Misperception of feedbacks: another source of vulnerability in social-ecological systems

Misperception of Feedbacks: Another Source of Vulnerability in Social-Ecological Systems

Juan Carlos RochaPhD student

Stockholm Resilience Centre

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Misperception of feedbacks

“the tendency that decision makers often are insensitive to nonlinearities that alter the strength of feedback loops, undervalue the importance of delays, and misperceive the workings of stock and flow relationships” (Moxnes 1998; Sterman 2000)


Case study: Lobster fishery in Providence Island, Colombia


Why Providence is interesting: the logic of failureThey have made number of efforts to reach sustainable fishing.

Atypically uncooperative.

Towards an undesirable regime where fishery is unsustainable: less and shorter lobsters, less profits and less fishermen; therefore erosion on the system’s knowledge.


The role of misperception of feedbacks for natural resource

management 1. Are misperception of

feedbacks undermining dynamic failures?

2. Are misperceptions of feedbacks triggering uncooperative behavior?

3. What can we do to tackle misperceptions?


MethodsData:

Fishing records

Interviews

Experimental economics - games

Literature reviewLobster fishery SES

Socio-Economic

BiologicCultural

Inequity

Equity

RespectabilityReputation

-

+

-

+B


Biological sub-system

• Cohort model

• Reproduction type r = Each lobster mom can produce up to 600.000 eggs per period.

• Confers fast recovery to disturbance - Noise and 2 yrs delay

• Metapopulation dynamics matter - Spatial misperception - Conflict with “others”.

Lobster population and K Metapopulation dynamics


Socio-Economic: Fishing

• Elder adults and young lobster decrease in fishing scenarios while young and middle age adults increase

• No giant lobsters anymore

• Perception of non-resource exhaustion

• Higher effort than in the past

Elder adults Adults

Young adultsYoung

No-fishing - Fishing



• Fishers manage more money but also spend and fish more than before.

• Increase in effort and technology use

• Price is fixed by the State

• Weaken balancing feedbacks - Information delay.

Birth potential

Lobsterpopulation

Effort

Fishingeffectiveness

Technology usage(engines & petro)

Operation cost Profitability

Gains

Price

Demand

+

+-

+

+

+

-

+

+

+

+

B

B

Lobster fished

+

-

+

+

B

R

R

Poverty trap of fishing effort.



How the decisions of fishers in the experimental game can tell us how the resource will be affected under different institutional settings

Lobster numbers or biomass is not sensitive enough; egg production is a good resilience surrogate.

Base lineMaximum effort with noiseMaximum effort without noiseTwice maximum effort

Lobster population

Lobs

ter

fishe

d in

Ton

s

Eggs produced

Lobs

ter

fishe

d in

Ton

s


0

500000

1000000

1500000

2000000

0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

The effect of institutions on the lobster population

Egg

s pr

oduc

ed

Effort in the game

• Institutional arrangements not only improve cooperation levels.

• Without rules and norms the system is way too close to collapse points.

• Why are they atypically uncooperative?

Cultural: Institutions and rule breaking

How the decisions of fishers in the experimental game can tell us how the resource will be affected under different institutional settings

Social optima & Low allowance

Communication, Low monitoring and Focalized monitoring

Base line


• Crab antics: a metaphor of social order.

• Conflict with “others”: role of external agents = authorities and industrial fishermen

• Legitimate rule breaking

• Erosion of traditional ecological knowledge and beliefs system

• The role of drug smuggling

Cultural: Institutions and rule breaking

Wilson 1973

Equity RespectabilityReputation

- +

+-R R


1. Are misperception of feedbacks undermining dynamic failures?

Fishermen:

2yr delay

Spatial misperception

Non resource exhaustion

Poverty trap of fishing effort

Scientists:

How much metapopulation matters?

Lobster biomass is not sensitive enough; eggs production is a good resilience surrogate.

Authorities:

Weaken balancing feedbacks and create information delays

Rules breaking institutions

Erosion of TEK and belief system


2. Are misperceptions of feedbacks triggering uncooperative behavior?

Role and power of external agents

Time gap between rule implementation and desired results (2 years)

Industrial fishermen only fish outside the barrier reef - Metapopulation dynamics

With todays technology, artisanal fishermen have the power to collapse the lobster stock.


3. What can we do?

Three tipping points:

Perception of equality among fishermen is driving them towards social equilibria highly uncooperative.

As fishermen social prestige is low, the social memory loss remains high with strong implications for innovation and adaptation.

Monitoring programs based on biomass are not sensitive enough to resilience losses, inducing on one hand misperceptions by delayed information, while on the other closing the window of opportunity for preventive action.


Thanks!

Fishermen

F&FCoop

INCODER

Daniel Castillo

Pablo Ramos

Jorge Maldonado

Juan Camilo Cardenas

Questions??e-mail: [email protected]: @juanrochaBlog: www.criticaltrasitions.worldpress.com


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Misperception of feedbacks: another source of vulnerability in social-ecological systems

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