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G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking thereversal of the Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.37001which affirmed an earlier decision2of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.

The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan,Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [hereinrespondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquiredthem by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from DemetriaCalderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have beenin possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, saidlots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having anyinterest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the

application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have beenin open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands inquestion since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax paymentreceipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fideacquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of

ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .;and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republicof the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole

world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearingof this registration case.

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. TheSolicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of theexhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidenceto adduce.3
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In a decision4dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for hereinrespondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question anddecreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situatedin Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing anarea of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipinocitizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with allthe improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name inaccordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, andPresidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the variouseasements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/orpresidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued.

And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration beimmediately issued. (Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republicwent on appeal to the CA inCA-G.R. CV No. 37001.

As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmedthat of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision " is not in

accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not establishedwith the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lotswhich would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." Inparticular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length ofrespondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not

considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have beendeclassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of theGovernment so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the publicdomain, are not capable of private appropriation.5As to these assets, the rules on confirmation

of imperfect title do not apply.6Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns onthe question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest orother inalienable lands of the public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7and the Constitution8classifying lands of thepublic domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks,"do notnecessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth oftrees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui9-
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A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classificationsimply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classifiedas forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators orother farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx.The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be

descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10which embodies the Regalian doctrine, alllands of the public domain belong to the Statethe source of any asserted right to ownership ofland.11All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to theState.12Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienableagricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienablepublic domain.13Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying orreclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e.,from forest or mineral to agricultural and viceversa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the court.14Needless tostress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject

of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable anddisposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannotbe sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of theprinciple established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession ofalienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jureand without the need of judicial or othersanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and

underscoring added.)

The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title forrespondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupationof the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption andfinding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court (IAC)16and Herico vs. DAR,17among other cases, that, upon the completion ofthe requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and becomeprivate property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards

for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienablenature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. Andthere lies the difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agencyor official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters ofland classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18Aside from taxreceipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the
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lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of theproperty. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome thepresumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been anotorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20For this reason, the Court has made ita point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the casemay be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express and positiveact from the government.21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land inquestion is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverseoccupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannotripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accordingly,respondents application for original registration of title inLand Registration Case No. N-25-1ofthe Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135527. October 19, 2000]

Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA

SANTOS, peti t ioners, vs.FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and

BELLA OJERIO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposablelands of thepublic domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared assuch, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer

ownership or possessory rights. A suit for the reversion of such property to the State may beinstituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorariassailing the August 28, 1998 Decision[1]of theCourt of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52048, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:[2]
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ACCORDINGLY, for want of merit, the appeal isDENIEDand the challenged Decision dated26 November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, isAFFIRMED. Nocosts.

The affirmed Decision[3]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled on the following: (1) LandRegistration Case No. N-340, filed in 1977 for confirmation of respondents title to three parcelsof land; and (2) Civil Case No. 4739, filed in 1981 for cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents

and Transfer Certificates of Title covering two of the said lots. The dispositive portion of the RTCDecision reads:[4]

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. In Civil Case No. 4739 -

1. Ordering the cancellation of Sales Patent Nos. 5387 and 5388 as well as Transfer Certificateof Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 in the names of [herein petitioner-]spouses Geminiano deOcampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos.

2. Taking judicial cognizance of the decision in Civil Case No. 3769, which ordered thecancellation of Free Patent Nos. 522697 and 502977 as well as Original Certificate of Title Nos.296 and 297, which decision has already become final and executory;

3. Ordering [Petitioners] Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and x x x PedroSantos and Crisanta Santos to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs attorneys fees in thesum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and the costs of suit.

II. In Land Registration Case No. N-340 -

1. Confirming [herein respondents]title [to] the land subject of registration and ordering theregistration thereof in the names of [Respondent] Teofilo D. Ojerio, of legal age, Filipino,married to Bella V. Ojerio and a resident of Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan - share; and CeciliaP. Arlos, Jose P. Arlos, Gloria P. Arlos, Luisito P. Arlos, all of legal age, Filipinos, single andresidents of 500-A, Fifth Avenue corner Baltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, MetroManila, and Alberto U. Arlos, minor, Filipino, and a resident of 500-A, Fifth Avenue cornerBaltazar Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City, Metro Manila - share; and

2. As soon as this decision becomes final and executory, let an order for the issuance of thecorresponding decrees be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts

The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows:[5]

On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration,

docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of theirtitles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with
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an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 41241 [PLAN]with an area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141[PLAN] with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, andhaving a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares.

Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos andCrisanta Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners ofLots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownershipis evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they becameowners of said lots by purchase from the government through sales patents.

The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the

applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediatelypreceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of thepublic domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron

also opposed the application for registration.

Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February

1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and hisspouse Bella V. Ojerio, filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title ofdefendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is, Original Certificate of Title(OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 squaremeters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an area of 43,089 square meters, or a total area of198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent title of defendants Armando

Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-(III-4) 510-D with anarea of 72,065 square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses PedroSantos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with anarea of 225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with an area of111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares.

In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739

which was then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the land registrationcases assigned to Branch 2.

Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26 April 1989

in G.R. 64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et

al. which annulled the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales

patent title issued in favor of the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the sameproperties subject of this appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


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Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to complywith the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants andcultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were incongruous withreality, bolstered the finding that [they had]never occupied, cultivated or made improvementson the property.It explained:

On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the ev idence presented,concluded that [herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest were in actualpossession of the subject lands in 1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, thecheckered testimonies of [petitioners] reveal that they have never been in possession of thelands. And because of the absence of the actual occupancy on their part, the sales patents andtitles issued in their favor are null and void citing therein the ruling in Republic v. Mina(114SCRA 946) that the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he had been occupying andcultivating the land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under Section 9 of thePublic Land Laws.

On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. x xx.[6]

Debunking petitioners reliance onManalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[7]the CA ratiocinated asfollows:

[Herein respondents]do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April 1989 inGR No. 64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendants-appellants Manalos andgranted the issuance of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses.

What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject property in favor

of the Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on

their part by misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject properties whenin fact the subject properties were being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 wayback when the land still formed part of the military reservation and further on when it wasdeclared to be public agricultural land. x x x.[8]

Hence, this Petition.[9]

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:[10]

I

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of theSupreme Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de

Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity and legality of petitioners TCT

No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298 [pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld.

II
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Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation ofpetitioners Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that privaterespondents are not the proper party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners titles [to]

the lots.

III

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners committed anact of misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent.

IV

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to pay privaterespondents the amount of P50,000.00 representing attorneys fees.

In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration ofrespondents title under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners Sales

Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title

Respondents application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that were once part

of the public domain is governed by the Public Land Act,[11]the pertinent portion of which reads:

SEC. 48.The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public

domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not beenperfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the landis located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, underthe Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of thepublic domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when

prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed allthe conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title underthe provisions of this chapter.

x x xx x x x x x

Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo andArsenio Obdin,[12]who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, whenthe former filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest
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had been occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for atleast 30 years, as required by the Public Land Act.

We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the PublicLand Act only if it pertains to alienablelands of the public domain.[13]Unless such assets arereclassified and considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept ofowner, no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily,Presidential Decree No. 1073[14]clarified Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specificallydeclaring that the latter applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.[15]

In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation thathad been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable andalienable only in 1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[16]a suit involving the sameparcel ofland and instituted by herein petitioners against other claimants, the Court held:

As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision:

x x x.It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of which the landin question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automaticallybecame a disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over saidreservation was transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservationremained unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only onMay 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No 26-

40).Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic ActNo. 274. If the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to thePhilippine government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in1971. This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military

reservation land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienablein 1971.(Emphasis supplied.)

Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subjectproperty from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because itwas a military reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry orsettlement. This is clear from Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provide asfollows:

SEC. 83.Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, thePresident may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain asreservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or ofthe inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for highways,rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation systems, communal pasturesor leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries, public fishponds, working-men's village andother improvements for the public benefit.
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SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shallbe non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other dispositionuntil again declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the

President.(Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners similar argument that they had beenoccupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise:

The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataanto which the parcels of land involved in the casebelong was formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which wasturned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of thePhilippines v. Court of Appeals et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under thesituation, the Court seriously doubts whether Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interestcould have been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed:

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be

acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30,1976, 73 SCRA 146).

We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have notsatisfied the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not haveoccupied the property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearlythen, their application for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellateand the trial courts.

Second Issue: Cancellation of PetitionersTit les

Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because it is a rule that the

Torrens Title issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one which wasjudicially secured upon registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance ofpatent.[17]

Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents and TCTsshould have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein respondents, pursuant toSection 101 of the Public Land Act, which we quote:

SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or

improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in hisstead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion, but forreconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit.

We are not persuaded by respondents argument.In an action for reconveyance, the decree ofregistration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of theproperty, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
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another persons name,to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. That is whatreconveyance is all about.[18]

Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not shown a titlebetter than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven any title that may be

judicially confirmed.

Moreover, respondents invocation ofHeirs of Nagano v. CA[19]must be rejected. In that case,the Court noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted for thepurpose of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, were an assertion that the lot is private land, or that

even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had alreadyacquiredimperfect title thereto under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 x x x.Hence, the Court ruledthat respondents, not the OSG, were the proper parties to file the suit.

In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the land. Theyhave not established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, notpetitioners, have a better right thereto.

Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained bypetitioners, who have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land inquestion. The former cite several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing thatthe latter have not actually occupied or cultivated the property.

The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would beimproper in this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulentlyobtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through theOffice of the Solicitor General. Since petitioners titles originated from a grant by thegovernment, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[20]At the risk of

being repetitive, we stress that respondents have no personality to recover the property,because they have not shown that they are the rightful owners thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTEDand the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appealsand the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED.No pronouncement as to costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review,in its sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in thename of herein petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
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THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitionervs.RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ,J.:

The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps,ormanglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they arenot alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they maybe acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in questionmust be judged by these criteria.

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in themunicipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for morethan forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of theRepublic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of FirstInstance. of Capiz. 1The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2The Director ofForestry then came to this Court in a petition for review oncertiorari claiming that the land indispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that theregistration be reversed.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree thatthe land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between theparties is the legal natureof mangrove swamps ormanglares.The petitioner claims, it is forestaland therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agriculturalland. The issue before us is legal, not factual.

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one ofthe earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in thePhilippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral andtimber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of theCommonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That

new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial,residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide forother categories. 3This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in thepresent Constitution. 4

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose,only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5Their disposition was provided for under


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C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unlessthey were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6promulgated in 1909, mangroveswamps or manglareswere defined by the Court as:

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plantswhich will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud andcasting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of thetropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sakeof the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palmpropagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion thatthey cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or ingeneral American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose ofnavigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in whatremains.

x x x

Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown ofconverting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature ofsettlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one ofthe most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vestedinterests and prove a public disaster.

Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of privateownership.

Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case,that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the

Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:

Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest'includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa andmangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine inthe Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act ofCongress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a bettertranslation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with treesgrowing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and landwhich has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.

xxx xxx xxx


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The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglareor nipa swamps does not change thegeneral character of the land from manglareto timber land.

More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:

'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase

agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain whichare not timber or mineral lands.

Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act ofCongress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineralor agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarilyagricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries orordinary farm lands.

The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.

These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered themagricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully establishedby Act No. 926.

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8promulgatedon March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application thereare mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the

Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrovelands are not forest landsin the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.

No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montanoand Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director ofForestry, 9with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove landsin litis were agricultural innature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are smalland sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value aslumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They donot form part of the public domain.

Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register ofDeeds, 11reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber ormineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipaswamps, manglares,fisheries or ordinary farm lands.

But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding thecontrary view.


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In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12promulgated in 1983, the Courtruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrovelands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.

Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13the Court was more positivewhen it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest landbecause it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified inSection 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land inquestion. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subjectto land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of privatepersons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted andmore valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to

be kept under forest classification.The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classificationsimply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of landclassified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingincultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing inbrackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of itslegal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to thateffect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the ruleson confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'

The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14where this Court agreedwith the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swampmangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case wasdecided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categoricalpronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swampsare agricultural lands or forest lands.

The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which hasthe authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain(and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislaturehaving made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of theirown role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that thelaws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the


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courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or,assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by theexecutive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve theobjectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.

In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines thefunction of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Lumber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for thepurposes of their administration and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands,the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:

For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienableor open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such landsare destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any timeand in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.

As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:

Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon therecommendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, thePresident of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall byproclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and


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thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shallremain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.

The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify theboundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and uponsuch revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as thoughsuch proclamation had never been made.

Sec. 1827.Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes.- Lands in public forest, notincluding forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands arebetter adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required bythe public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to beagricultural lands.

With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglaresshould be understood as comprised within the public forests of

the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917.The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, andin effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remainsunchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executivedepartment. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary orunrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicialintervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeatour statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forestlands is descriptive of itslegalnature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what theland actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having

been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should beunderstood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the

Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislatedas forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by thedue process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs.Court of Appeals, 15where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909,before it was much later classified as timberland.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangroveswamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureauof Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be thesubject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the privaterespondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released asforest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director ofForestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.


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The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by theDirector of Lands, 16to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that themere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps,as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly inofficious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited

law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is morevaluable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agriculturalland and release for private ownership.

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that untiltimber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands northe Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands forhomesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and othermodes of utilization.

The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands ormangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forestland or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.

The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned byprivate persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grantof title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land hasbeen declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannotconvert it into private property.'

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the privaterespondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubiouspersuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence ofthe informacionposesoriaallegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alonethe fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has itbeen shown that theinformacion posesoriahas been inscribed or registered in the registry ofproperty and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the privaterespondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17These matters are notpresumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basisused by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Taxdeclarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership infavor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration ofthe subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.


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It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,mangrove swamps or manglaresform part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, theyare not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership untiland unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application forregistration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision isimmediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39473 April 30, 1979

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO, respondents.

Eduardo G. Makalintal for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines fromthe Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. Sp-01504 denying the State's Petition for certiorari and Mandamus.

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967, in the Court of FirstInstance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the reopening of cadastral proceedings over aportion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971.0569 hectares, pursuant toRepublic Act No. 931, as amended by Republic Act No. 2061, docketed as Cad. Case No. 19,LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097. In the absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or

from private individuals, private respondent was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. OnOctober 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating theland in favor of private respondent. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a decreeof registration on November 20, 1967, and on November 21, 1967, the Land RegistrationCommission issued Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, OriginalCertificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor. Private respondent thereafter


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subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding titles. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.18905 to 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds.

On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of registration, petitioner filed aPetition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that duringthe period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of land was part ofthe U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan. which was formally turned over to the Republic of thePhilippines only on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest ofMariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public LandLaw. Respondent field an Opposition thereto, which was considered by the trial Court, as aMotion to Dismiss, and on December 20,1968, said Court (Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding)issued an Order dismissing the Petition for Review mainly on the ground that the SolicitorGeneral had failed to file opposition to the original Petition for reopening of the cadastralproceedings and was, therefore, estopped from questioning the decree of registration orderedissued therein. On January 28, 1969, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied bythe trial Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of merit.

Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal, which was objected toby private respondent. On July 15, 1972, or three years later, *the trial Court (Judge AbrahamP. Vera, presiding) refused to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration but the trial Court denied it in its Order of October 14, 1972 on the ground thatthe proper remedy of petitioner was a certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that theOrder sought to be appealed from had long become final and executory as petitioner's Motionfor Reconsideration waspro-forma and did not suspend the running of the reglementary periodof appeal.

On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of

Appeals claiming that the trial Court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack ofjurisdiction when, without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition for Review;and since said Petition raised certain issues of fact which cannot be decided except in a trial onthe merits, the dismissal of the Petition on the basis of private respondent's Opposition,considered as a Motion to Dismiss, constituted a denial of due process of law. Petitioner thenprayed that the Order of the trial Court, dated December 20, 1968 dismissing the Petition forReview, be declared null and void, and that said trial Court be directed to give due course to thePetition for Review; or, in the alternative, to give due course to petitioner's appeal.

On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial Court's dismissal of the Petitionfor Review stating:

... We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which shows that private respondenthad committed fraud against petitioner. Its representations and officials were duly notified ofprivate respondent's petition for reopening and registration of title in her name. In said petition,the technical descriptions of the portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre,subject-matter of the petition were expressly stated, the boundaries, specifically delineated. Thealleged ground that the land forms part of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was dulynotified of said petition. Failure to file opposition is in effect, an admission that the petition is


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actually not part of a forest land. Indubitably, therefore, no justifiable reason exists for theannulment of the Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) of the lower courtdismissing herein petitioner's petition for review of the decree issued in favor of privaterespondent Lastimado. 1

The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed any grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the issuance of an Order, dated December 20,1968 (Annex D-Petition) dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review, the present petition forreview is hereby denied.

The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition is no longer necessary asthis Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and authority to supervise orderlyadministration of justice, has already resolved on the merits the question whether or not thedismissal of the petition for review had been done with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction. 2

From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorariassigning the following errors to the Court of Appeals and to the trial Court:

1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there can bepossession, even for the purpose of claiming title, of land which at the time of possession issubject to a military reservation.

2. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that such land which issubject to a government reservation, may appropriately be the subject of cadastral proceedings,and hence. also of a petition to reopen cadastral proceedings.

3. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding that a parcel of land which ispart of the public forest is susceptible of occupation and registration in favor of private individual.

4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Republic of thePhilippines is not estopped from questioning the decree of registration and the title issuedpursuant thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado over the parcel of land in question.

5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the Republic of the Philippines.

6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides:

Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of decree.

If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in hisapplication or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation andregistration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet titlethereto. subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon


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and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whethermentioned by name in the application, notice of citation, or included in the general description"To all whom it may concern". Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence,infancy, or other disability of any person affect thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court forreversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or

of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in thecompetent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decreeprovided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... 3

The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that thepetitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud;d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that theproperty has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 4

However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and thefacts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the

judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.5

The following ruling spells out the differencebetween extrinsic and intrinsic fraud:

Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulentscheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party,or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presentingfully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in alitigation during the trial such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which didnot affect the present action of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of thecase. 6

The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.

7

In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner alleged that fraud was committedby private respondent when she misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest hadbeen in possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and adversely against the wholeworld as owner for more than forty years when, in fact, the subject land was in. side the formerU.S. Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines onlyon December 22, 1965, and that she likewise contended that her rights, as derived from theoriginal and primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial confirmationunder existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of land is within the public forest of Mariveles,Bataan, and is not subject to disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Public Land

Law.

The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that no fraud was committed byprivate respondent, which deprived petitioner of its day in Court as there was no showing thatshe was aware of the facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not have suppressedthem with intent to deceive. The trial Court also noted that petitioner had failed to file anopposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only to theSolicitor General as required by Republic Act No. 931. but to the Bureau of Lands and the


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Bureau of Forestry as well. It then concluded that "the remedy granted by section 38 of the LandRegistration Act is designed to give relief to victims of fraud, not to those who are victims of theirown neglect, inaction or carelessness, especially when no attempt is ever made to excuse or

justify the neglect." With the foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court dismissed thePetition for Review.

We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the parties to submit forresolution the Opposition to the Petition for Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss,the trial Court, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed thePetition outright but should have afforded petitioner an opportunity to present evidence insupport of the facts alleged to constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by privaterespondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., 8it was held that "the action of thelower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of registration filed within one yearfrom entry of the d without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim thatactual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, becausethe lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it."

If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation at thetime it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral p nor can it be theobject of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. 9Similarly, if the land in question, indeed formspart of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into privateproperty as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the powerand jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System. 10

Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (althoughthe Solicitor General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to baraction by the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or

agents.11

Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal consideration that "the State as personain law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land" underbasic Constitutional Precepts, and that it is moreover charged with the conservation of suchpatrimony. 12

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30, 1974, dismissing thePetition for certiorari and mandamus filed before it, as well as the Order of the Court of FirstInstance of Bataan (Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing the Petition for Review, arehereby set aside and the records of this case hereby ed to the latter Court for furtherproceedings to enable petitioner to present evidence in support of its Petition for Review.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. L-52518 August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,vs.UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondents-appellants.

Taada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

From an adverse decision of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) Laguna dated 3 June1968 in a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction, Civil Case No. SC-650 entitledInternational Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippinesand Jose Campos, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioner and against therespondents:

(a) Declaring that Rep. Act No. 3990 does not empower the University of the Philippines, in lieuof the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry, to scale, measure and seal thetimber cut by the petitioner within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect thecorresponding forest charges prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code therefor; and

(b) Dismissing the respondents' counterclaim.

respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.

49409-R.

After the parties filed their respective Briefs in 1971, the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)promulgated on 28 December 1979 a resolution elevating the case to this Court as the "entirecase hinges on the interpretation and construction of Republic Act 3990 as it applies to a set offacts which are not disputed by the parties and therefore, is a legal question. 1

Civil Case No. SC-650 was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 June1966. 2Petitioner seeks therein a declaration that respondent University of the Philippines(hereafter referred to as UP) does not have the right to supervise and regulate the cutting andremoval of timber and other forest products, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or to

collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from petitioner and/or impose any otherduty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession, covered by License AgreementNo. 27-A issued on 1 February 1963, ceded in full ownership to the UP by Republic Act No.3990; asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained of and prays thatrespondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of P100,000.00 as damages and costs of thesuit.


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Its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue having been unfavorably acted upon, andpursuant to the order of the trial court of 26 August 1967, respondents filed their Answer on 13September 1987, 3wherein they interpose the affirmative defenses of, among others, impropervenue and that the petition states no cause of action; they further set up a counterclaim for thepayment of it by petitioner of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area

ceded to UP under R.A. No. 3990 from 18 June 1964, with surcharges and interests as providedin the National Internal Revenue Code.

Petitioner filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. 4

On 18 October 1967, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Joint Submission ofthe Case for Judgment, 5which reads as follows:

COME NOW the parties in the above entitled case by the undersigned counsel, and respectfullysubmit the following JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF THECASE FOR JUDGMENT, without prejudice to the presentation of evidence by either party:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is, among others, engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation ofplywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for aperiod of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from thatportion of timber land located in the Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province ofQuezon and in the Municipalities of Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province ofLaguna under License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) issued and promulgated by theGovernment through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on January 11, 1960.... ;

3. That aforementioned Timber License No. 27-A (Amendment) is a renewal of the TimberLicense Agreement No. 27-A previously granted by the Government to the plaintiff on June 4,1953 to February 1, 1963. ... ;

4. Plaintiff, since June 4, 1953, continuously up to the present, has been in peaceful possessionof said timber concession and had been felling cutting and removing timber therefrom pursuantto the aforementioned Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of January 11, 1960;

5. Plaintiff, on the strength of the License Agreement executed by the Government on June4,1953 (License Agreement No. 27-A) and of the License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) ofJanuary 11, 1960, has constructed roads and other improvements and installations of the

aforementioned area subject to the grant and purchased equipment in implementation of theconditions contained in the aforementioned License Agreement and has in connection therewithspent more than P7,000,000.00 as follows: ... ;

6. Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Agreement No. 27-A(Amendment) of January 11, 1960, the President of the Philippines issued ExecutiveProclamation No. 791 which reads as follows:


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xxx xxx xxx

RESERVING FOR THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,AS EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE PROPOSED DAIRY RESEARCH AND TRAININGINSTITUTE AND FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION STUDIES OF THISCOLLEGE A CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SITUATED PARTLY INTHE MUNICIPALITIES OF PAETE AND PAKIL ,PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, AND PARTLY INTHE MUNICIPALITY OF INFANTA, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, ISLAND OF LUZON.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuantto the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do herebywithdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of thePhilippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies ofthis College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities ofPaete and Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province ofQuezon, Island of Luzon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that the

disposition of timber and other forest products found therein shall be subject to the forestry lawsand regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic ofthe Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila this 25th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteenhundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the sixteenth.

(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA President of the Philippines

xxx xxx xxx

7. That on or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the aforementioned LicenseAgreement No. 27-A (Amendment) of July 11, 1960, Republic Act No. 3990 was enacted by theCongress of the Philippines and approved by the President of the Philippines, which Republic

Act provides as follows:

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A CENTRAL EXPERIMENT STATION FOR THE UNIVERSITY OFTHE PHILIPPINES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established a central experiment station for the use of theUniversity of the Philippines in connection with its research and extension functions, particularlyby the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences.

SEC. 2. For this purpose, the parcel of the public domain consisting of three thousand hectares,more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of


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which are stated in Executiv

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