Medical Malpractice cases.docx

8/10/2019 Medical Malpractice cases.docx

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G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA,Petitioner,vs.BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J .:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1datedSeptember 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition forcertiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the Orders2issued by publicrespondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-upon February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of

RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney isnormal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, sheunderwent kidney operation in September, 1999.

On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint forgross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in thefateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo andpetitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors,including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of theleft non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, privaterespondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence.Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for thepurpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she wasoperated. She described her exhibits, as follows:

"EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which isalso marked as Annex 2 as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counteraffidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by[Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation ofthe results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as oridentical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit datedMarch 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board inanswer to this complaint;

"EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is alsomarked as Annex 3 as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIscounter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminalcomplaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries whichare the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also thesame as or identical to the certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex 3 which is likewisedated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15,2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to thiscomplaint.
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"EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is alsomarked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of theexamination.

"EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is alsomarked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results ofthe examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of thesame examination which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In thecase of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex 4 is not a certifiedphotocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy.Both documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are writtenon Exhibit D.

Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits. Healleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified andauthenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits areincompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

Dispositions of the Board of Medicine

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] perits Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:

"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [hereinpetitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondentFlorendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of thiscase.

"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the respondents.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated in hiscomment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.

The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concludedthat it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decidesthe case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look atit through the process of admission. x x x.3

Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Ev idence.The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:

WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THEPETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF APPEALSUNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004

AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
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WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDEDA QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THEAPPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OFINCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CANRESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSEA PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONESLIVELIHOOD.4

We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of theBOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot bethe subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case.5At thatstage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, theonly and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on theground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed itsjurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in herFormal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.

Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2)have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent toprove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.

We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings beforeadministrative bodies such as the BOM.6Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of therules of evidence,7in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, oradmissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them

unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond theconsideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, theiradmission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completelydiscarding them or ignoring them.8

From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probativeweight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of

Appeals9teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to beconsidered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not itproves an issue.

Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading tothe loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of theProfessional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Courtshall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable andconvenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights ofeither party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10
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As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights ofpetitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were intheir proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 ofthe Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may becontradicted and overcome by other evidence:

x x x x

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997,March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, f iled in connection with Edithas medical case. The documents containhandwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached asannexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, whichwas investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal MedicalCenter (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered theexhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of heroperation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in theirproper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory

judicial notice.11

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter offact.12Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as thosecovered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.13Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,specifically biology,14include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. Inthis case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as withmost human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. 1awphilSection 3 of Rule 130

provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the contents of adocument, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the followingcases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith onthe part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence isoffered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined incourt without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the generalresult of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a publicoffice.
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The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for grossnegligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not theproper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations ofEdithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibitsoffered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. Tofurther drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removalof one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15Witness Dr. NancyAquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits "because [it]transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building."16Ultimately, since the originals cannot beproduced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shalldetermine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 isAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeActing Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case wasassigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeActing Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certifythat the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned tothe writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice
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G.R. No. 156037 May 28, 2007

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner,vs.SEBASTIAN M. BAKING,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1assailing the Decision2dated May 30, 2002and Resolution dated November 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435, entitled "SebastianM. Baking, plaintiff-appellee, versus Mercury Drug Co. Inc., defendant-appellant."

The facts are:

On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medicalcheck-up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis,Dr. Sy found that respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave

respondent two medical prescriptionsDiamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.

Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribedmedicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum.Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.

Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong medicine, respondent took one pill of Dormicum on threeconsecutive daysNovember 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m., November 7 at 6:00 a.m., and November 8 at 7:30 a.m.

On November 8 or on the third day he took the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The carhe was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could notremember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.

Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of thecollision, respondent returned to Dr. Sys clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to findthat what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.

Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 of Quezon City acomplaint for damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20193.

After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision dated March 18, 1997 in favor of respondent, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court hereby renders judgment infavor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay mitigated damages as follows:

1. P250,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses;

3. plus % of the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated November 5, 2002.
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Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with law or prevailingjurisprudence.

Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the petition lacks merit and, therefore, should be denied.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause ofrespondents accident; and

2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit isjustified.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged topay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered bythe plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the faultor negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.3

There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.

It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety ofthe people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care anddiligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to thefindings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of theprescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient,the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whetherthe medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must becommensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledgeof the business which the law demands.41awphi1.nt

Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving his car.

We disagree.

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbrokenby any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is

determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, andprecedent.5

Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr. Sysprescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fallasleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code which states:
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ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

x x x

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by

their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of theirfunctions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within thescope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that theyobserved the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. Whenan injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there

has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervisionover him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part ofthe employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection andsupervision of his employee.6Here, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a goodfather of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for damagescaused by the latter.

As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may be awardedwhenever the defendants wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering,mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, socialhumiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the CivilCode.7

Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the award of moral damages when he testifiedthat he suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the accident caused by the negligence of petitionersemployee.

There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages,since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it must be commensurate to the loss orinjury suffered.8Taking into consideration the attending circumstances here, we are convinced that the amountawarded by the trial court is exorbitant. Thus, we reduce the amount of moral damages from P250,000.00to P50,000.00 only.

In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages. Article 2229 allows the grant ofexemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good. As mentioned earlier, the drugstorebusiness is affected with public interest. Petitioner should have exerted utmost diligence in the selection andsupervision of its employees. On the part of the employee concerned, she should have been extremely

cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products. Due to the sensitive nature of its business, petitioner must atall times maintain a high level of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of exemplary damages in the amountof P25,000.00 is in order. 1awphi1.nt

On the matter of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for theaward thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court.9Since the trial courts decision did not give thebasis of the award, the same must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila ElectricCompany,10we held:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_156037_2007.html#fnt6


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Likewise, the award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses should be deleted. Well-enshrined is that "anaward for attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision and not in the dispositive portiononly"(Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] andKeng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This is also true with the litigationexpenses where the body of the decision discussed nothing for its basis.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57435 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the award of moral damages torespondent is reduced from P250,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) petitioner is likewise ordered to pay saidrespondent exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorneys fees and litigationexpenses is deleted.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeChairperson

(on leave)RENATO C. CORONA

Associate JusticeADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIAAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the aboveDecision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtsDivision.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

G.R. No. 142049 January 30, 2001

GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES, INC. and LUBECA MARINE MANAGEMENT HK LTD., petitioners,vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FROILAN S. DE LARA, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

On 17 October 1994, private respondent was hired by petitioners to work as a radio officer on board its vessel,the M/V T.A. VOYAGER. Sometime in June, 1995, while the vessel was docked at the port of New Zealand,private respondent was taken ill. His worsening health condition was brought by his crewmates to the attentionof the master of the vessel. However, instead of disembarking private respondent so that he may receiveimmediate medical attention at a hospital in New Zealand, the master of he vessel proceeded to Manila, a


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voyage of ten days, during which time the health of private respondent rapidly deteriorated. Upon arrival inManila, private respondent was not immediately disembarked but was made to wait for several hours until avacant slot in the Manila pier was available for the vessel to dock. Private respondent was confined in theManila Doctors Hospital, wherein he was treated by a team of medical specialists from 24 June 1995 to 26 July1995.1wphi1.nt

After private respondent was discharged from the hospital, he demanded from petitioners the payment of hisdisability benefits and the unpaid balance of his sickness wages, pursuant to the Standard EmploymentContract of the parties. Having been assured by petitioners that all his benefits would be paid in time, privaterespondent waited for almost a year, to no avail. Eventually, petitioners told private respondent that, aside fromthe sickness wages that he had already received, no other compensation or benefit was forthcoming.1Privaterespondent filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for payment of disabilitybenefits and the balance of his sickness wages. On 31 July 1997, the labor arbiter rendered a decision,2thepertinent parts of which are quoted hereunder

In the case at bar, there is no issue on the propriety or illegality of complainant's discharge or releasefrom employment as Radio Operator. What complainant is pursuing is limited to compensation benefitsdue a seaman pursuant to POEA Standard Employment Contract, Part II, Section C, paragraph 4(c)and paragraph 5, which reads:

"SECTION C. COMPENSATION BENEFIT

xxx xxx xxx

"4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the term ofhis contract are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves thevessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the seaman is entitledto one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work orthe degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated

physician, but is [sic] no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120)days. For this purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employmentmedical examination by the company-designated physician within three working daysupon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which casethe written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance x xx.

"5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seamen [sic] [during] the term ofemployment caused by either injury or illness, the seamen [sic] shall be compensated inaccordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of this Contract.Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the ratesand the rules of compensation applicable at the time of [sic] the illness or disease wascontracted."

The aforecited provisions of the POEA Standards [sic] Employment Contract is clear and unmistakablethat its literal meaning should be preserved.

Thus, the only question at which the liability of respondents is anchored is whether complainant wasreally fit to work in his position as radio operator. If this is so, it could mean that he is not entitled todisability compensation which respondents vigorously disputed, citing in support the certification madeby Dra. Victoria Forendo [sic] Cayabyab, allegedly "the officially accredited and designated physicianof respondents, which is likewise, accredited with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration"where it is stated that "Nothing [sic] his job description as a radio operator, Mr. De Lara may be


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allowed to go back to work." (Annex D & E). Complainant on the other hand disputes respondent'sabove posture contending that the more persuasive and authentic evidence for purposes of decidinghis fitness or lack of fitness to work is the certificate issued by Ms. Naneth [sic] Domingo-Reyes, MD,FPMA where it appears that after submitting himself to another medical examination by his attendingphysicians at the Manila Doctors Hospital on December 4, 1996, to verify possible mistake in his posttreatment examination on March 25, 1996, firmly "was classified under partial permanent disability andis not fit to go back to his previous work due to mental state." (Annex "C", complainant's reply to

respondent's position paper).

We have gone into a judicious study and analysis of the arguments and exhibits particularly the onesrelied upon by the parties and find that of the complainant worthy of consideration. Looking closely at

Annexes "D" and "E" of respondents' position paper, there is hardly any clear affirmation thatcomplainant was fully fit to resume his work as radio operator. Although the document alluded to,declares that complainant may be allowed to go back to work, the tenor of the same seems uncertainthat complainant is fit to resume his work, and that assuming that such was the message, the words"may be" can not be taken as overriding that coming from the Manila Doctor Hospital which in thebeginning handled the medical case of complainant and to which respondents unconditionally referredhim and by reason of which six or seven medical especialists [sic] of the hospital took turn [s] studyingand reviewing his uncertain ailment after release by respondents. Otherwise stated, unlike themessage of annexes D to E of respondents, annex "C" of complainant is clear and unmistakable andconfirm complainant's partial permanent disability and his definite unfitness to go back to his previouswork due to his mental health. Some pronouncements in this exhibit mentions also that whencomplainant was admitted an emerging basis for drowsiness, behavioral change and off and on fever"and different procedures were resorted along his case, like emergency CT scan on the brain and hisadmission in June 24, 1995 was catastropic, whereas, more could be said in three document[s] issuedby Dra. Victoria Florendo Cayabyab.

Finally, respondents contend that the annexes issued by Dr. Domingo-Reyes of the Manila DoctorsHospital should not be given weight because it is not issued by the hospital or doctor duly accreditedby the POEA. Neither would a close look on the applicable provision for seamen showthat a dulyaccredited hospital or doctor is needed for purposes of the grant of compensation benefits to a such[sic] or ailing seamen. We are more persuaded based on the arguments of the complainant amongothers, that it is absurd to require an ailing seaman in high seas or in a foreign land to still wait until theship where he is working land in the country to secure treatment in a duly accredited hospital or doctor.

On the basis of the above therefore, and convinced that complainant's "partial permanent disability"which was contracted in the course or on account of his employment as radio operator in foreignprincipal's vessel, he is entitled to disability benefit in accordance with the schedule of benefitsenumerated in Appendix 1 of the Contract, the maximum of which is US $50,000. But since theamount prayed for is US$25,000.00 which were presume has a more realistic basis, the same ishereby granted.

Concerning the sickness wage, respondents averred that the same had already been paid. However,there is no evidence that the same has been paid except the payment to the complainant ofP49,546.00. Since complainant's salary as US$870 and a seaman's sick wage entitlement is fixed to amaximum of 120 days, his "sickness wages would rest to a total sum of US$3,480 or its pesoequivalent. On this, complainant has been paid only [P]49,546.00 (US$1,943), thereby leaving forcomplainant a balance of US$1,537. Finally, it is also argued that as regards the balance, the same

has been paid citing as proof the Sickness Release and Quitclaim signed by complainant (Annexes"C" & "C-1"). Complainant, on the other hand denied this, and contended that the quitclaim andrelease is invalid. Considering that there is no proof on record that this balance of US$1,537 was paid,unlike the P49,546.00, the same is granted.

WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, a decision is hereby issued ordering respondent GermanMarine Agencies Inc. to pay complainant the following sums:

(a) Disability benefit - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - US$25,000.00


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(b) Sickness wage balance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - US $1,137.00

all in the aggregate of Twenty Six Thousand One Hundred Thirty Seven Dollars (US$26,137.00) or itspeso equivalent, the claim for damages being hereby dismissed for lack of merit, plus ten (10%)percent attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

On 29 July 1998, the NLRC3affirmed the labor arbiter's decision in totoand declared that the latter's findingsand conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.4After its motion for reconsideration was denied bythe NLRC on 20 May 1999, petitioners repaired to the Court of Appeals.5The appellate court's assaileddecision was promulgated on 1 December 1999, upholding the decision of the NLRC, with the modification thatpetitioners were ordered to pay private respondent exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Theappellate court reasoned out its decision,6thus

The basic issue here is: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay private respondent's claim asawarded by the NLRC, and whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC inaffirming such decision on appeal? To resolve this issue, this Court took time in looking closely at thepertinent provision of the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of FilipinoSeafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, particularly PART II, SECTION C, par. no. 4 (c), and par.

no. 5, which states as follows:

"SECTION C. COMPENSATION BENEFIT

"4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the term ofhis contract are as follows:

"xxx xxx xxx

c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel formedical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the seaman is entitled to one hundredpercent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work or his degree of permanentdisability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall thisperiod exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. x x x x.

"5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seamen during the term of hisemployment caused by either injury or illness the seamen shall be compensated inaccordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of his Contract.Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the ratesand the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

xxx xxx xxx. . ."

A cursory reading of these applicable contractual provisions and a thorough evaluation of thesupporting evidence presented by both parties, lends strong credence to the contentions andarguments presented by private respondent.

The award of disability compensation has a clear and valid basis in the Standard Employment Contractand the facts as supported by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nannette Domingo-Reyes of theManila Doctors Hospital. Petitioners' contention, that dr. Domingo-Reyes is not company designated isfar from the truth. The designation of the Manila Doctors Hospital by petitioners as the company doctorfor private respondent cannot be denied. Their very act of committing private respondent for treatmentat the Manila Doctors Hospital under the care of its physician is tantamount to company designation.The very act of paying the hospital bills by the petitioners constitutes their confirmation of such


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designation. Hence, petitioners cannot resort to the convenience of denying this fact just to evade theirobligation to pay private respondent of his claims for disability benefit.

This Court also finds no basis on (sic) the petitioners' contention that the company-designated[physician] must also be accredited with the POEA before he can engaged in the medical treatment ofa sick seaman. There is nothing in the Standard Employment Contract that provides this accreditationrequirement, and even if there is, this would be absurd and contrary to public policy as its effect willdeny and deprive the ailing seaman of his basic right to seek immediate medical attention from anycompetent physician. The lack of POEA accreditation of a physician who actually treated the ailingseaman does not render the findings of such physician (declaring the seaman permanently disabled)less authoritative or credible. To our mind, it is the competence of the attending physician, not thePOEA accreditation, that determines the true health status of the patient-seaman, which in this instantcase, is [sic] the attending physicians from the Manila Doctors Hospital.

As to the award of the balance of wages, this Court is inclined not to disturb the factual findings of theNLRC. The failure of the petitioners to present a strong and credible evidence supporting the fact ofalleged payment of the balance of sickness justified the award of such claim. The long standingdoctrine in labor cases that "in case of doubt, the doubt is resolved in favor of labor" applies. For thereare indications that the evidence presented by petitioners appears to be of dubious origin as privaterespondent challenged the petitioners to present the original copy of the quitclaim and the vouchers in

a motion demanding from petitioners to produce the original copy of those documents purporting toshow that he had received the alleged sum of P39,803.30, which allegedly shows the payment of thebalance of his sickness wages. This motion was vehemently opposed by petitioners. To our mind,such opposition only created more doubts and eroded the veracity and credence of petitioners'documentary evidence.

As to the award of attorney's fees, the same is justified by the fact that private respondent actuallyhired the services of a lawyer to vindicate his right to claim for his disability benefit which is beingarbitrarily denied to him by petitioners. Had it not been for the arbitrary denial of petitioners, privaterespondent could not have been compelled to hire the services of a lawyer to pursue his claims incourt, for which he is presumed to have incurred costs.

With respect to private respondent's claim for damages, this Court finds that the NLRC overlooked theattendance of negligence on the part of petitioners in their failure to provide immediate medical

attention to private respondent. It further appears that negligence not only exists but was deliberatelyperpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal to commit the ailing private respondent to a hospital inNew Zealand or at any nearest port deprived of his right to immediate medical attention by petitioners,which resulted to the serious deterioration of his health that caused his permanent partial disability.Such deprivation of immediate medical attention appears deliberate by the clear manifestation frompetitioners' own words which states that,"the proposition of the complainant that respondents shouldhave taken the complainant to the nearest port of New Zealand is easier said than done. It is worthy tonote that deviation from the route of the vessel will definitely result to loss of a fortune in dollars notonly to the respondents but likewise to the owners of the cargoes being shipped by the said vessel."

By petitioners' own statement, they reveal their utter lack of concern for their Filipino crew. This kind ofattitude cannot be taken to pass by this Court without appropriate sanction by way of payment ofexemplary damages, if only to show that the life of a Filipino crew must be accorded due attention and

respect by the petitioners. For after all, had it not been for the toils of this crew, among others,petitioners would not be doing as good in their business and making "fortunes in dollars."

In affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, this Court finds that the NLRC never abused its discretionnor exceeded its jurisdiction.

Hence, this Court finds no valid basis to disturb the findings of the NLRC.


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WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 29 July 1998, and the Order dated 20 May 1999, arehereby AFFIRMED, and in addition thereto, petitioners are ordered to pay exemplary damages toprivate respondent in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 11 February2000. Hence, the present appeal.

Disability Benefits

Petitioners contend that the existence and degree of a seaman's disability must be declared by a "company-designated physician" who must be accredited with the POEA. Following this line of reasoning, petitionersclaim that private respondent is not entitled to disability benefits because he was found fit to return to work byDr. Victoria Florendo Cayabyab, the designated physician of petitioners, who is also accredited with the POEA. 7

Disagreeing with petitioners' stand, the labor arbiter ruled that, for purposes of determining compensationbenefits under the Standard Employment Contract, an ailing seaman need not have his condition assessed bya doctor or hospital accredited with the POEA. Consequently, the labor arbiter gave more weight to the opinion

of the specialists from the Manila Doctors Hospital who treated private respondent and declared him as havingsustained a partial permanent disability and unfit to go back to his previous work.8Meanwhile, the Court ofAppeals held that petitioners' act of committing private respondent for treatment at the Manila Doctors Hospitaland of paying his hospital bills therein is tantamount to "company-designation," and therefore, the certificateissued by Dr. Nanette Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital describing private respondent assuffering from a partial permanent disability should be construed as decisive in the matter of privaterespondent's entitlement to disability benefits. The appellate court also declared that nothing in the StandardEmployment Contract requires the company-designated physician or hospital to also be accredited with thePOEA.9

In the case at bar, the parties are at odds as to the proper interpretation of the POEA Standard EmploymentContract Government the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels (StandardEmployment Contract), particularly Part II, Section C thereof, which provides that

xxx xxx xxx

4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the term of hiscontract are as follows:

a. The employer shall continue to pay the seaman his basic wages during the time he is onboard the vessel;

b. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, theemployer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, dental, surgical and hospitaltreatment as well as board and lodging until the seaman is declared fit to work or to berepatriated.

However, if after repatriation the seaman still requires medical attention arising from saidinjury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declaredfit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel formedical treatment. After discharge from the vessel the seaman is entitled to one hundredpercent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanentdisability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall thisperiod exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman shall submit


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himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physicianwithin three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so,in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.Failure of the seaman to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in hisforfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seaman during the term of employment causedby either injury or illness the seaman shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule ofbenefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illnessor disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time theillness or disease was contracted.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners' contention that the existence and grade of a seaman's disability must be pronounced by aphysician accredited by the POEA does not find any support in the abovecited provision, nor in any otherportion of the Standard Employment Contract. In order to claim disability benefits under the StandardEmployment Contract, it is the "company-designated" physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a

permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter'semployment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside fromtheir own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in supportof their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification,by specifically using the term "accreditation" in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. Forinstance, under the Labor Code it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care toan injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or Government Service Insurance Systemmust be accredited by the Employees Compensation Commission.10It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation ofcontracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contractingparties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.11There I no ambiguity in the wording of the StandardEmployment Contractthe only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessingthe seaman's disability is that he be "company-designated." When the language of the contract is explicit, as inthe case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any

other intention that would contradict its plain import.12

The word "designate" means to specify, to mark out and make known, to identify by name, to indicate, to show,to distinguish by mark or description, or to set apart for a purpose or duty.13The Court agrees with the appellatecourt's ruling that petitioners' act of committing private respondent for treatment at the Manila Doctors Hospitaland paying the hospital bills therein is tantamount to "company-designation." By such unequivocal acts,petitioners clearly set apart and distinguished the Manila Doctors Hospital, together with its team of specialists,as the ones qualified to assess the existence and degree of private respondent's disability and thereby resolvethe question of the latter's entitlement to disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract.

In addition to their having been effectively designated by petitioners, it was the physicians from the ManilaDoctors Hospital who examined and treated private respondent for a little more than one month, subjecting thelatter to a series of medical procedures, such as medical therapy, neurological surgical drainage for brain

abscess, bilateral thalamic area S/P craniotomy (Burr Hole), and opthalmological (orbit) surgery for socketrevision and reconstruction of his left eye. The extensive medical attention given to private respondent enabledthe Manila Doctors Hospital specialists to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with private respondent'smedical condition.14No doubt such specialized knowledge enabled these physicians to arrive at a much moreaccurate appraisal of private respondent's condition, including the degree of any disability which he might havesustained, as compared to another physician not privy to private respondent's case from the very beginning.Thus, the appellate court was not mistaken in giving more weight to the certificate issued by Dr. NanetteDomingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital dated December 4, 1996, than to the one issued by Dr. VictoriaFlorendo Cayabyab.


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On the strength of Dr. Domingo-Reyes's medical certificate which stated that private respondent "can beclassified under partial permanent disability and is not fit to go back to his previous work due to his mentalstate," the labor arbiter awarded $25,000.00 as disability benefits, which award was upheld by the NLRC andthe appellate court. Petitioners insist that there is no factual basis for the award of $25,000.00 since there is nofinding as to the grade of permanent partial disability sustained by private respondent, in accordance with

Appendix 1 of the Standard Employment Contract (Schedule of Disability or Impediment For Injuries Sufferedand Diseases or Illness Contracted), and therefore, no means of determining the exact amount of

compensation to which private respondent may be entitled.15

The Court does not agree with petitioners' position. Under the Standard Employment Contract the grade ofdisability suffered by the seaman must be ascertained in accordance with Appendix 1 of such contract, which ispartially reproduced herein

Appendix 1SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT

FOR INJURIES SUFFERED AND OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED

HEAD

Traumatic head injuries that result to:

1. Apperture unfilled with bone not over three (3) inches withoutbrain injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 9

2. Apperture unfilled with bone over three (3) inches withoutbrain injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . Gr. 3

3. Severe paralysis of both upper or lower extremities or oneupper and one lower extremity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . Gr. 1

4. Moderate paralysis of two (2) extremities producing moderatedifficulty in movements with self care activities . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 6

5. Slight paralysis affecting one extremity producing slightdifficulty with self-care activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . Gr. 10

6. Severe mental disorder or Severe Complex Cerebral functiondisturbance or posttraumatic psychoneurosis which requireregular aid and attendance as to render worker permanentlyunable to perform any work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 1

7. Moderate mental disorder or moderate brain functionaldisturbance which limits worker to the activities of daily livingwith some directed care or attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 6

8. Slight mental disorder or disturbance that requires little

attendance or aid and which interferes to a slight degree withthe working capacity of the claimant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 10

9. Incurable imbecility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 1

Each grade under Appendix 1 has an equivalent disability allowance or benefit expressed in terms of apercentage of the maximum amount of $50,000.00. This is specified in Appendix 1-A of the StandardEmployment Contract


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APPENDIX 1-A

SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES

Impediment Grace Impediment

1 Maximum Rate x 120.00%

2 " x 88.81%

3 " x 78.36%

4 " x 68.66%

5 " x 58.96%

6 " x 50.00%

7 " x 41.80%

8 " x 33.59%

9 " x 26.12%

10 " x 20.15%

11 " x 14.93%

12 " x 10.45%

13 " x 6.72%

14 " x 3.74%

Maximum Rate: US$50,000.

To be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

Private respondent asked petitioner for disability benefits in the amount of $25,000.00, or fifty percent (50%) ofthe maximum rate of $50,000.00, which, under Appendix 1-A, is awarded when the seaman sustains a grade 6disability. One of the grade 6 head injuries listed in Appendix 1, specifically number seven (7), is described as a"moderate mental disorder or moderate brain functional disturbance which limits worker to the activities of dailyliving with some directed care or attendance." This coincides with Dr. Domingo-Reyes' diagnosis of privaterespondent's condition, as follows

xxx xxx xxx

Work-ups and Management:

Patient was admitted on an emergency bases for drowsiness, behavioral change and on and off fever.This started with headaches since the first week of June 1995 while on duty (on voyage). Patientprogressively deteriorated and arrived here already dehydrated with high grade fever. (emphasissupplied)


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Emergency CT Scan of the brain revealed rounded masses in both thalamus on the brain; the largermass was situated at the right.

Burr hole at the right parietal and drainage of the right thalamic abscess was done on June 26, 1995.Repair of shallow fornix of left eye and biopsy was done for culture studies thereafter.

Mr. De Lara stayed in the hospital for 33 days and was still in bedridden state when discharge. Hebecame ambulant on mid-August 1996 but his cerebral functions (cognitive and behavioral) remainimpaired.

This is his 18thmonth of illness. His admission last June 24, 1995 is considered catastrophic. He nowcan be classified under partial permanent disability and is not fit to go back to his previous work due tohis mental state.16(emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the medical certificate of Dr. Domingo-Reyes is more than sufficient basis for the award of disabilitybenefits in the amount of $25,000.00 in favor of private respondent.

Sickness wages

Petitioners assert that the award of $1,137.00, representing the balance of the sickness wages owed to privaterespondent, is erroneous and in absolute disregard of their documentary evidenceparticularly the threecheck vouchers in the total amount of P89,354.80, all issued in 1995 in favor of either private respondent or hiswife, and the "Sickwages Release & Quitclaim"which, according to petitioners, taken together would provethat they had paid private respondent the total amount of P89,354.80, or $3,480.00, corresponding to the 120days sickness wages as required under the Standard Employment Contract.

Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the labor arbiter held that only P49,546.00 ($1,943.00) was paid bypetitioners and that private respondent is still entitled to the balance of the sickness wages in the amount of$1,537.00. According to the labor arbiter, petitioners failed to prove that they had paid this amount to privaterespondent, notwithstanding the document entitled "Sickness Release & Quitclaim" introduced by petitioners inevidence, which was not given credence.17The NLRC and the Court of Appeals concurred with the labor arbiteron this issue. The appellate court held that the documentary evidence of petitioners was insufficient to supporttheir contentions.18

The Supreme Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the NLRC, particularly ifthey coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, when supported by substantial evidence. The reason for this isthat a quasi-judicial agency like the NLRC has acquired a unique expertise because its jurisdiction is confinedto specific matters.19Whether or not petitioners actually paid the balance of the sickness wages to privaterespondent is a factual question. In the absence of proof that the labor arbiter or the NLRC had gravely abusedtheir discretion, the Court shall deem conclusive and cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factualfinding.20

Damages

We affirm the appellate court's finding that petitioners are guilty of negligence in failing to provide immediatemedical attention to private respondent. It has been sufficiently established that, while the M/V T.A. VOYAGERwas docked at the port of New Zealand, private respondent was taken ill, causing him to lose his memory andrendering him incapable of performing his work as radio officer of the vessel. The crew immediately notified themaster of the vessel of private respondent's worsening condition. However, instead of disembarking privaterespondent so that he may receive immediate medical attention at a hospital in New Zealand or at a nearbyport, the master of the vessel proceeded with the voyage, in total disregard of the urgency of privaterespondent'' condition. Private respondent was kept on board without any medical attention whatsoever for theentire duration of the trip from New Zealand to the Philippines, a voyage of ten days. To make matters worse,when the vessel finally arrived in Manila, petitioners failed to directly disembark private respondent for


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immediate hospitalization. Private respondent was made to suffer a wait of several more hours until a vacantslot was available at the pier for the vessel to dock. It was only upon the insistence of private respondent'srelatives that petitioners were compelled to disembark private respondent and finally commit him to ahospital.21There is no doubt that the failure of petitioners to provide private respondent with the necessarymedical care caused the rapid deterioration and inevitable worsening of the latter's condition, which eventuallyresulted in his sustaining a permanent disability. 1wphi1.nt

In light of the foregoing, petitioners are liable for moral damages for the physical suffering and mental anguishcaused to private respondent.22There is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fairamount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.23In thepresent case, the Court considers the amount of P50,000.00 in moral damages as proper.24

Meanwhile, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, pursuant toArticle 2229 of the Civil Code. They are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve asa deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. While exemplary damagescannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he isentitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whetheror not exemplary damages should be awarded.25In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if thedefendant acted with gross negligence.26Coming now to the case at bar, the appellate court found that

negligence not only exists but was deliberately perpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal tocommit the ailing private respondent to a hospital in New Zealand or at any nearest port whichresulted to the serious deterioration of his health that caused his permanent partial disability. Suchdeprivation of immediate medical attention appears deliberate by the clear manifestation frompetitioners' own words which states that,"the proposition of the complainant that respondents shouldhave taken the complainant to the nearest port of New Zealand is easier said than done. It is worthy tonote that deviation from the route of the vessel will definitely result to loss of a fortune in dollars notonly to the respondents [petitioners herein]but likewise to the owners of the cargoes being shipped bythe said vessel."

Petitioners never denied making this statement. Given the prevailing circumstances, the appellate court'saward of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is adequate, fair, and reasonable.27

Although the labor arbiter awarded attorney's fees, which award was subsequently affirmed by the NLRC andthe Court of Appeals, the basis for the same was not discussed in his decision nor borne out by the records ofthis case, and should therefore be deleted. There must always be a factual basis for the award of attorney'sfees.28This is consistent with the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.29

WHEREFORE, the 1 December 1999 Decision and 11 February 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioners must also pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moraldamages and the award of attorney's fees is deleted. SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,concur.

Footnote

G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATOYAP,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.


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Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

RELOVA, J .:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in theconcept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.

On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by privaterespondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeepdriven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, EdgarMarcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru recklessimprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No.2745).

On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance ofRizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc.and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter indriving the passenger bus.

While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal actionproceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Pajewas convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in adecision promulgated on November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:

1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino, Zambales,at about 2:00 AM

2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellantdriver thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila,without

3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p. h. inorder to pass said truck;

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.

5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could doso, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.

6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as to

avoid a frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder of theroad going to Bataan;

7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for whichreason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and crashedinto the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.

8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision whichat the least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible.


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and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT evenguilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."

As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instanceof Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquittingFelardo Paje and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the NewRules of Court), which reads:

SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as otherwiseprovided by law, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless theextinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civilmight arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action mayinstitute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who maybe liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein privaterespondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:

(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga inwhich defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally andconvicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the accused; and

(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appealscase.

On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint

against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of Pajein the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a ground fordismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinctfrom the criminal action and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever mayhave been the result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of theRules of Court and not Section 3, paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision ofthe Court of Appeals in the criminal action that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty of civilnegligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be completely disregarded as anextraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any way the instant civil action; that the recordsof the criminal action against defendant Paje are inadmissible evidence; that it has been established in thecase at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitionerssuffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of respondent Paje and that it has been established,

not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence, that the damages sufferedby petitioners as a result of the negligence of private respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that thelatter should be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the same to petitioner.

In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision, instituted aseparate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on thealleged reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. beordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of ClementeMarcia was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et alvs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA 1062) which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that


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"(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the groundthat the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision wasa case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, whichaction was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in thecriminal action."

Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Pajedecision, respondent Court of Appeals held that theprivate respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence waswanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGESAGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROMNEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROMTHE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OFTHE NEW (CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. ANDIN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT

CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.

II.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVEROF RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THESAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THEINSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONSOF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDINGTHAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDERSECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OFCOURT.

III.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEINSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THECRIMINAL ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

ACQUITTING RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAIDRESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL

ACTION FOR DAMAGES.

IV.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLYBY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE

EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OFTHE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT PAJE.

V.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCEOF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THEDAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF


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DEFENDANTS IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATERESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof,should apply in the case at bar.

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency ofthe criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Suchcivil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only apreponderance of evidence.

We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action withoutwaiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence toprosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, anacquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of anindependent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs.Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will notnecessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the

civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause offire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declarationfits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability. " Likewise, inAlbornoz vs.

Albornoz,98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a criminal action contains an expressdeclaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil liability is barred undersection 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs. Priela 24 SCRA 582, this Court, speakingthrough then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of the penal action does not carry with itextinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact fromwhich the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it inthe jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of thething and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court.)"

As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimesmentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party.Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall requireonly a preponderance of evidence.

The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by hereinpetitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, noindependent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111of the Rules of Court states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil mightarise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to benonexistent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the

civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal byreason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if hisacquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil actionfor damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from whi

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