l l ix Guattari (1988). I Thousqnd Plateaus'. Capiralinn and

n: Athlone.

), A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist

Twent ieth Century ' , pages 149- l8t in Donna Haraway (ed.) ,

nd llomen: the Reinvention of Nalure, London: Free

-he Condition of Postmodernity'. an Enquiry into the Origins of

>rd: Blackwell.)97), 'Museum Topology and the Will to Connect', Journal of

9 9 2 1 8 .183), NelxorÈs of Power: Electriftation in Western Society,

:: Johns Hopkins University Press.

I\, Postmodernisnt, or, the Cultural Logit' of Late Capiralism,

Science in Action'. Hott' to Follou Scler?lis/s ttnd Engrneers

:on Keynes: Open University Press.'he

Pasteuri:ation of France. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard.

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ù: ing Jl{ odernir 1,, Oxford: Blackwell.

luctionlTrahison: Notes on lNl Oslo: University of Oslo.

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letherington (1998), Allegory and Interference: Economies of

ociology', submitted.

Brown (1994), 'Otherness and the Actor Network: the

enl' , American Bthavioural Scien|isl, J6'.772-790.

(1991), The Inhutnan'. Refectiuts on Time, Cambridge: Polity.

, The Body ùIultiple: Artherosclerosis in Pructice, Durham, N.

:rsity Press, forthcoming.

fohn Law (1994), 'Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia

, Socia l Studies of Science,24:641-671.

.) {1992), Science as Pructic'e and Culture, Chicago and

rf Chicago Press.

991), 'Power, Technologies and the Phenomenology of

ng Allergic to Onions', pages 26 56 in John Law (ed.), I

s? Essays on Pover, Technologl' and Dominution, Sociological

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7-5 35.7), ' "Improving Ratings": audit in the British University sys-

' r ' . 5 : 305 321.ntial Formationç. London. Thousand Oaks and New Delhi:

On recalling ANT

Bruno Latour

Abstract

The paper explores one after the other the four difhculties of actor-network theory, that is the words 'actor', 'network' and 'theory'-without

forgetting the hyphen. It tries to refocus the originality ol what is more amethod to deploy the actor's own world building activities than an alter-native social theory. Finally, it sketches some of its remaining potential.

I will start by saying that there are four things that do not workrvith actor-network theory; the word actor. the word network, theword theory and the hyphen! Four nails in the coffin.

The first nail in the cofûn is I guess the word 'network', as JohnLaw indicates in his paper in this volume. This is the great danger ofusing a technical metaphor slightly ahead of everyone's commonuse. Now that the World Wide Web exists, everyone believes theyunderstand what a network is. tffhile twenty years ago there was stillsome freshness in the term as a critical tool against notions asdiverse as institution, society, nation-state and, more generally, anyflat surface, it has lost any cutting edge and is now the pet notion ofall those who want to modernize modernization. 'Down with rigidinstitutions,' they all say, 'long live flexible networks.'

What is the difference between the older and the new usage? Atthe time, the word network, like Deleuze's and Guattari's term rhi-zome, clearly meant a series oî transformations-ûanslations, trans-ductions-which could not be captured by any of the traditionalterms of social theory. With the new popularization of the word net-rvork, it now means transport without deformation, an instanta-neous, unmediated access to every piece of information. That isexactly the opposite of what we meant. What I would like to call'double

click information' has kil led the last brt of the crirical

j The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers,:rl8 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148. USA.e The Editorial Board ofThe Sociological Review 1999

Bruno Lutour

cutting edge of the notion of network. I don't think we should use it

uny-àr. u1 l.urt not to mean the type of transformations and trans-

lations that we want now to explore.

The second nail that I'd like to hammer into the coffin is the word,actol. ' in its hyphenated connection tvith the notion of 'network'.

From day one, f objected to the hyphen because inevitably it would

remind sociologists of the agency/structure cliche, or, as we say in

French, of tbe'pont aux ânes'of social theory' Most of the misun-

derstandings about ANT have come from this coupling of terms'

one that is much too similar to the traditional divides of social

theory.The managerial, engineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic character

of ANT has been criticised many times. More exactly, critiques have

alternated, quite predictably, between the two hyphenated poles:

one type of èritiqûe has turned around the actot the other turned

uround the network. The first line of criticism has insisted on the

Schumpeterian, male-like, hairy gorilla-like character of ANT; the

second line of criticism has focused instead on the dissolution of

humanity proposed by ANT into a field of forces where morality'

humanity, psychology was absent. Thus, the actor-network was split

into two: demiurgy on one side; 'death of Man' on the other'

No matter how prepared I am to criticise the theory, I still think

that these two symmetrical critiques are off target even though the

very expression of 'actor-network' invites this reaction. The original

idea was not to occupy a position in the agency/structure debate,

not even to overcome this contradiction. contradictions. most of the

time and especially when they are related to the modernist predica-

ment, should not be overcome' but simply ignored or bypassed' But

I agree that the hyphenated term made it impossible to see clearly

the bypass operation that had been attempted'

Let me try to refocus the argument. Let us abandon the words,actor' and .network' for a moment and pay some attention to lwo

operations, one of franring (see the chapter in this volume by Michel

Cal lon)and one of surnming uP.

It is not exactly true that social sciences have always alternated

between actor and system, or agency and structure' It might be

more productive to say that they have alternated between two types

of equally powerful dissatisfactions: when social scientists concen-

trate on what could be called the micro level. that is face to face

interactions, local sites' they quickly tealize that many of elements

necessary to make sense of the situation are already in place or are

coming irom far away; hence, this urge to look for something else'

O The Editorial Board ofThe Sociological Review 1999

some other level. and 1o concentrate on w.in the situation but has made the situationmuch work has been dedicated to notionsvalues, culture, structure, social context, allnating what gives shape to micro interact'new level has been reached, a second typeSocial scientists now feel that something is rt ion of terms like culture and structure. ntoo great, and that one needs to reconnermove. back to the flesh-and-blood local sitrhad started. Once -back to the local sites. htness that pushed them in the direction of ature quickly sets in. Social scientists soorsituation is exactly as abstract as the so cwhich they came and they now want to leavrthe situation together. And so on acl infnitur

It seems to me that ANT is simply a wa,these two dissatisfactions, not again to ovethe problem. but to follow them elsewhere avery conditions that make these two oppositsible. By topicalizing the social sciences' omight have hit on one of the very phenomrmay be the social possesses the bizarre propof agency and structure at all. but ratherentity. The double dissatisfaction that has trconceptual agitation of the social sciences inan artefact: the result of trying to picture a Iby us ing opposi t ions belween two not ions.vidual and structure, which have nothing to c

If this bypassing strategy is accepted therare c lar i f ied: ANT concentrates at tent ion onment well demonstrated by the successive shdissatislied social scientist. This movement ltures. The first one is the redescription of wh;as having to do with the macro-social. As ieven, I think, by the harshest crit ics of AN'actor-network does not aim at all at designeAnimal that makes sense of local interactionrnate an anonymous field of forces. Insteadentirely different which is the summing up cvarious kinds of devices, inscriptions, formrvery local, very practical, very tiny locus. T

The Editorial Board ofThe Sociological Review 1999l 6

otion of network. I don't think we should use it

to mean the type of transformations and trans-

now to explore.at I'd like to hammer into the coffin is the word

ated connection rvith the notion of 'network'.

:cted to the hyphen because inevitably it would

cf the agency/structure cliché, or, as we say in

aux ânes' of social theory. Most of the misun-

ANT have come from this coupling of terms,

ro similar to the traditional divides of social

ngineering, Machiavellian, demiurgic character

ticised many times. More exactly, critiques have

edictably, between the two hyphenated poles:

has turned around the actot the other turned

. The first line of criticism has insisted on the

e-like, hairy gorilla-like character of ANT; the

rism has focused instead on the dissolution of

by ANT into a field of forces where morality,

;y was absent. Thus, the actor-network was split

rn one sidel 'death of Man' on the other.

repared I am to criticise the theory, I still think

retrical critiques are off target even though the

"ctor-network' invites this reaction. The original

)upy a position in the agency/structure debate,

r this contradiction. Contradictions, most of the

when they are related to the modernist predica-

overcome, but simply ignored or bypassed. But,henated term made it impossible to see clearly

r that had been attemPted.ôcus the argument. Let us abandon the words

l' for a moment and pay some attention to two'atning (see the chapter in this volume by Michel

;wnming up.lrue that social sciences have always alternated

system, or agency and structure. It might be

say that they have alternated between two types

dissatisfactions: when social scientists concen-

I be called the micro level, that is face to face

ites, they quickly realize that many of elements

rense of the situation are already in place or are

a1 : hence, this urge to look for something else,

On recalling AltlT

some other level, and to concentrate on what is not directly visiblein the situation but has made the situation what it is. This is why somuch work has been dedicated to notions such as society, norms,values, culture. structure, social context, all terms that aim at desig-nating what gives shape to micro interaction. But then, once thisnew level has been reached. a second type of dissatisfaction begins.Social scientists now feel that something is missing, that the abstrac-tion of terms like culture and structure. norms and values. seemstoo great, and that one needs to reconnect, through an oppositemove, back to the flesh-and-blood local situations from which theyhad started. Once back to the local sites. however. the same uneasi-ness that pushed them in the direction of a search for social struc-ture quickly sets in. Social scientists soon realize that the localsituation is exactly as abstract as the so called 'macro' one fromwhich they came and they now want to leave it again for what holdsthe situation together. And so on ad infinitwn.

It seems to me that ANT is simply a way of paying attention tothese two dissatisfactions. not again to overcome them or to solvethe problem, but to follow them elsewhere and to try to explore thevery conditions that make these two opposite disappointments pos-sible. By topicalizing the social sciences' own controversies. ANTmight have hit on one of the very phenomena of the social order:may be the social possesses the bizarre property of not being madeof agency and structure at all, but rather of being a circulatingentity. The double dissatisfaction that has triggered so much of theconceptual agitation of the social sciences in the past would thus bean artefact: the result of trying to picture a trajectory, a movement.by using oppositions between two notions, micro and macro, indi-vidual and structure, which have nothing to do with it.

If this bypassing strategy is accepted then perhaps a few thingsare clarified: ANT concentrates attention on a movement-a move-ment well demonstrated by the successive shifts of attention of thedissatisfied social scientist. This movement has many peculiar fea-tures. The first one is the redescription of what was earlier perceivedas having to do with the macro-social. As it has been understoodeven, I think, by the harshest critics of ANI the network pole ofactor-network does not aim at all at designating a Society, the BigAnimal that makes sense of local interactions. Neither does it desig-nate an anonymous field of forces. Instead it refers to somethingentirely different which is the summing up of interactions throughvarious kinds of devices. inscriptions, forms and formulae, into avery local, very practical, very tiny locus. This is now well known

t7C The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review I 999 e The Editorial Board ofThe Sociolosical Review 1999

Bruno Latour

through the study of accounting, managerial practice (Power, 1995),

organization studies (Czarniawska, 1997), some sociolinguistics

(Taylor, 1993), panoptica (or what I now call 'oligoptica', Latour

and Hermant, 1998), economics, the anthropology of markets, and

so on. Big does not mean 'really' big or 'overall ' , or 'overarching',

but connected, blind, local, mediated, related. This is already an

important contribution of ANT since it means that when one

explores the structures of the social, one is not led away from the

local sites-as it was the case with the dissatisfied social scientist-

but closer to them.The second consequence is less well developed but equally impor-

tant: actantiality is not what an actor does-with its consequence

for the demiurgic version of ANT-but what provides actants with

their actions, with their subjectivity, with their intentionality, with

their morality. When you hook up with this circulating entity, then

you are partially provided with consciousness, subjectivity, actorial-

ity, etc. There is no reason to alternate between a conception of

social order as made of a Society and another one obtained from

the stochastic composition of individual atoms. To become an actor

is as much a local achievement as obtaining a 'total ' structure. I wil l

come back to this aspect in a moment, but the consequence is

already important: there is nothing especially local, and nothing

especially human, in a local intersubjective encounter. I have pro-

posed 'interobjectivity' as a way of phrasing the new position of the

actor (Latour, 1996).The third and very puzzling consequence is that, by following the

movement allowed by ANT, we are never led to study social order,

in a displacement that would allow an observer to zoom from the

global to the local and back. In the social domain there is no

change of scale. It is so to speak always flat and folded and this is

especially true of the natural sciences that are said to provide the

context, the frame, the global environment in which society is sup-

posed to be located. Contexts too flow locally through networks, be

these geography, medicine, statistics, economics, or even sociology.

This is where ANT has used the insights of sociology of science-

including of course the sociology of the social sciences-as much as

possible: economies emerge out of economics; societies out of soci-

ologies; cultures out of anthropologies; etc. The topology of the

social, John Law is right, is rather bizarre, but I don't think it is

fractal. Each locus can be seen as framing and summing up. Actor'

is not here to play the role of agency and 'network' to play the role

of society. Actor and network-if we want to still use those terms-

O The Editorial Board ofThe Sociological Revrew I999

designates two faces of the same phenomenocles, the slow realization that the social is ation that can travel endlessly without ever emicro-level-there is never an interaction thamacro-level-there are only local summing ulocal totalit ies ('oligoptica') or total localit ies

To have transformed the social from whattory, a province of reality, into a circulatiobeen the mosti useful contribution of ANT.negative contri,bution, because it has simply ra fourth consequence which is also the moslzoom going from macro structure to micrrmicro and macro are local effects of hookingties. if contexts flow inside narrow conduits,plenty of 'space' in between the tiny traject<called the local productions of 'phusigeni'psychogenics'.

'Nature', 'Society', 'Subjectivity' do not delike, but what circulates locally and to whichas we subscribe to cable TV and sewers-irsubscription that allows us to say 'we' and 'c'in between' the networks, those terra incognitaspects of ANT because they show the extenlthe immense reserve that is open for change. Ebe drawn from this vast empty space 'in betwries is not clear yet because of a third difficutackle.

The third nail in the coffin is the word thsaid some time ago, ANT should really be <ontology'. But who would have cared for sucof words-not to mention the acronym ARpoint. If i t is a theory, of what it is a theory?

It was never a theory of what the social isthe reading of many sociologists who belieschool trying to explain the behaviour of sociauas simply another way of being faithful t<nomethodology: actors know what they dot-rom them not only what they do, but how anrrs. the social scientists, who lack knowledgenot they who are missing the explanation oftingly manipulated by forces exterior to thenthe social scientist's powerful gaze and meth<

The Editorial Board ofThe Socioloeical Review 1999t 8

accounting, managerial practice (Power, 1995),(Czarniawska, 1997), some sociolinguistics

ptica (or what I now call 'oligoptica', Latour

, economics, the anthropology of markets, andmean 'really' big or 'overall', or 'overarching',

[, local, mediated, related. This is already anion of ANT since it means that when onees of the social, one is not led away from thethe case with the dissatisfied social scientist-

luence is less well developed but equally impor-rot what an actor does with its consequence:sion of ANT-but whar provides actants withreir subjectivity, with their intentionality, withyou hook up with this circulating entity, then

rided with consciousness, subjectivity, actorial-reason to alternate between a conception of

r of a Society and another one obtained fromsition of individual atoms. To become an actorrievement as obtaining a'total ' structure. I wil lrspect in a moment, but the consequence ishere is nothing especially local, and nothinga local intersubjective encounter. I have pro-

y' as a way of phrasing the new position of the

puzzling consequence is that, by following they ANT, we are never led to study social order,at would allow an observer to zoom from theand back. In the social domain there is noso to speak always flat and folded and this is

: natural sciences that are said to provide there global environment in which society is sup-Sontexts too flow locally through networks, belicine, statistics, economics, or even sociology.ras used the insights of sociology of science-re sociology of the social sciences-as much as:merge out of economics; societies out of soci-of anthropologies; etc. The topology of the

right, is rather bizarre, but I don't think it isin be seen as framing and summing up. Actor'e role of agency and 'network' to play the rolenetwork-if we want to still use those terms-

On recalling ANT

designates two faces of the same phenomenon, like waves and parti-cles, the slow realization that the social is a certain type of circula-tion that can travel endlessly without ever encountering either themicro-level-there is never an interaction that is not framed-or themacro-level-there are only local summing up which produce eitherlocal totalit ies ('oligoptica') or total localit ies (agencies).

To have transformed the social from what was a surface, a terri-tory, a province of reality, into a circulation, is what I think hasbeen the most useful contribution of ANT. It is, I agree, a largelynegative contribution, because it has simply rendered us sensitive toa fourth consequence which is also the most bizarre: if there is nozoom going from macro structure to micro interactions. if bothmicro and macro are local effects of hooking up to circulating enti-ties, if contexts flow inside narrow conduits, it means that there isplenty of 'space' in between the tiny trajectories of what could becalled the local productions of 'phusigenics', 'sociogenics' and'psychogenics'.

'Nature', 'Society', 'Subjectivity' do not define what the world islike, but what circulates locally and to which one 'subscribes' muchas we subscribe to cable TV and sewers-including of course thesubscription that allows us to say 'we' and 'one'. This empty space'in between' the networks, those terra incognita are the most excitingaspects of ANT because they show the extent of our ignorance andthe immense reserve that is open for change. But the benefit that canbe drawn from this vast empty space 'in between' network trajecto-ries is not clear yet because of a third difficulty that I now have totackle.

The third nail in the coffin is the word theory. As Mike Lynchsaid some time ago, ANT should really be called 'actant-rhizome

ontology'. But who would have cared for such a horrible mouthfulof words-not to mention the acronym ARO'? Yet, Lynch has apoint. If it is a theory, of what it is a theory?

It was never a theory of what the social is made of, contrary tothe reading of many sociologists who believed it was one moreschool trying to explain the behaviour of social actors. For us, ANTwas simply another way of being faithful to the insights of eth-nomethodology: actors know what they do and we have to learnfrom them not only what they do, but how and why they do it. It isars, the social scientists, who lack knowledge of what they do, andnot they who are missing the explanation of why they are unwit-tingly manipulated by forces exterior to themselves and known tothe social scientist's powerful gaze and methods. ANT is a wav of

O The Editorial Board ofThe Sociolosical Review 1999 O The Editorial Board of The Sociolosical Review I 999 t 9

Bruno Latour

delegitimating the incredible pretensions of sociologists who, to r'rse

Bauman's forceful expression (Bauman, 1992), want to act as legis-

lators and to open yet another space for interpretive sociology. Far

from being a theory of the social or even worse an explanation of

what makes society exert pressure on actors, it always was, and this

from its very inception (Callon and Latour, 198 I ), a very crude

method to learn from the actors without imposing on them an n

priori defrnition of their world-building capacities. The ridiculouspoverty of the ANT vocabulary-association, translation. all iance.

obligatory passage point, etc.-was a clear signal that none of these

words could replace the rich vocabulary of the actor's practice, but

was simply a way to systematically avoid replacing their sociology,

their metaphysics and their ontology with those of the social scien-

tists who were connecting with them through some research proto-

col--I use this cumbersome circumlocution to avoid the loaded

term 'studying', because ANT researchers cannot exactly be said to'study' the other social actors.

I agree that we have not always been true to the original task, and

that a great deal of our olvn vocabulary has contaminated our abil-

ity to let the actors build their own space, as many critiques have

charitably shown (Chateauraynaud, 1991; Lee and Brown, 1994).

This weakness on our part does not mean, however. that our

vocabulary was too poor, but that, on the contrary, it was not poor

enough and that designing a space for the actors to deploy their

own categories is a much harder task than we thought at f irst-andthis applies of course to this notion of deployment itself. From the

very beginning, ANT has been sliding in a sort of race to overcome

its l imits and to drop from the l ist of its methodological terms any

which would make it impossible for new actors (actants in fact) to

define the world in their own terms, using their own dimensions and

touchstones. John Law and Annemarie Mol have used the word

fluid (Mol and Law 1994), Adrian Cussins, the word trails (Cussins,

1992), Charis Cussins, the word choreography (Cussins, 1996). All

of these words designate in my view what the theory should be and

what the excessive diffusion of 'double-cliçk' networks has rendered

irretrievable: it is a theory that says that by following circulations we

can get more than by defining entities, essence or provinces. In that

sense, ANT is merely one of the many anti-essentialist movements

that seems to characterize the end of the century. But it is also, like

ethnomethodology, simply a way for the social scientists to access

sites, a method and not a theor1,, a way to travel from one spot to

the next, from one field site to the next, not an interpretation of

e The Editorial Board of The Socioiogical Review I 999

what actors do sirnply glossed in a differemore universalist language.

I have often compared it to perspective cbecause of this peculiar relation between ithat is nonetheless strictly determined but vthan disappearing once the picture is left toam well aware of the l imits of this metaphormore constraining method than three dirdrawing! Yet the image has its advantase: AI\the shape that is to be drawn--circles-or cuhow to go about systematically recording thties of the sites to be documented and resistpotentialit ies of ANT are sri l l largely untalpecal implications of a social theory that wàutthe actors' behaviour and reasons. but onlvrvhich render actors able to negotiate theanother's world-building activity.

The fourth and last nail in the coffin is tland distinguishes the two words .actor'

andrndicated above, it is an unfortunate reminderagency and structure into which we never waalso a place holder for a much bigger problbecome aware of only very slowly, and whosmuch felt in the future. By clealing simuitanernon-human agencies. we happened to falliretrveen the four major concerns of the mode\\-e were not conscious of this coherence at firard way when we began to understand that t,:rr.n most interested in our work, that is socii:hose of SSK (the Sociology of Scientif ic Knor"c its harshest crit ics (Coll ins and yearlev. 199..,cial explanation did nor seem to us to irold r' ..n of society was part of the problem notil,,rr could that be possible. anà how could':rrger such entirely different research program

\\T slowly drifted from a sociology of sci- ,rt a social theory, into another enquirv (^:er c-alled comparative. symmetrical, o. ,

-):.cola and Palsson,1996). The difference br-' :. icS of reflection on modernity and post_, l- . ir 'rnit\,. was simply that it took to task all r- - :: could be called the modernist nredicar

' : .: :rrrrl Board ofThe Sociologicai Review 199920

ncredible pretensions of sociologists who, to use:xpression (Bauman, 1992), want to act as legis-yet another space lbr interpretive sociology. Fary of the social or even worse an explanation ofexert pressure on actors, it always was. and this

rtion (Callon and Latour, l98l). a very crudeom the actors without imposing on them an atheir world-building capacities. The ridiculous

I vocabulary association, translation, all iance,point, etc.-was a clear signal that none of these: the rich vocabulary of the actor's practice, buto systematically avoid replacing their sociology,nd their ontology with those of the social scien-Iecting with them through some research proto-nbersome circumlocution to avoid the loaded:ause ANT researchers cannot exactly be said to:ial actors.Ive not always been true to the original task, andour own vocabulary has contaminated our abil-l build their own space. as many critiques haveChateauraynaud, l99l; Lee and Brown, 1994).our part does not mean, however. that ourpoor. but that, on the contrary. it was not poor

esigning a space for the actors to deploy theirmuch harder task than we thought at first-andse to this notion of deployment itself. From theT has been sliding in a sort of race to overcomerp from the l ist of its methodological terms anyit impossible for new actors (actants in fact) toiheir own terms, using their own dimensions andLaw and Annemarie Mol have used the word,1994\, Adrian Cussins, the word trails (Cussins,ns. the word choreography (Cussins, 1996). All

;nate in my view what the theory should be andIiffusion of 'double-click' networks has renderedheory that says that by following circulations wery defining entities. essence or provinces. In thatrly one of the many anti-essentialist movementscterize the end of the century. But it is also, likesimply a way for the social scientists to accessnot a theory, a way to travel from one spot tofield site to the next, not an interpretation of

On recalling ANT

.ihat actors do simply glossed in a dif l 'erent more palatable and:'.!)re universalist language.

I have often compared it to perspective drawing (Latour, 1997),\ ' .uuse of this peculiar relation between an empty construction:h.it is nonetheless strictly determined but which has no other aim:r.rn disappearing once the picture is left to deploy its own space. I-rm rr!l l aware of the l imits of this metaphor since there is hardly alrr)re constraining method than three dimensional perspectivaljra*'ing! Yet the image has its advantage: ANT does not tell anyone:he shape that is to be drawn----circles or cubes or lines-but onlyrtr\\ ' to go about systematically recording the world-building abil i-:res of the sites to be documented and registered. In that sense, the:r)tÈntialit ies of ANT are sti l l largely untapped. especially the polit i-;al implications of a social theory that would not claim to explain:he actors' behaviour and reasons, but only to find the procedureslhich render actors able to negotiate their ways through onernother 's wor ld-bui ld ing act iv i tv .

The fourth and last nail in the coffin is the hyphen that relates.rnd distinguishes the two words 'actor' and 'network'. As I haverndicated above, it is an unfortunate reminder of the debate betweenrgency and structure into which we never wanted to enter. But it is.rlso a place holder for a much bigger problem, cne that we havebecome aware of only very slowly, and whose impact will be verymuch felt in the future. By ciealing simultaneously with human andnon-human agencies. we happened to fall into an entpty spacebetween the four major concerns of the modernist way of thinking.We were not conscious of this coherence at first. but learned it thehard way when we began to understand that those who should havebeen most interested in our work, that is social scientists, includingthose of SSK (the Sociology of Scientif ic Knowledge). turned out tobe its harshest crit ics (Coll ins and Yearley, 1992; Bloor. 1998). Theirsocial explanation did not seem to us to hold water: the very defini-t ion of society was part of the problem not part of the solution.How could that be possible, and how could sociology of sciencetrigger such entirely different research programs?

ANT slowly drifted from a sociology o[ science and technology,from a social theory, into another enquiry of modernity-some-times called comparative, symmetrical, or monist anthropology(Descola and Palsson, 1996). The difference between ANT and themasses of reflection on modernity and post-, hyper-, pre- and anti-modernity, was simply that it took to task all of the components ofwhat could be called the modernisi predicament simultaneousl),.

2lO The Editorial Board ofThe Sociolosical Review 1999 O The Editorial Board ofThe Socioloeical Review 1999

Bruno Latour

The reason why it could not stick to a theory of social order is that

the whole theory of society soon appeared to be enmeshed in a

much more complex struggle to define an epistemological settle-

ment about: (a) what the world is llke outside without human inter-

vention; (b) a psychology inside-an isolated subjectivity still able

to also comprehend the word out there; (c) a political theory of how

to keep the crowds at bay without them intervening with their

unruly passions and ruining the social order; and finally (d) a rather

repressed but very present theology that is the only way to guaran-

tee the differences and the connections between those three other

domains of reality. There is not one problem of deciding what soci-

ety is, a second of explaining why there is a psychology, a third of

defining politics, and a fourth of accounting for the deletion of the-

ological interests. Instead there is only one single predicament

which, no matter how entangled, has to be tackled at once. To sum

it up in one simple formula: 'out there' nature, 'in there' psychology,'down there' politics, 'up there' theology. It is this whole package

that by happenstance ANT called into question at once.

There is no room here to review the whole question-I have done

so elsewhere (Latout 1999)-but only to indicate the consequences

for one possible future of ANT. ANT is not a theory of the social,

any more than it is a theory of the subject, or a theory of God, or a

theory of nature. It is a theory of the space or fluids circulating in a

non-modern situation. What type of connection can be established

between those terms, other than the systematic modernist solution?

This is, I think, clearly the direction of what is 'after' ANT and

what would begin to solve a number of the worries expressed in the

contributions to this book.Let us not forget that the first thing we made circulate is nature

and reference, that is the 'out there' box. I was struck to see that

none of the writers. in this book or at the conference from which it

derived, mentioned social constructivism and the recent Science

Wars. Clearly the treatment of the collective of scientific reality as a

circulation of transformations-is it even necessary to say again

that reference is real, social and narrative at once?-is now, if not

taken for granted, at least clearly articulated. If ANT can be credited

with something, it is to have developed a science studies that entirely

bypasses the question of 'social construction' and the 'realist/

relativist debate'. lt is not, it never was. a pertinent question. even

though it still amuses many people who are not familiar with either

science studies or ANT. Social theory is now allowed to have as

many points of contact. as many correspondences. with a bountiful

O The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review I 999

reality as there are circulating references. Alrealities without having to spend a single monot believing in an 'outside'

reality. On the rto explain why on earth the modernist had tling reality 'outside'.

What I call the 'second wave' of science

.offering) the same sort of treatment to the otSubjectivity, corporeality, is no more a propejviduals, of intentional subjects, than being iproperty of nature. This new tack is so wpapers in this book that there is no need to r(see the chapter by Annemarie Mol). Subiecticirculating capacity. something that is parti ihooking up to certain bodies of practice. Marthe chapter by Emilie Gomart and Antoine Fthe work I am doing on ethnopsychiatry (LatcCharis Cussins, the new book by Marc Berg(Berg and Mol, 1998), all have the charactertributing subjective quality outside-but of coferent 'outside'

now that epistemology hascirculating reference. The two movements-thwave, one on objectivity, the other on subrelated: the more we have ,socialized'

so to slthe more 'outside'

objectivity the content oigain. There is plenty of room now for both.

What is next? Clearly the .down there' asppredicament, namely political theory as indirgrowing body of work (see work by Dick pels)..f our definition of political practice escapes tncrlogy ('out there') and psychology (,in therr:he specificity of a certain type of circulatiorBody Polit ic into one, that is, some type of circ::ie collective, we would have made an immer.\(ruld have at last freed politics from science_rristemology (Latour, 1997)-a result that woutr)ple who are still often accused to have politi-:pairl From the recent work in political ecolog\:.ngers call 'cosmopolit ics'

(Stengers, 1996; S-,:her confident that this wil l soon come to fi-- ' .:r3nçs that academics always search for, so-:r.rot be obtained without a relocation of the- ., ::r of polit ical circulation.

': !.:rrtrrial Board ofThe Sociological Review 199922

)uld not stick to a theory of social order is thatf society soon appeared to be enmeshed in ax struggle to define an epistemological settle-t the world is llke outside without human inter-ology inside-an isolated subjectivity still ablethe word out there; (c) a political theory of howr at bay without them intervening with theirruining the social order; and finally (d) a ratherresent theology that is the only way to guaran-Lnd the connections between those three otherfhere is not one problem of deciding what soci-xplaining why there is a psychology, a third ofI a fourth of accounting for the deletion of the-nstead there is only one single predicamentw entangled, has to be tackled at once. To sumrrmula: 'out there' nature, 'in there' psychology,;, 'up there' theology. It is this whole package: ANT called into question at once.here to review the whole question-I have done:, 1999)-but only to indicate the consequencesrre of ANT. ANT is not a theory of the social,. theory of the subject, or a theory of God, or as a theory of the space or fluids circulating in a,n. What type of connection can be established

, other than the systematic modernist solution?rrly the direction of what is 'after' ANT andsolve a number of the worries expressed in thebook.that the first thing we made circulate is natures the 'out there' box. I was struck to see thatin this book or at the conference from which itsocial constructivism and the recent Scienceatment of the collective of scientific reality as abrmations-is it even necessary to say again

, social and narrative at once?-is noq if notleast clearly articulated. If ANT can be creditedto have developed a science studies that entirelyon of 'social construction' and the 'realist/

is not, it never was, a pertinent question, evens many people who are not familiar with eitherNT. Social theory is now allowed to have asrct, as many correspondences, with a bountiful

On recalling ANT

reality as there are circulating references. ANT can gorge itself onrealities without having to spend a single moment excusing itself fornot believing in an 'outside' reality. On the contrary, it is now ableto explain why on earth the modernist had the bizarre idea of mak-rng reality'outside'.

What I call the 'second wave' of science studies has offered (isoffering) the same sort of treatment to the other sphere-'in there'.Subjectivity, corporeality, is no more a property of humans, of indi-r iduals, of intentional subjects, than being an outside reality is aproperty of nature. This new tack is so well represented in thepapers in this book that there is no need to develop the point heretsee the chapter by Annemarie Mol). Subjectivity seems also to be acirculating capacity, something that is partially gained or lost byhooking up to certain bodies of practice. Madeleine Akrich's work,the chapter by Emilie Gomart and Antoine Hennion for this book,the work I am doing on ethnopsychiatry (Latour, 1996), the work ofCharis Cussins, the new book by Marc Berg and Annemarie MollBerg and Mol, 1998), all have the character of, so to speak, redis-tributing subjective quality outside-buT of course, it is a totally dif-Èrent 'outside' now that epistemology has been turned into acirculating reference. The two movements-the first and the second\\'ave, one on objectivity, the other on subjectivity-are closelyrelated: the more we have 'socialized' so to speak 'outside' nature,the more 'outside' objectivity the content of our subjectivity cangain. There is plenty of room now for both.

What is next? Clearly the 'down there' aspect of the modernistpredicament, namely political theory as indicated by a small butgrowing body of work (see work by Dick Pels). Not a single featureof our definition of political practice escapes the pressure of episte-mology ('out there') and psychology ('in there'). If we could elicitthe specificity of a certain type of circulation that is turning theBody Politic into one, that is, some type of circulation that 'collects'

the collective, we would have made an immense step forward. Wewould have at last freed politics from science-or more exactly fromepistemology (Latour, 1997)-a result that would be quite a feat forpeople who are still often accused to have politicized science beyondrepair! From the recent work in political ecology, or in what IsabelleStengers call 'cosmopolit ics' (Stengers, 1996; Stengers, 1997), I amrather confident that this will soon come to fruition. The politicalrelevance that academics always search for, somewhat desperately,cannot be obtained without a relocation of the extraordinary origi-nality of political circulation.

O The Editorial Board of The Sociolosical Review I 999 O The Editorial Board ofThe Socioloeical Review 1999 Z J

Bruno Latour

What about the half hidden sphere above, that has been used as aguarantee for the rest of the modernist systems? I know this is avery risky territory since if there is anything worse than dabblingwith non-humans, it is to take theology seriously. This line of workis not represented at all, I agree, in this book. Yet, I think that it isin theology that the notion of circulation is the most rewarding. pre-cisely because it quickly rejuvenates a tissue of absurdities (what hasbecome a tissue of absurdities) because of the shadow cast by thenotion of a Science and by the notion of Society. Morality thatseems totally absent from the engineering dreams of ANI may bevery abundant if we care to take it also for a certain type of circula-t ion.

The point on which I want to conclude is somewhat differentfrom that of John Law. In his chapter, he asks us to limit ANT andto tackle complexity and locality seriously and modestly. As withseveral of us, he is somewhat terrified by the monster that we havebegot. But you cannot do to ideas what auto manufacturers do withbadly conceived cars: you cannot recall them all by sending adver-tisements to the owners, retrofitting them with improved engines orparts. and sending them back again, all for free. Once launched inthis unplanned and uncharted experiment in collective philosophythere is no way to retract and once again be modest. The only solu-tion is to do what Victor Frankenstein did not do. that is, not toabandon the creature to its fate but continue all the way in develop-ing i ts s t range potent ia l .

Yes, I think there is life after ANT. Once we have strongly pusheda stake into the heart of the creature safely buried in its coffin-thusabandoning what is so wrong with ANT, that is 'actor', 'network',' theory' without forgetting the hyphenl-some other creature mightemerse, l ight and beautiful: our future collective achievement.

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.alf hidden sphere above, that has been used as a

est of the modernist systems? I know this is a

since if there is anything worse than dabblingt is to take theology seriously. This line of work

t all, I agree, in this book. Yet, I think that it is

notion of circulation is the most rewarding, pre-

ckly rejuvenates a tissue of absurdities (what has

absurdities) because of the shadow cast by thee and by the notion of Society. Morality that

t from the engineering dreams of ANI may ber care to take it also for a certain type of circula-

rich I want to conclude is somewhat different,aw. In his chapter, he asks us to limit ANT andy and locality seriously and modestly. As with

somewhat terrified by the monster that we have

rot do to ideas what auto manufacturers do with's: you cannot recall them all by sending adver-ners, retrofitting them with improved engines orthem back again, all for free. Once launched in

uncharted experiment in collective philosophy

etract and once again be modest. The only solu-

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rt of the creature safely buried in its coffin-thusr so wrong with ANT, that is'actor', 'network',

'getting the hyphen!-some other creature might

rautiful: our future collective achievement.

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O The Editorial Board of The Sociolosical Review I 999 O The Editorial Board of The Sociolosical Review 1999 25