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Pastoralism in the New Borderlands: Cross-border Migrations, Conflict and Peace-building ZoeCormackandHelenYoung2012

ContentsIntroduction...........................................................................................................................1Politicalandlegalissues........................................................................................................3

Legal Demarcation .......................................................................................................... 3Militarisation of the Border ............................................................................................ 3Oil ................................................................................................................................... 4Pastoralist Citizenship ..................................................................................................... 4

ImplicationsforLivelihoodsandforPastoralistsinParticular...............................................5DifferentbordertrajectoriesandtheimplicationsforpastoralistssinceJuly2011..............6

Abyei and Northerm BeG/South Darfur ......................................................................... 7Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile ..................................................................................... 10Recent Agreements and Implementation ...................................................................... 10

Recentinitiativestopromotedialogueandunderstandingoftheissues............................10Conclusions..........................................................................................................................12References...........................................................................................................................13

IntroductionCross-borderlivelihoodsaretransnational,inthattheyextendandoperateacrossnationalboundaries, inordertobesustainable. Pastoralistsfrequentlycrossbordersinordertoaccess seasonal pastures andwater, tomove away from climatic and soil conditions orpeststhataretothedetrimentoftheirlivestock,oralternativelycrossingbordersenablesaccess to trade routes,marketsandopportunities for labourmigration, seasonal labourandtradingopportunities,(oreventoparticipateinkeysocialandculturalevents).Thenorth-southborderbetweentheRepublicofSudanandtheRepublicofSouthSudanhasonlyrecentlybecomeaninternationalborder,andunlikesomeoftheotherbordersofSudan, which are uninhabited, this new border cuts through multiple socially,economicallyandenvironmentallyactiveregions.ItisthelongestinternationalborderinAfrica (2,100km), and the adjacent area is home tomore than 25% (12million) of thecombinedtotalpopulationofSudanandSouthSudan.FortheRepublicofSudanitisaneconomicallyimportantareaincludinganenvironmentallyrichsavannahbelt,withmanymechanized farms and a wealth of lucrative natural resources, including oil and gumarabic. The border passes through grazing lands containing importantmigration routes,especially for northern pastoralist groups, enabling them to access their favoured dryseasonpasturesinthesouth.Manydifferentpastoralgroupsinparticularareaffectedas

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seen in Table 1 and the map in Annex 1, which provides a map of major livestockmigrationroutesalongthenorthsouthborder.Thisisineverysenseapastoralistborder.Aswellaspastoralistscrossinganinternationalborder,mostoftheSouthSudanborderareaisthehomeofDinkaandNuerpastoralists.Table 1 Pastoralist groups that are affected by the new border (Tufts/FIC, SOS Sahel,UNEPandIIED2011;Anon2010)

PastoralistGroup Location

MisseriyaHumr SouthKordofan/Abyei/UnityState

BaggaraRizaygat SouthDarfur/NorthernBahrel-Ghazal

AlAhamda WhiteNile/UpperNile/SouthKordofan(WesternbankofNile)

AlSilaim WhiteNile/UpperNile(WesternbankofNile)

AwladHiemid WhiteNile/UpperNile(WesternbankofNile)

Sabaha WhiteNile/UpperNile(EasternbankofNile

Nuzi WhiteNile/UpperNile(EasternbankofNile)

DarMirahib WhiteNile/UpperNile(EasternbankofNile)

Subha Sennar/UpperNile

Kinana Sennar/UpperNile

MbororoFelata UnityState;BlueNile/UpperNile(Maban)

Wajdab BlueNile/UpperNile(Maban)

Nabmo BlueNile/UpperNile(Maban)

Kibishuab BlueNile/UpperNile(Maban)

Hallieb BlueNile/UpperNile(Maban)

Thereare twosetsof issuesof immediateconcern forpastoralists; first thehighprofileand hugely important political and legal issues, including for example, borderdemarcation,citizenshipandnationalagreementsonoil,andsecond,theimplicationsoftheseissuesforcross-borderlivelihoodsandpastoralismmorebroadly.Whileareviewoftheliteratureprovidesagoodbackgroundandpreliminaryunderstandingontheformer,it falls well short of answering themany questions on the impact and implications forlivelihoodsofthosewholiveordependonaccesstolandintheborderregions.Itisthislatter area in which research is urgently needed to inform and influence the formerdebates.However,whilewemightwantatoneleveltotreatpoliticalissuesandlivelihoodissuesasanalyticallydifferent,itisincreasinglyclearthatcross-borderlivelihoodsandhigh

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levelborderpoliticsareinseparable.ThisisparticularlyclearinthecaseofAbyei,themostpoliticizedpartoftheborder,astheresolutiontothecurrentpoliticalstalemateandthefutureofMissiryagrazingrightsisbounduptogether(Craze2011:58)In the six months following South Sudan’s Independence the pressing issues facingpastoralist groupson theborderbegan to solidify. This is a very longborder and it hasbecomeclearthereareverydifferentpoliticalandsocialtrajectoriesatdifferentpartsofitandnotonediscreetsetofchallengesforpastoralists.Inthelightofthesedevelopments,thispaperoutlines(a)thedifferent(butinterrelated)politicalandlivelihoodissuesfacingpastoralists around the border and (b) the patterns emerging at different parts of theborder.

Political and legal issues

LegalDemarcationFor the most part, it has been agreed that the international border will revert to theborderbetweennorthernandsouthernprovincesat the timeof Independence in1956.However,someareasremaincontestedandpastoralistsarecaughtupinthesedisputes.One factor causing the stalling of the border demarcation is that the 1956 border hastakenonamythicstatus.Themaindisputedareasare:

• Renk/Jabalain(UpperNile/WhiteNile).• Megenis(UpperNile/SouthKordofan)• KakaTown(UpperNile/SouthKordofan)• TheBahrel-Arab/KiirRiver(NorthernBahrel-Ghazal/SouthDarfur)• KafiaKingi(WesternBahrel-Ghazal/SouthDarfur)• Abyei

FormoredetailsofthesedisputesseeICG(2010)andJohnson(2010).InMarch 2012, an initial agreement to demarcate the border (and on nationality) wassignedinAddisAbababyNorthandSouthGovernments(SudanTribune14.03.12).

MilitarisationoftheBorder There aremany reports and satellite images showing troopbuildups along theborder,particularly in Abyei. A significant army presence is certain to cause problems forpastoralistswhowanttopasswiththeirlivestock.Armypresenceisalreadyaproblemforpastoralists inSouthKordofan;MisseryiaZuruqhavehad theirmigration routes inSPLAoccupied areas blocked by the SPLA who have allegedly blocked grazing and exhortedtaxeswith impunity(HSBA2010,2). Priortothis increase inhostilities,analystswarnedthattherewouldbeareturntolargerscaleconflictiftheinterestsoflocalactorswerenotperceived as being met, partly as a result of the increasing militarized culture andproliferationofarms(Anon2010).

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OilPastoralistshavealreadycomplainedthattheyhavelostgrazinglandtooilfieldsandoiliscritical to political relations between Sudan and South Sudan. South Sudan succeededwithout a comprehensive plan for managing the oil industry between Northern andSoutherngovernments.Oilproductioncontinuedamid intensepoliticalmanoeuvringupto20Januaryof2012whenSouthSudanannounced,afteraccusingKhartoumofstealingoil,theywereindefinitelyshuttingdownproduction(SudanTribune20.01.12).Atpresentall major pipelines run through the north-south border areas, if oil production beginsagain in its previous form, the industry (and industry revenues for both of thegovernments) depends on the stability of these areas (ECOS 2010, 12). However, thelikelihoodof this isuncertain. Jubahas reportedly reachedanagreementwithKenya tobuild a pipeline and export through the port ofMombasa.However, there is as yet notimelineonwhenthiswillstart(BBC25.01.12).GiventhedeterioratingsecuritysituationinSouthSudan,ifandwhenoilproductionstartsagainitispossiblethatoilcompanieswillbring in theirownprivate security (if thegovernment isunable toensure security).TheexperienceofthiselsewhereinAfrica,forexampleintheNigerDelta,hasbeenverybadfor local communities. Aswell asoil, partsof theborder regionare rich in copperandpotentially uranium (Western Bahr el Ghazal/South Darfur) and gold (Mabaan/Kurmuk)(Anon2010).

PastoralistCitizenship Mobilepastoralismpresentschallengesfordefinitionsofcitizenshipinmostlegalsystems,asthesetendtofavoursedentarygroupswhocanclaimafixed,stablepointoforigin.Thediscourseofautochthonyandclaimsto landarebecomingincreasinglypoliticizedacrosstheAfricancontinent.Thistrendissignificantlyunderminingthestatusofpastoralistsandtheirclaimstonationalityastheyarefrequentlyperceivedas‘wanderers’,latecomersoroutsiders (Hickey2007,84).Manyofwhomeffectively liveoutside the legal frameworkfor citizenship and attendant rights and responsibilities in their countries of residence(Manby2011,26).Manby (2011) argued the likeliest and simplest option is for pastoralistswho cross theborder to retain citizenship in the Republic of Sudan even though they spend aconsiderable amount of the year in the Republic of South Sudan. This is because theywouldeitherretainthestatusquo(withtheoptiontochangetheirnationalityatafuturepointshouldthatbeanoptionaccordingtoGOSScitizenship laws),orbecause ‘habitualresidence’(oneofthecriteriaforcitizenship)wouldmostprobablybetiedtotheir‘dar’ortheareatheyspendtherainyseason/havepermanentresidences,whichwouldbenorthofthenewborder(Manby2011,29).Dual citizenshipwould solve a lot of these problems for pastoralists, although recently,the possibility of dual citizenship was ruled out by the NCP (Anon. 2011). Theopportunities for citizenship in South Sudan are more ambiguous. Pastoralists mighttheoreticallyobtainnaturalizedcitizenshipinSouthSudan.ThedraftconstitutionofSouth

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Sudan article 45 (6) stipulates that a non-South Sudanese can obtain naturalizedcitizenship(ROSS2011,14),althougharticle45(1)stipulatesonlythoseborntoaSouthSudanese mother or father “shall have an inalienable right to enjoy South Sudanesecitizenshipandnationality”(ROSS2011,14).Thedraftconstitutiondoesnotgointodetailaboutwhoqualifiesas‘SouthSudanese’.ManySouthSudaneseareextremelyreluctanttosee groups such as the Misseriya be counted as ‘South Sudanese’ because of theirassociationwithwarandslaveraidsintotheSouth.EachofthepastoralistsgroupsinTable1facesaslightlydifferentsetofpost-referendumchallenges, but almost all suffer from the same negative perceptions being seen aswanderers, constantmigrantswith no ‘real’ home; suspicion fromneighbouring groupsandpoliticians;marginalizationandinvolvementinparamilitaryactivities. Oftenthereismystery, fearandsuspicionsurrounding thepastoralistgroups inbothSudanandSouthSudan(e.g. theMbororoarebelievedtobewitches,able to turnpeople intocowsetc).However,inmanypartsofAfrica,pastoralistsregularlycrossbordersandthereisalreadylegislationthatsupportsthis(Manby2011,29).Therearealreadyaconsiderablenumberof international borders that are regularly crossed by pastoralists so this should not beseenasaninsurmountableproblem.BilaterallegislationinWestAfricathroughECOWASis considerably more forward thinking, when it comes to cross border pastoralistmovements than in East and Southern Africa (COMESA), although there are indicationsthatCOMESApolicywillbebroughtintolinewithECOWAS(COMESA2010).However,atpresenttheearly indicationsfromJubasuggestthatproposalsofanentirelysoftborderallowing freemovement for pastoralists are unrealistic. InAbyei at least, SPLMofficialshave said that there will be military checkpoints and a highly policed border (Craze2011:59). BeforeSouthSudan’sindependenceofficialsfrombothgovernmentsaffirmedthat cross-border pastoral migrations should continue (ICG, 2013) and that localagreementswere reachedby leadership participating in border conferences (Concordis,2010).

Implications for Livelihoods and for Pastoralists in Particular While local livelihood issuesmay seemperipheral to theoutstandingpolitical questionsandenormouschallengesoftransitionfollowingsecession,theyareinfactcentraltothefuture peace and stability of the region, and to national economic prosperity,environmentalsustainabilityandsocial integration. Themost interestingacademicworkon borders in Africa sees them not as empty peripheries, but as productive social andeconomicspaces(Catleyetal,2012;Homewood,2008).There remain many unanswered (and some unasked) questions on the effects andimplicationsofthesehugepoliticaleventsonthecommunities livingintheborderareasforallorpartoftheyear,inparticulartheirimplicationsfor:

• Migration and transhumance, access to water and pasture for livestock,demarcation of livestock routes, social and cultural cohesion including cross-border local agreements, herding arrangements and local security, impact of

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increasedpressureongrazingresourcesinSudanasaresultofreducedaccesstopasturesintheSouthetc.

• Markets,customsandlivestocktradeinanemergingbordereconomy(seeAklilu2001,56).Whatwilltheemergingbordereconomylooklike,andwhowillcontrolit?Forexample,thecross-bordercattletradeintoUgandafromEasternEquatoriaismonopolisedbythe(mainlyDinka)SPLAandthis is leadingtoserioustensionswithnon-Dinkaresidents(Walraet2008).

• Oil and private security arrangements, implications for land use, and specificallyfor transhumance. According toPantulianoet al., (2009), pastoralists feel cattlehave suffered as a result of oil extraction and they have not been properlycompensated.Inparticular,asaresultoflosinggrazinglandsintheconcessionstooilcompanies,and inadditiontothechanges indrainagesystems, flowofwateranddistributionofresourcescausedbyearthworksassociatedwithoilindustry

• Access to basic services and local governance (veterinary services,publichealth,education).A2005UNDPassessmentofpastoralisminsouthernKordofaninitiatedbecauseofthelackofinformationandanalysisonpastoralproductionconcludedthatlackofvetservicesandlackofwaterorproblemswithaccesstowaterweremajor problems (UNDP2006). A sister case-study of various settled pastoralistslivingintheNewHalfaschemeareadocumentsthecompletelackofawiderangeofservices(UNDP2006).

• Small-armsproliferationandmilitarization,linkedwithongoingconflict,andalsolinked with safeguarding larger concentrations of herds. There are reports thatMissiryiapastoralistsmigratingthroughAbyeiduringthe2012dryseasonaremoreheavilyarmedandmaybeco-ordinatingwithSAF(SmallArmsSurvey2012).

• Adaptation,anddiversificationoflivelihoods–howwillpastoralistsrespondandadapt to the significantly altered political landscape? How will this play out interms of inter-relations between livelihood groups including pastoralists?Pantuliano et al (2009) provide one of themost comprehensive reviews of thisquestionanddescribesthepotentialnegativeimpactoftheCPAonthelivelihoodsofMisseryiayouth,forexamplethroughthedismantlingofthePDF,andlossofthelucrativewareconomy(Pantulianoetal.2009).

• Mal-adaptations by pastoralists and implications for other livelihoods, andspiralling localized conflict, as revealed in our own study of pastoralists in theDarfurregion(Youngetal.2009).

In conclusion, most of these livelihood issues in the borderlands have not been wellstudied.While research should focuson the impacton local level livelihoods, inevitablythesearealsomattersofnational importance, fromthepointofviewofnationalpeaceandsecurityandalsothenationaleconomy(GDPandlivestockexports).

Different border trajectories and the implications for pastoralists since July 2011 A crude and preliminary categorization of different parts of the borderwould look likethis:

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Abyei–Politicalbargaining,closedborder,increasingriskofmaladaptivelivelihoodstrategies.Veryhighprofilebutmaynotactuallybethatrepresentativeofwhatishappeningforpastoralistsontherestoftheborder.Northern Bahr el Ghazal/South Darfur – amajormigratory route for Rizeigat, apotential success story, improved dialogue and relations between Malwal andRizeigatpastoralists.SouthKordofan/BlueNile–Notdirectlyrelatedtotheborder,butsinceJune2011secessionrelatedwarbetweentheSPLM-NandSudanArmedForceshasaffectedhundreds of thousands of people. Members of different pastoralist groups areturning to mal-adaptive livelihood strategies, switching sides and supportingdifferentarmedgroupsasmilitiainanincreasinglyintransigentconflict.

Kafia-Kingi/RajaCounty-Militarybuild-upandaerialbombardmentswithimpactsforpastoralists.

In2013,theentireborderregionhasbeendubbed“thenewSouth”–partofaspreadingregion of insecurity caused by unresolved political and legal issues (ICG, 2013). Sincesecessionthisescalatingconflicthasbroughtthetwocountriestothebrinkofall-outwar.

AbyeiandNorthernBeG/SouthDarfurThe western and eastern ends of the River Kiir (Bahr el Arab) are both crossed bypastoralistsmigratingfromthenorthtodryseasongrazinginSouthSudan.Acomparisonof two different parts of the river shows the different experiences of these pastoralistgroupssinceSouthSudan’sIndependence.Withoutdenyingthattherearesignificantandimportantchallengesineachplace,thecomparisonshowsthat,whilemostinternationalattention is on Abyei, it should not be taken as representative of the challenges forpastoralistsonthewholeborder.Inotherareasthereareprocessesofworkingoutsomeborderissues,someprogressseemstobebeingmadeandusefullessonscouldbelearnt.AbyeiJohnson(2010)providesahelpfulreviewofeventsandAbyei’schequeredadministrativehistory from the eighteenth century to the current crisis. Decisions made under theAnglo-Egyptian condominium to include the “nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms” in KordofanProvinceratherthanBahrel-GhazalwiththeotherDinka,havetakenonhugesignificance.1905isnowseenasthedatewhenpartofthe‘south’wastransferredtothe‘north’.Thisperiod marked good relations between Ngok and Humr. The Humr were thereforeallowed to expand grazing into Ngok areas, but during the period of the Anyanya war(1955-1972) these good relations were broken down by conflict. Skirmishes betweenAnyanya troops and Humr lead to the destruction of many of the northernmost Ngokvillages.The1972AddisAbabaAgreement includedaprovisionforareas“culturallyand

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geographically”similartothesouthtohaveareferendum,whichentitledtheNgokDinkatovoteonjoiningthenewlyformedSouthernregion.Duringtheinterwarperiod(1972-1983), investmentsindevelopmentfortheNgokDinka(basedontheassumptionthatunderdevelopmentwastherootcauseoftheAnyanyawar)wasaperiodofmarginalisationoftheMisseriyaHumr.Theirlocalgovernancewasfurtherundermined by the abolition of the Native Administration by the government inKhartoum. Seasonal movements and access to pastures were restricted, mechanisedagriculture expanded around Babanusa and Laghawa, while at the same time the areasouth of Bahr el-Arab/Kiir came under Southern regional authority. The proposedreferendumnevertookplaceandtheNgoksettlementswereattacked.RaidsandcounterraidstookplacebetweentheNgokandMisseryia.AbyeiandtheMisseriyawereatthecentreofthegovernment’smilitiastrategyduringthesecond civil war (1983-2005), whereby the Misseryia were armed and formed intoMurahalin and Popular Defence Force units characteristic of the North’s counterinsurgency strategy against the SPLA and civilian population. This led to demographicshifts,withmanyNgokdisplacedandmoreMisseryiaforcedfurtherSouthandsettledinformerNgokDinkaterritory.AccordingtoJohnson(2010p36)”thewarinAbyeiAreawastheresultofthedirectfailureoftheAddisAbabaagreementthatendedthefirstcivilwarandthesubsequentmarginalizationofthepastoralistpopulationthroughchangesinthepoliticaleconomyofthenation”.DuringtheCPANegotiations(2002-2005)AbyeiwasexcludedfromtheMachakosProtocol(whichwasessentiallyaceasefireagreement),eventhoughAbyeiwaspartofthewar.TheAbyeioilfieldswerealsoexcludedfromtheWealthSharingProtocol(2004),becauseAbyeiwaspartofa separatesetofnegotiationsandprotocol for theThreeAreas. TheAbyeiProtocol (2004)establishedanAbyeiadministrativebodyandguaranteeda referendumonbecomingpartoftheSouth.However,therewasstillnoagreementontheterritorialboundaryofAbyei.TheAbyeiBoundaryCommission(ABC)wasestablishedbyprovisionsintheAbyeiProtocoltodeterminehowfarnorththeAbyeiareawouldextend.Therewasalackofagreementwithin the ABC, and thus international experts recommended taking the 1905 area of“nineNgokDinkaChiefdoms”asabaseline.ThisrecommendationoftheABCwasrejectedby the NCP and the Misseryia. Subsequently in July 2009, the Permanent Court onArbitration(intheHague)(PCA)decidedonamuchnarrowerdefinitionofAbyei’sborders(includingonlypermanentNgokDinkasettlementsbutexcludingtheoilfields). ThePCAmadeanimportantruling,thatinaccordancewithgeneralprinciplesoflaw,thisdecisiononborderdemarcationdidnot“extinguish traditional rights touseof land” (PCA,2009.p260).Thisbringsustothepresentimpasse,withAbyeibeingclaimedbyboththeNorthand South and the outbreak once again of brutal conflict and human rights abuses, inwhichlocallivelihoodgroupsareinevitablycaughtup.Since the CPA, Misseriya migrations have become increasingly difficult. Despite theassurancesoftheAbyeiProtocolintheCPAthatnomadicpeoplesretaintheirtraditionalrightstograzeandmovetheiranimalsintheAbyeiiarea,theMisseriyareportthatsince

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2005 they have experienced systematic blockages and increased taxation (Craze,forthcoming). According to Pantuliano et al, (2009) from 2005-10, the Missiriya foundtheir grazing routes into South Sudan increasingly fraught, and many smaller herderscouldnotaffordtotravel.The2010-2011NovembertoAprilmigrationswerethefirstinlivingmemorytonotreachtheriverKiir(Craze2011:6)asaresultofincreasinghostilities.TheviolenceinAbyeiin2011wastheworstsincetheendofthecivilwar,withmorethan100,000residentsinAbyeifleeingacrosstheborderintoSouthSudan,andsubsequentlytheborderwasclosedtoalltraffic,bothcommercialandpastoral(OCHA,2011). Duringthesubsequent2011-12grazingseason,theMissiriyasouthwardsmigrationstotheBahrelArab(RiverKiir)apparentlypassedwithoutproblem(Craze,2013). MeanwhilesomeNgokDinkatentativelybegantoreturntotheirvillagesaroundAbyei.TheUNISFAforceare attempting tomonitor theMissiryia to discourage them from entering Abyei town(SmallArmsSurvey2012).Abyeiisaspecialcase.Thesensitivitiesarenotjustaboutoil,asthereisn’tthatmuchoilleftinAbyei.Ithasbecomethemostimportantpoliticalbargainingtoolbetweennorthernandsoutherngovernments,whichbothsidesareusingtomanoeuvreandgaingroundonother issues.The implications forpastoralists inAbyeiarehuge.Asa recentSmallArmsSurvey report points out, seemingly local issues about grazing rights, local justice andcompensationclaimscannotbeseparatedfromthebroaderpoliticalprocesses.Nationalpoliticalprocesseshavedisruptedlocalcourtstotheextentthattheycannotoperateandcompensationpaymentstolastseason’sdeathscannotbemade.BoththeSPLMandtheNCPhaveused flare ups of local grievances tomask their ownpolitical interests in thearea.(Craze2011:21,58).ThesituationinAbyeiisnowapoliticaldeadlock,andthefutureofpastoralistsgrazingandlivelihoodinseparable.NorthernBahrelGhazalandSouthernDarfurContrary to the situation in Abyei, there has been more communication between theMalwalandRizeigat.Atapeaceconferenceinlate2011,leadersfromeachgroupagreedto resolve disputes using local courts, maintain clear communication, freedom ofmovementandevendiscussedjoint livestockmarkets(RadioTamazuj23.01.12).Despitethis,thereareserioustensionsalongthispartoftheborder,andthereisaSAFandSPLApresencealongrespectivesides.Theborderbetweenthetwocommunities,likeAbyei,ishistoricallyproblematic.TheBahrelArab(RiverKiir) isthefocalpointoftheboundarydisputeanditselfformspartoftheboundary between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Southern Darfur. The disagreement isoverwhethertheboundarybetweenDarRizeigatandtheMalwalDinka liesat theriver(as the Dinka claim it does) or 22miles south of the river (as the Rizeigat claim) (ICG2011:8).Again,thisisahistoricdisagreementanddisputesoveraccesstotheareagobackgenerations.Historically,annualtribalconferenceswerearrangedtosettledisputesandchairedbytribalchiefsfrombothsides.Inthepostsecessioncontextthegovernmentsofbothcountriesentrustedtheborderadministrationtosemi-militaryofficialsinsteadofthetraditionalnativeadministrationsystems.

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NubaMountainsandBlueNileThere is fighting between SPLM-N and SAF along the border and evidence that PDFfightersareworkingalongsideSAFinthisconflict.PDFinthisareaarehistoricallyrecruitedfrom pastoralists groups, suggesting that the conflict may be providing maladaptivelivelihoodopportunitiesforsome(HSBA2011).OnemajorconsequenceoftheconflictinNubaMountainsandBlueNileisthemovementofrefugeesacrosstheborderintoSouthSudan.

RecentAgreementsandImplementationAnagreementsignedon27thSeptember2012inAddisAbabacommittedSudanandSouthSudan tocooperateonborder securityanddemarcation,economicand tradedealsandcitizenshiprights.ThisAgreementsupportedtherightsofpastoraliststoaccessseasonalpastures, but actual terms of commitments by both sides are vague and committeesintendedtooverseethemhavenotyetbeenformed(Craze,forthcoming,p24).After six months of stalling a Matrix Agreement (signed on 8th March 2013) pushedforward implementationoftheSeptemberarrangement. Italsostipulatedan immediatewithdrawalof forces fromtheborderandestablishedademilitarizedzonebetweenthetwo countries. This appears tobehappening,but,worryingly, SouthSudanhasaccusedSudanoffreshattacksonciviliansneartheborder(SudanTribune,2013).Abyeiremainsaseriousimpedimenttoimplementation.

Recent initiatives to promote dialogue and understanding of the issues Thebuild-uptothefinalstagesof theCPAandsecessiongenerated increasingconcernsaboutthepolitical issuesandrelatedchallengesoutlinedabove. Southernofficialshavefrequently stated that cross-border pastoral migrations from north to south, shouldcontinue(ICG2010). Althoughrecentstudies indicatethesituationalongtheborder indifferentstatesishighlyvariable(Milner,2012;Craze,forthcoming).One recent paper describes a series of grassroots tribal peace conferences held during2011between theMalualDinka onone side andMisseriya andRizaighat on theother,withajointconferenceinAweilinFebruary,2012.Thisculminatedinthesigningofajointprotocol(Abdalla,2013).Themostimportantrecommendationsincluded:

• Immediaterestartofbordertrade• Delineationofmigrationroutesduringseasonalentryandexitwithstrict

observancetofarmingplots,waterpointsandagriculturallands• Disarmingofallpastoralistswhilethetwocommunitiesintermingleduringthe

drySeason(Ibidp.5)

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Nodoubt,therearemanyotherlocalinitiativesbetweentribesorevenjustbetweenlocalgroupsofherdersandresidents,althoughdocumentedinformationontheseisseriouslylacking.Theinternationalcommunityhasbeensupportingaraftofinitiativestopromotedialogueontheseissues,someofwhicharedescribedinBox1.Whileuseful,thesetalkshavetheirlimitations, particularly given the difficulties ensuring the right people are present, thattalksarewellinformedandbasedonthecurrentrealitiesandevidence,andthatsolutionsarepragmaticandnotsimplyanaspirationalwishlist.Box1ExamplesofrecentinitiativestopromoteunderstandinganddialogueonNorth-Southcooperationandpeacefulco-existenceCross-Border Forum:TheTamazuj (intermingling) forum,bringtogether leadersofeachofSudan’sNorth-Southborder statesaswell asAbyei, towork towardgreatereconomic, social, securityanddevelopmentintegration.TheforumissupportedbytheNationalCouncilforStrategicPlanning,UNMIS–CivilAffairs,theUSgovernmentAssessmentEvaluationCommission(AEC)(ICG2010).

StudyonConflictDrivers, (Anon, 2010): In2010,Concordis Internationalundertookastudyondriversofconflict in theNorth-Southborderareasand related initiatives.Thiswascombinedwithsevenworkshopseach at State level along the North-South border, and one subsequent national workshop in Khartoum(Anon 2010). Workshop participants were asked to consider the issues and come up with proposals inrelationtosecurityandjustice;movement,rightsandcitizenship;tradeandeconomicsandinfrastructure.The non-participation of senior Misseryia was problematic and many subsequent resolutions wereaspirational,althoughtherewerefirmcommitmentstofurthermeetings(2010,perscomm).Pastoralism and Citizenship project and national symposium (UNHCR, 2010): UNHCR are specificallyinterested in issues of citizenship, related legal rights, natural resources and the border economy andsecurity.InNovember2010theyorganizedasymposiuminKhartoum,andreviewedissuesofcitizenshipforpastoralists. There was a dearth of actual information and evidence about the current situation ofpastoralists,withsomepresentersclaimingthat‘thenorth–southannualmovementhasnotchangedovertheyears’(UNHCR2010)p16.MappingofnomadicissuesbytheCrisisandRecovery,MappingandAnalysisUnitofUNDP(CRMA):TheCRMAinitiallyfocusedtheirattentiononDarfur,althoughmorerecentlyhaveheldatotalof44workshopsinSouthKordofan,BlueNile,Abyei,Gedaref,KassalaandRedSeaStates,plus7StatesinSouthSudan.Theinformationgatheredisusedformappingchallengesandprioritizingareasforintervention.UNMIS Civil Affairs Unit (2010) have supported a number of national consultancies and internationalconsultantstoreviewissuesrelatedtograzingrightsandpastoralistmigrationstothesouth. SeveralorganizationshaverecentlyplannedstudiesorassessmentsinsouthernKordofan,some of which have stalled or been postponed as a result of the recent conflict andrestricted access. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, released apreliminary report in August 2011 on violations of international human rights andhumanitarianlawinSouthernKordofanduringJune2011(OHCHR2011).Inotherregions,suchasSouthDarfurtherehavebeennoknownassessmentsorstudieschieflybecauseoftheproblemofaccess,particularlyforstudyteamswhichincludeinternationalmembers.Access and security remain the two major challenges to undertaking field research intheseareas.Itisknownthatanumberoforganizationsanddonorshaveplannedvariouslivelihoodstudies,althoughmostarenowstalledorhavebeenpostponede.g.AECOM,a

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studyfundedbytheDutch.AECOMarealsoworkingontheborderregionsinSouthSudansupportinglocalleveldialoguein2012AND2013.

Conclusions ThenewborderbetweenSudanandSouthSudanrunsthroughalargenumberofpastoralmigration routes. Continued instability and heightened tensions as well as outrightconflictalongthisborderareaareaffectingtheabilityofpastoralistsintheregiontohavefullaccesstotherangelandstheyneedtosustaintheirlivelihoods.Thisinturncanonlyincreaseconflictintheregion.Systemstoprotecttherightsofcitizensarecomplicatedforthesepastoralistswhospendsignificant timeonboth sidesof aborder. They risk losingaccess to key rangelands towhichtheyhavetraditionallyhadaccess. Somegroupsevenriskstatelessness ifneithercountrywillgrantthemcitizenship.The very high profile of the sovereignty issues and access to petroleum proceeds hasovershadowed theseother local,butequallycritical issues. If these local issuesarenotresolved, groupswho feel their survival is threatened but are not being heard throughpeacefulchannelswillbeforcedtoresorttoviolence.Evenifthisconflictis"local",itwillhavetheimpactofdestabilizingtheborderregion,affectingtherevenuesandstabilityofbothgovernments,andriskingareturntolarge-scaleconflict.In the sixmonths following South Sudan’s Independence the border assumed, asmanypeopleexpected,greatimportanceinpoliticalrelationsbetweenthetwoSudans.Insomeplaces, like Abyei, negotiations between the two sides have reached near deadlock. InSouthKordofanandBlueNile,fullscaleconflictsrelatedtounresolvedborderissueshaveemerged.To the farwest, inRajaCounty,SAFhavebeenbombingSouthSudanbut fullscaleconflicthasnoterupted.OntheborderbetweenNorthernBahrelGhazalandSouthDarfur,peacetalksandnegotiationsaboutmigratorymovementsaretakingplacedespitesignificantmilitarybuild-ups.Thereareanumberofexamplesofwherecross-borderlivelihoodshavebeensupportedthroughregionalsystemssupportedbyinternationalagreements,mostnotablyECOWASinWest Africa and COMESA in Eastern and Southern Africa. However, no attempt hasbeenmadetoseriouslystudyhoweithersystemcouldbeappliedinthetwoSudans.Themostsignificantbarriertoanagreementcurrentlyisgettingfullengagementbytherightpeoplewithin the concernedparties, thosewho truly representandcan speak for theirparties.The only way to assure stability in the border region is to give increased support andattentiontothelivelihoodneedsofthepastoralistsandrecognisetheiruniqueneeds.Areview of other borders in which pastoralists must cross would be helpful as well asincreased support to those initiativesalreadyunderway. Toneglect theneedsof thesepastoralistsistoriskcontinuedinstabilityinthiscriticalregionandthespreadofconflict.

13

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15

Annexone-Majorlivestockmigrationroutesalongthenorthsouthborder

Misseriya central route from

Southern Kordofan final

destination in Unity State

Rizeigat western route

from South Darfur final

destination in WBeG

Rizeigat estern route

from South Darfur final

destination in NBeG

Ambororo route from Blue

Nile final destination

in Upper Nile State

Misseriya estern route from

Southern Kordofan final

destination in Unity State

Rizeiga

t wes

tern rou

te

from Sou

th Darf

ur fin

al

desti

natio

n in W

BeG

Misseriya western routefrom Southern Kordofanfinal destination in NBeG

Hawaz

ma rou

te fro

m

Southe

rn Kord

ofan f

inal

desti

natio

n in U

nity S

tate

Hawaz

ma rou

te fro

m

Southe

rn Kord

ofan f

inal

desti

natio

n in U

nity S

tate

Seleim&Awlad Hiemid route from

White Nile final destination

in Upper Nile State

Subha

&Kina

na ro

ute fr

om

Senn

ar fin

al de

stina

tion

in Upp

er N

ile S

tate

Ethiopia

Central

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Rep

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