Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 93695 February 4, 1992RAMON C. LEE and ANTONIO DM. LACDAO,petitioners,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SACOBA MANUFACTURING CORP., PABLO GONZALES, JR. and THOMAS GONZALES,respondents.Cayanga, Zuniga & Angel Law Offices for petitioners.Timbol & Associates for private respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:What is the nature of the voting trust agreement executed between two parties in this case? Who owns the stocks of the corporation under the terms of the voting trust agreement? How long can a voting trust agreement remain valid and effective? Did a director of the corporation cease to be such upon the creation of the voting trust agreement? These are the questions the answers to which are necessary in resolving the principal issue in this petition forcertiorari whether or not there was proper service of summons on Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA, for short) through the petitioners as president and vice-president, allegedly, of the subject corporation after the execution of a voting trust agreement between ALFA and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for short).From the records of the instant case, the following antecedent facts appear:On November 15, 1985, a complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International Corporate Bank, Inc. against the private respondents who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against ALFA and the petitioners on March 17, 1986.On September 17, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint which the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated June 27, 1988.On July 18, 1988, the petitioners filed their answer to the third party complaint.Meanwhile, on July 12, 1988, the trial court issued an order requiring the issuance of analiassummons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of the petitioner's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to the DBP.In a manifestation dated July 22, 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate and distinct corporate personality and existence.On August 4, 1988, the trial court issued an order advising the private respondents to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA.On August 16, 1988, the private respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the trial court granted on August 17, 1988.On September 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer officers of ALFA and that the private respondents should have availed of another mode of service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules,i.e.,through publication to effect proper service upon ALFA.In their Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1988, the private respondents argued that the voting trust agreement dated March 11, 1981 did not divest the petitioners of their positions as president and executive vice-president of ALFA so that service of summons upon ALFA through the petitioners as corporate officers was proper.On January 2, 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration and requiring ALFA to filed its answer through the petitioners as its corporate officers.On January 19, 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, the petitioners attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA (the petitioners included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP.On April 25, 1989, the trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated January 2, 1989 and declared that service upon the petitioners who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA.On May 15, 1989, the private respondents moved for a reconsideration of the above Order which was affirmed by the court in its Order dated August 14, 1989 denying the private respondent's motion for reconsideration.On September 18, 1989, a petition forcertiorariwas belatedly submitted by the private respondent before the public respondent which, nonetheless, resolved to give due course thereto on September 21, 1989.On October 17, 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the pending petition forcertiorariwith public respondent issued an Order declaring as final the Order dated April 25, 1989. The private respondents in the said Order were required to take positive steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on October 25, 1989 the private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial court took no further action.On March 19, 1990, after the petitioners filed their answer to the private respondents' petition forcertiorari, the public respondent rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the orders of respondent judge dated April 25, 1989 and August 14, 1989 are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent corporation is ordered to file its answer within the reglementary period. (CA Decision, p. 8;Rollo, p. 24)On April 11, 1990, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the public respondent which resolved to deny the same on May 10, 1990. Hence, the petitioners filed thiscertioraripetition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent in reversing the questioned Orders dated April 25, 1989 and August 14, 1989 of the courta quo, thus, holding that there was proper service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners.In the meantime, the public respondent inadvertently made an entry of judgment on July 16, 1990 erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its Resolution dated January 3, 1991, the public respondent set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to us pursuant to our ruling in the case ofRefractories Corporation of the Philippines v.Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 539 [1989]. (CARollo, pp. 249-250)In their memorandum, the petitioners present the following arguments, to wit:(1) that the execution of the voting trust agreement by a stockholders whereby all his shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholders of his position as director of the corporation; to rule otherwise, as the respondent Court of Appeals did, would be violative of section 23 of the Corporation Code (Rollo, pp. 270-3273); and(2) that the petitioners were no longer acting or holding any of the positions provided under Rule 14, Section 13 of the Rules of Court authorized to receive service of summons for and in behalf of the private domestic corporation so that the service of summons on ALFA effected through the petitioners is not valid and ineffective; to maintain the respondent Court of Appeals' position that ALFA was properly served its summons through the petitioners would be contrary to the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts which are within the scope of its officers' or agents' authority (Rollo, pp. 273-275)In resolving the issue of the propriety of the service of summons in the instant case, we dwell first on the nature of a voting trust agreement and the consequent effects upon its creation in the light of the provisions of the Corporation Code.A voting trust is defined in Ballentine's Law Dictionary as follows:(a) trust created by an agreement between a group of the stockholders of a corporation and the trustee or by a group of identical agreements between individual stockholders and a common trustee, whereby it is provided that for a term of years, or for a period contingent upon a certain event, or until the agreement is terminated, control over the stock owned by such stockholders, either for certain purposes or for all purposes, is to be lodged in the trustee, either with or without a reservation to the owners, or persons designated by them, of the power to direct how such control shall be used. (98 ALR 2d. 379 sec. 1 [d]; 19 Am J 2d Corp. sec. 685).Under Section 59 of the new Corporation Code which expressly recognizes voting trust agreements, a more definitive meaning may be gathered. The said provision partly reads:Sec. 59. Voting Trusts One or more stockholders of a stock corporation may create a voting trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the right to vote and other rights pertaining to the share for a period rights pertaining to the shares for a period not exceeding five (5) years at any one time: Provided, that in the case of a voting trust specifically required as a condition in a loan agreement, said voting trust may be for a period exceeding (5) years but shall automatically expire upon full payment of the loan. A voting trust agreement must be in writing and notarized, and shall specify the terms and conditions thereof. A certified copy of such agreement shall be filed with the corporation and with the Securities and Exchange Commission; otherwise, said agreement is ineffective and unenforceable. The certificate or certificates of stock covered by the voting trust agreement shall be cancelled and new ones shall be issued in the name of the trustee or trustees stating that they are issued pursuant to said agreement. In the books of the corporation, it shall be noted that the transfer in the name of the trustee or trustees is made pursuant to said voting trust agreement.By its very nature, a voting trust agreement results in the separation of the voting rights of a stockholder from his other rights such as the right to receive dividends, the right to inspect the books of the corporation, the right to sell certain interests in the assets of the corporation and other rights to which a stockholder may be entitled until the liquidation of the corporation. However, in order to distinguish a voting trust agreement from proxies and other voting pools and agreements, it must pass three criteria or tests, namely: (1) that the voting rights of the stock are separated from the other attributes of ownership; (2) that the voting rights granted are intended to be irrevocable for a definite period of time; and (3) that the principal purpose of the grant of voting rights is to acquire voting control of the corporation. (5 Fletcher,Cyclopedia of the Law on Private Corporations, section 2075 [1976] p. 331citingTankersly v. Albright, 374 F. Supp. 538)Under section 59 of the Corporation Code,supra,a voting trust agreement may confer upon a trustee not only the stockholder's voting rights but also other rights pertaining to his shares as long as the voting trust agreement is not entered "for the purpose of circumventing the law against monopolies and illegal combinations in restraint of trade or used for purposes of fraud." (section 59, 5th paragraph of the Corporation Code) Thus, the traditional concept of a voting trust agreement primarily intended to single out a stockholder's right to vote from his other rights as such and made irrevocable for a limited duration may in practice become a legal device whereby a transfer of the stockholder's shares is effected subject to the specific provision of the voting trust agreement.The execution of a voting trust agreement, therefore, may create a dichotomy between the equitable or beneficial ownership of the corporate shares of a stockholders, on the one hand, and the legal title thereto on the other hand.The law simply provides that a voting trust agreement is an agreement in writing whereby one or more stockholders of a corporation consent to transfer his or their shares to a trustee in order to vest in the latter voting or other rights pertaining to said shares for a period not exceeding five years upon the fulfillment of statutory conditions and such other terms and conditions specified in the agreement. The five year-period may be extended in cases where the voting trust is executed pursuant to a loan agreement whereby the period is made contingent upon full payment of the loan.In the instant case, the point of controversy arises from the effects of the creation of the voting trust agreement. The petitioners maintain that with the execution of the voting trust agreement between them and the other stockholders of ALFA, as one party, and the DBP, as the other party, the former assigned and transferred all their shares in ALFA to DBP, as trustee. They argue that by virtue to of the voting trust agreement the petitioners can no longer be considered directors of ALFA. In support of their contention, the petitioners invoke section 23 of the Corporation Code which provides, in part, that:Every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director which share shall stand in his name on the books of the corporation. Any director who ceases to be the owner of at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he is a director shall thereby cease to be director . . . (Rollo, p. 270)The private respondents, on the contrary, insist that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP had all the more safeguarded the petitioners' continuance as officers and directors of ALFA inasmuch as the general object of voting trust is to insure permanency of the tenure of the directors of a corporation. They cited the commentaries by Prof. Aguedo Agbayani on the right and status of the transferring stockholders,to wit:The "transferring stockholder", also called the "depositing stockholder", is equitable owner for the stocks represented by the voting trust certificates and the stock reversible on termination of the trust by surrender. It is said that the voting trust agreement does not destroy the status of the transferring stockholders as such, and thus render them ineligible as directors. But a more accurate statement seems to be that for some purposes the depositing stockholder holding voting trust certificates in lieu of his stock and being the beneficial owner thereof, remains and is treated as a stockholder. It seems to be deducible from the case that he may sue as a stockholder if the suit is in equity or is of an equitable nature, such as, a technical stockholders' suit in right of the corporation. [Commercial Laws of the Philippines by Agbayani, Vol. 3 pp. 492-493,citing5 Fletcher 326, 327] (Rollo, p. 291)We find the petitioners' position meritorious.Both under the old and the new Corporation Codes there is no dispute as to the most immediate effect of a voting trust agreement on the status of a stockholder who is a party to its execution from legal titleholder or owner of the shares subject of the voting trust agreement, he becomes the equitable or beneficial owner. (Salonga,Philippine Law on Private Corporations, 1958 ed., p. 268; Pineda and Carlos,The Law on Private Corporations and Corporate Practice, 1969 ed., p. 175; Campos and Lopez-Campos,The Corporation Code; Comments, Notes & Selected Cases,1981, ed., p. 386; Agbayani,Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines,Vol. 3, 1988 ed., p. 536). The penultimate question, therefore, is whether the change in his status deprives the stockholder of the right to qualify as a director under section 23 of the present Corporation Code which deletes the phrase "in his own right." Section 30 of the old Code states that:Every director must ownin his own rightat least one share of the capital stock of the stock corporation of which he is a director, which stock shall stand in his name on the books of the corporation. A director who ceases to be the owner of at least one share of the capital stock of a stock corporation of which is a director shall thereby cease to be a director . . . (Emphasis supplied)Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a director, strictly speaking, cannot be adversely affected by the simple act of such director being a party to a voting trust agreement inasmuch as he remains owner (although beneficial or equitable only) of the shares subject of the voting trust agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the stockholder's shares in favor of the trustee is required (section 36 of the old Corporation Code). No disqualification arises by virtue of the phrase "in his own right" provided under the old Corporation Code.With the omission of the phrase "in his own right" the election of trustees and other persons who in fact are not beneficial owners of the shares registered in their names on the books of the corporation becomes formally legalized (seeCampos and Lopez-Campos,supra, p. 296) Hence, this is a clear indication that in order to be eligible as a director, what is material is the legal title to, not beneficial ownership of, the stock as appearing on the books of the corporation (2 Fletcher,Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, section 300, p. 92 [1969]citingPeople v. Lihme, 269 Ill. 351, 109 N.E. 1051).The facts of this case show that the petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed ofall their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of the enterprise. The petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of the petitioners' shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholder of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject voting trust agreement as evident from the following stipulations:1. The TRUSTORS hereby assign and deliver to the TRUSTEE the certificate of the shares of the stocks owned by them respectively and shall do all things necessary for the transfer of their respective shares to the TRUSTEE on the books of ALFA.2. The TRUSTEE shall issue to each of the TRUSTORS a trust certificate for the number of shares transferred, which shall be transferrable in the same manner and with the same effect as certificates of stock subject to the provisions of this agreement;3. The TRUSTEE shall vote upon the shares of stock at all meetings of ALFA, annual or special, upon any resolution, matter or business that may be submitted to any such meeting,and shall possess in that respect the same powers as owners of the equitable as well as the legal title to the stock;4. The TRUSTEE may cause to be transferred to any person one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying such person as director of ALFA, and cause a certificate of stock evidencing the share so transferred to be issued in the name of such person;xxx xxx xxx9. Any stockholder not entering into this agreement may transfer his shares to the same trustees without the need of revising this agreement, and this agreement shall have the same force and effect upon that said stockholder. (CARollo, pp. 137-138; Emphasis supplied)Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stock covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter became the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA, the petitioners can no longer be deemed to have retained their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject voting trust agreement. There appears to be no dispute from the records that DBP has taken over full control and management of the firm.Moreover, in the Certification dated January 24, 1989 issued by the DBP through one Elsa A. Guevarra, Vice-President of its Special Accounts Department II, Remedial Management Group, the petitioners were no longer included in the list of officers of ALFA "as of April 1982." (CARollo, pp. 140-142)Inasmuch as the private respondents in this case failed to substantiate their claim that the subject voting trust agreement did not deprive the petitioners of their position as directors of ALFA, the public respondent committed a reversible error when it ruled that:. . . while the individual respondents (petitioners Lee and Lacdao) may have ceased to be president and vice-president, respectively, of the corporation at the time of service of summons on them on August 21, 1987, they were at least up to that time, still directors . . .The aforequoted statement is quite inaccurate in the light of the express terms of Stipulation No. 4 of the subject voting trust agreement. Both parties, ALFA and the DBP, were aware at the time of the execution of the agreement that by virtue of the transfer of shares of ALFA to the DBP, all the directors of ALFA were stripped of their positions as such.There can be no reliance on the inference that the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreementipso factoreverted to the petitioners as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code which reads:Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificate as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the transferors.On the contrary, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. This is shown by the following portions of the agreement.WHEREAS, the TRUSTEE is one of the creditors of ALFA, and its credit is secured by a first mortgage on the manufacturing plant of said company;WHEREAS, ALFA is also indebted to other creditors for various financial accomodations and because of the burden of these obligations is encountering very serious difficulties in continuing with its operations.WHEREAS, in consideration of additional accommodations from the TRUSTEE, ALFA had offered and the TRUSTEE has accepted participation in the management and control of the company and to assure the aforesaid participation by the TRUSTEE, the TRUSTORS have agreed to execute a voting trust covering their shareholding in ALFA in favor of the TRUSTEE;AND WHEREAS, DBP is willing to accept the trust for the purpose aforementioned.NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows:xxx xxx xxx6. This Agreement shall last for a period of Five (5) years, and is renewable for as long as the obligations of ALFA with DBP, or any portion thereof, remains outstanding; (CARollo, pp. 137-138)Had the five-year period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred all its rights, titles and interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated January 24, 1989 of the Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had handled APT's account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a management agreement by and between the DBP and APT (CARollo, p. 142) Hence, there is evidence on record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners on August 21, 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.In view of the foregoing, the ultimate issue of whether or not there was proper service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners is readily answered in the negative.Under section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that:Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the officers or members who compose it. (SeeSulo ng Bayan Inc. v. Araneta, Inc., 72 SCRA 347 [1976]; Osias Academy v. Department of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. Nos. 83257-58, December 21, 1990). Thus, the above rule on service of processes of a corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of a corporate entity separate from those who compose it.The rationale of the aforecited rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make ita priorisupposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. (Far Corporation v. Francisco, 146 SCRA 197 [1986]citingVilla Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor Corp. 81 SCRA 303 [1978]).The petitioners in this case do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through the petitioners, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise, as correctly argued by the petitioners, will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority. (seeVicente v. Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210 [1973]).WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision dated March 19, 1990 and the Court of Appeals' resolution of May 10, 1990 are SET ASIDE and the Orders dated April 25, 1989 and October 17, 1989 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 are REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 100290 June 4, 1993NORBERTO TIBAJIA, JR. and CARMEN TIBAJIA,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EDEN TAN,respondents.PADILLA,J.:Petitioners, spouses Norberto Tibajia, Jr. and Carmen Tibajia, are before this Court assailing the decision*of respondent appellate court dated 24 April 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 24164 denying their petition forcertiorariprohibition, and injunction which sought to annul the order of Judge Eutropio Migrio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 54863 entitled "Eden Tan vs. Sps. Norberto and Carmen Tibajia."Stated briefly, the relevant facts are as follows:Case No. 54863 was a suit for collection of a sum of money filed by Eden Tan against the Tibajia spouses. A writ of attachment was issued by the trial court on 17 August 1987 and on 17 September 1987, the Deputy Sheriff filed a return stating that a deposit made by the Tibajia spouses in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in the amount of Four Hundred Forty Two Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P442,750.00) in another case, had been garnished by him. On 10 March 1988, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151 of Pasig, Metro Manila rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 54863 in favor of the plaintiff Eden Tan, ordering the Tibajia spouses to pay her an amount in excess of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision by reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages. The decision having become final, Eden Tan filed the corresponding motion for execution and thereafter, the garnished funds which by then were on deposit with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, were levied upon.On 14 December 1990, the Tibajia spouses delivered to Deputy Sheriff Eduardo Bolima the total money judgment in the following form:Cashier's Check P262,750.00Cash 135,733.70Total P398,483.70Private respondent, Eden Tan, refused to accept the payment made by the Tibajia spouses and instead insisted that the garnished funds deposited with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila be withdrawn to satisfy the judgment obligation. On 15 January 1991, defendant spouses (petitioners) filed a motion to lift the writ of execution on the ground that the judgment debt had already been paid. On 29 January 1991, the motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that payment in cashier's check is not payment in legal tender and that payment was made by a third party other than the defendant. A motion for reconsideration was denied on 8 February 1991. Thereafter, the spouses Tibajia filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibition and injunction in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition on 24 April 1991 holding that payment by cashier's check is not payment in legal tender as required by Republic Act No. 529. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 27 May 1991.In this petition for review, the Tibajia spouses raise the following issues:I WHETHER OR NOT THE BPI CASHIER'S CHECK NO. 014021 IN THE AMOUNT OF P262,750.00 TENDERED BY PETITIONERS FOR PAYMENT OF THE JUDGMENT DEBT, IS "LEGAL TENDER".II WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY VALIDLY REFUSE THE TENDER OF PAYMENT PARTLY IN CHECK AND PARTLY IN CASH MADE BY PETITIONERS, THRU AURORA VITO AND COUNSEL, FOR THE SATISFACTION OF THE MONETARY OBLIGATION OF PETITIONERS-SPOUSES.1The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not payment by means of check (even by cashier's check) is considered payment in legal tender as required by the Civil Code, Republic Act No. 529, and the Central Bank Act.It is contended by the petitioners that the check, which was a cashier's check of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, undoubtedly a bank of good standing and reputation, and which was a crossed check marked "For Payee's Account Only" and payable to private respondent Eden Tan, is considered legal tender, payment with which operates to discharge their monetary obligation.2Petitioners, to support their contention, cite the case ofNew Pacific Timber and Supply Co., Inc. v. Seeris3where this Court held through Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. that "It is a well-known and accepted practice in the business sector that a cashier's check is deemed as cash".The provisions of law applicable to the case at bar are the following:a. Article 1249 of the Civil Code which provides:Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.;b. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 529, as amended, which provides:Sec. 1. Every provision contained in, or made with respect to, any obligation which purports to give the obligee the right to require payment in gold or in any particular kind of coin or currency other than Philippine currency or in an amount of money of the Philippines measured thereby, shall be as it is hereby declared against public policy null and void, and of no effect, and no such provision shall be contained in, or made with respect to, any obligation thereafter incurred. Every obligation heretofore and hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision as to payment is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon payment in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts.c. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended (Central Bank Act) which provides:Sec. 63. Legal character Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and their acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option of the creditor: Provided, however, that a check which has been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor of cash in an amount equal to the amount credited to his account.From the aforequoted provisions of law, it is clear that this petition must fail.In the recent cases ofPhilippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals4andRoman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,5this Court held that A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.The ruling in these two (2) cases merely applies the statutory provisions which lay down the rule that a check is not legal tender and that a creditor may validly refuse payment by check, whether it be a manager's, cashier's or personal check.Petitioners erroneously rely on one of the dissenting opinions in thePhilippine Airlinescase6to support their cause. The dissenting opinion however does not in any way support the contention that a check is legal tender but, on the contrary, states that "If the PAL checks in question had not been encashed by Sheriff Reyes, there would be no payment by PAL and, consequently, no discharge or satisfaction of its judgment obligation."7Moreover, the circumstances in thePhilippine Airlinescase are quite different from those in the case at bar for in that case the checks issued by the judgment debtor were made payable to the sheriff, Emilio Z. Reyes, who encashed the checks but failed to deliver the proceeds of said encashment to the judgment creditor.In the more recent case ofFortunado vs. Court of Appeals,8this Court stressed that, "We are not, by this decision, sanctioning the use of a check for the payment of obligations over the objection of the creditor."WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.#Footnotes* Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares Santiago with the concurrence of Justices Nicolas P. Lapea, Jr. and Cancio C. Garcia.1 Rollo, p. 11.2 Rollo, p. 54.3 G.R. No. L-41764, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 686.4 G.R. No. 49188, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 557.5 G.R. No. 72110, 16 November 1990, 191 SCRA 411.6 Supra, Dissenting Opinion of Padilla,J., pp. 580-582.7 Supra, pp. 581-582.8 G.R. No. 78556, 25 April 1991, 196 SCRA 269.SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 132362.June 28, 2001]PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE PERFECTO A. S. LAGUIO, JR., RTC-Branch 18, Manila, and HONOR P. MOSLARES,respondents.D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO,J.:This petition for review oncertiorariassails the Decision dated 30 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33982, "Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Perfecto A. Laguio, et al.," which dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner, as well as its Resolution dated 14 January 1998 denying reconsideration.On 2 October 1984 respondent Honor P. Moslares instituted an action for annulment of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the Testate Estate of Nicolai Drepin represented by its Judicial Administrator Atty. Tomas Trinidad and petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation.Moslares alleged that the Deed of Sale over four (4) parcels of land of the Drepin Estate executed in favor of the Barretto Realty was null and void on the ground that the same parcels of land had already been sold to him by the deceased Nicolai Drepin.The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27008 and raffled to respondent Judge PerfectoA. S.Laguio, Jr., RTC-Br. 18, Manila.On 2 May 1986 the parties, to settle the case, executed aCompromise Agreementpertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder-1. The Parties agree to sell the Estate, subject matter of the instant case, which is composed of the following real estate properties, to wit:a.Three (3) titled properties covered by TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541[1]of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, with a total area of 80 hectares, more or less, andb. Untitled Property, subject matter of (a) Land Registration Case No. 1602 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, with an area of 81 hectares, more or less,subject to the following situations and conditions, to wit:a.If plaintiff Honor P. Moslares x x x buys the property, he is under obligation, as follows:1.To reimburse and pay Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Anthony Que, its capital investment of ThreeMillion Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, and2. To pay the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, represented by the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the sum of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currencyb. If defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Mr. Anthony Que x x x continue[s] to buy the property, it shall pay for the interests of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares:1.The sum of One Million (P1,000.000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency to plaintiff Honor P. Moslares personally and2. Pay to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, through the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the balance of the agreed purchase price subject to negotiation and verification of payments already made.2.In the event that plaintiff Honor P. Moslares buys the Estate and pays in full the amount of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) Philippine Currency to defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, and the full sum of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, through Atty. Tomas Trinidad, defendant Pio Barretto shall execute the corresponding Deed of Conveyance in favor of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares and deliver to him all the titles and pertinent papers to the Estate.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, thepartiesheretoherebysignthis Compromise Agreement at Manila, Philippines, this 2nd day of May 1986x x x xx x x xx x x xOn 24 July 1986 the trial court rendered a decision approving theCompromise Agreement.[2]However, subsequent disagreements arose on the question of who bought the properties first.It must be noted that theCompromise Agreementmerely gave Moslares and Barretto Realty options to buy the disputed lots thus implicitly recognizing that the one who paid first had priority in right.Moslares claimed that he bought the lots first on 15 January 1990 by delivering to Atty. Tomas Trinidad two (2) PBCom checks, one (1) in favor of Barretto Realty forP3 million, and the other, in favor of the Drepin Estate forP1.35 million.But petitioner Barretto Realty denied receiving the check.Instead, it claimed that it bought the properties on7March1990bytenderingaTradersRoyalBankManager'sCheckforP1million to Moslares, and a Far East Bank and Trust Company Cashier's Check forP1 million and a Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check forP350,000.00 to Atty. Tomas Trinidad as Judicial Administrator of the Estate.However, Moslares and Atty. Trinidad refused to accept the checks.Consequently, Barretto Realty filed a motion before the trial court alleging that it complied with its monetary obligations under theCompromise Agreementbut that its offers of payment were refused, and prayed that a writ of execution be issued to compel Moslares and Atty. Trinidad to comply with theCompromise Agreementand that the latter be directed to turn over the owner's duplicate certificates of title over the lots.On 10 May 1990[3]Judge Laguio, Jr. ordered that"a writ of execution be issued for the enforcement of the decision of this Court for the parties to deposit with this Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of Manila, their respective monetary obligations under the compromise agreement that had been executed by them x x x x"Reacting to the order, Atty. Trinidad for the Estate filed an urgent motion to hold the execution in abeyance on the ground that there was another case involving the issue of ownership over subject lots pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City.Moslares in turn filed a motion for reconsideration while Barretto Realty moved to amend the order since the lower court did not exactly grant what it prayed for.On 14 June 1990, ruling on the three (3) motions, Judge Laguio, Jr., issued his Order -Considering Defendant Judicial Administrator's urgent motion to hold in abeyance x x x the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and the Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s opposition to both motions x x x this Court finds the two motions without merit and are accordingly, denied.As regards Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s ex-parte motion to amend order x x x the same is hereby granted and the deputy sheriff of this Court is allowed to deliver to the parties concerned thru their counsels the bank certified checks mentioned in par. 2 of the motion (underscoring ours).[4]On 20 June 1990 Deputy Sheriff Apolonio L. Golfo of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, implemented the order by personally delivering the checks issued by Barretto Realty in favor of Moslares and the Estate to Atty. Pedro S. Ravelo, counsel for Moslares, and to Atty. Tomas Trinidad, respectively, as recorded in a Sheriff's Return dated 25 June 1990.[5]However, on 17 September 1993, or more than three (3) years later, Moslares filed aMotion for Executionalleging that he bought the lots subject of theCompromise Agreementon 15 January 1990 and that he paid the amounts specified as payment therefor.He asked that Barretto Realty be directed to execute a deed of conveyance over subject lots in his favor.In aSupplementto his motion Moslares contended that the previous tender of the checks by Barretto Realty did not produce the effect of payment because checks, according to jurisprudence, were not legal tender.Respondent Judge granted Moslares'Motion for Execution.Consequently, on 8 November 1993 Barretto Realty was ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the subject lots in favor of Moslares.Aggrieved, Barretto Realty moved for reconsideration alleging that respondent Judge could no longer grant Moslares' motion since the prior sale of subject lots in its favor had already been recognized when the court sheriff was directed to deliver, and did in fact deliver, the checks it issued in payment therefor to Moslares and Atty. Trinidad.On 7 December 1993 respondent Judge granted the motion of Barretto Realtyfor reconsideration and ruled -Considering the motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution filed by defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., dated 16 November 1993, together with the plaintiff's comment and/or opposition thereto, dated 18 November 1993, and the movant's reply to the opposition etc., dated 20 November 1993, this Court finds the motion well taken.The record shows that on 10 May 1990, a writ of execution was issued by this Court for the parties to deposit with the Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of Manila, their respective monetary obligations under the compromise agreement that they had executed, and that it was only defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. that had complied therewith, per the return of this Court's deputy sheriff, Apolonio L. Golfo, dated June 25, 1990.Such being the case, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc., is the absolute owner of the real properties in question and the issue on such ownership is now a closed matter.WHEREFORE, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc.'s motion for reconsideration etc., dated November 16, 1993, is hereby granted; this Court's order, dated November 8, 1993, is reconsidered and set aside, and the writ of execution of the same date against Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. is ordered quashed (underscoring ours).[6]Within a reglementary period Moslares moved to reconsider insisting that Barretto Realty's payment by check was not valid because (a) the check was not delivered personally to him but to his counsel Atty. Pedro Ravelo, (b) the check was not encashed hence did not produce the effect of payment; and, (c) the check was not legal tender per judicial pronouncements.Barretto Realty opposed the motion, but to no avail.On 11 February 1994 respondent Judge granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside his Order of 7 December 1993.Judge Laguio ruled that Barretto Realty's payment through checks was not valid because"a check is not legal tender and it cannot produce the effect of payment until it is encashed x x x x the check in question has neither been negotiated nor encashed by the plaintiff."[7]At the same time, however, Moslares' alleged payment ofP3,000,000.00 on 15 January 1990 intended for Barretto Realty but delivered to Atty. Tomas Trinidad was likewise decreed as not valid because the latter was not authorized to accept payment for Barretto Realty.Invoking interest ofjusticeandequity,respondentJudge resolved to: (a) set aside its ruling contained in its order of 7 December 1993 that"(d)efendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., is the absolute owner of the property in question and the issue on such ownership is now a closed matter;" (b)order the plaintiff (should he desire to exercise his option to buy the real property in question) to pay defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., the sum ofP3,000,000.00 within five (5) days from notice thereof by way of reimbursement of the latter's capital investment; and, (c) order defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, Inc., to pay the plaintiff (in the event the latter should fail to exercise his said option and the former would want to buy the real property in question) the sum ofP1,000,000.00.But Moslares failed to exercise his option and pay the amount within the five (5)-day period granted him.Instead, he filed aSupplemental Motion to Paypraying that he be given additional seven (7) days within which to do so.Barretto Realty opposed and invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 granting it the option to buy the lots in the event that Moslares should fail to pay within the period given him.Barretto Realty prayed that theP1 million cashier's check still in Moslares' possession be considered as sufficient compliance with the pertinent provision of the court's order.Later, Barretto Realty offered to exchange the check with cash.When Moslares did not appear however at the designated time for payment on 10 March 1994 before the Branch Clerk of Court, Barretto Realty filed a motion for consignation praying that it be allowed to deposit theP1,000,000.00 payment with the cashier of the Office of the Clerk of Court.Respondent Judge however failed to act on the motion as he went on vacation leave.For reasons which do not clearly appear in the record, Judge Rosalio G. dela Rosa, Executive Judge of the RTC, Manila, acted on the motion and granted the prayer of Barretto Realty.[8]Upon the return of respondent Judge Laguio from his vacation, petitioner Barretto Realty immediately filed a motion for his inhibition on the ground that he had already lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as evident from his "seesaw" orders in the case.On 28 March 1994 respondent Judge denied the motion for his inhibition.Moslares for his part moved for reconsideration of Executive Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994.On 15 April 1994, in a Consolidated Order, respondent Judge Laguio set aside the questioned order of Executive Judge dela Rosa on the ground that the motion for consignation should have been referred to the pairing judge of Branch 18, Judge Zenaida Daguna of Branch 19.Respondent Judge further ruled that the questioned order was premature since there were pending motions, namely, Moslares'Supplemental Motion to Paydated 1 March 1994, andMotion to Depositdated 9 March 1994 which were both filed earlier than Barretto Realty'sMotion for Consignationwhich however remained unresolved.Respondent Judge Laguio found Moslares' motions meritorious and granted them.Moslares was thus given a non-extendible grace period of three (3) days within which to pay theP3,000,000.00 to Barretto Realty.Moslares then deposited the amount with the Branch Clerk of Court of Br. 18 within two (2) days from receipt of the order of respondent Judge, and on 25 April 1994 filed a motion for the Clerk of Court to be authorized to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in his favor.On 2 May 1994 Barretto Realty filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of respondent Judge dated 28 March 1994 and 15 April 1994 on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion.Meanwhile, on 12 October 1994 or during the pendency of the petition, respondent Judge granted Moslares' motion and authorized the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of conveyance in his favor.The implementation of the order however was enjoined by the Court of Appeals on 9 December 1994 when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction barring the issuance of the writ until further orders from the court.In itsPetitionandMemorandumpetitioner specifically alleged that respondent Judge's Orders of 8 November 1993,[9]11 February 1994,[10]15 April 1994,[11]and 12 October 1994[12]were all issued with grave abuse of discretion as the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue such orders since theCompromise Agreementof 2 May 1986 which was the basis of the decision of 24 July 1986 had already been executed and implemented in its favor way back on 20 June 1990.Petitioner likewise contended that the Order of 28 March 1994[13]denying petitioner's motion for inhibition was void because it did not state the legal basis thereof; that respondent Judge displayed obvious bias and prejudice when he issued "seesaw" orders in the case; and, that the bias in favor of Moslares was apparent when respondent Judge granted the former another three (3)-day period within which to pay theP3 million notwithstanding the fact that Moslares failed to comply with the original five (5)-day period given him.With respect to Executive Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994, petitioner contended that there was no rule of procedure prohibiting the Executive Judge from acting on an urgent motion even if the pairing judge of the judge to whom the case was raffled was present.The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.It ruled that the denial by respondent Judge of the motion for his inhibition was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.Aside from the fact that judges are given a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether to voluntarily recuse themselves from a case, which is not lightly interfered with, the appellate court however observed that the orders and resolutions issued by respondent Judge in the five (5) years he had been presiding over Civil Case No. 84-27008 indicated that they were not uniformly issued in favor of one or the other party.As petitioner itself aptly described, respondent Judge's actuations in the case "seesawed" between the parties.On the matter of the validity of Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994 grantingpetitioner's motion for consignation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the order was precipitate and unauthorized not only because the motion did not comply with the requisites for litigated motions but also because Judge dela Rosa had no judicial authority to act on the case.His duties as Executive Judge were purely administrative and did not include acting on a case assigned to another judge.With respect to the two (2) writs of execution, one dated 10 May 1990 in favor of petitioner, and the other dated 11 February 1994 in favor of respondent, the Court of Appeals ruled -Lastly, anent the existence of two writs of execution, first one for petitioner and the second for Moslares which the former has repeatedly cited as capricious and whimsical exercise of judicial discretion by respondent Judge, the records reveal that on 10 May 1990 a writ of execution was issued in favor of the petitioner upon its motion.For reasons of its own, petitioner did not pursue its effective and fruitful implementation in accordance with the decision based on a compromise agreement, spelling out the respective monetary obligations of petitioner and Moslares.Hence, after the lapse of at least one year, Moslares filed a motion for execution of the same decision x x x x [I]t cannot be said that respondent Judge issued two conflicting orders sans any legal basis.What really happened was that the matter of the first order granting execution in favor of petitioner was repeatedly put at issue until the order of the court dated 11 February 1994 x x x x Observedly, the said order was never elevated by petitioner to the appellate courts.Instead, he agreed with it by filing a "Manifestation and Motion on 01 March 1994 praying that theP1 Million Cashier's Check still in the possession of Moslares be considered compliance with paragraph 3 of that order x x x xOn 14 January 1998 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred (a) in concluding that petitioner did not pursue the effective and fruitful implementation of the writ of execution dated 10 May 1990 in its favor, (b) in not setting aside Judge Laguio's Orders dated 11 February 1994, 15 April 1994 and 12 October 1994 as patent nullities, and, (c) in disregarding jurisprudence declaring that cashier's or manager's checks are deemed cash or as good as the money they represent.We grant the petition.Final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, mayno longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature.They become the law of the case and are immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.[14]Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.[15]The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.[16]It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate subject matter of theCompromise Agreementahead of Moslares and that the checks issued in payment thereof were even personally delivered by the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge dated 14 June 1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin Estate.Respondent Moslares never raised the invalidity of the payment through checks either through a motion for reconsideration or a timely appeal.Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision dated 24 July 1986 which approved theCompromise Agreement, Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving nothing else to be done by the trial court with respect thereto.[17]As petitioner correctly contended, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of the writ of execution in its favor.As already stated petitioner paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure outlined above.There was no more need for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's favor because it had already done so on 10 October 1980.In fact the disputed lots were already registered in petitioner's name under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a consequence thereof.That was also why in the penultimate paragraph of theCompromise Agreementit was provided that in the event respondent Moslares bought the lots ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent papers to respondent Moslares.There was therefore nothing more to be done by way of fruitful and effective implementation.Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any jurisdiction whatsoever to act on, much less grant, the motion for execution and supplement thereto filed by Moslares on 17 September 1993 or more than three (3) years later, claiming that he had already bought the lots.The fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was never encashed should not be invoked against the latter.As already stated, Moslares never questioned the tender done three (3) years earlier.Besides, while delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is encashed, the rule is otherwise if the debtor was prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment.Acceptance of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment.If no such presentment was made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury sustained by the payee.Payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as conditional payment will be discharged.[18]Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order dated 8 November 1993 which granted private respondent's motion for execution thus nullifying the 1990 sale in favor of petitioner after he had in effect approved such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and after such order had already become final and executory, amounted to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, for which reason, all further orders stemming therefrom are also null and void and without effect.[19]The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[20]The fact that petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 praying that itsP1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares' possession be considered sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be cited against it.For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact been executed.Secondly, estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.[21]WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 June 1997 and 14 January 1998, respectively, areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.The Order of respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio Jr. dated 11 February 1994 in Civil Case No. 84-27008, setting aside his earlier ruling of 7 December 1993 which had declared petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation as the absolute owner of the real properties in question, and all subsequent proceedings culminating in the Order of 12 October 1994 authorizing the Clerk of Court, RTC-Manila, to execute a deed of conveyance over subject properties in favor of respondent Honor P. Moslares, are declared NULL and VOID for want of jurisdiction.Consequently, petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation is declared the absolute owner of the disputed properties subject matter of theCompromise Agreementdated 2 May 1986 as fully implemented by the Deputy Sheriff, RTC-Br. 18, Manila, pursuant to the final and executory Order dated 14 June 1990 of its Presiding Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.SO ORDERED.Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena,andDe leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-35767 June 18, 1976RAYMUNDO A. CRYSTAL,Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIA OCANG, PACITA, TEODULO, FELICISIMO, PABLO, LYDIA, DIOSCORA and RODRIGO, all surnamed DE GRACIA,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O NBARREDO,J.:Motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court in this case promulgated on February 25, 1975 affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of private respondents which held that petitioner's redemption of the property acquired by said respondents in an execution sale pursuant to a final judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1666, Court of First Instance of Cebu, was invalid inasmuch as the check which petitioner had used in paying the redemption price had been either dishonored or had become state, hence its value was never this upholding in the process the jurisdiction of the trial court to rule on the question of validity of the redemption in question notwithstanding that by order of that same court, said matter had been made the subject of a separate suit, Civil as No. 62-T also of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, filed on August 9, 1960.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn his motion for reconsideration, petitioner insists that it was an act in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in R-1666, to issue on May 31, 1971 the writ of possession sought by private respondents, thru Pelagia Ocang, in her motion of August 15, 1970, considering that court had previously pointedly observed in its order of March 24, 1960 that "the question as to whether or not the redemption allegedly made by Mr. Crystal by paying the amount to Mrs. Pelagia Ocang without using the said P11,200 deposited with the sheriff is legal and effective" has to be decided in "another proper case" and, furthermore, in its order of June 4, 1960 in the same case, the same court had more definitely ruled that "the question of ownership of Mr. Raymundo Crystal, the redemptioner, is not a proper matter to be decided in this case but in another case where the legality or validity of the alleged deed of redemption executed in favor of Mr. Crystal will be amply raised and threshed out" and, accordingly, in attention to such observations and ruling, petitioner did file Civil Case No. 62-T, which is still pending trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWhile, as already explained in Our decision, such pose of petitioner has its merits, We deem it in advisable to this point to modify Our ruling that there is really no issuance of jurisdiction involved here and that it is preferable, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this particular case, that the root of the controversy between the parties be inquired into and (determined in the incident already taken cognizance of by the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1666 regarding tile light of possession over tile alert in dispute. In this connection, it is to be noted that even after he had filed Civil Case No. 62-T, in of hat he must have considered as his right a redemption i of the property sold in execution a judgment in Civil Case No. R-1666, petitioner regained possession of the four (4) parcels of land in question without the torture of the court, taking the same from Pelagia Ocang who his taken it from him also extrajudicially that she had legally acquired the same precisely in the same execution and that petitioner redemption as null and void because the cheek he used to pay the redemption price had been dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. In other words both petitioner and Ocang, predicating their respective claims to rightful possession on the same sale on execution in the same case, Civil Case No. R-l666, had alternately taken the law in their hands to obtain possession of the lands in question in disregard of the toilet for the complete satisfaction of that significant of the court in that case. In the light of these peculiar circumstances, it does appear to be more that since it is the Case in that Civil Case No. R-1666, that rendered the judgment and subsequently ordered the execution from which the redemption was made, it should to the people to settle the whole controversy among all the interested statistics including even the judgment leftors 'the heirs of Nicolas Rafols themselves, who, according to the records, have claim of that own relative to the same redemption, which might just as well be inquired into in said case, rather than in Case No. 62-T in which they are not parties. Otherwise, stated, in issuing the impugned writ of possession, the court took the bull by the horns, so to speak, thereby overturning its own previous stand on the matter announced in its orders of March 24 and June 4, 1960 aforementioned. Consequently, We overrule the argument of jurisdiction or even abuse of discretion raised by petitioner and reiterate what We have said in regard thereto ni Our decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThis is not to say that the procedure followed by Ocang and sactioned by the trial court of resorting to the issuance of a writ of possession is not open to question, since a writ of possession is not always available in all controversies concerning possession of real estate. But We see no need to resolve that point here. More importantly, what impresses Us in the motion for reconsideration is the possible injustice that might result from our unqualified reliance in our decision on the finding of the Court of Appeals that the check for P11,200 paid by petitioner for the redemption in dispute had been dishonored, in the face of the other finding in the same decision of the Court of Appeals indicating that instead of having been dishonored, the said check had become state, albeit it was being replaced with new ones from time to time. Surely, for a check to the dishonored upon presentment on the one hand, and to be state for not being presented at all in time, on the other, are incompatible developments that naturally have variant legal consequences. Thus, if needed the check in question had been dishonored, then there can be no doubt that petitioner's redemption was null and void. On the oher hand, if it had only become stale, then it becomes imperative that the circumstances that caused its non-presentment be determined, for if this was not due to the fault of the petitioner, then it would be unfair to deprive him of the rights he had acquired as redemptioner, particularly, the value of the check has otherwise been received or realized by the party concerned. From the motion for reconsideration and its annexes, We gather that petitioner has ready evidence showing that when Pelagia Ocang secured the writ of possession in question, she had already been paid the full amount of the check in dispute. What is more, there are a number of circumstances pointed out in said motion, apparaently supported by corresponding evidence, tending to show that a compromise had already been agreed upon by the parties, although not yet approved by the court, or, at least, that Ocang has made admissions which indicate that the issue regarding the supposed dishonorign or becomeing state of the repeatedly mentioned check is no longer of any legal significance and, for that matter, the observations we made in our decision in regard to the duties of the sheriff in the premises have been rendered academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryNeedless to say, the Supreme Court should not allow any of its decision to become final when it is properly made to appear in a motion for reconsideration based on relevant facts and circumstances not previously brought to its attention, although demonstrable from the records, that even if the technical consideration on which it is based is well taken, substantial jusitce might be sacrificed, if further proceedings are not ordered to be held to verify undeniable facts which might have escaped the eyes of the Court of Appeals. In the instant case, We took it as proven, per statements of fact in the decision of the Court of Appeals, that the check with which petitioner redeemed the property in dispute had been dishonored. On that premise and seeing that even if We upheld the technical point of jurisdiction raised by petitioner, the final outcome of the controversy between the parties would not be different, We proceeded to decide the merits of the respective substantive claims of the parties. We felt that in view of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, equity demanded that the case be earlier terminated by ignoring not only whatever flaw ther was in the procedure adopted by the court below but also the seemingly unusual departure by the Court of Appeals from the orthodox rule requiring courts to confine its scrutiny in certiorari cases only to the specific point of jurisdiction complained of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryNow, however, there is a strong showing in the motion for reconsideration, presmised on no less than other portions of the very decision of the intermediate court and other apparently credible evidence, that not only was said check not dishonored, although it became stale, but that repondent Pelagia Ocang had actually been paid already the full value thereof. And in this connection, it is notable that in the comment of respondents on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, there is no clear and categorical denial of these important and decisive facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOne more point. In our decision, We assumed that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals were the result of an exhaustive consideration of evidence presented in due course by the parties. It turns out now, that inasmuch as the trial court itself had previously ruled that the validity of the redemption in controversy should be the subject of a separate action and that, in fact, such separate action had already been filed by petitioner, it was in this other case that petitioner was present the corresponding evidencence. Hence, whatever evidence was before the trial court in Case No. R-1666 when it issued the subject writ of possession could not have been complete, much less incontrovertible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWith these substantial consideration in view, We find no just alternative than to reconsider Our decision in so far as the matter of validity or invalidity of petitioner's redemption is concerned. It being shown that the pivotal finding of the Court of Appeals regarding the check in question might actually be belied in a more appropriate proceeding, the foundation of Our own decision has been shaken. Indeed, We are now convinced that is but fair and just that the trial court should be allowed to receive all relevant and competent evidence the parties may wish to present relative to the issue of whether or not respondent Pelagia Ocang has already received in one form or another, directly or indirectly, the full amount of P11,200 as redemption price of the four (4) parcels of land in dispute, as well as to all other facts which might affect the validity of the redemption here in controversy. Withal, should it be found by the trial court that the redemption was invalid, because the redemption price has not been fully paid, it should further determine who made the improvements found on said lands, in order that if it should turn out that they were introduced by petitioner, possession may not be awarded to respondents unless said improvements are first properly and fully reimbursed to petitioner. It goes without saying that the proceedings herein contemplated are to be held in Civil Case No. R-1666. Correspondingly, Civil Case No. 62-T and the other case reviewing the same should be deemed academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, the decision of this Court of February 25, 1975 is hereby reconsidered and modified in line with the foregoing opinion and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as therein indicated.Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryFernando J., took no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryConcepcion Jr., J, is on leave.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-222 April 26, 1950SALVACION F. VDA. DE EDUQUE, ETC.,plaintiff-appellee,vs.JOSE M. OCAMPO,defendant-appellant.Alfredo B. Cacnio and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando for appellant.Jose Feria for appellee.Delfin L. Gonzalez for plaintiff-intervenor.MORAN,C.J.:This is an action to compel acceptance of payment of a mortgage debt.On February 16, 1935, Dr. Jose Eduque secured two loans from Mariano Ocampo de Leon, Doa Escolastica de los Reyes and Don Jose M. Ocampo, the first in the amount of P40,000 and the second in the sum of P15,000, both payable within the period of twenty years, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. Payment of these two loans was guaranteed by mortgage on real property. In the mortgage contract it is stipulated that any of the mortgage creditors may receive payment and execute deeds of cancellation of the mortgage debts.On December 6, 1943, plaintiff and appellee, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Dr. Jose Eduque, tendered payment, by means of cashier's check, of the total amount of the two loans, P55,000, to defendant-appellant Jose M. Ocampo, one of the creditors, who refused to accept payment. By reason of such refusal, an action was brought and a cashier's check for the total amount of P55,000 deposited in court. After trial, judgment was rendered against defendant compelling him to accept the P55,000 deposited in court, to issue deeds for cancellation of the mortgage debts, and to pay the expenses of consignation and costs.Defendant accepted the judgment with respect to the second loan of P15,000 upon the ground that, according to him, in the deed of mortgage corresponding to that loan it clearly appeared that the loan was payable "durante el termino de 20 aos," and that the only question remaining between the parties is the interpretation of the first deed of mortgage regarding the first loan of P40,000. and he asked the court to order "que de la cantidad de P55,000 consignada en este Juzgado, se entregue al demandado la suma de P15,000, despues de descontar proporcionalmente cualesquiera cantidades por deposito y otros conceptos segun los terminos de la decision promulgada." The order was issued accordingly and the sum of P15,000 out of the P55,000 deposited in court was delivered to the defendant.The present appeal concerns the decision of the lower court regarding the first loan of P40,000, and the principal error assigned by the appellant is that tender of payment by means of a cashier's check representing Japanese war notes is not valid.We have already help that Japanese military notes were legal tender during the Japanese occupation. But appellant argues, further, that the consignation of a cashier's check, which is not legal tender, is not binding upon him. This question, however, has never been raised in the lower court. Upon the contrary, defendant accepted impliedly the consignation of the cashier's check when he himself asked the court that out of the money thus consigned he be paid the amount of the second loan of P15,000. It is a rule that " a cashier's check may constitute a sufficient tender where no objection is made on this ground." (62 C. J., p. 670;see also40 Amer. Jur., p. 764.)For all the foregoing, judgment is affirmed with cost against appellant.Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ.,concur.

Separate OpinionsTUASON,J.,dissenting:I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision on the ground on which I rested my dissent in various cases involving the validity of payments in Japanese military notes.I maintain that Japanese war notes were not legal tender and could not be made so by military orders. Accordingly, payment in that currency of pre-war obligation over the protest of the creditor did not operate to discharge the debt except to the extent he was or could have been benefited by the payment.SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-41764 December 19, 1980NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.,Petitioner, vs.HON. ALBERTO V. SENERIS, RICARDO A. TONG andEX-OFFICIOSHERIFF HAKIM S. ABDULWAHID,Respondents.CONCEPCION JR.,J.:A petition forcertiorariwith preliminary injunction to annul and/or modify the order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City (Branch ii) dated August 28, 1975 denying petitioner'sEx-ParteMotion for Issuance of Certificate Of Satisfaction Of Judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryHerein petitioner is the defendant in a complaint for collection of a sum of money filed by the private respondent.1On July 19, 1974, a compromise judgment was rendered by the respondent Judge in accordance with an amicable settlement entered into by the parties the terms and conditions of which, are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library(1) That defendant will pay to the plaintiff the amount of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P54,500.00) at 6% interest per annum to be reckoned from August 25, 1972;chanrobles virtual law library(2) That defendant will pay to the plaintiff the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as attorney's fees for which P5,000.00 had been acknowledged received by the plaintiff under Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation Check No. 16-135022 amounting to P5,000.00 leaving a balance of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00);chanrobles virtual law library(3) That the entire amount of P54,500.00 plus interest, plus the balance of P1,000.00 for attorney's fees will be paid by defendant to the plaintiff within five months from today, July 19, 1974; andchanrobles virtual law library(4) Failure one the part of the defendant to comply with any of the above-conditions, a writ of execution may be issued by this Court for the satisfaction of the obligation.2For failure of the petitioner to comply with his judgment obligation, the respondent Judge, upon motion of the private respondent, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution on December 21, 1974. Accordingly, writ of execution was issued for the amount of P63,130.00 pursuant to which, theEx-OfficioSheriff levied upon the following personal properties of the petitioner, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library(1) Unit American Lathe 24chanrobles virtual law library(1) Unit American Lathe 18 Cracker Wheelerchanrobles virtual law library(1) Unit Rockford Shaper 24and set the auction sale thereof on January 15, 1975. However, prior to January 15, 1975, petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City, in his capacity asEx-OfficioSheriff of Zamboanga City, the sum of P63,130.00 for the payment of the judgment obligation, consisting of the following:chanrobles virtual law library1. P50.000.00 in Cashier's Check No. S-314361 dated January 3, 1975 of the Equitable Banking Corporation; andchanrobles virtual law library2. P13,130.00 incash.3In a letter dated January 14, 1975, to theEx-OfficioSheriff,4private respondent through counsel, refused to accept the check as well as the cash deposit. In the 'same letter, private respondent requested the scheduled auction sale on January 15, 1975 to proceed if the petitioner cannot produce the cash. However, the scheduled auction sale at 10:00 a.m. on January 15, 1975 was postponed to 3:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day due to further attempts to settle the case. Again, the scheduled auction sale that afternoon did not push through because of a last ditch attempt to convince the private respondent to accept the check. The auction sale was then postponed on the following day, January 16, 1975 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.5At about 9:15 a.m., on January 16, 1975, a certain Mr. Taedo representing the petitioner appeared in the office of theEx-OfficioSheriff and the latter reminded Mr. Taedo that the auction sale would proceed at 10:00 o'clock. At 10:00 a.m., Mr. Taedo and Mr. Librado, both representing the petitioner requested theEx-OfficioSheriff to give them fifteen minutes within which to contract their lawyer which request was granted. After Mr. Taedo and Mr. Librado failed to return, counsel for private respondent insisted that the sale must proceed and theEx-OfficioSheriff proceeded with the auction sale.6In the course of the proceedings, Deputy Sheriff Castro sold the levied properties item by item to the private respondent as the highest bidder in the amount of P50,000.00. As a result thereof, the Ex-Officio Sheriff declared a deficiency of P13,130.00.7Thereafter, on January 16, 1975, theEx-OfficioSheriff issued a "Sheriff's Certificate of Sale" in favor of the private respondent, Ricardo Tong, married to Pascuala Tong for the total amount of P50,000.00 only.8Subsequently, on January 17, 1975, petitioner filed anex-partemotion for issuance of certificate of satisfaction of judgment. This motion was denied by the respondent Judge in his order dated August 28, 1975. In view thereof, petitioner now questions said order by way of the present petition alleging in the main that said respondent Judge capriciously and whimsically abused his discretion in not granting the motion for issuance of certificate of satisfaction of judgment for the following reasons: (1) that there was already a full satisfaction of the judgment before the auction sale was conducted with the deposit made to theEx-OfficioSheriff in the amount of P63,000.00 consisting of P50,000.00 in Cashier's Check and P13,130.00 in cash; and (2) that the auction sale was invalid for lack of proper notice to the petitioner and its counsel when theEx-OfficioSheriff postponed the sale from June 15, 1975 to January 16, 1976 contrary to Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On November 10, 1975, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondentEx-OfficioSheriff from delivering the personal properties subject of the petition to Ricardo A. Tong in view of the issuance of the "Sheriff Certificate of Sale."chanrobles virtual law libraryWe find the petition to be impressed with merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe main issue to be resolved in this instance is as to whether or not the private respondent can validly refuse acceptance of the payment of the judgment obligation made by the petitioner consisting of P50,000.00 in Cashier's Check and P13,130.00 in cash which it deposited with theEx-OfficioSheriff before the date of the scheduled auction sale. In upholding private respondent's claim that he has the right to refuse payment by means of a check, the respondent Judge cited the following:chanrobles virtual law librarySection 63 of the Central Bank Act:chanrobles virtual law librarySec. 63. Legal Character. - Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and their acceptance in payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option of the creditor, Provided, however, that a check which has been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor in cash in an amount equal to the amount credited to his account.Article 1249 of the New Civil Code:chanrobles virtual law libraryArt. 1249. - The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.Likewise, the respondent Judge sustained the contention of the private respondent that he has the right to refuse payment of the amount of P13,130.00 in cash because the said amount is less than the judgment obligation, citing the following Article of the New Civil Code:chanrobles virtual law libraryArt. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the presentations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make partial payment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryHowever, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and the debtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.It is to be emphasized in this connection that the check deposited by the petitioner in the amount of P50,000.00 is not an ordinary check but a Cashier's Check of the Equitable Banking Corporation, a bank of good standing and reputation. As testified to by theEx-OfficioSheriff with whom it has been deposited, it is a certified crossed check.9It is a well-known and accepted practice in the business sector that a Cashier's Check is deemed as cash. Moreover, since the said check had been certified by the drawee bank, by the certification, the funds represented by the check are transferred from the credit of the maker to that of the payee or holder, and for all intents and purposes, the latter becomes the depositor of the drawee bank, with rights and duties of one in such situation.10Where a check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the certification is equivalent to acceptance.11Said certification "implies that the check is drawn upon sufficient funds in the hands of the drawee, that they have been set apart for its satisfaction, and that they shall be so applied whenever the check is presented for payment. It is an understanding that the check is good then, and shall continue good, and this agreement is as binding on the bank as its notes in circulation, a certificate of deposit payable to the order of the depositor, or any other obligation it can assume. The object of certifying a check, as regards both parties,is to enable the holder to use it as money."12When the holder procures the check to be certified, "the check operates as an assignment of a part of the funds to the creditors."13Hence, the exception to the rule enunciated under Section 63 of the Central Bank Act to the effect "that a check which has been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor in cash in an amount equal to the amount credited to his account" shall apply in this case. Considering that the whole amount deposited by the petitioner consisting of Cashier's Check of P50,000.00 and P13,130.00 in cash covers the judgment obligation of P63,000.00 as mentioned in the writ of execution, then, We see no valid reason for the private respondent to have refused acceptance of the payment of the obligation in his favor. The auction sale, therefore, was uncalled for. Furthermore, it appears that on January 17, 1975, the Cashier's Check was even withdrawn by the petitioner and replaced with cash in the corresponding amount of P50,000.00 on January 27, 1975 pursuant to an agreement entered into by the parties at the instance of the respondent Judge. However, the private respondent still refused to receive the same. Obviously, the private respondent is more interested in the levied properties than in the mere satisfaction of the judgment obligation. Thus, petitioner's motion for the issuance of a certificate of satisfaction of judgment is clearly meritorious and the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in not granting the same under the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIn view of the conclusion reached in this instance, We find no more need to discuss the ground relied in the petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt is also contended by the private respondent that Appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy in this case, and that since the period to appeal from the decision of the respondent Judge has already expired, then, the present petition has been filed out of time. The contention is untenable. The decision of the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 250 (166) has long become final and executory and so, the same is not being questioned herein. The subject of the petition at bar as having been issued in grave abuse of discretion is the order dated August 28, 1975 of the respondent Judge which was merely issued in execution of the said decision. Thus, even granting that appeal is open to the petitioner, the same is not an adequate and speedy remedy for the respondent Judge had already issued a writ of execution.14chanrobles virtual law libraryWHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrobles virtual law library1.