensemble of independent expected earthquake motion at each point.

The deterministic method is commonly used for disaster management purpose and the probabilistic

methodology is usually used for zoning in the building seismic code or earthquake insurance system

etc.

It is desirable to use the probabilistic method in the seismic hazard assessment for area BCP because

the probability of the hazard is important. The hazard that has high possibility to occur in the lifetime

of the industrial facilities is considered in area BCP, therefore to estimate the probability of the hazard

is essential component in the analysis.


4

7) Methodology of Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

The combination of earthquake ground motion at a certain point and the probability to experience at

least the ground motion in a certain period is calculated by the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis

method. The flow of the analysis is shown in Figure-2. The general steps of the analysis are as follows.

1) Set up the model of seismic activity around the study point. Not only the earthquakes that the

source faults are clearly known but the earthquakes that the earthquake sources are not known and

definite estimation of the magnitude and the location of future event is difficult should be included.

2) Estimate the probability of the magnitude, probability of the distance from the study point and the

probability of the occurrence of the modeled earthquakes.

3) Set up the probability model to estimate the earthquake ground motion if the magnitude of the

earthquake and the distance from the study point are given. The empirical attenuation equation and the

dispersion of the equation are usually used.

4) Calculate the probability that the earthquake ground motion at the study point by modeled

earthquake become larger than a certain value in a certain period.

5) Steps 1) to 4) are carried out for each modeled earthquake and all the probabilities are aggregated.

The probability to experience a certain earthquake ground motion at least once in a certain period at

the study point is calculated as a result.

McGuire, R. K. (2004) 1) is recommended as a textbook of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis.


5

Figure-2 Flowchart of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (NIED(2005)2), original in Japanese)

As shown above, the earthquake ground motion according to the probability can be known from the

hazard curve which is available by the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. Therefore, it is not

necessary to decide one probability to study before the calculation. Once hazard curve is created, the

earthquake ground motion corresponding to the any probability is known.


6


The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis is performed based on the collected and analyzed

information, by setting an appropriate model.


As the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis involves complicated numerical calculation, many

computing programs are developed and some of them are freely available. Among them, SEISRISK,

FRISK, CRISIS, NSHMP and OpenSHA are famous but they are intended to be used by the

researchers or the engineer with expert knowledge. Danciu et al. (2010)3) compiled the precise

information about the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis programs. Table-1 is the general

information of the major software for probabilistic seismic hazard analysis by Danciu et al. (2010).

Table-1 Major software for probabilistic seismic hazard analysis

EZ-FRISK is the expanded commercial version of FRISK and offered by Risk Engineering Inc. The

analysis by EZ-FRISK is comparatively easy because the earthquake source model and attenuation

formula are provided with computing program.

9) Input Data Preparation

9)-1 Source Model

The earthquake source model should include all the seismic activities within several 100km from the

study point. The active faults in the area are modeled at first because earthquake basically occurs by

the activity of the fault. However, not all the active faults are known or studied of the properties, the

earthquakes that the earthquake sources are not known and definite estimation of the magnitude and

the location of future event is difficult are modeled as the background seismic activities also. As the


7

creation of the earthquake source model needs high grade capacity and expert knowledge,

earthquake modeling is usually conducted in university or public research institute. Therefore, to

conduct originally new probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, the earthquake source model should be

given from academic organization.

9)-2Attenuation Formula

The so-called empirical attenuation formula is used to calculate the earthquake ground motion from

the magnitude of the earthquake and the distance between epicenter and the study point. Many

researchers proposed various attenuation formulas for several decades. They have different features

based on the database and the algorithm that were used to create the formula, and they also have the

limitation of applicability. It is desirable to use the attenuation formula that was intended to use the

study site. The newer proposed attenuation formula is generally desirable to use because newer

formula is derived based on the more precise recent earthquake observation records.


The baserock motion is calculated based on the prepared input data set. The calculated earthquake

ground motion by the probabilistic method is expressed as follows.

a) The probability that the study site experiences a certain earthquake ground motion.

ex. The probability is 10% in 50 years to experience 100 gals or more.

b) The earthquake ground motion value for a certain probability.

ex. 100 gals or more will be experienced on the probability of 10% in 50 years.

The probability is expressed as the combination of the period and the probability in the period. If the

seismic activity is uniform not depending on the year, probability can be expressed by annual

probability.


The earthquake ground motion is affected by not only the magnitude and the distance but by the

ground condition around the study area. The seismic wave is amplified by the surface grounds and the

extent of amplification is different depending on the structure of the surface ground. Some of the

empirical attenuation formula includes the effect of surface ground amplification but another method

is usually used to evaluate the wide area. At first, the earthquake motion at the bedrock is calculated

by the empirical attenuation formula and the amplification of the surface ground is multiplied to get

the surface ground motion.

There are several methodology to evaluate the amplification characteristics of surface grounds; for

example, based on the surface soil, based on the average S wave velocity of surface soil layers and

numerical response analysis using the ground structure model. The suitable method is selected

considering the available data, necessary work and budget.


8

The methdology by FEMA(1995)4) is well known as the simple and easy way to evaluate the

amplification by subsurface ground. The ground classification and amplification factor are shown in

Table-2 and Table-3. They are developed in U.S.A. and used in many countries recently. The soil

profile, average S wave velocity of upper 30 meters and N value are used to define the site class. If the

average S wave velocity is available by geophysical survey or N value is known by drilling survey,

ground classification can be done by these data. If these data are not available, ground will be

classified based on the geology map or geomorphology map.

Table-2 NEHRP Classification Site

Class Profile

Average S-wave velocity of the upper 30 meters

N value

A Hard rock 1500 m/sec B Rock 1500 Vs > 760 m/sec C Very dense soil and soft rock 760 Vs > 360 m/sec N > 50 D Stiff soil 360 Vs > 180 m/sec 50 N 15 E Soil 180 m/sec Vs 15 > N

Table-3 NEHRP Amplification


The calculated value is a physical quantity, such as peak ground acceleration or velocity. The seismic

intensity is another expression of the strength of the ground vibration by the earthquake and more

popularly understandable. The seismic intensity is also used to estimate the damage based on the past

earthquake disaster experiences. Though the relation between PGA or PGA with seismic intensity is

not one by one, they are usually converted to seismic intensity by the empirical formula.

[References]

1) McGuire, R. K. (2004). Seismic Hazard and Risk Analysis, Earthquake Engineering Research

Institute, Berkeley.

2) National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention (NIED), 2005, A Study on

Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Maps of Japan, Technical Note of the National Research Institute

for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention, No. 275.


9

3) Danciu, L., M. Pagani, D. Monelli and S. Wiemer (2010), GEM1 Hazard: Overview of PSHA

Software, GEM Technical Report 2010-2.

4) Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1995. FEMA 222A and 223A - NEHRP Recommended

Provisions for Seismic Regulations for New Buildings, 1994 Edition, Washington, D. C.,

Developed by the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) for the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA)


10

[Example of Seismic Hazard Analysis] Cavite, Laguna and south of Metro Manila


EZ-FRISK Ver. 7.62 was used in this analysis.

9)-1Source Model

The source models provided with EZ-FRISK software are used in this analysis. The source model for

the Philippines is shown in Figure-3. The surface projection of source models along the plate boundary

is shown in rectangular shape and the inland faults are shown as folded lines. The seismic activities

that the location and the magnitudes are not identified in advance are modeled as the comparatively

broad area sources.

Figure-3 Source models for the Philippines

9)-2Attenuation Formula

The empirical attenuation formula for ASEAN region is not known. In this analysis, following formula

based on the world wide earthquake observation records are adopted.

[for shallow crustal earthquake]

Abrahamson and Silva (2008)1)

Boore and Atkinson (2008)2)

Campbell and Bozorgnia (2008)3)

Chiou and Youngs (2008)4)

[for deep plate boundary earthquake]

Atkinson and Boore (2003)5)

Youngs et al. (1997)6)


11


The acceleration distribution on the ground with Vs=760 m/sec is shown in Figure-4. The expected

probability of occurrence is at least once in 200 years (200 years probability). The calculated

acceleration is larger in north.

Figure-4 Baserock acceleration distribution (expected for 200 years, unit: g)


Following three data sets are used for the ground classification of the Philippines.

a) Proposed Vs30 value (average sheer wave velocity of the ground over 30m from surface) in Metro

Manila, north of Cavite and Laguna by Grutas and Yamanaka (2012)7).

b) Vs30 value calculated from the database of the ground model by JICA (2004)8).

c) Geological maps with 1/50,000 scale by National Mapping and Resource Information Authority

(NAMRIA)

The Vs30 values of a) and b) are used. Also, the geological time was read from c) and ground was

classified as follows. If several classifications are possible, the geological classification with largest

amplification value is adopted. The ground classification map is shown in Figure-5.

Class B: Tertiary and before

Class C: Pleistocene

Class D: Holocene

Class E: River deposit and marine deposit in Holocene


12

Figure-5 Ground classification


The acceleration at the ground surface is calculated multiplying the amplification factor to the

acceleration value at the baserock. The acceleration value is converted to seismic intensity in MMI

scale by empirical equation and shown in Figure-6. In this study, peak ground acceleration is

converted to seismic intensity in MMI scale following empirical formula by Trifunac and Brady

(1975)9).

log PGA = 0.014 + 0.30*I PGA: peak ground acceleration (gal), I: seismic intensity (MMI)

Figure-6 Seismic intensity distribution (expected for 200 years in MMI scale)


13

[References]

1) Abrahamson N. and W. Silva, 2008, Summary of the Abrahamson & Silva NGA Ground-Motion

Relations, Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 67-97.

2) Boore D. M. and G. M. Atkinson, 2008, Ground-Motion Prediction Equations for the Average

Horizontal Component of PGA, PGV, and 5%-Damped PSA at Spectral Periods between 0.01 s

and 10.0 s, Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 99-138.

3) Campbell K. W. and Y. Bozorgnia, 2008, NGA Ground Motion Model for the Geometric Mean

Horizontal Component of PGA, PGV, PGD and 5% Damped Linear Elastic Response Spectra for

Periods Ranging from 0.01 to 10 s, Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 139-171.

4) Chiou B. S.-J. and R. R. Youngs, 2008, An NGA Model for the Average Horizontal Component of

Peak Ground Motion and Response Spectra, Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 173-215.

5) Atkinson G. M. and D. M. Boore, 2003, Empirical Ground-Motion Relations for

Subduction-Zone Earthquakes and Their Application to Cascadia and Other Regions, Bull. Seism.

Soc. Amer., Vol. 93, No. 4, 1703-1729.

6) Youngs, R. R., S. -J. Chiou, W. J. Silva, and J. R. Humphrey, 1997, Strong Ground Motion

Attenuation Relationships for Subduction Zone Earthquakes, Seism. Res. Let., Vol. 68, No. 1,

58-73.

7) Grutas R. and H. Yamanaka, 2012, Mapping the Seismic Site Conditions in Metro Manila,

Philippines based on Microtremor Measurements, Topographic Data and Geomorphology, Joint

Conference Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Urban Earthquake Engineering/ 4th

Asia Conference on Earthquake Engineering.

8) JICA, 2004, Earthquake Impact Reduction Study for Metropolitan Manila, Republic of the

Philippines, Final Report, Vol.3.

9) Trifunac M. D. and A. G. Brady, 1975, On the Correlation of Seismic Intensity Scales with the

Peaks of Recorded Strong Ground Motion, Bull. Seism. Soc. Amer., Vol. 65.

Methodology for Tsunami Hazard Assessment

14


The basic procedure of earthquake originated tsunami hazard assessment is shown in Figure-1. The

precise of each item is stated below.

Figure-1 Basic Procedure of Tsunami Hazard Assessment

[Step 1] Collection of Existing

1) Historical tsunami disaster

2) Existing research and study

3) Earthquake data

4) Social infrastructures

5) Natural conditions

6) Statistical Analysis (G-R Low) 7) Setting of Scenario

8) Setting of tsunami (earthquake) model

10)-1 Topographical

<Tsunami related Information> <Social & Natural Information>

11) Tsunami simulation

10) Preparation of Input data

10)-4 Initial water height

10)-3 Sea defense data

10)-2 Roughness data

[Step 2] Setting of Scenario Earthquake


9) Selection of tsunami simulation model


15

[Step 1] Collection of Existing Information

The tsunami related information such as the wave or run-up height distribution and the disaster records

by past tsunamis are collected. The social and natural condition such as the industrial facilities that the

industrial agglomerated area is relying on and the geological information of the site are also collected.

<Tsunami Related Information>

1) Records of historical tsunami disasters

Records of historical tsunami disasters surveyed by the following organizations are informative

material to know and understand about tsunami disaster around the objective area.

National agency for disaster prevention

Municipal agency for disaster prevention

Domestic university and research institute

Global research institute

ex.) CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster): EM-DAT, International

Disaster Database, http://www.emdat.be/database

Others

2) Literature of existing research and study

Tsunami hazard map and tsunami assessment report by the following organizations are informative

material to know and understand about tsunami disaster around the objective area.


Municipal agency for disaster prevention



Others

3) Earthquake data (earthquake catalog)

Earthquakes data (catalog) by the following organizations are informative data to know the occurrence

probability of earthquakes and develop earthquake model for tsunami simulation.




Others

ex.) NOAA: The Significant Earthquake Database

http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1

<Social and Natural Information>

4) Social infrastructures

Information of industrial agglomerated areas and social infrastructure which would be potentially


16

affected by tsunami is to be collected. Social infrastructures are categorized into transportation

infrastructures and lifelines.

Transportation infrastructures (for internal and external transportation): Highway, Railroad, Port,

Airport

Lifelines (essential for business continuity): Electric power supply, Water supply, Sewerage

system, Gas, Communication, Oil

The actual region to assess the tsunami hazard is decided based on the distribution of infrastructure



5) Natural conditions

The impact of natural hazard is strongly associated with geomorphological features.

Geomorphological feature is understood by the following data.

Altitude data of land area

Water depth data of sea area

The following data is also helpful to understand geomorphological features. It is desirable to use the

data with equal or less than 1km resolution to secure accuracy.

Land use

Geological information


A scale of tsunami disaster should be set for risk assessment based on the data collected in Step 1. The

scale of tsunami is defined as the scale of earthquake which generates tsunami.

6) Statistical analysis of earthquake (Gutenberg-Richter Low)

The relationship of earthquake magnitude and return period is estimated by Gutenberg-Richter Low

using earthquake data, usually called earthquake catalog, around the targeted earthquake zone.

It is well known that larger earthquake occurs less frequently. It was Gutenberg and Richter who

formulate this relation by the following equation in 1941. It is the reason why this relation is called

Gutenberg-Richter Low or G-R Low.

log n(M) = a - b M

or

log N(M) = A - b M

In case of insufficient information of natural conditions is available:

The following public data is also available. Altitude data: GTOPO30 or SRTM. Note: The quality of GTOPO30 varies among the area. Water depth data: GEBCO08


17

The relation between occurrence frequency, n(M) dM, and cumulative frequency with magnitude M

and over, N(M), and 0.1 interval magnitude, dM = 0.1, is arranged in Table-1 for the earthquake data

which occurred during 1965 to 1999 in and around Japan area. Figure-2 is the plot of the data with

magnitude on x-axis and frequency on y- axis. The formula on the figure is a regression curve of M

and N relation derived by the least square method.

M = 7.5 corresponds to N = 6.8 on the formula, for instance. It means that the occurrence frequency of

the earthquake with magnitude 7.5 and over is 6.8 times on average in 35 years, during 1965 to 1999.

And its annual probability is calculated as 6.8 / 35 = 0.19 / year. It is recognized that the earthquake

with magnitude 7.5 and over is expected to occur 0.19 time on average in and around Japan area. On

the other hand, inverse number of the annual probability, 1 /0.19 = 5.1 years in this case, is called

recurrence time. Then it is expressed that the recurrence time of the earthquake with magnitude 7.5

and over is 5.1 years.

As described above, an annual probability or a recurrence time of the scenario earthquake of arbitrary

magnitude can be estimated by using the G-R relation around the scenario earthquake area.

Table-1 Number of Shallow Earthquakes Occured in and around Japan (1965 - 1999) 9)


18

Figure-2 Data Plot of Table-5 9)

7) Setting of scenario earthquake

Scenario earthquake and its magnitude should be set for Area BCP. If larger magnitude is assumed, the

components of Area BCP increase and the process to formulate it becomes complicated, however

business in case of disaster will be more stable. On the other hand, if smaller magnitude is assumed,

the Area BCP can be formulated easier but it is likely to suffer larger disaster than the estimated

scenario and business continuity may become difficult. Therefore, it is desirable to decide the

magnitude of the scenario earthquake by discussing within stakeholders including citizens about the

local disaster management planning, governmental policy and feasibility of the plan.

[Step3] Analysis and Evaluation

The proper scenario earthquake for tsunami simulation which corresponds with the purpose of Area

BCP is defined based on the information collected in clause 1), 2), 3), 6) and 7), and the tsunami

simulation is conducted.


The following fault parameters of the scenario earthquake are necessary for the simulation.

One perspective for defining scenario:

One way for defining magnitude of scenario disaster is to assume several probability of occurrence like 1/100, 1/200 or 1/500 in one year and compare the results with other natural hazards and define the proper magnitude of the scenario.

● N(M)

○ n(M) dM (dM=0.1)

M=7.5

N=6.8


19

Depth (km)

Strike angle (degree)

Dip angle (degree)

Rake angle (degree)

Length of fault plane (km)

Width of fault plane (km)

Slip (m)

Other information: coordinates of origin point (Longitude, Latitude)


There are several theories to describe the behavior of tsunami such as liner long-wave theory,

non-liner long-wave theory, liner dispersive wave theory and non-liner dispersive wave theory. Each

of them is a theory based on the long-wave approximation which can be applied to the wave of long

enough compared with the water depth. The wave length of tsunami is several 10 km to 100 km in

general and it is long enough compared with 4km, which is the average depth of the ocean. That is the

reason why the long-wave approximation is reasonable for tsunami.

Liner ling-wave theory can be applied to the deep water area, over around 50 m in depth, where the

amplitude of the wave is small enough compared to the depth of water and the friction on the sea floor

can be neglected. On the other hand, non-liner long-wave theory is usually applied to the shallow

water area, say less than 50m in depth, where the amplitude of the wave is not small compared with

the depth of water and the friction on the sea floor cannot be neglected. Also it is used in case of

tsunami run-up to the land area.

The velocity of propagation of waves with shorter wave length is slower than those with longer wave

length. Therefore, if tsunami is consisted with several lengths of waves, dispersion can be observed.

The difference of velocity due to the wave length is called “dispersibility” and the theory considering

this dispersibility is named the dispersive wave theory. The simulation based on the dispersive wave

theory is not so common at this moment; however in case of distant tsunami which occurs over 1,000

km away from the study site, liner dispersive wave theory is often used. When the effect of

dispersibility at shallow water area is the main concern, non-liner dispersive wave theory is applied.

Please see references 1) and 2) for more precise technical explanation of tsunami simulation theories.

Table-2 shows the several tsunami simulation models based on the long-wave theory and the

dispersive wave theory introduced above.

Table-2 Tsunami Simulation Model

Program Name Organization Source URL

Long Wave Theory

TUNAMI Tohoku University, Japan Open https://code.google.com/p/tunami/

STOC The Port and Airport Research

Institute, Japan Open

http://www.pari.go.jp/cgi-bin/search-en/detail.cgi?i

d=2005060440205


20

COMCOT Cornell University, USA Open http://ceeserver.cee.cornell.edu/pll-group/comcot.ht

m

GeoClaw Washington University, USA Open http://depts.washington.edu/clawpack/geoclaw/

MOST NOAA, USA Closed http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/model.html

ComMIT NOAA, USA Closed http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/ComMIT/

Dispersive Wave Theory

Disperse

Potential Model

National Defense Academy,

Japan Open http://www.nda.ac.jp/cc/kensetsu/index-e.html

FUNWAVE University of Delaware, USA Open http://chinacat.coastal.udel.edu/programs/funwave/f

unwave.html

NEOWAVE University of Hawaii, USA Open http://www.ore.hawaii.edu/OE/index.htm

COULWAVE Cornell University, USA Closed http://ceeserver.cee.cornell.edu/pll-group/doc/COU

LWAVE_manual.pdf


The general input data for tsunami simulation is as follows. These data are given to each grid which is

explained in 10)-1 topographical data.

1. Topographical data

2. Roughness data

3. Sea defense data

4. Initial water height data (= deformation of sea-floor)

10)-1 Topographical data

Topographical model for the area which includes the source region of the scenario earthquake, the

objective area and the route of tsunami propagation between them are required for simulation.

Topographical model includes the topography of sea-floor, the topography of the land surface where

tsunami might run up and the sea defense structures.

Orthogonal coordinate system is used for the modeled area of less than 1,000 km x 1,000 km and

polar coordinate system is used for the wider area.

The simulation area is divided and covered by square grid and altitude and roughness data are given

to each grid. Altitude describes topographic features and roughness is used for considering friction

between water and sea-floor or land surface. The size of grid is properly defined considering the

complexity of topography and the wave length of tsunami. The grid size is usually defined from

larger to smaller according to the distance from coast, considering the condition that the topography

becomes more complex and shorter wave component becomes dominant near the coast. This

methodology is called "nesting". The grid size is defined as, for instance, 1350m -> 450m -> 150m

-> 50m from tsunami source region to the coast. In this example, the grids with different size are

connected with 1/3 step, which is most popular way, however 1/2 connection and 1/5 connection are

also used for nesting.

Topographical data is available from the bathymetry charts and topographical maps. The digital data

of these maps are also available in these days. If the digital data is not available, it is required to


21

generate digital data by digitizing these maps. Table-3 shows the publicly available digital

topographical data provided by international organizations. These data can be also used for the

modeling.

Table-3 Publicly-available Bathymetry Data Name Explanation

GEBCO_08 Grid - General Bathymetric Chart of the Ocean - Organization: British Oceanographic Data Centre (BODC) - Topographic data of 30 sec grid covering sea-floor and land surface - URL: http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/gridded_bathymetry_data/

SRTM30_PLUS - Organization: Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California San Diego- Topographic data of 30 sec grid covering sea-floor and land surface - URL: http://topex.ucsd.edu/

Following maps show the examples of topographical model preparation by GEBCO_08 data

(Figure-3) from source region to coastal area and from coastal area to the coastline and inland area

by more detailed bathymetry chart (Figure-4).

Figure-3 Wide Area Topography Model by GEBCO Data (South China Sea Area)

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000

Depth (m)

1350m mesh area


22

Figure-4 Topography Model of Coast Area by Bathymetry Data (Manila Bay Area)


The effect of friction for tsunami wave propagation is expressed by Manning's roughness coefficient

(n). “n=0.025” is usually adopted as roughness coefficient for marine area. Table-43) and Table-5 4)

shows Manning's roughness coefficients for different types of ground surfaces.

Table-4 Comparison of Manning's roughness coefficients 3) Fukuoka et al. (1994) Aida (1977) Goto and Shuto (1983) Kotani et al. (1998)

category estimated roughness coefficient

category equivalent roughness coefficient

categoryestimated coefficient

category setup

roughness coefficient

80% 0.1 high

density 0.01

50～80% 0.096 dense zone 0.07 high density residential zone 0.080

20～50% 0.084 rather high density

zone 0.05

mid density

0.05 mid density residential zone 0.060

0～20% 0.056 low

density 0.03 low density residential zone 0.040

road 0.043 other land zone 0.02 forest zone

(inc. garden, tide protection forest)

0.030

field zone

(inc. waste land) 0.020

Shoreline (inc. tide protection forest)

0.04 sea and river zone (w/o tide

protection forest) 0.025

The purple line indicates the

boundary where sounding point

depth is consistent with GEBCO.

The density of sounding

point is low to use.

50m mesh area


23

Table-5 Manning values for land cover classes 4)


Embankment and other sea defense structures are modeled as height data of grid boundary.

10)-4 Initial water height data (= deformation of sea-floor)

Change of water height caused by fault movement should be prepared as an initial condition for

tsunami simulation. Change of water height is assumed to be same as vertical component of sea-floor

deformation.

The sea-floor deformation is calculated as a displacement cause by a slip on the fault in the

semi-finite elastic body using fault parameters shown in Table-6. The theory of the calculation is

described in the following references like Mansinha and Smilie (1971) 5) or Okada (1992) 6) and

others. The website of Cornell University7) and National Research Institute for Earth Science and

Disaster Prevention (NIED) 8) are also informative.


24

Figure -5 shows a calculated deformation of sea-floor by the program named DC3D0 / DC3D 8)

developed by Okada.

Table-6 Fault Parameters

Fault Parameter Sample Value

(corresponding to Figure-5)

Depth (km) 18

Strike angle (degree) 177

Dip angle (degree) 24

Rake angle (degree) 90

Length (km) 313

Width (km) 70

Slip (m) 9.6

Figure-5 Example of Calculated Vertical Deformation

Water Level (m)


25


Tsunami simulation can be conducted using the input data prepared in the clause 10). The general

output of the tsunami simulation is as follows. Output items are obtained for each grid.

1. Maximum water height or maximum inundation height (for all grids)

2. Maximum velocity (for all grids)

3. Elapsed time of maximum water height (for all grids)

4. Elapsed time of given water height ( x cm, for instance) (for all grids)

5. Time history of water height (selected grids)

6. Time history of water velocity (selected grids)

Figure-6 shows a sample of tsunami simulation result by the program “TUNAMI” developed by

Tohoku University in Japan. The left side of Figure-6 shows maximum water height distribution map

and the right side shows time history of water height at the selected grids.

Figure-6 Example of Tsunami Simulation Result

[References]

1) IUGG/IOC Time Project: Numerical Method of Tsunami Simulation with the Leap-frog Scheme,

IOC Manuals and Guides No.35, UNESCO 1997

http://www.jodc.go.jp/info/ioc_doc/Manual/122367eb.pdf

2) Imamura, Yalciner and Ozyurt (2006): TSUNAMI MODELLING MANUAL (TUNAMI model)

http://www.tsunami.civil.tohoku.ac.jp/hokusai3/E/projects/manual-ver-3.1.pdf

3) Tsunami Dictionary (Japanese) (2007) : Edited by Shuto, Imamura, Koshimura, Satake,

Matsutomi, Asakura Publishing Co., Ltd

4) Kaiser, Scheele1, Kortenhaus, Løvholt, Romer, Leschka (2011): The influence of land cover

Water Level (m)


26

roughness on the results of high resolution tsunami inundation modeling, Nat. Hazards Earth Syst.

Sci., 11, 2521–2540

http://www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/11/2521/2011/nhess-11-2521-2011.pdf

5) Mansinha, Smilie (1971): The Displacement Fields of Inclined Faults, Bulletin of the

Seismological Society of America, Vol. 61, No. 5, pp. 1433-1440

http://ceeserver.cee.cornell.edu/pll-group/doc/Mansinha_Smylie_1971.pdf

6) Okada (1992): Internal deformation due to shear and tensile faults in a half-space, Bull. Seism.

Soc. Am., 82, 1018-1040.

7) COMCOT, Cornell University

http://ceeserver.cee.cornell.edu/pll-group/comcot_fault.htm

8) Program to calculate deformation due to a fault model DC3D0 / DC3D

http://www.bosai.go.jp/study/application/dc3d/DC3Dhtml_E.html

9) Seismology, 3rd edition (Japanese)(2001): Utsu, Kyoritsu Shuppan Co., Ltd.


27

[Example of Tsunami Hazard Analysis] Cavite, Laguna and south of Metro Manila

[Step 1] Collection of Existing Information

The following information and data are collected for setting scenario earthquake and conducting

tsunami simulation.

1) Literatures related to scenario earthquakes

- EMILE A. OKAL et al. (2011) 1): Tsunami Simulations for Regional Sources in the South

China and Adjoining Seas

- Vu Thanh Ca1 et al. (2008)2): Tsunami risk along Vietnamese coast

- Nguyen Hong Phuong et al. (2013)3): Simulation of a Worst Case Tsunami Scenario from the

Manila Trench to Vietnam

2) Literatures related to earthquake environment

- Earthquake Impact Reduction Study for Metropolitan Manila, Republic of the Philippines

Final Report (2004)4): JICA, MMDA, PHIVOLCS

3) Data related to bathymetric feature

- Wide area: GEBCO_08 Grid

- Vicinity of objective area: Topographical map by NAMRIA (National Mapping and

Resource Information Authority)


6) Statistical analysis of earthquake (Gutenberg-Richter Low)

The earthquake data along the Manila Trench is picked up from the data4) as shown in Figure-1 and

the return period of the earthquake is estimated by statistical analysis based on the Gutenberg-Richter

Law. The estimated result is shown in Figure-2. Followings are the results obtained by the analysis.

Formula-1: G-R Law parameters are derived from the data during 1980 to 2002 as ‘b = 1.0’ and

‘a = 5.2’.

Formula-2: In case of drawing envelope assuming ‘b = 1.0’, ‘a = 6.0’ is estimated.

Formula-3 (for reference): In case of drawing envelope for all data, ‘b = 0.9’ and ‘a = 5.2’ are

estimated.

Magnitude of the earthquake along the Manila Trench with 100 years return period is estimated to be

7.2 to 8.0 from Formula-1 and Formula-2.

On the other hand, the return period of the earthquakes with magnitude 8.0 is estimated to be 100 to

630 years and 1,000 to 6,300 years for magnitude 9.0.

7) Setting of scenario earthquake

The west side of Luzon Island where Cavite is located faces the South China Sea where fewer

earthquakes occur than the Pacific Ocean. In addition, Cavite is located inside the Manila Bay.

Therefore, there is almost no record of large tsunami disaster around the area. In this study, the

possible tsunami that may cause impact to the study area, though the possibility is very low, is


28

simulated considering that the result will be used in the future.

Figure-1 Epicenter Data along Manila Trench used for Statistical Analysis

Figure-2 Return Period of the Earthquakes along Manila Trench (Gutenberg–Richter law)


29

[Step3] Analysis and Evaluation


Scenario earthquakes which may affect to the objective area are selected from the existing researches

1)2)3). Table-1 shows fault parameters of scenario earthquakes. The locations of the scenario

earthquakes are shown in Figure-3 to Figure-5.

Table-1 Source Model Scenario

Mw Depth Strike Dip Rake Length Width Slip

No. (km) (degree) (degree) (degree) (km) (km) (m) 12) 8.0 12 177 24 90 151 47 5.3 22) 8.5 18 177 24 90 313 70 906 32) 9.0 27 177 24 90 646 101 17.5 41) 8.6 10 355 35 57 400 90 6.0 51) 8.6 10 355 24 72 400 90 6.0 6 8.0 10 355 24 72 151 47 5.3

Worst Case 3)

9.3

0 35.4 10 90 190 120 25.0 0 22 20 90 250 160 40.0 0 2 28 90 220 160 40.0 0 356 20 90 170 90 28.0 0 344 22 90 140 110 12.0

0 331 26 90 95 80 5.0

Figure-3 Tsunami Source Model (Scenario 1 - 3)

Scenario 1 (M8.0)

Scenario 2 (M8.5)

Scenario 3 (M9.0)


30

Figure-4 Tsunami Source Model (Scenario 4 - 6)

Figure-5 Tsunami Source Model (Worst Case Scenario)

Worst Case Scenario (M9.3)

Scenario 4 (M8.6)

Scenario 5 (M8.6)

Scenario 6 (M8.0)


31


Tsunami simulation program "TUNAMI" which is developed by Tohoku University based on the

non-linear long wave theory is used for the analysis. Analysis period is set to be 24 hours after

earthquake occurrence.


UTM coordinate system is used. Square grids are adopted for topographical model. The size of grids

are defined as 1350m, 450m, 150m and 50m, from tsunami source region to the coast based on the

nesting method.

10)-1 Topographical data

The depth of the grids in the ocean area with the size of 1350m, 450m and 150m and the inland 50m

grids are generated based on "GEBCO_08 Grid" data prepared by BODC (British Oceanographic Data

Centre).

The point water depths in the topography map prepared by NAMRIA (National Mapping and

Resource Information Authority) are digitized and used for creating the depth data of the 50m grids in

the Manila Bay.

Figure-6 shows the wide area topographical model prepared from "GEBCO_08 Grid". Figure-7 shows

the topographical model around the Manila Bay prepared from topographical map.

Figure-6 Wide Area Topography Model by GEBCO Data (South China Sea Area)

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000

Depth (m)

1350m mesh area


32

Figure-7 Topography Model of Coast Area by Bathymetry Data (Manila Bay area)


Roughness coefficient “0.025” is used for ocean and land area.


Embankment and other sea defense structures are not considered in this study.

10)-4 Initial water height data (= deformation of sea-floor)

Deformation of sea-floor is calculated by Okada's program “DC3D0 / DC3D” with using fault

parameters of scenario earthquakes and the vertical component of the deformation of sea-floor is given

to corresponding grid as initial water height.

Calculated deformation of sea-floor is shown in Figure-8.


Figure-9 shows the results of the simulation for Worst Case Scenario. Table-2 shows the maximum

tsunami height at Cavite and the expected return period calculated from magnitude of each scenario

earthquake.

Cavite is located inside of the Manila Bay, therefore tsunami height is not so high compared to the

open ocean. It is estimated that the tsunami heights by the earthquakes with magnitude around 8.5

which occur along the Manila Trench are less than 1 m by the simulation (Scenario 2, 4, 5, 6). If

earthquake of magnitude 9.0 occurs, the tsunami height may become larger than 2 m (Scenario 3 and

Worst Case Scenario); however the probability of such a huge earthquake may be once in several

thousand years.

The purple line indicates the

boundary where sounding point

depth is consistent with GEBCO.

The density of sounding

point is low to use.

50m mesh area


33

Table-2 Maximum Tsunami Height at Cavite for Each Scenario

Scenario No. Mw Return Period (year) Max. Tsunami Height (m)

1 8.0 100～630 0.12

2 8.5 300～2000 0.57

3 9.0 1000～6300 2.66

4 8.6 400～2500 0.24

5 8.6 400～2500 0.66

6 8.0 100～630 0.34

Worst Case 9.3 2000～13000 2.98

Figure-8 Vertical deformation (Worst Case Scenario)

Figure-9 Maximum Water Height (Worst Case Scenario)

Cavite

Water Level (m)


[Analytical condition] Software: TUNAMI by Tohoku Univ., Bathymetry data: GEBCO_08, Topography map by

NAMRIA, Grid size: 1350m, 450m, 150m, 50m, Simulation duration: 24 hours, Return period: 2000 - 13000 years.

This map is intended to be used for disaster scenario creation.

This map is not the forecast of the future hazard.

[Analytical condition] Software: TUNAMI by Tohoku Univ.,

Bathymetry data: GEBCO_08, Topography map by NAMRIA,

Grid size: 1350m, 450m, 150m, 50m, Simulation duration: 24

hours, Return period: 2000 - 13000 years.


34

Figure-10 Wave form of Tsunami Height at Cavite (Worst Case Scenario)

[References]

1) EMILE A. OKAL, COSTAS E. SYNOLAKIS, and NIKOS KALLIGERIS (2011): Tsunami

Simulations for Regional Sources in the South China and Adjoining Seas, Pure and Applied

Geophysics 168 (2011), 1153–1173

2) Vu Thanh Ca1 and Nguyen Dinh Xuyen (2008): Tsunami risk along Vietnamese coast, Journal of

Water Resources and Environmental Engineering, No. 23, November 2008

3) Nguyen Hong Phuong, Vu Ha Phuong, and Pham The Truyen (2013): Simulation of a Worst Case

Tsunami Scenario from the Manila Trench to Vietnam, Joint Symposium on Seismic Hazard

Assessment - Sendai, Japan, 17 –19 June, 2013

4) Earthquake Impact Reduction Study for Metropolitan Manila, Republic of the Philippines Final

Report (2004): Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Metropolitan Manila

Development Authority (MMDA), and Philippine Institute of Volcano and Seismology

(PHIVOLCS), Pacific Consultants International, OYO International Corporation, PASCO

Corporation


35

Methodology for Flood Hazard Assessment

The basic procedure of Flood Hazard Assessment is shown in Figure-1. The detailed procedure is

prescribed below.

Figure-1 Basic procedure of flood hazard assessment

[Step1] Collection of existing information

Collect the society and nature related information such as the existing flood information including past

flood record and hydrological data and information relating to society and nature including urban

infrastructure and environmental condition.

<Information relating to flood>

1) Collection and arrangement of existing flood record

Collect the flood related information in target area for evaluation of flood risk. Collecting the data

such as rainfall during flood, water level, river discharge makes it possible to grasp the characteristic

1) Collection and arrangement of existing record

2) Collection and arrangement of hydrological data

3) Information of social Infrastructure

4) Information of natural condition

5) Frequency Analysis on hydrological data

6) Setting of design flood scale

7) Selection of runoff analysis model

8) Construction of runoff analysis model and conduct the analysis

8)-1 Analysis of past flood

8)-2 Analysis of designed flood

<Flood related Information> <Social & Natural Information>

Step 1

Collection of existing

information

Step 2

Setting of target flood

scale

Step 3

Flood analysis


36

of flood. The inundation area, duration time, water depth and the cause of flood implicated in the

damage report or photograph are also helpful to understand the phenomena of inundation. If flood

hazard map is available in the target area, utilize the information (inundation area, duration time and

depth) shown in the map.

2) Collection and arrangement of hydrological data

Collect existing hydrological data in target area. Data on rainfall (hourly data or daily data), river

water level, river discharge and tidal level should be collected. If there are river facilities such as dam

or gate, it is advisable to collect the operation report of these facilities during flood. Before arranging

these data, confirm if wrong or missing data is included.

Based on the collected hydrological data, analyze the flood continued time, probability of flood

occurrence and situation when the largest recorded flood occurred. Cross-cutting profile data also

would be helpful in the step of model construction.

If there is little hydrological data,

If the availability of ground-based rainfall data is limited, utilize the satellite-based rainfall data. From various kind of satellite-based rainfall data, 3B42RT, GSMaP、Qmorph、Cmorph can be utilized into flood runoff model IFAS directly. (The detail about IFAS is shown in the following.) Because the reliability of data accuracy would change depend on the observation condition, the data need to be modified (enlarged) by comparing the ground-based rainfall data.

If there is little information about past flood,

Try to gather additional information by conducting field survey or interview survey (check the inundation area, the trace of water level and flood continued time) to local resident. Inundation area can be confirmed in the Google Earth in some cases.

0

2

4

6

8

10

(mm)

0

2

4

6

8

10

(mm)

（Before enlargement）

Ground‐based rainfall data and satellite‐based rainfall data is equal

（After enlargement）

Enlarge the satellite‐based rainfall data by comparing with ground‐based rainfall data

There is a gap between ground‐based rainfall data and satellite‐based rainfall data

Ground‐based Satellite‐based

Ground‐based Satellite‐based


37

<Information on social infrastructure and natural condition>

3) Collection and arrangement of information on social infrastructure

Collect the information of industrial estates and social infrastructure which would be affected by flood.

Social infrastructure can be divided into two category; transportation infrastructure to be concerned

with importation into/from industrial estates and lifeline infrastructure which are necessary to maintain

the business.

Transportation infrastructure: road, railway, harbor, airport, etc.

Lifeline infrastructure: electricity, water and sewerage system, gas, communication, oil, etc.

The actual region to assess the flood hazard is decided based on the distribution of infrastructure



4) Collection and arrangement of information on natural condition

Collect the topographic map and arrange the data relating to natural condition such as altitude, land

use pattern and geology. From the aspect of data accuracy, it is advisable to use detailed map than

1/5,000 scale.

[Step2] Setting of target flood scale

Based on the data collected in Step1, the target flood scale for formulating the Area BCP is set. Basic

flood scale is largest recorded flood, 50-year return period, 100-year return period and 200-year return

period

5) Frequency analysis on hydrological data

Calculate probable hydrological value by using hydrological data collected in 2). As for statistic

processing procedure, apply probability density function such as Exponential Distribution, then

evaluate the probability density function, and finally decide the appropriate probability density

function. Note that the result of probability density function highly depends on the total number of

sample; therefore the accuracy of probability density function would decrease with small samples. (To

have reliable result of probability density function, samples for 50 years are at least needed.)

If there is little information on natural condition,

Elevation…ASTER GDEM (Advanced Space borne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer Global Digital Elevation Model) can be used for global altitude data. Note that ASTER GDEM is satellite-based data; therefore if the data area includes buildings, the data shows the height of building, not on the ground.

Land use pattern…GLCC (Global Land Cover Characteristics) provided by USGS is available.

If there is little information on social infrastructure,

Try to collect the information on special important infrastructure (industrial estates, main arterial road, etc.) for formulating Area BCP in the target area. Creating the GIS data by extracting the important infrastructure information from commonly shared topographic map is possible measures to complement the required information.


38

have reliable result of probability density function, samples for 50 years are at least needed.)

Figure-2 Example of Frequency analysis

6) Setting of design flood scale

Set the design flood scale for formulating the Area BCP. If the designed flood scale is huge, there

should be much more content to formulate Area BCP. In this case, it requires considerable work to

formulate Area BCP, but safeness of the plan become high. On the other hand, if the designed flood

scale is small, the target scope of the Area BCP become limited, and makes it easier to formulate Area

BCP. In this case, there is a possibility Area BCP doesn’t work effectively. Hence, design flood scale

should be set in accordance with regional city plan, administrative strategy, feasibility of plan with the

discussion among the relevant people including local resident.

A way of thinking to set design flood scale

If to set the design flood scale is difficult, as initial scale, set some scale like largest recorded flood, 50, 100, 200-year return period flood. After that, set the design flood scale in conjunction with the result of flood risk evaluation.

Typically used probability density function and evaluation method in Japan

Probability density function

Exponential Distribution, Gumbel Distribution, Square-root Exponential Type Maximum Distribution, Extreme Value Distribution, Peason Type III Distribution (Real Space), Peason Type III Distribution (Logarithmic Space), Iwai Method, Ishihara・Takase Method, Log-normal Distribution (Quantile Method), Log-normal Distribution 3 (Slade II), Log-normal Distribution 2 (Slade I, L-moment method), Log-normal Distribution 2 (Slade I, Product moment method), Log-normal Distribution 4 (Slade IV, Product moment method)

Plotting position In commonly used plotting position, Cunnane plot (α=0.4) is applicable for all probability density distribution, so Cunnane plot is used in many cases.

Evaluation method

The Probability density function with standard Least-Squares Criterion is 0.04 and fewer, correlation coefficient is high, and expected error by Jack knife is small. SLSC: The indexical deference of probable hydrological value between “data estimated by using Probability density function” and “plotting positioned data”. When the deference is small, the goodness of fit is high. Jack knife method: The method to calculate the expected accuracy. Select Probability density function with small value.


39

On the basis of past flood information summarized in 1), select the appropriate model to simulate the

flood in the target area and conduct flood analysis.

7) Selection of runoff analysis model

Select appropriate model to analyze the characteristics of flood in target area. Commonly used flood

analysis models are shown in Table-1. Depend on the characteristics of the flood, select single model

or combine some models.

The appropriate analysis model should be selected from the view point of runoff characteristics,

required resolution, and financial capacity to afford the software. At the very beginning, it is desirable

to actively promote the formulating the Area BCP by using the charge-free software like IFAS.

8) Construction of flood analysis model and conduct the analysis

8)-1 Analysis of past flood

Conduct flood analysis with the model selected in 7) and past rainfall data. After that, confirm the

simulation accuracy by comparing the result of simulation with actual discharge record. (If river

water level and other relevant hydrological data are available, compare these records also.) If

simulation precision is not satisfactory, try to improve the accuracy by modifying the parameter.

Modifiable parameter varies by each model. Generally, parameters relating to roughness coefficient,

infiltration rate, soil hydraulic property, thickness of soil and bedrock hydraulic property are

modified by utilizing the information on natural condition.

To secure the model accuracy, modify the model so as to simulate past several floods as precise as

possible.

8)-2 Analysis of designed scale flood

Conduct the runoff analysis on designed flood prepared in 6).


40

Table-1 Major Flood analysis models It

em

Representative hydraulic analysis model

IFAS (Integrated Flood Analysis System)

RRI (Rainfall Runoff

Inundation Model)

iRIC (International

River Interface Cooperative)

MIKE-Series

HEC-RAS(The Hydrologic

Engineering Centers River

Analysis System)

Info Works FLOW 2D River 2D

Mod

el

Distributed runoff model.

Distributed runoff model (including inundation analysis model).

Hydraulic analysis model. （for river）

Runoff analysis model, Hydraulic analysis model (for river ), Inundation analysis model, Ground water analysis model and so on

Hydraulic analysis model.

Runoff, hydraulic (for river channel), and inundation analysis model. And sewage, water quality and pollution load etc. can be analyzed.

Runoff analysis model Hydraulic analysis model (for river channel) Inundation analysis model

Hydraulic analysis model (for river channel）

Pur

pose

Calculate runoff (discharge) at arbitrary calculation grids

Calculate runoff (discharge) at arbitrary calculation grids considering inundation and groundwater at the same time

Simulate water behavior (flow velocity, direction, discharge etc.) with not only 1-dimeinonal also 2-, 3-dimensional model. User can conduct inundation analysis with 2-dimentiona model. Calculate riverbed valuation with sediment model.

Runoff analysis, Inundation analysis, groundwater analysis, Water quality analysis, Calculation water balance. It carries plural various calculation modules.

1-dimensional hydraulic analysis Quasi 2-dimensional river hydraulic analysis, (Estimating each flow velocity of high and low flow channel individually) User can select unsteady model or uniform/non-uniform model, depending on needs.

River hydraulic analysis, flood inundation analysis with river channel and flood plain model and sewage system model, runoff analysis, water quality (incl. pollution load) analysis. User can analyze various hydraulic phenomenon calculation modules integrally.

Two-dimensional flood inundation analysis, One-dimensional river channel hydraulic analysis (unsteady flow model).

Two-dimensional river channel hydraulic analysis (unsteady flow model)

Mai

n In

put

Elevation data (SRTM, ASTER etc.) Rainfall data (Satellite rainfall data）

Elevation data (SRTM, ASTER etc.) Rainfall data Boundary condition data (up-stream: release water from dams etc. , downstream: tidal level etc.)

Elevation data (SRTM, ASTER etc. ) Boundary condition data (up-stream: release water from dam etc. downstream: tidal level etc.)

Cross section data of river channel. Elevation data (SRTM, ASTER etc. ) Boundary condition (up-stream: release water from dam etc. , downstream: tidal level etc.) Structures (weir, gate, pump etc.)

Cross section data of river channel. Boundary condition (up-stream: release water from dam and so on, downstream: tidal level and so on)

Cross section data of river channel. Elevation data (SRTM, ASTER etc.) Rainfall data Boundary condition (up-stream: release water from dam etc. , downstream: tidal level etc.) Structures (weir, gate, pump etc.)

Cross section data of river channel. Elevation data (SRTM, ASTER etc.) Rainfall data Boundary condition (up-stream: release water from dam etc. , downstream: tidal level etc.)

Cross section data of river channel. Boundary condition (up-stream: release water from dam etc. , downstream : tidal level etc.)

Mai

n O

utpu

t

Hydrograph at arbitrary points (In river channel, From each river basin , From protected plane)

Hydrograph, inundation area/depth in flood plain. River discharge, water level at river calculation grids.

Water level and discharge, flow velocity in river Inundation depth and flow velocity and flax of each grid in flood plain (in case of considering flood plain analysis)

Runoff at arbitrary point (in rivers/ channels, river basin etc.) Water level and discharge, flow velocity in river/channel. Inundation area/depth, flow velocity and flux flow in flood plain.

Water level, discharge and flow velocity etc. in river/channel.

Water level, discharge, flow velocity etc.in river/channel. Inundation area/depth, flow velocity and flux flow in flood plain.Water level, discharge and pollution load in pipe line.

Water level, discharge and flow velocity etc. in river channel. Inundation area/depth and flow velocity and flux flow in flood plain.

Water level, discharge and flow velocity etc. in river channel.

Dis

tri

bute

r

ICHARM http://www.icharm.pwri.go.jp/index_j.html

Same as on the left

iRIC Project http://i-ric.org/ja/

DHI Water & Environment http://www.dhigroup.com/

USACEhttp://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-ras/

Innovyze Ltdhttp://www.innovyze.com/

FLO-2D Software, INC http://www.flo-2d.com/flo2d-basic

University of Alberta in Canada http://www.river2d.ualberta.ca/

Pri

ce

Free

Under considering

Free Over 15,000 Euro(depending on combination of analysis modules)

Free About 4 - 18 million JPY. (depending on combination of analysis modules)

Free version (basic version) Payment version (advanced version).

Free

Rem

arks

IFAS was developed in order to analyze rainfall runoff in a developing country where there is no hydrological observation. IFAS has affinity with satellite products.

This model is able to conduct runoff analysis considering retarding function in protected plain caused by inundation. In addition, behavior of ground water can be calculated.

This software was developed by MD_SWMS (USGS) and RIC-Nays. Afterwards, it has improved and integrated by Dr. Shimizu (Hokkaido Univ.) and Dr. Jon Nelson (USGS).

MIKE is equipped with user-friendly interface, MIKE-ZERO This software has high affinity with ArcGIS (ESRI, US).

Mainly, water service, sewage system, and water environment etc. shall be examined. Also data management tool is equipped. Especially sewage system is well-analyzed. Most modules are integrated with GIS.

It has operation interface. The one-dimensional river channel calculation can input a rectangular section, an arbitrary section, but section distance can be controlled by limitation each a calculation grid size. So, calculation precision of the river channel water level is a problem.

This model was developed in order to investigate water environment such as fish biotope. By using a finite element method, river flow condition shall be calculated.


41

Figure-3 Output of flood analysis


42

[Example of Flood Hazard Analysis] Bakasi/Karawan in Indonesia

- Runoff analysis with IFAS and inundation analysis with iRIC -

The following example shows the procedure for flood analysis by using IFAS and iRIC. As the merit

of using IFAS, even if the availability of ground-based rainfall data is limited, IFAS can conduct

runoff analysis with satellite-based rainfall data. Although IFAS can’t analyze inundation phenomena,

the user can conduct inundation simulation by using iRIC with the output of IFAS.

[1] Get the analysis software

Get and install IFAS and iRIC through the Internet

◆ IFAS : http://www.icharm.pwri.go.jp/research/ifas/

（Developed and provided by ICHARM of Public Works Research Institute）

◆ iRIC : http://i-ric.org/en/

（Developed and provided by Foundation of Hokkaido River Disaster Prevention

Research Center, U.S. Geological Survey and Hokkaido University）

[2] Set up runoff analysis condition

Set up runoff analysis condition for IFAS.

1) Calculation period

Set calculation period for runoff analysis

Calculation period should include initial rise, peak and decay of flood.

In the case of Indonesia,

→ 8 – 14 November, 2007 (7 days)

Period the largest rainfall recorded at Cisomang gauging station.

2) Discharge calculation point

Set the point of discharge calculation

This point become input condition of inundation analysis of iRIC

If actual discharge data are recorded, set the point for the purpose of comparing the actual

discharge with calculated discharge


→ Set at the downstream side of Jatiluhur dam in Citarum river

3) Topographic data

Set the data on altitude, land use pattern and geology


→ The following data are employed

[Altitude]：GTOPO30

[Land use pattern]：GLCC

[Geology]：CGWM


43

Figure-1 Elevation data

Figure-2 Land use pattern data

4) Rainfall data

Input the actual rainfall data for past flood analysis. For designed flood analysis, input the

estimated design magnitude.

If the availability of ground-based rainfall data is limited, utilize satellite-based rainfall

data instead.


→ Since the ground-based data is limited, utilized satellite-based rainfall data,

3B42RT(V5). Satellite-based rainfall data are enlarged to the scale of

ground-based rainfall data.


44

Figure-3 Enlargement of rainfall data

5) Other parameters

Modify the parameter by comparing actual discharge with calculated discharge


→ Employed the default parameter setting because the parameter identification is

impossible due to the lack of discharge data.

[3] Runoff analysis

Conduct the runoff analysis with constructed IFAS model.

In the case of Indonesia, the following 4 cases were performed.

・Case 1：2007 year flood as target flood

・Case 2：50-year return period flood as target flood



Figure-4 Output of runoff analysis

[4] Set up condition of inundation analysis (iRIC model)

Set up the followings as calculation condition

1) Set up the software/ calculation method

Conduct the simulation of inundation by using Two-dimensional plane flow analysis

model with the input data, which is the output data of IFAS. A kind of software

“Nays2dFlood” is used in Two-dimensional plane flow analysis model.

2) Target area of inundation analysis

Set the areas in which important social infrastructure like industrial estates and main

arterial road are included.

0

50

100

150

200

250

2007/11/8

2007/11/9

2007/11/10

2007/11/11

2007/11/12

2007/11/13

2007/11/14

Pricipitation(m

m)

Comparison of the daily precipitation Cisomang

観測値

3B42RT（V5)

引き伸ばし前3B42RT(V5)

引き伸ばし後

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

11/8

11/9

11/10

11/11

11/12

11/13

11/14

Discharge(m

3/s)

Chitarum River

2007 year Flood

Return Period 50y

Return Period 100y

Return Period 200y


45


→ Set the areas in which industrial estates are located along the Cikampek Highway,

and city area is located in the downstream side

3) Grid size

If there are many grids, it takes many times to calculate. Therefor take into account the

calculation capacity.


→ Set grid size as 200m*200m

4) Elevation data

Set up elevation data by using available data


→ ASTER(Advanced Space-borne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer)

was utilized. Since the special resolution of ASTER DEM is 30m and there was a

possibility that elevation data on the highway is incorrect, the complementary

data were collected by spot elevation measuring with handy GPS.

Figure-5 ASTRE GDEM data (http://gdem.ersdac.jspacesystems.or.jp/)

5) Boundary condition

As upper boundary condition, give the hydrograph data calculated in runoff analysis.


→ Five hydrographs calculated with runoff model are given as upper boundary

conditions.

6) Roughness Coefficient

Give Roughness Coefficient in each mesh depending on the land use pattern


→ Global map managed by ISCGM (International Steering Committee for Global

Mapping) was employed for determination of land use conditions to which the

values of roughness coefficient are corresponding.

7) Drainage Effect

Consider the drainage effect based on the actual drainage condition


46


→ Assumed the drainage capacity of 2m3/s/ km2 and deducted the amount of water

from each grid

[5] Inundation analysis

Evaluate the inundation situation (inundated area, duration time and depth) by comparing the analysis

output with location point of industrial estates and social infrastructure.

Figure-6 Output on inundation analysis by iRIC

Depth(m)

～ 1.0

1.0 ～ 2.0

2.0 ～ 3.0

3.0 ～ 4.0

4.0 ～ 5.0

5.0 ～

：Industrial park


47

Methodology for Hazard Assessment of Storm Surge

Figure-1 shows the basic procedure of the methodology for the hazard assessment of storm surges.

The details of each step are indicated below.

Figure-1 Basic procedure for hazard assessment of storm surge

[Step 1] Collection and analysis of existing

1) Collection of information on past damages due to storm surges

2) Collection and analysis of tidal data

3) Collection and analysis of typhoon data

4) Collection of the data about social conditions

5) Collection of the data about natural conditions

7) Analysis of typhoon data based on statistics of extreme

8) Determination of design storm surge scale

9) Select of typhoon model

11)-1 Construct typhoon model

<Information on storm surges> <Information on social & natural conditions>

12) Evaluation of inundation situation

11) Construction of analysis model and conduct the analysis

11)-4 Analysis of storm surge for stochastic typhoon

11)-3 Analysis of stochastic typhoon

11)-2 Construct storm surge

[Step 2] Determination of a scenario disaster scale

[Step 3] Analysis and assessment of storm

10) Select of storm surge model

6) Collection of information on the structures in ports and harbors


48

[Step 1] Collection and analysis of existing data

The typhoon and storm surge related information such as the damage records by past storm surges,

observation data of tide level and wind and best track data of typhoon are collected. As for observation

data, the confirmation that observatories and observation methods are effective and the avoidance of

overestimation, underestimation, errors and missing data are necessary. The social and natural

condition such as the industrial facilities that the industrial agglomerated area is relying on and the

geological information of the site are also collected.

< Information on storm surges >

1) Collection of information on past damages due to storm surges

Records of past storm surges in the study area where a hazard assessment will be conducted are

collected. The following information is necessary:

Time and tide data when large storm surges occurred

Damage records and pictures

Inundation area and its depth

Characteristics of storm surges in the study area are comprehended by organizing and analyzing these

data.

2) Collection and analysis of observed tidal data

Continuous tidal data in the study area are collected. These data are used to estimate the astronomical

tide in the study area. The risk of storm surges is assessed by adding sea level variations caused by

typhoons to the astronomical tide level. Comprehending the highest astronomical tide level such as

mean high water springs is required to evaluate in the safe side. Observation data of more than one

year is desirable for the implementation of a harmonic analysis to estimate astronomical tide level.

3) Collection and analysis of typhoon data

Following data are collected regarding past typhoons in the study area.

Atmospheric pressure

Wind direction and speed

Center position and time

Radius of maximum wind

The characteristics of typhoons in the studyt area are comprehended by organizing and analyzing the

In case of lack of observed tidal data:

NAO.99b, opened to the public by the National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ), is available for the astronomical sea level prediction model. However, it is desirable to use observed data because the 0.5 degree spatial resolution of the global scale model (NAO.99b) is rough.

In case of insufficient information on storm surge is available:

Field study and hearing surveys (i.e. confirming inundation situation) to residents are conducted to comprehend the characteristics of storm surges in the study area.


49

data.

<Information on social and natural conditions>

4) Collection of data about social conditions

Information on industrial agglomerations and social infrastructure in the study area which would be

affected by storm surges are collected and arranged. Social infrastructures can be divided into two

category; transportation infrastructures and lifelines.

Traffic infrastructures (Internal and external transportation of industrial agglomerations):

- Roads, railways, ports, harbors and airports

Lifelines (Necessary for business continuity):

- Electricity, water and sewerage, gas, communication and oil

The actual region to assess the hazard by storm surge is decided based on the distribution of

infrastructure facilities. As the infrastructure facilities spread widely outside of industrial agglomerated

area, the region of hazard analysis does not remain in the industrial agglomerated area in general.

5) Collection of data about natural conditions

Following data are collected to understand the topographic features of the study area.

Elevation data

Bathymetry

The data below are also useful for more detailed investigation.

Land use map

Data related to geological information

It is desirable to use data with equal or less than 1km resolution to secure accuracy.

6) Collection of information on the structures in ports and harbors

Information on the artificial structures such as breakwaters and seawalls are not included in the

In case of insufficient information of natural conditions is available:

The following public data is also available. Elevation: GTOPO30 (Global 30-Arc-Second digital elevation model data) and SRTM (Shuttle Radar

Topography Mission) can be used for global altitude data. Note that the quality (resolution) of GTOPO30 varies among the area.

Bathymetry: GEBCO08 (Global 30-second grid, General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans) data is available.

If there is little information on social infrastructure,

Try to collect the information on special important infrastructure (industrial estates, main arterial road, etc.) for formulating Area BCP in the target area. Creating the GIS data by extracting the important infrastructure information from commonly shared topographic map is possible measures to complement the required information.

In case of lack of typhoon data:

Typhoon best track data is available from meteorological organizations around the world. Atmospheric pressure, location, time and radius of maximum wind can be complemented by weather charts.


50

elevation data. These structures are important factors in assessing the storm surges. The following data

are collected.

Existence of the structures

Location of the structures

Function and performance of the structures

[Step 2] Determination of a scenario disaster scale

Based on the data collected in Step1, the target scale of storm surge for formulating the Area BCP is

set. Note that the scale of storm surge is defined as the scale of typhoon which generates storm surge.

7) Analysis of typhoon data based on statistics of extreme

The typhoon scale in the study area is studied based on the collected data in 3). The return period is

calculated using the analysis on statistics of extreme.

[Procedure of the statistical analysis]

1. Apply multiple probability distribution functions

2. Perform the goodness of fit evaluation

3. Adopt the optimum probability distribution function

The result of the extreme statistical analysis depends on the number of samples. The reliability of the

return period of typhoons becomes lower if the number of samples is insufficient. It is desirable to

collect the annual maximum value at least for 50 years to perform a reliable analysis.

8) Determination of a design storm surge scale

Set the design storm surge scale for formulating the Area BCP. If the designed scale is huge, there

should be much more content to formulate Area BCP. In this case, it requires considerable work to

formulate Area BCP, but safeness of the plan become high. On the other hand, if the designed storm

surge scale is small, the target scope of the Area BCP become limited, and makes it easier to formulate

Area BCP. In this case, there is a possibility Area BCP doesn’t work effectively. Hence, design hazard

scale should be set in accordance with regional city plan, administrative strategy, feasibility of plan

with the discussion among the relevant people including local resident.

Typical statistical processing technique,

Gouda method: Apply several probability distribution functions*). Adopt the one whose residual error becomes a minimum against the mean value of the residual error of the coefficient of correlation.

*) Exponential distribution, Gumbel distribution, Extreme type-II distribution, Weibull distribution, etc.

If there is little information on structures in ports and harbors,

These structures can be confirmed by field survey or aerial photographs with high resolution. The efficacy of the structures is analyzed in conjunction with the disaster records collected in 1).


51

[Step 3] Analysis and assessment of storm surges

On the basis of past storm surge information summarized in 1), select the appropriate model to

simulate the storm surge in the study area and conduct analysis.

9) Select of typhoon model

Select the appropriate model to create the fields of surface wind and air pressure caused by typhoons.

To simulate the storm surge by the stochastic typhoon, the typhoon model to reproduce the fields of

surface wind and atmospheric pressure which are the external forces in the storm surge simulation.

The two-dimensional typhoon model based on the Myers’ formula is used usually.

10) Select of storm surge model

Select the appropriate storm surge model to calculate sea level variations using surface wind and

pressure estimated by the typhoon model. The appropriate analysis model should be selected among

several general storm surge models from the view point of the characteristics of the study area, the

degree of required accuracy and the available computer resources.

Example of storm surge model

POM (Princeton Ocean Model)

MOM・GOLD (Modular Ocean Model Generalized Ocean Layered Model)

FVCOM (Finite Volume Coastal Ocean Model)

Model Hydrostatic Hydrostatic Hydrostatic/Nonhydrostatic

Purpose Analyze the marine current and the changes in the surface caused by meteorological fields based on the marine climate conditions such as insolation, wind and air pressure.

Analyze the marine current and the changes in the surface caused by meteorological fields based on the marine climate conditions such as insolation, wind and air pressure. GOLD accommodates oil defluxion and flowage.

Analyze the marine current and the changes in the surface they caused based on the marine climate conditions such as tide, river water flow and ground water flow.

Original creator

Princeton University GFDL (Global Fluid Dynamics Laboratory) of NOAA (National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration)

University of Massachusetts

Distributor http://www.ccpo.odu.edu/~tezer/POMDB/adduser.htm

https://fms.gfdl.noaa.gov/gf/account/?action=UserAdd

http://fvcom.smast.umassd.edu/FVCOM/Source/code.htm

A way of thinking to set design storm surge scale

If to set the design storm surge scale is difficult, as initial scale, set some scale like 50, 100, 200-year return period hazard. After that, set the design storm surge scale in conjunction with the result of disaster risk evaluation.


52

11) Construction of analysis model and conduct the analysis

11)-1 Construct typhoon model

A past typical typhoon is selected among several typhoon data collected in 3). The field of surface

wind and air pressure are calculated using the typhoon model selected in 9). The reproducibility of

the typhoon is confirmed by comparing the analyzed and the observed wind and air pressure. If the

reproducibility is not enough, the parameters of the model are modified to upgrade reproducibility.

11)-2 Construct storm surge model

The tide level for the selected typhoon is calculated using the storm surge model selected in 10) and

the surface wind and air pressure distribution calculated in 11)-1. The reproducibility of tide level is

confirmed by comparing the analyzed and the observed tide level collected in 1) and 2). If the

reproducibility is not enough, the parameters of the model are modified to upgrade reproducibility. It

is desirable to perform the affirmation of reproducibility for several cases to secure the reliability.

11)-3 Analysis of stochastic typhoon

The conditions of designed typhoon are decided based on the analysis in 7). The hazard by storm

surges is not only determined by the scale of typhoon but also by its course and velocity. Therefore,

it is desirable to study several courses for the target typhoon. Based on the typical course of past

hazardous typhoon collected in 1) and 3), the conditions of designed typhoon is studied and adjusted.

11)-4 Analysis of storm surge for stochastic typhoon

The tide level for the designed typhoon is studied based on the wind and atmospheric pressure

calculated in 11)-3. The magnitude and range of hazard varies depending on the specified scale,

radius, course and speed of typhoon. The course of typhoon is selected finally referring to the

inundation area and depths caused by storm surges and the effect to the important facilities.

12) Evaluation of the inundation situation

The inundation area and depths are calculated from the results of the storm surge analysis in 11).

Examples of the method to evaluate the inundation are shown below. The method is selected

considering the required accuracy, available computational resource and etc.

Level Flooding Method…Simplified technique, capable of assessing the safe side

Dynamic technique…Capable of assessing the detailed distribution of inundation area and

duration


53

[Example of Storm Surge Hazard Analysis] Hai Phong in Vietnam

- Storm surge analysis using a two dimensional typhoon model and POM-

The procedures mentioned below are the steps in performing an analysis of storm surges using

publicly available data and models.

[1] Get the analysis software and necessary data

1) Get the ocean model

Download POM (Princeton Ocean Model) from the site below

◆http://www.ccpo.odu.edu/POMWEB/

2) Get the terrain model

Download GEBCO08 data from the site below.

◆http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/gridded_bathymetry_data/

3) Get the typhoon data

Download best track data from Japan Meteorological Agency.

◆http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/indexe.html

4) Get the tidal data

Download NAO.99b from the site below.

◆http://www.miz.nao.ac.jp/staffs/nao99/

[2] Setting a calculation condition

1) The domain of the storm surge model

Taking into account the computation time and the stability of the calculation, nesting calculation has to

be performed. Terrain data of a specified area is prepared.

In the case of Hai Phong, the calculation domain was performed as shown in Figure-1.

Figure-1 The domain of the storm surge model at Haiphong, Vietnam

2) Selection of the past typhoon for verification

Region 1 (mesh size: 18″) 18.5oN～22.0oN

105.5oE～110.0oE

4

Region 2 (mesh size: 6″) 20.4oN～21.0oN

106.5oE～107.1oE

Region 3 (mesh size: 2″) 20.75oN～20.95oN 106.6oE～106.9oE


54

The typhoon Son Tinh (coded T1223), which caused significant damage to north of Vietnam in 2012,

was selected for verification.

Figure-2 Track of typhoon Son Tinh (T1223)

3) Analysis of typhoon based on statistics of extreme for the return period of the typhoon

Return periods of the typhoon to the study area are analyzed based on the collected typhoon data. In

the case of Hai Phong, 50, 100 and 200-years return periods are studied by Gouda method.

Figure-3 Analysis of typhoon based on statistics of extreme in Vietnam

(Return Period and probability of exceedance for pressure dip of typhoons)

4) Generating wind and air pressure fields using a two dimensional typhoon model (the Myers’

formula)

Generate wind and air pressure fields from the central atmospheric pressure and radius of maximum

wind speed based on the Myers’ formula below.

Weibull (k=2.00)

Return Periods (years)

N = 59 R = 0.9824

Return Periods

(Year)

Pressure dip of

typhoons

(hPa)

Standard

Deviation

(hPa)

1 - -

2 31.720 1.547

5 42.078 2.140

10 47.922 2.576

15 50.925 2.815

20 52.917 2.977

25 54.397 3.099

30 55.568 3.197

50 58.688 3.460

75 61.020 3.660

100 62.608 3.797

200 66.240 4.113

300 68.253 4.290

P0 : Minimum pressure at the typhoon center (hPa) △P : The difference between environmental atmospheric pressure and pressure

at the maximum wind area (hPa) r0 : The radius of maximum wind (km) r : The distances from typhoon center (km)


55

Figure-4 Distribution of wind (left) and air pressure (right)

generated using two dimensional typhoon model

5) Setting a typhoon course

Considering geomorphological condition and typhoon characteristics, the typical course or the course

which is assumed to cause the greatest damage to the study area are set by performing multiple

investigations.

Figure-5 Example of the setting of a typhoon course in the case of Hai Phong

[3] Analysis using a storm surge model

1) Calculation of storm surge of the past typhoon for verification

The reproducibility is confirmed by comparing the analyzed and the observed wind speed, air pressure

and tide level; and the parameters for computation are adjusted.

In case of Hai Phong, predicted wind speed by the typhoon model was underestimated at first in

comparison with the actual observed data. The correction factor is introduced.

Track 4Track 3Track 2 Track 1

The radius of maximum wind


56

Figure-6 Reproducibility of sea level in the case of Vietnam

2) Storm surge estimation for stochastic typhoons

Storm surge estimation is performed using stochastic typhoons after adjusting the model. In case of

Hai Phong, 50, 100 and 200-years return period cases were studied with multiple courses.

[4] Inundation calculation

Inundation area and depths are analyzed from the results of the storm surge analysis using stochastic

typhoons. The distribution map of the maximum inundation depth is prepared using the Level

Flooding Method.

Figure-7 Inundation map (Inundation depths)

Tool 3 : Lessons Learned from the Extreme Natural Disasters

Lessons Learned from the Extreme Natural Disasters

Contents

1. Methodologies and Scope of Survey ............................................................................1

2. Information and Data Compiled in Appendix ............................................................2

3. Summary of Survey ....................................................................................................2

1) 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake (Japan) .......................................................................2

2) The Great Sumatra Earthquake and the tsunami in 2004 (Indonesia, etc.) ......4

3) 1999 İzmit Earthquake (Turkey) .........................................................................6

4) 2013 Flood in Jakarta (Indonesia) .......................................................................8

5) 2011 Flood in Thailand (Thailand) ....................................................................10

6) 2008 Cyclone Nargis (Myanmar) .......................................................................14

7) 2005 Hurricane Katrina (USA) ..........................................................................17

8) 2004 Typhoon Muifa/Unding (Philippines)5 ......................................................19

9) 2010 Eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull (Iceland)......................................................20

10) The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (Philippines)..........................................22


1

1. Methodologies and Scope of Survey

In this Chapter, some major disasters that occurred in the past (especially in the 1990s and later) are

examined. Information on the description of occurrences of the disasters and the impact on supply

chains and economic activities are organized, and lessons are derived therefrom. (Disasters already

described in the Study Report 1 are also examined, with additional updated information.)

Table 1 Methodologies and Scope of Survey

Information obtained through survey Methodologies of Survey Scope of Survey

Information on major disasters that occurred in the past and lessons derived therefrom

Collect information from open-source materials available on the internet, etc.

Search information from the websites, etc. listed below: Asian Disaster Reduction Center

(ARDC) The International Centre for Water

Hazard (ICHARM) Other open source materials

Natural disasters covered under this survey include, geo-hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic

activities and eruptions, and landslides; tsunamis; and hydrometeorological hazards such as floods,

hurricanes/typhoons, and high tides. Droughts and forest fires, and biohazards such as outbreak of

infectious diseases and incidences of infection in animals and plants are not covered by this survey.

In particular, the following disasters listed in the following Table 2 are selected to represent each type

of extreme natural disaster described above and are examined.

Table 2 Past natural disasters examined in this Survey

Disasters Country

Earthquakes and Tsunamis

2011 Tōhoku Earthquake Japan

The Great Sumatra Earthquake and the tsunami in 2004

Indonesia, etc.

1999 İzmit Earthquake Turkey

Floods 2013 Flood in Jakarta Indonesia

2011 Flood in Thailand Thailand

Hurricanes/typhoons

2008 Cyclone Nargis Myanmar

2005 Hurricane Katrina USA

2004 Typhoon Muifa/Unding Philippines

Volcanic activities and eruptions

2010 Eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull Iceland

The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 Philippines

Planning Guide for Area Business Continuity ~ Area BCM Tool Kits ~ Ver.2 Tool3

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2. Information and Data Compiled in Appendix

In Appendix, information and data regarding the description of occurrence and impacts on supply

chains and economic activities with respect to the natural disasters described above are presented.

Table 3 Information and Data Compiled in the Appendix

Information and Data Compiled in the Appendix Summary

Description of occurrence of past disasters and their impact on the supply chains and economic activities

Detailed information on the above natural disasters, including the description of occurrence and impact on economic activities, etc. are provided here, as well as the description of source of information. (The information presented in the Study Report 1 is not included.)

3. Summary of Survey

1) 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake (Japan)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence 14:46 JST on March 11, 2011

2. Place of occurrence Epicenter: Offshore of the Sanriku Region (130 km east-southeast of the Oshika Peninsula)

3. State and scale of the disaster

Large earthquake and tsunami occurred mainly in the Pacific coastline of the Tōhoku region.

Tsunami inundated a total area of approximately 561 km2 Devastating damage was caused to human lives and residential

houses, as well as infrastructures/lifelines etc. Due to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and

shutdown of thermal power station, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. (TEPCO) conducted scheduled power outage in its service area for a total of ten days, starting on March 14, 2011.

Since some of the oil refineries halted production and because of difficulties in securing transportation due to damaged roads, etc. in the disaster affected area, it became extremely difficult to deliverpetroleum products to places where such fuels are vital to lifesaving and survival purposes including hospitals, communication stations, local fire department, etc.

As for urban gas, LNG facility of Sendai City Gas, the largest gas company in the Tōhoku region, was damaged by the massive tsunami. Manufacturing facility was inundated and some equipment was swept away by the tsunami, resulting in serious damage to the facility.

Due to severe damage to facilities in the entire Pacific coastlines, mainly in the Tōhoku region, roads and railroads were blocked in many places.

All of the ports in Tōhoku region located on the Pacific coast side, suffered enormous damage to port facilities, including breakwater, berthing facilities, cargo-handling machines, etc.

Sendai Airport was flooded by the massive tsunami, and it took more than one month to recover.


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Massive disaster waste was generated (an estimated 22.6 million tons of debris including destroyed houses, etc. was generated by the tsunami), and disposal of such waste is an ongoing problem.

4. Economic damage Total damage of the disaster amounts to approx. 16.9 trillion yen (estimated).

In addition to shutdown of manufacturing facilities, scheduled power outage implemented in Tōhoku and Kanto region to overcome the crisis of power shortage, also had a great impact on the production activities in Japan.

In March 2011, Japan’s mining and manufacturing production dropped 15.5% from the previous month (adjusted to seasonal variations). As for specific sector, production of transportation equipment industry including automobile and auto parts, dropped 46.7% from the previous month, which made the largest negative contribution.

5. Human damage Number of death 15,883; number of people missing 2,676; number of people injured 6,144.

Damages to buildings: totally collapsed 126,421; half collapsed 272,028; partially damaged 740,572.

6. Impacts on supply chain and business activities

Interruption of auto parts production in Japan affected overseas productions via global supply chain. For example, production of automobiles/auto parts in USA in April 2011, dropped 8.9% from the previous month (adjusted to seasonal variations).

On the other hand, production activity recovered to some degree after one month from the disaster. Japanese manufacturing companies’ quick initial response is said to have contributed to the prompt recovery.

According to the survey result conducted by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, more than 60% of the companies in basic materials business and 40% of the companies in the processing business grasped the size of impact of the disaster on their supply chain within one week following the earthquake (Level of damage suffered by the supplier, possibility of procuring parts and materials, etc.). Also, by early April, more than 60% of the manufacturing facilities had finished recovery, and 80% of the companies in processing business and 60% of the companies in basic materials business had gradually secured alternative suppliers.

7. Response Immediately after the earthquake, the government established the Headquarter for Emergency Disaster Control to handle immediate issues. And in June 2011, the legislature passed the basic law on reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake to promote recovery of the disaster affected area. In February 2012, Reconstruction Agency, a new government office, was established.

Supplementary budget worth 415.3 billion yen was approved for measures for disaster recovery for fiscal 2011 (as of May 2, 2011).

8. Lessons learned Manufacturing companies in the disaster affected area temporarily stopped its production after the earthquake. However, the efforts of the companies, early recovery of infrastructures including lifelines and transportations, and the government’s approval of budget for disaster recovery together with implementation of series of policies, all had helped to give the affected companies the prospects to recover their business within one month from the disaster.

Scheduled power outage and oil fuel shortage that occurred after the earthquake were problems that had to be faced for the first time, and these events seriously affected the industrial activities throughout Japan. Such events highlighted the importance of securing energy supply during time of widespread disaster.


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2) The Great Sumatra Earthquake and the tsunami in 2004 (Indonesia, etc.)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence December, 2004

2. Place of occurrence The earthquake occurred in the Indian Ocean in the offing of the Sumatra northwest in the western Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, Tsunami generated over about 1,500-km area from the sea near Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the sea near northwestern Sumatra. (In particular, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives, African countries, etc.)


An earthquake of magnitude 9.3 occurred at about 160km west ofSumatra islands in Indonesia, with an epicenter at a depth of about 10km. Then, within 24 hours after the main shock, aftershocks occurred within 1,200-1,300km from the epicenter. Large aftershocks of about magnitude 5 occurred 26 times.

Tsunamis with an average height of about 10m rolled on to the Indian Ocean coast several times. It is estimated that the seabed was raised about 2-3m when the tsunami struck, and the velocity of tsunami was about 700 km/h. It is pointed out that speed of the tsunami that reached the coast east of the epicenter was slower compared to the tsunami that reached the coast west of the epicenter.

In Aceh Province, Indonesia, tsunami reached 4-5km inland. It has been reported that the speed of tsunami reached 7.7m/sec at the point 2km inland, and with the pressure of 4 ton per square meter, residential buildings were swept away in an instant.

4. Economic damage According to the announcement of the United Nations, emergency aid of 977 million dollars will be needed, and economic damage of the disaster has reached approx. 11.5 billion dollars.

Out of the 3,500 small and medium sized companies in Aceh province (total number of employees: 17,854), approx. 65% of the companies were reported to have stopped their business due to the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami. The percentage of losses suffered due to damage to small and medium sized companies in each region was estimated as follows: Banda Aceh 70%; Sabang 90%; West Aceh Regency 95%; and Aceh Singkil Regency 20%. Market system in the area stretching from Aceh to Medan in North Sumatra Province lost its function, and such situation contributed to the stagnation of social and economic activities of the region.

5. Human damage Some 300,000 or more people are reported to be dead or missing, andabout 5 million people were affected by the disaster. Except for in Aceh Province, Indonesia, most damage was caused by tsunami.


Japanese companies operating in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia did not suffer serious damage, because these companies had their manufacture/sales base in Java or in the inland of each country, distant from the epicenter.

Fortunately, the Arun LNG Terminal which is an export base of liquefied natural gas (LNG) for Japan did not sustain damage, although it was located at the north end of Sumatra close to the epicenter. Also, there was no significant damage to tankers and ships


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operating in the Strait of Malacca which is an important location for transportation of resources, such as for the crude oil imports for Japan.

However, operations of ports were interrupted in some area, and there were cases of delay in delivery of products such as parts. For example, port of Chennai located on the east coast of India is a landing base to deliver goods to the inland where IT enterprises and automobile related companies are concentrated, and because part of the function of this port was interrupted due to tsunami, the local factory of Denso, a subsidiary of Toyota, was unable to unload the parts for the radiator supplied from Japan, and was forced to consider adopting an alternative means of transport.

7. Response National governments and international organizations including UN-related organizations such as UNESCO and WFP, and the Red Cross, provided relief and reconstruction support immediately after the disaster. As for relief efforts, national governments, international organizations and volunteer workers provided emergency relief assistances, and Japan also provided emergency support mainly through mobilization of Japan Disaster Relief Team and the Self-Defense Forces. While secondary disaster such as disease outbreaks caused by poor hygiene was a major concern, such secondary disaster was prevented through prompt burial/cremation of dead and appropriate epidemic prevention measures/medical services provided by the relief party.

In order to rehabilitate/restore the economy of the region stretching from Aceh Province to North Sumatra Province, the Ministry of Commerce of Indonesia established 240 emergency markets, with the aim of substituting the local market system which was shut down.

8. Lessons learned Although there was fortunately little influence on the business activities and supply chains of Japanese companies, it can be suggested that it is important to discuss alternative means of transportation of important parts and products beforehand, in preparation for the case where transport infrastructures such as port facilities suffer damage.

For most of the disaster affected areas, it was their first time to experience earthquake or tsunami. Therefore, the people were unfamiliar with tsunami warnings, and it is pointed out that such condition exacerbated the loss of lives.

It is said that in the offing earthquake of Sumatra, countries in the Indian Ocean and residents thereof were unprepared and unaware of tsunami, and that insufficient utilization of disaster information and lack of information infrastructure have caused the expansion of tsunami damage caused by the earthquake. From such observations, it could be pointed out that it is important to communicate emergency disaster information correctly and quickly, in order to minimize earthquake and tsunami damage.


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3) 1999 İzmit Earthquake (Turkey)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence August 17, 1999

2. Place of occurrence The epicenter of the earthquake was near Izmit in Kocaeli province located in the northwest part of Turkey (Approx. 55 mile east-southeast of Istanbul). Heavily industrialized areas, including Izmit, Sakarya, Istanbul, Bolu, Bursa and Eskishir were majorly affected. Also, the main naval base of the Turkish Navy at Gölcük was hard-hit by the earthquake.


A magnitude 7.4 earthquake occurred, with an epicenter at 11 km southeast of the City of Izmit, located in the northwest part of Turkey.Large area of approximately 31,250 km2 was affected by the earthquake. Height of tsunami generated by the earthquake was 2.5 m.

Approximately 40% of heavy industry in Turkey was concentrated in this region.

4. Economic damage Turkey’s central bank chief has estimated the cost of earthquake damages at between 5-7 billion USD.

The total estimated loss for port facilities in the region was around 200 million USD.

5. Human damage Number of death：17,127 Number of people injured：43,953

(as of October 19, 1999) 6. Impacts on supply chain and business activities

A devastating fire destroyed large parts of the facilities of the state-owned Tupras oil refinery, the largest in Turkey. The fire-fighting capability of the refinery was lost immediately following the earthquake because of the ruptures of the water pipeline from Lake Sapanca, 45 km east of the refinery. For this reason, it took longer to extinguish the fire (the fire was finally extinguished on August 21). According to the Istanbul stock exchange, the damage reported by Tupras oil refinery amounts to 115 million USD.

Operation of state-owned petrochemical company Petkim was interrupted for three months.

The area affected by the earthquake is an important industrial hub in Turkey, especially for automotive industry, and 93% of Turkey’s vehicle productions are carried out in this area. Ford, Hyundai and Toyota operate motor vehicle assembly plants in the epicentral region. Pirelli and Goodyear are located nearby, and Sabanci, which is one of the biggest companies in Turkey has several joint-venture facilities in the region. Among these companies, Hyundai is reported to have experienced significant nonstructural damage. Toyota car factory had fault ruptures in its parking lot. Pirelli Tires had difficulties in restarting its operation since critical production equipment was in heavily damaged sections of the facility. Time to normal operation varied between 7 and 75 days depending on the severity of damage.

7. Response The Government of Turkey announced three phase plan on August 30 to meet the needs of the homeless: The first phase provides tents to immediate victims; the second phase will provide prefabricated housing by the end of November; third phase will be long-term reconstruction (no details provided). Also, the Prime Minister’s Crisis Management Center (PMCMC) prepared temporary shelters for earthquake victims in earthquake affected cities.


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1 Details of the relocation plan of Gölcük and Degirmendere unknown. 2 http://stage.unocha.org/ftsext/arfts/nd1999/tur991.htm

In September 1999, Prime Minister Ecevit expressed concern over the fact that many settlements are established in areas prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods, and emphasized that Turkey needs to pay more attention to geological data in planning settlements. Ecevit announced that Turkey has started to consider relocating at least three major settlements battered by the earthquake, and stated that the Adapazari, Gölcük and Degirmendere are on the agenda. Among these settlements, Adapazari, with a population of 300,000, was relocated to a restoration estate 12 km away from Adapazari and tens of thousands of people moved to the new restoration estate. However, it is reported that there are many issues to be addressed with regards to the livelihoods of the settlers1。

Total amount of foreign aids from national governments and international organizations, etc. was 116,413,423 USD2.

8. Lessons learned Disaster risk: If industrial agglomerated area is located in areas prone to disasters, it is desirable to consider measures including relocation plans. During Izmit earthquake, area where automobile industry was concentrated was hit hard by the earthquake, and this suggests that existing industrial agglomerated area should also reassess its disaster risk and risk awareness should be shared among involved parties.

Infrastructure: Port is a crucial facility which supports the business of industrial agglomerated area and thus, early recovery from disaster is desired. Also, oil fuel supply is also vital to the operation of industrial agglomerated area.

Government response: Because not only the employees working in the industrial agglomerated area, but also their families will suffer from the disaster, relief measures for the citizens offered by the Government will also become an important factor when considering Area BCP.


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4) 2013 Flood in Jakarta (Indonesia)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence January, 2013

2. Place of occurrence The entire city of Jakarta

3.State and scale of the disaster

Major floods and submergence occurred all across Jakarta, due to heavy rainfall continuing from early dawn of January 14, 2013. Water depths of the flood areas ranged between 50 cm and 150 cm.

About 40% of the city of Jakarta is below sea level, and due to its poor drainage system and lack of maintenance thereof, the area is prone to flood during rainy seasons. In addition to such background, the water level at that time was high due to prolonged rain in the area, and when the flood gates located at the upstream of Ciliwung River, which is running through the city, were opened, the river water overflowed into various parts of the city and caused flood.

4.Economic damage According to the figures announced by Asosiasi Pengusaha

Indonesia (Apindo), the economic damage suffered by the entire capital reached approx. 15 trillion rupiah (approx. 140 billion yen).

5.Human damage 20 people or more dead; 6,000 people or more evacuated.

Jakarta has experienced major flooding in the past (e.g. 1996, 2002 and 2007). The damage from the flood in 2007 was especially severe, with 200,000 or more people evacuated, and lifelines for 70,000 households or more affected.

6.Impacts on supply chain and business activities

Logistics in Pulo Gadung Industrial Park in east Jakarta and in industrial parks in north Jakarta including Sunter, Marunda, and Cakung were disrupted due to flooding.

Approximately 300 plants were shut down in the Pulo Gadung Industrial Park region where companies such as Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd. have their plants. Water immersion between 30 to 100 cm continued and electric power supply was also disrupted. In addition, operation hours of the plants of Toyota Motor Corporation and Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd. were delayed by one to two hours because plant workers were stranded during their commute.

Most of the suburban industrial parks in which foreign manufacturers are agglomerated, continued most part of their operations. However, it is reported that in some suburban industrial parks, delivery of parts and export of completed products from ports and inner-city area were disrupted.

Tanjung Priok Port in north Jakarta, which is the largest seaport in Indonesia, operated normally, although some of the cargo was damaged by water due to rain water pooling in one part of the yard. However, the amount of inbound freight reaching the port decreased to one half of the normal level due to disruption in logistics as described above. Also, trucking business delivering freights to Tanjung Priok Port suffered a loss of 7.5 billion rupiah (approx. 69 million yen) per day.

Furthermore, daily sales in public transportation and general cargo sector were reduced by 40 to 60 %.

7.Response As discussed above, logistics were disrupted in part of the region, but no information was found as to alternative measures utilized to respond to the situation. Factories which suffered interruptions due to power outage and employees’ commuting difficulties, responded to


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the situation by methods such as delaying their operation until the situation was resolved and it was possible to restart their business. No information on implementation of precautionary measures by such factories was found.

Learning from the past experiences of havoc caused by floods, the government of Jakarta Special Capital Region was working on measures including the construction of two flood canals (Banjir Kanal Barat [BKB] which is currently under construction, and Banjar Kanal Timur [BKT] which started operation in 2010); improvement and dredging/cleaning of rivers; and construction of tide embankment/tide gates to prevent storm surge. However, these measures were still incomplete when the flood hit, and the effects of reducing the impact of the disaster were limited.

8.Lessons learned The disruption of operation and power supply which occurred in some industrial parks due to flooding, indicate the importance of anticipating flood risks in industrial parks and the necessity of adopting countermeasures such as securing back-up power sources.

Even industrial parks that were not directly hit by the flood suffered indirect impacts caused by delays in delivery of parts and export of completed products at the port. Also, commuters were stranded by paralyzed traffic. These facts show the necessity of adopting appropriate preparation/measures based on the assumption that transport infrastructure and public transportation can be disrupted even when they are not directly damaged by the flood.

In Jakarta, it is pointed out that river water that comes from the south is prevented from flowing freely into the open sea during storm surge, and that the overflow of river water induced by such storm surge is the main cause of the flood in the city. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise great caution, especially during high tide, by implementing appropriate flood control measures (e.g. management of flood gates).


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5) 2011 Flood in Thailand (Thailand)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence July, 2011 – January 2012

2. Place of occurrence Northern and central Thailand


Heavy rain brought by several tropical storms including Nock-ten, continued to pour across northern and northeastern Thailand causing floods in fifteen provinces.

Precipitation in 2011 was 145 % above normal (estimated to occur once in 50 years). In the middle and downstream basin of Chao Phraya and in the peripheral area of Ayutthaya, the flood started in early September, and the floodwaters breached the dikes between mid to late September. Waters from the breached dikes flowed into Ayutthaya region and caused massive flooding in the industrial parks in the periphery of Ayutthaya. The volume of water flowing through the breached dike is considered to be 5 billion m3 or more. The total flood volume was estimated to be 15 billion m3.

In Thailand, most of the rainfall over the northern and central regions flows into the Chao Phraya River. In addition, there is not sufficient difference in elevation between Ayutthaya and Bangkok to drain excess water, and such topographical feature is pointed out to be contributing to the bad drainage of the area. Furthermore, with respect to river improvement policy, the Thai government has been focusing on drought mitigation measures rather than flood management, and therefore the country’s flood protection measures were inadequate.

4. Economic damage The World Bank estimates 660 billion baht in damage to property such as real estate, and 700 billion baht in opportunity losses, for a total economic damage of 1.36 trillion baht (approx. 3.5 trillion yen).

According to the announcement of the Ministry of Interior of Thailand, the area of damaged agricultural land throughout Thailand was 18,291 km2 (about the same size as the Kanto plain). In the industrial sector, 804 companies in seven industrial parks suffered flood damages, and among them were 449 Japanese companies.

Economic damage increased drastically when the flood reached the industrial parks in central Thailand (Ayutthaya province and Pathum Thani province) after mid-October. International firms in the electronic and electrical industries are concentrated in these provinces, creating an industrial agglomeration (cluster). Seven industrial parks located in the two provinces were inundated, and 955 companies were affected by the disaster (out of which 484 companies, nearly half, were Japanese companies). Total number of man power working in the industrial park was 380,000 workers.

5. Human damage Number of death：753 Number of people missing：3 Number of people affected by the disaster：4,176,763

（current as of December 2011） 6. Impacts on supply chain and business activities

Companies that suffered from flood damage were mainly located in the industrial parks on the periphery of Ayutthaya (including many Japanese companies). Also, it is pointed out that some of the industrial parks were located in places prone to flood and exposed to flood risks such as areas near the narrow upstream section of the river.


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Industrial parks that were inundated by the flood are as follows: Saha Rattana Nakorn Industrial Estate (42 companies,

including 35 Japanese companies) Rojana Industrial Park (218 companies, including 147

Japanese companies) Ban Wa (Hi-Tech) Industrial Estate (143 companies, out of

which 70 % are Japanese companies) Bang Pa-in Industrial Estate (84 companies, including 30

Japanese companies) Factory Land (Wangnoi) Industrial Estate (14 companies,

including 5 Japanese companies) Nava Nakorn Industrial Estate (190 companies, including 104

Japanese companies) Bangkadi Industrial Park (34 companies, including 28

Japanese companies) Thailand was the center of manufacturing of Hard Disk Drives

(HDD) in the world with a 30 percent or more of the global market share. Major HDD manufacturers such as Western Digital Corporation and Seagate Technology and parts supplier for HDD productions such as Nidec Corporation have their manufacturing base in Thailand. Therefore, the flood caused spike in HDD prices, and affected the production of computers inside and outside of Thailand.

Not all of the industrial parks were hit by the disaster, but it is reported that global supply chain and production activities in other industrial parks were widely affected. The area stretching from Ayutthaya to northern Bangkok where electronic and electrical product factories are agglomerated was worst hit by the disaster, but automobile factories in other regions where they were not submerged by floodwater, were also forced to stop production. This was due to the fact that automobile parts supply was heavily dependent on the electronic and electrical factories in Ayutthaya which suffered the flood damage.

Among the many companies affected by the flood were: automakers such as Honda Motor Co., Ltd. and Toyota Motor Corporation; electric and electronic manufacturers such as Sony Corporation, TOSHIBA CORPORATION, and Hitachi, Ltd.; and food manufacturers such as Ajinomoto Co., Inc.

For example, Honda Automobile (Thailand) Co., Ltd., which is the manufacturing base of automobiles of Honda Motor Co., Ltd., was forced to halt production from October 4 due to shortage of parts. This shut-down further delayed the procurement of parts, and automobile manufacturing base in Malaysia was also forced to halt production. Suzuka Factory and Saitama Factory which are engaged in automobile production in Japan, also adjusted their production. As for Toyota Motor Corporation, there was no actual damage to the factories of Toyota Motor Thailand Co., Ltd., but it had to halt production in three of its factories due to shortage of parts. As a result, factories in Japan and in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Philippines, and factories in North America and in South Africa had to adjust production. Also, Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., Mazda Motor Corporation and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation reduced or halted the production at their factories in Thailand.

In Bangkok, flood control measures such as building an outer dike (King’s Dike) and regulating land use, were implemented. However, because part of the construction of King’s Dike was unfinished, and the land use regulation was insufficient, flood waters spilled over the dike and poured into the city of Bangkok. By


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mid-November, the flooded area extended from central Bangkok up to approx. 5 km north, reaching the Bang Sue Canal. To add further explanation, the flood control measure for Bangkok is made to drain floodwater from the upstream by means of waterways running east and west through the city. This measure is primarily aimed at protecting the important facilities located in the downstream side of the region.

7. Responses Sony Corporation restored its production of digital cameras manufactured in its Ayutthaya factory by means of alternative production at factories in Chonburi, China and Japan. Also, some of Sony’s factories in countries/regions other than Thailand also had to adjust their production due to shortage of parts caused by the flood in Thailand.

TOSHIBA CORPORATION was forced to halt the production of the manufacturing base in Thailand due to inundation. Production of hard disk drives (HDD) was restored through alternative production in Philippines. Production of semiconductors was also restored by alternative production in factories in Japan.

Ajinomoto Co., Inc. responded to the production stoppage by increasing the production at factories in other regions owned by Ajinomoto Sales（Thailand）Co., Ltd., or by outsourcing production to other companies in Thailand. Also, in order to respond to the closedown of distribution center and the neighboring packaging plant in PathumThani province, distribution center and packaging plant in other region were utilized as alternative means.

The Yingluck Administration proposed the “New Thailand” plan which is a 900 billion baht project involving both post-disaster reconstruction and long-term flood control measure. Out of the 900 billion baht, 100 billion baht will be used for restoration of the industrial parks, and the remaining 800 billion baht will be used for flood prevention measures to protect the industrial parks and for maintenance of facilities such as water control facilities. 140 drainage pumps were used to rehabilitate the seven inundated industrial parks.

8. Lessons Learned In Bangkok, problems including land use issues were left

unaddressed in some part of the outer dike (King’s Dike), especially in certain part of the dike in the north side. It is pointed out that these untreated portion of the dike allowed floodwater to pour into the city of Bangkok. Through this experience, it can be suggested that it is important to prepare for future floods by completing the flood control plan without flaw.

It is reported that some of the industrial parks on the peripheral area of Ayutthaya were located in areas prone to flood, which means that they were exposed to flood risks from the beginning. In the future, locations of industrial parks should be reviewed and carefully determined based on the possibility of natural disaster risks, such as floods and submergence.

In most of the cases, companies responded to the situation by seeking alternative manufacturing bases in completely different countries/regions, and no case was found where a company managed to continue production in the same factory by utilizing alternative infrastructure or lifelines. This means that companies without alternative manufacturing bases were unable to supply the needs of the customers. It may be inferred that, in order to be able to continue business operations during a disaster, it is efficient to


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establish alternative sources of lifeline utilities through combined efforts of the whole industrial agglomerated area, rather than through the exclusive effort of a single company.

In addition, as an efficient method to prepare for the disaster, it is encouraged to gain better understanding of the supply chain (to visualize the supply chain). By identifying which products/parts depend on which primary and secondary suppliers, and where those products/parts are being manufactured, better understanding on the scale of the damage (including indirect damage) will be achieved and will lead to better preparedness and response to disasters.

Also, decrease in water-holding capacity of the forest caused by recent deforestation in Thailand, and difficulties in discharging excess water from Chao Phraya River into the sea due to urbanization of floodway in eastern Bangkok, are pointed out as problems that need to be addressed. In the long run, it is suggested that comprehensive approach be adopted to deal with flood risk, including measures for forest conservation and urban development.


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6) 2008 Cyclone Nargis (Myanmar)

3 There is not much information on damages incurred by Japanese companies in Myanmar. Since the disaster took place prior to the democratization and liberalization under Thein Sein administration, there were only about 50 companies registered with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Yangon at that time. It could be assumed that number of companies which suffered notable damage was relatively few.

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence May 2 – 3, 2008

2. Place of occurrence Southern Myanmar (Ayeyarwady Region, Yangon Region, Bago Region, Mon State, Kayah State)


Cyclone Nargis made landfall in the Ayeyarwady Delta in southwest Myanmar. High-speed winds of up to 250 kilometers per hour and 3.6 meter storm surge caused the destruction.

4. Economic damage Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) reported that the total economic loss of Nargis was estimated at 4 billion USD.

Over 700,000 ha (63%) of paddy land was inundated; 15,000 ha of fish and shrimp ponds, and 9,000 ha of salt farms were affected; and 50% of the buffaloes and 25% of the cattle were lost. The economic loss in agricultural, livestock and fishery sector is estimated to be 570 to 700 million USD.

Economic loss in industry and commerce sector is estimated to be approximately 500,000 USD.

Economic loss in water supply sector is estimated to be approximately 9 million USD.

Economic loss in transport and communication sector is estimated to be approximately 185 million USD.

Port of Yangon was severely damaged, and losses were estimated to be around $800 million USD

5. Human damage Number of death：84,537 Number of people missing：53,836 Number of people affected by the disaster：19,359

（current as of June 24, 2008） 6. Impacts on supply chain and business activities

Almost 5,630 establishments sustained partial or complete destruction to business premises, equipment and machinery, and inventories. Many of these enterprises had to suspend operations or had to operate substantially below capacity for 2-5 months. Nearly 45% of industry losses are attributable to the larger firms located in several industrial parks in Yangon region. A large number of informal enterprises and small and medium enterprises have also been damaged but the damage and loss is not yet accounted for3.

Nargis inflicted total or partial destruction on 70% of Yangon’s 2,500 factories, depriving most of them of electrical power. More than 60% of the 496 factories, including power stations operating in Hlaing Tharyar Industrial Zone, suffered damage, and more than 150 lamp posts were felled.

According to the Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA), total damage and losses in the electricity sector was modest from a national perspective. The reason for minimal losses in the sector is attributed to the fact that the rural areas most affected by the cyclone have not been widely electrified.

Port of Yangon was closed due to severe damage caused by Nargis,


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4 http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10_E15549_asof___1307040203.pdf

and import and export trades of companies which had depended on sea freight were interrupted for 1-2 months. Since cross-border trade activities were not allowed at that time, the only alternative was to use air freight, and the cost became a great burden for the garment manufacturing industry (cost of air freight may be as much as ten times higher than the cost of shipping).

Many houses were destroyed and serious damages were caused to public facilities such as hospitals and schools, and infrastructures including water pipes, roads, bridges, electricity and communications (International Telecommunication Union (ITU) deployed 100 satellite terminals to help restore communication links in the aftermath of the cyclone). As a result, relief operation and shipments/supply of goods were hampered, and caused problems in delivering food, water, and medical/health services to the affected areas.

7. Response The Government of Myanmar’s response to Nargis was immediate, and as part of lessons learned from the Asian Tsunami of 2004, the Government had already set up a National Natural Disaster Preparedness Central Committee (NNDPCC), chaired by Prime Minister. Soon after the disaster, ten Emergency Disaster Response Sub-Committees (EDRSCs) were formed to effectively coordinate Government response.

The Government set aside an immediate emergency response package worth K 50 billion (USD 45.45 million).

The Tripartite Core Group (TCG) consisting of ASEAN, the Myanmar Government, and the United Nations was formed to coordinate domestic and international relief efforts in order to carry out effective mid-term recovery plan (Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan [PONREPP]). TCG conducts monitoring and periodic review of the recovery process.

The closure of the Port of Yangon raised the need for a new land route for trade. In order to respond to this situation, JETRO, Japanese garment manufacturers, Myanmar Garment Manufacturers Association and Myanmar International Freight Fowarders’ Association implemented a joint project to develop a new land route and carried out trial freight transport for different routes. Trial freight transport was carried out several times between Oct. 2009 and April 2010, and the results showed that the transit time could be reduced to 53 hours, compared to approx. 2 weeks by sea transport. After the reopening of Mae Sot (Thailand) - Myawaddy (Myanmar) border in late 2011, JETRO conducted a research to find out whether the route is usable to transport products other than garments. However, report released on April 2013 concluded that, while Mae Sot-Myawaddy route may be useful in the future, it has not yet reached the stage of commercial use at the moment.

In the early stage, military leaders’ refusal of international aid created a serious problem. However, the military gradually relaxed the restrictions and accepted the offer of foreign aid4.

8. Lessons learned Disaster risk: When an industrial agglomerated area is located in a low-lying coastal area, it is necessary that the problems such as storm surge be seriously addressed.

Infrastructure: Availability of electric power and accessibility of ports are vital to the continuity of operation of industrial agglomerated area. Electricity systems in developing countries are vulnerable to disasters and it is necessary to exercise great caution.Because ports are relatively vulnerable to natural disasters, it is


16

desirable to secure a land route. However, for a land route to be useful, it will require development of road facilities and collection/delivery center, as well as establishment of structures such as customs and cargo distributors.

Response of the Government: Flexible response of the Government is desirable; i.e. change in usual trade procedures, acceptance of foreign aids.

BCP: Companies affected by the disaster experienced business interruptions and deep production cuts which lasted about 2 – 5 months. In such cases, financing of the company becomes an important issue. Also, small and medium size local enterprises can suffer severe damages from disasters. If an industrial agglomerated area is depending on parts supplied from small and medium size local enterprises, ensuring the business continuity of such enterprises may also become an important issue.


17

7) 2005 Hurricane Katrina (USA)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence August 23, 2005

2. Place of occurrence Hurricane Katrina formed as tropical depression southeast of Bahamas, and made initial landfall in Florida on August 25. It moved across Florida into the Gulf of Mexico and made its second landfall on August 29 in Louisiana. Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia and Alabama were majorly affected by the hurricane.


Hurricane Katrina was a Category 1 hurricane (Saffir-Simpson Scale) when it made its first landfall in Florida. After it moved across into the Gulf of Mexico, the hurricane strengthened to a Category 5 hurricane on the 28th , just before making its second landfall (Maximum sustained wind 175 mph, minimum central pressure 902 hPa)

At least 80% of New Orleans was under flood water on August 31, largely as a result of levee failures of nearby lake.

4. Economic damage Total economic loss of Katrina is estimated to be $125 billion

5. Human damage Number of death：1,833 Approx. 10,000 people evacuated to Superdome in New Orleans.


Power outage occurred in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Kentucky and Tennessee. According to US Department of Energy, 2.7 million customers lost power at the height of Katrina. As of September 23, 246,884 customers remain without electric power in Louisiana and Mississippi.

Katrina had a profound impact on Louisiana/Mississippi oil and gas industry, which accounts for nearly 30 % of total domestic crude and 20% of domestic natural gas production. More than 30 oil platforms were damaged or destroyed and nine refineries were damaged and/or shut down for weeks following the storm.

Gasoline prices surged, and shortages and gasoline lines were reported in parts of South Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Arkansas and Kentucky.

As for Wal-Mart which caught media’s attention for its immediate response (detail discussed in “7. Response”) , 120 to 140 stores were closed after the disaster, and approximately 40 stores were still not open as of September 1.

P&G was reported by the media for its fast recovery (detail discussed in “7. Response”). However, access routes to its major coffee-producing facility which sits on high ground and was built to withstand winds of up to 140 mph, was completely blocked by the floods, and for many days, the only access to the facility was by helicopter (This coffee plant suffered more than $10 million of damage). Also, even though P&G had prepared for disaster situations based on its BCP, complete failure of the local phone system made useless of a carefully rehearsed employee call-in procedure, and it took 27 days until all local employees had been safely accounted for.

The operation of the factory of The J.M. Smucker Company which produces coffee for P&G, was interrupted for approximately two months.

7. Response Provided a total of $16.7 billion in Federal funds under the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) program to help


18

rebuild damaged housing and other infrastructure (Largest single housing recovery program in U.S. history).

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) repaired and restored 220 miles of floodwalls and levees, improving storm and flood protection infrastructure to a 100-year protection level.

USDA authorized $250 million to help hurricane-impacted farmers. It was widely reported by the media that Wal-Mart arrived to the

disaster site before the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and launched relief activities by utilizing its vast logistics network ($20 million in cash donations, 1,500 truckloads of free merchandise, food for 100,000 meals). In Mississippi where Wal-Mart operates a vast distribution center, the company had 45 trucks full of goods loaded ready for delivery before Katrina made landfall. To keep operating near capacity, Wal-Mart secured a special line at nearby gas station. Lee Scott, the president and CEO of Wal-Mart said in September, that current challenges include such matters as how to pay Gulf Coast Wal-Mart employees suddenly scattered across the country.

P&G which operates four major coffee producing facilities in the area had detailed business continuity plan, designed for each facility and rehearsed annually. Due to such preparedness, P&G was said to be the first business back in operation following Katrina. Satellite communications were installed at all sites within a couple of weeks, and in order to respond to the demands of the upcoming holiday season, specially appointed teams were given the ability to sign contracts with new suppliers. As a result, the supply line was established in less than a month, but P&G was still short of needed production capacity. It took around 25 days to start the first production line in New Orleans. With local water supplies cut off, P&G drilled a well which continues to provide water at lower rates. By mid-October, the plants were at full capacity. As a result, the post-hurricane coffee sales increased 6%.

8. Lessons learned Disaster Risk: It can be presumed that levee and floodwall of the area did not have sufficient strength to withstand the level of storm strength that could have been expected to come. It is important to understand the level of design criteria that was applied when disaster prevention facilities to protect the industrial agglomerated area were built. Also, while warning system is effective upon wind and flood damage such as hurricanes, it is important that the citizens and companies take appropriate response measures when they receive the warning.

Infrastructure: Roads, communications and water supply are essential infrastructures for the operation of industrial agglomerated area. From the case of Katrina, we learned that recovery of electricity may take more than one month even in developed countries, and that early recovery of electricity is a vital factor for Area BCP.

Government Response: Restoration works and price stabilization measures (oil fuel) led by the government are important issues for Area BCP.

BCP: Securing alternative infrastructures, payment of salaries to employees, establishment of coordination team among related parties are important matters for BCP. Also, regular rehearsal of BCP procedures during ordinary circumstances is essential in order to secure the effectiveness of BCP.


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8) 2004 Typhoon Muifa/Unding (Philippines)5

5 http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10c_C169_Y2004_asof___1307080204.pdf

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence November 13 – 21, 2004

2. Place of occurrence Muifa (Typhoon No. 25) developed into a tropical storm on Nov. 14 over the sea near east Philippines. Muifa gained strength over the sea east of Luzon Island, and after making a circular track, developed into a typhoon on Nov. 17. On Nov. 19, Muifa made landfall near Naga City located on Bicol at the south end of Luzon island. After it crossed Luzon island toward west, it weakened into a tropical storm, but later developed into a typhoon again in the South China Sea and headed toward Vietnam and Thailand. Provinces of Oriental Mindoro, Palawan and Camarines Sur (where Naga city is located) were damaged by the typhoon.


Maximum sustained wind: 80kt (Recorded on Nov. 18)

4. Economic damage Total damage estimated at 852 million PHP. (1USD≒43.38PHP) (Overview of Damage: Agriculture 405 million PHP; Fisheries 76 million PHP; Infrastructure 971 million PHP)

5. Human damage Number of death：71 Number of people injured : 169 Number of people missing：69


Roads were blocked by landslides and floodwaters on CatanduanesIsland. Floods have also swept through four nearby provinces with extensive power cuts. Nearly 3,000 commuters were stranded at ferry crossings between the Bicol peninsula and the central islands after the coastguard restricted the operation.

Estimated cost of damages on transmission lines and substation facilities due to Muifa amounted to 26.58 million PHP. Also, Ten towers were broken, and 267 transmission line structures and accessories were damaged in Luzon and Visayas.

Due to mudflow and debris brought by the typhoons in late November, Umiray-Angat tunnel was severely damaged and Metro Manila suffered loss of about 30% of the water supply.

7. Response President Arroyo released a total of 4 million PHP as assistance from the national government for the victims of Muifa in Oriental Mindoro.

Total aids received from national governments, international organizations, etc. for flood damages caused by the typhoons and tropical depressions in December 2004 amounted to 8,582,536 USD5.

8. Lessons learned Infrastructure: Electricity and water supply are important for the continuity of business in industrial agglomerated area. Electricity and water supply systems in developing countries are vulnerable to disasters and it is necessary to exercise great caution. Also, public transportation is important for commuting, and early recovery from disaster is desired.


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9) 2010 Eruptions of Eyjafjallajökull (Iceland)

Items Contents

1. Time of occurrence March 20 – October, 2010

2. Place of occurrence Seismic activities began in late 2009, and on March 20, 2010, first eruption occurred at Fimmvörðuháls near Eyjafjallajökull glacier. After a brief stop, Eyjafjallajökull erupted on April 14 for the second time, this time in the center of the ice cap. Tephra ejected by this second eruption caused massive disruption to transportation network in Europe. The volcanic activity which started on April 14, seemed to stopped around May 23, and in October, Ármann Höskuldsson, scientist at the University of Iceland Institute of Earth Science declared the eruption at Eyjafjallajökull “over”.


The scale of eruption was estimated to be between VEI (Volcanic Explosivity Index) 2-3. Extensive air travel disruption was caused by ash cloud from the second eruption on April 14, with massive cancellation of commercial flights occurring throughout Europe. This air travel disruption interfered with social activities. On April 17, it was reported that at least 26 countries in Europe closed parts of their airspace in Europe to avoid accidents that could be caused by engine troubles from volcanic ash.

4. Economic damage Total financial impact to airlines was estimated at 1.8 billion in lost revenue.

The Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) calculated the impact of closing of airspace on the German economy, and estimated that the losses throughout the German economy will amount to 1 billion euro a day.

5. Human damage No Deaths Upon the eruption on March 20, 600 people living in the surrounding

area were evacuated, and on April 15, 800 people were ordered to evacuate (there was a threat of flood being caused by melted glacier).


The eruption on April 14 led to closure of the majority of European airspace in Europe for six days (and some temporary closures in different parts thereafter). It is reported by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) that during this six days period, some 10 million passengers and 100,000 flights were affected, and that lost revenue suffered by the airline industry amounted to 1.8 billion USD.

It was estimated that the loss to the logistics industry will amount to few billion yen per day. Transportation companies switched from air freight to truck-based distribution. Impact on logistics industry in Europe was relatively small since freights are usually transported by trucks among European countries. However, trade between Japan was significantly affected by the closure of major hub airport in Europe.

Transportation of fresh products such as food and flowers and medicines and garments which are usually transported by air, were hindered: It is estimated that African economies lost $65 million in exports

of time-sensitive perishable goods such as fresh food and flower. Hotels and restaurants in Hong Kong were facing shortages of

imported food and fresh-cut flowers. Supply chain suffered extreme disruptions. There are many

Japanese automotive companies and electrical/electronic manufacturers operating in Central and Eastern Europe, and since these companies utilize airports such as Amsterdam airport and


21

Frankfurt airport as their air freight hubs, parts supply was significantly disrupted by the prolonged airport closure: Nissan Motor Co. shut down three auto assembly lines in Japan

because the factories had run out of tire-pressure sensors that were supposed to be delivered from a supplier in Ireland.

Jaguar Land Rover Japan Limited postponed the debut of its new Jaguar XJ due to delay in the delivery of parts.

At a BMW plant in South Carolina, USA, work was slowed after transmissions could not be delivered from Germany due to cancellation of flight.

In South Korea, Samsung and LG said they were unable to air-freight more than 20% of their daily electronic exports.

7. Response In response to the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in UK recommended in its report on the use of science in national emergencies, that the government involve scientists more in planning for emergencies.

EU established a new guideline to respond to volcanic ashes. Instead of one-size-fits-all solution, new guideline provides a graduated response to ash based on the following steps: (1) airlines submit safety risk assessments for their operations; (2) member state safety authorities can then give permission (or not) to operate, based on the safety risk assessments submitted.

As for air freight to Japan, Southern route (via Singapore or South Korea) has been considered as an alternative route to respond to the closure of hub airports such as Paris and Frankfurt. However, the capacity of such route was limited and sufficient services were not available to respond to the situation. Japanese courier companies which used Brussels as their hub airport, stopped their distribution services during the airport closure. Although delays in deliveries occurred, American courier companies continued their services by utilizing other available airports in Europe.

Volvo considered exporting their Japanese products to other parts of European countries with accessible airports, and delivering to other countries in Europe via land route. Sony Ericsson also considered the possibility of switching air freight to other method of transportation.

The new EU guideline prepared after the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, was applied when another eruption occurred at Grimsvötn in Iceland next year. While it is true that the situation for the Grimsvötn volcano has been very different, only 900 flights were cancelled during the Grimsvötn crisis, and this was mostly due to the more precise risk assessment adopted under the new guideline which allowed for a much more graduated response.

8. Lessons learned Disaster risk: Because volcanic eruption can affect a wide geographical area, industrial agglomerated area must take into consideration such possibility upon reviewing its business continuity.

Infrastructure: In the case of eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, large number of flights was cancelled and it had a huge impact on the industry. If a business in the industrial agglomerated area relies on air-freight services, it should conduct risk assessments with respect to volcanic eruption, and measures such as securing alternative routes should be reviewed.


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10) The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (Philippines)

Items Contents

1 Time of occurrence June, 1991

2 Place of occurrence Located on the border of Zanbales, Bataan and Pampanga provinces in the western part of Luzon, Commonwealth of the Philippines (Approx. 95 km from Manila, the capital of Philippines)

3 State and scale of the disaster

In Mount Pinatubo, phreatic eruption started around April, 1991, andmagma eruption occurred on June 9, 1991. Although the eruptive activity itself ended in about one week, the surrounding area suffered from volcanic mudflow which is a mix of rain water and volcanic sediment that moves fast, in addition to a pyroclastic flow and volcanic ashes. These mudflows inundated farmlands, villages and towns and destroyed thousands of houses in five neighboring provinces. Furthermore, such mudflows are occurring every year since the eruption.

Also, a lot of air aerosol particles were emitted to the stratosphere by the eruption, and sulfate aerosol layer remained for several months. Thereby, the average temperature of the earth fell by about 0.5 ℃, and it is said that depletion of the ozone layer increased significantly.

4. Economic damage While the Gross Regional Product (GRP) of the area surroundingMount Pinatubo was growing steadily at the rate of 5% every year before the eruption, it fell 3% or more for the period between 1990- 1991.

Infrastructures such as roads and transportations in the vicinity of the volcano were damaged by pyroclastic flows and volcanic mudflows, and the costs incurred for rehabilitation is estimated to be 3,800 million pesos. Also, great expense was required to construct embankments and dams to control mudflow floods.

Several cases of troubles with aircraft engines caused by volcanic ashes were reported, and the amount of damage was estimated to exceed 100 million USD.

In addition, it is reported that 800 square kilometers of rice fields were damaged and 800,000 livestock were killed in the disaster. The amount of damage in agriculture sector is estimated to be about 1,500 million pesos.

5. Human damage This eruption is said to be the largest scale in the 20th century. However, since the peak of the eruption was predicted in advance, the government was able to evacuate tens of thousands of residents in the vicinity, and this reduced the number of loss of lives.

Approx. 900 people are estimated to be dead and the missing due to the eruption. Many deaths were due to collapse of houses, caused by heavy mud-rain containing pumice stone and volcanic ashes piling up on the roof. The damage was exacerbated by rains brought by the typhoon, which added weight to the accumulated volcanic ash.

The total number of victims affected by the eruption is estimated to be about 1.2 million.


The manufacturing subsector, and consequently the exporting subsector, was heavily damaged. Lost assets for 559 firms totaled 851 million pesos. Foregone production losses for 1991 were reported to be about 45 percent of the potential sales for the year 1991, or 454


23

million pesos, and 424 million pesos of capital investment was destroyed at 306 firms. The furniture industry was hardest hit, with damage of 156.5 million in 108 firms. The processed food sector suffered 97 million pesos of loss in 18 firms.

The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Regional Office III estimated damage to public infrastructure amounting to 3.8 billion peso. The breakdown of the estimated damage is as follows: transportation infrastructure, 11.5 billion peso; communications infrastructure, 13 million peso; electricity related infrastructure, 55 million peso; water resource management infrastructure, 1.57 billion peso; other social infrastructure (e.g. schools) 1.05 billion peso. Through these data, we can observe that the gravest destruction was on irrigation and flood control systems, roads and bridges, and school buildings. Additional damage of at least 1 billion pesos was done to roads and bridges by lahars of 1992.

There was no report/information of significant damage suffered directly by major foreign companies, including Japanese companies, or of major interruption of supply chain thereof, caused by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo.

U.S. Clark Air Base in the Province of Pampanga was severely damaged by the pyroclastic flow from the eruption. The U.S. military withdrew from Clark, and returned the base to the government of Philippines. In 1993, the former Clark Air Base was reopened as the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Several Japanese companies including Yokohama Tire Japan Co., Ltd., are conducting business in CSEZ.

7. Responses Evacuation of the population at risk had been the concern of local authorities as early as April 1991 when the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) declared a 6-mile-radius danger zone around the volcano. PHIVOLCS, jointly with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), had conducted intensive studies and monitoring of the volcano’s activity from which it forecast and declared an imminent eruption and issued early warnings to the communities at risk. This early warning was counted as a successful case.

In the immediate aftermath of the eruption, the National Disaster Coordinating Council mobilized civilian and military resources to respond to the evacuation, rescue and relief requirements of the affected populations. Government agencies mobilized their respective facilities (hospitals, schools, etc.) and personnel (medical, social workers, teachers, etc.) to provide the necessary basic services in designated evacuation centers. The Department of Social Welfare and Development was in the forefront of providing emergency relief assistance to displaced families and victims in evacuation centers. The Department of Health led in the provision of medical care and public health services at evacuation centers, including disease surveillance. Heath advisories were also issued and broadcast to guide the public in coping with the ashfall as health hazard since the fine volcanic particles could cause sore eyes or trigger asthma. Later on, a host of countries extended humanitarian relief assistance to the Philippine Government and its support NGOs, including the Philippine National Red Cross. These countries included Australia, Japan, U.S.A. and etc. International organizations such as WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDRO and WFP also extended humanitarian relief assistance.

The government of Philippines identified the following as the pillars of its rehabilitation/development plans to recover from the aftermath of eruption, and stated that it will implement specific measures for


24

REFERENCES

1) Asian Disaster Reduction Center（ADRC）Website http://www.adrc.asia/top_j.php (in Japanese)

2) Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. (2011). Estimated Damage of the Great East Japan

Earthquake. (in Japanese)

3) Durukal, E., & Erdik M. (2008). Physical and economic losses sustained by the industry in the

1999 Kocaeli, Turkey earthquake: Springer Science + Business Media.

4) Global Hydrology and Water Resources Engineering, Institute of Industrial Science, the University

of Tokyo. Related information regarding the Thailand Floods in 2011.

http://hydro.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Mulabo/news/2011/ThaiFlood2011.html (in Japanese)

5) Guzman, Emmanuel M. de. (2004). Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in June 1991.

Asian Disaster Reduction Center.

6) ICHARM The International Centre for Water Hazard Website

http://www.icharm.pwri.go.jp/index_j.html (in Japanese)

7) International Air Transport Association. (2010). IATA Economic Briefing: The impact of

Eyjafjallajokull’s volcanic ash plume.

8) The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies(IFRC), Disaster relief

emergency fund (DREF) Website http://www.ifrc.org/

9) Japan External Trade Organization. (2013). Research on Bangkok-Yangon cross-border

transportation via East-west economic corridor/Western route. (in Japanese)

each area: Resettlement; Livelihood, Social Services, Infrastructure; Land use and environmental management; and Science and Technology.

As can be seen from the above description, the measures adopted by the government of Philippines mainly focused on the support/rescue of the residents affected by the disaster, and the restoration of infrastructure. On the other hand, Government’s reference to the issue of continuity and recovery of business activities of the companies was relatively limited, and it can be assumed that the issue of business continuity was not regarded as an important theme at that time.

8. Lessons Learned Although there was little influence on the business activities and supply chains of Japanese companies, the case shows that once a volcanic eruption occurs, it can cause extensive damage to vast areas, and depending on the surrounding conditions, rehabilitation itself may be difficult or may require substantial cost and time. Therefore, it can be pointed out that companies should be extremely cautious when deciding on starting their business in areas where risk of volcanic eruption exists.

Even when a company does not have its operational base near the volcano, domestic and international logistics services may be disrupted due to damages to transport infrastructures such as highways and railroads, or possible danger to airplanes caused by volcanic ashes. In preparation for such situation, it is necessary to discuss and arrange for alternative means of transportation and substitute suppliers beforehand.


25

10) Japan Meteorological Agency. (2004). Annual Report on the Activities of the RSMC - Tokyo

Typhoon Center 2004.

11) Kawada, Yoshiaki. (2005). The Earthquake and Tsunami in the Indian Ocean off Sumatra. Annuals

of Disaster Prevention Research Institute, No. 18 A. Kyoto University. (in Japanese)

12) Komori, D. (2012). Factor analysis on the 2011 Chao Phraya River flood. Japanese Chamber of

Commerce, Bangkok. (in Japanese)

13) Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Government of Japan. (2011). White paper on trade and

commerce 2011. (in Japanese)

14) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (2006). Service Assessment: Hurricane

Katrina August 23-31, 2005.

15) Sezen, H., & Whittaker A. (2004). Performance of industrial facilities during the 1999, Kocaeli,

Turkey earthquake: 13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering.

16) The Procter and Gamble Company. (2011). After Devastation of Hurricane Katrina, P&G Shows

the Value of Best-Laid Plans. Global Logistics & Supply Chain Strategies.

17) The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2004). Philippines –

Comprehensive report on the after effects of 4 typhoons, damage assessment and relief/recovery

operations.

18) Tripartite Core Group comprised of Representatives of the Government the Union of Myanmar,

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations. (2008). Post-Nargis Joint

Assessment.

19) University of Iceland & The National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police & Icelandic Met

Office. (2012). The 2010 Eyjafjallajökull eruption, Iceland.

Tool 4 Samples of Lesson Learned Report

Report of Response to the 2013 Typhoon No. 5 in Haiphong, Vietnam: Tropical Storm JEBI and other Typhoon, AHA Centre and JICA, December 2013, AHA Centre and JICA The Impact of January & February 2014 Jakarta Flood to the Industrial Park in Jakarta and Bekashi, AHA Centre and JICA, February 2014

Natural Disaster Risk Assessment and

Area Business Continuity Plan Formulation

for Industrial Agglomerated Areas

in the ASEAN Region

Report of Response to the 2013 Typhoon No. 5 in

Haiphong, Vietnam: Tropical Storm JEBI and other Typhoon

December 2013

AHA CENTRE

Japan International Cooperation Agency

OYO International Corporation

Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc.

CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd.

Index

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................1

2 Specification of Typhoon No. 5：JEBI (2013) ........................................................................1

3 Observation Record in the City of Hai Phong: Typhoon No. 5 JEBI (2013) .............................2

4 Recorded Damages in the City of Hai Phong: Typhoon No.5 JEBI (2013) ...............................2

5 Response to Typhoon No. 5: JEBI (2013) ...............................................................................4

6 Results of Field Survey on Typhoon No. 5: JEBI (2013) .........................................................6

6.1 Before Typhoon: August 2nd Afternoon ............................................................................6

6.2 After Typhoon: August 3rd Afternoon ...............................................................................7

6.3 September 3, 2013...........................................................................................................8

6.4 Summary of Typhoon No. 6: MANGKHUT (2013) .........................................................9

7 Summary of Typhoon No. 2：BEBINCA (2013) .................................................................. 10

8 Summary of Typhoon No. 8：SON TINH (2012) ................................................................. 11

9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 14

Report of Response to the 2013 Typhoon No. 5 in Haiphong, Vietnam: Tropical Storm JEBI and other Typhoon

1

1 Introduction

During the 3rd mission from July 28th to August 10th, 2013, Typhoon No. 5 : Tropical Sotrm JEBI

(August 2013) and Typhoon No. 6 : Tropical Storm MANGKHUT (August 2013) have occured.

The City of Hai Phong established Hai Phong Committee for Flood and Storm Control (Hai Phong

CFF&SC) to respond flood and typhoon by advising proactive measures and evacuation advisories,

providing typhoon information and conducting damage investigations. In this report,the Sutdy

Team summarized 1) specification of each Tyhoon, and 2) disaster prevension measures applied by

Hai Phong CFF&SC, public sectors, private sectors and industrial estates. Target Typhoons are

JEBI, MANGKHUT, as well as the past typhoons which brought severe damages to Hai Phong,

namely Typhoon No. 2 : BEBINCA (June 2013) and Typhoon No. 8 : SON TIHN (October 2012).

2 Specification of Typhoon No. 5：JEBI (2013)

On July 29th, 2013, Typhoon No. 5 occured as a tropical storm in the South Chian Sea. It moved

toward northwest direction with increasing its strength, then the tropical strom became typhoon on

July 31st. From August 2nd noon to 3rd early morning, Typhoon JEBI reached to the maximum

wind speed of 25 m/s. After landing in the City of Hai Phong, it weekend into a tropical cyclone

before disappearing on the 4th. The route and specification of Typhoon No. 5 are summarized

below.

Figure 2.1 Route of Typhoon No. 5：JEBI

Reference：Japan Meteorological Agency http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/indexe.html


2

Table 2.1 Location Chart of Typhoon No. 5 *1：JEBI

CentralPressure

Maxsustained

Wind Speed

Strom Area(radius)

M D T N E hPa m/s km7 29 03 13.1 N 123.3 E 1006 -- --- ---

09 13.2 122.4 1008 -- --- ---15 13.4 121.6 1006 -- --- ---21 13.6 120.9 1006 -- --- ---

30 03 13.7 120.1 1004 -- --- ---09 13.8 119.5 1004 -- --- ---15 14.0 118.4 1002 -- --- ---21 14.3 117.5 1002 -- --- ---

31 03 14.6 117.0 1002 -- --- ---09 14.7 116.3 1000 18 --- 220 --- ---15 14.8 115.7 998 18 --- 220 --- ---21 15.1 115.0 994 18 --- 330 --- ---

8 1 03 15.3 114.5 994 18 --- SE: 460 NW: 280 --- ---09 15.6 113.8 994 18 --- SE: 460 NW: 280 --- ---15 16.1 113.5 994 18 --- SE: 460 NW: 280 --- ---21 16.4 113.2 992 20 --- SE: 460 NW: 280 --- ---

2 03 16.8 112.8 990 20 --- SE: 460 NW: 280 --- ---09 17.7 112.5 990 20 --- SE: 330 NW: 220 --- ---15 18.8 111.8 985 25 --- SE: 330 NW: 220 --- ---21 19.7 111.1 985 25 --- SE: 330 NW: 220 --- ---

3 03 20.3 109.4 985 25 --- SE: 330 NW: 190 --- ---09 21.0 107.9 985 25 --- E: 330 W: 190 --- ---15 21.6 106.5 990 20 --- E: 280 W: 170 --- ---21 22.0 104.5 998 --- --- ---

4 03

Position CentreDate/Time

(Japan) StrengthSize

Cahged to Tropical CycloneDisappear

Tropical Cyclone Developped

Strong Wind Area (radius)

km

*1: Japan Meteorological Agency named as Typhoon No. 9


3 Observation Record in the City of Hai Phong: Typhoon No. 5 JEBI (2013)

According to Hai Phong CFF&SC (Hai Phong CFF&SC, August 2013) , at 4:00 AM on August 3rd,

the center of Typhoon No. 5 was located at 20.6°N ; 108.7°E 180 km east-southeast from Quang

Ninh-Nam Dinh coast with the maximum wind speed of Level 10 (24.5 - 28.4 m/s). Coastal

areas from Auang Ninh province to Nam Dinh were warned for rising sea levels combined with

high tides.

4 Recorded Damages in the City of Hai Phong: Typhoon No.5 JEBI (2013)

There was no report on accident, inundation and casualty due to Typhoon No.5. The main damage

among records is a breakage and damage of infrastructure facilities, including the roof damage to

the office and residence, fire caused by electrical problems and agriculture-aquaculture damages.

The recorded damages were over a wide area from the coast to inland. Hai Phong CFF&SC (Hai


3

Phong CFF&SC, August 2013) summarized damages caused by Typhoon No. 5 as shown in Table

4.2

Table 4.1 Accident and Inundation Damages

Item Condition Remarks

Accident None None

Inundation No Major Inundation None

Reference: Hai Phong CFF&SC, August 2013

Table 4.2 Other Damages

Item Condition/Location Remarks

Human Life No Casualty None

Dyke ・

Irrigation

Structure

No Major Damage - Erosion: Part of dyke (Vinh Bao) along

No.17 Road

Residence Kien An Area - 30m2: Roof damaged

- 150m2：Fire by electrical problem

An Duong - 100m2：Office roof damaged

Cat Hai - Roof damaged

Agriculture・

Aquaculture

An Duon and Cat

Hai

- Farmland damaged: Approx. 50 hectors

Cat Hai - Aquaculture cage damaged

Infrastructure Cat Ba - Damages along No.356 Road

- Balcony damaged at Cat Ba Road Station,

fallen tree（35 trees）, dyke damaged（15m）

― - Sidewalk surface loosened：30m2

- Road depression：20m2

- Road Sign collapse：2 signs

Beach Long Vy - VHF antenna broken

Long Phu Commune- 35KV line cut

Hien Hao - Transformer line cut


4

Commune, Cat Hai

Reference: Hai Phong CFF&SC, August 2013

5 Response to Typhoon No. 5: JEBI (2013)

Data collection was conducted on the responses of each stakeholder including governmental

agencies, private companies and locals to typhoon. The methodologies are (1) governmental

official report (Hai Phong CFF&SC, August 2013) and (2) interviews with locals. The

governmental official report described the responses of the central government and the City of Hai

Phong (CFF&SC) to the Typhoon No.5. From the report, the method and timing of official

orders/instructions are organized in chronological sequence in Table 5.1. The interviews were

conducted with people of commercial facilities and Nomura Hai Phong Industrial Park

Management office and tenants.

According to Hai Phong CFF&SC report, on August 1st (2 days before the Typhoon landed in the

City of Hai Phong), the central government sent emergency telegram (No.05/CD-CT) to related

agencies and units requesting for the implementation of prevention measures. In response to the

telegrams, the local government, Hai Phong CFF&SC, sent a telegram (No. 07/CD-CFF&SC) to

local public agencies and units in order to convey the national government’s order on

implementation of prevention measures.

The local reported during the hearing investigation at Do Son area that, on August 1st (on the same

day the telegrams were sent out), they also received the typhoon information and warnings from the

local government. The prevention measures implemented by locals are moving boats to safer places,

removal of lantern decorations at Cat Ba area, removal of large signs of restaurants/hotels at coastal

areas and covering windows and entrance facing the sea by using plywood at Do Son Area.

As for the activities of central and local government, officials held meetings and field investigation

for gathering supplemental information, and issued evacuation order and offshore fishing ban.

The local government also ordered the military mobilization (100 members) for placing a

prevention measure to the coast line at Do Son Tourist Park which was severely eroded by previous

typhoons (CFF&SC supplied reinforced material).

On the other hand, on August 2nd, the tenants of industrial park, particularly foreign-affiliated

companies received typhoon information and warnings from the embassy of their country and the

Industrial Park management office. With the information, they conducted internal discussion on

prevention measures. It must be noted that throughout the typhoon period, they did not receive

information from the central and local government agencies. It is recommended that the current

system or means for transmitting information/warning on natural disaster must be improved to

provide accurate and timely warnings to stakeholder including private companies.


5

Table 5.1 Response by Public Sectors and Stakeholders

Dat

eC

entr

al G

over

nmen

t*1T

he C

ity

of H

ai P

hong

*1P

riva

te S

ecto

rIn

dust

rial

Est

ate

Unk

now

n14

:30

Unk

now

n (in

terv

iew

ed in

fo a

t Do

Son

Are

a on

Aug

ust 3

):

- E

mer

genc

y T

eleg

raph

(E

T)

(No.

05/C

D-C

T):

requ

este

d se

ctor

s an

d un

its to

impl

emen

t pre

vent

ion

mea

sure

s.

- C

FF&

SC E

T (

No.

07/C

D-C

FF&

SC):

Dire

ct s

ecto

rs to

mon

itor

cond

ition

s, g

athe

r in

form

atio

n, li

mit

the

vess

el o

pera

tion,

pro

hibi

tof

fsho

re b

oats

act

iviti

es, k

eep

regu

lar

cont

act w

ith b

oat o

wne

rs,

impl

emen

t saf

ety

plan

to p

rote

ct d

ykes

, irr

igat

ion,

dra

inag

esy

stem

, agr

icul

ture

, liv

esto

ck, f

ishe

ries

and

man

ufac

turin

gfa

cilit

ies,

war

ehou

se a

nd d

ocks

, ord

er m

aint

enan

ce a

nd r

escu

e as

requ

ired.

- L

ocal

peo

ple

at D

o So

n ar

ea r

ecei

ved

typh

oon

info

rmat

ion

from

loca

l gov

ernm

ent.

AM

17:0

0U

nkno

wn

(inte

rvie

wed

info

at D

o So

n A

rea

onA

ugus

t 3):

Unk

now

n (in

terv

iew

ed in

fo a

tN

omur

a H

ai P

hong

IZ

on

Aug

ust 5

)-

Cha

irman

of

PC

insp

ecte

d pr

even

tion

mea

sure

s at

maj

or r

egio

ns.

- H

ai P

hong

CFF

&SC

pro

hibi

ted

the

offs

hore

fis

hing

and

oper

ated

res

cue

vess

els

CN

09.

17:3

0-

Sta

rt m

ovin

g bo

ats

to s

afe

plac

e.

- O

btai

ned

Typ

hoon

Inf

orm

atio

n(w

eath

er m

ap)

from

the

Em

bass

y of

Jap

an a

nd th

em

anag

emen

t off

ice

of N

omur

aH

ai P

hong

IZ

.

- H

Pai

Pho

ng C

FF&

SC E

T (

No.

09/C

D-P

CL

B&

TK

CN

):or

dere

d to

impl

emen

t ET

s N

o.05

/CD

-CT

and

No.

06/T

B-

PC

LB

&T

KC

N.

- R

emov

al o

f la

nter

n de

cora

tions

at C

at B

aar

ea. R

emov

al o

f la

rge

sign

s of

res

taur

ants

and

hote

ls a

t coa

stal

are

as. B

egin

to c

over

win

dow

s an

d en

tran

ce f

acin

g th

e se

a by

usi

ngpl

ywoo

d at

Do

Son

area

.-

Det

erm

ined

to e

vacu

ate

entir

e re

side

nts

at w

arni

ng a

rea

(out

side

the

dyke

s, c

ritic

al a

rea,

aqu

acul

ture

are

) be

fore

7 a

m o

nA

ugus

t 3, 2

013,

ord

ered

to im

plem

ent m

easu

res

to a

gric

ultu

relo

wla

nd.

-

Unk

now

nIn

spec

ted

safe

ty o

f op

erat

ion

of ti

de a

nd s

ewer

sys

tem

.-

The

Min

istr

y of

Mili

tary

Com

man

der

mob

ilize

d 10

0of

ficer

s an

d H

ai P

hong

CFF

&SC

sup

plie

d 50

0 st

eel

gabi

on, 1

200

m3 r

ipra

p, 5

0 kg

ste

el w

ire, 5

0 pl

iers

tore

info

rced

em

bank

men

t at D

o So

n to

uris

t are

a.T

yp

ho

on

No

. 5

la

nd

ed

in

th

e C

ity

of

Ha

i P

ho

ng

Aug

ust

3R

efer

ence

: *1

Hai

Pho

ng C

omm

itte

e fo

r F

lood

and

Sto

rm C

ontr

ol (H

ai P

hong

CF

F&

SC),

“R

EP

OR

T: P

reve

ntio

n an

d co

ntro

l and

rec

over

wor

ks r

esp

onse

to

Tro

pic

al S

torm

JE

BI”

, Peo

ple

’s C

omm

itte

e of

Hai

Pho

ng, N

o.:

/BC

-PC

LB

&T

KC

N, A

ugus

t 20

13

2-A

ug

Mor

ning

: Cha

irman

of

PC

and

CFF

&SC

mem

bers

site

vis

it (D

o So

n)

1-A

ug

PM

- H

ai P

hong

CFF

&FC

mtg

. (ch

airm

an: C

hairm

an o

f P

eopl

e’s

Com

mitt

ee (

PC

): as

sign

ed C

FF &

SC

mem

bers

to in

spec

t-

Del

egat

es in

spec

ted

prev

entio

n m

easu

res

at C

at h

ai, D

o So

n, D

uong

Kin

h, K

ien

Thu

y, T

huy

Ngu

yen,

Tie

n L

ang,

Vin

h


6

6 Results of Field Survey on Typhoon No. 5: JEBI (2013)

The Study Team conducted a two day field survey: 1) on August 2nd before typhoon and 2) August

3rd after typhoon. The survey on August 2nd included the investigation of evacuation situation and

preventative measures within the City of Hai Phong and at the Cat Bi Airport. The survey after

typhoon on August 3rd focused on a damage investigation within the City of Hai Phong and at the

Do Son Area. The main survey points are shown in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Location Map of Field Survey

6.1 Before Typhoon: August 2nd Afternoon

In the City of Hai Phong, most of shops were already closed and there was less traffic as compared

to the usual condition. It was noted that the preparation to typhoon was underway.

Legend Before Typhoon： Field Survey on Aug 2

・Photos 1 2

Photo 3

・・Photos 4 5 6

Photo 7

・Photos 8 9

Photo 10

Photo 11

After Typhoon： Field Survey on Aug 3


7

Photo 6.1 Looking at the City of Hai Phong Photo 6.2 Street in front of Nam Cuong Hotel in the City of Hai Phong before arrival of

typhoon. Much fewer traffic as compared to the usual condition.

Photo 6.3 Hai Phong Cat Bi Airport

6.2 After Typhoon: August 3rd Afternoon

The observed damages at Do Son area include coastal dyke damages at few locations (unknown if

they were caused by Typhoon No. 5). In the afternoon of August 3rd, people were out cleaning the

aftermath of the typhoon and removing plywood which was used to protect the commercial

facilities (restaurants and hotels) located along a road facing the South China Sea. At a dock, as a

typhoon measures, boats were tied to trees along embankment.

Within the city of Hai Phong, inundations caused by inland water were recorded, especially along

major roads and lowlands (university campus). However, the investigation from the Bin Bridge

across the Cam River indicated that there was no damage along the river.


8

6.3 September 3, 2013

Photo 6.4 Coastal dyke damaged at Do Son Area (Unknown if the damage caused by

Typhoon No. 5 JEBI:JEBI(2013))

Photo 6.5 People cleaning the aftermath of typhoon and removing plywood used to

protect doors and windows.

Photo 6.6 Coastal dyke damaged at Do Son Area (Unknown if the damage caused by Typhoon No. 5 JEBI:JEBI(2013))

Photo 6.7 Prevention measures to protect boats by strapping to trees along embankment at Do Son area

Photo 6.8 Inundation in the City of Hai Phong Photo 6.9 University Campus Inundated in the City of Hai Phong


9

Photo 6.10 Looking downstream from a commercial port (tour boats for Catba island)

located on right bank of Cam River

Photo 6.11 Looking downstream of the Cam River from the Bin Bridge

6.4 Summary of Typhoon No. 6: MANGKHUT (2013)

On August 5th, 2013, Typhoon No. 6 occurred as a tropical storm in the South China Sea. It moved

toward northwest direction with increasing its strength, and then on the 6th the tropical storm

became Typhoon. From August 7th morning to evening, Typhoon MANGKHUT reached to the

maximum wind speed of 20 m/s. After landing in Northern Viet Nam, it weakened into a tropical

cyclone before disappearing on the 8th morning. According to reports by local media, there was no

significant damage caused by the Typhoon MANGKHUT. The route and specification of Typhoon

No. 6 are summarized below.

Figure 6.2 Route of Typhoon No. 6：MANGKHUT



10

Table 6.1 Location Chart of Typhoon No. 6 *2：MANGKHUT

CentralPressure

Maxsustained

Wind Speed

Strom Area(radius)

M D T N E hPa m/s km8 5 09 10.7 N 117.7 E 1006 -- --- ---

15 11.4 116.9 1004 -- --- ---21 12.0 115.5 1004 -- --- ---

6 03 13.1 113.5 1004 -- --- ---09 14.0 112.8 1002 -- --- ---15 15.1 111.8 1002 -- --- ---21 15.8 110.8 998 18 --- 220 --- ---

7 03 17.1 109.5 996 18 --- 220 --- ---09 18.1 108.3 994 20 --- 220 --- ---15 18.7 106.8 992 20 --- 220 --- ---21 19.0 106.4 994 20 --- 220 --- ---

8 03 19.7 105.4 996 18 --- E: 220 W: 150 --- ---09 20.0 104.2 1000 -- --- ---15

Cahged to Tropical CyclonDisappear

ropical Cyclone Developpe

Date/Time(Japan)

Position Centre Strong Wind Area(radius)

kmSize Strength



7 Summary of Typhoon No. 2：BEBINCA (2013)

On June 20th, 2013, Typhoon No. 2 occurred as a tropical storm in the South China Sea. It moved

toward northwest direction with increasing its strength, and then changed to typhoon on the 21st.

From June 22nd morning to 23rd dawn, Typhoon BEBINCA reached to the maximum wind speed of

20 m/s. After landing in Northern Viet Nam on the 23rd midnight, it weakened into a tropical

cyclone on the 24th noon before disappearing. The route and specification of Typhoon No. 2 are

summarized below.

Figure 7.1 Route of Typhoon No. 2：BEBINCA


11


Table 7.1 Location Chart of Typhoon No. 2 *3：BEBINCA

CentralPressure

Maxsustained

Wind Speed

Strom Area(radius)

M D T N E hPa m/s km6 20 03 14.8 N 116.9 E 1002 -- --- ---

09 15.7 117.4 1002 -- --- ---15 16.4 117.6 1000 -- --- ---21 7.2 117.4 1000 -- --- ---

21 03 17.6 116.8 998 18 --- E: 220 W: 190 --- ---09 18.0 116.2 998 18 --- E: 220 W: 190 --- ---15 18.4 115.5 996 18 --- E: 280 W: 220 --- ---21 18.8 114.3 996 18 --- E: 280 W: 220 --- ---

22 03 19.2 112.8 994 18 --- E: 280 W: 220 --- ---09 19.2 111.4 990 20 --- E: 280 W: 220 --- ---15 19.1 110.2 990 20 --- E: 280 W: 220 --- ---21 19.0 108.7 990 20 --- SE: 280 NW: 220 --- ---

23 03 19.2 107.8 992 20 --- E: 280 W: 220 --- ---09 19.3 107.3 992 18 --- 220 --- ---15 19.8 107.0 994 18 --- 220 --- ---21 20.4 106.6 994 18 --- 220 --- ---

24 03 20.7 106.4 996 18 --- 220 --- ---09 21.0 106.4 998 18 --- 190 --- ---15 21.6 106.6 1000 -- --- ---21

Cahged to Tropical Cyclon

Disappear

ropical Cyclone Developpe

Date/Time(Japan)


kmSize Strength



According to Hai Phong CFF&SC (Hai Phong CCF&SC, June 2013), at the evening of June 23rd,

Typhoon No. 2 landed Hai Phong-Thai Binh with strong wind speeds at the level 8 (17.2-20.7 m/s).

High tide on June 23rd (at 5:5 PM: 3.6 m) with strong winds caused rising water level over 4m at

Do Son and Cat Hai.

Financial loss caused by Typhoon No. 2 (Hai Phong CCF&SC, June 2013) was estimated

approximately 395,71 billion VND. The main loss and damages are evacuation (more than 1,800

people from Cat Hai Area, Do Son Area and other Area), Inundated house (1,500 houses at Do Son

area), house collapsed and swept away (4 houses), livestock mortality (cattle: 180 cattle, other :

2,650 livestock), salt damage of farmland and grazing land, dyke and embankment damage

(4,048m), slid embankment at Cat Ba (167m), slide coast dyke and area at Do Son tourist area

(433,65m3), national highways, provincial and rural roads damaged/inundate, and electrical

poles/lines/substation damaged.

8 Summary of Typhoon No. 8：SON TINH (2012)

On October 21st, 2012, Typhoon No. 8 occurred as a tropical storm in the South China Sea. It

moved toward northwest direction with increasing its strength, and then changed to typhoon on the

23rd. Typhoon No.8 recorded the maximum wind speed at 45 m/s on the 27th. After landing in


12

Northern Viet Nam on the 28th noon, it weakened into a tropical cyclone before disappearing. The

route and specification of Typhoon No. 8 are summarized below.


Figure 8.1 Route of Typhoon No. 8：SON TINH


13

Table 8.1 Location Chart of Typhoon No. 8 *4：SON TINH

CentralPressure

Maxsustained

Wind Speed

Strom Area(radius)

M D T N E hPa m/s km10 21 21 6.4 N 135.0 E 1008 -- --- ---

22 03 6.9 133.7 1004 -- --- ---09 7.4 133.4 1006 -- --- ---15 8.0 132.7 1004 -- --- ---21 8.6 131.9 1004 -- --- ---

23 03 8.8 131.0 1004 -- --- ---09 8.4 130.0 1004 -- --- ---15 8.0 128.9 1000 -- --- ---21 8.3 128.1 1000 18 --- 280 --- ---

24 03 8.8 127.5 998 18 --- 280 --- ---09 10.0 126.3 998 18 --- 280 --- ---15 10.8 124.9 996 18 --- 280 --- ---21 11.4 123.9 998 18 --- 280 --- ---

25 03 11.9 122.3 996 20 --- 390 --- ---09 12.8 120.9 998 20 --- 390 --- ---15 14.0 119.6 998 20 --- 390 --- ---21 14.4 117.6 998 20 --- 390 --- ---

26 03 14.4 116.8 996 20 --- 390 --- ---09 14.6 115.6 990 23 --- 390 --- ---15 14.9 114.8 980 30 90 390 --- ---21 15.5 113.6 980 30 90 390 --- ---

27 03 16.1 112.2 975 30 90 390 --- ---09 16.5 111.0 975 30 90 390 --- ---15 17.0 109.7 965 35 110 390 --- Strong21 17.5 108.9 945 45 110 390 --- Very Strong

28 03 18.1 107.8 955 40 110 390 --- Strong09 18.4 107.5 955 40 110 390 --- Strong15 19.2 107.1 970 35 110 330 --- Strong21 19.8 106.7 980 30 110 280 --- ---

29 03 20.7 106.6 990 23 --- 280 --- ---09 21.3 107.0 1004 18 --- 220 --- ---15 21.5 107.1 1008 -- --- ---21 21.8 107.6 1008 -- --- ---

30 03

Cahged to Tropical Cyclone

Disappear

Tropical Cyclone Developped

Date/Time(Japan)


kmSize Strength



Hai Phong CFF&SC (Hai Phong CCF&SC, November 2012) reported that Typhoon No. 8 had

strong intensity, and landed in Hai Phong from evening of the 28th to dawn of the 29th. It recorded

the strong wind speeds at the level 11 (24.5-28.4 m/s) – Level 12(28.5-32.6 m/s), caused heavy rain

at whole city with total rainfall from 300 to 350 mm.

The total value of damaged assets (Hai Phong CCF&SC, November 2012) was estimated to

997,395 billion VND. Major damages and losses are victims (2 deaths, 9 injured), rescued victims

(56 people), house collapsed (136 house), lost roof (house: 10,621, business building: 125, farm:

1,584, temporary housing: 536), agriculture damage (rice field: 8,433ha, crops damaged: 5,604ha,


14

aquaculture areas: 3,943ha), livestock mortality (cattle/chicken: 202,937 head), tree collapsed

(209,976 tree), electric poles broke (863 poles), electric line cut (83line), port damaged (4 ports),

bridge/gauging station damage (8 stations), dyke damage (Cat Hai Dyke, Thai Binh Right Dyke,

Thai Binh Left Dyke, Van Uc Left Dyke, Luoc River Right Dyke), and coast dyke eroded at Do

Son tourist area (1,200m).

9 Conclusion

During the 3rd mission, Typhoon No. 5: Tropical Storm JEBI (August 2013) and Typhoon No. 6:

Tropical Storm MANGKHUT (August 2013) occurred. JICA Study Team conducted field survey

and gathered related information to investigate the damages and losses caused by Typhoon No. 5

and summarized the general description of each typhoon and the prevention measures and

responses taken by the related agencies. As for other past typhoons which caused severe damages

and losses to the city of Hai Phong, the Study Team gathered information through the relevant

government agencies and summarized specifications, route and damages of each typhoon.

It was found that, all four typhoons (JEBI, MANGKHUT, BEBINCA and SON TINH)

demonstrated a number of similarities that (1) it appeared in Pacific Ocean or the South China Sea

located southeast of the City of Hai Phong, and (2) It reached the maximum wind speed before

landing in the city of Hai Phong or in the Northern Viet Na, then soon weakened into a tropical

cyclone and disappeared. Typhoon No. 8 SON TINH in 2012 was the largest among the

investigated typhoons in terms of the total value of damaged assets, wind speed, and radius of

strong wind zone.

In response to the investigation through the governmental official report (Hai Phong CFF&SC,

August 2013) and hearing investigation with locals, it was found that the local residents received

telegrams issued by central and local government and are informed regarding the description of the

typhoon and actions to be taken in a timely manner. On the other hand, the source of typhoon

information and warnings for the tenants of industrial park, particularly foreign-affiliated

companies, was mainly the embassy of their country and the Industrial Park management office;

they did not receive information from the central and local government agencies. It is

recommended that the current system or means for transmitting information/warning on natural

disaster must be improved to provide accurate and timely warnings to every stakeholder including

private companies.

In addition, the field survey confirmed that damages and loses caused by typhoons were not only

regionally but also spread through a wide area. At the coast, coast dykes were severely damaged

and collapsed, whereas the city life was interrupted by inland inundation at lowland and collapsed

trees along major roads. In addition, the City of Hai Phong has many major infrastructures (ports,

station, airport and highways) located within the city, regional inundation or collapsed trees could

temporarily suspend or cut the important distribution network and roads which may lead large


15

economic loss. Therefore, even when the abnormal condition that affects the entire region occurs, it

is important to maintain and early recovery of function particularly in the industrial areas.

It is recommended that local governments, infrastructure providers and private companies within

the region to develop and have disaster prevention measures as well as BPC. Also the findings of

the investigation reveal the importance of development of Area-BCP which can be used for

understanding and sharing important information among every stakeholder at timely manner.

Area-BCP could be also beneficial for strengthening the capacity of means for transmitting

information between local government and private companies.

References:

1) Hai Phong Committee for Flood and Storm Control (Hai Phong CFF＆SC), “REPORT:

Prevention and control and recover works response to Tropical Storm JEBI”, People’s

Committee of Hai Phong, No.: /BC-PCLB&TKCN, August 2013


Prevention and control and remediation to Storm No.2”, People’s Committee of Hai Phong, No.:

/BC-PCLB&TKCN, June 2013


Prevention and control and remediation to Storm No.8”, People’s Committee of Hai Phong, No.:

/BC-PCLB&TKCN, November 2012

February, 2014

Prepared by:

Dr. Krishna S. Pribadi Aria Mariany

This report is developed with participation of:

1. Anin Utami 2. Bayu Novianto 3. Gery Andrika 4. In In Wahdiny 5. Mona Foralisa 6. Nimas Maninggar 7. Rienna Oktarina

SUMMARY

The January and February, 2014 flood that occurred in Jakarta has affected many sectors, including industry, both production process and supply chain. Flood that inundated North Jakarta has impacted the logistic distribution through Tanjung Priok. It has caused billions rupiah losses. The flood in Jakarta affected industries not only in Jakarta but also in the surrounding area, such as in West Java, where Tanjung Priok is the distribution hub of the industrial logistics. Head of APINDO West Java mentioned that the losses of industries in West Java are about IDR 200 million per day because the road to Tanjung Priok is flooded. The case shows that even though the industrial area is not flooded, if the distribution infrastructure (such as roads, harbor, etc) are affected, the industrial process will be disturbed. Additionally, if the residential areas where industrial workers live are affected, the industry will also be disturbed.

To cope with the disaster, each industry should have its own business continuity plan (BCP). But it is also important to prepare how industry will manage the emergency situation, in case the disaster does not affect the industrial area itself, but affect the logistic routes outside of their premises, where they cannot do anything. Therefore, an Area BCP, which is a new method, is necessary to integrate the emergency management among various stakeholders, including industry, industrial parks, government, infrastructure and utility operators.

Appropriate input regarding disaster risk information is important in developing the Area BCP. Therefore, 2014 Jakarta flood survey was conducted to recognize the impact of flood disaster, especially to the industry.

The finding from the field shows that even though the industrial parks were not inundated, the production process can still be disrupted since the logistic routes were flooded and the houses of industrial workers were inundated.

TABLE OF CONTENT

I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1

II. METHODOLOGYOF SURVEY ............................................................................................... 1

III. REPORTING ............................................................................................................................ 1

IV. A GLIMPSE OF 2014 JAKARTA FLOOD ............................................................................... 2

V. IMPACT OF 2014 JAKARTA FLOOD ..................................................................................... 6

5.1 Impact to the Community ................................................................................................... 6

5.2 Impact to the Industries ...................................................................................................... 7

5.3 Impact to the Utilities ....................................................................................................... 12

5.4 Impact to the Infrastructure .............................................................................................. 14

VI. ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................. 16

VII. REFERENCES FOR SECONDARY INFORMATION ........................................................... 17

1 2014 Jakarta Flood Survey Report

I. INTRODUCTION

The January and February, 2014 Flood that occurred in Jakarta has affected many sectors, including industry, both production process and supply chain. Flood that inundated North Jakarta has impacted the logistic distribution through Tanjung Priok. It has causedbillion rupiah losses (Antara, 2014). The flood in Jakarta affected industries not only in Jakarta but also in the surrounding area, such as in West Java, where Tanjung Priok is the distribution hub of industrial logistic. Head of APINDO West Java mentioned that the losses of industries in West Java is about IDR 200 million per day because the road to Tanjung Priok is flooded (Sanjaya & Samariansyah, 2014). The case shows that even though the industrial area is not flooded, when the distribution infrastructure (such as roads, harbor, etc) are affected, the industrial process will still be disturbed. Additionally, if the residential areas where industrial workers live are affected, the industry will also be disturbed.

Currently, JICA in collaboration with AHA Center is conducting the study on Area Business Continuity Plan for industrial area in facing the disaster. 2nd Workshop will be held on the first week of March 2014. In the 2nd Workshop, there will be an exercise regarding the development of ABCP in an industrial area,where there are industrial parks, for certain hazards (based on scenario). The January and February, 2014 flood in Jakarta and Bekasi will be used as input to develop the flood disaster scenario that is needed in developing the ABCP in the case study area. Therefore, flood survey was conducted in order to gather information regarding flood impact, especially to the industry.

The objective of the survey is to gather information regarding flood impact that occurred in Jakarta and Bekasi in January 2014 especially to the industry, both process and transportation of goods and material.

II. METHODOLOGYOF SURVEY

The survey was conducted through secondary and primary. Secondary survey was conducted to collect preliminary information regarding the January and February, 2014 Jakarta flood including its magnitude and impact. Meanwhile, primary survey was conducted to collect information regarding the impact of the 2014 Jakarta flood, especially to the infrastructure and the industries. The method used in primary survey was interview with the stakeholders and collect secondary data, if possible. Primary survey was conducted in Jakarta and Bekasi to the following institutions:

1. Local government agency (BPBD/Local Disaster Management Agency, Bina Marga/Public Works)

2. Infrastructure Operator (Tanjung Priok, Jasa Marga) 3. Utility Operator (Telkom, PDAM, PLN) 4. Industrial park 5. Industry tenant 6. Infrastructure Operator: Tanjung Priok operator 7. Cargo company 8. Workers

III. REPORTING

The survey result will be reported as the following outline:

1. A glimpse of 2014 Jakarta Flood. It will describe the current condition of 2014 Jakarta Flood, which was occurred in January and early February 2014.

2. Impact of 2014 Jakarta Flood. It will describe the impact of 2014 Jakarta Flood to the community, industries, and infrastructures. It will be based on the result of both primary and secondary survey.

3. Annexes. Annexes will contain the result of primary survey both in Jakarta and Bekasi. Flood map will also be provided in the annexes.


IV. A GLIMPSE OF 2014 JAKARTA FLOOD

Flood in Jakarta is almost an annual occurence. The flood is caused bythe inadequate capacity of the river and surface water drainage system to evacuate surface run off caused by high intensity rain fall. Garbage clogging and siltation that caused by sedimentationin the upstream area exacerbate the situation. The intense change of land use (from vegetation into cultivation and settlement including residential areas) in the upstream part of the river basin areas in the past decades has increased the surface run off. The development of the Greater Jakarta area has also increased the surface impermeabilisation of the area and provoking higher peak flows and shorter time of concentration. Thenatural geological condition of Jakarta, which is in the flood plain areas of 13 river basins has contributed to the flood hazard, as well as land subsidence that occurred in the northern part of Jakarta, worsened by intense groundwater extraction . The social cultural activity of Jakarta urban community with low awareness of flood hazard has deteriorated the situation.

Regarding the 2104 Jakarta Flood, Local Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) of DKI Jakarta Province mentioned that the inundation was started on January 8, 2014. Initially flood inundated North and East Jakarta.. Figure 1 shows the flood inundation maps on January 8, 2008, which was published by BPBD of DKI Jakarta Province.

Figure 1a. Flood Inundation Area in North Jakarta on January 8, 2014

(Source: BPBD DKI Jakarta Province, 2014)


Figure 1b. Flood Inundation in East Jakarta Area on January 8, 2014

(Source: BPBD DKI Jakarta Province, 2014)

From the data of Meteorological, Climatological, and Geophysical Agency (BMKG), it was recognized that the flood on 12 January 2014 occurred after the heavy rainfall on 11-12 January 2014. On 17 January 2014 heavy to very heavy rainfall occurred in Jakarta area and also in the southern parts of the greater catchment area (upstream) , such as Puncak, Bogor, Cibereum and Ciawi areas. The rainfall duration in those areas was almost 12 hours. This caused inundation in the settlement and roads in Jakarta area, such as in Kelapa Gading, Condet, Kampung Pulo and Otista, and also in Bekasi.

The significant differences between rainfall on 17 January and 11-12 January 2014 is on the concentration area of the very heavy rainfall (the rainfall is above the 100mm/day1). The rainfall is distributed in the Eastern and Southern part of Jakarta and Bogor and Bekasi on 11-12 January 2014, meanwhile, on 17 January 2014 the rainfall was concentrated in the Central Jakarta and Bogor areas(BMKG, 2014). Table 1 shows the daily rainfall in Jakarta area.

1Rain fall in normal condition is about 20-50 mm/day. During flood disaster, the intensity of rain fall is 124 mm/day.


Table 1. Daily Rain Fall in January 2014 (BMKG, 2014)

AREA

DAILY RAINFALL

JANUARY 2014 (in mm/day)

8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th

Tanjung Priok 72 0 7 91 50 6 44 6 154 63

PIK 189 0 1 37,5 28 1,6 51,4 0,56 41,92 61,6

Kemayoran 121 0 12 31 79 17 28 5 118 148

Cengkareng 62 0 0 34 16 3 58 6 104 72

Kedoya 65 0 10 24,8 69,5 1,7 14,1 7,1 41,2 80

Pakubuwono 37 0 11 58 90 4 13 40 15 75

Ciledug 46,4 0 21 58 82 8 11,9 62,5 9 43

Ps. Minggu 39,5 0 9 29,5 100 6 9 55,5 23 65,5

Lebak Buluus 15,5 21,5 0 53 128 11,5 6,5 77,3 22,9 51

Halim PK 22 0 87 86 104,2 9,3 50,8 47,2 12,8 -

TMII 65,5 3,5 11,5 29,5 171 5 7 46 22,5 89

Mekarsari 8 0 97 26,5 132,5 5,5 2 29,5 9 48,5

Gunung Mas 1 0 19 25 120 4,5 18 7 29 152

Citeko 6 0 23,9 65 132 13 37 14 38 103

Dermaga 37 0 9 85 102 10 11 29,6 12 141

Jagorawi 26 0 20,5 72 124,5 14 3,5 34,5 5 29

Depok 36 0 0,1 65 147 20 0,01 56 16,5 78

Matoa 37,5 0 3,5 89,5 122 19 4 52 13,5 51,5

Remarks: : Heavy to Very Heavy Rain

: Moderate Rain : Light Rain

The peak of flood inundation occurred on 19-21 January 2014. During that time, flood inundated almost the whole area in DKI JakartaProvince. The average of flood height was about 10-70 cm and the worst flood height was more than 150 cm. Figure 2 shows the inundation map from 19-21 January 2014, which is published by BPBD of DKI Jakarta Province. The inundation maps from 8 January to 7 February 2014 are provided in Annex 3.


Figure 2.Flood Inundation Map from 19-21 January 2014 (Source: BPBD of DKI Jakarta Province, 2014)

The worst flooded areas in Jakarta during 2014 flood were Kampung Pulo Jakarta Timur, Kalibata Jakarta Selatan and Pasar Rebo Jakarta Timur.

2014 Flood also affected the periphery area such as Bekasi. 23 sub-districts in Bekasi were inundated, and the worst flooded areas were Sub-district Babelan, Tarumajaya, Cabang Bungin and Muaragembong. The height of flood inundation varied from 10 to 150 cm and the duration was between 2 to 30 days. Beside those sub-districts, the other areas that were affected by flood in Bekasi are:

1. Muara Gembong: Pantai Bahagia, Pantai Sederhana, Pantai Mekar, Pantai Harapan, Pantai Bakti

2. Babelan: Ds. Buni Bakti, Urip Jaya, Pantai Hurip, Muara Bakti, Kedang Pengawas 3. Tarumajaya: Ds. Pusaka Rakyat, Setia Mulya, Samudra Jaya, Pahlawan Setia, Segara

Makmur, Setia Asih, Pantai Makmur, Segera Jaya) 4. Tambun (Papan Mas, Mangun Jaya, Kitamani, Srianur, Srimahi, Srimukti, Karang Satria) 5. Cibitung (Wanasari, Wanajaya) 6. Cabang Bungin (Ds. Lenggah Jaya, Ds. Setia Laksana, Ds. Jaya Laksana) 7. Tambelang (Ds. Sukatenang, Ds. Sukamekar) 8. Sukatani (Ds. Sukajadi, Ds. Sukamakmur, Ds. Sukararsa) 9. Pebayuran (Ds. Kr. Segar, Ds. Kr. Harja, Ds. Sumber Hurip, Ds. Sumber Reja, Ds. Sumber

Sari) 10. Kedung Waringin (Ds. Bojong Sari, Ds. Waringin Jaya, Ds. Kd. Waringin) 11. Cikarang TImur (Ds. Laban Sari, Ds. Cipayung, Ds. Sukakrsa) 12. Cikarang Pusat (Ds. Pasir Ranji, Ds. Pasir Tanjung) 13. Serang (Ds. Nagasari)


Figure 3. Photo of Distribution of Flood Prone Areas in Bekasi District

Regarding the 2014 Flood, the Governor of DKI Jakarta Province, Joko Widodo declared the letter Number 70 Year 2014 and stipulated the status of flood emergency alert situation since 13 January until 12 February 2014. This period of emergency alert situation was determined based on rainfall as predicted by BMKG. The peaks of rainfallswere predicted in the period from January to February 2014.

This is in contrast to what was found during the interview with the staff of BPBD DKI Jakarta Province. He mentioned that the governor eventually did not declare the status of flood emergency situation because the economy was considered not disturbed and the extreme weather would not continue (Annex 1).

V. IMPACT OF 2014 JAKARTA FLOOD

Description of 2014 Jakarta flood impact will be limited to impact to the community, impact to the industries(including freight forwarder industry), impact to the industry workers, impact to the utilities, and impact to the infrastructure (such as toll road and port).

5.1 Impact to the Community

During 19-21 January 2014 flood inundation, 134.662 people who live in 100 villages and 34 sub-districts in Jakarta were affected. Up to 21 January 2014, the fatality due to flood disaster is about 12 people, caused by electric shock, swept away, and illness (BPBD of DKI Jakarta Province-Annex 1). Table 2 shows the recapitulation of flood report until 21 January 2014 at 06.00 am.


Table 2. Recapitulation of Flood Report (Monday 20 – Tuesday 21 January 2014 until 06.00 am)

Temporary Data

No Administrative

Area

Average

Height

Total

Location of

evacuation Notes

Affected

Evacuees Fatality Sub-

district Villages RW RT HH People

1 East Jakarta 20-350 cm 9 32 131 559 22.209 65.090 22.405 7 101 2 South Jakarta 50-300 cm 8 16 40 171 7.557 29.969 16.354 1 44 3 Central Jakarta 50-150 cm 2 9 25 56 250 10.392 3.426 0 17 4 West Jakarta 10-150 cm 9 19 87 278 7.820 24.933 14.521 1 52 5 North Jakarta 20-130 cm 6 24 161 163 836 4.278 6.113 3 39

Total 34 100 444 1.227 38.672 134.662 62.819 12 253

(Source: BPBD Prop. DKI Jakarta, 2014)

Last updated data on 5 February 2014 at 18.00, 2014 Jakarta Flood affected the 96.332 people who live in 24 villages and 14 sub-districts. Table 3 shows the recapitulation of flood report up to 5 February 2014 at 18.00.

Table 3. Recapitulation of Flood Report (5 February 2014 until 18.00 am)

Temporary Data

No Administrative

Area

Average

Height

Total

Location of

evacuation Notes

Affected

Evacuee Sub-

district Villages RW RT HH People

1 East Jakarta 0-200 cm 3 6 23 117 3.946 11.847 7.123 38 2 South Jakarta 0-100 cm 4 5 14 105 2.770 11.467 522 2 3 Central Jakarta 0-60 cm 1 1 4 16 1.518 8.461 464 0 4 West Jakarta 0-90 cm 4 8 36 218 20.507 64.557 5.052 20 5 North Jakarta 0-40 cm 2 4 28 0 0 0 0 0

Total 14 24 105 456 28.741 96.332 13.161 60

(Source: BPBD Prop. DKI Jakarta, 2014)

In Bekasi, 51.200 people were affected by the flood. The distribution of affected people is listed as follows:

Kec Cibitung 1800 people Kec. Sukatani 1300 people Kec, Peboy 3000 people Kedung Wringin 1500 people Cikarang timur 4250 people Cikarang pusat 1600 people Menara Gembong 15000 people Taruna Jaya 6000 people Tambun Utara 6000 people Babelan 7000 people Sukawangi 750 people Tambun Selatan 1500 people Setu 1500 people

5.2 Impact to the Industries

Industrial Areas

Flood also affected the industrial parks, both directly and indirectly. Jakarta Industrial Estate Pulogadung (JIEP) was flooded on 18 and 19 January 2014. The flood height in the industrial park was up to 60 cm. Some machines in steel factories were flooded with height of about 40 cm, therefore the management stop the production process and all the workers were not coming to the factories (Tribunnews.com).


Beside JIEP industrial park, there were three more industrial parks visited by the surveyors, i.e. Jababeka and MM2100 industrial praks in Kabupaten Bekasi (District) and KBN Cakung in Jakarta. The visits were aimed to collect information directly from the stakeholders from industrial areas.

From the survey, it was found that both industrial parks in the Kabupaten Bekasi were not inundated by the flood. There was only temporary inundation, which lasted for 10 to 15 minutes and was caused by the overflow of Cilemah Abang, Cipegadungan, and Cikarang Rivers.

Some workers in the Bekasi industrial parks did not come to work during flood, but this did not cause disturbance to the production process inside the industrial parks. The production process disturbance was primarily caused by the disturbance of logistic, both incoming (material input to the industry)as well as outgoing (distribution of the products) because the area around the industrial areas was inundated.

The industrial parks in Bekasi also did not have any problem with electricity supply, since they are provided by private sectors, such as Cikarang Listrindo (a private power supplier) that guarantee that the electricity supply will not be shut down, event when there is outage from the state power company grid (PLN). The industries in industrial parks (both in Jababeka and MM2100) in Bekasi also use water that is processed through water treatment plant.

Industrial parks have also prepared the business continuity plan (BCP) to deal with emergency situation such as flood, fire, etc., such as provided by the MM2100 industrial park. Meanwhile, Jababeka industrial park has anticipated the flood by maintaining the rivers, providing catchment ponds, also making use of biopori (a system for improving water infiltration into the ground/percolation by drilling a series of holes on the ground, filled with pwervious organic materials), and developing 70 hectares of botanical garden that consists of 2530 species of plants and animals.

Some industrial parks, such as Jababeka, also have coordination with other stakeholders, such as Balai Besar Pengelola Wilayah Sungai (BBWS) Cisadane and Citarum, Geographic Information Agency (BIG), Meteorological, Climatological, and Geophysical Agency (BMKG), and TKSPDA to control the water flow from Jatiluhur Dam. It also has coordination with other industrial areas to overcome all the production problems, such as traffic jam and labor demonstration, which can disturb to the production process.

Different with industrial parks in Bekasi area, the visited industrial park in Jakarta (KBN Cakung) was inundated by 2014 Jakarta flood especially in the main gate area. The height of flood is about 50-60 cm, and in some areas the height of flood is about 50-80 cm (Figure 4). Figure 5 shows the inundation in KBN Cakung industrial park.


Figure 4. Map of KBN Cakung Industrial Park. The areas in red circle were inundated by 2014 Jakarta Flood

(Source: KBN Cakung)

Figure 5. Flood Inundation in KBN CakungIndustrial Park(Source: KBN Cakung)

The flood did not inundate the industry buildings, but since the main gate and some of streets in KBN Cakung were inundated and some workers’ houses were also inundated by flood, therefore, on Friday, 7 February 2014 some industries allowed the workers to go home. They also made one day off for the workers on Monday, 10 February 2014.

Flood inundation also disturbed the logistic of material and product distribution from KBN Cakung industrial park, due to the traffic jam cause by the inundation. (Figure 6).


Figure 6. Traffic Jam on Main Gate of KBN Cakung (Source: KBN Cakung)

The 2014 Jakarta flood did not much affect the production process in KBN Cakung industrial park. It was different with the 2007 Jakarta Flood, which caused the production off for a whole week. KBN Cakung gave rent discount for the industry tenants during that time.

From the past flood experiences (in 2007 and 2002), KBN Cakung also provides 10 water pumps and develops two ponds as catchment area to reduce the inundation areas if flood occurs. Besides, many industries have raised their building up and put vital assets to higher place (second floor).KBN Cakung also has Flood Response Team to cope with the problems due to a flood disaster.

Internally, KBN Cakung has also some strategies to respond to the problem of inundation on the main gate and on some streets within the industrial park for the industrial workers, such as providing rubber boat or other transportation means to bring the workers to the industry buildings (Figure 7).

Figure 7. PT.KBN Cakung provides transportation means inside the industrial areas to bring the workers to the

industry buildings(Source: KBN Cakung)

According to the KBN Cakung management, the flood was caused by the development of toll road that caused the clogging of water channel around the area, and in addition to that, the drainage system (Cakung Drain) effectiveness was also reduced by squatter settlements in the area.

KBN Cakung recommends some solution to overcome the flood inundation, i.e.:

Normalization of Cakung river, addition of water channel and water gates Bypass channel to the Cakung Drain Integrated flood management Development of dormitory for workers Address the squatter settlement problem


Industry Tenants

There were two industries in Jakarta and two industries in Bekasi, i.e. PT. KAHO and PT. IFI (KBN Cakung industrial park) in Jakarta, and PT. Bumimulia Indah Lestari (Jababeka industrial park) and PT. Seiwa Indonesia (MM2100 industrial park) in Bekasi that were visited during the survey

The flood did not inundate the industrial buildings, except in PT. IFI in KBN Cakung area. The height of inundated water inside PT. IFI is about 10-15 cm, meanwhile the inundation on the street outside the factory is about 20 cm.

The production process both in PT. KAHO and PT. IFI in KBN Cakung area was stopped for two days (on Friday,7th and Monday,10th) due to the flood inundation and the traffic jam in the access to the industrial area caused by the inundation. The wages for the workers were still paid, but they have to change their working day later. However, male workers came to the factory of PT. KAHO on Monday (10th February) to anticipate if the flood comes again, as was the case in 2007. Meanwhile, the male worker at PT. IFI came to the factory on Monday (10 February) to clean the buildings after flood inundated them.

Despite the disruption of the production process due to the flood which hampered the workers to come to the factory, the assets of the industry were not damaged as, learning from their experiences in 2002 and 2007 flood, they have put their valuable assets, such as machines, raw materials, and products, in the higher place. They also have water pump to pump out the water if there is flood in the factory building.

The industry in Bekasi was not directly impacted by flood. The internal production process in PT. Bumimulia Indah Lestari (in Jababeka industrial park) was not disrupted, even though 70% of workers cannot come to the factories for 1 to 2 days because their houses and the access to the factories were inundated. It is different in PT. Seiwa Indonesia (in MM2100 industrial park), where 20% of workers of PT. Seiwa Indonesia cannot come to the factory for about 1 to 5 days for the same reason with the workers before. The absence of the workers, especially machine operators has caused theinternal production process disruption for about one week.

The indirect impact to the industries in Bekasi is similar with the industries in Jakarta, i.e. the delayed material and products logistics, because the infrastructure and the access, such as the road to the port, the road to the main gate of industrial areas, etc., were inundated. This will cause losses to the industry. In addition to this, the absence of industrial workers will also cause the loss to the industry, as both industries in Bekasi used overtime policy for the workers who work more than their usual shift, and they have to pay overtime fee for the workers who have to work more to cover for those who could not come due to the flood.. Therefore, the industries may have to pay more expenses and may suffer additional loss.

Industrial Workers

There were three workers interviewed in Jakarta and Bekasi. The complete summaries of interview result are provided in the Annex 1 for Jakarta and Annex 2 for Bekasi.

Based on the interview, we understand that the workers did not go to the factory because their houses were inundated and their access to the factory was disrupted.

The height of inundation in their houses was varying from 5 cm to 1-2 meters for 2 to 4 days. Their properties were damaged and they have to clean the house. Because of this situation, they were allowed to not to come to the factory as long as they have recommendation letter from the head of neighborhood unit (Ketua RT). The average days they did not go to the factory were about 1 to 2 days without wage cut.

Figure 8 shows the interview process with the industrial workers.


Figure 8. Interview with the Industrial Workers

Cargo Company

Two freight forwarder companies were interviewed to gather information on the impact of flood to their business, i.e. PT. Lookman Djaja and PT. Hokkindo Jaya Mandiri. The complete summary of interview result is provided in Annex 2.

From both cargo companies, only one company was impacted by flood, i.e. PT. Lookman Djaja. The access from Jakarta was inundated by flood and it caused disturbance to the delivery time which took longer than normal condition. Direct impact also felt on the vehicle, tires easily damaged and sometimes the engine stalled due to the flood. To respond to this problem, PT. Lookman Djaja had to replace the damaged parts and engine.

Meanwhile, PT. Hokkindo Jaya Mandiri is not impacted by flood both directly and indirectly because the access to the industrial area for the company was not inundated by flood.

5.3 Impact to the Utilities

Communication

2014 Jakarta Flood caused telecommunication utility disruption, mostly in West Jakarta, albeit it was less severe compared to the impact of 2002 and 2007 Flood, where the telecommunication utility was totally out of service, and the head office of PT. Telkom was inundated.

The disturbance of telecommunication utility was caused by the high humidity (due to rain) at the distribution points and connections, and this caused connection interference. Besides, the battery in the cable houses can have short-circuit and run out of power, when the power supply from PLN is disrupted.

PT. Telkom as one of telecommunication utility operator has preparedness measures to face the flood disaster, i.e. they put cable house in the safer place, they provide standby generators, and they put the switch, generator and battery in second floor in the head office where that place is safer from flood inundation. They also have Telkom Care during emergency situation. However, up to now they do not have any collaboration with the industrial parks manager .

Electricity

Electricity operators that were interviewed are PLN, Bekasi Power and Cikarang Listrindo. The last two electricity operators were private sector entities supplying electrical power to the industrial parks.


PT. PLN

During flood inundation, PT. PLN shut the power down to avoid the danger of electric shock. The electric utility was usually shut down for maximum two days. The electricity can be turned on if the situation is totally safe. The damages in electric utility were mostly on substation, cable, and broken connection.

In industrial areas, PT. PLN has built electrical substation in two methods. First, the substation is put in the basement, and second, the substation is put on the ground surface. The substation in the basement is more vulnerable towards flood disaster, so PT. PLN has moved some of the substation to the safer place.

The substation that is located on the ground surface is still lower than flood level. It is also lower than the industrial floor level, which have been raised above the flood level. PT. PLN has raised one substation building to mitigate the flood impact (Figure 9), but some of them are still not raised yet. The substations which are not raised yet are very vulnerable towards flood disaster. If the substation is inundated, the electric power can be shut down.

Figure 9. Substation building that has been raised (ASTRA Daihatsu Jl. Danau Sunter Utara)

PT. PLN has some standard procedures to cope with flood disaster. It has flood hazard map, which can be used as a reference to prioritize the electric substation to be handled. The management of electric substation in the flood prone area includes reducing the damage risk to the components in the substation and reducing the service disruption to the costumers. Asa mitigation effort, PT. PLN put the substation in the safer place that is higher than flood level. New substation was built by raising the flood to secure the cubical and switch from the inundation. PT. PLN also has motorcycles and 2 unit-cars that can be used by Emergency Response Unit during emergency situation.

Cikarang Listrindo

Cikarang Listrindo is a private electricity operator in Indonesia that was established in 1997. It is located in Jababeka industrial park, but it provides also electric supply for other industrial parks, such as MM2100, beside for Jababeka industrial park. The location of Cikarang Listrindo is not prone to flood inundation. Cikarang Listrindo guarantees the electric supply outage, otherwise, it will pay for the loss due to its fault. Figure 10 shows the area of Cikarang Listrindo.


Figure 10. Cikarang Listrindo

Bekasi Power

PT. Bekasi Power is under PT. Jababeka, Tbk. authority. It has completed the testing and commissioning of electric supply on January 5, 2013. It supplies the electricity needs to the PT. PLN. The location of PT. Bekasi Power is not prone to flood disaster, so it still can supply the electricity, even though the surrounding area is flooded.

5.4 Impact to the Infrastructure

Road

Flood disaster affects the roads, both express ways and roads. Express way is under PT. Jasa Marga responsibility, meanwhile, roads areunder public work agency responsibility. This sub-section will provide the impact of flood disaster to both express way (toll road) and other roads.


Express way

According to PT. Jasa Marga, generally, the express ways (toll roads)are not damaged by the flood inundation because they have been designed for 100 years flood. However, incidental inundation on toll roads occurs, caused by the failure of the adjacent drainage, such as the Cipinang River, which is spoiled by the development of squatter settlements on its river bank. The worst flood inundation occurred in 2007 that caused the closing of toll road to Cengkareng (Soekarno Hatta) airport.

PT. Jasa Marga does not have any specific management unit to cope with the flood disaster. If there is traffic problem caused by a disaster, PT. Jasa Marga will manage it through operational units in every branch office. These operational units do not only maintain traffic problem during disaster, but also maintain all traffic problems. Nonetheless, PT. Jasa Marga has prepared water pumps as emergency measures during the heavy rain fall season, i.e. January to February.

PT. Jasa Marga also collaborates with the local disaster management agency (BPBD) of DKI Jakarta, i.e. for evacuation, emergency posts, health posts, and pumps on several segments of toll road, for instance on Cengkareng Airport toll road..

Road

The Public Work Agency which is responsible for the road network (outside of toll roads) mentioned that the characteristics of flood in 2014 were different from that in 2007. In 2007, the flood inundation was much higher than that in 2014, but the duration was shorter than the one in 2014, meaning that the 2014 flood was not so high, but it took a longer duration compared to the previous flood inundations..

The floods caused road damage (potholes) in 6.300 points, the worst is in Daan Mogot Street, West and North Jakarta. The depth of the hole is about 40 cm.

Public Work Agency has already had a preparedness system to face flood disaster, such as early warning system in each area, standard operational procedure for flood emergency response, and 24 hours flood emergency posts. Potholes in roads are repaired by hot mix or cold mix asphalt within a maximum of 2X24 hours after damage identification.

The community can ask or report the situation and condition of flood in the flood emergency posts and the Jakarta Command Center. In the Command Center, community can also report the situation through online social media, such as twitter. There are also CCTV monitors in some road segments.

Public Work Agency at DKI Jakarta Province level has collaborated with KBN Cakung industrial park to maintain the roads in the industrial park in September to October 2013.

Port

The flood that occurred in January and February 2014 did not directly affect the Tanjung Priok (PT. PELINDO II) area, because the area was not inundated2. The indirect impact to the area is the delayed loading and unloading of cargo goods because the route to the port is inundated and caused the worst traffic jamThe container trucks were stuck on the traffic jam. Figure 11 shows the logistic route to and from Tanjung Priok Port.

2Tanjung Priok was not directly affected by the 2014 Flood, but it was inundated during the 2007 flood disaster. Tens of containers that were put on the storage area were inundated. The inundation height at that time was about 50 to 70 cm.


Figure 11. Logistic Route to and from Tanjung Priok Port (Source: KBN Cakung)

To overcome such situation, which was beyond PT. Pelindo capability to handle, there are some policies adopted by PT. Pelindo, such as:

Prioritize the loading and unloading of goods that should be delivered immediately (those which are delayed for more than one day)

Joint Slot Policy, i.e. if the goods are not loaded for one reason, they can join other ships to the same POD (Port of Destination).

The indirect impact caused by flood to the port operation process was the absence of workers. PT. Pelindo has more or less 900 permanent workers (for Tanjung Priok branch). 10-15% of the workers were affected by flood. Their houses were inundated and their access to the port was jammed due to flood inundation. So, most of them were not able to come to work from Friday to Monday (17 to 20 February 2014), but it did not affect the work productivity.

To overcome this problem, PT. PELINDO provided rubber boat and special transportation for the workers that were affected by the flood, to go to the work place.

PT.PELINDO II (IPC) is also planning the development of Chain of IPC Care to handle emergency situation in 12 ports in Indonesia. Specific to PT. PELINDO II Tanjung Priok, a unit for internal obedience control, emergency response and Port Facility Security Officer was established in the middle of 2012, with the support from BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency) and BASARNAS (National Search and Rescue Agency). During flood emergency situation, the unit coordinates with the Mayor’s office, Police and the Public Work Department for improving access and goods traffic flow.

VI. ANNEXES

1. Primary Survey Result: Jakarta 2. Primary Survey Result: Bekasi 3. 2014 Jakarta Flood Maps 4. Disaster Maps of Bekasi District


VII. REFERENCESFOR SECONDARY INFORMATION

Antara. (2014, January 22). Harian Nasional. Retrieved January 29, 2014, from http://harian-nasional.com

Sanjaya, R., & Samariansyah, I. (2014, January 21). Jurnas. Retrieved January 29, 2014, from http://www.jurnas.com

http://www.tribunnews.comTribun Jakarta Kamis, 13 Februari 2014

http://news.liputan6.com liputan 6.com news, 7 februari 2014

http://news.liputan6.com liputan 6.com news, 8 februari 2014

http://www.bmkg.go.id , 19 Januari 2014

http://www.tribunnews.com/

http://news.liputan6.com/

http://news.liputan6.com/

http://www.bmkg.go.id/

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