International Negotiation 1: 313–??, 1996. 313c 1996 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

American Strengths and Weaknesses

TOMMY T.B. KOHInstitute of Policy Studies, Han Sui Sen Memorial Library Building, Kent Ridge Drive,Singapore 119260

Editor’s Note. Former Ambassador of Singapore to the United States Tommy T.B. Koh reflectson American negotiating strengths and weaknesses. Koh also served as president of the ThirdU.N. Law of the Sea Conference, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for and main Com-mittee at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), 1990–1992,and UN’s Special Envoy to Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Key words: U.S. negotiating style

American Strengths and Qualities

Two caveats are appropriate for any discussion of national negotiating styles.First, there may not necessarily be a definable negotiating style for each coun-try or people. Good and effective negotiators, irrespective of their nationalor cultural background, have certain common skills. Second, although it isprobably possible to say impressionistically that the American people pos-sess certain character and personality traits, there are many exceptions to therule, and a person’s negotiating style is inevitably affected by his character,temperament, and attitude toward people.

American negotiators have many strengths and qualities. If distance makesthe heart grow fonder, my perception of Americans may be unrealisticallyfavorable and idealized, since Singapore is located 12,000 miles away fromthe United States.

First, U.S. negotiators are usually well prepared. They arrive at negotiationswith their homework completed, and they are armed with facts, figures, maps,and charts. They usually know what their national interests are and what theirnegotiating objectives are. This is not always the case among Third Worldnegotiators.

Second, American negotiators tend to speak clearly and plainly. As some-one who was educated in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, I regard this as avirtue, not a liability. However, the American preference for plain speakingcan sometimes cause unintended offense to other negotiators whose national

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culture prefers indirectness, subtlety, and avoidance of confrontation. Thereare, of course, exceptions to this rule.

Third, U.S. negotiators tend to be more pragmatic than doctrinaire. Theyfocus on advancing their country’s interests rather than principles which theycherish. The Reagan administration, however, was a clear exception to thisrule, and at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, decided,for rational and arguable reasons, that principles were more important thaninterests.

Fourth, American negotiators generally do not regard negotiations as azero-sum game. A good U.S. negotiator is even prepared to put himself inthe place of his negotiating adversary. A good U.S. negotiator is preparedto admit that his adversary, like himself, has certain irreducible, minimumnational interests. A good U.S. negotiator is prepared to engage in a processof give and take, and he believes that the successful outcome of a negotiationis not one in which he wins everything and his adversary loses everything,but rather one in which there is a mutuality of benefits and losses, in whicheach side has a stake in honoring and maintaining the agreement.

Fifth, a U.S. negotiator’s opening position is never his final position. Heexpects his opponent to make a counterproposal or a counteroffer. He isanxious to reach an agreement and will, therefore, make concessions to hisopponent, expecting – not unreasonably – that his adversary will behave in likemanner. Americans are sometimes completely exasperated at internationalforums when their adversaries do not behave as they do.

Sixth, the American people are very candid and straightforward, and thisis reflected in their negotiating style. Americans are not usually perceived ascunning or devious. In only one incident have I found American negotiatorsto be devious, and that was shocking. This incident occurred in July 1981when the United Nations sponsored an international conference on Cambodia.The conference was initiated by the ASEAN (Association of Southeast AsianNations) countries, which proposed a framework for the resolution of theCambodian situation. All Cambodian factions were invited to participate inthe conference, including, of course, the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam was invited,but boycotted the meeting. At the conference, General Alexander Haig, thenU.S. Secretary of State staged a dramatic walk-out, accompanied by the entireU.S. delegation, when the Khmer Rouge leader approached the rostrum tospeak. The picture of this walk-out appeared on the front page of the NewYork Times.

On a subsequent day, the ASEAN countries and the People’s Republicof China (PRC) were locked in a ferocious confrontation over the futurerole of the Khmer Rouge in any post-settlement Cambodia. The ASEANcountries argued that in light of the massacres and atrocities that the Khmer

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AMERICAN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 315

Rouge had committed, it would be morally and legally impermissible to allowthem to return to power. We demanded a public election to be organized andsupervised by the United Nations. To ensure free elections, we insisted thatall armed elements be disarmed or sequestered in camp. The Chinese foughtagainst all these points. The negotiating group was composed of twenty-fivedelegations, but the dynamics of the discussions revolved around the PRC,the ASEAN countries, and Pakistan as a middleman. Pakistan, however, wasnot an honest broker and basically submitted a series of amendments to dilutethe ASEAN position. I assumed that Pakistan, because of its proximity to thePRC, was “fronting” for the Chinese, and was shocked to learn later that theywere actually fronting for the Americans. Although the American delegationhad publicly walked out of the negotiations, they were privately supportingChina for geostrategic reasons. This is the only example of devious behaviorby American negotiators of which I am aware, but I will remember it.

Weaknesses and Idiosyncrasies

One problem in negotiating with Americans is that American delegationsusually suffer from serious interagency rivalries. During the U.N. Law of theSea Conference, the American delegation met every morning and sometimestheir internal meetings lasted longer than the other meetings in the conference.

A second problem in negotiating with the United States is the separationof power between the administration and the Congress. One has to be verycareful if one is negotiating an agreement that is subject to ratification by theU.S. Senate. It is important to always keep in touch with U.S. senators asthe negotiating process continues in order to obtain their independent inputs,be aware of their sensitivities, and recognize vested domestic interests andblocking constituencies.

A third special characteristic is the influence of the U.S. private sector andprivate interest groups on negotiations. During the Law of the Sea ConferenceI made it a point to meet not only with the official U.S. delegation andmembers of the Congress, but also to meet with representatives from theseabed mining industry, the petroleum industry, fishing industry, the marinescientific community, the environmental lobby, and individuals who have anaffection for marine mammals. The reality of political life in America is thateven one of these many lobbies can block ratification of a treaty. Foreignnegotiators must understand the domestic political process in the UnitedStates and must, in some way, interfere in American internal affairs to ensurethe success of their mission.

A fourth problem – the role of U.S. media – is a problem more for U.S.negotiators than for their counterparts. This is a problem because somehow

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the good nature of Americans and their propensity to candor makes it verydifficult even for negotiators to keep confidences. And, in the midst of asensitive negotiation it is sometimes very counterproductive for the media toreport on issues that are under negotiation. In a speech to the House ForeignAffairs Committee, Secretary of State George Shultz recounted with greatfrustration an occasion when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were engaged in bilateralnegotiations. The negotiation had reached a critical point and he had that daydrafted a cable giving his final instructions. He said he found to his horror atbreakfast the next morning that the New York Times had reported the contentof his cable. Members of the U.S. media should be asked whether they shouldexercise more discretion and self-restraint. Do they not feel an allegiance asAmerican citizens to the advancement and protection of American nationalinterests? Should not the right of the public to know and the freedom of thepress sometimes be modulated by competing and larger interests? The extentto which the U.S. exposes its flank makes it easier for others to win at thenegotiating table.

A fifth weakness is impatience. Americans suffer from an “instant-coffeecomplex.” They do not have time, as Europeans and Asians do, to buy coffeebeans, grind them every day, brew the coffee, enjoy the aroma, and savorevery sip. Americans are always in a rush and are extremely frustrated whenthere is a lack of progress. Americans are result-oriented. Jeanne Kirkpatrickhad a shock several years ago when she visited the ASEAN capitals andmet the foreign ministers of the six ASEAN countries. To each she asked,“Do you think there are prospects for settling the Cambodian conflict?” Allsix ASEAN foreign ministers said “Yes.” She said, “Do you think it will besoon?” They all said, “Oh yes, very soon.” She said, “Well, how soon?” Theysaid, “Oh, about five years’ time.” She was shocked because to an Americanfive years’ time is certainly not soon.

A sixth weakness is cultural insensitivity. Everyone is guilty of this, notonly Americans. Everyone assumes that others have similar cultures, cus-toms, and manners. Singaporeans are “the barbarians of Southeast Asia.” Weare “the least sensitive and least subtle people in the region.” But, if one is aprofessional negotiator, then part of the preparation for an effective negotia-tion is to learn enough about the culture of one’s adversary to at least avoidsimple errors of behavior, attribution, and body language.

Finally, it is surprising that in many recent multilateral forums the UnitedStates has been represented by amateur rather than professional negotiators.Given that the United States is so rich in human resources and has a foreignservice studded by superstars, it is amazing how inadequately the U.S. isrepresented at important international negotiations.

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Conclusion

In conclusion, a good negotiator, whether an Indian, an American, a Cana-dian, English, Ghanian, or whoever, is a person with certain definable skills,aptitudes, and temperaments. His character and personality have an impact onhis effectiveness. Some American negotiators put people off; others readilywin people’s confidence. In choosing a negotiator, select someone who doesnot bristle like a porcupine but who can win the trust and confidence of hisnegotiating partners. What are these qualities that attract people’s confidenceand trust? These are moral qualities, qualities of leadership. If a negotiator isa leader, a person who acquires a reputation for competence, reliability, andtrustworthiness, then others will trust him with leadership roles. The word“charisma” is not useful because it does not accurately portray the qualitythat bestows leadership on certain negotiators and not others. Henry Kissingeris not charismatic; he is dominating and impassive and has an exceptionalintellect and a monotonous voice. In 1976, when the Law of Sea Conferencewas deadlocked between industrialized and developing countries, Kissinger,who was then Secretary of State and had no background in the law of thesea and knew nothing about seabed mining, spent one morning in New Yorkmeeting with the U.S. delegation. In the afternoon he met with other leadersof the Group of 77, and by the end of the day presented an innovative schemefor reconciling the competing ambitions and claims of the different countries.

There probably is an American negotiating style, and this partakes of thequalities, attitudes, customs, conventions, and reflexes that have come downthrough U.S. history, culture, and political institutions. On the whole, Ameri-can negotiators have very positive qualities, being well prepared, reasonable,competent, and honorable. Even more than this, some, like Elliott Richardson,will take it upon themselves to be an honest broker and help to settle a conflictbetween two other groups in which they are a totally disinterested party. Thisgraciousness and willingness to help is a positive attribute as well.

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