Lecture08 Evaluating Anti Terror Policies

8/18/2019 Lecture08 Evaluating Anti Terror Policies

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Counter Terrorism Policy

© William Eric Davis. All Rights Reserved.


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COUNTER-TERRORISM

Counter-terrorism is the use of personnel andresources to deter, preempt, disrupt, ordestroy terrorists and their support

netor!s" It can include diplomacy, laenforcement, military and other options"

The prefix "counter" in words such as counter-terrorismcounterintelligence and counterespionage is intended to

mean that an! effort taen will #e proactive aggressiveand offensive as opposed to an! reactive or simpl!defensive strateg! which might #e implied #! other termssuch as $anti-terrorism% or $responding% to terrorism.


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#EIN$ PRO%CTI&E

There are a variet! of polic! options in

counter-terrorism #ut outside of

prevention &in the form of secondar! targethardening' few experts recommend

conciliation restraint isolationism or

ignoring the pro#lem.


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'Soft( %pproaches

( )iplomacy

( Ne*otiation

( Social Reform

( $ood Intelli*ence %nalysis

'Soft+ approaches are comple, complicated, andreuire patience, .ut they ha/e the potential to .ehi*hly effecti/e in the lon* run, and in the end, thatis perhaps all that matters - hat or!s"


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$)ard% Approaches

( *aw Enforcement +ptions

( ,ilitar! +ptions &including $reemption%'

( /A st!le $0lac 0ag 1o#s% &$0lac +ps%'


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Terrorism 0 Political &iolence

E/aluatin* %nti-Terror Policies

( Diplomac!

(/ntelligence

( reemption

( Deterrence


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)IP1OM%C2

)iplomacy is defined as the ordered conduct ofrelations .eteen one *roup of human.ein*s and another *roup alien tothemsel/es"

The primary purpose of diplomacy iscommunications, and the ultimate goal ofdiplomacy is peace"

)iplomacy, as it is practiced today, can .econsidered a method of conflicttransformation"


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Material Conflicts 0 Identity Conflicts

There are two inds of conflicts for which Diplomac! is #estsuited2

&3' ,aterial conflicts2 which revolve around divida#leassets and can usuall! #e handled #! traditional conflictresolution techni4ues &including warfare'.

&5' /dentity conflicts2 which involve deep-seeded feelings of

hate #ut a sense of legitimate grievance and areusuall! handled #! diplomac! techni4ues that fre4uentl!ut not necessaril!' focus on reconciliation and6orrestorative 7ustice.


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)iplomacy Eperts are Eecuti/es, Not1e*islators or 3ud*es

)iplomacy is mostly +eecuti/e+ in thesense that a seasoned team ofprofessionals 4called the 5orei*n

Ser/ice or )iplomatic Ser/ice6 are usedho are dedicated to the practice ofdiplomacy and nothin* else"

( )iplomacy is also NOT a.out ne*otiation,*uile, or tric!ery" In fact, the practice ofdiplomacy is often all a.out fiin* thepro.lems that nations *ot into .ecause they

ere tryin* to decei/e one another"


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)iplomacy /s" Ne*otiation7hen diplomats are dispatched to settle a conflict or

contro/ersy, it is not the same as sendin*ne*otiators"

( The role of a negotiator is mae a #argain or to distractthe enem! while !ou are doing other things lie

preparing to attac them.

( With negotiation there is usuall! compromise8 someonewins someone loses or at least #oth parties never get allthe! want.

The role of a diplomat, hoe/er, is to resol/e a situation4ithout ne*otiatin*6 to the ultimate triumph for all8e/eryone usually ins 4somethin*6, and the re*ion isideally transformed .y peace"


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What is a Diplomat9

Diplomats carr! letters of credentials and full

powers signed #! a resident or :ecretar! of

:tate to act on #ehalf of a nation &or group'.

)owever this does not #ind their countr! until an!

agreement has gone through an acceptance

process &lie passage in a legislature signature

#! a resident rime ,inister or dictator.


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Uses of )iplomacy

The most common uses of diplomac! in counterterrorisminclude2

3. Developing #ilateral or multilateral anti-terrorist policies.

5. Arranging for the sharing of intelligence.

;. Arranging permission for law enforcement authorities fromone countr! to come in and arrest &or interrogate' asuspected terrorist in another countr!8 or rendition.


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E/aluation of )iplomacy

Diplomacy is the most frequently used

and most successfully used form of

counterterrorism"

/t re4uires the least amount of resources

among all the counterterrorism strategies.


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)iplomatic Successes

( :ome famous cases where diplomac! wored inthe terrorist context include2

( Ending the +E hostage crisis at =ienna in3>?@.

( Arranging a prisoner exchange with *e#anesehi7acers in 3>@.

( atching arlos the 1acal in 3>>> &and su#se4uent #reathroughs'.( And numerous cease-fire agreements #etween

/sraelis and alestinians from 5CC3-5CC;&although the! alwa!s eventuall! failed'.


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)iplomacy can or! 49 rational re*imes6,.ut it can also .e a ruse


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'NE$OTI%TION( %S COUNTERTERRORISM

Con/entional isdom holds that it isne/er ise to ne*otiate ith terroristsor to concede to their demands, at leasthile they are still en*a*in* in/iolence"

/n fact the .:. and man! of its allies are

$formall!% committed to a polic! of "nonegotiation" with terrorists &although the!have made exceptions generall! to their

regret'.


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)emocracies li!e to Ne*otiate

:istory shos democracies are more illin* to

ne*otiate and compromise ith terrorists than not,and more than alternati/e forms of *o/ernment")emocracy is itself a system of .ar*ainin*"

7hen such efforts *o ron*, they only encoura*e theterrorists to repeat their acts and .ecome more/iolent later on"

They also em.arrass a nation and result in lostcredi.ility for many years"

7hen such efforts *o partially ri*ht, and that is all theycan .e - partially effecti/e, the .est that can happenis the incident *oes aay, and there is some closure4for ahile6"


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Possi.le Concessions

( Payment of ransom money to terrorists

( Payment of .ri.e or protection money to terrorists

( $i/in* eapons, food, material, technolo*y, or information to terrorists

( Release of imprisoned terrorists

( Release of imprisoned supporters or sympathi;ers of terrorism

( Release of political prisoners, dissidents, etremists, and spiritual fanatics

( Pro/ision of transport to another location intra- or internationally

( Pro/ision of political asylum or amnesty ithin a host country

( Safe passa*e out of on country to a illin* host country

( Pro/ision of top-notch le*al ser/ices and a pu.lic court forum to air their cause

( Pro/ision of access to the nes media to .roadcast their propa*anda


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Eamples of Ne*otiation

% countless num.er of ransom payments ha/e .eenmade .y *o/ernments, corporations, and families toterrorists"

( Numerous prisoner echan*es, prisoner releases,and e/en mass releases of prisoners ha/e .een madethrou*hout history, and the U"S" has .een party to it"

( 5or all its tou*h tal!, Israel has en*a*ed in almost asmany concessions as crac!dons" It has *ottenthem little"

( It sol/es a short-term pro.lem 4li!e *ettin* a hosta*ereleased6, .ut it contri.utes to the lon*-term pro.lemof terrorism"


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The Iran-Contra %ffair

Perhaps the most famous act of concession in/ol/in* the U"S" as the Iran-Contra scandal" )urin* ?-@, hi*h-ran!in* officials of the U"S"*o/ernment sold AB million orth of *uns to Iran in hopes of *ettin*Iranian help for releasin* %merican hosta*es held .y Shiite terrorists in1e.anon"

( The money from the *un sale as used to support anti-Sandinista forcesin 1atin %merica" Iran, for its part, came throu*h and successfullypressured the terrorists to release the hosta*es in 1e.anon"

( Shortly after, hoe/er, more %merican hosta*es ere sei;ed .y the sameterrorist *roup, amon* others, and the U"S" suffered a maDor credi.ilitypro.lem in 1atin %merica from hich it has not since reco/ered"

( Iran-Contra is Dust one eample of thin*s *one horri.ly ron*, .ut in allfairness, it is up to history to decide if short-term epediency options areorth the lon*-term costs"


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E/aluatin* Ne*otiation

The .est that can .e said a.out ne*otiatin*ith terrorists is that concessions areonly mar*inally effecti/e 4and for the

most part, .ad ideas6, .ut they mi*ht .econcei/a.ly useful under some /eryspecific historical circumstances here

they dont reard terrorism or createcredi.ility pro.lems"


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INTE11I$ENCE

%n 'Intelli*ence( policy means toincrease intelli*ence .ud*ets so as to

'detect( terrorist plots .efore they arecarried out and to help catch terroristsshould they succeed in an attac!"

( )uman /ntelligence

( :ignals &Electronic' /ntelligence

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Intelli*ence Indicators of Terrorism

Indicators are usually thou*ht of as factors of ris!"

Re*ardin* terrorism, the three primary factors of ris! areF

(1) Adversary Capability

(2) Adversary Intentions

(3) arget !ulnerability

There is some de.ate ithin intelli*ence circles as to hether the thirdone is necessary 4does /ulnera.ility encoura*e /iolenceG6"

Some eperts tal! a.out +terrorism threat assessment+ 4as opposed toterrorism ris" assessment6 as only in/ol/in* the first to"

The third is contro/ersial precisely .ecause it sometimes in/ol/escollectin* /ulnera.ility information on an ally or friendly force"


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Capa.ility Indicators#ethal Agents$


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Intention Indicators


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&ulnera.ility Indicators

3. *ow current securit! posture5. um#er of people in a target area

;. :ignificance of target


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:ecurit! on :esame :treet


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Idealism /s" Realism

Idealism$ & The act or practice of en/isionin* thin*s in an ideal form"+ As aforei*n policy, it means to *au*e the 'intentions( of our enemies as anindication of threat to US national security" 5riendly *estures .y ourenemies may lead to US /ulnera.ility" It also includes a focus onad/ancin* human ri*hts around the orld"

'ealism$ +the inclination toards literal truth and pra*matism+ 4 As aforei*n policy, means to *au*e enemy capa.ilities and adDust USpolicy to deal ith an attac!, re*ardless of indications of the intent ofanother country or *roup" Can sometimes .e seen as pro/ocati/e"More illin* than idealists to o/erloo! human ri*hts a.uses and totolerate dictators 4in the interest of security6, such as 5erdinandMarcos in the Philippines and e/en Saddam :ussein"

NoteF 1i.erals 4)emocrats6 tend to .e idealists, hile Conser/ati/es4Repu.licans6 tend to .e realists" :oe/er, e are only tal!in* a.outtendencies" There are alays eceptions"


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%nother 7ay to 1oo! at It

Idealists measure threat to the US in terms of feelin*s4ho others 'feel( toard the US6" If more peoplehate us than .efore, then the US security le/el isloer, accordin* to idealists 4re*ardless of the

enemyLs capa.ilities6" Idealists tend to .e optimistic"

Realists measure threat to the US in terms of thecapa.ilities of the enemy" %ccordin*ly to realists, ife ha/e reduced their capa.ility, e ha/e impro/ed%merican security 4re*ardless of ho people feela.out it or us6" Realists tend to .e pessimistic"


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Stri/e for PerfectionG

Idealists assert e should stri/e for perfection":oe/er, idealists often .ecome lost in their dreams,and for*et the real orld around them8 and as aresult can acuire an out-of-touch aura a.out them"

Realists on the other hand are more *rounded in reality4hence the name6, and as a result are often .etterprepared to deal ith it" :oe/er, as they focus toomuch on reality, they often aim loer than can .ereached, only aimin* for hat can .e reached ithassurance, and as a result often miss out on the4fe6 times humanity does reach ecellence"


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7hy does a person .ecome arealist or an idealistG

It has to do ith attitudes a.out ris!"

Realists tend to .e ris!-a/erse 4i"e", they donLt

li!e it6"

Idealists tend to .e more tolerant of ta!in*ris!s"

This raises the uestionF hy does one.ecome ris!-a/erse 4or, alternati/ely, a ris!see!er6G


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Idealism has a )ismal Record of Success

( In


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B. W. 0ush is a realist #ut

sometimes has idealistic policies

5or eample, hen decidin* to *o to ar inIra, he loo!ed at IraLs capa.ilities4suspectin* 7M)s68 i"e", realism, .ut #ushalso somehat concerned himself ithSaddam :usseinLs intentions"

Once the ar as o/er 4and the occupation

.e*an6 he .e*an to try and transform Irainto a sta.le democracy .elie/in* that itould lead to peace and sta.ility in there*ion 4/ia the ')emocratic Peace(68 i"e",idealism"


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The $roup Information Indicator

$roup Information -- Name4s6, ideolo*y4political or social philosophy6, history of the*roup, dates si*nificant to the *roup, anddates on hich former leaders ha/e .een!illed or imprisoned"

Terrorist groups often strike on important

anniversary dates. :ome groups also have amanifesto which is important to o#tain orconfirm &such as doomsday dates'.


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The 5inancial Information Indicator

5inancial Information -- Source of funds, proceedsfrom criminal acti/ities, .an! account information"

Sudden influxes of funding or bank withdrawals indicate

preparation for activity. /tHs also important to identif! thegroupHs legal and financial supporters.

Technicall! an!one who would write an official letter of

protest or gather names on a petition for a terrorist is alegal or financial supporter. :ometimes an anal!sis ofsupport will reveal linages and6or mergers with otherterrorist groups.


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The 1ocational )ata Indicator

1ocational )ata -- 1ocation of *roups headuarters,location of *roups +safe+ houses 4here they hidefrom authorities6, and location of *roups +stash+houses 4here hide eapons and supplies6"

Regular attacks on "stash" houses is the most frequentlyused counter-terrorism technique.

/tHs important to specif! the underground that exists --where terrorists can flee. This is harder than identif!ingsafe havens. Terrorists lie to live in communal homesinstead of living alone.

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The Personal )ata Indicator

Personnel )ata -- 1ist of leaders 4and chan*es in leadership6, listof mem.ers 4and former mem.ers6, any personnel connections.eteen its mem.ers and other *roups of similar ideolo*y, andthe s!ills of all *roup mem.ers 4eapons epertise, electronicsepertise, etc"6

nowing the skills of the group is an important part of threatassessment.

/f the philosoph! revolves around one leader itHs important to nowwhat will occur if something happens to that leader.

+ften the anal!sis of famil! #acground is useful to determine howradicall! a leader or mem#er was raised. Broup structureparticularl! if the organiIation pattern is cellular determines whonows whom.


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E/aluation of )eterrence

7hile ordinary street crime is often deterred .y crac!dons,tar*et hardenin*, denyin* opportunity, and a**ressi/e security4ith !non displacement patterns6, terrorism frequentlydefies deterrence .ecause they dont see! tar*ets ofopportunity, .ut sym.olic tar*ets"

As a group terrorists are ver! team-oriented and often prepared forsuicide missions.

+n the other hand ordinar! criminals are undisciplined untrained andoriented toward escape. Terrorists are 7ust the opposite. The! have

prepared for their mission are willing to tae riss and are attac-oriented. /f captured the! will usuall! not confess or snitch onothers as ordinar! criminals do.

Traditional law enforcement methods are not all that effective when itcomes to the investigation or intelligence of terrorism.


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PREEMPTION

Attacing the enem! #efore the! strie us.

/t need not mean that the enem!Ks attac is$imminent.%

0ush reemption Doctrine &Eligi#ilit!'2 L on-Democrac!

L )ave or seeing W,Ds

L Ties to Terrorism

MEligi#le nations in 5CC32 Afghanistan /ra4 /ran orthJorea :!riaN


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Paul 7olfoit;MArchitect of the 0ush reemption DoctrineN

M l S i it C t t i

http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Jan2004/031209-D-2987S-016.jpg


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Moral Superiority as Counterterrorism

Some ould say that moral superiority is ho to in the ar onterrorism"

Most terrorist mo/ements and *roups do come to an end, ande/en a doctrine can .e defeated" 7innin* a ar on terrorismreuires that there .e a moral con/iction in the Dustice of thefi*ht"

% terror ar must *i/e epression to the morality in/ol/ed, andfi*ht as if it ere a ar of ideas"

Terrorism, in may ays, is an attac! on national ill" Terroristsoften count on the fact that their tar*ets are +soft and ea!+

and ill not .e a.le to sustain a coordinated *rand strate*y"

Terrorists !no that their tar*ets ill critiue themsel/es, andde.ate amon* themsel/es" They !no their tar*ets ill ar*ueamon* themsel/es a.out the morality of counterterrorism, andin fact, they are often countin* on this !ind of moral s!epticism

to de/elop .efore they attac! a*ain"


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Moral Counterterrorism Policy

The moral arguments against terrorism &that it isun7ustifia#le' should #e forcefull! restated time and timeagain and #! as man! voices as possi#le glo#all!.

The language of moralit! can #e powerful. ot onl! does it

appeal to foreign audiences #ut it can also help withdomestic morale.

)emocratic-minded and moderate leaders of

or*ani;ations in the host nations for terroristsshould .e assisted in ha/in* their +/oices+ amplified.y the democratic nations"


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%merican 5orei*n Policies

( ,onroe Doctrine

( Truman Doctrine &$ontainment% of ommunism'

( Reagan Doctrine &$Roll 0ac% ommunism'

( 0ushKs $reemption% &o waiting for terror attacs'.


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There are )ifferences of Opinion on :o to#est )eal ith Terrorism, and often they

are Partisan )ifferences


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E55ECTI&ENESS of PO1ICIES

In )escendin* order of Effecti/eness 4%ccordin* tosome studies6F


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SU#STITUTION E55ECT%s one counter-terrorism policy 4strate*y or tactic6

.ecomes successful, the enemy ill sitch strate*iesand tactics"

We call this a $su#stitution effect.% That is the enem! willsu#stitute a different tactic once current one is no longer

effective for them. The! ma! also change the $structure%of their organiIation.

The : must #e on guard and watch for this. We need to

sta! one step ahead of the enem!.

We should not get complacent once it appears we are$winning.%

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Terrorist Inno/ation

( ew ,odes of Attac

( ew Techni4ues and Tactics

(ew Targets

( ew ,ethods of Recruitment

( ew T!pes of +rganiIation

( Etc.

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Terrorism ill Continue to E/ol/e

/f governments want to cur# terrorism the! must

+T focus on 7ust one t!pe of event #ecause

terrorist tactics will change and evolve to adapt

to our counterterrorism strateg!.

/nstead we ,:T target simultaneousl! a wide

range of various terrorist attac modes.

This includes $financing% as well as strateg! and

tactics. We should go after ever!thing.

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%llocatin* Resources Efficiently

Comparin* the effecti/eness of anti-terroristpolicies is crucial in order to allocate

*o/ernment resources in the mostefficient ay in the fi*ht a*ainst terrorism"

#ut, it should .e dynamic 4chan*in*6 ratherthan static 4unchan*in*6 .ecauseterrorists e/ol/e"

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'INTER%CTION E55ECT(

The effect of '( on '2( ill depend on the /alue of 'Q("

This means it is possi.le for a policy to .ecome the /ictimof its on success"

That is the effect of preemption and deterrence will depend onthe effect of intelligence polic! &which changes'.

/ntelligence effectiveness will decline eventuall! #ecauseterrorists evolve and as a result preemption and deterrencewill increase in effectiveness if we turn to it once intelligencedeclines in effectiveness.

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Predictin* $roth of Terror %ttac!s

The $rate of growth% of terrorist attacs increases withterrorist innovations.

The : government emplo!s deterrence and preemption to

reduce the growth rate of terrorist attacs.

)owever deterrence triggers the development of terroristinnovations which increases the num#er of terror attacs

&and using the new innovations'.

The government uses intelligence to anticipate terroristinnovations aiming at decreasing its growth rate.

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TERRORISM STR%TE$IES %RE C2C1IC%1

+verall an important regularit! arises from thesu#stitution effect2

As terrorists su#stitute #etween attac modes orsu#stitute timing the time series of all terrorincidents are characteriIed #! $O*E:%.

/f s!7acings #ecome difficult the! switch to portattacs etc. until s!7acings #ecome feasi#leagain.

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%llocatin* Resources As anti-terrorist resources #ecome scarce our

government should allocate more to intelligencethan to preemption and more to preemption thanto deterrence.

0ut we should #e read! to 4uicl! reallocateresources as $intelligence% achieves success &weshould pro#a#l! alread! #e shifting resources tosome degree to sta! one step ahead of theenem!'.

There is however a cost for preemption &Ehina and Russia do not lie it'.

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Lecture08 Evaluating Anti Terror Policies

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