Obligations Briefs p. 1-182

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CHAPTER 1Salles v. Stafford, Derbes, and Roy, Inc.

FACTS: P and D enter into a written contract for the sale and purchase of ten lots of ground. ( Bond for deed, a security measurefor obligor). R.S. The contract contained a clause: Specifically, the clause relating to the 1) the vendor may have a new map orsurvey made 2) This map, if made, may show a change of position or location of the property sold, provided the same number ofsquare feet and location in the same square or plot shall be retained 3) the vendor at his discretion make apply for and obtain

dedication of streets. Potestative condition- depends upon the whim of one of the parties- not enforceable.

PROCEDURAL: the court rendered in favor of plaintiff and Court of Appeal affirmed.

ISSUE: Did the object of sale of the contract lack certainty (because it was too benefical to the vendor) making the contract nullunder La. C.C. art. 1779 and did the defendant breach the contract?

RULE: Art. 1779Term is presumed to benefit the obligor unless the agreement or the circumstance show that it was intendedto benefit the obligee or both parties.

ANALYSIS: The court does not understand how the privilege granted the vendor of making a new map or survey withoutprejudicing the rights of the purchaser nullifies the contract. The other privilege granted the vendor to change the location of thelots in the same square does not make the object of the contract uncertain. The conditions of the contract are to be construed asthe parties must be supposed to have understood them at the time of its execution. The agreement of sale is not a nullity foruncertainty, but the case will be remanded for decision on the breach of contract claim.

PROPOSITION: When parties enter into a contract to sell a plot of land (an object) to another and there is a special provision inthe contract which allows the seller to create a new map which changes the location of the plot in the same square but the size &shape remains the same, the object will be considered certain and the contract will not be voided because parties are free tocontract for whatever they want as long as it is lawful.

Harrison v. Gore:

FACTS: Ms. Harrsion alleges in her petition that she was molested and sexually harassed by herhigh school basketball coach. She filed the petition eight years after the last tortious act. Theprescriptive period is 1 year. She is filing an exception to prescription that the court failed toapply the 10 year contractual prescriptive period to her claim. Respondeat superior- employer is

responsible for their employees. (vicarious liability)The court looks at the damages to see if it is based on tort or contract.

Art. 1998. Damages for nonpecuniary lossDamages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, because of

its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the circumstancessurrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, orshould have known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss.

Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be recovered alsowhen the obligor intended, through his failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee.

ISSUE: Should Art. 3499 which says that personal actions have a prescriptive period of ten yearsapply or is this claim barred by the one year prescriptive period?

RULE: Art. 3467- liberative prescription runs against all persons unless exception is establishedby law. Art 3467 even if it is a minor or incompetent same rule.


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ANALYSIS: Even when tortfeasor and victim are bound by a contract, courts usually apply thedelictual prescription (1 year) to actions that are really grounded in tort. The 10 year liberativeprescription is a applicable only in the absence of another, specific legislative statement. The factthat the father had a contract with Trinity Heights does not change the nature of the harm. Theconduct arises from an intentional tort barred by the prescription and is not a breach of contract.

Contract law is general legislation and the tort is specific legislation, the more specific should beapplied. Court held in favor of the defendant. The nature of the breach will determine if contractor tort law will be applied. Court will look at the real source of complaint in this case the realcomplaint is tortuous not contractual even though the is arguing that there was breach of

contract on part of the school.

Chapter 2 Briefs

Belgard d/b/a Belgard Construction Company v. Collins628 So.2d 1254 (La.App.3rdCir. 1993)

No meeting of the minds

Facts

1. Collins store was damaged by a tornado in Nov. 1987. The building was insured by All-State. Belgard came to Collins and said he would get a engineer to get an estimate. Theengineer actually did the work.

2. Belgard claims that Collins entered into an oral contract with him by his performance ofconsulting services, presentation of 3 construction bids, and delivery of bids to All-Stateoffice.

3. Collins claims that she never entered into an oral contract with Belgard and believed himto be a commercial contractor soliciting for work. Collins believed she hired theengineer, Beard, and that she in no way was under a contract with Belgard.

Proc. History

1. DC rendered judgment in favor of Collins, finding that there was no oral contractbetween the parties because there had never been a meeting of the minds.

2. Belgard appeals the judgment asserting as error the trial courts failure to find that therewas a contract between the parties.

Issue

Whether an oral contract existed between the two parties?

Holding

No, there was no oral contract between the two parties. There was no uniformity of the will ofthe 2 parties. The court says Defendant did no believe she was forming a contract with plaintiff.Here, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that there was a meeting of the minds by apreponderance of the evidence.


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Rules

1. Four elements are required for a valid contract: (1) the parties must have legal capacityto contract; (2) the parties mutual consent must be freelygiven; (3) there must be alawful cause or purpose; and (4) the object of the contract must be lawful, possible, and

determined or determinable (CC Art. 1918, 1927, 1966, and 1971)2. A party who demands performance of a contract has the burden of proving the existenceof the obligation (CC Art. 1831).

3. The existence of an oral contract with a value in excess of 500 dollars must be proved byat least one witness and other corroborating circumstances (CC Art. 1846).

Reasoning

The evidence supports the conclusion that Collins never agreed to hire Belgard to do consultingwork. She believed he was a contractor bidding for the construction work on her building. Thisis supported by the fact that Collins believed that she was the one hiring Beard, the engineer. If

she had contracted with Belgard to do consulting work which included inspection of the buildingby an engineer, Collins would not have called Beard in February or March in order to find outwhat she owed him. This was several weeks after Belgard had presented his package ofinformation to Collins; the date he claims an agreement was reached regarding his consultingservices.

However, Collins is responsible for paying Belgard $1,314.20 for his cost of hiring Beard, whichCollins received a benefit of expert advice. The court ordered Collins to pay Belgard the amountplus legal interest from the date of judgment.

North Louisiana Milk Producers Assoc., Inc. v. The Southland Corporation352 So.2d 293 (La.App.2d Cir 1977)

Consent-offer & acceptance

Facts

1. Plaintiff (N. La. MPA) and Defendant (Southland) had previously conducted business inthe buying and selling (sale) of milk from one another, at a price determined by the fixedpricing system set forth by either the state agency or federal agency regulating suchactivities.

2. Plaintiff sold the milk at the highest minimum cost from either the state or federalagency.

3. When the minimum pricing came under fire in 1976, Plaintiff decided to set its own pricefor milk sold to Defendant, and notified Defendant as such of its new pricing.

4. Plaintiff and Defendant corresponded from August 1976 to April 1977, essentiallybargaining over the price of milk. Plaintiff stated that it would sell its milk at its own setprice, and Defendant stated that it did not like the price and would only pay thegovernment established minimum price.

5. During the time of negotiation, Defendant continued to order milk from Plaintiff, andPlaintiff billed Defendant at its own established price.

6. Defendant paid Plaintiff the amount of the government minimum price.


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Proc. History

1. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant in December, 1976 for the difference in price of$79, 958.

2.

DC entered judgment for the Plaintiff for said amount.3. Defendant appealed stating that the DC erred in supplying the price.Issue

Whether or not an agreement existed for the price of bulk milk delivered by the plaintiff to thedefendant?

Holding

Yes, a contract existed for the price of milk delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant.

We hold that P made an operative offer to sell to the D at stated prices for a stated period oftime, the acceptance of which was contemplated to be an order made by defendant for a specificquantity of milk. We hold that correspondence did not constitute an operable offer to buy from Pb/c the correspondence did not order a specific quantity at a stated price. We further hold thatwhen the Ds employee verbally placed a periodical order for a specific quantity of milk, and

w/o conditioning the order as to price, each periodical order constituted an acceptance ofplaintiffs standing offer to sell at its stated price

Rules

1. The Louisiana Civil Code states that an offer is a proposal to do something or to refrainfrom doing something in return for a counter-promise, an act, or forbearance.

2. To be considered an offer, 3 requirements must be established:a. The design to give the other party the right of concluding the contract by his

assent;b. The offerors intention to obligate himself;c. A serious intent.

3. When requirement A is absent, the proposition cannot be considered an offer, butrather an invitation to negotiate, or an expression of willingness to receive an offer fromthe other party.

4. The intention required under B must be that of creating a legal obligation and not onein the moral sense or a duty in conscience.

5. A quotation of prices is not an offer ot sell in the sense that a completed contract willarise out of the mere acceptance of the rate offered, or out of the giving of an order formerchandise in accordance with the proposed terms. But when a merchant, on request,send a price list to a customer who orders goods in accordance with the price list,

there is a contract formed between them for the price and upon conditions

mentioned in the price list.


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Reasoning

The court concludes that plaintiff made a standing or operative offer to sell for the stated periodas was expressed in the monthly correspondence as well as in some telephone calls between themanagers.

The court considers the offer which was made an offer to sell rather than an offer to buy. Inorder to be legally operable and to create a power of acceptance, it is necessary that the offershall contain all of the terms of the contract. It is not enough for one party to say what he willdo; he must also say what he will do it for, that is, what the other party must do in exchange.

Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company v. International Harvester368 So.2d 1009 (La. 1979).

Action: Plaintiff filed this eviction suit alleging that defendant breached its contract by subleasingproperty leased from plaintiff. The district court ordered defendant to vacate the premises and deliver

possession of the property to plaintiff. The defendant appealed and the court of appeals reversed,indicating that plaintiff's silence over the matter over a period of 16 months amounted to consent of thesublease. Plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff leased some land to defendant for defendant to operate a sales and service centerfor trucks. This land was directly across the street from where the Superdome was being built. After theDome was built, the property values increased significantly. Defendant moved its sales and service centerto another location, and built a new building on the leased property. In 1975, defendant asked plaintiff ifthey could sublease the property for use as a parking garage. Plaintiff refused, citing the previouslysigned lease agreement. Despite this, defendant did sublease the property for the parking business. Laterthat year, a representative of the plaintiff contacted the defendant in writing, requesting that they meet todiscuss the situation, but did not specifically mention the sublease. Letters passed back and forth but

nothing came of the matter. 16 months later, an officer of the plaintiff complained to defendant about theproblem with the leased property. Defendant responded by saying that it was complying with the terms ofits lease. Plaintiff filed suit shortly thereafter.

Issue: Did the lessor by its silence and acceptance of rentals under the circumstances of thiscase impliedly consent to a sublease and a modification of the lease clause restricting the tenant's use andoccupancy of the premises?Should the court, by applying the doctrine of abuse of rights to the facts of this case, refuse to enforce thelessor's right under the lease contract to withhold permission from the lessee to enter a sublease with athird party?

Held: Reversedjudgment of trial court reinstated.

Rule: Consent results from a free and deliberate exercise of the will of each party where theintent has been mutually communicated or implied, and accepted by the party to whom a proposal ismade.Consent may be implied in the following instances: (1) when it is manifested by actions, even by silenceor inaction, in cases in which they can from the circumstances be supposed to mean, or by legalpresumption are directed to be considered as evidence of an assent. (2) when actions without words aredone under circumstances that naturally imply a consent to such contract.


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In cases where the law does not expressly create a legal presumption of consent from certain facts, it isleft to the discretion of the judge to determine if consent is to be implied from the particularcircumstances of the case.

Reason: The court held that there was no showing that the plaintiff consented to the modificationof the leases such to permit the sublease. Additionally, the plaintiff declined defendant's request to amend

the lease and offered instead to cancel the lease. This request and denial of the request show that plaintiffdid not consent. As far as the delay in filing the suit, it was shown that plaintiff is a company headquarterin Chicago with vast real estate holdings. It's delay could have been based on its lack of information andinattention rather than consent.

Marine Ins. Co., Limited, of London, Eng. V. Rehm

177 So. 79 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).

This is an action for negligencesubrogation claim.

Action: Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant seeking to recover, under subrogation, monies ithad paid its insured for damages to his vehicle. The trial court dismissed the suit and plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Klein parked his vehicle at defendant's parking lot. He then received an identificationticket and paid the parking fee. Three hours later, Klein returned to find his vehicle stolen. Klein wasthen paid $300 from his insurer, who is the plaintiff in this suit.

Issue: Was defendant's acceptance of the parking identification ticket considered a contractbetween the parties.

Held: Reversed.

Rule: A person who receives a check for baggage entrusted to a transfer company is not boundby an inscription on the baggage check limiting liability of the transfer company in the absence of proof

of assent by the passenger.The depository is bound to use the same diligence in preserving the deposit that he uses in preserving hisown property.

Reason: The court held that a proprietor of a parking lot who collects a fee for parkingautomobiles is a compensated depository. As such, he is held to take as good care of those vehicles as hisown. Although defendant argued that he was providing a public service and only charged a nominal fee,the court found that the statute is clear and that if the application of the statute against this type ofbusiness in not in the public interest that the legislature and not the courts should address this issue.

Cashio v. Amco Transmissions

613 So2d. 765 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1993).

This is an action for negligenceproperty damage.

Action: Cashio filed suit against defendant for property damage due to defendant's negligence.The trial court held in favor of Cashio and the defendant appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff and his son drove to New Orleans to go to a Saints game. The observed a signthat stated "Parking $3.00. This sign was at the Amco Transmission shop. They spoke with an attendant,who was wearing an Amco shirt. The attendant indicated that he was employed by Amco and that


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plaintiff could park there for the fee. The owner of the shop, as well as the attendant were going to thegame as well. When plaintiff returned, their vehicle was missing. Neighbors to the shop confirmed theexistence of the parking lot attendant. Plaintiffs then filed suit.

Issue: Was the legal relationship between Macaluso and Cashio that of compensated deposit ormerely a lease of space?

Held: Compensated deposit. Affirmed.

Rule: It has been recognized that the general rule is that parking lots are to be treated ascompensated depositaries.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the leaving or parking of a vehicleby any person at a parking meter operated by any municipality or other political subdivision or at anyprivately owned unattended parking lot, when such parking lot has signs prominently displayed informingcustomers that the lot is unattended and when the owner retains the keys, shall not give rise to a contractof deposit by only to one of hiring or letting out space, and neither the political subdivision nor theparking lot owner shall thereby incur the obligations or the responsibilities of a depositary for losses as aresult of theft, vandalism, or property damage.

Reason: The court held that the statute above regarding parking is not applicable to this case. Inthis case, the only sign displayed was the cost of the parking, and did not state that the lot would beunattended. Further, there was no indication that defendant intended to limit liability by merely leasingspace. Once plaintiff gave defendant the vehicle and the defendant knows it is there, consent is implied.Based on this, it was determined that defendant would have to exonerate himself from fault, but therecords indicates that he has not done this.

Johnson v. Capital City Ford Company, Inc.85 So.2d 75 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1955).

This is an action for specific performance of a contract.

Action: Plaintiff sued the defendant, seeking specific performance of a contract.The district court held in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Art. 1758-

Facts: Defendant ran an ad in the local paper (see page 43). Plaintiff alleged that basedon the ad, he purchased a new 1954 Ford from defendant and traded in his existing vehicle.Defendant later refused to give the plaintiff a 1955 model as was advertised. Defendantindicated that plaintiff was under a duty to inform them that he was there to accept the offer, as it

would not have paid as much for his trade if that were the case. Defendant apparently did notinform plaintiff that the trade in would alter the offer.

Issue: Whether the newspaper advertisement from the defendant was an offer.

Held: Affirmed.


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Rule: A newspaper advertisement may constitute an offer, acceptance of which willconsummate a contract and create an obligation in the offerer to perform according to the termsof the published offer.

A newspaper advertisement to purchase bonds at par was an offer, rather than amere proposal to negotiate, being complete and definite, and if ambiguous, construed against the

offeror.The party proposing shall be presumed to continue in the intention, which his proposalexpressed, if, one receiving the unqualified assent of him to whom the proposition is made, hedoes not signify the change of his intention.The Supreme Court held that acceptance of an advertised order completes the contract, which isnot subject to further modification by either one of the parties without the consent of the other.

Reason: The court held that the defendant was under an obligation to inform the plaintiffof any changes to the offer. As this was not in the contract, the contract is construed against thedefendant.

Dissent: advertisements are meant to be invitations to negotiate.

North Central Utilities, Inc. v. Walker Community Water System, Inc.

506 So.2d 1325 (La. App. 2nd. Cir. 1987).

This is an action for breach of contract.

Action: Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant was a public entity and thatplaintiff was low bidder. As such, plaintiff alleged that he should have been awarded thecontract. Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action which was sustained by the trialcourt. This was reversed by the appellate court and remanded. Defendant then filed an MSJwhich was sustained by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Defendant advertised for bids for a water distribution system. Plaintiff entered abid, meeting all requirements outlined in the advertisement. Plaintiff was the low bidder, but didnot get the contract. Plaintiff alleges that he should be awarded damages for loss of profits, andfor expenses incurred.

Issue: Whether the defendant's advertisement amounts to an offer such that the plaintiff'sbid is an acceptance and completes the formulation of a contract.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: For any proposal to qualify as an offer, it must reflect the intent of the author togive to the other party the right to concluding the contract by assent. Where this intent is notpresent, the proposal cannot be considered an offer, but rather an invitation to negotiate or anexpression of willingness to receive offers from others. Under common law, request for bids isnot an offer, but an invitation to negotiate. Civil Law holds this as well.


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Reason: The court held that defendants merely indicated an intent to sell, thus it does notconstitute an offer to accept the highest bid.

Schulingkamp v. Aicklen

FactsThe def sent an irrevocable offer to purchase some property of the pl, along w/ apromissory note. Pl sued to enforce offer. However, the pl did not respond for 36 days. Defsent a telegram withdrawing offer 5 days before the pl sent an acceptance. Pl feels that if herprevious actions did not give implied acceptance, express acceptance was sent. Def argue that itwas too late b/c the offer had been withdrawn. Pl counter argue that the offer was irrevocablethrough act of sale, thus def could not withdraw offer.

IssueDoes an irrevocable offer expire after a reasonable time?

HoldingYes

ReasoningThe agreement provides that the offer remain irrevocable until the act of sale.Since the offer does not designated a specific time period for the act of sale, we conclude that itis an irrevocable offer w/I 1928. When the offeror manifests an intent to give the offeree a delaywithin which to accept, without specifying a time, the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time.What determines reasonable time is to be determined under the facts and circumstances of thecase.*In these circumstances, there was a reasonable period of time in which the pl could haveaccepted the offer. However, after 36 days the offer became unreasonable, thus making the offerrevocable.

Meyers v. Burger King Corporation618 So.2d 1123 (La. App. 4th. Cir. 1993).

Action: Meyers, an employee of Parkway who was renovating a Burger King, suedBurger King when a menu board fell on him. BK third partied Parkway, Nationwide Indemnity(Parkway's umbrella) and Nationwide Mutual (Parkway's G.L. carrier). Burger King filed an MSJ whichwas granted. Parkway appealed.

Facts: Meyers was working on a renovation job at a Burger King, which was beingcompleted by his employer Parkway. A menu board fell on him at the job site, causing injuries. It isimportant to note that Parkway contractually agreed to insure BK against any claim arising fromParkway's operations, and to name BK as an additional insured on it's policy. Parkway alleged thatbecause BK did not sign the contract until 54 days from the date Parkway signed it, there was no contract.

Issue: Whether Parkway's offer to insure BK was irrevocable and whether it was acceptedwithin the prescribed time.

Held: Affirmed.


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Rule: An offer that specifies a period of time for acceptance is irrevocable during thattime period. When the offeror manifests an intent to give the offeree a delay within which to accept,without specifying a time, the offer is revocable for a reasonable time.An acceptance of an irrevocable offer is effective when received by the offeror.

Reason: The court held that contract from Parkway was a quote which was in effect for "at

least 45 days". The court believes that "at least" means it could be longer, thus it was irrevocable for alonger period. As it was signed just 9 days later, the court held that this was a reasonable period of time.

W.M. Heroman & Co., Inc. v. Saia Electric, Inc.346 So.2d 827 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).


Action: Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant after defendant refused toperform work they had agreed to in a construction project. The trial court held in favor of the

plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff sought to obtain bids for reconstruction of Capital House hotel in BatonRouge. Defendant contacted plaintiff in order to bid on the electrical work for the job. On 5-17-73, defendant submitted a bid of 335,125.00. However, the overall price of the project exceedingthe amount to be spent on the project so the plans were modified. During a meeting inSeptember of 1973, plaintiff met with defendant and other subcontractors to finalize bids.Defendant then bid 214,600.00 based on the modified plans. Three months later, plaintiffentered into a contract to complete the construction of the hotel. During the three month period,it was alleged that defendant was aware that the project was moving forward. Once informedthat the job had been awarded to plaintiff, and by extension, the defendant, defendant picked up

the plans. About a month later, defendant submitted a new bid of 396,305.00. When plaintiffobjected, defendant reduced their bid to 269,000.00. Although unacceptable to the plaintiff, hecontinued to attempt to negotiate with defendant but was not successful. Due to time constraints,plaintiff hired an alternate subcontractor on a cost plus basis. That job amounted to 310,180.23.Plaintiff sued for the difference between this amount and defendant's original bid.

Issue: Whether defendant's offer to complete the project was a valid offer.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: The contract, consisting of a proposition and the consent to it, the agreement is

incomplete until the acceptance of the person to whom it is proposed. If he, who proposes,should before that consent is given, change his intention on the subject, the concurrence of thetwo wills is wanting and there is no contract.

An offer, under certain circumstances, may remain irrevocable until the offeree isafforded reasonable time to accept.

Reason: The court held that defendant's offer was irrevocable until either rejectedor the project had been abandoned, provided an unreasonable time had no elapsed. In this case,


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three months did elapse but based upon the substantial nature of the project and the fact that theevidence supported all parties proceeding as if the project were moving forward, the court heldthat this was not an unreasonable time. As such, defendant is bound to the offer. Sincedefendant refused to complete the work, plaintiff was forced to find an alternate vendor, whorequired a much higher price for the work.

GLOVER V. ABNEY P. 62

YOUNGBLOOD V ROSEDALE DEVELOP COP. 71

Ryder v. Frost3 La. Ann. 523 (1848).


Action: Ryder sued Frost to recover $500. The trial court held in favor of defendant and theplaintiff appealed.

Facts: Ryder and Frost were business partners in Illinois. Their business failed and theydissolved the company. In 1841, Ryder attempted to settle all of the affairs of the company, and took allof the assets. At that time, Ryder gave Frost a bond of indemnity to hold him harmless against all of thepartnership debts. One of the debts included a $6000 to Leavitt of New York that was never paid. In1843, Leavitt sued the business and obtained a judgment for the $6000, but Leavitt later agreed to accept$2000 as full payment of the debt. Ryder sent a letter to Frost requesting Frost pay $1000 toward thedebt. Frost replied in writing and stated that he will not give $1000, but would give $500 once thesettlement with the Leavitts was completed and erased from the court record. Additionally, Frostindicated that once his partner returned, he would visit Ryder and would pay him the $500 if Ryderdesired. Some 6 weeks later, Ryder resolved the judgment with Leavitt.

Issue: Whether Ryder gave his assent to Frost's proposition within a reasonable time.Whether earlier notice of acceptance should have been given.

Held: Reversed.

Rule: It is not indispensible that the consent should be express. It may be implied. An impliedconsent may be manifested by actions. (acceptance by performance)

Reason: The court held that Ryder unequivocally manifested his consent based on his followingthrough with the negotiation of the judgment. Frost had indicated that he wished for the judgment to beresolved, and for that being accomplished, offered to pay Ryder $500. Although Frost appears to havemade the argument that his offer was not accepted timely, the court disagreed. As noted above, thejudgment was resolved about 6 weeks after Frost's offer. Further, the court did not believe that Frost wasdamaged by any sort of delay. Additionally, there was nothing in Frost's letter that Ryder should have toaccept the offer within a specified time. As such, the actions of Ryder were his acceptance and judgmentshould be made in favor of Ryder.

Cardinal Whoesale Supply, Inc. v. Chaisson504 So.2d 167 (La. App. 3rd Cir. (1987).



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Action: Plaintiff brought this action to attempt to enforce guarantees for a loan. The trial courtheld in favor of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Defendant's company needed to get credit for business purchases from plaintiff. Two co-owners of defendant's company signed personal guarantees in favor of plaintiff. The credit application

was refused but the plaintiff held on to the guarantees without signing them. Two years later, the two co-owners sold their share of the business. Defendant then obtained credit from plaintiff. Eight years afterthe guarantees were signed, the company became insolvent. Plaintiff then signed the guarantees andattempted to enforce them upon the two prior co-owners for payment of defendant's debt.

Issue: Whether personal guarantee of credit can be bound in perpetuity.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: There can be no contract without an offer an acceptance.

Reason: The court held that there was no acceptance of the guarantees that would have completed

the contract between the parties. Although the two co-owners waived notice of the creditor's acceptance,the court believed it was obvious that the extension of credit would have been made either at that time, orin the near future. However, there was no credit contract set up at that time. The fact that plaintiff heldthese documents for 8 years indicates that plaintiff did not accept them for the purpose for which theywere intended. Further, plaintiff agreed to credit for defendant after the two guarantors sold their sharesof the company. As such, the contract was with defendant, and not with the two co-owners. Further, theguarantees were not valid in perpetuity.

Ambrose v. M&M Dodge, Inc.

509 So.2d 444 (La. App. 3rd Cir. (1987).


Action: Plaintiff sued defendant because his truck did not work properly. The parties reached asettlement. While the settlement documents had been signed by plaintiff, but not yet mailed back,plaintiff learned that defendant would not pay off his loan. Plaintiff announced there was no deal andcancelled the signatures. Defendant alleged that it was res judicata, and filed an exception for same. Thetrial court overruled this exception and the defendant appealed.

Facts: Same as history.

Issue: Whether the claim was subject to an exception of res judicata because the plaintiff signedthe documents.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: A written acceptance is received when it comes into the possession of the addressee or ofa person authorized by him to receive it, or when it is deposited in a place the addressee has indicated isthe place for this or similar communications to be deposited for him.

According to the reception theory, the acceptance of an offer takes place at the momentits communication reaches the offeror.


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Reason: The court held that in this case, the acceptance had to be in writing. As it would have hadto have been received by defendant to be valid, it was not valid as it was not received. Even though thesignatures were placed on the documents, they were still in possession of the plaintiff, thus the settlementwas not valid.

Ever-tite Roofing Corp. v. Green

83 So.2d 449 (La. App. 2nd Cir. (1955).


Action: Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract. Defendants denied that the contract wasaccepted by plaintiff. The trial court sustained defendant's argument and dismissed the suit. Plaintiffappealed.

Facts: Defendant's signed a contract for plaintiff to re-roof his residence. This was done on 6-10-53. This set out the work in detail, and indicated that the price was to be paid in installments. Asalesman of plaintiff also signed the document but the salesman was apparently without authority toaccept the contract on behalf of the plaintiff. The contract stated that it would become effective with an

acceptance of plaintiff or upon commencing performance of the work. The contract also indicatedplaintiff's address. As part of the contract, plaintiff had to check defendant's credit. This credit check wasdone the day after the contract was signed. The lender then approved the financing on either 6-18 or 6-19. The next day, plaintiff obtained all materials and went to defendant's residence to do the work. Upontheir arrival, plaintiff saw that defendant had employed another company to perform the work. Defendantadvised the plaintiff that they retained the alternate vendor two days prior, and that plaintiff's serviceswere not needed.

Issue: Whether plaintiff had accepted the terms of the contract.

Held: Reversed.

Rule: An offer proposes may be withdrawn before its acceptance and that no obligation isincurred thereby.

The power to create a contract by acceptance of an offer terminates at the time specifiedin the offer, or, if no time is specified, at the end of a reasonable time. What is reasonable time is aquestion of fact depending on the nature of the contract proposed, the usages of business and othercircumstances of the case which the offeree at the time of his acceptance either knows or has reason toknow.

An offer is incomplete as a contract until its acceptance and that before its acceptance theoffer may be withdrawn.

Reason: The court noted that plaintiff, upon receiving the signed contract, immediately beganmaking preparations to complete the job. They checked the credit, obtained financing and acquired the

materials. All of this was done in roughly 8-9 days. Defendants never contacted plaintiff to notify themof their intent not to have plaintiff perform the work.

Since the contract indicated that acceptance was affected when the work began, and didnot specify when the work was to begin, the court had to determine a reasonable time. As plaintiff clearlybegan taking steps just days after the contract, the court held that this was a reasonable time, and thatjudgment should be in favor of plaintiff.

NATIONAL CO. V NAVARROP. 91


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Rodrigue v. Gebhardt416 So.2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. (1982).


Action: Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant for breach of contract. The trial court found

that the contract was perfected and breached by defendant. Defendant appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff put his house up for sale. In a written agreement, defendant offered to pay 100Kfor the house with a deposit of 1K in cash and a 9K demand note. Plaintiff rejected this, and made acounter offer of 105K with a deposit of 5K in cash and 5500 in a demand note, with each party to sharediscount points not to exceed three. This counter was to remain open until noon on 1-31-80. At 1:15pmon 1-31-80, defendant sent another offer via wire. That offer stated that defendant accepted agreement topurchase the home for 105K. However, he indicated a deposit of 2K in cash and 8500 on demand note.Further, each seller was to pay one point. Defendant later refused to tender the deposit and the plaintifffiled suit.

Issue: Whether there was an acceptance of the offer.

Held: Reversed.

Rule: For a contract to be formed, the acceptance must be in all things conformable to the offer.An offer must be accepted as made to constitute a contract.A modification in the acceptance of an offer constitutes a new offer which must be

accepted in order to become a binding contract.

Reason: The court held that the plaintiff had to have accepted defendant's new offer for it tobecome binding. There was no evidence that this offer was accepted. Further, a contract to purchaserealty must be in writing. As this was not the case, the court held in favor of defendant.

Breaux Bros. Construction Co. v. Associated Contractors, Inc.226 La. 720, 77 So.2d 17 (1954).


Action: Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant for breach of an oral contract between theparties. The trial court held in favor of defendant and plaintiff appealed.

Facts: The Lafourche Police Jury was soliciting bids for excavation and removal of a largeamount of dirt. This job entailed doing both dry land work and water work. Defendant wascontemplating bidding on this job. On 3-4-51, two officers of defendant corporation looked at the

proposed job site. On their way home, they met Breaux, who was a member of the plaintiff partnership.As defendant did not have equipment to do the water work, Breaux indicated that he had that equipmentand would be interested in subcontracting this work. The parties reviewed the plans that same day.Breaux indicated that the portion of the work that plaintiff would do was agreed upon at that time.However, defendant denied this took place. There was to be a subsequent meeting of the parties on 3-14-51.

At the second meeting, plaintiff indicated that defendant's discussed the amount of theirbid for the job. Breaux indicated that they would submit a bid of $.1569 for each yard of dirt. Further,Breaux stated that plaintiff would accept that same amount for all dirt moved by them. It is at this point


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that Breaux believed he had a finalized contract with defendant. Defendants denied there was a firm priceagreed upon. Allegedly, Breaux had no knowledge of defendant's bid until it was opened and accepted.Breaux then said he wanted the same amount. Defendant's then asked if Breaux would split the bondingcosts, which Breaux declined to do. Negotiations terminated at this point.

There was testimony at trial from Breaux who admitted he thought that they wouldeventually sign a written contract for them to perform the work.

Issue: Whether there was a valid contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: Where it has been agreed between parties that an agreement shall be reduced to writing,the contract is not complete until it is written and signed by all the parties.

It is elementary in our law, that where the negotiations contemplate and provide that thereshall be a contract in writing, neither party is bound until the writing is perfected and signed. Thedistinction is manifest between those cases in which there is a complete verbal contract, which the lawdoes not require to be reduced to writing, and a subsequent agreement that it shall be reduced to writing,and those in which, as in this case, it is a part of the bargain that the contract shall be reduced to writing.

Reason: The court held that in this case, the parties intended from the very beginning to reducetheir negotiations to a written contract. As such, neither party was bound until the contract was writtenand signed by both parties. As this did not take place, there was no contract and the judgment wasappealed.

Barchus v. Johnson151 La. 985, 92 So. 566 (1922).


Action: Plaintiff sued defendant for specific performance of a contract. Defendant filed a no

cause of action which was sustained. Plaintiff appealed.

Facts: On 8-21-17, plaintiff bought an option to purchase some property. For $50, he had theoption for 30 days. On 9-15-17, plaintiff telephoned the defendant to accept. On 9-28-17, plaintiff thenwrote defendant, and accepted the option. This was beyond the 30 day period.

Issue: Whether plaintiff's acceptance of the contract to purchase immovable property bytelephone was valid.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: All contracts relative to the transfer of immovable property must be in

writing.It is apparent that an option to buy or not to buy immovable property

must be evidenced by a written instrument, that the acceptance of the offer made in such instrument mustbe equally evidenced by writing, and that it must be tendered to the proposer before the time limited in theoption has expired.

Reason: The court held that according to the plaintiff, he only tendered his acceptance on 9-28-17,which was 8 days after the expiration of the time within which the proposer had agreed to become boundby the acceptance. This was too late.


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1. Decedent had expressed during his life the intention of donating the monies that he haddeposited in a joint account to his nephew.

2. Upon the death of the decedent, the other heirs contested the validity of the donation.Procedural: TC- found for Jones the recipient of remunerative and onerous donations during the

lifetime of Lawrence, therefore the owner of the money. (looked at the services that wererendered for Lawrence by Jones over his lifetime.) Appeal Court reversed and said there was nodonation inter vivos for lack of proof of ownership of the money, and lacked formalities.

Issue

Whether the transfer of the money in the accounts were donations inter vivosor donations mortiscausa?

Rule: Art. 1524- defines onerous and remunerative donationsArt. 1526- onerous and remunerative are not subject to the rules and peculiars of donations inter

vivos, except when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the charges or of theservices.

Holding

The transfer of the money was a donation inter vivosbecause it constituted an inter vivosremunerative and onerous donation. Jones had performed work for Lawrence and Lawrencewanted to repay him for his work.

Reasoning: The value of the bank accounts did not exceed one-half that of the services that Jonesrendered to Lawrence over his lifetime, The rules of donative inter vivos do not apply in thiscase.

Perry Jr. v. Perry Sr.507 So.2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).

This is an action to enjoin execution of a prior judgment.

Action: Perry Sr filed for a preliminary injunction against the seizure of property alleging thatthey wanted as compensation against their judgment, various donations they made to their son. Thedistrict court enjoined the execution of the judgment pending a hearing to determine the value of thedonations to be offset against the judgment. Perry Jr appealed.

Facts: The parties are father and son. The father was a part owner of Ogden-Perry Theatres.Over a period of years, the father gave the son a large amount of stock in the company. When the sonbecame an attorney, the father signed a written guarantee, prepared by the son, by which the companywould buy back the shares of stock. There was an initial payment of 150K, followed by what was to bemonthly payments of 5K each. About 7 years later, due to financial difficulties, the company ceasedmaking payments and filed for bankruptcy. The son then sued his father as guarantor on thecontractand received a judgment in his favor in the amount of $163,249.28.


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Reason: The court held that it was entirely competent for Gahlman to convey the property to hisnephew in consideration of the obligation which the latter was shown to have assumed, i.e. furnishing theuncle with a home and caring for him.

As far as the payment of $1, the court held that although it would have been insufficientunder the law, the defendant has shown the existence of a true and sufficient consideration by caring forthe uncle. Based on this, the judgment was affirmed.

Louisiana College v. Keller10 La. 164 (1836)

Facts

1. This was an action instituted by the trustees of the Louisiana College, established atJackson, to recover from the defendant the sum of five hundred dollars, the amount of hissubscription to said college.

2. The writing in question set forth an agreement in which individuals pledged to pay a sumof money to help establish the college if it were established by the Legislature in Jackson,

East Feliciana. The document clearly stated, expressly understood that no obligationis hereby created against the subscribers, unless the said Legislature do establish a collegewith an endowment, in the said town, at their next session.

3. On February 18, 1825, the Legislature passed a law to incorporate Louisiana College inJackson, East Feliciana.

4. The defendant having failed and refused to pay his said subscription, on the 18thofMarch, 1832, a formal demand was made on him and a protest entered on instrument bythe parish judge, acting as notary public for the non-payment.

5. The defendant pleaded a general denialthat he should not be bound by the writing, andhe claimed it to be a nudum pactum (naked promise) that was given withoutconsideration. He further pleads the prescription of 5 years and that the writing has

lapsed.6. DC rendered judgment in favor of Louisiana College, and the defendant appealed.7. Plaintiff contends that when the Legislature passed the act establishing the college, the

obligation of the defendant then became absolute.8. Defendant contends that (1) the writing was imperfect in obligation and could not be

enforced by the courts; (2) It was without legal and sufficient consideration to render itvalid and binding; (3) It did not become binding on the maker, for want of acceptance ofits conditions by the party to whom it was made; and (4) There was no party in existencecapable of accepting or enforcing its conditions.

Issue

Whether the writing (agreement) had cause that created an obligation for defendant to pay hispromised sum?

Holding

Yes, the writing was freely consented to, which allowed for cause, and created an obligation fordefendant to pay the promised sum to Plaintiff. The obligation was subject to only one


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Rules

1. An obligation according to the Code is not the less binding, though its consideration orcause is not expressed.

2.

In contracts of beneficence, the intention to confer a benefit is a sufficient consideration.

Baptist Hospital v. Cappel129 So. 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930)

Facts:

1. Baptist Hospital instituted this suit against Dr. J. T. Cappel for payment of a pledge hemade towards the construction of a new nurses home for the students of the Nurses

Training School.2. Baptist Hospital decided to put on a campaign to raise funds by appealing to the

generosity of the citizens of Alexandria and surrounding communities.

3. Dr. J. T. Cappel signed a pledge card for $500, to be paid in 4 installments of $125 each.He paid the first installment and refused to pay the remaining 3.

4. Cappel insists that because the hospital was required to move the location of the newnurses home, some 2 miles away from the hospital, that the pledge was without

consideration and charged error and fraud. Cappel further contends that he is relievedfrom paying his pledge for the reason that the home was not building within the time itwas represented to be built, that the home was built in a different location than originallyplanned; and that the time in which it was to be completed are such as to relieve him fromliability.

5. DC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed.Issue

Whether or not the acts of the Baptist Hospital have been such, since the signing of the pledgecard, to relieve the defendant of liability?

Holding

No, the acts of the Baptist Hospital have not been such as to relieve the defendant of liability.

Reasoning

It was necessary to secure another location, and the duty of deciding on that location was uponthe board of trustees of the hospital and not upon the subscribers.

There is no merit in defendants contention that the home was not completed within the timerepresented to him. Defendant does not show that any benefit he expected to receive from thenew nurses home has been in any way lessened or that he has been in any way injured bythechange in plans; therefore he is bound by his pledge.


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Flood v. Thomas5 Mart. (N.S.) 560 (La. 1827)

Facts

1. Defendant is sued on his promise to pay $678.71, due to the plaintiff by Lee.2. Defendant pleaded want of consideration in the alleged promise.3. Judgment was rendered in Defendants favor, and plaintiff appealed.4. Lee admitted the debt due by him to be about $500, but deposed he neither recollected

nor believed the account was presented him by Sprigg.

Issue

Whether there was sufficient cause which required defendant to pay remaining balance toplaintiff?

Holding

Yes, there was sufficient cause which required defendant to pay remaining balance.

Rule

The debt of another is sufficient consideration to support a contract of surety, or a promise to payit.

DOrgenoy v. Droz

13 La. 382 (1839)

Facts

1. Plaintiffs ancestor and Ramis entered into an agreement, notarial act, in which plaintiffpurchased some land from Ramis, for what must have been an outrageous price in itstime (1807).

2. Decendents of Ramis sold the land to defendant in 1836.


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3. Defendant advertised the sale of the land.4. Plaintiffs contended that they were the true title holders.5. Heirs of Ramis contend that she received the land as inheritance from her father, and that

the land had never been legally vested to Plaintiffs.6. DC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs as the rightful owners, and defendant

appealed.

Issue

Whether the instrument was one of sale or donation?If it were a sale, was there sufficient cause?If there was not sufficient cause, was it a donation?

Holding

The court held that the instrument was one of donation.

Reasoning

The donation, as long as it existed, is conclusive against the pretensions of the defendant; andunless it had been set aside and rescinded, in an action instituted for that purpose, the defendanthad no right to disregard it, by attempting, as he has done, to sell the property which theplaintiffs possessed under it.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Crais127 So. 414 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930)

Facts

1. Plaintiff and Canal Commercial Trust and Savings Bank of New Orleans had a contractin which plaintiff agreed to cover the bank against any losses resulting fromembezzlement by its employees.

2. Bank Manager, Johnson, embezzled some $30,000 plus from the bank and devised a planto ease out. He gathered his friends to sign an agreement, which stated that they wouldcover the excess losses to the insurer in the event that Johnsons liquidated assets would

not cover the debt owed to Plaintiff.3. Johnsons friends said that they would sign the document if it insured that Johnson would

not face criminal charges for his actions. USF&G said that it was not up to them, but upto the District Attorney as to whether or not Johnson would face criminal charges.Friends signed the document anyway.

4. The friends, including the defendant, refused payment of the $500.5. Plaintiff sues defendant for $500 on a contract alleged to have been entered into between

the parties.6. Defendant admitted his signature, but denied liability for want of valid or legal

consideration.


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7. Plaintiff concedes that a contract for restitution, supported only by the consideration notto criminally prosecute for embezzlement, is against public policy and is illegal, null, andvoid, but contends that the contract between itself and Canal was one of suretyship andthat, upon payment of the loss to the bank, the surety was subrogated by law to the rightsof the bank against the embezzler, and therefore, had the right to enter into any

agreements for the settlement of its civil losses with Johnson and his friends, and hencethe agreement was supported by a valid consideration.8. DC granted judgment in favor of USF&G, and defendant appealed.

Issue

Whether or not the contract is supported by a valid consideration?

Holding

No, the contract is not supported by a valid consideration.

Reasoning

It is obvious that the defendant did not secure any benefit from this contract. It is likewise clearthat Johnson did not secure any benefit from it, unless it could be said that he was not criminallyprosecuted, but such a consideration would be contra bonos mores1, and therefore the contractwould be invalid.The record shows that Johnson was not discharged or released from his obligation or any part ofit when the defendant signed the contract sued upon, and hence plaintiff did not surrender anylegal right which it might have had against Johnson. If plaintiff had released Johnson, then thesituation might be different.

Dissent: The surety company could have refused to settle with the assured for Johnsonsshortages until receipt by it of full proof in the usual form. He thought full legal considerationwas given and received.

Carpenter v. Williams428 So.2d 1314 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).


Action: Plaintiff brought this suit to enforce defendant's specific performance of a contract to buyplaintiff's home. Defendant reconvened to obtain a refund of his deposit. The trial court held in favor of

defendant and the plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Defendant lived in Lafayette and drove to Cameron to work for his employer, Transco.The employer ordered defendant to move closer to his work. Defendant contracted to purchase plaintiff'shouse, in order to comply with his employer's wishes. Later, Transco rescinded its order, and defendantrefused to purchase plaintiff's house.

1Lat. against good morals Offensive to the conscience and to a sense of justice; voidable contracts


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Issue: Whether the termination of defendant's cause to enter into the contract would make thecontract null and void.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: Errors may exist as to all circumstances and facts which relate to a contract, but it is not

every error that will invalidate it. To have that effect, the error must be in some point, which was aprincipal cause for making the contract, and it may be either as to the motive for making the contract, tothe person with whom it is made, or to the subject matter of the contract itself. La C.C. Art. 1823.

Reason: The court held that the only cause Williams had to by the plaintiff's house was the orderof his employer. Apparently, the plaintiff was aware of this. Thus, when Transco rescinded its order,the defendant's cause of entering into the contract ceased to exist, and the contract became unenforceable.

Losecco v. Gregory108 La. 648, 32 So. 985 (1901).

This is an action for return of consideration due to a null contract.

Action: Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, seeking to recover $4000 he had paid defendant foran orange crop. The trial court held in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff contracted to buy the orange crops of defendant. Per the contract, the plaintiffwould pay $4K for the crops of 1899, and $4K for the crops of 1900. The contract indicated thatpurchaser assumes all risks. Three months later, the temperature in New Orleans dropped to 7 degreesabove zero, destroying the orchard. Plaintiff alleged that due to the destruction of the trees, there was nocrop for him to buy, thus defendant owed the $4K back to plaintiff.

Issue: Was this an aleatory (dependant on uncertain contingencies) contract?

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: A contract is aleatory or hazardous when the performance of that which is one of itsobjects depends on an uncertain event. It is certain when the thing to be done is supposed to depend onthe will of the party, or when in the usual course of events it must happen in the manner stipulated.

If, during the lease, the thing be totally destroyed by an unforeseen event.the lease is atan end.

Reason: The court held that the contract called for the sale of the crops, not the trees. As the treeswere destroyed, they did not yield a crop, thus no contract. Further, the severe cold weather was anextraordinary event, as the weather had not been that cold for in excess of 60 years. As it was so unlikelyfor this weather to exist, it was likely not considered in the formation of the contract. As such, it was not

an aleatory contract, but was a certain contract.

The case then went up on rehearing. On rehearing the court put more emphasis on the fact thatthe contract said that plaintiff assumes all risks. They interpreted this to mean that the purchaser,knowing that the crop might never materialize, paid cash, unconditionally, for the crop. By assuming allrisks, that means he also assumed the risk of total failure. Based on the rehearing, the court reversed,ordering the plaintiff to pay the $4K.


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Notes on rehearing: the purchaser was in the habit of buying orange crops in advance on aspeculation, and that not infrequently these crops had perished in cold weather. The purchaserprepaid without a word for its return on any contingency.The dissent thinks he assumed the risk.

Lamy v. Will140 So.2d 794 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).


Action: Plaintiff sued defendant over a check for $135 that was not honored. The trial court heldin favor of plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff and defendant, who were friends, met after work at a bar to play "poker dice."During the course of the night, defendant lost all of his money, and asked plaintiff for loans on numerousoccasions. Plaintiff, through six separate loans, loaned defendant $150, having received a check fromdefendant for that amount. When the game finally ended, plaintiff was broke. Defendant had since wonback his money. The next day, defendant gave plaintiff $15, took back his check for $150, and gaveplaintiff a new check for $135. Plaintiff then attempted to cash the check, but payment on the check wasrefused by the bank.

Issue: Whether the amount claimed by plaintiff is a gambling debt and therefore uncollectibleby court action.

Held: Reversed.

Rule: The law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at gaming or by a bet,except for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms, such as the exercise of the gun and foot,horse, and chariot racing.

An obligation without cause, or with a false or unlawful cause, can have no effect.The cause is unlawful, when it is forbidden by law, when it is contra bonos mores

(contrary to moral conduct) or to public order.

Reason: The court held that the plaintiff, in order to collect, must have been wholly unconnectedwith the gambling activity. As plaintiff was a participant in the game, the transaction was part of theactivity, thus plaintiff is precluded from maintaining an action for recovery.

To be a constitutionally prohibited gambling contract, however, there must be a mutual illegalintent to gamble and the intent of one party not communicated to or concurred in by the otherwill not nullify an agreement.

Lauer v. Catalanotto522 So.2d 656 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).


Action: Plaintiff sued defendant to enforce a contract. Defendant reconvened for repayment of aloan of $1300 made to plaintiff. The trial court held in favor of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.


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Facts: Plaintiff alleged that he entered into a contract with the defendant where plaintiff wouldgive defendant $10,000 to engage in gambling in Vegas. They were to share the profits. Defendant andanother witness testified that plaintiff asked to borrow $1300 from defendant as they were going to leavethe hotel. Apparently, plaintiff immediately went to the blackjack table where he quickly lost the money.Plaintiff admitted borrowing the money to play dice, but claimed he signed a marker to the hotel for thatamount. He alleged that defendant was standing right behind him when he asked for the money.

Issue: Whether plaintiffs cause of action for recovery of gambling debts is specificallyprohibited.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: The law grants no action for the payment of what has been won at gaming or by a bet,except for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms, such as the exercise of the gun and foot,horse and chariot racing. And as to such games, the judge may reject the demand, when the sum appearsto him excessive.

Courts have sometimes refused to enforce payment of loans made by a third party to agambler, where the loan is clearly for the purpose of gambling or repaying a gambling debt and the lender

was not an innocent bystander.

Reason: The court held that plaintiff simply asked the defendant for the money; defendant wasnot involved in the transaction for which plaintiff had requested the money (whether it was to repay themarker or play blackjack). Although plaintiff states there was nor formal indication of the loan, the courtheld that the friendship of the parties makes such an informal loan very credible. As such, the court foundno manifest error.

McMahon v. Hardin121 So. 678 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).


Action: Plaintiff brought this suit against defendants, who were husband and wife, to enforce acontract for him to paid for services rendered. The trial court held that the contract was unenforceable asit was against public policy. The plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff, who was a private detective, sued the defendants for breach of contract.Plaintiff was hired by the wife to obtain evidence of the husbands adultery. At first, he wasunsuccessful, and the wife sued for separation on the grounds of cruelty. She then abandoned this suit.

Nine months later, the wife again sued the husband as she received satisfactory evidence of her husbandsadultery from the plaintiff. The defendants were then divorced, and were granted a separation ofproperty. Plaintiff apparently was never paid. He sued the wife since she was the one who hired him. Hesued the husband because he was the head and master of the former community of the defendants, and

was responsible for expenses of wife obtaining the divorce.

Issue: Whether a contract of this kind is enforceable and not repugnant to public policy.

Held: Affirmed.

Rule: Contracts to pay for collecting or procuring testimony to be used in evidence,coupled with the condition that the contractees right to compensation depends on the character


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of the testimony procured or upon the result of the suit in which it is to be used, have beenuniversally, condemned by the courts as contrary to public policy, for the reason that suchagreements hold out an inducement to commit fraud or procure persons to commit perjury.

Reason: The court held that they must look with a kind eye upon the institution of matrimony. In

doing so, this type of contract must be against public policy as it would encourage individuals to attemptto destroy something that was intended to be permanent.

Gravier's Curator v. Carraby's Executor17 La. 118 (1841).

This is an action to recover payment for services rendered.

Action: Plaintiff, the curator of the estate of Gravior, sued the defendant seeking to becompensated by defendant for the value of property sold by them to the detriment of Gravier. The trialcourt made a monetary award to the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The defendant then filed anexception that the action of the plaintiff could not be maintained because the contract was fraudulent,

illegal and against public policy.

Facts: The plaintiff, curator of the estate of Gravier, indicated that Gravier made some simulatedsales of property to Carraby. Gravier was pressed for money and was facing several judgments. Ratherthan have the land seized by creditors, he made a scheme with Carraby that would transfer the land tohim, but Gravier would still actually be the owner. Eventually, Gravier abandoned his affairs as beinghopeless, and did not let it be known that he owned that property. In 1826, Carraby died and his brotherbelieved that the land was actually owned by Carraby. Most of this property was then sold.

Issue: Whether the plaintiff had a cause of action against defendant since simulated sales of landto the defendant were fraudulent.

Held: The exception was sustained.

Rule: No principle is better settled, than that no action can be maintained on a contractthe consideration of which is either wicked in itself or prohibited by law. How far this principleis to affect subsequent or collateral contracts the direct and immediate consideration of which isnot immoral or illegal, is a question of considerable intricacy, on which many controversies havearisen and many decisions have been made.

Reason: The court held that the defendants were made to appear to the world as the owner's of theproperty, thus the creditors of the plaintiff were unable to seize the land. As the intent of the parties wasfraudulent, the court held that the exception should be sustained.

Herbert v. McGuire

447 So.2d 64 (La. App. 4th. Cir. 1984).


Action: Plaintiff, who was a physician, sued the defendant, who was one of his patients, torecover the cost of a surgery. The trial court dismissed the case and the plaintiff appeals.


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Facts: Plaintiff performed a surgery upon the defendant for a fee of $900. According to thedefendant, the plaintiff was to file her insurance claim in order for it to be paid by her carrier. Becauseplaintiff failed to do this, the insurer refused to pay it at a later date.

Issue: Whether defendant is entitled to a defense of detrimental reliance.

Held: Reversed in part. Judgment for plaintiff for $155.

Rule: If the promise came before the surgery, it was part of an enforceable contract. Ifthe promise came after the surgery was incurred, it would be a clearer case of a gratuitouspromise, as to which estoppel would reasonably apply.

Reason: The court held that the trial judge was not manifestly erroneous in concluding thatplaintiffs breach of promise by plaintiffs employee to take care of the insurance claim caused defendantto suffer the loss of the insurance benefit. However, the defendant only lost the benefits of what herinsurance would have paid. She was still required to pay 20% of the amount, less a $25 credit.

Edinburgh v. Edinburgh523 So.2d 893 (La. App. 4th. Cir. 1988).


Action: The wife sued the husband to quiet her title (make secure by freeing fromdispute/litigation in the house. The husband reconvened for the value of the services rendered during themarriage based on the owner's promise that the husband would become owner of a one-half interest in thehouse. The trial court held in favor of plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff (wife) and defendant (husband) entered into an agreement with a homeownernamed Dorsey. Dorsey's house was badly damaged by Hurricane Betsy. Per the agreement, the couple

would repair the house and pay the mortgage. In return, Dorsey would leave the house the couple uponher death. Defendant performed the repairs on the house, and paid the mortgage. However, the couplewas then divorced. After Dorsey's death, she left the house to the plaintiff only

Issue: Whether the husband has a claim under detrimental reliance.

Held: Yes. Reversed in part. Husband entitled to recover money he spent on the house uponreliance of Dorsey's promise.

Rule: In order to recover under the theory of detrimental reliance, a plaintiff must provethat: (1) a representation was made; (2) justifiable reliance upon that representation; and (3) achange in position of one's detriment because of the reliance.

Reason: The court held that the defendant met the requirements to recover under detrimentalreliance. Based on Dorsey's promise to leave he and his wife the house, which was reduced to writing, heassumed certain responsibilities he was under no obligation to assume. As such, he is entitled to recoverthe money he spent on the house.


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Kethley v. Draughon Business College, Inc.535 So.2d 502 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1989).

This is an action to void a contract, and for damages related to the contract.

Action: Plaintiff filed suit against defendant based on a lack of consideration for additional

employment duties. The trial court rescinded the contract and granted the plaintiff damages.

Facts: Plaintiff was a teacher at defendants college. Defendant requested that the plaintiff teachanother class. After plaintiff received his first check, he realized he was not being paid for the additionalwork.

Issue: Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages related to the contract.

Held: The court held that plaintiffs recovery must be in form of damages rather than specificperformance.

Rule: Art. 1967 protects plaintiffs reliance when he knew or should have known that

the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party wasreasonable in so relying.

Reason: The court held that the above Art. Incorporates detrimental reliance as an additional basis forenforceability of obligations. Further, this allows either specific performance or damages to thedisappointed promisee.

Martin v. Schluntz589 So.2d 1208 (La. App. 4th. Cir. 1991).

This is an action to void a contract, and for damages related to the contract.

Action: Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant for breach of contract and damages. The trialcourt held that there was no contract between the parties, and that the legal presumption was that the leaseagreement was an oral month-to-month lease. The trial court also awarded her $175 in damages.Plaintiff appealed.

Facts: Plaintiff owned some immovable property in New Orleans. In April of 1987, defendantspoke with the plaintiff about leasing the premises. Defendant requested a rent reduction ($450 v. $500)for a longer lease, to which plaintiff agreed. This was done orally. Defendant later notified plaintiff ofhis intent to vacate in August of 1987, bringing the length of his occupancy to three months. When hemoved out, the premises were unsanitary and damaged. It should be noted that the written lease wasnever signed. In fact, plaintiff, who was a law student, states that while she continued to request

defendant sign the lease, she never prepared one.

Issue: Whether there was a contract between the parties based on the oral agreement.Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for detrimental reliance.Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach of the lease agreement.

Held: Affirmed.


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Rule: LSA C.C.Art. 1967A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew orshould have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detrimentand the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expensesincurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisees reliance on the promise. Reliance

on the gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.

The essential elements to state a detrimental reliance theory of recovery inLouisiana are: (1) representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance thereon; and (3) achange of position to ones detriment because of the reliance.

Reason: The court held that there was no contract between the parties as there was never anythingsigned. Based on the oral agreement, the court applied the legal presumption that the lease was month-to-month. She got damages for the cleaning, detrimental reliance, and the rent reduction for a total of 275.

Obligations Briefs p. 1-182

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Transcript of Obligations Briefs p. 1-182