[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005]LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This is aPetition for Review[1]dated December 6, 1996 assailing theDecision[2]of the Regional Trial Court[3]dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount ofP30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform program.The facts follow.On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.After trial, the court rendered the assailedDecisionthe dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.SO ORDERED.[4]DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in itsOrder[5]dated July 30, 1996 for beingpro formaas the same did not contain a notice of hearing.Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailedDecisionbecame final and executory.Land Bank then filed aPetition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,[6]citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.[7]The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record notably states that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing[8]due to his heavy workload.The trial court, in itsOrder[9]of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsiderationpro formaconsidering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.Private respondents filed aComment[10]dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declaredpro forma,does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.Land Bank filed aReply[11]dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.The Courtgave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[12]Both parties complied.[13]The petition is unmeritorious.At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Sec. 1.Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[14]Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel,i.e.,that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.[15]Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.[16]The trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsiderationpro forma.Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.[17]Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter[18]to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.At any rate, inPhilippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[19]we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.[20]Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27,ergojust compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals,[21]we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)[22]before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling inParis v. Alfeche.[23]Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[24]In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISIONJOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in herG.R. No. 170220capacity as Assignee of FEDERICOC. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAYTAEDO and EMILIO A.M.SUNTAY III,Petitioners,Present:Panganiban,C.J. (Chairperson),- versus -Ynares-Santiago,Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.LAND BANK OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.Promulgated:November 20, 2006x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.The facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee[2]of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)[3]of the Registry of Deeds of OccidentalMindoro.In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)[4]and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).[5]The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries.The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128[6]of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares.Lot2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation.OnJanuary 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).[7]Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed onFebruary 17, 2003, two separate petitions[8]for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as aSpecial Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988)[9]and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.OnMarch 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[10]granting petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:1.In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;2.In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of thePhilippines,Manilawithin five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.SO ORDERED.[11]LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[12]datedMay 26, 2003.The following day,May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[13]directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.Thus, onJune 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.[14]OnJune 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order[15]and onOctober 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.[16]OnMay 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[17]in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order datedMarch 31, 2003, Resolution datedMay 26, 2003, and Order datedMay 27, 2003are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.SO ORDERED.[18]The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation.It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted.OnOctober 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision,[19]the dispositive portion of which reads:Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.SO ORDERED.[20]In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed.CitingGabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[21]it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price.Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, onOctober 21, 1972when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27.According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.Hence, this petition raising the following issues:A.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THECASE IN A WAYNOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THEPHILIPPINESVS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM.MAY 16, 2005; and[22]B.THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[23]Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment.Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as ofOctober 21, 1972when P.D. No. 27 took effect.The petition is impressed with merit.In the case ofLand Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24]the Court ruled thus:Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang,Manilav. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.TheNatividadcase reiterated the Courts ruling inOffice of the President v. Court of Appeals[25]that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 onOctober 21, 1972but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.Likewise, in the recent case ofHeirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[26]we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act onJune 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation therefor.The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use.Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names.Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.[27]The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank.Until then, title remains with the landowner.[28]Our ruling inAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[29]is instructive, thus:It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative.It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as ofOctober 21, 1972of the land theyacquiredby virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. x x xThe CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.Until then, title also remains with the landowner.No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled.Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.[30]InLand Bank of thePhilippinesv. Court of Appeals,[31]we held that:RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.[32]Corollarily, we held inLand Bank of the Philippines v. Celada[33]that the above provision was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation.Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time.That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[34]WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition isGRANTED.The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, isREINSTATED.The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting asSpecial Agrarian CourtisORDEREDto proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,respondents.G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.,respondents.FRANCISCO, R.,J.:It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.1As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.2In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated.3Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition forCertiorariandMandamusand ruled as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition forCertiorariandMandamusis hereby GRANTED:a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declarednullandvoidinsofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;b) Respondent Landbank is ordered toimmediatelydeposit not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. YapP 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano SantiagoP 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered toallow the petitioners to withdrawthe above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; andd) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1)immediatelyconductsummaryadministrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners15 days from noticewithin which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the caseswithin 30 daysafter they are submitted for decision.4Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995,5denying their motion for reconsideration.Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition forCertiorariandMandamuswith prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 19926and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:PetitionerPedro Yapalleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.PetitionerHeirs of Emiliano Santiagoallege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E";Rollo,p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).8Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.9Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.10Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines,Inc.,et al.vs.Hon.Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.13On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents.14Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same.15Hence, the instant petitions.On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision.16The Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments.17Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, uponthe deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bondsin accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.18In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extendthe law and amend a legislative enactment,19for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.20In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 1821of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".22The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.xxx xxx xxxThe CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.xxx xxx xxxHence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . .that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation."23(Emphasis supplied)We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.Without prompt payment,compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.24(Emphasis supplied)The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer.25But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.26WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.Footnotes1 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608. 615 (1992), quoting Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy.2 Ibid, p. 616.3 Rollo, p. 7.4 Rollo, pp. 122-123.5 Rollo, p. 149.6 which provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated under RA 6657.7 which provides for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land expropriated by the DAR.8 Rollo, pp. 109-111.9 Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following shall be followed:xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.10 Rollo, p. 111.11 Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (l0) days after the publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.12 Rollo, pp. 111-112.13 Rollo, p. 112.14 Rollo, p. 107.15 Rollo, p. 149.16 Rollo, p. 63.17 Rollo, p. 67.18 Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).19 Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991)citingTeoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 (1970),citingSantos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 (1989).20 Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA 628 (1988).21 Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.22 175 SCRA 343.23 Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 14.24 Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990)citingCosculluela vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393, 400 (1988); Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).25 175 SCRA 343, 392.26 Mata vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070REFORM, represented by SECRETARYJOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present: Petitioner, Davide,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, - versus - Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia,JJ.DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated:HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents. October 19, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONPUNO,J.: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1]their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.On December 4, 1990, in anen bancdecision in the case ofLuz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2]this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.In view of theLuz Farms ruling,respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.On December 27, 1993, DAR issuedA.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5]which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits,viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e.,1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under theLuz Farms doctrine,their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6] On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order[7]partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9]with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of theLuz Farms casewhich declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10]It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to theLuz Farms caseas the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However,the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE,premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is herebyDECLAREDnull and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.[11] Hence, this petition. The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. Petitioners arguments fail to impress. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature,i.e.,the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.The fundamental rule in administrative law is that,to be valid, administrative rules and regulationsmust be issued by authority of a law andmust not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.[13]The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution.Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.[14]In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in theLuz Farmscasethat livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.[15]Clearly, petitionerDAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.The subsequent case ofNatalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16]reiterated our ruling in theLuz Farmscase. InNatalia Realty,the Court heldthat industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew thatwhile Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands,the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, inNatalia Realty,even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which arearable yetstill undeveloped,could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention.The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case.Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18]Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is theconversion of agricultural landsfor non-agricultural purposesafter the effectivity of the CARL.There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20]which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically,the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21]With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.IN VIEW WHEREOF,the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP.,petitioners,vs.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV,respondents.Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.The Solicitor General for respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies1prior to 15 June 1988,2covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? This is the pivotal issue in this petition forcertiorariassailing the Notice of Coverage3of the Department of Agrarian Reform over parcels of land already reserved as townsite areas before the enactment of the law.Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31527 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The necessary permit for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of 13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in 1982;4for Phase II, with an area of 80,000 hectares, on 13 October 1983;5and for Phase III, which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986.6Petitioner were likewise issued development permits7after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued on 22 November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the notice of Coverage.EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote him requesting the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for the brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.8The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the development of the subdivision. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied. Instead, the Regional Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB); however, on 16 December 1991 the DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings.9In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters, thus compelling petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a year thereafter.NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including undedeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They maintain that the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated. Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies available to them before coming to court.The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances as well as the Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim of public respondents, petitioners NATALIA and EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the development of the townsite reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the Human Settlements RegulatoryCommission.10And, in all permits granted to petitioners, the Commissionstated invariably therein that the applications were in "conformance"11or "conformity"12or "conforming"13with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence, the argument of public respondents that not all of the requirements were complied with cannot be sustained.As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval from DAR. The NATALIA properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met. And, in the case at bar, there was compliance with all relevant rules and requirements. Even in their applications for the development of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, the predecessor agency of HLURB noted that petitioners NATALIA and EDIC complied with all the requirements prescribed by P.D. 957.The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and condominiums in general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the latter prevails.14Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which have already been developed.15Of course, this is contrary to its earlier position that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the developed and undeveloped portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated. Consequently, both did not need prior DAR approval.We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act andnot classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."16The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."17Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,18DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus . . .Agricultural lands refersto those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, andnot classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion19that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637,inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant petition, suffice it to say that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from those of petitioners. The former involve possession; the latter, the propriety of including under the operation of CARL lands already converted for residential use prior to its effectivity.Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents acted on their letter-protests, this after sitting it out for almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under the circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to act to assert and protect their interests.20In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in issuing the assailed Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by of lands over which they no longer have jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, the petition forCertiorariisGRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of which undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.#Footnotes1 National Housing Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission; see C.T. Torres v. Hibionada, G.R. No. 80916, 9 November 1990, 191 SCRA 268.2 Date of effectivity of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.3 Annex "H", Petition;Rollo, p. 33.4 Annex "A", Petition;Rollo, p. 26.5 Annex "C", Petition;Rollo, p. 28.6 Annex "E", Petition;Rollo,p. 30.7 Annexes "B", "D" and "F", Petition;Rollo, pp. 27, 29 and 31.8 Complaint, p. 3;Rollo, p. 68.9 DARAB Resolution, 16 December 1991, p. 8;Rollo, p. 82.10 Renamed Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) per E.O. No. 90, dated 17 December 1986.11 Annexes "A" and "C", Petition;Rollo, pp. 26 and 28.12 Annex "B", Petition;Rollo, p. 27.13 Annexes "D" and "E", petition;Rollo, pp. 29-30.14 National Power Corporation v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXV, G.R. No. 72477, 16 October 1990, 190 SCRA 477.15 Comment, p. 8;Rollo, p. 63.16 Sec. 3 (c), R.A. 6657.17 Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51, Citing Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30.18 DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990.19 Opinion No. 181, Series of 1990.20 Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu, Br. VIII, G.R. No. 65037, 23 November 1988, 167 SCRA 615.

G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES,respondents.Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for private respondents.PARAS,J.:Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5, 1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands obtained thru the homestead law,2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.The question certainly calls for a negative answer.We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,Section 6. Retention Limits. ...... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.Footnotes** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in by Justices Josue N. Bellosillo and Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. of the Fourth Division.

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roXAS & CO, INC.,Respondent.x------------------------------------xROXAS&CO.,INC.,Petitioner,- versus -DAMBA-NFSW,Respondent.x------------------------------------xDAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN,Petitioner,- versus -ROXAS & CO., INC.,Respondent.x------------------------------------xDAMBA-NFSW,Petitioner,- versus -ROXAS & CO., INC.,Respondent.G.R. No. 149548G.R. No. 167505Present:PUNO,C.J.,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DELCASTILLO,ABAD, andVILLARAMA,JJ.Promulgated:December 4, 2009G.R. No. 167540G.R. No. 167543G.R. No. 167845G.R. No. 169163G.R. No. 179650

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.The main subject of the seven consolidated petitions is the application of petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.) for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use of its threehaciendaslocated in Nasugbu, Batangas containing a total area of almost 3,000 hectares.The facts are not new, the Court having earlier resolved intimately-related issues dealing with thesehaciendas.Thus, in the 1999 case ofRoxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[1]the Court presented the facts as follows:. . . Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway,all located in theMunicipalityofNasugbu, Batangas.Hacienda Palico is1,024 hectares in areaand is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985.This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354.Hacienda Banilad is1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390.Hacienda Caylaway is867.4571 hectares in areaand is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.x x x xOnJuly 27, 1987, the Congress of thePhilippinesformally convened and took over legislative power from the President.This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.The Act was signed by the President onJune 10, 1988and took effect onJune 15, 1988.Beforethe laws effectivity, onMay 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR avoluntary offer to sell [VOS]Hacienda Caylawaypursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL.x x x xNevertheless,onAugust 6, 1992, [Roxas & Co.], through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of DARwithdrawing its VOSof Hacienda Caylaway.The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangasallegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it wasapplying forconversionof Hacienda Caylawayfrom agricultural to other uses.x x x x[2](emphasis and underscoring supplied)The petitions inG.R. Nos. 167540and167543nub on the interpretation ofPresidential Proclamation (PP) 1520which was issued on November 28, 1975 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.The PP reads:DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON ANDTERNATEINCAVITEPROVINCEAND THEMUNICIPALITYOFNASUGBUIN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESWHEREAS,certain areasin the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province andNasugbuin Batangashave potential tourism valueafter being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; andWHEREAS,it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and tosegregate specific geographic areasfor concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province asa tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority(PTA)pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.The PTA shallidentifywell-defined geographic areas within the zone withpotential tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts.Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this proclamation.All proclamation, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.(emphasis and underscoring supplied).The incidents which spawned the filing of the petitions inG.R. Nos. 14