Champions Briefs

8/12/2019 Champions Briefs

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Copyright 2014 by Champion Briefs, LLC

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The Evidence Standard___________________________ 3

Topic Analyses _________________________________ 7

Topic Analysis by Danny Rego ______________________________ 8

Topic Analysis by Ethan Goldstein _________________________ 13

Topic Analysis by Grant Sinnott ___________________________ 19

General Information ____________________________ 23

Possible Frameworks ___________________________ 43

Pro Arguments with Con Responses _______________ 50

Court Ruling Followed Prior Court Precedent _________________ 51

A/2: Court Ruling Followed Prior Court Precedent __________ 55

Discrimination Against States Always Unconstitutional _________ 59

A/2: Discrimination Against States Always Unconstitutional ___ 62

Discrimination Against States Lacks Reason _________________ 66

A/2: Discrimination Against States Lacks Reason __________ 69

States Should Be Treated Equally ___________________________ 72

A/2: States Should Be Treated Equally _____________________ 75

States Have the Right to Self-Govern _________________________ 78

A/2: States Have the Right to Self-Govern __________________ 81

Disparate Impact _________________________________________ 84

A/2: Disparate Impact ___________________________________ 89

Violations of Federalism ___________________________________ 94

A/2: Violations of Federalism ____________________________ 102

Judicial Review and Limiting Federal Power _________________ 107

A/2: Judicial Review and Limiting Federal Power __________ 111

Outdated Formula _______________________________________ 117


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A/2: Outdated Formula _________________________________ 122

Section 2 Necessary ______________________________________ 127

A/2: Section 2 Necessary ________________________________ 131

15th Amendment Violations Prevented by Section 3 ___________ 140A/2: 15th Amendment Violations Prevented by Section 3 _____ 140

Court Ruling Protects Voting Rights with Section 5____________ 144

A/2: Court Ruling Protects Voting Rights with Section 5 _____ 148

Equal Sovereignty and Equal Protection _____________________ 152

A/2: Equal Sovereignty and Equal Protection ______________ 156

Unconstitutional due to Necessary and Proper Clause __________ 160

A/2: Unconstitutional due to Necessary and Proper Clause ___ 164

Overstep of the Federal Government ________________________ 168A/2: Overstep of the Federal Government _________________ 171

Con Arguments with Pro Responses ______________ 176

Covered Jurisdictions Still Have Worst Voting Conditions ______ 177

A/2: Covered Jurisdictions Still Have Worst Voting Conditions 181

The Decision Invalidates Section 5 Unjustly __________________ 184

A/2: The Decision Invalidates Section 5 Unjustly ____________ 189

Section 2 of the VRA is an Imperfect Replacement ____________ 192

A/2: Section 2 of the VRA is an Imperfect Replacement ______ 196

The VRA is Preferable to New Legislation ___________________ 199

A/2: The VRA is Preferable to New Legislation _____________ 204

Supreme Court Should Practice Severe Judicial Restraint ______ 207

A/2: Supreme Court Should Practice Severe Judicial Restraint 212

Elections Clause Allows Congress to Choose __________________ 216

A/2: Elections Clause Allows Congress to Choose ___________ 220

Section Five is the Constitutional Flaw, not Section Four _______ 223

A/2: Section Five is the Constitutional Flaw, not Section Four _ 226

Preclearance Still Necessary _______________________________ 229

A/2: Preclearance Still Necessary ________________________ 232

Decision Removes Progress Made to Provide Equality _________ 236


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A/2: Decision Removes Progress Made to Provide Equality ___ 239

States Dont Need to be Treated Equally _____________________ 242

A/2: States Dont Need to be Treated Equally ______________ 246

State Equality is not a Constitutional Requirement ____________ 248A/2: State Equality is not a Constitutional Requirement _____ 251

Different Coverage Formulas not Politically Possible __________ 254

A/2: Different Coverage Formulas not Politically Possible ____ 259

15th Amendment Grants Congress These Powers _____________ 262

A/2: 15th Amendment Grants Congress These Powers _______ 267

Civil Rights Questions are Answered by Congress _____________ 270

A/2: Civil Rights Questions are Answered by Congress ______ 274

There is still a need for Section 4 of the VRA _________________ 277A/2: There is still a need for Section 4 of the VRA ___________ 282


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Resolved: The Supreme Court rightly decided that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act violated

the Constitution.

Being frustrated with this topic at first glance is completely legitimate. Constitutionality

is always a tough issue to debate, but this topic is not only about that. The Supreme Courts

decision surrounded the issues of discrimination, federalism, and timeliness. These are issues

that reach into the deep recesses of our country and its history. My main issue with this topic is

not the issue of individual rights and the Supreme Court but rather with the constitutional issue

that the NFL chose to examine.

This topic is not only narrow but it is difficult to access because the topic is worded in a

way saying not that that Section 4 is unconstitutional but rather that the decision was correct.

This limits the debate in an unnecessary way because it will force teams from the Affirmative to

either debate the same arguments made by the Supreme Court or deal with frameworks by the

Negative that attempt to force them into that advocacy. The wording of the topic makes is

unnecessarily ultra-specific and this is going to lessen the quality of debates because teams wont

be able to access a plethora of constitutional ground. Additionally, limiting the debate to this one

section reduces the ability for this debate to come down to different issues in every round. Im

not suggesting that the topic should have been whether or not the Voting Rights Act itself was

unconstitutional; what I am suggesting is that the other topic regarding religious exemptions

would have been the lesser of the evils because that would at least allow debaters to discuss the


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extent to which rights apply. This topic is not one about rights but rather if the system in place to

correct for rights infringements is still valid or not.

So how do teams win on this topic? The first thing that each team needs to establish is

how the Supreme Court ought to operate when it interprets the Constitution. This is vital to

answering the question of whether or not they decided correctly because the answer will most

certainly change depending on how they are supposed to interpret the Constitution as well as

what their role within society is. This can either be done at the framework level or the contention

level. The framework level is more practical because it makes it an overarching argument within

the round as opposed to an argument that can be beaten and then ignored. This is an argument

that will be the internal link of either teams case because it will determine whether or not your

arguments answer the question based upon the Courts calculus.

The second thing that is necessary for both teams is establishing the grounds on which

the round will be decided. What I mean by this is that you need to establish and explain the main

issues concerning the constitutionality of Section 4. This will be weaved through the contention

level arguments of your case and will be the core tenets of your voting issues at the end of the

round. On both sides, you will have multiple different ways of linking into the decisions

constitutionality, but ultimately it will come back to those main core tenets that I mentioned at

the beginning of this topic analysis. This will make it easier for you to boil down the round to a

few main arguments regarding the validity of Section 4. This is key because constitutionality is a

difficult topic to relay to judges because there is very little room to weigh; if you prove your

constitutional arguments and warrants, then the impact is simply that the Section is constitutional


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or not. Essentially, this topic is going to be much more focused on the link debate than on the

impact analysis.

The third thing that both teams need to do is understand the history and precedent that

followed the Voting Rights Act, its amendments, and its history in the U.S. court system. These

can change the course of the round if you are not fully informed because the precedent is

bilateral but some cases are more applicable or are better apt to helping judge the question of

whether or not this section is topical. Moreover, it is important to note that both teams are most

likely going to have to argue the role that precedent plays within the court system as well as the

burden of proof necessary to deem something unconstitutional or constitutional. On the

Affirmative, you are going to want to argue that the court must interpret the Constitution in such

a way that looks to the potential harms to the individual citizens rights, which means that they

have a lower burden of proof to rule something as unconstitutional. On the Negative, you should

argue that the Supreme Court ought take the greatest care when ruling something

unconstitutional because the legislature has the power to enforce laws and the Constitution

through appropriate legislation. The Supreme Court should only intervene with legislative

powers when absolutely necessary, which means that there is a higher burden of proof in order to

rule something unconstitutional.

Teams need to be careful about how they are going to choose to interpret the resolution

because it can change the course of the round. In the Framework section, we analyze a few

different ways to approach the topic. One way is for you to analyze it in the sense of looking at

the specific decision made and whether or not it was correct in its entirety. This will allow you to


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still remains necessary. Second, I would argue that the Supreme Court needs to practice strict

restraint in order to prevent an infringement upon legislative powers when such an infringement

is unwarranted. Third, I would argue that the sections that the court did uphold, such as Section

5, couldnt be used without Section 4 being in place because it invalidates the main tenets of the

law. Overall, I think that both teams are going to have a difficult time finding clash in a round

when there a so many topic interpretations and arguments that follow it.

Good Luck!

About Danny Rego

Danny Rego attended and competed for University School of Nova Southeastern

University and graduated in May, 2012. He competed in Public Forum Debate throughout his

entire 4 years of high school. He won the Tournament of Champions (2012) and Crestian Classic

(2011). He was a finalist at the Florida State Tournament and the Crestian Classic (2012). He

was a late elimination round competitor at the Glenbrooks, Emory, and Apple Valley. Danny is

currently a sophmore at Northeastern University majoring in International Business and

minoring in International Affairs and Economics. He spends his summers instructing at the

Champion Briefs Institute.


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Before I begin my Topic Analysis, I would like to introduce myself to our readers. I am

Ethan Goldstein, a former 4-year Public Forum debater from American Heritage School. And

yes, my partner did win Nationals in Congress. Now that weve gotten the awkward first

introduction out of the way, lets delve into the topic of arguably the biggest month on the PF

circuit.


the Constitution.

I have to say that February is one of my favorite months of debate and this year, like past

years, the February topic is very straightforward. Unfortunately this year, the resolution is very

straightforward about a very confusing issue. Basically, I dont think you should worry about

arguing definitions, but the subject matter of Section 4 is very difficult to understand.

So lets first begin with some background information on the Voting Rights Act and

Section 4. The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965 and was aimed at reducing electoral

corruption and discrimination by creating something known as preclearance. Preclearance

forced all districts that met a certain requirement to get approval from the U.S. Attorney General

or a 3-judge panel of the U.S. District Court of D.C. if they wish to make any changes that could

affect voting. Shelby County v Holder (2013), the case in question, struck down Section 4(b) as

Unconstitutional. The court ruled that the criterion used outdated data and thus put an


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Unconstitutional burden on the federal government to oversee this state issue of voting. This

specific section established the criterion for a district needing preclearance. It is very important

to recognize that Section 4(b) only determined the criterion. However, once ruled

Unconstitutional, preclearance can no longer be practiced until or unless new legislation is

passed. It is also very important to realize that the Section 4(b) standards only applied to very

few states, mostly in the south. This means that the law was never some sweeping mandate used

across the entire nation, but rather it was instituted as a check and balance on racial

discrimination.

For this topic, it is very important to know the constitution. Obviously Im not suggesting

that you all become Constitutional scholars in a week, but definitely brush up on your

Constitutional knowledge. Knowing more than your opponents about the constitution can be an

effective way at refuting your opponents contentions without cards that specifically relate to the

arguments your opponents use. As discussed earlier, there is a short turnover from January to

February so the amount of research you compile may be less than you compile for other

tournaments. But a broader knowledge of the constitution can a) make your opponents lose

credibility with the judge; and b) allow you to effectively refute without reading card after card

after card.

I believe the nature of this topic will tend to favor debaters who analyze arguments rather

than just simply read cards. I honestly believe that a second speaker can give a brilliant rebuttal

only using one or two cards. I think judges will prefer analytics to card reading because the

resolution begs the debaters (you guys) to tell the judge WHY, not WHAT. Whywas the


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Supreme Court right or not right in making this decision? For example, while with past topics

you could read cards that essentially say According to this professor from this prestigious

university, my opponents are wrong, I can guarantee that you will not be able to get away with

that on this topic. So brush up on your Constitutional knowledge and focus on analyzing and

explaining rather than just card reading.

This resolution, unlike past topics, is not asking the judge to choose between two

different options, but rather this resolution is a truth test. The Supreme Court did strike down

Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, now lets debate if they were right in doing so. A lot of

you will be coming off a very busy month of January and as such the turnover between topics is

fairly short. This will require some strategic prepping. Given the wording of this topic, you

probably are not going to win rounds off case turns. In other words, because this topic is a truth

test, dropping ones case and hoping to win off turns read in rebuttal is not the best decision when

trying to win rounds. Instead, I suggest having well-warranted, strong cases that you can win

with independently of winning your opponents case. I think this topic more than any other so far

this year could come down to which team has the better case.

I think that most rounds will be won in the framework debate. Some of you will love this

and others will find this too nitpicky for your liking. Regardless, I truly believe that all cases

should absolutely have some sort of framework establishing the mechanisms you will be using to

analyze the Constitutionality of this decision. Teams should be analyzing Constitutionality on

pillars such as Federalism, popular sovereignty, voter turnout, etc. Because this topic applies

specifically to voting regulations; think back to the Citizens United topic and remember some of


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the Constitutional standards you debated. Ideas such as voter turnout, voter knowledge, voter

responsiveness, and voter fairness could all be applied to this topic. My suggestion is to write a

framework that includes a few of these democratic ideals, tell the judge why these are the most

important in analyzing the Constitutionality of the decision, and write contentions that support

that framework.

Lets look specifically to the Pro side of this debate. Because a judge could be very

opinionated about this topic, I think its important to point out that you are debating

Constitutionality, not your personal feelings. With that being said, I think the pro should use the

courts decision to its advantage. What I mean by this is use the courts reasoning to develop

your arguments. The court ruled that the coverage formula was outdated considering it was

implemented over 40 years ago. I think you could use that line of logic to your advantage and

explain that since the Constitution is a living, breathing document, things need to be changed

over time. I also believe the pro could make a compelling argument that the U.S. has undergone

dramatic changes since the 1960s and that the Voting Rights Act is no longer required. I think

you could back this argument up by giving statistics about minority voting rates in recent

elections.

I think another good way for the pro to win rounds is via Federalism. You could easily

argue that Section 4(b) gave the federal government too much power over the states to determine

voting regulations for the states. I also think Pro could make the argument that not many districts

were affected to begin with and then challenge the negative team to show some dramatic change

that will happen as a result of the decision. I think the best way for Pro to approach the round is


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based strictly on Constitutionality rather than emotions, and challenge the negative team to show

absolute harms that will occur as a result of the decision.

On the Con side of the debate, I think debaters should stress that current voting habits are

nowhere near equal and that Section 4(b) is absolutely necessary to insure an equal and fair

election system. I think Con should focus on the Constitutional standards of equality and

fairness. Con could present a very compelling case arguing that currently there are still issues

with electoral equality and fairness, prove that Section 4(b) reduces that inequality, and ague that

decreasing fairness in anyway is antithetical to Constitutional views. I think most judges will

want to side with the Con based on personal views, so use that to your advantage. Good negative

teams will argue that inequality and unfairness in elections has been decreasing over time and

find evidence that attributes that success to the Voting Rights Act. The Con has the ability to

play the speculation game. They can easily make the argument that we will not truly know what

will happen as a result of the decision and that the devil you know if better than the devil you

dont know. Pigeonhole the affirmative into defending an election system with no check on

racial discrimination or force them explain how new legislation could solve this problem better.

The negative team should be constantly asking the affirmative to explain how taking away

checks and balances on racial discrimination could possibly lead to a more democratic society.

I think Pro is a more technical side, while I think Con can use some bigger picture ideas

to their advantage. With that being said, I am extremely excited to see this topic debated as a bit

of a Constitutional scholar myself. Good luck to everyone in the monster month that is February

and I hope to see many of you at Harvard!


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About Ethan Goldstein

Ethan Goldstein attended and competed for American Heritage in Florida for four years

and graduated in 2013. During his career, he championed the 2013 NCFL Grand National

Tournament, the 2012 Wake Forest Earlybird, and the 2011 & 2012 Villager Invitational.

Additionally, he was a finalist at Emory, the Sunvitational, and the Sunvitational Round Robin

and was named the top speaker at the 2012 Tournament of Champions. He currently attends the

University of Florida where he is studying political science and economics.


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the Constitution.

Due to the narrow nature of the fundamental question of this resolution, several factors

that may not play as large of a role in other resolutions will become more critical for success.

The first area we will look at is one (that my topic analyses dont normally touch on) is the

history of the conflict and why this resolution has been chosen. Rob Teilhetoffers one of the bestexplanations of the problems of the past that I could find. He explains:

Prior to the Voting Rights Act, voter suppression and intimidation were

widespread and institutional. Schemes designed to keep African-Americans from voting

were commonplace and barely disguised usually in the form of a poll tax, literacy test

or grandfather clause. In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, designed to

outlaw discriminatory voting practices that had led to the widespread disenfranchisement

of African-Americans.1

By understanding from where this law comes, discrimination, and racism in south, we are

better able to understand the constitutional challenges of today. The voting rights act clearly

"Teilhet, Rob. "Our election politics: Present just like past."University of Georgia. (2013 ): n.page. Web. 7 Jan. 2014. .


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empowers minorities with special protection, but are these protections still needed and are they

fair to all citizens? To better understand the questions of this resolution, it is necessary to look at

the scoop and overreaching impact of the section. This section has been used in a host of cases to

stop things like voter ID laws from coming into fruition; I would suggest further research

specific actions that this law has been used to stop. Before engaging in the debate of whether or

not the benefits of the law are good or bad / right or wrong, I think it is important to ask whether

it is the role of the judiciary and the constitution to fix the problems that this law is meant to stop

or the role of the legislature.

This debate could be answered on two levels in my mind. The first is a pragmatic level. It

could be argued that judicial activism is needed because the legislature is failing to do its job to

pass policy. On the other side, it could be argued that because the law has existed, the legislature

has felt no need to pass policy and that this decision has overstepped the role of the judiciary,

who some would argue exist solely to interpret. This debate stems back into a discussion of

whether the SCOTUS should interpret the constitution as a living document one that is fluid

and needs to be changed or as a set in stone set of instructions that should not be altered.

Interesting justifications for both sides surely exist, but I think the best example is that if we

interpreted the constitution strictly, the practice of slavery still might exist today. With this in

mind, I think intuition suggests that almost anything is and should be up for change, but there are

most definitely people with other lines of thought.

I like how these arguments are directly predicated around the idea of constitutionality, by

defining the way the document should be interpreted it will become easier for teams to defend

their own arguments and attacks others. When thinking about the substance of this topic, I

imagine many teams will carve out specific advocacies about how without this section X policy


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will pass that will cause Y rights violation that violates Z part of the constitution. Luckily the

decision was made on a 5-4, so there is clearly room for contention on the issue, and I dont

think arguments about SCOTUS being the best decider are going to work. Anyways, these niche

positions are a creative way to frame the topic and find unique justifications for why the law is or

is not constitutional.

The other side could make counter claims about the over extension of the law and how

these negatively effect rights and violate the constitution. Ultimately, I think this sides ground is

slightly limited and that the teams who are going to win on the affirmative are going to be able to

tell a persuasive narrative about why the problems that justified these special conditions in the

south are no longer relevant today. Here, I think arguments that agree that the problems still exist

but that they are not of the same magnitude as in the past will be effective. When the ruling was

made, these issues were much worse, and while there are some problems today they are not on

par with what they use to be. This could invalidate the constitutional bases of the negative

position.

For all teams, I offer some random advice. Amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme

Court are going to be some of the best evidence you can find. Secondly, it is important to

understand the underpinnings of the decision both current and past. Find out why it was

constitutional then and why it is unconstitutional now, this will enable you to link or delink

weird arguments or specific disadvantages.


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About Grant Sinnott

Grant Sinnott was a Public Forum debater for Lake Highland Prep in Florida and

graduated in May 2013. He was the Champion of the 2013 NFL National Tournament, the

Sunvitational, Sunvitational Round Robin, the Florida State Tournament. Additionally, he was a

finalist at the Tournament of Champions, the Glenbrooks, and Emory. Throughout his career, he

amassed 10 TOC bids among other achievements. Grant currently attends the University of

Florida in Gainesville, FL.


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Resolved: The Supreme Court rightly decided that Section 4 of the

Voting Rights Act violated the Constitution.

Foreword: We, at Champion Briefs, feel that having deep knowledge

about a topic is just as valuable as formulating the right arguments.

Having general background knowledge about the topic area helps

debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of

knowledge. As such, we have compiled general information on the key

concepts and general areas that we feel will best suit you for in- and out-

of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built from a

strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this

section to help build that foundation.


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SEC. 4.(a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United States to vote is not denied or

abridged on account of race or color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal,

State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any test or device in any State with

respect to which the determinations have been made under subsection (b) or in any political

subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit, unless

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory

judgment brought by such State or subdivision against the United States has determined that no

such test or device has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action for the

purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color:

Provided, That no such declaratory judgment shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period

of five years after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the United States, other than the

denial of a declaratory judgment under this section, whether entered prior to or after the

enactment of this Act, determining that denials or abridgments of the right to vote on account of

race or color through the use of such tests or devices have occurred anywhere in the territory of

such plaintiff. An action pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of

three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States

Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. The court shall retain jurisdiction of any

action pursuant to this subsection for five years after judgment and shall reopen the action upon

motion of the Attorney General alleging that a test or device has been used for the purpose or

with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.

If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to believe that any such test or

device has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or

with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, he shall

consent to the entry of such judgment.(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State or in any political subdivision of a

state which (1) the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or

device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census determines that less than 50

percentum of the persons of voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or

that less than 50 percentum of such persons voted in the presidential election of November 1964.


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A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of the Director of the Census

under this section or under section 6 or section 13 shall not be reviewable in any court and shall

be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

(c) The phrase "test or device" shall mean any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for

voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret

any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular

subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of

registered voters or members of any other class.

(d) For purposes of this section no State or political subdivision shall be determined to have

engaged in the use of tests or devices for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging

the right to vote on account of race or color if (1) incidents of such use have been few in number

and have been promptly and effectively corrected by State or local action, (2) the continuing

effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and (3) there is no reasonable probability of their

recurrence in the future.

(e) (1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the fourteenth amendment of

persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom language was

other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of

such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English

language. (2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary

grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of

Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language

was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election

because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English

language, except that, in States in which State law provides that a different level of education is

presumptive of literacy, he shall demonstrate that he has successfully completed an equivalent

level of education in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory,the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant

classroom language was other than English (Transcript of Voting Rights Act (1965)).

Other Relevant Sections of Voting Rights Act


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SEC. 3.(a) Whenever the Attorney General institutes a proceeding under any statute to enforce

the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court shall

authorize the appointment of Federal examiners by the United States Civil Service Commission

in accordance with section 6 to serve for such period of time and for such political subdivisions

as the court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment

(1) as part of any interlocutory order if the court determines that the appointment of such

examiners is necessary to enforce such guarantees or (2) as part of any final judgment if the court

finds that violations of the fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred in such

State or subdivision: Provided, That the court need not authorize the appointment of examiners if

any incidents of denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color (1) have

been few in number and have been promptly and effectively corrected by State or local action,

(2) the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and (3) there is no reasonable

probability of their recurrence in the future.

(b) If in a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General under any statute to enforce the

guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court finds that a

test or device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right of

any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, it shall suspend the use of

tests and devices in such State or political subdivisions as the court shall determine is appropriate

and for such period as it deems necessary.

(c) If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General under any statute to enforce the

guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision the court finds that

violations of the fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred within the

territory of such State or political subdivision, the court, in addition to such relief as it may grant,

shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such period no

voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to

voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced shall beenforced unless and until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,

or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the

right to vote on account of race or color: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite,

standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced if the qualification, prerequisite, standard,

practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official


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of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed

an objection within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the court's finding nor

the Attorney General's failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of

such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure (Transcript of Voting Rights

Act (1965)).

SEC. 5.Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set

forth in section 4(a) are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or

prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from

that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute an action in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such

qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will

not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and

unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for

failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure:

Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced

without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has

been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision

to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty

days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a

declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin

enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action

under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with

the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the

Supreme Court.

SEC. 6.Whenever (a) a court has authorized the appointment of examiners pursuant to theprovisions of section 3(a), or (b) unless a declaratory judgment has been rendered under section

4(a), the Attorney General certifies with respect to any political subdivision named in, or

included within the scope of, determinations made under section 4(b) that (1) he has received

complaints in writing from twenty or more residents of such political subdivision alleging that

they have been denied the right to vote under color of law on account of race or color, and that


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he believes such complaints to be meritorious, or (2) that, in his judgment (considering, among

other factors, whether the ratio of nonwhite persons to white persons registered to vote within

such subdivision appears to him to be reasonably attributable to violations of the fifteenth

amendment or whether substantial evidence exists that bona fide efforts are being made within

such subdivision to comply with the fifteenth amendment), the appointment of examiners is

otherwise necessary to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment, the Civil Service

Commission shall appoint as many examiners for such subdivision as it may deem appropriate to

prepare and maintain lists of persons eligible to vote in Federal, State, and local elections. Such

examiners, hearing officers provided for in section 9(a), and other persons deemed necessary by

the Commission to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act shall be appointed,

compensated, and separated without regard to the provisions of any statute administered by the

Civil Service Commission, and service under this Act shall not be considered employment for

the purposes of any statute administered by the Civil Service Commission, except the provisions

of section 9 of the Act of August 2, 1939, as amended (5 U.S.C. 118i), prohibiting partisan

political activity: Provided, That the Commission is authorized, after consulting the head of the

appropriate department or agency, to designate suitable persons in the official service of the

United States, with their consent, to serve in these positions. Examiners and hearing officers

shall have the power to administer oaths (Transcript of Voting Rights Act (1965)).

Cause of Suit Against the Attorney General

Shelby County is located in Alabama, a covered jurisdiction. It has not sought bailout, as the

Attorney General has recently objected to voting changes proposed from within the county. See

App. 87a92a. Instead, in 2010, the county sued the Attorney General in Federal District Court

in Washington, D. C., seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting

Rights Act are facially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction against their

enforcement. The District Court ruled against the county and upheld the Act. 811 F. Supp. 2d424, 508 (2011). The court found that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was sufficient to

justify reauthorizing 5 and continuing the 4(b) coverage formula (SHELBY COUNTY,

ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Opinion of the Court 7).

70&-#8 *) ,9" :*0$,


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Held:Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula can no longer be used

as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance. Pp. 925.

(a) In Northwest Austin, this Court noted that the Voting Rights Act imposes current

burdens and must be justified by current needs and concluded that a departure from the

fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statutes disparate geo-

graphic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. 557 U. S., at 203. These

basic principles guide review of the question presented here. Pp. 917.

(1) State legislation may not contravene federal law. States retain broad autonomy,

however, in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Tenth

Amendment re- serves to the States all powers not specifically granted to the Federal

Government, including the power to regulate elections. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452,

461462. There is also a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States, which is

highly pertinent in assessing disparate treatment of States. Northwest Austin, supra, at 203.

The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It requires States to

beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise

have the right to enact and execute on their own. And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty,

the Act applies to only nine States (and additional counties). That is why, in 1966, this Court

described the Act as stringent and potent, Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337. The Court

nonetheless upheld the Act, concluding that such an uncommon exercise of congressional

power could be justified by exceptional conditions. Id., at 334. Pp. 912.

(2) In 1966, these departures were justified by the blight of racial discrimination in

voting that had infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century,

Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308. At the time, the coverage formulathe means of linking the

exercise of the unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted itmade sense. The

Act was limited to areas where Congress found evidence of actual voting discrimination, and

the covered jurisdictions shared two characteristics: the use of tests and devices for voterregistration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the

national average. Id., at 330. The Court explained that [t]ests and devices are relevant to voting

discrimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate

is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the


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number of actual voters. Ibid. The Court therefore concluded that the coverage formula [was]

rational in both practice and theory. Ibid. Pp. 1213.

(3) Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically. Largely because of the

Voting Rights Act, [v]oter turnout and registration rates in covered jurisdictions now approach

parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates

hold office at unprecedented levels. Northwest Austin, supra, at 202. The tests and devices that

blocked ballot access have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years. Yet the Act has not

eased 5s restrictions or narrowed the scope of 4s coverage formula along the way. Instead

those extraordinary and unprecedented fea- tures have been reauthorized as if nothing has

changed, and they have grown even stronger. Because 5 applies only to those jurisdictions

singled out by 4, the Court turns to consider that provision. Pp. 1317.

(b) Section 4s formula is unconstitutional in light of current conditions. Pp. 1725.

(1) In 1966, the coverage formula was rational in both practice and theory. Katzenbach,

supra, at 330. It looked to cause (discriminatory tests) and effect (low voter registration and

turnout), and tailored the remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both. By 2009,

however, the coverage formula raise[d] serious constitutional questions. Northwest Austin,

supra, at 204. Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula

captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s

and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned for over 40 years. And voter registration and

turnout numbers in covered States have risen dramatically. In 1965, the States could be divided

into those with a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout and those

without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the

Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if

it were. Pp. 1718.

(2) The Government attempts to defend the formula on grounds that it is reverse-

engineeredCongress identified the jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with criteriato describe them. Katzenbach did not sanction such an approach, reasoning instead that the

coverage formula was rational because the formula . . . was relevant to the problem. 383 U. S.,

at 329, 330. The Government has a fallback argumentbecause the formula was relevant in

1965, its continued use is permissible so long as any discrimination remains in the States

identified in 1965. But this does not look to current political conditions, Northwest Austin,


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supra, at 203, instead relying on a comparison between the States in 1965. But history did not

end in 1965. In assessing the current need[ ] for a preclearance system treating States

differently from one another today, history since 1965 cannot be ignored. The Fifteenth

Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. To

serve that purpose, Congressif it is to divide the Statesmust identify those jurisdictions to be

singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. Pp. 1821.

(3) Respondents also rely heavily on data from the record compiled by Congress before

reauthorizing the Act. Regardless of how one looks at that record, no one can fairly say that it

shows anything approaching the pervasive, flagrant, widespread, and rampant

discrimination that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation in

1965. Katzenbach, supra, at 308, 315, 331. But a more fundamental problem remains: Congress

did not use that record to fashion a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead

re-enacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day. Pp.

2122.

679 F. 3d 848, reversed (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY

GENERAL, ET AL. Syllabus 2-4).

Excerpts from Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion

Regarding Section 5: The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit affirmed. In assessing 5, the

D. C. Circuit considered six primary categories of evidence: Attorney General objections to

voting changes, Attorney General requests for more information regarding voting changes,

successful 2 suits in covered jurisdictions, the dispatching of federal observers to monitor

elections in covered jurisdictions, 5 preclearance suits involving covered jurisdictions, and the

deter- rent effect of 5. See 679 F. 3d 848, 862863 (2012). After extensive analysis of the

record, the court accepted Congresss conclusion that 2 litigation remained inadequate in thecovered jurisdictions to protect the rights of minority voters, and that 5 was therefore still

necessary. Id., at 873 (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY

GENERAL, ET AL. Opinion of the Court 7-8).

Regarding Section 4:


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Framework for Decision: In Northwest Austin, we stated that the Act imposes current

burdens and must be justified by current needs. 557 U. S., at 203. And we concluded that a

departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a

statutes disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. Ibid.

These basic principles guide our review of the question before us (SHELBY COUNTY,


Regarding Supremacy Clause: State legislation may not contravene federal law. The

Federal Government does not, however, have a general right to review and veto state enactments

before they go into effect. A proposal to grant such authority to negative state laws was

considered at the Constitutional Convention, but rejected in favor of allowing state laws to take

effect, subject to later challenge under the Supremacy Clause (SHELBY COUNTY,


Regarding Equal State Sovereignty:Not only do States retain sovereignty under the

Constitution, there is also a fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States.

Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 (citing United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 16 (1960);

Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845); and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725726

(1869); emphasis added). Over a hundred years ago, this Court explained that our Nation was

and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559,

567 (1911). Indeed, the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious

operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized. Id., at 580. Coyle concerned

the admission of new States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle operated as a

bar on differential treatment outside that context. 383 U. S., at 328329. At the same time, as we

made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly

pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States. 557 U. S., at 203.The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It suspends all

changes to state election law however innocuousuntil they have been precleared by federal

authorities in Washington, D. C. Id., at 202. States must beseech the Federal Government for

permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on

their own, subject of course to any injunction in a 2 action. The Attorney General has 60 days to


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object to a preclearance request, longer if he requests more information. See 28 CFR 51.9,

51.37. If a State seeks preclearance from a three- judge court, the process can take years.

And despite the tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and

several additional counties). While one State waits months or years and expends funds to

implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the same law into effect

immediately, through the normal legislative process. Even if a noncovered jurisdiction is sued,

there are important differences between those proceedings and preclearance proceedings; the

preclearance proceeding not only switches the burden of proof to the supplicant jurisdiction, but

also applies substantive standards quite different from those governing the rest of the nation.

679 F. 3d, at 884 (Williams, J., dissenting) (case below) (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v.

HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Opinion of the Court 10-11).

Regarding Original Ruling of Section 4: Shortly before enactment of the Voting

Rights Act, only 19.4 percent of African-Americans of voting age were registered to vote in

Alabama, only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent in Mississippi. Id., at 313. Those

figures were roughly 50 percentage points or more below the figures for whites. Ibid.

In short, we concluded that [u]nder the compulsion of these unique circumstances,

Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner. Id., at 334, 335. We also noted then and

have emphasized since that this extraordinary legislation was intended to be temporary, set to

expire after five years. Id., at 333; Northwest Austin, supra, at 199.

At the time, the coverage formulathe means of linking the exercise of the

unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted itmade sense. We found that

Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed

necessary. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 328. The areas where Congress found evidence of actual

voting discrimination shared two characteristics: the use of tests and devices for voter

registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points below thenational average. Id., at 330. We explained that [t]ests and devices are relevant to voting

discrimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is

pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the

number of actual voters. Ibid. We therefore concluded that the coverage formula [was] rational

in both practice and theory. Ibid. It accurately reflected those jurisdictions uniquely


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characterized by voting discrimination on a pervasive scale, linking coverage to the devices

used to effectuate discrimination and to the resulting disenfranchisement. Id., at 308. The

formula ensured that the stringent remedies [were] aimed at areas where voting discrimination

ha[d] been most flagrant. Id., at 315 (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Opinion of the Court 12-13).

Regarding the Necessity of Section 4: Nearly 50 years later, things have changed

dramatically. Shelby County contends that the preclearance requirement, even without regard to

its disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments have a good deal of force. In the

covered jurisdictions, [v]oter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly

discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at

unprecedented levels. Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 202. The tests and devices that blocked

access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years. See 6, 84 Stat. 315;

102, 89 Stat. 400.

Those conclusions are not ours alone. Congress said the same when it reauthorized the

Act in 2006, writing that [s]ignificant progress has been made in eliminating first generation

barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased numbers of registered minority

voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, and

local elected offices. 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577. The House Report elaborated that the number of

African-Americans who are registered and who turn out to cast ballots has increased

significantly over the last 40 years, particularly since 1982, and noted that [i]n some

circumstances, minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that surpass those of white

voters. H. R. Rep. No. 109478, p. 12 (2006). That Report also explained that there have been

significant increases in the number of African-Americans serving in elected offices; more

specifically, there has been approximately a 1,000 percent increase since 1965 in the number of

African-American elected officials in the six States originally covered by the Voting Rights Act.Id., at 18 (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court 13-14).

Regarding the Formula: By 2009, however, we concluded that the coverage formula

raise[d] serious constitutional questions. Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 204. As we explained,


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a statutes current burdens must be justified by current needs, and any disparate geographic

coverage must be sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. Id., at 203. The coverage

formula met that test in 1965, but no longer does so.

Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula

captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s

and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years. 6, 84 Stat. 315;

102, 89 Stat. 400. And voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States have risen

dramatically in the years since. H. R. Rep. No. 109478, at 12. Racial disparity in those numbers

was compelling evidence justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. See, e.g.,

Katzenbach, supra, at 313, 329330. There is no longer such a disparity.

In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent history of voting

tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics. Congress

based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along those

lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were (SHELBY COUNTY,

ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Opinion of the Court 17-18).

Final Conclusions of the Court: Striking down an Act of Congress is the gravest and

most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142,

148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). We do not do so lightly. That is why, in 2009, we took care

to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act when asked to do so, and instead

resolved the case then before us on statutory grounds. But in issuing that decision, we expressed

our broader concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could have updated the

coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice

but to declare 4(b) unconstitutional. The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis

for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.

Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discriminationin voting found in 2. We issue no holding on 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress

may draft another formula based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial prerequisite

to a determination that exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an extraordinary

departure from the traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal

Government. Presley, 502 U. S., at 500501. Our country has changed, and while any racial


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discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to

remedy that problem speaks to current conditions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

reversed (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court 24).

Excerpts from Justice Ginsbergs Dissenting Opinion

Regarding Reauthorization Meeting the Rational-Basis Test: For three reasons, legislation

reauthorizing an existing statute is especially likely to satisfy the minimal requirements of the

rational-basis test. First, when reauthorization is at issue, Congress has already assembled a

legislative record justifying the initial legislation. Congress is en titled to consider that

preexisting record as well as the record before it at the time of the vote on reauthorization. This

is especially true where, as here, the Court has repeatedly affirmed the statutes constitutionality

and Congress has adhered to the very model the Court has upheld. See id., at 174 (The

appellants are asking us to do nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v.

Katzenbach . . . , in which we upheld the constitutionality of the Act.); Lopez v. Monterey

County, 525 U. S. 266, 283 (1999) (similar).

Second, the very fact that reauthorization is necessary arises because Congress has built a

temporal limitation into the Act. It has pledged to review, after a span of years (first 15, then 25)

and in light of contemporary evidence, the continued need for the VRA. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger,

539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003) (anticipating, but not guaranteeing, that, in 25 years, the use of racial

preferences [in higher education] will no longer be necessary).

Third, a reviewing court should expect the record sup porting reauthorization to be less

stark than the record originally made. Demand for a record of violations equivalent to the one

earlier made would expose Congress to a catch-22. If the statute was working, there would be

less evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that Congress should not be allowedto renew the statute. In contrast, if the statute was not working, there would be plenty of evidence

of discrimination, but scant reason to renew a failed regulatory regime. See Persily 193194.

This is not to suggest that congressional power in this area is limitless. It is this Courts

responsibility to ensure that Congress has used appropriate means. The question meet for judicial

review is whether the chosen means are adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have


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in view. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880). The Courts role, then, is not to substitute

its judgment for that of Congress, but to determine whether the legislative record sufficed to

show that Congress could rationally have determined that [its chosen] provisions were appro-

priate methods. City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 176177.

In summary, the Constitution vests broad power in Congress to protect the right to vote,

and in particular to combat racial discrimination in voting. This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed

Congress prerogative to use any rational means in exercise of its power in this area. And both

precedent and logic dictate that the rational-means test should be easier to satisfy, and the burden

on the statutes challenger should be higher, when what is at issue is the reauthorization of a

remedy that the Court has previously affirmed, and that Congress found, from con temporary

evidence, to be working to advance the legislatures legitimate objective (SHELBY COUNTY,

ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. GINSBURG, J., dissenting11-12).

Regarding the Courts Ruling on the Coverage Formula: The Court holds 4(b) invalid on

the ground that it is irrational to base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when

such tests have been illegal since that time. Ante, at 23. But the Court disregards what Congress

set about to do in enacting the VRA. That extraordinary legislation scarcely stopped at the

particular tests and devices that happened to exist in 1965. The grand aim of the Act is to secure

to all in our polity equal citizen ship stature, a voice in our democracy undiluted by race. As the

record for the 2006 reauthorization makes abundantly clear, second-generation barriers to

minority voting rights have emerged in the covered jurisdictions as at tempted substitutes for the

first-generation barriers that originally triggered preclearance in those jurisdictions. See supra, at

56, 8, 1517.

The sad irony of todays decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the VRA has

proven effective. The Court appears to believe that the VRAs success in eliminating the specific

devices extant in 1965 means that preclearance is no longer needed. Ante, at 2122, 2324. With

that belief, and the argument derived from it, history repeats itself. The same assumptionthat

the problem could be solved when particular methods of voting discrimination are identified and

eliminatedwas indulged and proved wrong repeatedly prior to the VRAs enactment. Unlike

prior statutes, which singled out particular tests or devices, the VRA is grounded in Congress

recognition of the variety and persistence of measures designed to impair minority voting


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rights. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 311; supra, at 2. In truth, the evolution of voting discrimination

into more subtle second-generation barriers is powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as

preclearance remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent backsliding.

Beyond question, the VRA is no ordinary legislation. It is extraordinary because

Congress embarked on a mission long delayed and of extraordinary importance: to realize the

purpose and promise of the Fifteenth Amendment. For a half century, a concerted effort has been

made to end racial discrimination in voting. Thanks to the Voting Rights Act, progress once the

subject of a dream has been achieved and continues to be made.

The record supporting the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA is also extraordinary. It was

described by the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee as one of the most extensive

considerations of any piece of legislation that the United States Congress has dealt with in the

2712 years he had served in the House. 152 Cong. Rec. H5143 (July 13, 2006) (statement of

Rep. Sensenbrenner).

After exhaustive evidence-gathering and deliberative process, Congress reauthorized the

VRA, including the coverage provision, with overwhelming bipartisan support. It was the

judgment of Congress that 40 years has not been a sufficient amount of time to eliminate the

vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100 years of disregard for the dictates of the 15th

amendment and to ensure that the right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed by the

Constitution. 2006 Reauthorization 2(b)(7), 120 Stat. 577. That determination of the body

empowered to enforce the Civil War Amendments by appropriate legislation merits this

Courts utmost respect. In my judgment, the Court errs egregiously by overriding Congress

decision (SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET

AL. GINSBURG, J., dissenting 35-37).

Summaries for Cases used in Shelby Case

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (S.Ct. 1966)

Facts:The Voting Rights Act of 1965 contained provisions attempting to prevent racial

discrimination in the voting process by offering remedies against such unjust practices as

requiring literacy or good moral character in order to vote.


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Issue:May Congress pass laws to carry out the provisions of constitutional amendments or to

exercise congressional powers?

Rule:(Warren, C.J.) Congress may constitutionally enact statutes that validly enforce a

constitutional amendment or that are necessary and proper for carrying out enumerated or

implied powers.

Dissent:(Black, J.) It is doubtful that this suit presents a justiciable case or controversy. In

addition, at least one of the Acts provisions unjustly blurs the constitutional distinction between

state and federal power by requiring federal approval of certain states laws and constitutional

amendments (Case Overviews).

Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder

Facts of the Case:Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One ("Northwest")

sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and

alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits "covered

jurisdictions" states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting

from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a

three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning

that it did not qualify as a "political subdivision" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover,

the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 for another

25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the

documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in "covered jurisdictions", Congress acted

rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional.

Questions

1) Does Section 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") permit any "political subunit" of a

"covered state" from seeking exemption from Section 5 of the VRA when it permits "political

subdivisions" within "covered states" from seeking such exemptions?

2) Was the 2006 extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a valid exercise of

congressional power when the Congressional Recordindicated no persistent patter of "covered

states" attempting to evade the enforcement of the VRA? (NORTHWEST AUSTIN


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MUNICIPAL v. HOLDER)

Conclusion:

Decision:9 votes for Northwest Austin Municipal, 0 vote(s) against

Legal provision:Voting Rights Act

Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the VRA permits all political subdivisions,

including the district, to seek to bailout from the preclearance requirements of the VRA. With

Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens,

Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.

Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that the

language of the VRA did not constrict the availability of a bailout for political subunits like

Northwest Municipal. Moreover, the Court reasoned that considering that only 17 of 12,000

jurisdictions covered by the VRA had bailed out suggested that Congress had never intended for

it to be so difficult to bailout.

Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He

criticized the Court for not addressing the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. He argued

that he thought it did in fact exceed Congress' power to enforce the 15th Amendment, rendering

it unconstitutional( NORTHWEST AUSTIN MUNICIPAL v. HOLDER).


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Works Cited

"Case Overviews - South Carolina v. Katzenbach (S.Ct. 1966)." Casebriefs. Web.

.

NORTHWEST AUSTIN MUNICIPAL v. HOLDER. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent

College of Law. 07 January 2014. .

SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.

GINSBURG, J., dissenting. Supreme Court of the United States. 25 June 2013. Web.

.

SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Opinion of

the Court. Supreme Court of the United States. 25 June 2013. Web.

.

SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. Syllabus.

Supreme Court of the United States. 25 June 2013. Web.

.

"Transcript of Voting Rights Act (1965)." Our Documents - United States Federal

Government.The Avalon Project at Yale University, Web.

.


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Argument:The Supreme Courts role is to establish the permissibility and constitutionality of

laws. One of the methods by which they do this is through following prior court precedent.

Warrant:Throughout the Supreme Courts history, justices have repeatedly claimed that court

precedent is the manner in which future court decisions are reached. The judiciary can only

fulfill its role in a consistent manner if it refers to previous court decisions.

Cross, Frank B., and James F. Spriggs. "Citations in the US Supreme Court: An

Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance." University of Illinois Law Review

(2010): 489. .

Of all citations, those to prior opinions are the most common,

demonstrating the Courts respect for stare decisis. The doctrine of stare

decisis is said to reflect the fundamental values of the legal process.

Alexander Hamilton declared that it was indispensable that [judges] should

be bound down by strict rules and precedents in order to avoid an

arbitrary discretion in the courts.The Court has declared that [a]dherence to

precedent, is, in the usual cases, a cardinal and guiding principle of

adjudication.In the plurality opinion declining to overrule Roe v. Wade,

Justices OConnor, Kennedy and Souter declared that respect for precedent

was the very concept of the rule of law.

Analysis: This evidence is key for establishing why stare decisis is an important element of the

decision-making process for the Supreme Court. Teams would do well to use this evidence

before trying to cite previous cases as the basis of Shelby Countybecause many con teams will

want to limit the debate simply to the realm of amendments, when in fact you should be

examining the Constitutional role of the Supreme Court. Its far better to have established why


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precedence is important to constitutionality, than try to make these arguments without having

established why precedence is so critical.

%"&'()*+;"#$ %&''$( )' *#)+# ,&*- +.%$ &/.01 )- /2 (..1)'3 1#$% )' 4&-1 ,&*-5

Warrant:Laws are consistently rooted in the history of laws that have been passed that have

similar background. The reason laws do this is so the Court can look back at how the

Constitution has been interpreted in the past and then prevent themselves from straying too far

from Court interpretations of the Constitution.

Fowler, James H., and Sangick Jeon. "The authority of Supreme Court precedent." Social

Networks30.1 (2008): 16-30.

.

Most judges and scholars would suggest that the law develops while clinging to

history. History, in this context, is precedentthe decisions made by earlier courts

in similar cases. Precedent plays a central role in the judiciary by providing

information to judges and other decision makers about the relevance or weight of

particular facts for a legal issue and by de!ning legal consequences or tests that

pertain to those facts.Not all court opinions are equally positioned to serve as a

precedent for a given dispute, and the norm of respecting stare decisis instructs judges to

rely on the most legally relevant and authoritative cases applicable to a given legal

question. In this sense, the legal relevance of a case (to which we refer synonymously

as case importance or case centrality)the degree to which the information in a

given case remains germane for deciding contemporary legal disputeslies at the

heart of law and legal development.

Analysis: This evidence extends upon the first evidence, clearly explaining why judicial

precedence is so critical to the Supreme Courts decision making process.

Champions Briefs

Documents

Transcript of Champions Briefs